PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS TRAINING FOR THE SUDAN PEACE FUND CONSORTIUM PARTNERS HELD AT THE AU-IBAR ON 12TH SEPT 03.

Facilitated by:
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALRMP</td>
<td>Arid Lands Resource Management Focus</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU – IBAR</td>
<td>African Union’s Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
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<td>CEWAR</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWARU</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (National Unit of IGAD’s CEWARN mechanism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Conflict Management Centre (African Union’s Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Resolution Arm)</td>
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<td>CMPB</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Peace Building</td>
</tr>
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<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Mitigation and Resolution</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<td>FAST</td>
<td>Is a political system early warning system introduced in 1998 for Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) to support decision makers in policy, administration, and business.</td>
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<td>FEWER</td>
<td>Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (Global coalition of organizations that provides early warning and promotes early coordinated responses to violent conflict)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>NSCC</td>
<td>New Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>Sudan Peace Fund</td>
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SUMMARY

Background on the need for the training day
The vision of the Sudan Peace Fund (SPF) is to work with local populations to respond to the needs they identify contributing to enhanced stability and to managing conflict in south Sudan. The SPF seeks to reinforce and expand the number of zones of stability currently found in some areas of Western Equatoria, southern Bahr el Ghazal, and parts of the Upper Nile, and extend their reach in other marginalized, opposition-controlled areas of the country. The programme supports an improved environment for peace through grassroots reconciliation, followed by the consolidation of grassroots peace building and delivery of peace dividends for newly reconciled communities to reinforce progress towards peace.

Implementation of this program has been ongoing since September 2002 and the following lessons have been learned from implementation so far:

- That the root causes, and factors aggravating conflict in southern Sudan, are immensely complex and wide-ranging;
- As a result of the protracted war, inter-communal conflict is particularly vulnerable to political manipulation;
- Because of the protracted war, and the relative under developed systems of local governance and organization, conflict resolution achievements at the grassroots level remain fragile and vulnerable to shocks;
- Despite the above constraints, significant opportunities for supporting peace building at the grassroots level exist and grassroots peace building initiatives are already taking place with significant achievement;
- From the perspective of communities and organizations involved in establishing peace committees and early response mechanisms, there is need for a strong functional conflict-monitoring program, which is both practical and highly integrated;
- One emerging issue for SPF is the need to establish an integrated early warning system operational at the local level, with upward reporting in order to determine regional and national trends;
- A much more innovative M&E system needs to be developed. This engenders a system that has process indicators that are much more appropriate for peace building and conflict management work. Conventional programs usually put emphasis on mechanistic and quantitative indicators. But there is need to strike a balance. Performance monitoring in conflict management and peacebuilding work ought to focus much more on monitoring processes and institutional capacities to bring about reconciliation and transformation as opposed to tracking activities and absence or presence of conflict as an indicator.

Objectives of the training day
There were three main objectives to be achieved through this training. These were as follows:

1. To enable participants from the consortium to know one another, to learn to plan and work together, and to develop consortium relationships that are so vital for achieving program goals;
2. To explore the whole area of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Systems with a view to applying the concept to the Sudan Peace Fund initiatives in the field;
3. To come up with an action plan on improving the monitoring of the progress in implementation and the impact being realized from the Program.
Participants were given the opportunity to share their expectations of the training day and to see if these were congruent with the intended objectives of the facilitators. It was agreed that objectives were feasible and relevant.

**Training Content**

The following areas were covered during this training:

- The concept of Conflict Early Warning and Response: What is it and where does it fit into SPF programming?
- Conflict phases and basic terms- where has SPF’s work focused over the last one year? Where should the emphasis be in the future?
- The IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Network - implications for SPF;
- Monitoring Program impact – The case study of the CAPE Unit of AU-IBAR and how lessons learned can inform the SPF program.
- Development of an Action Plan.

**Results**

- Participants discussed the different phases of conflict together with the basic terminology commonly used in conflict work. They gained an appreciation of the concepts and how these were applicable to SPF work. It was however, noted that the different phases are not usually a logical flow with one phase leading to another. Instead there is movement to and fro between phases with some phases being bypassed. It is important to realize that conflict is a dynamic phenomenon that is influenced by many factors;
- Participants became conversant with conflict management and peacebuilding terminology;
- They were exposed to the details of how the IGAD CEWARN mechanism works and this enabled decision-making on how SPF could be part of the IGAD CEWARN process;
- An examination of the CAPE case study on tracking impact in conflict work was done and this generated discussion on how to improve SPF’s impact monitoring mechanisms.

**Action Planning**

The following action plans were agreed upon after all the sessions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Expected Result</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produce proceedings of training and circulate to consortium members</td>
<td>Mike Wekesa</td>
<td>Before next consortium management meeting on 14-10-03</td>
<td>Issues arising from training are incorporated into the year 2 work plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop scope of work for undertaking a situational analysis with stakeholders on the ground with a view to establishing the potential for developing a CEWAR system.</td>
<td>AU/IBAR/CAPE</td>
<td>Activity to be included in work plan for year 2. By October 31st 2003.</td>
<td>The SPF will be able to assess the usefulness and relevance of a CEWAR system in yr.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot a CEWAR once on the ground</td>
<td>AU-IBAR/Acacia Consultants</td>
<td>Year 2 Work plan</td>
<td>Lessons learned to inform implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore linkage of CEWAR/radio communication installation etc. with the OTI programme. Develop approach and methodology.</td>
<td>PACT Kenya/AU-IBAR</td>
<td>Year 2 Work plan.</td>
<td>To develop strong link between SPF and the OTI programme for more effective impact.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Write an introductory letter to IGAD’s CEWARN authorities and detail possible SPF contribution and capacity SPF has on the ground.</td>
<td>PACT Kenya on behalf of consortium members.</td>
<td>Before the end of October 2003.</td>
<td>This link will provide opportunities for policy influence and will give SPF credibility among stakeholders and the donor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Find out details on IGAD’s CEWARN operations in south Sudan including on ground linkages etc. Meet with IGAD’s national CEWARU coordinator.</td>
<td>Richard Grahn</td>
<td>Before end of October 2003.</td>
<td>To establish the link between SPF and IGAD’s CEWARN mechanism in south Sudan. Strengthened linkages.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Install radio communication in Chukudum and explore possibilities of linking this with CEWAR initiatives on the ground.</td>
<td>PACT Kenya</td>
<td>To be included in the year 2 work plan.</td>
<td>Piloting CEWAR activities for lesson learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review SPF’s impact monitoring methodology based on CAPE’s lessons.</td>
<td>Consortium members.</td>
<td>To be included in the year 2 work plan</td>
<td>Improved system of impact monitoring and tracking for SPF’s initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look into ways of strengthening working</td>
<td>Consortium</td>
<td>To be discussed in the</td>
<td>To improve understanding and</td>
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</table>
relationships within the consortium through joint and common work-related and non-work related activities by consortium staff.

Management Committee

next CMC meeting.

working relationships among consortium members of staff. This will contribute to the effective implementation of the program.

1. PROCEEDINGS

PARTICIPANTS
The following were the participants during this training day:

1. Andrea Freeman – Program Advisor, SPF Pact Kenya
2. Sam Lony – Program Officer, SPF Pact Kenya;
3. Douglas Ouma – Senior Program Officer Pact Kenya;
4. Titus Syengo – Computer Information Management Systems Officer, Pact Kenya;
5. Richard Grahn - Conflicts & Natural Resources Advisor, CAPE, AU-IBAR, Nairobi;

ITINERARY
The following itinerary had been developed for the training day. However, there were modifications to it based on the realization that there were fewer participants than had been anticipated and therefore the time it would take to cover the content of the training would be shorter. It was agreed by participants to finish the day with lunch instead of breaking for lunch and returning in the afternoon.

2. ITINERARY FOR THE CEWAR TRAINING

1. Welcome and introduction (MW)
2. Overview on objectives and expectations of the day (MW)
3. Reminder - What is SPF’s vision and purpose? What brings us together in SPF? Checklist of objectives (MW)
4. Reminder - Conflict Phases and Basic Terms (MW) – Where do you think SPF’s emphasis has been in the last one year? Where should the emphasis be? Why?
5. TEA BREAK
6. Introduction to Conflict Early Warning and Response (MW)
7. CEWARN – History of the mechanism, purpose, data collection & analysis, engagement of CSO in the CEWARN process, potential synergies with SPF activities (RG)
8. GROUP WORK/BRAINSTORMING SESSION – Is CEWARN applicable to SPF activities? How?
9. LUNCH
10. CONFLICT AND ACTIVITY TRACKING: THE EXAMPLE OF THE CAPE UNIT (RG) – Original Purpose of the system, field data collection methods, data interpretation, evolution of system to include new indicators, conflict tracking Vs impact tracking, strengths & weaknesses.
11. GROUP WORK/BRAINSTORMING SESSION – SPF monitoring and evaluation programme. Are we currently tracking impact effectively enough? In our activities, are we trying to achieve the right kinds of impact?
Key: MW-Mike Wekesa; RG-Richard Grahn; SPF-Sudan Peace Fund

Facilitation and methodology used
The methodology used in the facilitation was:
• Use of key presentations by the facilitators;
• Provision and discussion of handouts;
• Brainstorming sessions;
• Consensus building on emerging key issues.

SESSION 1: WELCOME, TRAINING OBJECTIVES, SPF’s PURPOSE, REALITY CHECK, CONFLICT PHASES AND BASIC TERMS

The main objective of this session was to ensure that a suitable environment for training was established through:

1. Self-introduction by participants who shared their names, what they did and the expectations they had for the day;
2. Sharing of training objectives in order to enlist consensus on the agenda for the day.

Sharing of SPF’s vision and purpose in order to gain common understanding by all participants from the different consortium members was undertaken. The following simple exercise was planned to enlist some discussion among participants. The facilitator would have asked the questions and participants would answer by agreeing or disagreeing with the statement.

Reality check: What do you think SPF should be doing? What is SPF’s vision and purpose?

1. SPF should be supporting processes of community-based dialogue and reconciliation (True/False)? Give reasons;
2. SPF should undertake disarmament in order to reduce proliferation of small arms and light weapons in southern Sudan (True/False)? Give reasons for your answer;
3. SPF should develop the capacities of the grassroots for conflict analysis while helping to revitalize traditional mechanisms for conflict management and peace building initiatives (Y/N)? Reasons?
4. Develop capacity of CSOs in order to facilitate PBCM initiatives (Y/N)? Reasons?
5. Give special focus to support the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to play their role in an effective and impartial manner (Y/N)? Reasons?
6. Rehabilitation and development of basic infrastructure and services in order to maximize peace dividends (Y/N)? Reasons?
7. Supporting the integration of IDPs into either home or elsewhere (Y/N)? Reasons?
8. Have direct links and work closely with the SPLM and the SPLA (Y/N)? Reasons?

This exercise could have been interesting but was not carried out because not sufficient consortium representatives were available at the beginning of the training to enable the exercise to be effective.

Vision and purpose of Sudan Peace Fund

Vision: To work with local populations to respond to the needs they identify contributing to enhanced stability and to managing conflict in south Sudan.

Purpose: To achieve dramatic reduction in the level of violent conflict in southern Sudan through increased local capacities for effective and sustainable conflict transformation.
The above exercise was followed by a review of commonly used terminology in conflict management. The facilitators provided a handout containing the terminology. Discussion ensued and two more terminologies were added. These were Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution and Conflict Analysis (See Annex 1).

This session ended with a discussion and analysis of the different phases of conflict and where participants thought the SPF had put emphasis during the first year of implementation. The diagram below was discussed.

The leading question was: Where do you think SPF’s emphasis in the last one year has been? Where should the emphasis be? Why?

The main outputs from this discussion were as follows:
1. Where does conflict analysis fit in this diagram? Answer: It depends on who is analyzing the conflict. However, it was agreed that conflict analysis would fit into post conflict phases as well as pre-conflict phases. Therefore conflict analysis is not just the analysis of violent conflict but also of negative peace, where negative peace is the absence of direct violence i.e. the cessation of hostilities. Negative peace may still include prevalent social and structural violence.
2. SPF has been involved a lot in peace making and in peace building (according to the above diagram) and less in conflict prevention over the last one year of implementation;
3. If conflict prevention succeeds, a move is made from phase 1 (conflict formation) to phase 3 (conflict transformation). Phase 2 (violent conflict) is then by-passed. Depending on the extent to which conflict is transformed into non-violent processes, the cycle may keep moving from phase 1
to 3 to 4. If the underlying causes or dynamics of the conflict are not changed sufficiently, the chances of arriving at phase 2 may increase;

4. On the ground, the phases are much more complex than it is shown on this diagram.

**SESSION 2: INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS**

This session’s objective was to bring all participants to a common understanding of conflict early warning and response and to examine its applicability to the Sudan Peace Program.

**What is conflict early warning and response?** It is research that tries to predict the occurrence of violent conflict and the implementation of initiatives to prevent the violent conflict. It is:

1. Part of conflict prevention that attempts to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict;
2. Conflict prevention that consists of two actions: predicting the occurrence of violent conflict (early warning) and the implementation of policy suggestions to prevent violent conflict, based on early warning assessments (early response);

**Facts about Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms**

- Analysts believe that preventive action taken before a conflict becomes violent could save not only lives and suffering but also money;
- But how to prevent conflict is a difficult job. And how can we convince donors to financially support the prevention of conflict when success or positive results are not very visible? How do you prove that you actually prevented a violent conflict?
- It may be easy to predict the eruption of violence but adequate Early Action may not be taken. (Examples include the Toposa / Turkana Conflict on the eve of Christmas in 2001 where more than 50 people lost their lives – everybody thinks this would have been prevented). The drought early warning system during the 1999-2001 drought gave early signals that things were worsening but early action in Turkana came nearly one year later.
- There is a success story of conflict prevention by the el fatah elders under the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Kenya. They have succeeded in preventing violent conflict because of the elaborate network of monitors comprising elders, women, youths, CSOs, government officials etc. It is simply difficult for latent conflict to go unnoticed and unreported. Immediately this is reported, early action is taken without further delay. Probably SPF could learn from this system.
- The production of early warning reports on possible violent conflict is a difficult task. A lot of input and expertise is needed from different organizations in order to evaluate information about a conflict. This needs to happen in an on-going fashion and needs to be coordinated;
- The next step is to decide what can be done by whom, where, and when (identifying opportunities for peace). This presupposes a lot of knowledge of the local situation and of the organizations involved in peace work on the ground.

**Conclusions from the group discussion on conflict early warning and early response**

1. We should not be afraid about how we are going to justify conflict prevention response actions based on community indicators. As long as we base our indicators on community-based perceptions and interpretation based on their experience, history etc., we can justify conflict prevention response action;
2. A specific violent incident can be interpreted in many ways. Therefore one’s proximity to the community finally determines one’s interpretation.

**Types of conflict early warning: Framework Analysis**

- Three main types of CEW can be readily identified: 1) quantitative analysis of trend data (similar to food security EWS analysis); 2) more qualitative approaches to understanding and providing background information as well as warning (which is similar to vulnerability analysis in classic food security analysis); and 3) general studies of the causes of conflict (which are more akin to general analyses of food insecurity than to early warning per se);
- The most comprehensive example of a CEW trends analysis has been developed by FAST, operated by the Swiss Peace Foundation.
• Other examples include the IGADs CEWARN mechanism and the ALRMP’s Drought/Conflict Early Warning Systems.
• The key to a successful CEW is in its ability to elicit timely and appropriate response to prevent or avert violent conflict.

Conflict Early Warning Indicators

1. FAST monitors a few specific categories of indicators. These include “triggers” and “accelerators”. Triggers are unexpected events that can spark a conflict. Examples could be: the split in SPLM in 1991. Or the assassination of a popular leader. Accelerators are catalysts that can escalate levels of violence and which increase the significance of underlying causal factors. An example would be an NGO that provides animal health services to a host community and excludes IDPs who also own livestock and require the same services.

2. The FEWER model includes context-specific situation assessment using indicators and analysis as well as quantitative model-based studies. The model is premised on participatory approaches and normally involves CSOs trying to understand local and national conflict risks. The indicators include; 1) military indicators (threats of attacks, troop movements); 2) Fragmentation and behavioral indicators (political and personal rivalries, loyalties to strong men rather to state); 3) Ideological indicators (ethnic polarization, use of media); 4) Social and economic indicators (population movement and displacement factors, rapid on set economic changes etc.)

Participants then took time to think about the SPF project area in order to determine which CEW indicators could be monitored. Examples of CEW that were given included:

- Women from different ethnic groups or clans often quarrelling at water points;
- Monitoring behavior of youths, women and girls in common market places e.g. whether they exchange pleasantries with would be enemies or not;
- Murmurs over grazing and water resources for livestock or over food aid etc.;
- Inflammatory statements from influential leaders;
- Certain ceremonies and songs that may be sang during a particular time may be telling;
- Disappearance of youths from the communities;
- The prevalence of surveillance teams from another tribe or clan in another clan’s territory may signal the possibility of a raid;
- Worsening environmental conditions that may signal a drought situation means that resources will be declining and the potential for violent conflict will be high. One does not need to wait for any more signals.

It was concluded that communities are able provide so many indicators that can be monitored for conflict prevention. They know their systems and the systems of their would-be enemies.

Constraints to Conflict Early Warning and Response

- It is difficult to establish baselines or comparative data for conflict. Conflict is complicated and unpredictable.
- Interpreting current events or predicting their impact on the future is not easy. Involves many variables and interpretation is usually very site specific.
- Conflict information is politically sensitive.
- There is a diversity of terminology and conceptual frameworks for conflict, multiple causal factors and levels as well as the lack of consensus on definitions and analytical frameworks.
- It is not easy to know what to do with the information. The response may be difficult to determine.

Conflict prevention (i.e. CEWAR) is possible, especially in an environment where communication e.g. VHF radio communication between villages or centers is available, community-based rapid response capacity exists, village conflict prevention committees are established etc. The SPF program’s proposal to USAID is very strong on conflict prevention. USAID also puts emphasis on conflict.
SESSION 3: IGAD’S CEWARN MECHANISM

The objective of this session was to enlighten participants on how the CEWARN mechanism of the IGAD operates in the different member countries and to explore possibilities of SPF’s participation in this mechanism because it covers the Sudan.

Introductory remarks

1. Most conflicts are not between countries. A century ago, most conflicts were between nations and 90% of casualties were soldiers. Today, almost all wars are civil, and 90% of the victims are civilians;
2. Conflict has multiple impacts: 1) reduction in trade; 2) reduced mobility; 3) fewer choices of livelihoods; 4) greater illicit trading; 5) riskier behavior appears more rational; 6) fewer development actors operational to provide services.
3. Poverty is a root cause of conflict. When incomes double, the risk of civil war halves. A country whose exports of primary commodities account for 30% of GDP has one in three chances of being at war.

Background to IGAD’s CEWARN mechanism

- IGAD’s CEWARN mechanism is funded by USAID and GTZ, with its headquarters in Addis Ababa;
- It is implemented jointly by Swiss Peace Foundation, Harvard University and the Forum for Early Warning and Response (FEWER);
- The main premise upon which the mechanism is implemented is that the political will and institutional capacity to address the recurrent armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa are significantly lacking;
- In 1995-6, the heads of the seven IGAD member states (Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, mandated IGAD “to promote peace and security in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, mitigation and resolution of inter-and intra-state conflicts through dialogues”.
- Where coordinated efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts in the region have been attempted, the task has fallen to individual states, often using bilateral mechanisms;
- These approaches do not take advantage of the information and influence that non governmental resources can bring to bear on such problems, or of the people and communities affected by violence on a daily basis;
- The mechanism has been designed and the protocol is due to come into force this year;

How the mechanism works

1. There are 5 field monitors (per country) based in conflict-prone locations. The monitors collect information on a regular basis;
2. There is a national coordinator for each country;
3. The national coordinator receives information from field monitors and passes this on to a national research organization;
4. This information is subjected to a multi-stakeholder CEWARU review as well as a peer review mechanism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
5. Action is then taken once the information has gone through the above steps.

CEWARN indicators

These include:
- Size of raid;
- Protagonist/victim;
- Rainfall and other climatic data;
- Songs/dances;
News sources;  
Rumors;  
Unusual cattle movements and unusual alliances.

**Strengths and weaknesses of the mechanism**

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<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transparent information gathering and sharing</td>
<td>Is Ministry of Foreign Affairs the right one to lead?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces the government to review the information</td>
<td>Traditional approach to security management likely to be perpetuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not just plain data, but some interpretation mechanisms</td>
<td>Process of data has been slow, unwieldy, what about the future?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Addresses trans-boundary nature of conflicts;</td>
<td>Tracking not predictive as originally planned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will fill need for systematic data, not hearsay</td>
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**Where is the synergy between the mechanism and SPF initiatives?**

1. The mechanism covers southern Sudan where SPF works, although the administration is done from the North;
2. The system has high regional government and donor support and developing links with the system could enhance SPF’s credibility as a serious player in the conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution arena;
3. There is potential for shared information. SPF has capacity on the ground through its grassroots linkages and can contribute significantly to data and information provision and review;
4. SPF’s linkage to the mechanism could provide avenues for advocacy and policy influence;
5. An SPF community-based CEWAR system could be a major avenue for the IGAD mechanism to learn lessons on the ground and to link these with national and inter-state conflict-related issues;

**Conclusion from the discussion**

It was agreed that there was potential for SPF and the IGAD mechanism to benefit from each other. In this regard:

1. It was agreed that Andrea Freeman would prepare an SPF introductory letter to the IGAD Kenya National Coordinator detailing what the SPF does and the interest it has in the IGAD CEWARN mechanism and the likely contribution it could make to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. (By 7/10/03);
2. Richard Grahn of AU-IBAR would contact the IGAD coordinator in Addis Ababa and make an appointment to obtain more information on how the mechanism works in south Sudan and how links with SPF could be established. (By end of October 2003)

**SESSION 4: CONFLICT ACTIVITY TRACKING SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF CAPE’S EXPERIENCE**

The objective of this session was to present the activity and impact monitoring and tracking system developed by CAPE for its conflict management work in the “Karamojong Cluster” with a view to assessing the possibility of utilizing some of the lessons learned from implementation to improve SPF’s impact monitoring system.

**Original purpose of the system**

1. To provide data on CPMR activities carried out by the CAPE Unit and other organizations working on conflict in the Karamojong Cluster;
2. To provide data on the incidents of violent conflict in Turkana and the Karamojong Cluster;
3. To monitor the impact of CAPE’s conflict management efforts.

The base assumption here was: CAPE ought to be reducing levels of violent conflicts in the field.

**How the system works**

- The system involves field-based staff filling information into structured forms aimed at tracking conflict management initiatives by all stakeholders in the project area as well tracking incidents of conflicts reported in the area.
- Activity Tracking form 1 – provides basic data on peace initiative, core stakeholders, location, participants disaggregated by age and gender etc.;
- Activity Tracking form 2 – Tracks the agency or institution that initiated the peace activity; the outcome of the activity; planned follow-up; media presence and type etc.
- Conflict Tracking form 1- Provides basic details on nature of incident e.g. child abduction, theft of camels, revenge killing, highway banditry etc. It also gives the location of the incident, loss of human life, number of aggressors, etc. and whether there is an existing peace agreement between these groups.
- Conflict Tracking form 2- Gives details of which weapons were used, number and type of weapons stolen, whether any agency has worked with the communities involved in the past, whether this was predicted or not, the background of the event, causes of the event and likely consequences.
- This data is then analyzed and a report is produced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systematic data is collected</td>
<td>“Extra” burden of field staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparable</td>
<td>Fax system never worked</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quicker and less demanding on field staff than full report</td>
<td>Tracking conflict is time consuming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assists with full reporting</td>
<td>The Killer Assumption was that reduction in incidences of conflict was the most meaningful indicator of impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could migrate to electronic submission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yields insights on program preferences/focuses</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enables tracking of key individuals/actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better understanding of other NGOs activities/impacts</td>
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</table>

**Conclusions from the discussions:**
1. It is worthwhile to track activities of the Program as well as those of other agencies because this provides a better understanding of other stakeholders’ initiatives and impacts:
2. Emphasis in monitoring program impact should be on local institutional and community capacity to handle conflict e.g. assessment of skills of partner agencies, number of mediation cases referred to local institutions etc. While reduction in the incidence of conflicts may be a good indicator, the factors that may be responsible for such a reduction are wide ranging and a program could find difficulties attributing such a result to its efforts;
3. The SPF program could learn from CAPE’s experience. But it is important to note that there is already a system in place that is deemed effective and is under constant review.

**3. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TRAINING**

The main issues arising from this training were:

1. The importance of SPF developing linkages between programs such as the OTI program and the IGAD CEWARN system for purposes of improving mutual effectiveness and impact and for profile raising;
2. The need for AU-IBAR/Acacia Consultants Ltd. to place SPF staff on the ground as soon as possible in order to ensure that proposed activities under the year 2 work plan are implemented without further delay;
3. Underscoring the importance of community and grassroots linkages and involvement in conflict early warning systems;
4. The need to strengthen relationships and trust building among consortium members through work and non-work-related activities
5. Better timing of training activities in future in order to attract higher attendance rates.
## 4. ACTION PLANNING

The following action plans were agreed upon after all the sessions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Expected Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produce proceedings of training and circulate to consortium members</td>
<td>Mike Wekesa</td>
<td>Before next consortium management meeting on 14-10-03.</td>
<td>Issues arising from training are incorporated into the year 2 work plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop scope of work for undertaking a situational analysis with stakeholders on the ground with a view to establishing the potential for developing a CEWAR system.</td>
<td>AU/IBAR/CAPE</td>
<td>Activity to be included in work plan for year 2. By October 31st 2003.</td>
<td>The SPF will be able to assess the usefulness and relevance of a CEWAR system in yr.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot a CEWAR once on the ground</td>
<td>AU-IBAR/Acacia Consultants</td>
<td>Year 2 Work plan</td>
<td>Lessons learned to inform implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore linkage of CEWAR/radio communication installation etc. with the OTI programme. Develop approach and methodology.</td>
<td>PACT Kenya/AU-IBAR</td>
<td>Year 2 Work plan.</td>
<td>To develop strong link between SPF and the OTI programme for more effective impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write an introductory letter to IGAD’s CEWARN authorities and detail possible SPF contribution and capacity SPF has on the ground.</td>
<td>PACT Kenya on behalf of consortium members.</td>
<td>Before the end of October 2003.</td>
<td>This link will provide opportunities for policy influence and will give SPF credibility among stakeholders and the donor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find out details on IGAD’s CEWARN operations in south Sudan including on ground linkages etc. Meet with IGAD’s national CEWARU coordinator.</td>
<td>Richard Grahn</td>
<td>Before end of October 2003.</td>
<td>To establish the link between SPF and IGAD’s CEWARN mechanism in south Sudan. Strengthened linkages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Install radio communication in Chukudum and explore possibilities of linking this with CEWAR initiatives on the ground.</td>
<td>PACT Kenya and the OTI programme</td>
<td>To be included in the year 2 work plan.</td>
<td>Piloting CEWAR activities for lesson learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review SPF’s impact monitoring methodology based on CAPE’s lessons.</td>
<td>Consortium members.</td>
<td>To be included in the year 2 work plan</td>
<td>Improved system of impact monitoring and tracking for SPF’s initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look into ways of strengthening working relationships within the consortium through joint and common work-related and non-work related activities by consortium staff.</td>
<td>Consortium Management Committee</td>
<td>To be discussed in the next CMC meeting.</td>
<td>To improve understanding and working relationships among consortium members of staff. This will contribute to the effective implementation of the program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS COMMONLY USED IN CPMR WORK

Conflict
Relationship between two or more parties that are pursuing (real or perceived) incompatible goals

Conflict Analysis
It is a structured analysis of a particular conflict at a given moment in time. It can give both the intervener and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for transformation of the actual or potentially violent conflict.

Conflict Formation
The period before a conflict erupts into ‘violent conflict’ is called the period of conflict formation. Once violence breaks out on a large scale, settling things by peaceful means may become more difficult, which is why emphasis is often placed on heading off a conflict before it becomes violent. You could say that any moment in a conflict, two simultaneous processes are taking place: peacebuilding and warfare. One process moves towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict or conflicts, the other promotes the use of violence to ‘resolve’ the conflict.

Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR)
All initiatives aimed at preventing, mitigating, mediating, resolving, transforming conflict and working towards social change. This terminology is commonly used by USAID.

Violence
Actions, words, attitudes, structures or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage, and/or prevent people from reaching their full potential.

Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention encompasses all activities attempting to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Because of the cyclical nature of conflict, peacebuilding attempts after a conflict will often overlap with conflict prevention activities.

Early warning, Early Response/Early Action
Conflict prevention consists of two separate actions or phases: Early Warning and Early Response/Early Action. Research that tries to predict the occurrence of violent conflict is called Conflict Early Warning. The implementation or policy suggestions to prevent violent conflict, on the basis of these early warning assessments, is called Early Action/Early Response.

Conflict Transformation
Refers to the difficult and long-term process of building appropriate attitudes, behaviours and structures within a society so that inevitable conflicts are not dealt with by the use of deadly force but are channeled into peaceful processes of social change.

Peace
Positive peace = the removal of structural and cultural violence. Where all types of violence is minimal or non-existent, and major causes of future conflict removed. Includes essential elements of human security and structural stability.
**Negative peace** = Absence of direct violence (e.g. a cessation of hostilities)
The end of widespread conflict associated with war. May still include prevalent social violence and structural violence (e.g. situations of extreme inequality).

**Peace** = ‘a cup of warm milk in the morning, the smile of a child, a glass of beer in a pub with friends, without the fear of a bomb dropping’ – definition from an Oxfam GB Sudan Conflict Analysis Workshop in 2001.

**Peacebuilding**
Include the negative peace aspect of preventing direct violence and the positive peace aspect of eliminating structural violence by addressing underlying causes of war. It is ‘a dynamic, participatory process that aims to transform existing or potential destructive conflict into sustainable peace, build upon justice and equity, trust and tolerance’.

**Peacemaking**
Peacemaking is associated with efforts to secure the agreement of the parties to a political settlement through diplomacy, mediation and other official channels. At some point in the conflict, the parties will begin to question whether continued violence is the best means through which to pursue their aims. This creates a window of opportunity in which third parties or the disputants themselves can create a peace agreement. Classically, this agreement was thought to represent the end of attempts to bring the parties together, but more recently it has become clear that the signing of the initial ‘peace accord’ is only the beginning of the long and difficult process in which a violent relationship is transformed into peaceful processes of social change.

**Peace-keeping**
Peacekeeping refers to the efforts to limit damage once a conflict has moved into a violent phase. This could include a military presence to prevent the renewed outbreak of hostilities or another type of third party presence that separates the parties. Usually this type of intervention takes place with the (official) consent of the parties after the signing of a political agreement. The main aim is to stop the violence and to separate the armed forces of the parties. In many cases a neutral armed force is put in place between the parties. In a classic peacekeeping intervention, a neutral armed force organized by the United Nations is put in place between the parties in order to ensure the implementation of a cease-fire. However, in recent years peacekeeping missions have assumed a variety of more complicated tasks related to rebuilding the relationship between antagonists.

**Peace Enforcement**
‘Peace Enforcement’ occurs when third parties intervene forcefully or without the consent of all the parties in order to enforce an end to the violence.

**Social capital**
Intuitively, the basic idea of “social capital” is that one’s family, friends, and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, or leveraged for material gain. Research shows that those communities endowed with a rich stock of social networks and civic associations have been shown to be in a stronger position to confront poverty and vulnerability, resolve disputes, and share beneficial information.

**Policies**
Are usually public declarations that define a set of actions to be executed, or a set of principles to be upheld in particular situations that have been agreed officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government or a political party.

**Policy change:**
Problem in Sudan – unrepresentative government, often there is no policy
Dilemma in Sudan – often people might be better off without a policy than with a bad policy. In some cases it is not clear whether a policy exists, or whether they are just bad policies – for example policies affecting livelihood of pastoralists?

**Practices**

Actions executed as a result of policy, as well as actions that are not the result of the policy, that is something that is usually or regularly done, such as a habit, tradition, agreed standard or custom. Practices concern both HOW things are done and WHAT is done.