TOWARDS A THEORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
A quantitative study of public diplomacy and soft power

By

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ABSTRACT

The following study seeks to develop an explanative theory concerning public diplomacy. While there are various theories that offer explanations for state actions in international relations, there has yet to be a fully-formed, independent theory for the practice of public diplomacy or soft power activities. The limited theoretical basis for understanding public diplomacy is matched by a need for augmented methodological approaches. The following study offers several hypotheses explaining the conduct of public diplomacy as theoretical lines or avenues for subsequent analysis. The study also expands the field of public diplomacy with a novel quantitative element of statistical analysis of the practice of soft power or image maintenance worldwide. This quantitative element is used to test the various explanations of motivations as to why states practice public diplomacy including rational, idealistic, and social trend motivations.

The study suggests that rational explanations for the practice of public diplomacy, represented by key factors in the quantitative study such as wealth and prestige, constitute the main motivational force. However, a social trend or non-rational movement towards the practice of public diplomacy also has explanatory potential. The increasing number of states interested in and practicing public diplomacy indicates an emerging norm that goes beyond a rational, interest-based calculation. On the other hand, the study finds that idealistic motivations for conducting public diplomacy are limited despite the original concept of “credible diplomacy” as truth over propaganda.

Key words:  public diplomacy theory, quantitative methods, soft power, public diplomacy practice, rational choice, constructivism
Introduction: The emergence of Public Diplomacy

Thomas Friedman (2004) wrote about a potential Third World War as a “Western” battle against fundamentalism, a new “War of Ideas”. Recently, the former United States undersecretary for public diplomacy, James Glassman (2008), described to the New America Foundation “Public Diplomacy 2.0” as “the war of ideas” where liberal openness is contrasted by radical repression. The scope of the potential next great conflict extends past this dichotomy. The New World War of Ideas exists as a phenomenon that goes beyond the characterization of the clash of Islam versus the ‘West’; it is a contest of ideas and narratives that is happening as multi-polarity prevails and states have become increasingly interested in soft power projection. The practice of public diplomacy is at the center of this emerging phenomenon. Ideas have become the sticks and stones of the modern state. The concern shifts to whether different narratives can coexist on the global level. Soft power and public diplomacy need not lead to bellicose contestation; rather, mutual activities may open ground for increased comity based on dialogue. Despite the salience and richness of public diplomacy, the study of public diplomacy has not expanded beyond case analysis of powerful states and actors. There is a pressing need for novel studies concerning public diplomacy and soft power.

Public diplomacy is the next frontier in the practice and study of diplomacy. The “old” style of diplomacy has been supplanted with “new”, open American-style diplomacy (Nicolson, 1962). States have gone beyond practicing open diplomacy on the world stage to using public diplomacy to promote and secure their national interests abroad. Public diplomacy can be defined as the activities of a state’s government through its ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) to
influence a foreign public with the goal of promoting and projecting its interests.\(^1\) Even the basic definition of public diplomacy as the active effort by a state’s government to influence a foreign public must be complicated by the variety of actors that can be involved in the practice of public diplomacy including “global citizens”, NGOs, businesses, and members of the media. Regardless of the contestable definition of public diplomacy, it is hard to deny the arrival of the new style of diplomacy.

The Edward Murrow Center at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (2009) offers a well-cited definition of public diplomacy that contrasts public diplomacy with “traditional diplomacy”:

Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one state with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.

Central to this concept of public diplomacy is the communication between nations, peoples, and cultures. Public diplomacy is the task of many including journalists who would share the experiences of other states with their audiences. While the idealism of such a definition of public diplomacy is obvious, it also brings up the necessity of communication and interaction for the practice of public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy was a particularly salient government pursuit during the Cold War period when the contest of ideologies, communism versus democracy, was at a high. Within public diplomacy, there were two camps centered on the great powers of the US and the Soviet

\(^1\) The first person credited with the term “public diplomacy” was Edmund Gullion, a former US diplomat who coined the term during the inauguration of the Fletcher School’s Edward R. Murrow Center. [http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/public-diplomacy.html](http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/public-diplomacy.html).
Union. Contesting ideologies appeared to come down with the wall in 1989 and, later, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The bipolar nature of public diplomacy during the Cold War gave way to an “end of history” where the US democratic narrative became dominant (Fukuyama, 2006). The relevance of public diplomacy was lessened and the US mechanism for public diplomacy, the United States Information Agency (USIA), was dissolved as an independent entity as it was absorbed by the US Department of State.

The bipolar quality of public diplomacy during the Cold War period has been replaced with a multitude of states practicing public diplomacy as key interests in soft power have increased. Joseph Nye (2005) outlines the concept of soft power as international image, in particular, highlighting the values underlying a government’s interests. For example, US soft power is the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of its actions. The linkage with public diplomacy is between the theoretical international relations concept of different “forms” of power and the practical elements of how states expand or improve their soft power capacity. Public diplomacy studies can also elucidate the “how” of soft power, notably the means with which states project their interests through soft power.

While public diplomacy has emerged as a critical element in the international activities of many governments, not all states practice public diplomacy and the role of the diplomat as an interlocutor between governments has not diminished. The emergence of public diplomacy does not eliminate the importance of traditional diplomatic interactions. Much of modern diplomacy occurs with cameras and microphones on, but the closed-door element of diplomacy remains intact. The traditional role of the diplomat and the primacy on bilateral relations has not decreased in importance; rather, this role has been supplemented by the needs of public
diplomacy. Image and substance have become intertwined. The modern diplomat must be aware of this fact without losing the lasting focus on bilateral diplomat to diplomat relations.

At the heart of the practice of public diplomacy is the practice of “cultural diplomacy” or the spreading of a state’s culture abroad. In fact it can be said that: “Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented” (Advisory Council on Public Diplomacy, 2005). Cultural diplomacy can become the pursuit of governments practicing public diplomacy, “requiring a long-term commitment to winning the hearts and minds of reasonable people everywhere” (Advisory, 2005) through the promotion of a nation’s popular culture. There have been significant studies concerning cultural diplomacy as public diplomacy particularly on the American practice of cultural diplomacy; however, the theoretical linkages between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy offer another relatively unexplored topic in the study of diplomacy.

From the discussion of the practice of public diplomacy based on cultural diplomacy, which could include anything from pop music to coca cola, it is obvious that the actors conducting public diplomacy extend beyond a state’s government. As mentioned at the onset of this discussion, public diplomacy can be understood as being a government or foreign ministry activity with the goal of influencing other governments through their public. But governments are certainly not the only actors involved in public diplomacy. As one commentator describes the current practice of diplomacy: “The traditional model of diplomacy, founded on the principles of national sovereignty and of statecraft, is becoming less relevant as a field of new, influential actors enter the international system. Diplomats must now engage a vastly larger number of players in host countries, as the age-old ‘club model’ of diplomacy gives way to a less hierarchical ‘network model’” (Heine, 2005). The complex network of actors involved in public
diplomacy arises out of the modern phenomenon of the proliferation of non-state actors. While the proliferation of non-state actors practicing public diplomacy holds infinite importance in any current study of diplomacy, this study holds that public diplomacy is a specific pursuit of governments.²

If public diplomacy includes a cultural dimension involving a multitude of actors but, for the sake of this study, often is conducted by governments, then it is logical to ask where public diplomacy takes place. Cultural diplomacy occurs on the battle-ground or, less bellicose, meeting place of cultures and peoples, likewise public diplomacy is the promotion and projection of a state’s views that is facilitated through the use of the internet. In fact, government-initiated public diplomacy is much more active than allowing a state’s “culture” to amorphously spread. This form of public diplomacy relies on the promotion of a state’s interests directed toward a foreign public primarily through the medium of information technology. One commentator summarizes the “use” of the internet by governments conducting public diplomacy:

The Internet can be considered by governments as a unique diplomatic instrument; through its proper use they can ‘advertise’ not only their positions on different issues, but also promote their ideas worldwide. Such a function, if used in the right way, helps the embassy, and as a result the state that it represents, to create a positive image in the host state. This is what Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has called ‘soft power’. So, the Internet is a political instrument of public diplomacy for a government to publicize its positions and to create a favorable image in the host state (Christodoulides, 2005).

Necessarily, a central element in this study is the use of the internet by governments for public diplomacy. The internet is the “where” of public diplomacy and has become the tool of governments practicing public diplomacy.

² The author does note that governments can sometimes “use” the multitude of actors such as the media in the pursuit of public diplomacy. In this way, the importance of these actors as channels for public diplomacy efforts by state governments is somewhat encapsulated by this study.
Despite the overwhelming importance of the internet to the practice of public diplomacy, there are several other relevant “places” where public diplomacy occurs ranging from other communications technology such as radio and newsprint to the activities of the diplomat in everyday conversation with foreign public opinion leaders. This study will examine several of these other “locations” of public diplomacy but will retain a focus on internet-based public diplomacy particularly in the quantitative analysis.

The central criticism to the proliferation and practice of public diplomacy is the concept of public diplomacy as propaganda. There are some analysts and practitioners that would consider state activities under the concept of strategic command or state branding as true public diplomacy. The limitations of public diplomacy as public relations are well documented. Public diplomacy, in its early stages, was even been labeled as state propaganda. US public diplomacy efforts come under particular criticism: “The United States has been in the international propaganda business, off and on, for a long time . . . propaganda played a crucial role in the war of independence” (Dizard, 1961). An historical reference will elucidate the criticism of public diplomacy as propaganda. Winston Churchill (1948) describes, in *The Gathering Storm*, the actions of Adolph Hitler in the commencement of World War II: “Simultaneously, in order to baffle British and American public opinion, Hitler declared that the occupation was purely symbolic….This provided comfort for everyone on both sides of the Atlantic who wished to be humbugged.” Churchill goes on to describe Hitler’s interest in maintaining prestige and providing a cover for Germany’s aggression. Murrow’s boys may have swayed the American public towards the allied just cause in World War II, but the manipulation of the media by Hitler poses a serious criticism of public diplomacy ideals.

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3 Consider the tenure of Karen Hughes as the undersecretary for US public diplomacy.
Perhaps this criticism is best answered by the purported founding father of public diplomacy, Edward Murrow. Murrow (1963) writes: “Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.” Murrow explains the necessity of public diplomacy to maintain a high level of credibility based on truthful, persuasive reporting. Inherent in the activity of the diplomat is an appeal to foreign publics grounded in how legitimate they find the representative and his government to be. A final defense of public diplomacy lies in the view that it is a tool to be used by governments which does not have a moral requirement. In this way, public diplomacy is a tool of the diplomat and the government he represents, not embedded with any special ideals.

Explaining the practice of Public Diplomacy

If public diplomacy and soft power constitute the metaphorical “next-frontier” in the practice of diplomacy, then they also are the next key branch of study in the fields of international relations and diplomatic studies. There has been significant literature discussing the practice of public diplomacy particularly that of American public diplomacy. On the other hand, the theoretical aspects of public diplomacy have not garnered as much attention. Existing research in public diplomacy suffers from several major weaknesses:

Most studies are historical, and they mostly deal with the U.S. experiences during the cold war. Historical accounts of public diplomacy are significant, especially if they are analytical and not just anecdotal, but their contribution to the development of theory and methodology in public diplomacy has been limited. Limited, too, is research on public diplomacy programs and activities of countries other than the United States and of new international actors such as NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals (Gilboa, 2008).

The nascent field of public diplomatic studies has yet to develop a specialized theory. For example, Cold War theories of public diplomacy based on the dichotomy of ideologies are
limited due to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new narratives. On the other hand, public diplomacy as purely a government pursuit should be challenged by the proliferation of actors involved in the construction of a state’s international image from private businesses and individual citizens to NGOs and the media. These are all the underlying theoretical questions that new studies in public diplomacy must confront.

In terms of methodology, the study of public diplomacy has developed salient comparative case analysis but no specific method has been advocated (Henrikson, 2004). The underlying social facts that dictate the behavior of individuals and, necessarily, states require models that seek to describe underlying motivations (Durkheim, 1994). International relations offers several such models for determining behavior including the realist, liberal, and the constructivist perspectives. The study of public diplomacy has yet to systematically develop similar and independent models: “Models are needed to develop knowledge because they focus on the most significant variables and the relations between them. Occasionally, models of diplomacy and foreign policy include superficial references to public diplomacy, but very few scholars developed specific models of public diplomacy itself” (Gilboa, 2008). While this study does not presume to build a comprehensive method in studying public diplomacy, it does offer several theoretical avenues worth consideration. Each of the prominent theoretical approaches to understanding motivations for the practice of public diplomacy, rational choice, idealism, and social trend, will be tested by the quantitative model and then refined with discussion of practical aspects of public in the qualitative case study.

**Rational choice model**

A rational choice perspective concerning public diplomacy would suggest that there is a continuum of costs and benefits that form the basis for the calculus of states that practice public
diplomacy. A rational theory then would find that states practice public diplomacy out of national interests, usually a complex measurement of immediate and future gains. These interests could range from prestige (a key indicator in the quantitative study) to tangible economic benefits perhaps including increased tourism or greater proclivity for outside states to trade with the state. The obvious advantages of public diplomacy and improving a state’s international image contrast the more opaque interest of convincing other states to a state’s national narrative. The possible rational motivations explaining the practice of public diplomacy found in this broad study include the desire to:

1) preserve international prestige (Example: the US)
2) combat negative international impressions (Example: Sri Lanka)
3) improve financial situation (Example: donors for Afghanistan and business for Singapore)
4) keep control over the information that flows into and out of the state (Example: China)

The rational, cost-benefit analysis that might predict the practice of public diplomacy also includes a relevant cost: capacity including wealth and development. In this way, a state practices public diplomacy out of national interests but the possibility of practicing public diplomacy may be limited by capacity. In evaluating the rational motivations behind the practice of public diplomacy it will be central to understand factors such as prestige and wealth.

While the rational explanation for motivations concerning public diplomacy holds great sway in this study, there is a central criticism to the rational perspective. The critique of rational choice public diplomacy motivations comes from the concept of “credible public diplomacy”. Murrow argues that for public diplomacy to be effective it must be credible and, necessarily, truthful. If the motivations behind the practice of public diplomacy are purely rational, self-interest, then there is a distinct possibility that the perceived credibility of public diplomacy is diminished. States may decide it is in their interest to project their ideals and image abroad;
however, the practice would be undermined if the foreign public thought that the public diplomacy narrative being projected is contrived and a vehicle for manipulation. In this way, self-interest can run counter to the efficacy of public diplomacy.

Beyond the limitation of rational motivations as potentially limiting the efficacy of public diplomacy, there is also the persistent concern of rational choice involving an impossible or, at least, unidentifiable calculus. Even if they desire to act rationally, states may not appropriately distribute their resources or otherwise miscalculate the cost-benefit analysis. In this way, rational analysis of the motivations behind public diplomacy practice offers a base to theoretically explain public diplomacy but not definitive explanation.

**Ideals and public diplomacy**

An ideal theory concerning the practice of public diplomacy is based on the concept of “credible public diplomacy”, outlined by Murrow. The open diplomacy inherent in public diplomacy, as described by Nicolson, hinges on the Wilsonian ideals of democracy and openness. Therefore, states practicing public diplomacy due to idealistic reasons would envision their activities as based upon and promoting an ideal of freedom. Necessarily, the quantitative study might, under an idealistic theory of motivations to conduct public diplomacy, show states with high levels of democracy and freedom of media/political systems practicing public diplomacy. The examination of this factor of freedom is particularly applicable under an idealistic motivation for states which consider public diplomacy worthwhile and uphold that the public being influenced will, in turn, influence its government. One commentator succinctly describes the links between idealism and public diplomacy: “Skillfully conducted and adequately resourced, this ‘new diplomacy’ — of which public diplomacy has become an integral part — will continue to contribute toward a safer and more peaceful world” (Roberst,
2006). Following these assumptions, the study will look to see if mostly democratic and free countries practice public diplomacy.

The ultimate critique of open diplomacy and idealistic public diplomacy comes from George Kennan. Kennan (1984) focuses on the rational power balances both pre and during the Cold War. He thinks back to the old, traditional diplomacy:

The Department of State as it existed at the turn of the century, and as it still was in large measure in the 1920’s when I entered it, was a quaint old place, with its law-office atmosphere, its cool dark corridors, its swinging doors, its brass cuspidors, its black leather rocking chairs, and the grandfather’s clock in the Secretary of State’s office. There was a real old-fashioned dignity and simplicity about it. It was staffed in those earlier days by professional personnel some of whom were men of great experience and competence. And it was headed more often than otherwise by Americans of genuine stature and quality.

Kennan fears the “short-term trends of public opinion”, erratic and undependable public views, and emotionalism. Kennan is nostalgic for the atmosphere of the past based on “dignity and simplicity” but closed and aloof from the outside world. He further critiques the ideals of equality found in open diplomacy through the United Nations as unrealistic and not attentive to the ever-changing international scene.

Kennan’s critique finds further substance in the work of Oren Stephens. Stephens considered public diplomacy to be “propaganda” and non-ideal. In *Facts to a Candid World: America's Overseas Information Program*, Stephens described US information programs as propaganda (Stephens, 1955). Similarly the United States Information Agency, the first formal public diplomacy instrument of the US, firmly placed the US in the activity of “international propaganda business” (Dizard, 1961). Far from idealism, the base of public diplomacy is considered here to be self-interest and deception. In fact, the perspective of idealistic motivations for public diplomacy must meet a final challenge: It appears as though public diplomacy can be understood without a democratic ideal present in communist states such as
China and Russia. The quantitative study will test the possibility of idealistic motivations of public diplomacy based on concepts of democracy and freedom.

**Non-rational, social trends towards public diplomacy**

Idealistic motivations for public diplomacy also point toward a more abstract concept of explanations of state actions based on non-rational, social trend theory. As with idealistic motivations which may lie outside a rational interest calculus, the concept of a social trend includes two levels of states practicing public diplomacy out of mimetic or imitative actions and due to social pressures towards the behavior. The non-rational, social perspective would suggest a trend towards public diplomacy where states conduct because they perceive it to be the appropriate behavior of states. States see other states practicing public diplomacy and follow suit. In this way, public diplomacy is not necessarily rationally based.

The concept of a social trend towards a certain state practice can be seen in the waves of democratization post World War II. Different norms emerge and states are socialized into these behaviors. For example, positive views of democracy can be seen as a general social trend amongst states, but rationalists contend that there is a rational calculus often beyond being part of the democratic trend such as the benefits of more state aid. In contrast, a non-rational social trend towards public diplomacy appears to lack these immediate benefits; states do not reward the states that try to influence their publics. In examining the possible non-rational, social trend motivations, it will be necessary to see a general trend towards the increased practice of public diplomacy and some outlier cases to the rational perspective. One would expect to find a general trend of increased public diplomacy without prevailing interest calculations. It will be difficult to find a social trend with a basis more in the spread of ideas and emergence of norms than in
tangible concepts such as wealth or freedom level. That having been said, the proliferation of states practicing public diplomacy lends credence to this concept.

The ultimate criticism of the social trend theory begins in the difficulty of observing this motivation matched with the rationalist view that states act with reason and even social behaviors have a rationalist origin. To survive as part of the international collective, it is important to observe some norms of action. For example, even perpetually “neutral” Switzerland finally joined the UN in 2002. Rationalists would say that it eventually became untenable for Switzerland to not be part of this order and that cost-benefit analysis includes the element of pervasive social pressures. In fact, it can be argued that social behavior has a rational origin in the motivation of a desire to be part of a group. Finally, the critics would contend that if public diplomacy has become a norm of state behavior, then this does not explain the many states which remain outside this sphere of activity. Despite these relevant criticisms, the trend towards the practice of public diplomacy cannot be ignored, whether rationalist, idealistic, or non-rational in origin, as an exponential number of state narratives now fill the international environment. These different hypothetical theories for understanding motivations of the practice of public diplomacy will be tested in the quantitative study, and they are put forward as potential avenues for further research into what motivate state actions at the international level.

**Quantitative inferences**

In testing the variety of theories explaining the practice of public diplomacy, a quantitative approach is extremely useful. However, public diplomacy in this model must be understood as a concerted or conscious effort by a government to promote its interests to a foreign public with the goal of altering that public’s perception of the state and changing the diplomatic actions of that public’s government. With government-initiated public diplomacy as
the dependent variable, there are several characteristics of countries or factors that will can examined. These factors include: wealth as per capita GDP, level of development, size as population, level of “freedom”, stable democracy, international prestige, years practicing “open” diplomacy, the number of missions abroad, and technological capacity. The study will show whether and how each of these factors play a role in determining whether or not a state practices public diplomacy.4

**The dependent variable: Government-initiated public diplomacy**

In the development of the quantitative model the countries selected play a critical role and the dependent variable of government-initiated public diplomacy sets the central pursuit of the study. As mentioned before, public diplomacy expands beyond the government level. Notable non-state actors practicing diplomacy include NGOs, businesses, international organizations, private citizens, and more. For example, one scholar finds that “Governments play a major role [in public diplomacy] but they do not act alone and the private sector is intimately involved in commercial diplomatic activities” (Mercier, 2008). That being said, this study focuses on public diplomacy associated with government agency. Public diplomacy is central to the current form of diplomacy being practiced by state governments. Governments use public diplomacy typically through the internet to project their interests on foreign publics. In the development of a quantitative model examining public diplomacy, the key preliminary step is to evaluate the set of countries to see which countries practice public diplomacy.

For each of the countries examined, the author explored whether or not their governments practice public diplomacy through their foreign ministries. A prime indicator as to whether or not

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4 The author must note the significant limitations of the model. Most information comes from English language or translation sources including information from US government sources such as the CIA world fact book. The current study only examines countries with MFA websites and nine major factors. Some data requires non-objective measures but to the best effort of the author and other sources with a priority on consistency.
a state is practicing public diplomacy is the structure of its ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). The initial research as to whether or not specific countries practice public diplomacy required each state’s MFA and its structure to be examined. For example, if the MFA of a state has a significant department dedicated to public diplomacy or image promotion/projection then that state can be considered to be practicing government-initiated public diplomacy. There were several such cases where a state’s MFA explicitly admits or recognizes that it conducts public diplomacy. One prominent example would be the US, which has an extensive department in its MFA dedicated to public diplomacy. The “Press and Public Diplomacy Department” of the Albanian MFA is another specific example. Other, less explicit, examples of state MFA departments conducting public diplomacy include departments responsible for public diplomacy efforts such as the “Department of Information and Public Affairs” (New Zealand), the “The Information Department” (China), the “Press/Information and Media/Relations Department” (Afghanistan), “Kulturpolitische Sektion” (Austria), and the “Ministry of Press and Culture” (Chile). Beyond MFAs dedicated to public diplomacy, the study also finds that the mission statement of each MFA may indicate a preference towards public diplomacy. A final indicator is the variety of studies that may describe the public diplomacy activities of states that do not have explicit MFA or mission statement evidence of the practice of public diplomacy.

**Single-factor regression results**

In examining the single-factor regressions the study will add a quantifiable evaluation to complement and develop the earlier basic comparisons between the dependent variable of public diplomacy.
diplomacy and each factor. The key to understanding the regression findings is to envision the comparison of public diplomacy and a factor as a scatter plot graph with the dependent variable of public diplomacy on the y-axis and the factor on the x-axis. The regression analysis will find a best fit line to organize the various points on the graph into a linear function \( Y = A + BX \) where \( Y \) is public diplomacy; \( A \) is the y-intercept—where \( x = 0, y = a \); \( B \) is the slope determined by the regression; and \( X \) is the specific factor being examined). For the study, each factor’s linear function is listed below, then \( y \) is set to equal 1 (the practice of public diplomacy) and the resulting \( x \), rounded to the nearest whole number and a half, shows the likely codec of the factor for states that practice public diplomacy. The findings concerning each linear regression will be discussed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Linear Regression</th>
<th>When ( Y = 1 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>( Y = .08 + .09x )</td>
<td>( X = 9 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>( Y = -.035 + .105x )</td>
<td>( X = 10 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>( Y = .016 + .14x )</td>
<td>( X = 7 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>( Y = -.08 + .2x )</td>
<td>( X = 5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>( Y = .23 + .29x )</td>
<td>( X = 3 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige</td>
<td>( Y = -.12 + .26x )</td>
<td>( X = 4 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of OD</td>
<td>( Y = .11 + .1x )</td>
<td>( X = 9 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions abroad</td>
<td>( Y = .59 + .0824x )</td>
<td>( X = 5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech capacity</td>
<td>( Y = .02 + .13x )</td>
<td>( X = 7 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• When comparing wealth with public diplomacy, the information from the linear regression supports the conclusion that public diplomacy is predominately practiced by wealthy countries. The optimal wealth level or codec for countries that practice public diplomacy (\( y = 1 \)) is 9, which covers the range of 20,001 USD plus.

• The linear regression comparing development and public diplomacy shows that states with a development codec of 10 practice public diplomacy; however, this is a codec well beyond the range of states studied (maximum codec of 6).

• The linear regression for size and public diplomacy leaves much to be desired in terms of conclusive evidence that mostly large (population size) countries practice public diplomacy. When \( y = 1 \) and a state practices public diplomacy, the optimal size of that state is at the codec level of 7, a size that was not even considered in the range—the original maximum codec being 6, a level of 300 million—would equate to over 1 billion. It appears as though there is a significant problem in the linear regression concerning size; this indicates the general
The pattern that bigger countries are more likely to practice public diplomacy is incorrect.

- The freedom and public diplomacy linear regression finds that countries that practice public diplomacy \((y=1)\) do not necessarily need to be free. The freedom codec level for countries conducting public diplomacy is 5, which goes beyond the maximum codec of 3.

- The linear regression for democracy does not provide conclusive evidence that only stable democracies practice public diplomacy. The function comparing democracy and public diplomacy creates a codec of 3, a figure higher than the maximum codec of 1 for stable democracies. Even though this quantified relationship suggests that stable democracies would practice public diplomacy there is concern with such a high codec.

- Prestige and public diplomacy have a linear regression that shows high correlation. The optimal level of prestige for countries practicing public diplomacy with a codec of 4 or a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This confirms the general observation that the more prestigious a state, the greater the propensity for that state to conduct public diplomacy.

- The linear regression for years of open diplomacy offers definitive pattern or conclusion as the codec for years of open diplomacy when a state practices public diplomacy is 9, well outside the range of years as a member of the UN.

- When the number of missions abroad is compared with public diplomacy in a linear function contrasts the expectation that the more missions abroad would indicate a greater likelihood to practice public diplomacy. The codec for missions abroad that was found for countries conducting public diplomacy \((y=1)\) is 5, which would indicate a total number of over 200 missions abroad an improbable number.

- The linear regression of technological capacity and public diplomacy supports the pattern that countries with high technological capabilities are more likely to practice public diplomacy. When \(y=1\) then the factor codec for technological capacity is 7, or the second highest codec in terms of level of technological capacity—either the MFA website has more than four languages and is smooth with limited errors \((4+2)\) or the website has four languages and is easy to navigate with no visible errors \((3+3)\).

The single linear regressions as functions comparing public diplomacy and each factor support the variety of conclusions from Section V.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) It should be noted that there may be some endogenous elements in the model between the factors of democracy and freedom. While both of these factors did not show a linear pattern correlating towards public diplomacy, a more thorough secondary study would seek to differentiate between them. Also, the model does not take into account some significant other factors such as whether a state is in the middle of a conflict, change over time, and other relevant variables. These issues were not ignored; rather, they were considered less vital to the current study.
Quantitative conclusions

The quantitative analysis of public diplomacy includes several important quantitative correlations; however, these correlations must be translated into salient conclusions concerning the practice of public diplomacy. Throughout the study, the focus has been on translating and supplementing quantitative analysis with qualitative conclusions. The following table summarizes the important conclusions learned from the quantitative analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Link to the practice of public diplomacy</th>
<th>Inferred conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PD requires a minimum of wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Development does not impact PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A variety of different sized countries do PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom level</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>State freedom level does not necessarily indicate PD practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable democracy</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Stable democracies typically do PD with important outliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Prestigious countries do PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of open diplomacy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Years of membership in the UN does not dictate PD efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions abroad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Public diplomacy is mainly conducted through internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological capacity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Countries with high tech capacity do PD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors which have an important quantifiable and significant relationship to the practice of public diplomacy have observable general patterns as with wealth, stable democracy (to some degree), prestige, and technological capacity. Crucial for the study are the unexpected conclusions, notably that size does not present a definitive pattern as to what sized countries conduct public diplomacy, that stable democracy suggests that democracies do practice public diplomacy but there are important outliers like China and Brunei, that years of open diplomacy or involvement in the UN does not effect whether or not a state practices public diplomacy—a state need not be a well-entrenched member of the international community to practice public
diplomacy, and that missions abroad are helpful for countries that practice public diplomacy but the internet and technological capacity matters more. Finally, neither freedom nor democracy have strong impacts on whether a state will practice public diplomacy, thereby diminishing the role of idealistic motivations for the practice of public diplomacy. To each observed pattern and expected relationship there were important qualifiers, which also reveal important elements in the practice of public diplomacy by state governments.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the study has sought to reveal, through novel quantitative analysis, the links between government-initiated public diplomacy and a variety of state characteristics or factors. The results suggest that states practice public diplomacy due primarily to rational interests, not ideals of democracy or openness; however, there is a general social trend, as predicted by normative expansion understood by the sociological, constructivist theories, towards the practice of public diplomacy. This is perhaps the most interesting conclusion of the study, going beyond the specific analysis of many interesting relationships between the practice of public diplomacy and different factors, to a general re-understanding of public diplomacy. It is the general conclusion of this study that public diplomacy is no longer solely the pursuit of Western countries and great powers, as the practice public diplomacy has become prolific expanding to countries in spite of limitations in the number of years a state has been involved in the UN, the number of missions a state has abroad, or even the democratic nature of a state. In fact, there is an overwhelming impetus for countries across the globe to increase their public diplomacy efforts, as “successful public diplomacy is becoming an increasingly important asset in a globalised world….current technological and economic changes suggest that there is a pressing need for active and effective public diplomacy” (Potter, 2002). The US, European
countries, and Canada all have had many prominent case studies in the field of public diplomacy; however, there is now a need to increase attention on the public diplomacy efforts of non-traditional diplomatic powers such as China, India, Brazil, Brunei, South Africa, Romania, Sri Lanka, and Singapore. Public diplomacy is the next frontier in the practice of diplomacy, and the study of public diplomacy must match the expansion of public diplomacy in innovativeness.
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