This paper will discuss certain aspects of the Latin American standpoint as regards the alleged doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Despite abundant debate on the subject,[1] for purposes of this paper we will assume that such a doctrine exists and has actually been used in international practice.

The paper will be divided into five main parts: I) Introduction: The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention, II) Latin America and Intervention in International Law: The Traditional Approach, III) Changes in the Latin American Attitude Towards Humanitarian Intervention? IV) Latin American Attitude towards Late Developments, and V) Conclusions and Proposals.

We will explore the reasons for the Latin American position with respect to intervention. Eventually we will arrive at the conclusion that the principle of absolute non-intervention underwent a process of progressive relaxation and that under the current state of international law, Latin America seems to admit the possibility of an intervention for reasons of humanity given certain conditions.

To conclude we summarize what those conditions might be and suggest that the region play a more active role in the definition of the guidelines of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

I. Introduction: The Principle of Non-Intervention

i. Introduction

Any attempt to deal with the concept of “intervention” or related issues is going to be faced with the problems inherent to its very definition. As with other terms in international law, a delimitation of the concept appears necessary before entering into its analysis.

Indeed, Judge Higgins recognized that “intervention can mean many things to many people”, [2] pointing out to the existence of several degrees, which go from a simple interference in the form of economic influence to military intervention. [3]

Much in the same vein, Professor Tesón distinguishes between three different categories of intervention: “soft”, “hard” and “forcible”. [4] While “soft” intervention would imply “simply discussion, examination and recommendatory actions” and “hard” intervention refers to measures that are coercive but do not imply the use of force –such as economic sanctions- “forcible” intervention comprises acts involving the use of force. [5]

The Latin American position on the subject started from the proposition that every kind of interference is prohibited and thus constituted illegitimate intervention. [6] For purposes of this paper and in order to circumscribe the analysis, any broad definition will be narrowed to a concept of protecting human rights, excluding other purposes for the intervention. In addition, we will focus on “forcible” interventions only and on their perception by Latin American countries.

Bearing this in mind, the definition provided by Professor Wil Verwey appears to suit the aims of this work. Professor Verwey defines humanitarian intervention as

[t]he threat or use of force by a state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life of persons, regardless of their nationality, such protection taking place neither upon authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations nor with permission by the legitimate government of the target state.[7]

II. Latin America and Intervention in International Law: The Traditional Approach

The principle of Non-Intervention has been historically linked to the very existence of Latin American countries, which regarded it as a protection for them from the involvement in their affairs of other states. [8] The law propounded by Latin American publicists [9] revealed an overwhelming concern for the unlimited independence and territorial integrity of the American states as well as respect for local standards of justice. [10] In this regard, an American international law scholar once wrote: “Latin American jurisprudence strained toward the Doctrine of Non-Intervention under whatever circumstances, toward the absolute and unhampered sovereignty of the state, even toward its complete irresponsibility to foreign governments.” [11]

More than fifty years after those writings and in the light of the evolution achieved in international law, these words seem too extreme. Nevertheless, the Doctrine of Non-Intervention continues to be one of the most fundamental pillars on which the Latin American community relies. [12] This could not have been otherwise, taking into account the historical origins of the Principle of Non-intervention.

ii. Origins of the Non-intervention Principle in Latin America

As stated above, the grounds for the Latin American position contrary to intervention are manifold, although probably rooted primarily in history. Professor Verwey restated the reasons for Third World skepticism against intervention, as the following: [13]

a) the “imperialist implications” in the history of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which developed “during an era of Western hegemony over uncivilized States”
b) the fact that it has so frequently been abused [14]
c) the circumstance that it can only be resorted by powerful States against weak ones, [15]
d) the consideration that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is vague and has been used only to benefit the interests of the intervening State. [16]

These reasons, together with the historical fact that Latin America was the target of numerous interventions of various kinds during the XIXth and XXth centuries, [17] shed some light as to the erection of the Non-intervention principle in Latin America.

Latin America could not and did not remain indolent to these foreign interventions. Attempts to resist those intrusions by foreign powers included: [18]

a) development of a Latin American law that prohibited intervention,
b) partial alliances among Latin American countries,establishment of unity and a general confederation of Latin American States and the subsequent development of a system of collective security, and
d) Appeals for protection by foreign powers.

Without ignoring the importance of the three other reactions, we will focus on the first one, i.e. the development of a body of Latin American law prohibiting foreign intervention.

iii. The development of the Non Intervention Principle in the Inter-American Context

For many years the Latin American countries made a great effort to have the Principle of Non-intervention incorporated into Inter-American international law. Bearing in mind, as highlighted by Judge Caminos, that humanitarian intervention has been used in the region “as an instrument of power politics”, [19] it is not difficult to imagine why Latin American countries where so interested in making the Principle of Non-intervention one of the pillars of the Inter-American system.

We will now examine how the Non-intervention principle became part of international law among Latin American countries. In so doing, we will consider the two major sources of international law, namely customary law and treaty law.

a) Regional Customary Law

Latin American countries and scholars advocated for many years against the existence of a right to intervention. [20] Finally, in 1933 the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States [21] represented the transition for the Non-intervention principle from the doctrinal to the conventional level in international law. [22] It could be said that the Non-intervention principle as contained in this Convention gained rapid acceptance since it was regarded as generally declaratory of existing law. [23]

Furthermore, since the Montevideo Convention, the Principle of Non-intervention has been recited in almost any other inter-American instrument on the subject. [24] This, together with the fact that the Principle of Non-intervention has been sustained by Latin American countries for more than a century in its practice with other States, are proof of the necessary state practice and the opinio juris for the creation of a customary norm. [25]

As Professor Schachter states: “In emphasizing the importance of ‘adoption’ and approval by States, I draw attention to the ‘political’ element or value judgment implicit in such approval. The governments do not express such approval solely on scientific grounds. They also make a judgment that the new lex scripta is desirable.” [26]

In other words, when the Latin American countries adopted the Principle of Non-intervention in the Montevideo and subsequent Conventions, they did so under the belief that the principle should have a legal status as one of the pillars of the Inter-American system. And if they chose to make a convention embodying the principle it mainly was because they already felt bound by it and only wanted to affirm it and circumscribe its limits.

Furthermore, the World Court specifically recognized the customary character of the Non-intervention principle in the Nicaragua case: “There can be no doubt that the principle of non-intervention is an autonomous principle of customary law . . . It is, moreover, a principle of law which in the Inter-American system has its own peculiar developments, interpretation and importance” [27]

In addition, Latin American attitude towards humanitarian intervention can also be regarded as a persistent objection to the existence of the doctrine. As a persistent objector a State which has consistently objected to or opposed the development of customary rule is allowed to avoid being bound by that rule in its relations with all other States. [28]

According to the jurisprudence of the World Court, for a State not to be bound by a customary rule, the manifestation of refusal to that rule should be consistent and unequivocal. [29] These requisites seem to be fulfilled by Latin American states, which have clearly and consistently objected to interventions since their independence.

Together with Professor Byers we wonder if persistent objection is ever realistically available as a long-term option for States. Or to put in a different way, can States persistently object for indefinite periods of time? Professor Byers provides us with examples that advise to the contrary. [30] An in-depth inquiry into the derivations of this issue would exceed the purpose of this work. Suffice to remark the importance of the doctrine of persistent objection as regards its systemic effects, compared by the English scholar to the role of an opposition party in a domestic legislature. [31]

Latin American practice together with the opinion of the Court in the Nicaragua case leave no room for any doubt that the Non-intervention principle represents a customary norm in the Inter-American context and is therefore binding among its members as a source of international law. Nevertheless, Latin American nations have deemed it necessary to confirm the existence of this principle at the conventional level. To that end, they included the Non-intervention principle in the OAS Charter, the highest international legal instrument in the region.

b) The Provisions in the OAS Charter

The norms in the OAS Charter dealing with the Principle of Non-intervention are embodied in Chapter IV, entitled Fundamental Rights and Duties of States. [32] Articles 19 and 21 OAS Charter, even broader than the ones in the UN Charter [33] codify the principle of Non-Intervention:

Article 19: No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements.(emphasis added)

Article 21: The territory of the state is inviolable, it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever… (emphasis added).

These two provisions, among others less stringent in the OAS Charter, [34] clearly reflect the position of the Latin American nations against the earlier interventionist tendencies of the United States and Europe. Through its comprehensive wording, those States tried to circumscribe the principle of non-interference in such a way that no problems could arise which would eventually weaken the prohibition of intervention. [35]

Articles 19 and 21 have also served as a model after which other international instruments have been designed. [36] Due to their importance for international law in general and for the Latin American community in particular, and as the leading legal body in the region, they deserve a closer reading.

Article 19 prohibits both collective and individual intervention in the internal or external [37] affairs of other States. The reference to a “group of States” or collective intervention was an addition with respect to the 1933 Montevideo Convention incorporated at the 1948 Bogota Conference. Argentine Professor Podesta Costa argued years before in the occasion of the 1927 Meeting of the International Commission of Jurists, “[I]t is understood that a coalition is not lawful … [the purpose of the norm] is to prohibit all kinds of action, be it taken by one State or by a group of States.” [38] We cannot but agree with such proposition. Indeed, intervention does not become legitimate by the mere fact of being carried out by more than one State. On the contrary, being collective intervention potentially more dangerous and powerful than individual intervention, it should be barred in the same or even a more stringent way.

Moreover, according to the language of Articles 19 and 21 OAS Charter, intervention is not going to be allowed in any case, irrespective of the grounds. Worded differently, not even human rights would justify the violation of the non-intervention principle as consecrated in the Charter. [39] Therefore some commentators have argued, that as far as the Inter-American System is concerned, human rights were less protected under the OAS Charter than they were under general international law. [40] As a consequence, these provisions appear to be troublesome at first sight, especially if read in conjunction with human rights provisions of the Charter.

Indeed, Article 3(k) of the OAS Charter together with the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols reaffirm the commitment of the region with the protection and promotion of human rights. These instruments also serve as an indication that human rights are no longer within the internal jurisdiction of the OAS Member States. [41] The creation of human rights monitoring bodies in the region also evinces the international status of human rights.

The question is whether the absolute prohibition of articles 19 and 21 can be reconciled with the commitment for the protection and promotion of human rights in the Inter-American System. In other words, should Latin American countries remain impassive in case of grave and large-scale violations of human rights in the region? Certainly not. Although an intervention, even if humanitarian, would violate the norms of the OAS Charter, Latin American nations never ignored the possibility of resorting to collective action as a means of protecting human rights.

For that reason, these countries tried to distinguish between collective action taken in pursuance to international agreements and intervention as an arbitrary means of interference in other States’ affairs, the former being permitted and the latter prohibited under Inter-American law.

In the same vein, the Inter-American Juridical Commission issued in 1965 a legal opinion on the differences between both institutions. Among its conclusions, the Commission found that intervention represented a violation of fundamental rights of States, meaning an injury to the State experiencing it and favoring the sole interest of the intervening country, whereas collective security sought to restore a violated right and redress the injury suffered by a State or group of States and was in the interest of all States comprised in the corresponding international association. [42]

To sum up, and after revision of the provision on intervention in the OAS Charter, we can affirm that, at least as to the law, Latin American countries reject the possibility of intervention in any case, notwithstanding its purposes or modalities. These nations would only accept action by a group of States if taken in accordance with an international agreement and for the reparation of injuries suffered. We must now determine if the principle remains in vigor after the experiences in the second half of the XXth century.

III. Changes in the Latin American Attitude towards Humanitarian Intervention?

i. An Interesting Case: The General Assembly “Uniting for Peace” Resolutions

On November 3, 1950, the GA passed Resolution 377 (also known as “Uniting for Peace” Resolution) [43] as a reaction to the situation originated by the Security Council attitude towards the armed attack by North Korean forces to the Republic of Korea. [44]

“Uniting for Peace” decided, that when a situation of a “paralyzed” Security Council arises, the GA could take up the matter and make any necessary recommendations to the Member States, including the use of armed forces.

The Resolutions as a whole were adopted 52-5 with two abstentions. As regards the Latin American countries, they all voted in favor of the resolution (18 votes out of 52), with the only exception of Argentina, which abstained.

Remarkably, the only few negative votes belonged to the former Soviet Union and its political allies. In the case under analysis, Latin American votes against the resolution, particularly in such a sensitive topic as intervention, would have meant rejection of the majority’s will, because of philosophical and political considerations; [45] however, almost every Latin American country chose to give its support to the Resolutions.

Due to the fact that “Uniting for peace” resolutions would authorize the GA to mount a humanitarian intervention, [46] one could argue that Latin American countries, when showing overwhelming adherence to the resolutions –as reflected in their voting pattern- have considered and accepted this possibility as legitimate. [47]

Although this is a valid inference, which demonstrates the beginning of a progressive relaxation of the Principle of Non-intervention, it should not be interpreted as abandonment by Latin American countries of such principle. International law now recognizes that resolutions and declarations are instances of State practice, which are indicative of rules of customary international law. [48] In spite of that, Latin American support to the Resolutions did not mean endorsement of customary rule of humanitarian intervention. Instead, such support might find its explanation in two different grounds:

a) Latin American countries might have seen the Resolution as a way of turning the intervention decision-making process -according to the Charter under the monopoly of the Security Council- into a more democratic one.
b) Intervention under the UN Charter represents “collective action” in the sense that is provided in an international treaty and is therefore legitimate and accepted by Latin American countries.

ii. Latin American practice in the second half of XXth Century

Despite the strict norms on non-intervention that characterize the Inter-American System, the region has witnessed many instances of intervention in the past decades. [49]

In the early 1960s, the situation in the Caribbean began to turn the OAS toward the view that violations of human rights and denials of democratic freedoms within member states might affect the peace of the Americas and might thus become a proper concern of the Organization. [50]

Precisely, in 1959, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was convened in Santiago de Chile to deal with the tension in the Caribbean region, in particular Cuba, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. The Meeting issued a Declaration, whose Preamble stated that the peace in the Latin American countries “can be effective only insofar as human rights and fundamental freedoms and the exercise of representative democracy are a reality within each of them.” [51]

The Meeting also asked the Inter-American Council of Jurists to prepare a draft human rights convention, modeled after the European convention, and to study the creation of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Finally, the Meeting resolved to establish the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.

A consideration of these elements shows a growing concern by Latin American countries for the respect of human rights. [52] This new position could be hardly compatible with the rigid Principle of Non-intervention maintained up to that moment.

In 1965, after the occupation by US forces of the Dominican Republic, the OAS Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called together one more time in order to evaluate US actions and eventually authorize measures to deal with the situation. It was decided to transform the US forces already in the Dominican Republic into an Inter-American Force, which should assist in peace negotiations and in evacuating foreign nationals.

This intervention by OAS in the Dominican Republic generated much controversy. Some scholars considered it a “smoke screen” to conceal US unilateral intervention. Indeed, Professor Nanda stated that “after having intervened unilaterally, the United States did feel that it needed some kind of umbrella, and the OAS was a handy excuse in a way.” [53]

Notwithstanding any hidden reasons of the US for proposing an OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic, we need to focus on the motivations for such a decision by the Latin American countries. In my view, Latin American states made for the first time a balancing test between human rights and democratic values, on one side, and an absolute Principle of Non-intervention on the other. It seems to me that OAS States decided not to stick to an inflexible Non-intervention principle anymore and initiated a collective action for the protection of human rights in Dominican Republic instead. No doubt that in so doing they also turn an inevitable unilateral -and therefore, prohibited- US intervention into a collective action under the aegis of the OAS Charter.

Nonetheless, Lori Damrosch is of the opinion that OAS intervention in Dominican Republic in aid of the US did not add legitimacy to such intervention. Quite the reverse, it could be regarded as being contrary to or at least outside of the OAS Charter. [54]

Later, in the 1970s, the OAS entered a lethargic period [55] that lasted for many years. The decline of the absolute principle of Non-Intervention had begun. The situation in the Dominican Republic triggered, as Cabranes put it, a “profound metamorphosis” in the perception of the principle by Latin America. [56] The current significance of the doctrine must be assessed in the light of late developments.

IV. Latin American Attitude towards Late Developments

As expressed by Professor Brownlie, examination of state practice in relation to humanitarian intervention “is rendered difficult as it is frequently a subsidiary justification for an intervention, which is an expression of purely national policy.” [57] He then goes on to say, “the jurists have tended to ex post facto classification of interventions which were justified without reference to any specific doctrine of humanitarian intervention.” [58]

For those reasons, together with the difficulties implied in the definition of the concept, it is sometimes hard to clearly identify what are the purposes for an intervention and whether a specific intervention relies on humanitarian grounds or not. Bearing this in mind, I will try to define the Latin American position as regards the intervention in Yugoslavia, which is the last and most debated case of humanitarian intervention.

Latin American responses to NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia were not uniform. In a context dominated by changing legal and political interpretations of the right to intervention and of democratic and humanitarian crises, reactions in the region varied from moderate support to open opposition. [59]

On the one side were Argentina and Chile, concerned about NATO’s decision, but trying through their responses to reconcile national interests, sovereignty and respect for human rights. For Argentina in particular, NATO’s action was not totally illegitimate. [60]

In the middle of the spectrum we could find Brazil and its moderate approach to the issue. The Brazilian position can be explained by its long-established alignment with the US and its traditional emphasis on “universalism” and multilateralism as well as its more cautious stand vis-à-vis the loosening-up of the principle of non-intervention in the region. [61]

At the other end of the spectrum we find Mexico’s strong condemnation of the attacks. As a traditional defender of Latin American legal principles and self appointed voice for the Latin American countries, the Mexican government privileged Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and rigidly opposed NATO’s use of military force. As one Mexican scholar pointed out, this attitude could have been motivated by fears in the Mexican government of autonomist threats at home. [62]

Probably the only occasion when Latin America spoke with one voice with respect to the NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia was the Declaration issued by the Group of Rio [63] on March 25 1999, one day after the bombing began. [64] In its communiqué the members of the Rio Group “expressed their anxiety” about NATO actions and called on the parties to resume talks with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement.

Furthermore, the Declaration regretted the recourse to force by NATO without observance of Articles 53 and 54 of the Charter, which require previous Security Council authorization before using armed force. [65] The Declaration was all the more surprising as two of the Group of Rio members, Brazil and Argentina, only very cautiously expressed their regret over NATO actions when they had their chance at the Security Council a day before. [66] Moreover, these two Latin American nations were among the states to oppose a draft resolution condemning the air strikes on March 26. [67]

According to one scholar, the reason for the rejection might have been these countries’ concern that the adoption of the draft could have been interpreted as an approval of the repressive action by Yugoslavia (Brazil and Argentina took a rather neutral or critical stand toward NATO strikes in the previous Council session). [68] There is yet another reason which could justify their position, namely the clear will of these two Latin American countries to be considered “US partners” as a means to be accepted into the developed world. [69]

In any case, given the legal implications and expectations implied in Security Council resolutions, the members of this UN organ – especially less powerful ones- should be very careful when supporting or opposing a particular resolution. The refusal of the draft resolution condemning the air strikes as well as the previous support for SC resolution 1244 [70] on the situation in Kosovo might be seen as an endorsement of the principle of humanitarian intervention in general. [71]

As we can see, the position of Latin American countries as regards current international law issues as the attack on Yugoslavia is mainly influenced by considerations of policy and convenience rather than a strict adherence to a once rigid legal principle. As reflected in the writings of Monica Serrano:

Entangled within the different responses lie a series of factors, among which domestic political circumstances and wider regional trends are the most important. The different dynamics unleashed by the transition to democracy and the restoration of democratic civilian supremacy have strongly influenced the positions of different countries in the changing legal context for intervention and the external protection of democracy. It is, in fact, possible to analyze the various responses to the Kosovo crisis in terms of this regional quest. [72]

V. Conclusion and Proposals

After maintaining an absolute principle of non-intervention for more than a century, Latin American countries face now a dilemma: considerations of humanity are being opposed by the traditional concepts of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

As Judge Caminos stated: “traditional core OAS principles of sovereignty and non intervention are being subverted in favor of increased support of democracy and human rights.” [73] This assertion confirms what has been expressed by the predecessor of the ICJ in the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco advisory opinion, that is, that the concept of domestic jurisdiction as a limit to foreign intrusion was relative, subject to changes, with no issue irrevocably fixed in it. [74]

If the concept of internal affairs is constantly undergoing a process of modification, the same can be said to hold true as regards the other pillar of the Non-intervention principle: State sovereignty. With the transformation of its legal and philosophical foundations, the Non-intervention principle -as well as the Latin American view on it- can no longer be the same as one hundred years ago. [75] Under the new legal and factual scenario, Latin American countries would now accept intervention provided it is exercised within certain limits.

Earlier in this paper we have summarized some of the reasons for the adverse position to humanitarian intervention adopted by Latin America. One of the hypotheses of this work is that once those fears in the Latin American countries disappear, it is very likely that the negative attitude towards the humanitarian intervention doctrine will vanish as well. We shall now enter into a brief discussion of them.

The first of those worries was the imperialist implications in the doctrine. However, in the current state of affairs, it seems awkward to speak of imperialism, at least in the traditional sense of the term. Certainly, one could argue that there are new forms of imperialism. Nonetheless, those variations of the habitual meaning of the expression are not so directly related with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, nor should they be raised as a barrier when human rights violations of any kind are at stake.

Moreover, Latin American countries are no longer in such a disadvantaged position as they were in the past. Colonialism belongs to other times and the principles of State sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction in the region are not so easily threatened. In addition, Latin America, and the Third World in general, have developed mechanisms, which put them in a somewhat stronger condition. The number of Third World States and its implications for the work of a democratic body as the UN General Assembly can be a good example of this new status.

We also mentioned other reasons that originated such a strong adherence to the Non-intervention principle by Latin America. The possibility of abuse by intervening countries, the fact that intervention has generally been used by powerful States against weak States and the vagueness in its definition have all conspired against the acceptance of the doctrine in the region. Since these reasons are intertwined, the remainder of this work will refer to all of them together.

Just like years before, when Latin America took the lead in setting down the Principle of Non-intervention, the current circumstances allow it to take a major role in defining the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This is precisely the way in which many of the qualms involved in the doctrine would fade away. Many commentators have already pointed out at the convenience of clear criteria, some of them even establishing them themselves. [76]

Probably the first of these guidelines should be that the intervention have a humanitarian purpose only. No other motivations should be involved. We are aware that intervention sometimes entails many different aims. Nevertheless, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the main objective to be pursued. In addition, intervening forces should not remain in the intervened territory more than is strictly necessary. Needless to say, neither should they take any action that would directly benefit the intervening powers.

Secondly, let us affirm, together with Judge Caminos, that the trend in intervention should be in the direction of collective humanitarian action of a truly international character and with authorization of the Security Council. [77] If a genuine representation of diverse nations and interests were achieved, the likelihood of abuse by intervening countries would certainly be reduced. [78] No longer would strong States be acting against weak ones. What is more, some human rights violations are so horrendous that they can shock the conscience of mankind. It is the whole international community then, which should stand up and put an end to those atrocities.

Thirdly, as we can derive from the analysis of the Latin American position, intervention should only take place in accordance with a previous agreement and with authorization of the Security Council or a competent body. Unilateral intervention, unless otherwise authorized by international law, shall remain unlawful.

The institution of these basic criteria is fundamental. Establishing further principles is surely necessary in order to find a solution for cases of internal situations of massive human rights violations.

Our proposal is not that Latin America should have its own law for humanitarian intervention, just as it does in other international law topics (e.g. asylum). We are dealing here with the use of force, which is an issue contemplated under the UN Charter. If the law of asylum can be regional, the regulation of the use of force cannot but be universal.

As regards forcible humanitarian intervention there is no possibility of different laws for different parts of the world. There is currently however, a question of different interpretations of the prohibition of use of force in the Charter which allows opposite solutions. Without creating a new kind of law for itself, Latin America has the opportunity to express its views in every possible construction of the prohibition in a way that reflects its interests. To that end however, the region must be able to speak with one voice.

We would like to remark that if effective peaceful solutions are unavailable, humanitarian intervention seems not to be a proper response under international law; [79] neither is it acceptable for Latin American and other States. Latin America should not patiently wait for the change to take place, but actively take steps towards a change in the law according to its beliefs.

As regards the role of the international legal community Judge Higgins has expressed:

[t]he task of the international lawyer over the next few years is surely not to go on repeating the rhetoric of dead events which no longer accord with reality, but to try to assist political leaders to identify what is the new consensus about acceptable and unacceptable levels of intrusion… It should not be impossible to us to prepare ourselves to new tasks. [80]

As we have seen, an absolute Principle of Non-intervention has disappeared as the summun ius of the Inter-American System. [81] Now may be the right time for Latin American countries to set off and face the challenge of these “new tasks”. Once again, Latin America can leave its mark in this novel area of international law.

Index of Abbreviations

Fla. J. Int’l. Law

Florida Journal of International Law

R.C.A.D.I

Recueil des Cours de la Academie de Droit International de La Haye

Mich. L. Rev

Michigan Law Review

A.J.I.L.

American Journal of International Law

B.Y.I.L

British Yearbook of International Law

Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce

N.I.L.R.

Netherlands International Law Review

I.C.J.

International Court of Justice

S.C.

Security Council

P.C.I.J.

Permanent Court of International Justice

Index of Authorities

Treaties and International Instruments

Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, VIIth International Conference of American States, Montevideo, 1933.

Additional Protocol Relative to Non Intervention, Inter-American Convention for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, 1936.

Declaration of American Principles, Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 1938

Act of Chapultepec, Mexico, 1945;

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Preamble, Rio de Janeiro, 1947;

OAS Charter, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948.

Declaration of Caracas, Tenth Conference of American States, Caracas, 1954;

Permanent Court of International Justice

Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.4.

International Court of Justice

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9).

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).

Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).

Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20),

Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18)

South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).

UN Documents

Uniting for Peace, A/Res/377 (V), November 3, 1950.

United for Peace: How the General Assembly Arrived at its Momentous Resolution, UN Secretariat, UN Publications 1952-I-8.

Letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/451 (Apr. 21, 1999).

Communiqué Issued on March 25 1999 by the Rio Group, Annex to Letter from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations to the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/884, U.N SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/347 (March 26, 1999).

Doc. S/PV.3988 of March 24, 1999.

Doc. S/1999/328 of March 26, 1999.

SC Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th meeting, S/RES/1244 (1999).

OAS Documents

Resolution II, Art. 2, Vth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago de Chile, 1959.

Inter-American Juridical Committee, Instrument Relating to the Violation of the Principle of Non-Intervention, Pan-American Union, General Secretariat, OAS, Washington DC, February 1959, CIJ-51.

Intervention and Collective Action, Inter-American Juridical Commission, Pan-American Union, General Secretariat, OAS, Washington DC, January 1966, OEA Ser.I/VI.2/E, CIJ 81.

Declaration of Santiago, Chile (1959). OAS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, Santiago de Chile, August 12-18, 1959, Final Act, OEA/Ser. C/II.5, (1960).

Treatises

FrancisKofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (1999).

Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963).

Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1998).

Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (1998).

Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (1999).

Benedetto Conforti, Diritto Internazionale (1992).

Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (1943).

Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, Planning for Intervention (1999).

Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (1995).

Amilcar Guido Jimenez, America Latina y la No intervencion (1984).

Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Derecho Constitucional de las Naciones Unidas (1958).

Stanley Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (1996).

Peter Malanczuk,Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force (1993).

Miguel Marin-Bosch, Votes in the General Assembly (1998).

Marco G. Monroy Cabra, Derecho Internacional Publico (1995).

Lucio M. Moreno Quintana, Tratado de Derecho Internacional (1963).

Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1996).

Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1955).

Simon Planas Suarez, Estudios de Derecho Internacional (1959).

1 Luis Podesta Costa & Jose Maria Ruda, Derecho Internacional Publico (1984)

Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (1996).

Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991).

Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (1997).

Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (1997).

Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas (1956).

Articles

Hedley Bull, Intervention in the Third World, inIntervention in World Politics (Hedley Bull ed., 1984).

Jose Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1147 (1967).

Hugo Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention and the Inter-American System, inIssues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law (Najeeb Al-Nauimi and Richard Meese eds., 1995).

Hugo Caminos, The Role of the OAS in the Promotion and Protection of Democratic Governance, 273R.C.A.D.I. 103 (1998).

Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, inHumanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).

Lori Fisler Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, inLaw and Force in the New International Order (Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991).

Hector Gross Espiell, Intervencion humanitaria y derecho a la asistencia humanitaria, in1 International Law in an Evolving World. Liber Amicorum Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga (1994).

Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and Us Policy, inRight vs. Might: International Law and the Use of Force (1989).

Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, 230R.C.A.D.I. 19 (1991).

Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in Intervention in World Politics (Hedley Bull ed., 1984).

Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of the Century, 159R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1978).

Nico Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq and the Security Council, in 3 Max Planck Yearbook of International Law (Jochen Frowein and Ruediger Wolfrum, eds., 1999).

Dominic McGoldrick, The principle of non-intervention: human rights, inThe United Nations and the Principles of International Law (Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick eds., 1994).

Theodor Meron, Commentary on Humanitarian Intervention, in Law and Force in the New International Order (Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991).

Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, inHumanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).

Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 9 (1982).

Aaron Schwabach, Yugoslavia v. NATO, Security Council Resolution 1244, and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 77 (2000).

Eric Stein and Richard Morrisey, Uniting for Peace, in 5Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Bernhardt ed., 1983).

Will D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention under International Law, 32 N.I.L.R. 357 (1985).

Wil D. Verwey, Legality of Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War (Ferris ed., 1992), reproduced in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (1996).

R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 Fla. J. Int’l. Law 435 (1989).

Jose Maria Yepes, La Contribution de l’Amerique latine au developpement du Droit International Public et Prive, 32R.C.A.D.I. 691 (1930).

Internet Sources

Mónica Serrano, Latin America: The Dilemmas of Intervention, in Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000) (visited May 16, 2000) <http://www.unu.edu/p&g/kosovo_full.htm>.

Que es el Grupo de Rio? (visited May 29, 2000) <http://www.pla.net.py/gruporio/html/que_es.html>.

Statement by the Group of Rio on the Kosovo Conflict, March 25, 1999 (visited May 31, 2000) <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo24.htm>.

Clarin Digital, Argentina voto en la ONU por el ataque, March 27, 1999 (visited May 29, 2000) <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/99-03/27/i-o4402d.htm>.

Clarin Digital, La OTAN rechazo el pedido de incorporacion de la Argentina, July 29, 1999 (visited May 29, 2000) <wysiwyg://57/http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/99-07-29/t-00501d.htm.>

Miscellaneous

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Policy Document No. 148, reprinted in B.Y.I.L. 57 (1986).

Wanjohi Waciuma, United States-Latin American relations: a study of the evolution of the doctrine of non-intervention in the inter-American system, Ph.D. Thesis, City University of New York, 1971, microformed in University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1971) (72-5813).

Remarks by Professor Nanda during the debate at the conference on Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations, Part III The Future, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).

Endnotes


[1] For writers opposed to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, see Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality 135 n.42 (1997); for writers who defend the legitimacy of the doctrine see id., at 148 n.44.

[2] Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, inIntervention in World Politics 29 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) [hereinafter Higgins, Intervention and International Law]

[3] Id. at 30. See also R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4Fla. J. Int’l. Law 435 (1989), 436.

[4] Teson, supra note 1 , at 135.

[5] Id.

[6] Will D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention under International Law, 32N.I.L.R. 357 (1985), 366 [hereinafter Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention].

[7] Wil D. Verwey, Legality of Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War (Ferris ed., 1992), at 114, reproduced inOliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 3 (1996).

[8] Dominic McGoldrick, The principle of non-intervention: human rights, inThe United Nations and the Principles of International Law 85 (Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick eds., 1994). See also Jose Maria Yepes, La Contribution de l’Amerique latine au developpement du Droit International Public et Prive, 32 R.C.A.D.I. 691 (1930), 746.

[9] See, e.g.,Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Derecho Constitucional de las Naciones Unidas 401,407 (1958); 1Luis Podesta Costa & Jose Maria Ruda, Derecho Internacional Publico 101 (1984);Simon Planas Suarez, Estudios de Derecho Internacional 29 (1959); Lucio M. Moreno Quintana, Tratado de Derecho Internacional 207 (1963);Marco G. Monroy Cabra, Derecho Internacional Publico 151 (1995); Hector Gross Espiell, Intervencion humanitaria y derecho a la asistencia humanitaria, in1 International Law in an Evolving World. Liber Amicorum Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga 302 (1994).

[10] Jose Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65Mich. L. Rev. 1147 (1967), 1150.

[11] Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States 237 (1943).

[12] Hugo Caminos, The Role of the OAS in the Promotion and Protection of Democratic Governance, 273 R.C.A.D.I. 103 (1998), 196 [hereinafter Caminos, Role of the OAS].

[13] Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 6 , at 405.

[14] See also, Corfu Channel, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9), at 35; Inter-American Juridical Committee, Instrument Relating to the Violation of the Principle of Non-Intervention, Pan-American Union, General Secretariat, OAS, Washington DC, February 1959, CIJ-51, at 2; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Policy Document No. 148, reprinted in B.Y.I.L. 57 (1986) at 614, cited inPeter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force 27 (1993); Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, 230R.C.A.D.I. 19 (1991), 313; Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, inHumanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 152 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973), Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 126 (1991) [hereinafter Schachter, International Law]; Gross Espiell, supra note 9 , at 302.

[15] Corfu Channel case, supra note 14 ;Podesta Costa & Ruda, supra note 9 , at 101; Hedley Bull, Intervention in the Third World, inIntervention in World Politics, supra note 2 , at 135; Farer, supra note 14, at 152; FrancisKofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention 8 (1999)

[16] For example, “economic motives”, Bull, supra note 15 , at 140; “political motives”, Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 9 (1982), at 144 [hereinafter Schachter, Recueil]; Schachter, International Law, supra note 14 , at 125;Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs 207 (1998); “economic, commercial and strategic” Gross Espiell, supra note 9 .

[17] As Professor Benedetto Conforti recalls, “[Latin America] was a region which was particularly interested in the issue [of intervention]. We have only to remember the naval blockades used by the European powers along the coasts of Latin America in order to safeguard the economic interest of their nationals, giving rise to the formulation in 1902 in Argentina of the Drago Doctrine, which opposed the forcible collection of debts. It was in this region that a member of ‘embryonic’ anti-colonialist provisions were gradually established which are still in force today.”Benedetto Conforti, Diritto Internazionale 468,469 (1992).

[18] Wanjohi Waciuma, United States-Latin American relations: a study of the evolution of the doctrine of non-intervention in the inter-American system, Ph.D. Thesis, City University of New York, 1971, microformed in University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1971) (72-5813), at 228.

[19] Hugo Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention and the Inter-American System, inIssues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law 971 (Najeeb Al-Nauimi and Richard Meese eds., 1995) [hereinafter Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention].

[20] See supra note 9 .

[21] Article 8, “No State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, VIIth International Conference of American States, Montevideo, 1933.

[22] Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 19 , at 973

[23] See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20), para. 62-64.

[24] Inter alia, Additional Protocol Relative to Non Intervention, Inter-American Convention for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, 1936, Art. 1, 2; Declaration of American Principles, Art.1, Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 1938; Act of Chapultepec, Part I (3), Mexico, 1945; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Preamble, Rio de Janeiro, 1947; OAS Charter, Art. 19, 21, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948; Declaration of Caracas, Tenth Conference of American States, Caracas, 1954; Resolution II, Art. 2, Vth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago de Chile, 1959.

[25] See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 23 , para 37.

[26] Oscar Schachter, International Law, supra note 14 , at 70.

[27] Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Jennings), at 534 [hereinafter Nicaragua]. The judgment in that case provides, for many authors, an authoritative construction of the law. See, Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and Us Policy, in Right vs. Might: International Law and the Use of Force 49 (1989); Theodor Meron, Commentary on Humanitarian Intervention, in Law and Force in the New International Order 213 (Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 122 (1995). Professor Tesón, however, suggests that the Court’s holding on the question of humanitarian intervention must be read narrowly, and should be interpreted as declaring “only the illegality of disproportionate forcible intervention to restore democracy”Teson, supra note 1 , at270.

[28] Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20), at 277; Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18), at 131;Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 172 (1997).

[29] North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 23 , at 26,27; id. at 131 (separate opinion Judge Ammoun); id. at 247 (dissenting opinion Judge Sørensen); see alsoIan Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 10 (1998) [hereinafterBrownlie, Principles].

[30] Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules 181 (1999).

[31] Id. at 183.

[32] OAS Charter, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.

[33] Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 19 , at 976;Amilcar Guido Jimenez, America Latina y la No intervencion 188 (1984).

[34] OAS Charter, Art. 3(e), Art. 16.

[35] Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 6 , at 362 n.25.

[36] Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 6 , at 362.

[37] For a more in depth discussion on the characterization of internal or external affairs as well as the validity of such distinction, see Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of the Century, 159R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1978), at 113.

[38] Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 37 , at 163.

[39] See, however, the provision of article 29, OAS Charter, which, unlike other organizations, expressly includes the power to authorize the use of force by its members against threats to the “peace of America”. Nevertheless, this provision has been invoked only once, during the Cuban missile crisis. Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, Planning for Intervention 22 (1999).

[40] Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 390 (1956).

[41] Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 19 , at 977; Higgins, Intervention and International Law, supra note 2 , at 34.

[42] Intervention and Collective Action, Inter-American Juridical Commission, Pan-American Union, General Secretariat, OAS, Washington DC, January 1966, OEA Ser.I/VI.2/E, CIJ 81, at 13.

[43] Uniting for Peace, A/Res/377 (V), November 3, 1950.

[44] United for Peace: How the General Assembly Arrived at its Momentous Resolution, UN Secretariat, UN Publications 1952-I-8, at 3.

[45] Miguel Marin-Bosch, Votes in the General Assembly 97 (1998).

[46] Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, inHumanitarian Intervention, supra note 14 , at190.

[47] Subsequent use of the resolutions has been relatively limited and not always entirely clear, due to the deliberate ambiguity in stating the legal basis of UN actions. See Eric Stein and Richard Morrisey, Uniting for Peace, in 5Encyclopedia of Public International Law 381 (Bernhardt ed., 1983).

[48] Nicaragua, supra note 27 , para 183-90; South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka), at 291;Byers, supra note 30 , at 41.

[49] Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 19 , at 978. For example, Dominican Republic (1965), Nicaragua (1978), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Haiti (1993).

[50] Cabranes, supra note 10 , at 1164.

[51] Declaration of Santiago, Chile (1959). OAS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, Santiago de Chile, August 12-18, 1959, Final Act, OEA/Ser. C/II.5, p.5 (1960) reprinted in 55 A.J.I.L. 537 (1961).

[52] Paradoxically, policies announced to the world by Latin American countries were not implemented at home. The ‘60s and ‘70s are sadly known for the heinous atrocities committed in Latin America.

[53] Remarks by Professor Nanda during the debate at the conference on Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations, Part III The Future, inHumanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, supra note 13 , at 77. For opposing views on the Dominican Republic intervention, see the literature cited in Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 19 , at 979,980.

[54] Lori Fisler Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, inLaw and Force in the New International Order, supra note 27 , at 221.

[55] Handler Chayes and Chayes, supra note 39 , at 22.

[56] Cabranes, supra note 10 , at 1174. See alsoKofi Abiew, supra note 15 , at 110,111.

[57] Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 339 (1963).

[58] Id.

[59] Mónica Serrano, Latin America: The Dilemmas of Intervention, in Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000) (visited May 16, 2000) <http://www.unu.edu/p&g/kosovo_full.htm>.

[60] Id.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] The Group of Rio is a mechanism of consultation and dialog which comprises 29 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Decisions within the Group are taken by consensus. See, Que es el Grupo de Rio? (visited May 29, 2000) <http://www.pla.net.py/gruporio/html/que_es.html>.

[64] The Non-Aligned Movement [hereinafter NAM] also disapproved NATO actions. Although some Latin American nations are part of the NAM, there are several other Third World and former Soviet countries in the Movement. Such variety of member states makes it difficult to identify and isolate the position of Latin American countries. For the Statement made by the NAM on the Situation in Kosovo, see Letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/451 (Apr. 21, 1999).

[65] Communiqué Issued on March 25 1999 by the Rio Group, Annex to Letter from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations to the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/884, U.N SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/347 (March 26, 1999). See also, Statement by the Group of Rio on the Kosovo Conflict, March 25, 1999 (visited May 31, 2000) <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo24.htm>.

[66] See Doc. S/PV.3988 of March 24, 1999, 8, 10 et seq.

[67] Doc. S/1999/328 of March 26, 1999. See also, Clarin Digital, Argentina voto en la ONU por el ataque, March 27, 1999 (visited May 29, 2000) <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/99-03/27/i-o4402d.htm>.

[68] Nico Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq and the Security Council, in 3Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 84 (Jochen Frowein and Ruediger Wolfrum, eds., 1999).

[69] Argentina left the NAM a few years ago. It is now an “Extra-NATO allied” of the United States and tried to be admitted as a full member of the NATO in 1998. See, Clarin Digital, La OTAN rechazo el pedido de incorporacion de la Argentina, July 29, 1999 (visited May 29, 2000) <wysiwyg://57/http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/99-07-29/t-00501d.htm.>

[70] SC Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th meeting, S/RES/1244 (1999).

[71] See cf. Aaron Schwabach, Yugoslavia v. NATO, Security Council Resolution 1244, and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 77 (2000), 84.

[72] Serrano, supra note 59 .

[73] Caminos, Role of the OAS, supra note 12 , at 196.

[74] “The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question, it depends on the development of international relations.” Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.4, at 24-27. See alsoBrownlie, Principles, supra note 29 , at 293.

[75] Abiew, supra note 15 , at 65.

[76] Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order 383 (1996); Stanley Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention 69 (1996); Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, supra note 7 , at 226.

[77] Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 19 , at 995.

[78] Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 313, 320 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1955).

[79] Schachter, Recueil, supra note 16 , at 144.

[80] Higgins, Intervention and International Law, supra note 2 , at 42.

[81] Caminos, Role of the OAS, supra note 12 , at 202.

 

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>