Silent enim leges inter arma … [1]

In the declining days of 1997, a seemingly momentous event took place in Ottawa, Canada, that presided over the elimination of an entire class of weapon system from the majority of the world’s military inventories. The purpose of this gathering was to invite States Parties to sign away their sovereign right to produce, stockpile, sell, or transfer antipersonnel mines (APMs) and to destroy existing stocks within a reasonable time frame. Some weeks earlier, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its global co-ordinator, Jody Williams of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) had been jointly awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their efforts to this end. Williams, in her Nobel Lecture, hailed civil society as the ‘world’s new Superpower’ 2] in presumed acknowledgement of the apparent triumph of ‘bottom up’ politics and by implication she offered a resounding debunking of the so-called ‘timeless wisdom’ of Realism. Whilst Ottawa remains far from being the universal panacea that some of the ICBL’s many advocates may have worked for, there is no doubting that at least in the public perception, it preserved the belief that a step had been taken in the right direction. In short, that something had been done. This belief was rewarded by the treaty’s legal Entry into Force six months after Burkina Faso became the 40th state to ratify the treaty in September 1998. Unfortunately it gave the wrong impression, that at the stroke of a pen; the world’s landmine problem had been effectively dealt with.

Like a snowball impelled by the logic of gravity, the Ottawa juggernaut gathered pace and grew out of all proportion to the original vision in the early 1990s, to the point that it was being seen as a benchmark instrument for the eventual banning of other types of weapon systems, and was accordingly afforded serious consideration. The assumption here would be that a ‘new’ polity was emerging from grass-roots activism, ready and eminently able to take on the state-level Goliath that had presided more or less unchallenged in the arena of arms control. The message was clear and unambiguous: ignore the vox populi at your peril; we have set the agenda, and we won’t go away.

Underpinning this argument was a dissatisfaction with traditional ‘top down’ thinking, a mindset straitjacketed by preoccupations with security, power, influence and apparent obsession with ‘big picture’ politics that offered little in the way of concession to ordinary peoples’ image saturated by an almost Stalinist style media campaign, which stifled all debate, and thus were duly horrified by the ICBL sponsored imagery of the gratuitous and random nature of mine warfare. In moral terms, the victory of ‘people power’ over narrow power-security dichotomies presented the chance for a new dawn for decency, common sense and simple humanity. However, as cynics would point out, this crusade to address and rectify perceived imbalances in the people-state relationship was at best illusory, and at worst dangerous; that when military necessity, national security and political expediency are factored into the equation, human rights and the popular will are punching above their weight – and losing.

Credence is given to this argument when one considers the ‘outsiders’, or those states not party to Ottawa now, or in the foreseeable future. In arms manufacturing terms, and as far as APMs are concerned, many of the major players have shown a marked reluctance to embrace Ottawa’s requirements in any form. Key regional powers, with a high degree of state militarisation are not signatories to the Ottawa treaty. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and others also remain effectively outside the process, with little or no sign of policy reversal. The United States, another non-signatory, cites key strategic interests for remaining outside, but has agreed to review its position by 2006, if alternative weapon systems can be developed to replace landmines in their military arsenal. On this point, however, one must bear in mind the unilateralist mindset currently abroad in Washington; accordingly, 2006 represents a ‘work in progress’ project that may or may not bear fruit. These states invariably cite the ‘national interest’, ‘national security’ and other compelling reasons for not joining the treaty, whether or not observers see these sentiments as valid. In other words, internal political matters are not for debate and that is all there is to it. Naturally, that is not all there is to it, but the problem here is to accept the fact that states cannot be compelled to sign, especially those powerful enough to resist overtures to fall into line. It was at the time of the Ottawa signing ceremony, and remains to this day, evidence that the moral argument alone is seemingly impotent in the face of national security concerns.

Many of the non-signatory states also cite the existence of the CCW treaty 1980, which already regulates the use and removal of landmines. It is argued by them that Ottawa is not necessary because a workable international legal instrument is already in place and strengthening the convention was all that remains necessary. Those responsible for the reckless deployment of landmines that constitute 95% of the problem of uncleared mines in the world today, could have been indicted under existing law rather than obfuscate the issue of mine clearance and regulation of mine warfare by the ‘emotionally’ based Ottawa process, which advocates of the CCW and the non-signatories argue is effectively a worthless document.

Having a treaty to ban APMs, whether the key land powers are on board or not, rather than not having one at all, is always going to win arguments between those who debate the merits of arms control regimes. As matters stand, the logic of this position should be transparent. Ottawa is not perfect, but the ICBL argue that at least this represents a step in the right direction. This line of reasoning appears to be perfectly rational in the light of its achievement, not least due to the successful grafting of state-level functionaries into the process, including then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, (ironically) US Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, and a host of other members at the system-level decision-making process.

The inclusion of significant decision-makers notwithstanding, the philosophy and moral force of Ottawa is in danger of implosion at some point in the future. The problems, some more obvious that others, are primarily structural in origin. As we have seen, state-level non-signatories leave a gaping hole in the matter of universal, single-issue arms control by distancing themselves from the process. How this affects the long-term legitimacy of Ottawa is still to be seen, but the impediments to greater progress and transparency are also located elsewhere, and which are more tightly bound to the treaty and the effects are immediate and devastating.

Post-Ottawa euphoria gave the impression of creating a new paradigm in the international community, one that offered a significant and sustainable challenge to the established order and traditional policy implementation agendas. The work of grass-roots activism, the ‘Diana Factor’ and sheer determinism of the ICBL suggested some kind of equilibrium in global political discourse. What was then vital, namely creating a legal document banning APMs, took priority over an issue of greater moment long-term, that is and which remains clearing the redundant minefields already in existence. Humanitarian mine clearance operations at NGO level were operating in conflict and post-conflict zones long before the Ottawa bandwagon began rolling and some would argue it has rolled right over the actual mine clearance issue itself,  upending priorities and even diverting much needed funding from clearance operations to campaigning and other displacement activities.  As some critics have already stated, what is the use of a document that many ignore and that cannot protect the innocent from the existing threat? [3] Over five years on from the treaty signing ceremony, as contemporary news footage informs us, mined fields (whether real or suspected) still lie fallow and lethal; populations still suffer food shortages as a result; innocent people still lose limbs and lives to landmines; and more mines are still being sown in various conflicts around the world, [4] many thousands during the most recent conflict in Iraq with neither the US or Iraq being signatories to  Ottawa.

Landmines continue to be deployed and not only by non-signatories to the Ottawa Process. Of some concern to the ICBL and its supporters, including with reference to Ottawa Signatory states and within certain other aspects of the international community, is the use of so-called ‘hybrid’ or quasi-landmine ordnance. 5] From a legal perspective, this is a cause of disquiet, as the language of weapon definition is a cause for concern. For those who suffer the effects directly, it is an ongoing tragedy. It will be near impossible to control weapons use and proliferation through the international legal regulation of warfare if the language is not precise. For example, the use of ‘area denial’ weapons, or ‘area impact munitions’ notably in Kosovo and now Iraq is creating a huge minefield in all but name, in that the weapons deployed, whilst exhibiting certain characteristics of mines, are not designated or directly intended for use as such. There is however, a key difference between these munitions. Area impact munitions differ form landmines because they are designed to expend their energy at the target, in other words it explodes on impact. In contrast, landmines are victim-operated traps designed to lie inert in the ground until some one stands on one or pulls the trip wire. The problem many observers of the global mines issue and in political circles feel is that the ICBL and its cohorts are losing direction over the clouding of different weapons systems, in that they are simply the vanguard of a wider disarmament agenda and are therefore, like the wider peace movement, simply unable to accept lesser evils. The landmine, as already stated, is a victim operated trap, not unlike a burglar alarm or a shop doorbell and thus is not simply a weapon but a concept in warfare and it is impossible to ban a concept. But what is clear is that the humanitarian tragedy continues and as time unfolds, the victim statistics are steadily growing to include the latest casualties of all these uncleared devices. Moreover, in poor regions of the world, exposure to unexploded ordnance creates problems out of all proportion to the perceived and actual utility of the weapon systems in several ways.

It has been oft stated elsewhere about the multi-dimensional nature of mine warfare, not least the economic and social devastation that often follows extensive use of these weapons. Mines prevent development projects from progressing, inhibit infrastructural cohesion and create havoc within a country’s healthcare apparatus. Moreover, given the ‘area denial’ properties of certain weapon systems, agricultural paralysis results from a lack of clearance implementation designed to remove these devices from workable fields. Thus, and the triumphs of Ottawa notwithstanding, the emphasis must now return to mine clearance as an absolute priority, if only based on the rationale that a treaty banning mines is of little use to an Angolan or Cambodian farmer unable to grow food due to chronic and uncleared APM infestation. What will solve the actual problems of uncleared mines impacting against such communities is simply to clear the mines. That is the real humanitarian imperative.

The matters discussed above, whilst being of significant moment, are nonetheless peripheral to the argument to be discussed in this paper. The point of conducting durable arms control (or eradication) regimes is to achieve the aims set out in the treaty or legal document; in other words, the issue of enforcement or compliance is the qualifying factor that judges the success or failure of any such binding international legal instrument. Taken in tandem with measures to ensure verification, the issue of compliance appears to have hit a brick wall with regard to certain signatories. Logically, if one signatory can get away with it, then this clearly sends the wrong signal to others in the event of a deterioration of the security situation, one in which the temptation or perceived necessity to use APMs may be too great to resist. Quite where this may leave the Ottawa Convention in future is open to conjecture, but it nonetheless offers negative prospects for future arms control mechanisms, unless more intellectual and operational vigour is applied to such processes. Existing instruments need to be reviewed and enforced in such a manner, without the decoration of unobjective and emotional media saturation coupled with celebrity endorsement.

Out of Africa – a cautionary tale

As a case in point, we will now examine the current problems with uncleared landmines in Angola, a country that has a chronic and devastating acquaintance with these weapons.  The prevailing climate regarding landmines in Angola, as a backdrop to the country’s active participation in Ottawa and subsequent Signatory status, was by any criteria critically severe. 6] With one of the highest ratios of APM-disabled to able-bodied populations on earth, this troubled former Portuguese colony has suffered more than most. Actual numbers of landmines, on a global basis, have been difficult to compute and are notoriously inaccurate. Indeed the over inflation of landmine statistics which were a key foundation stone of the ban campaign, has been a severe blow to the credibility of the ICBL since Ottawa. 7] The oft-cited figure for Angola is put at between ten and fifteen million devices scattered across the country, although, in the absence of a complete level-one survey, the final figure may be well under six million. 8] In any event, what remains indisputable is the severe scale of mine-related amputees in the country, variously put at between 70,000 and 90,000, dependent upon whose totals one refers to. 9]

Statistics will, of course, remain subject to interpretation in whatever field they may be presented; what matters, in the final analysis, remains the problems faced by ordinary people who have to exist alongside patently lethal inventions that threaten livelihoods on a daily basis. For Angolans, this means having to address renewed hostilities and a new round of mine laying despite the government’s ‘commitment’ to eradicating, and future non-involvement with, the scourge of APMs. One might have been forgiven for thinking that the Angolan government’s desire for a mine-free country was self-evident, given the enthusiastic endorsement of the ICBL and its declared aims. However, almost before the ink had dried on the Ottawa document, the security situation deteriorated to the point that hostilities again resurfaced, accompanied by yet more mines being laid. Interviewed by journalists in 1998 as to why the government forces had laid landmines in breach of the Ottawa treaty, the Angolan foreign minister bemusedly replied, “Why, because we are at war of course!” Renewal of hostilities may be seen to have been inevitable, given the climate of mutual mistrust between the governing party MPLA and the ‘rebel’ UNITA forces dating back to the Cold War era. Attempts at rapprochement have met with mixed success, although the leaders of both factions actually talked by telephone in December 1997 after several months of being mutually incommunicado.

From a tentatively promising beginning, the two main factions embarked on a process that was designed to bring about national reconciliation, power sharing and some semblance of normality within the country. On February 28, 1998, the full restoration of the state, a government of national unity, and the complete demobilisation of UNITA were expected to be in place. However, irregularities in timetabling events and other obstacles conspired to delay national solidarity, not the least being apparent mischief by UNITA supporters and activists in pursuit of other agendas. 10] The causes for missing a golden opportunity to end decades of war are many; delay in meeting deadlines, excuses, and general obfuscation. It seems that much of the problem lay with UNITA’s reluctance to surrender key strategic positions, (notably in the economically-critical diamond fields of the north-west) and this despite the presence of UN peacekeepers of the UNAVEM mission. 11] That particular peacemaking initiative came about through the auspices of the Lusaka Protocol, a document designed to broker a cease-fire between UNITA and government forces. However, given that neither leader deigned to actually sign the Protocol and thereby denying authentic legitimacy, the objective appeared to have been doomed from the start. 12] The culmination of these, and other divisive events translate into a further descent into a classic model for intrastate violence and the concomitant problems of bloodshed, random atrocity, population haemorrhage and extensive use of mine warfare.

The travails of Angola since independence from Portugal in 1975, in much more extensive and analytical form than this article can cater for, have been well documented elsewhere, but for the aims of this paper, the current unrest is now less ideological than economic. The country boasts extensive valuable and strategic deposits of diamonds, oil, bauxite, and uranium, 13] control of which underwrites the level of power and security wielded by the possessor. This scenario has received much in the way of exposure in recent months, but has tended to concentrate on Sierra Leone as a ‘fashionable’ case study, documenting the problems of child soldiers, massive population displacement, atrocities, war diamonds, and internecine strife. The struggles of Sierra Leone and Angola have certain parallel aspects in relation to their internal situations, apart from the fact that Angola’s are more chronic and recurring, and that the latter does suffered from the effects of wide-scale landmine infestation.

The deterioration of Angola’s security situation reflects the type of warfare that lends itself well to the use of APMs; frequent hit-and-run operations, a perceived need to hold territory that has obvious economic, political and strategic value, and the weapon’s inherent properties of intimidation, psychological distress, low cost and easy obtainability. Situations where perceived military necessity prevail, as epitomised by Angola in recent years, become fertile ground for the renewed use of mines, primarily for both defensive and offensive configurations that minefields are aimed to provide. 14] This is a direct violation of Ottawa’s requirements by signatory states, and calls into question Angola’s commitment to the treaty as well as the viability of the treaty itself.

The obverse side of the dilemma confronting the Angolan government, or any other state-level authority for that matter, concerns the need to balance a secure environment with humanitarian principles on a concurrent basis. For example, this would be a relatively straightforward matter in Western Europe where a stable security climate allows the theory of a landmine ban to merge unhindered. It is naive to expect the same regime to flourish according to the vision set out by the ICBL and its adherents in a country that has to look to the most cost effective military option for security solutions. In the ebb and flow of military confrontation, especially when strategically vital areas may change hands several times, the use of APMs provides the belligerent parties with the means to interrupt offensive operations, in addition to meeting immediate security needs. Angola, as a country that typifies a state bereft of an overarching and hermetically secure regime, has to fall back on whatever means are available for the full range of its operational requirements.

Where this leaves Angola’s future security needs is open to question, given the chronic instability and concomitant anarchy that bedevils the country. The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi presupposed that with his demise and the ongoing overtures to end hostilities that the business of national regeneration would have proceeded unhindered. However, until a system of mutual confidence and transparency is yet fully installed and some form of real and cohesive national unity becomes apparent, it will be difficult to prescribe a durable and democratic outcome. Removing landmines, and returning to the requirements of the Ottawa treaty or other relevant international legal instruments, will be problematic until the underlying rationale for laying these weapons in the first place is removed, because clearance of redundant minefields remains key to post conflict redevelopment, personal security and the removal of the reminders of the conflict and thus vital to provide a stable platform a lasting peace and confidence building process to emerge and to hold firm.  Of course, this scenario does not confine itself to Angola alone; there are several other theatres of conflict across the globe that would undoubtedly benefit from reduced tension and arguably, even a level of ‘mine free’ open warfare which would at least bring swifter resolutions of the military issue.

Overall, the position that Angola has adopted vis-à-vis the Ottawa Declaration and treaty does not bode well for the future of this particular instrument of arms control, as a single-agenda concord on landmines attempting to bench press up to a wider spectrum of weapons proscription. Assuming that Ottawa would be the benchmark that would act as a direction finder for this type of initiative, one might ask where the impetus would come from, if at all. It had been mooted that the next item on the agenda would be a move toward curtailment of the traffic in small arms, seeing as these weapons have been prominent during various low-intensity conflicts and larger conflagrations over several continents, as will now be discussed.

Guns don’t kill people – people kill people

The contentious slogan adopted by the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the US emphasised that the act of discrimination remains a human property, unlike landmines, which are variously described as indiscriminate, remote, and so on. This aspect of the ICBL’s clarion call for total abolition of APMs – no exceptions, no excuses – struck a chord with ordinary people due to the image presented as the insensate nature of these weapons. Therefore, the then vaunted ‘success’ of the Ottawa Declaration offered a signpost for other incremental proscriptions within the orbit of arms control matters.

However, measures to constrain the trade in and use of small arms has more fundamental, and probably difficult obstacles to surmount. As the authors have written elsewhere, 15] small arms, notably the ubiquitous Kalashnikov, including those carried and used by young children, have visited appalling damage in the developing world, where 90% of casualties in recent conflicts have been civilians, and in which 80-90% of victims were killed by small arms. 16] The principal difference between small arms and landmines, as the subtitle offers clues to, refers to the perception of these weapons in the public consciousness. Certainly in the US, where the Second Amendment provides for the citizens’ right to bear arms, the idea of a complete blanket ban on small arms is unthinkable at this point in time.

At the system level, one may firstly have to contemplate the conditions that necessitate a substantial traffic in small arms; like landmines, they can act as a security guarantor for the possessor, presumably because in conflict areas it is safer to be armed than not. Moreover, they reflect a wider concern about the legal and illegal traffic in weapons across the world, and that, in purely political-economic terms, they are an aspect of the supply-demand equation. Initially, for example, there had been a measure of optimism that the end of the Cold War – the so-called ‘peace dividend’ – would help curb military expenditures that exceeded over US$ 1 trillion in the 1980s 17] Moreover, as far as the industrialised ‘core’ nations were concerned, military spending had reduced significantly, although it is accepted that prevailing concerns tend to change that state of affairs. Analysis of the poorer states in the system, however, reveals that spending on arms had taken a reverse trend and that a ‘bottom up’ remilitarisation has occurred as a result of the ‘dumping’ in one way or another, countless surplus weapons from both NATO and WARPAC sources, a situation exacerbated in the states of the FSU, where many unpaid Soviet garrisons simply sold off their armouries. The expenditure has thus increased, to the level where sub-Saharan Africa, as a case in point, military spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has escalated from 0.7 per cent to 3.5 per cent today – a five-fold increase. 18]

Furthermore, in separating small arms from APMs one must bear in mind the issue of legitimacy, [19] that is mines have been stigmatised by the majority of states, whereas light weapons systems have not. Dependent on which region and country under examination, the matter of gun or small weapon control varies with the prevailing local culture. For example, the problem rests with the state itself; in others, it is sub-state groups, or perhaps the country has an ingrained gun culture, [20] like the United States or indeed Jamaica where a gun is regarded as common a tool as a wrench is to a plumber. Whilst the former present difficult if not insurmountable obstacles, the latter observation presumes an altogether more incorrigible scenario that suggests arms control measures would be an infringement of the citizen’s inalienable right to bear arms, certainly in the US, irrespective of the impact on the general population.

Matters relating to arms and the state-citizen dichotomy have, however, to be taken largely in context. It would be analytically unwise, and theoretically unsafe to compare the US with, say, a sub-Saharan country; to relate an advanced industrialised nation with an entity from the global South. The former has, in broad terms, a durable, extensive security regime in place that extends to protecting the majority of the population. Regarding the latter, for example Sierra Leone, [21] national cohesion had effectively imploded due to the presence of large numbers of small arms – notably, carrying arms for the individual affords greater security than the state can provide. These are, simply the characteristics of so-called ‘failed’ states, where the rule of law, national infrastructures, civil society and economic stability are conspicuous by their absence. Moreover, the lack of state responsibility for the legitimisation of violence carries certain penalties for the long-term viability of peace programmes, post-conflict resolution, social cohesion and future national prosperity. A state awash with legal and especially illicit light weapons exhibits a tendency to conflict escalation, widespread civilian attrition and makes reconciliation initiatives much more difficult. [22] As Greene aptly points out, even the most primitive of unregulated weapons can have a devastating effect on populations, citing the 1994 Rwandan genocidal atrocities, which were largely executed with machetes and home-made weapons. [23]


The arguments advanced thus far make a clear distinction between the industrialised nations and those that are euphemistically described as ‘developing’, although perhaps in some ways the word ‘undeveloped’ may be more accurate. Either way, it should be evident that some parts of the world have a greater need for light weapons control than others. Paradoxically, it is precisely those regions that display greatest need that are the ones most likely to suffer from inertia, for reasons to do with trade, investment, strategic value and also because of matters of dominance and dependence – with undeveloped states assuming the submissive role, as Neo-Marxists and others would have it. [24]

Given the vexed issues of global security, and the problems of extending a secure environment to places where such a regime is effectively non-viable, presents further evidence of anarchic forces that preclude a truly world-wide system of protection. As such, the limited guarantees offered by Ottawa, and the lack of a durable compliance mechanism, indicate a future that is far from reassuring. Breaches of the letter and spirit of Ottawa, and certainly in the Angola scenario, send a clear signal to potential transgressors that renewed mine laying is acceptable, especially due to raisons d’état, and nothing can be done to redress these situations. The obvious danger here is that, because Ottawa is not set in stone for all time, new landmine crises will appear in places that ostensibly are mine free, or in the process of becoming so.

Moreover Ottawa, as a case in point, stands as a post-Cold War or ‘’new’ treaty, which has rewarded the conscience of western liberal idealism at the terrible cost of life saving and development programme supporting mine clearance; it is a ‘comfort food’ for the chattering classes. It penalises the poor and marginalised of the south. How can you criminalise a poor Cambodian villager for placing mines around his village at night to prevent lethal attack or ruinous robbery by bandits or the Khmer Rouge? Are the defenders of Sarajevo  or Srebrenica from the Serb ethnic cleansers now also war criminals? As an instrument of international arms control it must be judged accordingly. Perhaps a process of strengthening the CCW, among whose signatories include the United States, would the best path for anti land mine campaigners to take, but also perhaps a more dull course which would have precluded the sheen of the media spotlight and celebrity attention, brought no glittering prizes and no six figure riches. If the NGOs that comprise the ICBL were institutionalised by Ottawa, they were bought off at Oslo. Signatories to the treaty from Cambodia through Angola to El Salvador have exploited the treaty’s lack of intellectual and technical rigour by cynically manipulating its spirit and letter. The final word thus goes to the Foreign Minister of El Salvador during a meeting in 2001 with one of the authors,

“We don’t have a mines problem, after all you know, we signed and ratified the Ottawa treaty!”

1] ‘In war, the law is silent.’ Cicero, c. 87 B.C.

2] Williams, J. Nobel Lecture. Oslo, Norway, 10 December, 1997.

3] This issue was raised between the author and the Director of the International Demining Group (IDG) during discussions that took place throughout August, 1999, and on a number of occasions since.

4]  Noting, for example, recent landmine-related incidents in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the West Bank.

5] See, for example, Chapman, J. ‘Betrayal of Diana Legacy.’ Daily Express, London, 26 February, 2001, pp 1; 6.

6] US Department of State. Hidden Killers: The Global Problem With Uncleared Landmines. Washington, USDS, 1993, p 45.

7] This refers to ICBL campaign statistics pre-Ottawa, when figures as high as 110 million landmines deployed globally were quoted, even though the real total may have been less than half of that. It was a figure used to presumably highlight the gravity of the global APM problem.

8] See Human Rights Watch, Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p 134. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

9] Ibid., p 150.

10] Human Rights Watch, ‘Angola: Human Rights Developments.’ WashingtonDC, HRW, World Report 1998. pp 1-2.

11] Ibid., p 2.

12] Human Rights Watch Arms Project. Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa. New York: HRWAP, 1997, pp 24-25.

13] For more statistical data on Angola, including mineral wealth, see: CIA World Factbook, located at This site also offers other data relating to capabilities, population facts, etc.

14] Human Rights Watch. ‘Angola: Human Rights Developments’. New York: HRW World Report 1999, p 5. Obtained from

15] See: Faulkner, F. ‘Kindergarten Killers: Morality, Murder and the Child soldier Problem.’ Third World Quarterly, 22, 4, August 2001.

16] Oxfam. Small Arms: Wrong Hands. Oxford: Oxfam publications, 1998, pp 7-8.

17] United Nations Dept. for Disarmament Affairs. Disarmament: Ending Reliance on Nuclear Conventional Arms. New York: UN, 1995, p 76.

18] Ibid., p 77.

19] Lawson, R. in UN Dept. for Disarmament Affairs. Disarmament: Disarmament at a Critical Juncture. New York: UN, 1996, p 109.

20] Ibid., p 109

21] See: Faulkner, op. cit.

22] Greene, O. ‘Tackling light weapons proliferation: Issues priorities for the UE. Saferworld Report, April 1997, p 1.

23] Ibid., p 1.

24] See, for example, Smith, H. in Groom. A.J.R. and M. Light, (eds.) Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory. London: Pinter, 1994, especially pp 146-149; Booth K. and S. Smith, (eds.) International Relations Theory Today. London: Polity Press, 1995, especially pp 52-53; 143-144; 333; Prebisch, R. Towards a New Strategy for Development. Geneva: UNCTAD, 1964.


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