First published in Global Society, Vol 11, No 2, 1997
Peace operations and the practice of development are currently shifting between archetypal stages of organization. The complexity of political systems evolves in stages distinguished by their arrangement of four universal elements of social organization, corresponding in the modern state to population, territory, government and sovereignty. After the Cold War, the international community is occupied with internal consolidation of nations as the objective of development. Yet, development through diplomatic assistance is unlikely to lead to sustainable results locally. The current political proportions of social environments, internationally and locally, alter the points of reference of conventional, inter-governmental development. Beyond diplomatic ‘peacekeeping’ and military ‘peace-enforcement,’ peace-maintenance operations can be deployed with a political mandate. Their goal is the establishment of a flexible mechanism for administrative control that can extend transitional phases. The aim of peace-maintenance is to enable a local population to choose its future development between conditions of violence and calm. In turn, the ability of the international and local communities to exercise control authority jointly in the interim would indicate a shift in the complexity of the international system as a whole.
‘Peace-maintenance’ is a concept that is derived from the principal purpose of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Article 1(1) refers to collective measures for the maintenance of international peace and (1) To this end, peace-maintenance acknowledges the prevailing need for a transnational capability to exercise political authority as a means of internal conflict resolution, establishing order and fostering justice. Political command in peace operations is a way to harmonize, not merely coordinate, the objectives and procedures of diplomatic, military, humanitarian and other civilian components. Missions deployed within states are unable to refrain from claiming a degree of jurisdiction over territory, assuming some powers of administration and accepting direct responsibility for a local population. These are political issues that cannot be addressed only diplomatically or militarily.
‘Assistance,’ however, has been the limited response of a diplomatic community of states to social scourges locally. ‘Development’ has tip-toed around the sovereignty of executive bureaucracies, while ‘progress’ relies on liberal-style, capitalist democracies as a global standard of measurement. The pace of demand for resources in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean has surpassed the growth in supply from major Western donors.(2) ‘Transitions’ in the former second world have exacerbated this gap. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared development to be “the most important task facing humanity today.”(3) Yet, his Agenda for Development is set in the constricted context of diplomatic assistance. Development cannot be a diplomatic process; it requires means of interim political control.
Inter-governmental assistance reflects the crystallization, and perhaps ossification, of development during the Cold War. But the field has entered a new stage that corresponds to the dominant imperatives internationally of intra-state consolidation of economic, social and political institutions within contested societies. Individual human rights, a nation’s financial welfare and other internal conditions were formally linked with external spheres of international jurisdiction, particularly peace and security, when the first summit meeting of the Security Council took account of the non-military sources of conflict. (4) Boutros-Ghali presented proposals for strengthening the security capacity of the UN in June 1992 in his Agenda for Peace, which included the term ‘peace-building.’ It was in the cast, however, of consent-reliant assistance, unlike the expanded notion of ‘peace-enforcement.’
Both were vague ‘peace’ ideas, not operational concepts that could guide the planning and conduct of increasingly multifunctional deployments beyond traditional, inter-state peacekeeping. Peace missions, too, had entered a new stage as they intervened in internal conflicts. Operations in complex environments revealed the limitations of development assistance within local communities. In Cambodia, for instance, the powers of ‘direct control’ and a distinct rehabilitation component were not underwritten with sufficiently independent means of implementation. The UN exercised its control powers through assistance with minimal impact. (5) In Somalia, by comparison, the UN’s enforcement powers contradicted its assistance mandate and a combat phase interrupted its development effort. When the UN did focus on reconstruction, in the absence of a local authority, it could not rely on development through assistance and resorted to powers of control. Although, by then it was too little too late.(6)
The idea of assistance pales in comparison to the scope of development imperatives in peace operations: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into civil society of combatants; dissolution of security forces and establishment of politically neutral police and armed forces; demining habitable land; electoral reform; formation of political parties; organization and conduct of elections; reconstitution of civil authority; judicial reform; human rights protection; determining financial policies; repatriation of refugees and relocation of internally displaced; political and social reconciliation; restoration or creation of public services; physical, material and psychological attention to vulnerable groups, such as children or the handicapped; and the growth of community action and non-governmental organizations. The expanding literature on the subject does not confine such tasks to the context of assistance. (7)
Nevertheless, Boutros-Ghali has decided the UN cannot achieve the kinds of non-consensual missions that have characterized its ‘second generation’ and he has reverted to development assistance as one amongst more attainable goals.(8) However, the inability of the UN to do more than peacekeeping successfully does not mean that more was not needed. Similarly, development approached principally through assistance is sure to founder. Global society is at a political moment, yet a diplomatic system of inter-governmental relations has not risen to the challenge.
Whether or not there will be adequate international or local commitment to tackle the political question in peace-maintenance is not known.(9) The indications to date have been dim. However, it is significant as a historical marker and functional standard to recognize that the requirements in the field are political. Defining the problem on the ground according to what is acceptable in New York or in national capitals led to dysfunction in Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. To bridge the gap between available resources and diplomatic will on the one hand and the genuine proportions of crises on the other, peace-maintenance can vary in its operational scope: assistance to an existing government; partnership with a reforming regime or withdrawing occupier; control of specific bureaucratic agencies of factions; and governorship over an authority vacuum.
A political system may be at a particular historical juncture which is perceived to circumscribe the internal role of an external third party. Consequently, there has been a tension between fears of involvement and regrets of abandonment: Did the belligerents in the former Yugoslavia have to finish fighting before the international community could begin to engage? Was an abrupt departure from Somalia unavoidable? Was failure to stop slaughter in Rwanda inevitable, and is it ever justifiable to permit a sovereign government’s mistreatment of its population? Affirmative answers to these questions would amount to accepting a doctrine of ‘the violence of non-intervention.’(10) It is the basis of a general retreat to ‘assistance-at-best.’
To determine an effective and legitimate response to social conditions, stages in the evolution of political systems need to be identified. In this manner, categories of peace-maintenance environments can be distinguished and mandates drafted accordingly. There is a stage of constitution in which the elements of a system–such as state territory, population, government and sovereignty–are in formation. This is followed by the construction of an external identity as well as internal consolidation. Finally, there is a chaotic stage in which a system fragments and its elements are transformed into ingredients for a new constitutive stage of a similar, more or less complex kind of organization. These four stages are a common pattern in: complex systems generally; the establishment of the modern state; the conceptual foundations of ‘development’; the history of international organization and peace operations doctrine; and each deployment in the field.
Development is situated between the short-term impact of peace operations and longer-term social conditions. Consideration of the so-called “relief continuum”(11) between humanitarian assistance and development tends to disregard the political context of assistance and the overall stages of historical development. In this larger dynamic, the nexus between peace operations and development can be defined. Since both are currently concerned with social and political consolidation within states, a flexible peace-maintenance mechanism, for joint international and local administrative control, can be designed. If this can be accomplished, however, then the direct connection between the international diplomatic and local social communities would indicate an initial stage in the formation of an international political system, of a means of transnational governance for civil society.(12) The concept and standard of measurement of ‘development’ would have fundamentally altered. Therefore, internal social consolidation through political peace-maintenance is the last stage of ‘development’ in an inter-governmental context.
Political systems tend towards ‘complexity.’ In their evolution, complex systems display coherence in space over time as they undergo transitions between degrees of order and kinds of organization. Such systems are consistently identifiable as the nature of their constituent elements transform. They are also conditioned by their external environments, which may be larger systems.(13)
There are four generic stages discernible in the evolution of complexity: constitution, construction, consolidation and chaos. These stages vary in the hierarchy, type of linkage and level of balance existing between their component elements. They are evident in anthropological and sociological concepts of political development, such as: stabilization, consistency and closure; (14) integration; (15) adaptation and stability;(16) institutionalization;(17) and centralization and continuity.(18) Robert Axelrod describes the emergence, growth and maintenance of cooperation.(19) Similar patterns have been discovered in scientific theories of complex systems.(20)
In a first constitutive stage, the ingredients of a system are formed. Some elements cohere and begin to exert minimal forces of attraction and repulsion. They can be discerned in a loose relationship with one another.
During a second constructive stage the system is established within a coherent framework. Combined elements are transformed into something more than the sum of the parts. The perimeter and parameters of the system are determined. The definite link between elements distinguishes an initial order and the logic of the whole as a whole. The structure is organized to secure external identification and delimits the capacity for growth.
The third consolidative stage concerns a rearrangement of ingredients within the system. The ordering of the parts shifts, even if a realignment in hierarchy does not necessarily occur. The linkage between elements is ensured by an organic equilibrium that results, additional to a formal infrastructure.
Finally, the fourth chaotic stage is characterized by the dual forces of destruction and reconstitution, of deconstruction and reconstruction. This stage is the link between one system and the next, at a level of comparable, lesser or greater complexity. Stagnation at the end of a consolidative stage leads to disequilibrium. The existing link between elements weakens and snaps, and the system fragments into separate components. The elements are reformed, redefined and reconceptualized as the primary ingredients of a new constitutive stage. In this manner, particularization can be the other face of universalization, and diversification of unification.
These functional categories are also theological and philosophical archetypes in conceptions of time, change and history.(21) George Steiner, for instance, has described how, in the political and philosophic history of the West, ‘scientific’ and ‘social scientific’ fields of inquiry and explanation have replaced the mythological properties of Old and New Testament Biblical theology. He considers Karl Marx and social history, Claude Lévi-Strauss and anthropology and Sigmund Freud and psychology–all of whom he regards as “secular messiahs.” Inherent in their teachings are conceptions of: a Creation and ultimate source of the world and its truths; a Fall and original sin in which humanity must find its own bearings; at the end, hope for a Promised Land, for ultimate redemption; and in between, the unfortunate present conditions of life. Each doctrine is a bridge from the wilderness to utopia; its only cost: faith.(22) The tetrahedral scheme is not only Judeo-Christian. The Hindu Laws of Manu and Buddhist Dhammapada share cosmological origins, perceive humanity in suffering, conceive of enlightenment as liberation, and in between define the Path from pain to bliss.
This kind of ‘progressive’ logic and the tendency towards complexity in four stages have characterized the history of the sovereign state as a political system. Modern statehood is positively defined as consisting of four ingredients: a permanent population, a defined territory, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states, or sovereignty.(23)Like their four stages of evolution, these elements are archetypes of social organization. As constants, they are repeatedly combined in one form or another.(24)
In the constitutive stage of state formation, elements are gradually shaped. A population begins to conceive of itself as a group, in which individuals associate with others they do not know personally. Successive generations of occupation obscure any geographic location of origin and inhabitants begin to identify, mythically, with the place of settlement. Social hierarchy stratifies as a division of labour necessitated by organizing a community’s survival. Political ordering by the force of the strongest accelerates an organic, compelling centre of gravity. Kin-ship becomes kingship. It is supported by common ideas, a way of life and by the belief in one or many supreme beings–transcendent and more powerful than the politically strong.(25)
The distinguishing feature of this stage is the tentative, unstable connection between the elements. Significantly, the logic of unity is defined when the political kingdom is identified with a religious or metaphysical realm. In his classic study of kingship in the ancient Near East, Henri Frankfort asserted that the king in Mesopotamia was only the foremost citizen, but the Egyptian ruler was descended from the gods.(26) As the polity and the deity bond, the psychological and therefore physical ties between political power, social community and territorial location are tightened, in a kind of intensifying centripetal momentum.
By the second constructive stage, a critical mass point is surpassed. This is achieved by the expropriation altogether of the metaphysical by the political. The unique connection that results between elements transforms the logic of the whole. Sovereignty is precisely the consequence of the subordination of the gods in heaven to the king on earth.(27) The prevention of this in medieval Europe, by the separation between the head of the king and the crown, ensured metaphorical unity and physical division.(28) The principle of such political supremacy was enunciated for the first time in the first century AD, when extra-legal authority was bestowed on the Roman emperor.(29) This was made possible not least by the deification of the imperial person. Sovereignty is not less than the deification of the political element. Added to the fact of power is the quality of absolute legitimacy, which together constitutes supreme authority. The connection of legitimacy and power enables a rule of law to emerge, not because rules from a collective source of law can be enforced by the centralized use of violence, rendering them effective and more than theological proposition, but because local law can be more than the naked will of the enforcer.
The metaphysical combination of elements becomes a single system. It is a construct with internal coherence and external identity. The elements condition each other and further strengthen the system: individuals become ‘citizens’ and the population is more a definition than a fact; territorial ‘place’ becomes the ‘space’ of the state and its boundaries represent not just physical occupation but the extent of the system. There is stringent organization, centralization, conformity and the mental assurance of unity.
To flourish, however, the state passes through a third consolidative stage. A structural skeleton turns into a living organism. Without social fluidity, instability destroys the unity achieved. Philip of Macedon was succeeded by an Alexander, and expansion followed expansion; so the life of that Greek empire may have been splendorous, but it was short. Julius Caesar, in comparison, was replaced by an Augustus, and expansion was matched by consolidation; so the Roman empire was massively durable. To quantitative, ‘objective’ criteria of statehood are added qualitative, ‘subjective’ standards, such as self-determination and non-discrimination.(30) Power passes from the monarch to the legislature; the Republic can become the Democracy; the security of the whole can tolerate distinctions between the parts; and the demands for duty give way to protection of rights, as order can afford justice. Bodin’s sovereignty for the prince is limited by Rousseau’s popular sovereignty. The relationship between ruler and ruled is altered.(31)
Eventually, states reach a final chaotic stage in which disequilibrium between the population and its government renders the idea of their linkage hollow, without social energy and eventually without political authority. The loss of integrity of ‘state-space’ leads to division of territorial place as a consequence of a people redefining itself, splintering and reclaiming authority. The transformation of the elements, as the compound of statehood dissolves and the former identity of the system decomposes, provides new ingredients for the next constitutive stage.
Extreme nationalism can lead to either parochialism or internationalism. Following their chaotic stages, political systems may shatter into independent components, or they may be integrated into larger systems. In the latter case, they have tended to merge with neighbours or some other aggregate, such as a confederation. But it is the nature of confederations, as the result of a unifying centripetal force, to become a federation; or to break apart as the result of a centrifugal force stronger than the intermediary ties that may have been forged. Whether or not modern states are generally approaching a chaotic stage, to be followed by a universalizing constitution of international society, remains to be seen.(32)
In an imperial configuration, indigenous elements are disassembled and reassembled to fit the logic of empire. If a local system has managed in a constructive stage to subordinate the metaphysical to the political, then imperial incorporation is more difficult diplomatically, militarily and politically. But once conquered, the logic imposed can be less destabilizing in the long term than if a local system, at the time of capitulation, was either in a constitutive stage or had proceeded according to a logic other than sovereignty in its political history.
Japan’s conquest and occupation of Formosa (1895-1945), Korea (1905-1945) and Manchuria (1932-1945) can be contrasted with European empires. As a result of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the secular power of the shogun was surrendered to the heavenly lineage of the emperor. A rigorous constructive regeneration of Japan followed, in which it adopted from Western governments highly centralized and authoritarian versions of their institutions, and in which a fragmented feudal order was unified. Similarly, the Chinese emperor ruled with the Mandate of Heaven. After Sun Yat Sen’s revolution in 1911, the Mandate was not so much revoked as transferred to the government of a republic in the form of nationalism. Historically, Korea was subjected to the nature of authority in both countries, ruled as it was by each in turn.
By the time of Japanese expansion at the end of the nineteenth century, there was not only a degree of cultural compatibility, if enmity, between conqueror and conquered, but a measure of consistency in the logic of governance. Therefore, after emancipation in 1945 there was rapid evolution of one kind or another. Powerful constructive forces led to war in Korea and revolution in China. After all, destruction can be one feature of the competition for authority in the process of centralization. Subsequently, Taiwan, North and South Korea and China shifted to their own versions of consolidation.
In medieval India, by contrast, a common spiritual consciousness was never matched by, let alone subordinated to, a single secular authority.(33) Even the authority of Moghul administration, which may have achieved some physical unity by force, operated according to a logic in which an Islamic god was forever supreme in heaven. In the wake of Moghul fragmentation, princely states re-emerged with absolutist rulers, Hindu and Muslim, but both divided between earthly body and heavenly head. Under British rule, the doctrine of ‘paramountcy’ was a kind of supreme sovereignty in which political agents and military units selectively controlled the Indian princes, but which did not fundamentally alter the elements in or replace entirely the logic of their states. Nevertheless, the loose supremacy of one logic over another had its impact: “In terms of resources of coal and iron and land for cotton-growing as well as in the supply of skilled weavers India should have been the seat of the first industrial revolution.”(34)
Eventually, the forging of an Indian Republic in 1947 spread a European, Christian logic of sovereign statehood from the subcontinental territory fully administered by British bureaucracy to the remainder of areas under princely rule. For them, the sovereignty of Delhi was more of a rearrangement than had been alien dominance. Knitting together indigenously centralized points of authority around an inherited imperial core facilitated national construction. However, shifting to a consolidative stage has proved a gradual and monumental task for governors of India as a result of this historical cocktail of political systems.
In further contrast, British ‘indirect rule,’ in Nigeria for instance, relied on so-called “tribes” to ‘divide and conquer’ and as a tool of administration. But at independence, the elements coalesced irresistibly around the colonial structure of centralization and ultimate sovereignty. A foreign logic and the local abuse of unchecked power arrested the transition from a sudden constructive to a longer-term consolidative stage of evolution, despite the wealth of the country.(35) Franz Fanon warned in his Wretched of the Earth of the final triumph of colonialism through adoption of Western institutions at independence. More recently, Basil Davidson declared the failure of the nation-state project in Africa.(36)
Are such nations to return to a constitutive stage and develop more indigenous systems? Is it possible to shift in both directions between the four stages of complexity, like a scale, or is their evolution linear, one-directional, as a feature of time? Is it possible to jump stages, from a constitutive to a consolidative? Is it possible to revert from a consolidative to a constructive stage in order to re-consolidate in an alternate manner? And what are the non-linear links between systems at either comparable or different stages? Is it possible to pass from consolidation at one level of complexity to the constitutive stage of a more complex system?
Placed in this historical dynamic, the concept of ‘development’ can be reconceived. It is understood neutrally as movement of a social and political system between generic stages of evolution, ascending levels of complexity and as the result of links with other systems. Notions of ‘backwards’ and ‘forwards,’ of developed and undeveloped lose their meaning. Development as a means of choosing the future becomes the dynamic response to linearity.
Stages of Development
The idea of ‘development,’ itself, as a field of inquiry and practice, can be divided into four stages: before the second world war, during the Cold War, the current era and a potential future.
These correspond perceptually to the stages of sovereign-state formation as a standard of measurement for the North’s treatment of local systems. Before 1945, European powers regarded polities in the South as being in a constitutive stage. During the waves of decolonization between the 1950s and 1970s, East and West conducted their relations with newly independent nations as if they had achieved a constructive stage in their evolution. After 1989, focus has shifted to a consolidative stage, not just in terms of the West’s policies regarding internal transitions in the South and the former second world, but it too is perpetually in this phase, balancing between central order and social justice.
A characteristic feature of the first stage of development was the notion of ‘progress.’ Its logic relied on the kind of scheme outlined by Steiner: a starting point, a reason for movement, and a perfect end, towards which movement was aimed. Change meant betterment, from the inferior to the superior, from the primitive to the civilized, and from undeveloped to developed. The agents of change, the chosen standard-bearers, were the European peoples; their nations, the standard; and the vehicle for the noble effort, the imperial project or regional dominance. The idea was rendered palatable: for the French it was une mission civilisatrice; for the British, a White Man’s Burden; and for the United States, Manifest Destiny.
The age of greatest faith in ‘progress’ lasted from 1750 to 1900.(37) The French historian, F.P.G. Guizot, lectured in the 1820s on progress as the defining criterion of ‘civilization.’ He followed in the late eighteenth century tradition of the French evolutionary sociologists. Anne Robert Jacques Turgot was considered to have discovered the ‘law of progress’ by his biographer and successor, Marquis de Condorcet, who believed in the inevitability of human progress and the power of science and technology to transform life and society.
Progress was subsequently affirmed in the natural world. With the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859, biological evolution proceeded through higher and higher orders of life. In 1871, the anthropologist E.B. Tyler in his study of the evolution of human implements, Primitive Culture, concluded that history was an ‘upward development.’ An engineer, philosopher and sociologist, Herbert Spencer, had considered progress a law of the universe.
Within a generation, and not least as a consequence of the shocking impact of the first world war, the idea of decay was resuscitated. In 1908, Georges Sorel wrote Les illusions du progrès. Oswald Spengler published in 1920 The Decline of the West, which considered the organic nature of ‘cultures’ subject to generation, growth and decay. Arnold Toynbee’s research culminated in 1946 in A Study of History, which described the genesis, growth, breakdown and disintegration, as well as eventual universalization of civilizations.
The environmental limits to growth gained notoriety in another generation at the end of the Cold War, with the publication in 1987 of the Brundtland Report of the World Economic Commission entitled Our Common Future, and the introduction of the concept of ‘sustainable development.’
Despite these pessimistic trends before its beginning and at its end, the second stage of development reflected earlier perceptions of ‘civilization.’ In fact, the word ‘development’ seemed to have become a twentieth century version of nineteenth century ‘progress.’ It spawned theories of ‘modernization’ as ‘Westernization’–which amounted to rapid state construction out of third world elements. In economics, W.W. Rostow contended that self-sustained economic growth is the result of industrialization.(38) Dichotomies in classical sociology were applied.(39) In Economy and Society, Max Weber had distinguished between traditional and rational bureaucratic authority and Émile Durkheim between mechanical and organic solidarity in The Division of Labour in Society. Political development was understood as structural evolution.(40)
The challenge to ‘modernization’ as ‘progress’ appeared in the form of left-wing disagreements with classical Marxism. Marx had presumed, for instance in Capital, that the spread of capitalism to less-developed societies would lead to their industrialization and development. Similarly, V. I. Lenin, in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, maintained that the export of capital to overseas colonies would lead not only to their development, but to decay in the imperial centres. By the 1950s, however, it was being asserted that capitalism did not lead to, and in fact prevented, development.(41) The theory of ‘underdevelopment’ or ‘dependency’ was enunciated, particularly in the context of Latin America.(42) It was argued, contrary to Lenin, that the movement of capital from a periphery group of countries to a core group of developed states increasingly impoverished the former.(43)
In its turn, dependency theory was challenged in the 1970s, when Bill Warren proclaimed that universal economic development was an inevitable fact of capitalism.(44) This was accompanied by Keynsian calls for redistribution to bridge the gap between rich and poor in North and South.(45) Within the decade, the victory of capitalism was celebrated.(46) According to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by the 1990s ‘privatization’ had become the preferred means to economic development.(47)
In reality, there had been a kind of ‘uneven development,’ in which capitalism led to industrialization in some areas, such as East Asia, and not others, like Africa.(48) This should not have been enough to vindicate it as the only means to development. The displacement of one promise by another is hardly a success story if conditions of violence and poverty do not improve. Nevertheless, capitalism, like democracy, has become an ‘autonomic’ force, a hidden hand beyond the control of human consciousness.(49)
If a future is to be chosen–which is essential to the effectiveness or legitimacy of any concept of development–then the critical issue is one of control within and between political systems. Throughout the Cold War era of development, third world nations achieved nominal political freedom, or external sovereignty as a kind of diplomatic independence. The defining feature of this period, as a consequence of the logic of relations between constructs, was the idea of development through ‘assistance.’
However, in a local social process there were limits to diplomatic engagement in the form of asocial governmental relations. External political emancipation and internal economic advance were to be the corollaries of juridical independence. Bureaucratic elites had to transform an alien logic and skeletal structure into an organism with social life. But this constructive period had not been the result of a naturally compelling constitutive period; its timing and character had been forced. The overwhelming imperatives of centralization and order led to disequilibrium amongst the elements and to social upheaval. Metaphysically absolute political authority rendered possible diplomatic independence, but without corresponding internal checks and balances, the abuse of power was not illogical and the lack of consolidation a natural consequence.
If diplomatic-style economic assistance was ineffective, and political and social imbalance a barrier to consolidation, then the geopolitical imperatives of the superpowers contributed another set of distortions. Development was charged with the terms of confrontation between East and West. On the one hand, the filter of assistance reflected, not only indigenous aims of obtaining external independence, but a time of grand diplomacy of Cold War deterrence and brinkmanship. On the other, the pursuit of US-Soviet interests did not remain in the realm of diplomacy but extended by proxy, and at times directly, into factional competition within developing states. To the idea of development as modernization was added a redefinition of progress: alliance with the defender of the faith of capitalism or communism as a means to the promised land of ideological victory.
Only now, in a third, post-Cold War, stage can joint control of development be considered. There are prevailing dangers that a new standard will be employed to measure the old formula of development as progress. ‘Autonomic’ capitalism and democracy appear the test of advancement. These are today’s equivalent to ‘civilization’ and ‘modernization.’ They are alien, arbitrary and narrower conditions applied in a broader context: if both East and West were ‘modern’ models for the South, then capitalism and democracy are criteria of the West for consolidation in both the former second and third worlds. Paternalistic development has yet to be applied to first world nations, but they too are subject to further evolution. Still, this perceptual ‘development gap’ divides the earth in two–not so much between East and West or North and South, but between contested and contented societies. Disequilibrium and violence distinguishes one from the other, in an era dominated by international imperatives of internal consolidation.
Most of the three worlds are in between a constructive and consolidative stage, or in varying degrees of one or the other. Some individual states are in the midst of chaotic stages. The axis that is connecting action by the international community as a whole and local communities in transition between stages of complexity seems to be a new centre of gravity. This would alter fundamentally the logic of a diplomatic community of states. In an international political system, the standards of measurement for development would be of a different kind, certainly other than the institutions and forms of elements that characterized the stages of sovereign-state evolution. As such, worldwide efforts to consolidate internally would be the last stage of inter-governmental development and the constitutive stage of a more complex international system.
Peace-maintenance is a concept for joint political control of internal consolidation as a last stage of development. It is a means of manoeuvering, for both a local population and the international community, between systems and stages of complexity. It is the ability, as part of an international social process, to determine the means and goals of development and to choose a future locally.
International Organization and Peace Operations
International Organization and Peace Operations
Peace-maintenance is the result of the historical evolution of international organization and peace operations in four stages comparable to the stages of development. In a first constitutive stage before the second world war, elements of international organization were in formation. Limited bodies emerged, particularly in the period between the establishment of the International Telegraphic Union (1865) in the nineteenth century and the League of Nations (1920) in the twentieth. As a ‘cooperative’ organization,(51) the League was not a construct greater than the sum of its parts, and Article 1 of the Covenant referred only to the “members.” A variety of disparate experiments were conducted in peace operations. In 1920-1921, military forces and civilian commissions supervised plebiscites in Schleswig, Allenstein and Marienwerder, the Klagenfurt Basin, Upper Silesia and Sopron. Territory was administered-in-transition in Danzig (1920), Memel (1920-1924), the Saar Basin (1920-1935) and Leticia (1933-1934). A truce was supervised between Greece and Bulgaria (1925) and troops accompanying the administrative commission in Leticia acted as an interpositionary force between Columbia and Peru. (52)
A second constructive stage of international organization and peace operations lasted from 1945 to 1989, and like its corresponding stage of development, this era of traditional ‘peacekeeping’ was dominated by a diplomatic habit. Unlike the League, the United Nations was a ‘collective’ arrangement and something more than the sum of its parts. Article 2 of the Charter distinguished between “the Organization” and “the Members.” Its legal personality was affirmed. (53) With external independence, it functioned between states in an assistance manner. Peacekeepers separated sovereign-state belligerents in places as diverse as the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, Kashmir between India and Pakistan, and between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. (54)
With the deployment of a decolonization mission to Namibia in 1989, peace operations entered a consolidative stage as they were dispatched to conflicts within states. UN forces were regarded to be in a “second generation” as they relied less on the conventional necessity of consent of belligerents.(55) Within contested societies, as in Cambodia and Mozambique, the UN attempted to supervise transitions from conditions of conflict to minimal order by fulfilling a variety of tasks, including delivering humanitarian assistance, organizing elections, protecting human rights, exercising administrative powers, and maintaining law and order in a secure environment.
No longer functioning between systems, peace missions could not remain aloof of their direct relationship to local territory, population or government. However, the diplomatic behaviour of peacekeepers either caused further fragmentation, as in Somalia,(56) or failed to redirect significantly the indigenous balance of power, as in Cambodia.(57) The use of military force has been grafted on to the diplomatic framework of a constructive era to fill the gap created by the imperatives of internal consolidation. Varying concepts for this have been collectively referred to cosmetically as “peace-enforcement.” Unless military force can be focused and directed politically, it can cause considerable disequilibrium in a system.
As important as are diplomacy and military force, they have proved entirely unsuitable as exclusive responses to the social and political demands of a consolidative stage. This requires peace-maintenance and the capacity to administer-in-transition local elements. However, as a diplomatic institution, the UN is inherently limited in its ability to shift from a constructive to consolidative stage of international organization. Consequently, the evolution of peace operations has outstripped its logic. In the same manner as the last stage of development, if peace-maintenance can bridge the gap between constructivist tools and consolidation, then it would have linked peace operations to a constitutive stage of international law and order maintenance, beyond inter-state organization.
While the objective is internal consolidation, a peace-maintenance operation may have to deploy in any of a state’s constitutive, constructive, consolidative or chaotic stages. In a constitutive environment, a peace-maintenance operation provides, in the absence of centralized authority, a link-in-transition between elements as they organically coalesce and indigenously unify. The UN trusteeship system at times operated in such a context, but it was dominated by the imperial interests of the colonial power charged with governance, including the British in Tanganyika, the Belgians in Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, the Italians in Somalia. Administering authorities tended not to be genuinely concerned with successful self-rule after independence. At the other extreme, a diplomatic approach by the UN to a constitutive process in Western Sahara, which included defining elements such as the population belonging to the territory, proved fatal.(58)
A contested society can be the result of too much power at the centre and conflict is a consequence of disequilibrium in the system at the cost of the many. As such, it may be, like El Salvador, at an arrested stage of construction.(59) A peace-maintenance operation focuses on correcting the imbalance between excessive powers of government and inadequate political participation of the population.
There may be political violence or threatening instability during a nation’s consolidative process, as in Argentina(60) or the former Soviet Union.(61) A peace-maintenance operation would be able to conduct or supervise an election, verify a transfer of power or ensure compliance with human rights standards.
A state may have descended into the fragmentation of a chaotic stage, comparable to Cambodia(62) or Somalia.(63) There are likely to be several factions vying for central authority. A peace-maintenance operation has to create an independent centre of gravity to displace the existing competition. This might be tantamount to: returning to a constitutive stage if complete deconstruction of elements is likely before reconstruction can begin; shifting to a constructive stage if a core can be re-established; or in the best case scenario, reverting immediately to a consolidative stage if institutions are sufficiently intact in spite of claims for their control. Therefore, successful missions need the capacity to maintain a presence through several stages.
Similarly, a peace-maintenance operation may have to contend with more than one stage at once. In the case of Namibia, supervising the withdrawal of South African forces at the same time a new authority inherited power, was shifting away from both a constructive stage at one level and constitutive stage at another. This was intended to result in a new constructive stage better able to consolidate in time. (64)
Furthermore, once a contested society has passed from one stage to another through a peace-maintenance operation, there is no guarantee that it will not revert to its previous condition, or as the result of new and separate causes, shift to another stage of disequilibrium. The lesson of recent events has been that comparatively consolidated nations like former Yugoslavia can quickly descend into chaos.
This raises the question of a link between internal conditions and external concerns in the form of a permanent international presence or arrangement in commonly contested societies. It could expand or contract according to requirements on the ground. Or it could act as a kind of early warning of civil disturbance and trigger mechanism for an international response, in the manner that the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission is a kind of trip-wire between Iraqi movements and US military force. Boutros-Ghali has proposed a similar concept, but it is yet to be accepted. This, like ‘peace-building,’ is a species of conflict prevention. (65)
Peace-maintenance operations range in their suitability for each stage of state complexity. There are four categories varying in increasing degrees of juridical and functional scope.
In an assistance operation, the local administration is in some though not complete disarray and a peace-maintenance authority provides international standards for the development of national institutions. Government may have been mishandled or abused and is a source of dispute. Assistance is ideally suited to an existing, if marginal, consolidative stage. It may be unavoidable in a constructive stage as a result of the strength of the existing authority. In such cases, the mission has few independent means to ensure a sustainable impact, unless it symbolically represents external influence.
A partnership operation deploys when a local authority is powerful and has adequate resources, either because it is a colonial or another kind of occupying force withdrawing, or it may be a totalitarian regime submitting itself to a democratizing process. The peace-maintenance authority behaves as a partner of the local authority, given the coherent structures of governance in place, although it is first among equals and has the final say in selective direction. This category is suited to a constructive stage, but is also applicable in consolidation.
Control is the most flexible type of operation and can be applied at any stage, in principle. Control is the functional constant in each category, while the juridical context determines the measure in which that control is conducted by the local community or the peace-maintenance authority. Control is the instrument that determines development. This is clearest in the context of constructive and, to a lesser extent, consolidative stages. Also, it may be unavoidable in a chaotic stage if divided factions have some coherent structure.
A control operation exercises the powers of ‘direct control.’ A peace-maintenance authority deploys throughout the instruments of the local administering power, including ministries, the judicial system, police and armed forces. Once deployed, peace-maintenance officials observe the local authority conducting the affairs of state and in the event that it commits an infraction according to the terms of an overall mandate for the process, the peace-maintenance authority has the power to ‘take corrective action’ by dismissing personnel or redirecting a local policy decision.
In a governorship operation, the peace-maintenance authority assumes full responsibilities for conducting the affairs of government. This occurs when there is an absence or total collapse of local state structures, as in a constitutive or chaotic stage. The peace-maintenance authority may assume the tasks of governance itself as part of an operation deployed specifically for the purpose or a single power or group of powers might be appointed as agents of the international community, performing tasks on its behalf. The latter case requires a means of effective accountability that ensures continued direction by the international community of the nations conducting the operation.
As a system, itself, a peace-maintenance operation that intends to control conditions in any environment is conducted in four stages. This is regardless of whether the authority-in-transition is in one measure or another international or local. In a first constitutive stage, the challenges in the field and the elements of the operation are identified. Deployment is a second constructive stage, in which the mission arrives decisively and establishes itself as an international authority with local jurisdiction. The third consolidative stage is formally a transitional phase in which the international authority and local population function together to achieve a sustainable result. In a fourth stage, peace-maintainers either withdraw altogether or a longer-term presence is accepted locally.
Peace operations to date have expected too much, too quickly. Internal, national consolidation has been anticipated as a result of a single transitional phase. It has amounted to a ‘quick fix’ world view. Capitalism, democracy and the institutions of Western, liberal-style states have been the measurements of instant-development. For successful peace-maintenance, these cannot be the standards of first instance. The transitional phase needs to be divided into two parts, a first dominated by an international authority and a second by the local community.
The goal of peace-maintenance operations is to establish a flexible administrative mechanism for control in longer-term transitions. It is the establishment of an interim social process between contested and contented societies. A population should be able to control its environment, regardless of the stage of complexity. As an effective and legitimate form of transitional administration, it would be a kind of temporary system, until such time questions concerning construction and consolidation can be decided. Development could be genuinely chosen, not ‘autonomically’ accepted.
The requirements of a society-in-transition include a flexible mechanism for control, the generation of social momentum and direct linkages between internal strata and other systems.(66)
Peace-maintenance is not ‘development’ or ‘peace-building’ as state-building. It cannot be bound by state conceptions of the elements: sovereignty, government, citizens and territorial boundaries dividing inside and out. Instead, it may be based on archetypal equivalents. A genuine form of self-determination is a kind of interim sovereignty. The control mechanism replaces the role of government in the transitional period. Direct participation in governance corresponds to ‘representational’ citizenry. Rather than territorial place, there is administrative space.
A control mechanism maintains political coherence and social equilibrium. If it becomes too exclusive, the system collapses, for the reasons that construction without consolidation equals extinction. The perennial balance between central direction and decentralized administration is critical. Individuals can identify with a series of associations ascending in size: the district or town, the region or province, the state and, in principle, the international community. Local inhabitants will depend on an administrative structure that can link them to each level simultaneously and perpetually.
To balance centralization, decentralization and internationalization, peace-maintenance rests more on the support of the many than on the power of the few. The key to social momentum is a basic unit of administration that generates individual participation at each level of association. Its size is limited to ensure social relevance through personal familiarity amongst members. This avoids the supremacy of anonymous bureaucracy, and can therefore limit abuses of power. Like the control of surplus production in capitalism, bureaucracy for government is control of surplus social energy. Direct participation reduces excess social surplus, and its accumulation is restricted by the separation of powers between each level of administration. A national centre retains control primacy, but not exclusivity.
Economic development accelerates social momentum. The welfare of local communities will increasingly rely on a network of direct connections internationally. The means to global economic domination has meant incrementally replacing ownership of the means of production with control of an impersonal, and virtual, market. Through technology, production steadily has become decentralized. By shifting their focus of activity, powerful inter-continental corporations vie for primacy in a world trading space that has expanded beyond the capacity of many nations to be competitive. The market has extended, in an unprecedented manner, the distance between producer and consumer to the benefit of the trader.(67)
In the same manner that Europe wished to circumvent traders by discovering a direct sea route to Asia, the economic survival of fragile societies will be the result of their ability to avoid dependence on the market-space. As direct trade relies more and more on transnational social and administrative links, short-term financial benefits will strengthen inter-communal ties in the long-term. As a rule of momentum, it is the nature of wealth to beget wealth, for there is “a ferocious law which states: ‘to he that has, will be given; from he that has not, will be taken away.'”(68)
The task of a peace-maintenance operation is to generate this kind of momentum for eventual self-perpetuation. It establishes a political control mechanism and constructs an administrative apparatus as part of a transitional social process. It approaches development through assistance, partnership, control or governorship, depending on the stage of complexity of the local community, whether constitutive, constructive, consolidative or chaotic. The international objective is universal internal consolidation. Yet, the ability to achieve this would indicate the advent of a constitutive stage of an international political system. Consequently, extreme particularism will have led to universalism.
*.This article benefitted from comments at a conference on peacekeeping and development, “Beyond the Emergency,” convened in Pretoria, South Africa, on 13-14 March 1996 by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Defence Policy.
*.*Research Associate and Lecturer in international law and peace operations at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University.
1.On Article 1(1) as a central juridical premise for peace operations, see for instance John W. Halderman, “Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 56, No. 4, October 1962, pp. 972-973.
2.These include: the United States; Japan; France; Germany; Italy; the United Kingdom; Canada; the Netherlands; Sweden; and Norway. Cf. John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, Eds., A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 48th General Assembly of the United Nations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., and the United Nations Association of the United States of America, Inc., 1993), pp. 163-164.
3.Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Development 1995 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), p. 1.
4.“Note by the President of the Security Council,” UN Doc. S/23500 of 31 January 1992, p. 3.
5.Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., and the International Peace Academy, 1995), pp. 49-51; and Jarat Chopra, United Nations Authority in Cambodia (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1994), pp. 55-75.
6.This is in reference to the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). See further, Jarat Chopra, Åge Eknes and Toralv Nordbø, Fighting for Hope in Somalia (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 50-61.
7.Cf. the ‘State of the Art’ literature review on the subject: Patricia Weiss-Fagen, “Research and Sources: A Bibliographic Essay,” unpublished paper for the United Nations Institute for Social Development and Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies Programme of Strategic and International Security Studies “Working Seminar on the Challenge of Rebuilding War-torn Societies, 1994.”
8.“Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,” UN Doc. A/50/60 and S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995, cf. para. 33 and 53.
9.On the harmonization of national legislation concerning peace operations as a means to this, see the author’s “Commitment to Peace-Maintenance,” Proceedings of the Canadian Council on International Law, 1995, pp. 32-35.
10.See the author’s response to Adam Roberts’ “Armed Humanitarianism: A Contradiction in Terms?” in Briefings, Fall 1995, pp. 1 and 3.
11.Cf. Matthias Stiefel, “UNDP in Conflicts and Disasters: An Overview Report of the ‘Continuum Project,'” (Geneva: UNDP Project INT/93/709, August 1994).
12.Cf. James P. Sewell and Mark B. Salter, “Panarchy and Other Norms for Global Governance: Boutros-Ghali, Rosenau, and Beyond,” Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 3, Sept.-Dec. 1995, pp. 373-382.
13.Cf. the collection of essays in Ikuo Kabashima and Lynn T. White III, Eds., Political Systems and Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
14.Don Martindale, Social Life and Cultural Change (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962); and see his “The Formation and Destruction of Communities,” in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, Eds., Explorations in Social Change (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), pp. 61-87.
15.Myron Weiner, “Political Integration and Political Development” in Harvey G. Kebschull, Ed., Politics in Transitional Societies (New york: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), pp. 263-272.
16.Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service, Eds., Evolution and Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1970).
17.Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay” in Kabashima and White, Political Systems and Change, pp. 95-139.
18.S.N. Eisenstadt, “Process of Change and Institutionalization of the Political Systems of Centralized Empires” in Zollschan and Hirsch, Explorations in Social Change, pp. 432-451.
19.Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation (London: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 21, 174 and generally.
20.Cf. Gregoire Nicolis, “Physics of far-from-equilibrium systems and self-organisation” in Paul Davies, Ed., The New Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 316-347.
21.Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1959), ch. II; and see further his The Myth of the Eternal Return (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954); Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time (London: Verso, 1995); and G.J. Whitrow, Time in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 74-75.
22.George Steiner, Nostalgia for the Absolute (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1983).
23.Article 1, “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” (1933). Cf. Jarat Chopra, “The Obsolescence of Intervention under International Law,” in Marianne Heiberg, Ed., Subduing Sovereignty (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), pp. 45-52.
24.Cf. Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
25.On the sociological dimensions of this process, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), Part I.
26.Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
27.F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 41.
28.Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
29.Olga Tellegen-Couperus, A Short History of Roman Law (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 73-77.
30.Cf. James Crawford, “The Criteria for Statehood in International Law,” British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 48, 1976-77, pp. 93-182.
31.Cf. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, “Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 280-303.
32.Cf. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 319-325.
33.Cf. Ram Charitra Prasad Singh, Kingship in Northern India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968).
34.Michael Barratt Brown, Models in Political Economy (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 311. On the de-industrialization of the Third World during colonialism, see further Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), ch. 8.
35.Cf. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria, Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).
36.Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York: Times Books, 1992).
37.Whitrow, Time in History, pp. 147 and 177-180.
38.W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
39.Cf. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951); and Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1966).
40.Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, Eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and A.F. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965).
41.Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957).
42.André Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
43.Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
44.Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980).
45.Willy Brandt, et al., North-South, A Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).
46.Peter L. Berger, The Capitalist Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
47.Tessitore and Woolfson, A Global Agenda, p. 164.
48.Brown, Models of Political Economy, pp. 318-323.
49.Philip Allott, “Philosophy and Global Social Development,” unpublished paper presented to the United Nations Development Programme Roundtable on Global Change, Stockholm, July 1994; and cf. his Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), ch. 17.
50.See further, Jarat Chopra, “The Space of Peace-Maintenance,” Political Geography, Vol. 15, No. 13/14, March/April 1996, pp. 335-357.
51.On the distinction between ‘cooperative’ and ‘collective,’ see Jarat Chopra, “From the Fig Leaf to the Olive Branch,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1993-1994, pp. 31-32.
52.Cf. Jarat Chopra, “UN Civil Governance-in-Trust” in Thomas G. Weiss, Ed., The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 70-75.
53.Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case. Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174.
54.See further, Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text (Hanover, NH: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1992).
55.John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1993).
56.Cf. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996, pp. 70-85.
57.Seth Mydans, “Cambodia’s Real Boss Rules From the No. 2 Post,” New York Times, 25 March 1996.
58.Jarat Chopra, “Breaking the Stalemate in Western Sahara,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 303-319.
59.Ian Johnstone, Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador (Boulder, CO: International Peace Academy/Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
60.Cf. Deborah L. Norden, “Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina’s UN Missions,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 334-339.
61.Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, “Prospects for Containing Conflict in the Former Second World,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 552-583.
62.Human Rights Watch/Asia, Cambodia at War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995).
63.Human Rights Watch/Africa, Somalia Faces the Future (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995).
64.Cf. Heribert Weiland and Matthew Braham, The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and Lessons for the Future (Freiburg: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut/International Peace Academy, 1994), pp. 163-178.
65.“Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,” para. 31.
66.Cf. the concluding remarks in W. Andy Knight, “Towards a subsidiarity model for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy: making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter operational,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 47-49.
67.Brown, Models of Political Economy, pp. 362-363.
68.Primo Levi, Survival In Auschwitz (New York: Collier Books, 1993), p. 88.
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