Haiti Demobilization and Reintegration Program

An Evaluation Prepared for
U.S. Agency for International Development

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Executive summary

In September 1994, U.S. Agency for International Development/Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) designed a program to demobilize the Haitian armed forces, and assist in their reintegration into Haitian civilian society. USAID/OTI then provided the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with a grant to implement the program. This Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP) became operational in November 1994, and was formally completed in November 1996. This report presents the findings of a USAID-funded evaluation of that demobilization program.

Background and program description

After Haitian President Aristide was overthrown by a military coup in 1991, U.S. policy, which focused on returning him to power, led to the September 1994 U.S. military intervention. When planning for the military operation started, U.S. officials had to consider the future of the Haitian military—the FAd’H. USAID/OTI developed and funded the demobilization program to help diminish the FAd’H threat. The demobilization program was unlike most other USAID projects in that its goals were political and process-oriented—not economic. They were:

- To neutralize the short-term threat of the former FAd’H so as to help protect U.S. forces in Haiti, and assist in their mission.
- To provide a longer-term breathing space from possible FAd’H disruption to help allow other transition activities to occur.
- To lay the foundation for the eventual reintegration of the former FAd’H into Haitian society.

As expected, the program was politically controversial because it provided assistance to the FAd’H—the group that overthrew the democratically elected President and had long oppressed the population.

All demobilized soldiers were eligible to participate in the program. First, the soldiers registered with IOM. If they wanted vocational training, they stated their skills and training preferences, and participated in an orientation session. The soldiers then enrolled in a vocational school for six months of training in one of ten vocations. All those enrolled received a stipend for the six months, which was paid by the Haitian government from foreign donor government balance of payments relief.

Upon graduation, former soldiers could participate in the Opportunity and Referral Service (ORS), which provided training on job search skills, employment referrals, and tool kits for the soldier’s vocation.
Demobilization and program data

This table presents data on the estimated 6,250 demobilized soldiers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of the former FAd’H</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered with IOM</td>
<td>5,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted training</td>
<td>5,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped out</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated</td>
<td>4,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received tool kits</td>
<td>4,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in ORS</td>
<td>4,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (through ORS)</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88% of the 6,250 demobilized FAd’H
95% of the 5,482 who registered with IOM
6% of the 5,204 who accepted training
94% of the 5,204 who accepted training
97% of the 4,867 who graduated
94% of the 4,867 who graduated
6% of the 4,867 who graduated

Program implementation

The program was generally implemented well. The following are the most important details of the implementation.

Grant accomplished. By offering quality training opportunities to every demobilized soldier, IOM met USAID’s expectations.

Good program design. Program design was sufficiently flexible to accommodate changing events, the stipend level was appropriate, and there was good central coordination by one organization (IOM).

Uneven coordination. Good USAID-IOM coordination led to timely start-up, as well as flexibility in program scope as the demobilization’s pace changed. Because of the program’s controversial nature, however, IOM had difficulty coordinating with high-level Haitian officials and forging links with other aid programs.

Quality vocational training. The demobilization program provided the highest quality six-month vocational training available in Haiti, limited the waiting time for soldiers to enter courses, provided the types of training requested, and increased the capacity of existing schools.

Difficult promotion of social reconciliation. Despite several efforts, IOM was unable to introduce civic education into the program (the FAd’H continued to view themselves as “entitled” victims of an unjust dismissal). There were also no systematic attempts by IOM to promote the efforts of some schools to foster local reconciliation through local projects, although IOM tried to support such programming.

Strong IOM staff. The IOM staff had the political sensitivity, experience in other programs, knowledge of the Haitian vocational training system, and person-to-person skills needed to implement the program.
Program impact

The demobilization program had a significant impact in several areas.

1. By holding out the promise of aid and engaging the former FAd’H in the short term (six months), the demobilization program probably helped to protect the U.S. military force, and contributed to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment.

The demobilization program offered soldiers training and a stipend, which gave them an incentive to demobilize willingly, “buy into” the program, and focus on reintegration in the critical first six months.

But only one FAd’H officer participated in the program, and most of the soldiers did not enter training until after the U.S. military transferred the operation to the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, the short-term neutralization of the former FAd’H can also be attributed to other factors, such as the overwhelming U.S. force in Haiti, confusion among the FAd’H over demobilization, and participation by many former FAd’H in the interim police force.

2. By continuing the demobilization program over two years as more soldiers were demobilized, the program probably helped to lessen threats from the former FAd’H, which, in turn, provided a breathing space to enable other security, political, economic, and social transition activities to occur.

The program clearly helped to engage former enlisted FAd’H, as seen by the high participation and graduation rates. This engagement helped contribute to a “breathing space” from former FAd’H threats. The lack of such threats and their accompanying instability allowed Haitian society to move toward sustainable political and economic development, as seen in the partial consolidation of democracy, a growth in civil society, and the beginning of economic reforms.

But only one FAd’H officer participated in the program, and other factors also contributed to this breathing space, including the UN presence and the threat of vigilantism. Moreover, the unexpected complete demobilization of the FAd’H (which also served as a police force) left Haiti without police. Building a new police force that could contain potential FAd’H threats proved difficult and time-consuming.

3. Although the demobilization program gave the former FAd’H some of the skills required for employment, full reintegration is not occurring because of the lack of progress in other areas.

The low employment rate among the former FAd’H is due to poor economic conditions in Haiti, lower-than-expected economic growth, and the stigma of being a former soldier. The essential determinant of reintegration and security, though, is Haiti’s economy. Without a stronger economy, the former FAd’H will remain unemployed, alienated from society, and a possibly disruptive source of insecurity—though not one capable of toppling the government.
Lessons learned

The Haiti experience provides many important lessons for future demobilization programs. Although every program is different and lessons from one must be applied with care to others, the Haiti experience clearly reinforces the importance of several factors:

- **Stay flexible.** Demobilization programs occur in quickly changing post-conflict situations. Certain types and levels of assistance appear appropriate in planning, but may simply not be so during implementation. Donors, coordinating and implementing agencies, and funding mechanisms must all be flexible.

- **Coordinate extensively.** Demobilization programs are one of many inter-connected transition activities. Personnel involved in demobilization programs must coordinate with each other to ensure rapid start-up and continuous program re-evaluation. They must also share information with those working on other transition activities to ensure that programs are mutually supportive and that the objectives or timing of the programs do not conflict.

- **Focus on engagement.** Most aspects of a demobilization program should not merely focus on the provision of assistance, but on doing so in a manner that keeps the demobilized soldiers engaged—occupied and satisfied so they don’t cause problems.

- **Try to promote reconciliation.** Reconciliation between former soldiers and society is important so that the soldiers can find jobs and become fully reintegrated into society. But such reconciliation is difficult in most post-conflict situations because few desire to reconcile with former enemies and/or war criminals. Although such reconciliation is outside the control of demobilization program managers, they should attempt to promote it when possible, perhaps through embedding demobilization programs in efforts to aid the local community.

The Haiti experience also demonstrates that demobilization programs are appropriate USAID/OTI projects because—depending on their outcome—they may help maintain the momentum of a transition by (1) assisting peacekeeping forces, (2) providing a breathing space to enable other transition activities to occur, and (3) reintegrating former soldiers into society.
Résumé analytique

En septembre 1994, l’Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (U.S. Agency for International Development)/le Bureau des initiatives de transition (Office of Transition Initiatives) (USAID/OTI) conçut un programme visant à démobiliser les forces armées d’Haïti (FAd’H), et à faciliter leur réintégration dans la société civile d’Haïti. L’USAID/OTI accorda ensuite une subvention à l’Organisation internationale pour la migration (International Organization for Migration ; IOM) pour la mise en œuvre de ce programme. Ce Programme de démobilisation et de réintégration devint opérationnel en novembre 1994 et prit officiellement fin en novembre 1996. Le présent résumé se propose de rapporter les conclusions d’une évaluation financée par l’USAID relativement à ce programme.

Climat politique et description du programme

Après la déposition du président Aristide suite à un coup d’État en 1991, la politique américaine, visant à le ramener au pouvoir, conduisit à l’intervention militaire américaine de septembre 1994. Lors de la planification de cette opération militaire, les responsables américains durent prendre en considération l’avenir des FAd’H. Pour permettre de réduire la menace qu’auraient pu poser les FAd’H, l’USAID/OTI mit au point et finança le programme de démobilisation. Ce programme diffèrait nettement de la plupart des autres projets d’USAID du fait que les buts qu’il se proposait étaient politiques et axés sur processus, et non économiques. Ces buts étaient les suivants :

- La neutralisation de la menace posée à court terme par les anciennes FAd’H, en vue de protéger les forces armées américaines se trouvant à Haïti, et de soutenir ainsi leur mission ;
- À plus long terme, éviter toute perturbation éventuelle par les FAd’H, pour assister les autres activités de transition ;
- L’établissement d’une assise pour une éventuelle réintégration des anciennes FAd’H dans la société haïtienne.

Comme l’on pouvait s’y attendre, ce programme fut sujet à controverse, du point de vue politique, du fait qu’il se proposait d’aider les FAd’H, c’est-à-dire le groupe qui avait renversé le président élu démocratiquement et qui avait, de longue date, opprimé la population.

Tous les soldats démobilisés eurent le droit de participer au programme. Ils devaient tout d’abord s’inscrire auprès de l’IOM. Ceux qui désiraient obtenir une formation professionnelle devaient indiquer leurs domaines de compétence ainsi que leur choix de formation, puis participer à une session d’orientation. Les soldats devaient ensuite s’inscrire auprès d’une école de formation professionnelle pour recevoir une formation de six mois, dans l’un de dix
domaines possibles. Tous les soldats inscrits reçurent un traitement pendant six mois, payé par le gouvernement d’Haïti et provenant des fonds d’assistance de la balance des paiements, versés par des gouvernements étrangers donateurs.

En fin d’études, les anciens soldats pouvaient être assistés par le Service de référral et d’opportunités (Opportunity and Referral Service ; ORS), qui offrait une formation sur les méthodes de recherche d’emploi, des aiguillages sur certains emplois ainsi que l’outillage nécessaire à la profession choisie par les soldats.

Données sur la démobilisation et le programme

Le tableau ci-dessous résume les données sur les quelque 6 250 soldats démobilisés.

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<th>Statut</th>
<th>Nombre</th>
<th>pourcentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inscrits auprès de l’IOM</td>
<td>5 482</td>
<td>88 % des 6 250 FAd’H démobilisées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptèrent la formation</td>
<td>5 204</td>
<td>95 % des 5 482 inscrits auprès de l’IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandonnèrent le programme</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>6 % des 5 204 qui acceptèrent la formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finirent le programme</td>
<td>4 867</td>
<td>94 % des 5 204 qui acceptèrent la formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reçurent l’outillage nécessaire</td>
<td>4 734</td>
<td>97 % des 4 867 qui financèrent le programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participèrent à l’ORS</td>
<td>4 572</td>
<td>94 % des 4 867 qui financèrent le programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employés (grâce à l’ORS)</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>6 % des 4 867 qui financèrent le programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exécution du programme

Dans l’ensemble, le programme fut exécuté de façon satisfaite. Les points suivants soulignent les détails les plus importants de cette mise en oeuvre.

Réalisation de la subvention. Grâce à ses programmes de formation de qualité, offerts à chacun des soldats démobilisés, l’IOM répondit aux attentes de l’USAID.

Un programme bien conçu. La conception du programme fut suffisamment souple pour permettre de s’adapter à l’évolution des événements, les traitements accordés étaient appropriés et la coordination centrale par une seule organisation (l’IOM) fut satisfaisante.

Une coordination inégale. La bonne coordination entre l’USAID et l’IOM conduisit à un démarrage opportun, et permit une certaine souplesse dans la portée du programme, permettant de s’adapter à la démobilisation plus ou moins rapide, suivant les circonstances. Cependant, en raison de la nature controversée du programme, la coordination avec les dirigeants haïtiens haut placés et l’association à d’autres programmes d’aide présentèrent des difficultés pour l’IOM.
Une formation professionnelle de qualité. Le programme de démobilisation offrit le meilleur programme de formation de six mois à Haïti, limita les délais d’attente pour la participation des soldats, offrit les types de formation demandés et augmenta la capacité des écoles existantes.

Difficultés à promouvoir une réconciliation sociale. Malgré plusieurs efforts, l’IOM ne fut pas en mesure d’intégrer au programme l’éducation civique (les FAd’H se considéraient toujours comme les victimes d’un renvoi injuste ayant « certains droits »). L’on constata également de la part de l’IOM une absence d’efforts systématiques en vue de promouvoir la bonne volonté manifestée par certaines écoles pour faciliter la réconciliation via des projets locaux, bien que l’IOM ait précédemment tenté de soutenir de tels programmes.

Excellent personnel IOM. Le personnel IOM fit preuve de sensibilité politique, était expérimenté en matière de programmes, connaissait le système haïtien de formation professionnelle, et avait les qualités de communication nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre du programme.

Impact du programme

Le programme de démobilisation eut un impact considérable dans plusieurs domaines.

1. **Le programme de démobilisation, en gardant la promesse d’assistance et en engageant les anciennes FAd’H à court terme (six mois), contribua probablement à la protection des forces militaires américaines, et permit de maintenir un cadre sûr et stable.**

   En offrant aux soldats une formation et un traitement, le programme de démobilisation les incita, au cours des six premiers mois considérés critiques, à se démobiliser de plein gré, à souscrire au programme et à concentrer leurs efforts sur la réintégration.

   Cependant, un seul officier des FAd’H participa au programme, et la plupart des soldats n’y prirent part qu’après le transfert de l’opération aux Nations Unies par l’armée américaine. De plus, la neutralisation à court terme des anciennes FAd’H peut également être attribuée à d’autres facteurs, tels que l’ampleur des forces américaines se trouvant à Haïti, la confusion des FAd’H quant à la démobilisation et la participation de nombreux anciens employés des FAd’H aux forces de l’ordre intérimaires.

2. **Le programme de démobilisation, en se poursuivant pendant plus de deux ans, tandis qu’un nombre croissant de soldats étaient démobilisés, contribua probablement à réduire la menace posée par les anciennes FAd’H qui, à leur tour, offrirent un répit permettant la réalisation d’autres activités de transition dans les domaines de la sécurité et au niveau politique, économique et social.**

   Il est manifeste que le programme permit d’engager d’anciennes FAd’H enrôlées, comme le démontrent les taux élevés de participation et
d’achèvement du programme. Cet engagement contribua à offrir un répit face à la menace posée par les anciennes FAd’H. L’absence de telles menaces et d’une telle instabilité permirent à la société haïtienne d’atteindre un développement politique et économique soutenu, comme l’illustrent la consolidation partielle de la démocratie, la croissance de la société civile et la naissance de réformes économiques.

Cependant, un seul officier des FAd’H participa au programme, et d’autres facteurs contribuèrent également à ce répit, y compris la présence de l’ONU et la menace d’éventuels groupes d’autodéfense. De plus, l’entièrè démobilisation des FAd’H (qui auparavant servaient également de forces de l’ordre), fait inattendu, laissa Haïti sans police. La constitution d’une nouvelle police capable de contenir une menace éventuelle de la part des FAd’H fut une tâche longue et difficile.

3. Bien que le programme de démobilisation ait donné aux anciennes FAd’H certaines des compétences nécessaires à l’emploi, l’entièrè réintégration n’a pas pu eu lieu en raison de l’absence de progrès dans d’autres domaines.

Le faible taux d’emploi des anciennes FAd’H a pour causes les difficiles conditions économiques d’Haïti, une croissance économique inférieure à celle anticipée et la mauvaise réputation accompagnant les anciens soldats. Cependant, le facteur principal de la réintégration et de la sécurité est l’économie haïtienne. À défaut d’une économie plus forte, les anciennes FAd’H resteront au chômage, étrangères à la société et pouvant éventuellement devenir une source d’insécurité perturbatrice, quoiqu’incapable de renverser le gouvernement.

Enseignements tirés de cette expérience

De nombreux enseignements importants peuvent être tirés de la situation haïtienne, au profit de futurs programmes de démobilisation. Bien que les programmes diffèrent les uns des autres, et que tout enseignement tiré de l’un doive être utilisé prudemment pour d’autres, la situation haïtienne souligne clairement l’importance de plusieurs facteurs :

• **Rester souple.** Les programmes de démobilisation sont mis en œuvre dans des climats nés d’un conflit et connaissant une évolution rapide. Certains types et niveaux d’assistance peuvent paraître appropriés lors de la planification, mais ne plus être appropriés lors de l’exécution du programme. Les donateurs, les agences de coordination et d’exécution et les mécanismes de financement doivent tous rester souples.

• **Une coordination de grande envergure.** Les programmes de démobilisation sont l’une de nombreuses activités transitionnelles étroitement liées les unes aux autres. Les participants à de tels programmes doivent coordonner leurs activités afin d’assurer un rapide démarrage et une réévaluation continue du programme. Ils doivent également communiquer les informations dont ils disposent à ceux qui participent à d’autres activités de transition pour permettre le soutien
mutuel des programmes et pour s’assurer que les objectifs ou les calendriers de ces programmes ne se contredisent pas.

- **L’importance de l’engagement.** La plupart des aspects d’un programme de démobilisation ne devraient pas se concentrer uniquement sur l’assistance offerte, mais aussi sur la façon dont les soldats démobilisés sont maintenus engagés, occupés et satisfaits de façon à ce qu’ils ne créent pas de problèmes.

- **Promouvoir la réconciliation.** La réconciliation entre les anciens soldats et la société est importante, afin que les soldats puissent obtenir un emploi et se réintégrer entièrement dans la société. Une telle réconciliation est difficile dans un climat faisant typiquement suite à un conflit, peu de personnes désirant se réconcilier avec d’anciens ennemis et/ou des criminels de guerre. Bien qu’une telle réconciliation ne dépende pas des responsables des programmes de démobilisation, ces derniers se doivent de tenter de la promouvoir autant que possible, en incorporant par exemple les programmes de démobilisation à des efforts d’assistance des communautés locales.

La situation haïtienne démontre également que les programmes de démobilisation sont des projets USAID/OTI appropriés car, suivant leur résultat, ils peuvent permettre de maintenir le dynamisme d’une transition (1) en aidant les forces de maintien de la paix, (2) en offrant un répit pour les activités de transition et (3) en réintégrant d’anciens soldats dans la société.
Background

This section documents the development of the demobilization program and presents the background necessary to place the findings in their proper context. It discusses the events leading up to the September 1994 Haiti intervention, the involvement of USAID/OTI in Haiti, the initial development of the demobilization program, the FAd’H demobilizations, and the final demobilization program design.

Political events and OTI involvement

Political background

Haiti’s long history of military rule appeared to end with President Aristide’s election in 1991. But the FAd’H-backed coup in September 1991 once again placed Haiti in the hands of the military. With U.S. support, the Organization of American States (OAS) led the international opposition against the new regime of General Cedras with calls for diplomatic and economic isolation. But the OAS could not enforce sanctions against Haiti.

The 1993 Governor’s Island Agreement, in which Cedras promised that Aristide could return to power in October 1993, signaled a breakthrough. But killings in Haiti increased and Cedras did not relinquish power.

U.S. policy took a stronger line against Cedras in 1994 because of the continued intransigence of the Cedras regime, widespread human rights abuses, the threat of more refugees from Haiti, and a public hunger strike by TransAfrica President Randall Robinson.

Increased U.S. public diplomacy led the UN to adopt Security Council Resolution 940 on 31 July 1994, which authorized the use of “all necessary means” to bring the legitimate government of President Aristide back to power in Haiti. This resolution was the basis for planning the U.S. military intervention throughout the summer of 1994.

As the threat of military intervention mounted, former President Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) undertook a last-minute diplomatic mission to Haiti. They negotiated an agreement with Cedras for the permissive entry of U.S. forces, the departure of Cedras, and the return of President Aristide.

Starting on 19 September 1994, over 20,000 U.S. troops participated in the military intervention in Haiti as part of the Multinational Force of Operation Uphold Democracy.
OTI Role

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) became involved in Haiti because of its role within USAID. OTI was created under USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Response in 1994 to enhance the prospects for political development in high-priority post-conflict situations.

OTI has three criteria for providing assistance in a country: (1) the U.S. Ambassador must issue a disaster declaration, (2) the country must be important to U.S. foreign policy, and (3) the country must be in a transition in which aid would be useful.

The last condition is met when there is a “significant political break” in a crisis. According to OTI’s Strategic Plan:

That break should have the potential to yield stabilization and prospects for medium term political, social and economic development if supported by an infusion of fast, politically relevant international assistance.

OTI became involved in Haiti because the U.S. Ambassador provided a disaster declaration; Haiti is obviously important to U.S. foreign policy (as evidenced by the military intervention); and the U.S. military intervention provided an opportunity (a break) to help put Haiti on the road to a more stable future. OTI officials, therefore, started planning assistance to Haiti before the military intervention, and arrived in Port-au-Prince only ten days after the first U.S. troops landed.

OTI officials recognized three key political development needs in Haiti:

- Restore legitimate government at all levels.
- Support decentralized authority.
- Move from a system of intimidation to one of public participation.

In response, USAID/OTI used its “notwithstanding authority” to provide IOM with a grant (Project Number AOT-4028-G-00-4215-00) out of the International Disaster Account for two programs.

The Communal Governance Program addressed the first two issues by sending teams of Haitians into the countryside to promote constructive citizen involvement by bringing Haitians together and encouraging them to identify a common set of priorities and needs. The focus of the development projects resulting from this process was not just completing the projects *per se*, but encouraging local ownership of projects, open decision-making, and community participation.

The demobilization program addressed the third concern. Although funding demobilization programs is fairly new to USAID, it is not new in the field of transitions. Such programs have been implemented elsewhere in Latin America (e.g., El Salvador, Nicaragua) and Africa (e.g., Mozambique, Angola, Uganda).
Initial program development

Within this context, OTI had several goals, including helping the Haitian government make the transition from a military-dominated to a civilian-dominated society, providing soldiers with basic technical skills, and requiring soldiers to participate in their own reintegration.

Demobilization program objectives

Different objectives for the demobilization program are stated in various documents. But interviews with USAID and State Department officials involved in the demobilization program point to three specific objectives.

- **Short-term neutralization**—to decrease the FAd’H threat while U.S. troops were present in order to help (1) protect U.S. forces, and (2) maintain the secure and stable environment that was the objective of the military operation.

- **Breathing space**—to decrease the FAd’H threat to allow for other post-conflict transition activities to proceed (e.g., elections, building a new Haitian police force, economic growth).

- **Long-term reintegration**—to lay the foundation for the long-term reintegration of the former FAd’H economically, socially, and politically into Haitian society.

Changes to program design

There were two major concepts for the demobilization program. First, when planning for the U.S. intervention started, it was supposed to be an invasion and the FAd’H was considered the enemy. Upon intervening, the U.S. military planned to return the FAd’H to their barracks, give them a one-time severance payment, and inform them of the opportunity to participate in a demobilization program, which was to provide a public works type of program for them.

When the planned invasion was changed to a “permissive entry,” a second plan developed, though the objectives remained the same. The permissive entry turned the FAd’H into almost a subordinate military command (for policing), and they were to become partners in their own dissolution by ensuring that only the best soldiers became policemen. The public works concept was thus no longer practical because the FAd’H found the idea humiliating (and the government wanted to decrease the public payroll and not be seen as giving jobs to the former soldiers). So USAID changed the program from public works to vocational training.

U.S. plans also called for allowing the former FAd’H to continue in their police role to assist with the U.S. military mission of providing a secure and stable environment, as well as to prevent mission creep (by not getting U.S. troops involved in policing duties). The FAd’H could be partially demobilized and partially integrated into a new police force. Thus there was a dilemma: U.S. officials wanted to demobilize the FAd’H because of their past human rights
abuses and the possibility that they would threaten the civilian government, but U.S. officials also wanted to keep the FAd’H as a police force to assist in the U.S. military mission. But as outlined below, decisions on the demobilization of the FAd’H were not to be made by U.S. officials, but by Haitian ones.

Political balancing act

One of the most important factors influencing the design, implementation, and impact of the demobilization program was its politically controversial nature. Before the U.S. intervention, many felt that a demobilization program that engaged the former FAd’H—satisfying their basic needs, occupying their time, and focusing them on reintegrating into society—was necessary because it would likely meet the three objectives, especially assisting in the U.S. military mission.

But there were political and moral objections to the program because the FAd’H were responsible for the coup that overthrew the democratically elected President and have long oppressed the population. Why should they be provided benefits when Haitians who were the victims of FAd’H oppression received nothing? While most Haitians and foreigners held this view, some still recognized the value of the program.

The demobilization program, therefore, had to balance what was necessary to satisfy the FAd’H with what was politically acceptable. More important, as discussed below, the program’s unpopularity among most Haitians made it difficult to obtain assistance from the Haitian government elite and others on a wide range of issues.

FAd’H demobilizations

FAd’H demobilizations significantly affected the demobilization program. USAID/OTI initially expected 1,500 FAd’H to be demobilized. This did not occur. Haitian government decisions on demobilization came at two times and produced two waves of demobilized soldiers. Although it is impossible to know exactly what happened to each of the estimated 7,000 FAd’H soldiers (because of the lack of accurate government records), the chart on the next page provides a simplified but reasonable estimate of what transpired.

1  The statistics are based on U.S. and UN estimates, which differ because there are no accurate figures on (1) how many soldiers were in the FAd’H before the U.S. intervention, and (2) how many FAd’H remained in the Interim Public Security Force and Palace Guards. The most common estimates (7,000 and 750 respectively) are used here. Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics, IOM became one of the best sources of information on the former FAd’H because IOM required soldiers to go through a registration process.
First demobilization: FAd’H

The FAd’H demobilization began soon after the U.S. intervention. This demobilization had two sub-phases. First, between October and December 1994, there was a voluntary demobilization. In this period, 187 soldiers left the military and registered with the IOM program.

In December 1994, President Aristide abolished the FAd’H by decree, and in February 1995 the legislature voted to amend the constitution as soon as possible. (The constitution must be amended according to a specific procedure to legally disestablish the FAd’H.) At this time, 3,554 former FAd’H were integrated into the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), about 200 of whom joined the Palace Guard. Assuming there were 7,000 FAd’H before the intervention, an estimated 3,446 former FAd’H were demobilized in this Winter-1994 period. Of that number, between January and March 1995, 3,054 registered for the demobilization program (including 187 who left the military after the President issued a decree allowing for voluntary demobilization). Therefore, an estimated 392 FAd’H were demobilized, but did not register for the IOM program.

Second demobilization: Interim Public Security Force

The Interim Public Security Force demobilization began in June 1995, when former FAd’H in that force were being dismissed, and the new Haitian National Police Force (HNP) was being formed. Between July 1995 and April 1996, 2,428 former FAd’H in the Interim Public Security Force registered for the demobilization program. Of the others, an estimated 750 remained in police units awaiting training or assignment to the HNP, and in the Palace Guards. The other estimated 376 did not register with IOM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition of the Former FAd’H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAd’H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First demobilization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAd’H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSF/Palace Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM DRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined DRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second demobilization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAd’H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Public Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM DRP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the two demobilizations, 5,482 former FAd’H had registered with IOM. The disposition of the estimated 1,500 others may be as follows:

- Haitian National Police (including Palace Guards): approximately 750 (probably 550 in the police, 200 in the Palace Guards)
- Demobilized but declined to register with IOM: approximately 768 (392 former FAd’H and 376 former FAd’H who served in the Interim Public Security Force).

The graph below shows when the demobilized soldiers started training.

![Number of Former FAd'H Enrolled in Training](image)

**Final program design**

The demobilization program that eventually developed had several components: Registration, orientation, vocational training, stipends and the Opportunity and Referral Service.

**Registration**

Upon notification of demobilization, former FAd’H presented themselves to the registration sites where they completed several steps.

- Multinational Force soldiers searched them for weapons and sent them in small groups to the processing area.
- The government confirmed their status as soldiers vetted out of the FAd’H (or out of the Interim Public Security Force for the second demobilization) and gave them a paycheck.
- The former soldiers completed their IOM demobilization form, and IOM entered the information into a database.
• If desired, the former soldiers chose a training course that met their interests and skills, and enrolled in it.

• IOM collected each former soldier’s FAd’H identification card, and replaced it with an IOM one.

• IOM gave the former soldiers start-dates for their training, and instructed them to attend a mandatory orientation session.

The table below shows how many former FAd’H registered at each check-in site. Over 82% registered in the capitol, which was evidence of (and resulted in) a high concentration of former FAd’H there.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>FAd’H Demobilization</th>
<th>IPSF Demobilization</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croix de Bouquets</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casernes Dessalines</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District de Carrefour</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>736</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps des Pompier</td>
<td></td>
<td>497</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casernes de la Police PAP</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>2,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>2,361</td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>4,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port de Paix</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grande Riviere du Nord</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinche</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonaives</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Liberte</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremie</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Cayes</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacmel</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: Provinces</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>5,482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Orientation**

Immediately before entering training, former soldiers participated in a four-to-five day orientation course, which included two days of general information on the status of former soldiers vis-à-vis the Haitian government, two days of orientation on the vocational training program, and one day for a general question-and-answer session. The orientation program had several objectives.

• Explain the demobilization program and IOM’s role in Haiti.

• Provide a forum for former soldiers to voice their concerns.

• Advise former soldiers on the probable challenges of their transition from military to civilian life.
• Prepare soldiers for the social and economic adjustments necessary to reenter a peaceful and productive civilian life within a democratic system.

• Prepare participants for the challenges of returning to school to promote discipline and the importance of acquiring training.

• Advise soldiers on Haiti’s economic and employment situations, and their relation to their choice of professional training.

Vocational training

The six-month vocational training courses were the principal component of the program. The demobilization program offered courses at 23 different vocational training schools, most in Port-au-Prince. The table below shows the ten different types of training offered, and the number of former soldiers who graduated from each program. All but two of the schools in the IOM program were either run or certified by the Institut National de Formation Professionnelle (INFP)—the Haitian government organization that sets standards for vocational training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Choices of Former FAd'H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumbing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masonry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigeration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Stipends**

To allow soldiers to participate in the vocational training courses full time, they needed a source of income; otherwise, they would have to spend part of their time looking for work and/or taking odd jobs.

The Haitian government agreed, in principle, to pay each soldier participating in the IOM program a stipend for as long as the soldier was in training (to a maximum of six months). The stipend was set at 1,500 gourdes per month (approximately US$100).

There were several advantages to a stipend instead of a package of aid and in-kind benefits (e.g., food), including ease of administration and the appearance (to the soldiers) of a continuation of pay.

The stipend was to about equal the pay the soldiers received when in the military. Many of those participating in the IOM program were enlisted, and thus had an average salary of 1,350 gourdes. Of the minority not at that salary level, most were at 1,500 gourdes and a small number at 2,000 gourdes. So, for most IOM participants, the stipend was a slight increase. But because the soldiers no longer qualified for other benefits, they probably experienced a small decrease in their standard of living.

At first, the Haitian government did not pay the stipends, or only paid them irregularly. To compensate for this and keep the soldiers in training, IOM provided the soldiers with meals and money for transportation.

In June 1995, the government agreed to pay the stipends out of foreign donor government balance of payments relief. Stipends were then paid to soldiers who had not received them in the past, and guaranteed for the demobilized soldiers serving in the Interim Public Security Force who would soon afterwards be entering training.

**Opportunity and Referral Service**

After the vocational training, former soldiers relied on their own initiative to find employment. For reasons discussed below, most were unsuccessful. They therefore sought help from IOM. To institutionalize the types of aid IOM thought were needed, IOM developed the Opportunity and Referral Service (ORS). The ORS was largely based on the IOM staff and facilities in-place at the time, and, thus, was not a significant extra expense. The ORS had several broad objectives:

- Help soldiers develop a positive attitude toward reintegration, and encourage the soldiers to actively seek employment.
- Ease tensions by acting as a focal point for problems of the former FAd’H, and giving the FAd’H an institutionalized way to air grievances (even if IOM could not act on them).
- Establish a system to track former soldiers.
To meet these objectives, the Opportunity and Referral Service had several components.

Seminars and briefings

Because the soldiers had no experience looking for employment outside the military, IOM hired a local agency to give a seminar on resume writing, interviewing, and job search strategies. IOM also briefed former soldiers to motivate them and make them aware of the difficulties they would face. The briefing also explained that the Opportunity and Referral Service was not a job placement service, but a means of providing information that would help soldiers with their own employment searches.

Regular contact

Former soldiers then filled out an Opportunity and Referral Service registration form on their training and current address. To remain in the program and eligible for referrals, they had to come to the Opportunity and Referral Service office regularly. The Opportunity and Referral Service was also used to maintain regular contact with soldiers to keep statistics on how many have found employment.

Certificates

IOM arranged for each soldier to receive a certificate of accomplishment (from USAID and IOM) and a diploma.

Tool kits

In many vocations in Haiti, owning a tool kit for that skill is a prerequisite for finding employment in the formal or informal sector. IOM, therefore, purchased and distributed tool kits to each former soldier (using the USAID grant). Each kit contained the basic tools needed for work in that soldier’s vocation. The average cost of the kits was $120. By the end of the program, IOM had distributed tool kits to 4,734 (97%) of the graduates.

Referrals

The Opportunity and Referral Service contacted enterprises about hiring former soldiers, and referred soldiers to places that might have vacancies. Throughout the program, IOM made 2,217 such referrals. Through these contacts, the IOM staff sought to (1) determine if there was a need for employees, (2) explain the IOM training program to enterprise managers, and (3) inform them of the availability of retrained soldiers.

Micro-enterprises

Finally, IOM developed two pilot micro-enterprise initiatives, giving small groups of former soldiers funds to start their own businesses. It is still too early to determine whether these experiments succeeded.

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2 Although the Opportunity and Referral Service was a relatively small part of the demobilization program, it is discussed in detail here because of the wide variety of programs associated with it.
Program costs

Program-specific funding on the demobilization program was expected to total approximately US$4.9 million. Most of the money, approximately $4 million of it, was spent on fees for the students at the vocational schools. Tool kits were the next largest expenditure.

But a more accurate picture of the total spending on the demobilization program should also include part of the overhead for the IOM Mission in Haiti. IOM ran two programs—the demobilization program and the Communal Governance Program (CGP).

The table below presents IOM’s expected costs through the end of the programs. IOM costs associated with both programs (e.g., staff, overhead) are divided between the two programs based on the relative value of the program-specific costs:

- 40% Demobilization and Reintegration program (DRP)
- 60% Communal Governance Program (CGP).

Thus, with the addition of 40% of IOM’s other costs, the total spending attributable to the demobilization program rises to approximately US$8.67 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated IOM Costs in Haiti</th>
<th>(1994-96, US$1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff and Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>5,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>2,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Staff &amp; Office (S&amp;O) Costs</td>
<td>7,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>4,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCP</td>
<td>7,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Training)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Operational Costs</td>
<td>11,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total S&amp;O and Operational Costs</td>
<td>19,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead</td>
<td>1,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Costs</td>
<td>21,329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Program costs in context

This cost estimate of US$8.67 million can be put in context by comparing it to other costs.

- **USAID spending.** Most of the demobilization program funds were spent in FY 1995 and 1996. If divided evenly between the two years, the demobilization program cost $4.3 million per year, which is approximately:
  - 3.6% of the $121 million USAID planed to spend in Haiti in FY 1996
  - 4.8% of the $90 million in non-food aid USAID planed to spend in Haiti in FY 1996.

- **Total foreign aid in Haiti.** The total Haiti demobilization program cost approximately 0.4% of the $2.145 billion committed by foreign donors through FY 1999 to aid Haiti.

- **Haitian population.** The demobilization program cost approximately $1.33 for each of the estimated 6.5 million Haitians.

- **Other demobilization programs.** The Haiti demobilization program cost approximately $1,781 per demobilized soldier completing training. The graph below compares that cost to other demobilization programs.  

  ![Comparison of Demobilization Program Costs](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cost per Soldier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>$1,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$1,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>$1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>$1,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>$1,114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 World Bank, *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transitions*, Discussion Paper No. 331, Washington, DC, 1996, and World Bank, *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Case Studies*, Report IDP-130, Washington DC, 1993. Extreme care should be used in drawing inferences from this graph because (1) the programs varied significantly in the types and levels of assistance provided, as well as the length of time demobilized soldiers were supported, and (2) the costs represent those at the time of the programs.
Related issues

Although not officially linked to the demobilization program, the issue of the pensions and savings of former FAd’H are related because the way the funds were handled affected (and may in the future affect) the attitudes of the former FAd’H (which the demobilization program has sought to influence).

Pensions

Throughout the Cedras regime, the Haitian government continued to pay the pensions of retired soldiers. But after Aristide’s return and the demobilizations, the government did not pay the pensions of the newly demobilized soldiers.

According to statistics collected by USAID and the Haitian government, there are 1,562 demobilized FAd’H who may be eligible for pensions, which are usually received after 15 years of military service. As pensions average 8,239 gourdes per year, per pensioner (approximately US$550), the yearly cost of paying these pensions to the former soldiers would be 12.9 million gourdes (approximately US$858,000)—or approximately 0.2% of the government’s budget. The government, however, has refused to pay, citing fiscal constraints, though the unpopularity of paying the former FAd’H is also likely a key reason.

This refusal has continued to upset the former FAd’H, who view it as another example of unjust treatment by the government, and a lack of due respect for the soldiers’ years of service to the country. The pensions issue has, in fact, become somewhat of a rallying point for the former FAd’H, and one potential pretext for action, or issue over which they may be manipulated by political groups seeking their support.

Paying the pensions may remove some of the legitimacy from this FAd’H argument, as well as a pretext for demonstrations. But it would not likely significantly reduce the level of anger from the former FAd’H or their potential threat for two reasons:

- Most soldiers believe they all deserve pensions because they were unjustly demobilized and dismissed, claiming that the constitution requires Haiti to have a military and/or that they deserve severance pay like any other civil servant laid-off.
- Pensions will go to the oldest soldiers, who have families and are the least likely to cause problems.

Haitian President Preval has signaled his intention to link payment of the pensions to compensation to victims of the coup and the de facto regime. President Preval has also stated that such payments would require parliamentary approval. Quick payment of pensions and savings, therefore, is unlikely.

Savings

Savings are another seemingly important issue with the former FAd’H. During their years of service, many former soldiers voluntarily put part of their pay in a
government savings account. That money had disappeared by the time President Aristide retook power; a common assumption is that it was taken by officers during (or toward the end of) the Cedras regime’s rule.

Some time after Aristide’s return, however, the government did manage to pay approximately one-fifth of the savings to soldiers. The rest remain unpaid.

Government records on savings plan participants are poor and unreliable. The table below is a rough estimate as to the number of soldiers on the state’s payroll savings list, those who had passbooks, and a maximum number of others who may have lost their records. The table lists how much is believed to be owed to each (totaling approximately 12.8 million gourdes) and how much was paid after Aristide’s return (approximately 2.5 million gourdes).

The total outstanding entitlement (i.e., the shortfall left after the previous payment) is probably about 10.3 million gourdes (US$666,000)—also approximately 0.2% of the government’s budget.

As is the case with the pensions, the government does not want to be seen as supporting former soldiers, and is therefore hesitant to pay them. Even if the government did pay them, the small amount of savings per soldier (2,400 gourdes, US$160) will not appreciably assist many former FAAd’H.

As also is the case with the pensions, however, the soldiers view non-payment as unfair, especially because some soldiers were paid and others were not. Paying off the savings would likely reduce the legitimacy of FAAd’H complaints and eliminate a pretext for demonstrations.
Evaluation methodology

This section outlines the methodology used in the evaluation. The methodology is based on the USAID Scope of Work for the evaluation, but expands it to include other key issues that became apparent in the course of the evaluation.

Areas of evaluation

This evaluation distinguishes between two important issues—implementation and impact:

- Implementation focuses on whether and how well the program was carried out.
- Impact focuses on whether the program met its objectives.

Implementation and impact are different, but closely related—successful implementation is often a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful impact.

Program implementation

Program implementation focuses on aspects of the design, start-up, and execution of a program over which program managers have significant control. The Haiti demobilization program was to demobilize and provide vocational training to the former FAd’H to assist them in reintegration.

The evaluation examined the question of how well the program was implemented from three related perspectives that are helpful in understanding program implementation:

- **Program accomplishment**—Did IOM accomplish what USAID provided a grant for it to do?
- **Program design and implementation**—How well was the program conceived and implemented with regard to program design, coordination, vocational training, IOM staffing, and other areas?
- **Comparison**—How can the successes and problems of the Haiti program be put into perspective by comparing the difficulties of the Haiti demobilization program with those of other similar programs?

Although the focus of this section was on the implementation of the program by IOM, the section includes some observations about coordination with other organizations.
Program impact

Program impact focuses on the objectives that are the primary reason for funding the program. Although program managers do not have direct control over the attainment of such objectives, all projects must be evaluated based on whether or not such goals were reached—both for accountability and to provide information useful to those undertaking similar programs in the future.

According to officials at USAID and the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince, there were three related objectives for the Haiti demobilization program:

- Short-term neutralization—to decrease the threat from the former FAd’H while U.S. troops were present in order to assist in (1) protecting the U.S. force, and (2) maintaining the secure and stable environment that was the objective of the operation.

- Breathing space—to decrease the threat from the former FAd’H to allow for other post-conflict transition activities to proceed (e.g., elections, building a new Haitian police, infrastructure repair, economic growth).

- Reintegration—to lay the foundation for the long-term reintegration of the former FAd’H economically, socially, and politically into Haitian society.

This evaluation examines the Haiti demobilization program against these three objectives. They are admittedly difficult objectives. And as the demobilization program was just being completed at the time of the evaluation, making a complete examination of whether the program succeeded was difficult.

The evaluation of the first two objectives is especially difficult because it requires proving the negative—that the program resulted in the FAd’H not posing a threat. To handle this issue, this part of the evaluation focused on whether the soldiers were kept engaged; that is, were they occupied and focused on the training, and somewhat satisfied with their stipend, so that they did not pursue extra-legal activities? And if they were engaged and did not pose such a threat, what effect did that have on the U.S. military mission in Haiti and other transition activities?

For these questions, the study was able (using a variety of quantitative and non-quantitative sources) to at least provide an outline of the key factors indicating whether or not these goals were—or are likely to be—achieved.

Lessons learned

Based on the examination of both implementation and impact, this section provides learned lessons on planning and implementing demobilization programs that focus on (1) specific implementation issues, and (2) the role of demobilization programs in post-conflict situations.
Sources

The sources of information for the evaluation included the following:

- Interviews with USAID and IOM program managers in Haiti
- Interviews with other U.S. and Haitian government officials, as well as other informed officials and citizens
- Interviews with United Nations officials and other members of the international community in Haiti
- Interviews with former FAd’H soldiers
- Site visits to vocational schools in which the former FAd’H were receiving training
- USAID-funded survey of the former FAd’H (though none was available on the attitudes of the population)
- USAID-funded focus group discussions with the former FAd’H
- Survey conducted as a test of the Opportunity and Referral Service tracking system
- Primary source data from IOM on the implementation of the program
- Secondary source data from IOM, USAID, American Embassy Port-au-Prince, and other Haitian sources.

Most of the conclusions drawn in this evaluation are supported by several different sources.

See Appendix A for a list of interviews, and Appendix B for a list of written sources.
Program implementation

This section presents the evaluation findings on the implementation of the demobilization program. It reviews whether IOM accomplished what was expected in the USAID grant; examines how well the grant was implemented with regard to program design, coordination, vocational training, IOM staffing, and several other issues; and compares the Haiti demobilization program with other such programs.

Program accomplishment

The most obvious measure of whether IOM accomplished what was outlined in the grant would be to compare the original USAID Scope of Work with what IOM did in the field. The table below outlines the first USAID Scope of Work objectives (as of September 1994) and IOM accomplishments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original USAID Grant Objectives and IOM Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate in the preparation of an integrated Plan of Action to carry out full demobilization of the caseload within six months of project initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop an information campaign to explain the demobilization/reintegration process and progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a national registration system and processing locations for the involved caseload to be demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage public works projects utilizing demobilized soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain statistical records of all demobilization, reintegration and assistance rendered within the project; provide regular information dissemination of the same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, however, the original demobilization Scope of Work was based on the assumption of a non-permissive U.S. intervention, and thus envisioned a very different program than what actually occurred.

A more appropriate approach to the question of whether IOM accomplished what was expected would be to take a broader view of what USAID wanted IOM to
do. After it became clear that the public works approach was not appropriate for a variety of reasons, USAID requested that IOM provide the former FAd’H with the opportunity for vocational training.

Because estimates as to the number of FAd’H who would be demobilized changed often, it was difficult to predict how many would participate in training. Therefore, what USAID expected IOM to do was provide training for all the demobilized FAd’H soldiers who request it.

**By any reasonable standard, IOM accomplished what the USAID expected.** Some of these standards (discussed in further detail below) are as follows:

- **Soldiers denied training.** There was no case of a former soldier who registered with IOM but was denied the opportunity for training.
- **Soldiers trained.** The IOM program graduated 4,867 soldiers.
- **Waiting time for training.** There was relatively limited waiting time between demobilization and starting the courses.
- **Quality of training.** The training provided was as good as any vocational training in Haiti.

The accomplishment of this objective (providing training) could be seen in several indicators:

- **Registration with IOM.** Approximately 88% of the former FAd’H who were demobilized registered with IOM. But most of these were enlisted soldiers; only eight officers registered.
- **Enrollment in training.** Approximately 95% of those who registered with IOM enrolled in the training. Similarly, all but one of those who enrolled in training were enlisted soldiers.
- **Completion of training.** Only 6% of those who started training dropped out of the program.

Although it is impossible to discern whether these high rates of registration, enrollment, and graduation were caused by the availability of quality training or other factors (e.g., the predication that the stipend was only available to those who were continuously enrolled in the courses), it was important to keep the former FAd’H engaged (to decrease the threat of their taking up arms against the new government). The demobilization program helped keep the enlisted soldiers engaged, but it did not engage the officers.

**Program design**

**Significant flexibility in initial program design**

In several instances, the program changed in both large and small ways in reaction to external events. After the intervention, for example, it became
apparent that the original program, which focused on using former soldiers for public works projects, was not appropriate. Good USAID-IOM coordination and flexibility resulted in a change to a focus on vocational training. Other examples of flexibility include the establishment of the Opportunity and Referral Service, and the provision of meals and money for transportation until the stipend issue was settled.

**Good central coordination**

Demobilization programs implemented elsewhere have sometimes faltered because they were coordinated loosely by the government or a consortium of organizations, and implemented by many different groups. Having one organization—IOM—coordinate and implement the program prevented those coordination problems from arising, and resulted in good synchronization of various parts of the demobilization program (e.g., orientation and training).

**USAID “distance” from program**

The choice of IOM (a high-profile International Organization) created a wide distance between USAID and the demobilization program. Although there were no attempts on the part of USAID to hide the funding source for the program, many people in Haiti viewed the demobilization program as an IOM effort, and did not associate it with USAID.

Because the demobilization program was so politically controversial, this distance allowed USAID to fund the program, but not be associated with it in the eyes of many observers. If IOM had used some of its own resources or other countries also contributed, this distance would have even been greater.

**Appropriate stipend level**

After the soldiers were demobilized, they no longer received their regular salaries. But to allow (and induce) them to participate full-time in IOM’s vocational training programs, they needed to receive income from another source to support themselves and their families. The issue was who would provide it.

With a balance of payments tranche coming due, the United States convinced the Haitian government to have that money used to provide stipends for the soldiers during their six months of training.

There are several indications that the stipend level was appropriate. First, the level was not cited by former soldiers as a reason for dropping out of the program. Second, there was no consensus among soldiers that the stipend was higher or lower than what they received while in the FAd’H. (In the USAID-funded poll of the former FAd’H, approximately 46% said the stipend was lower than they received as a soldier, 20% said it was equal, and 33% said it was higher.)
Late stipend settlement, creative alternatives

The former FAd’H started entering the IOM program in November 1994, with the first significant numbers starting in March 1995. But the Haitian government did not pay stipends regularly until June 1995. To allow former soldiers to attend the training, IOM provided meals and money for transportation. If spent wisely, it was enough to also give the former soldiers some spending money. The small number of FAd’H from the first demobilization that declined training after registering for the IOM program (199 out of 3,045) may in part be attributable to the funds for meals and transportation.4

No embedding of program within other aid programs

Because of the need to focus on the FAd’H to engage and neutralize them, as well as the reticence of the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to become involved in this controversial project, the demobilization program was isolated and vulnerable to the criticism that it focused aid on one (undeserving) group—the former FAd’H.

This problem is not uncommon to other demobilization programs. Elsewhere, programs have sometimes embedded aid to former soldiers in programs to help surrounding communities (or moved from a targeted to more general aid program), which has somewhat blunted such criticism, as well as assisted in easing the soldiers back into society. Such an approach would not have been possible in the Haiti program because of the need to begin quickly, and the fact that other program managers did not want their efforts to be tainted by the demobilization program.

Coordination

Timely start-up

The U.S. military intervention occurred on 19 September 1994, but OTI started planning and coordinating with IOM on the potential for a demobilization program before then, which resulted in the grant to IOM being signed on 22 September (effective 20 September). This early and extensive USAID and IOM

4 Several other factors may have affected the participation rate. Other negative influences on participation may have included the fear among the worst human rights abusers that they may be identified and punished if they registered with IOM. Positive factors may have included the promise of full stipends, occasional stipend payments, the fact that there were no other immediate employment options, and that the program provided a comfortable environment in which soldiers could remain with their friends.

5 The controversial nature of the program affected several issues discussed in this section, including the difficulties of embedding the demobilization program in other aid programs, coordination with high-level Haitian government officials, links to other aid programs, transition of some of the Opportunity and Referral functions to the Haitian government, provision of civic education, and attempts at reconciliation between the former FAd’H and society.
planning and coordination, combined with OTI’s flexible procurement regulations, allowed for donor resources to be disbursed in a timely manner and the program to be started quickly.

As events turned out, however, the FAd’H was not demobilized right away. Instead, significant numbers of soldiers did not enter the IOM program until March 1995. But the extra time allowed IOM to establish their headquarters, recruit and train their staff, convince more schools to participate, and plan for program expansion.

**Significant flexibility in program scope**

The original grant was for six months to demobilize 1,500 soldiers. As events occurred, only 187 soldiers registered with IOM through December 1994; 3,054 additional registered from the FAd’H demobilization in the spring and summer of 1995; and another 2,428 registered from the Interim Public Security Force demobilization after that.

Good coordination between IOM and USAID resulted in an almost continual reevaluation of the program scope and level of funding required. This resulted in the addition of funds when required, and shifting of funds when there was excess.

**Difficult coordination with high-level Haitian officials**

There was clearly a lack of coordination with high-level government officials on the issue of the demobilization program. The Joint Working Commission on demobilization and reintegration, for example, never met. The lack of Haitian high-level official interest in the program was due to several reasons:

- The demobilization program was unpopular among most Haitians, and the government resisted being associated with it.
- There was a high turnover rate among government officials.
- Haitian government officials had other pressing priorities.
- When the Ministry of Defense was largely dismantled, responsibility for the demobilization program moved to the under-staffed, over-burdened Ministry of Justice, which was run by civilians with other interests and more pressing problems.

The lack of government involvement had many negative effects, such as their unwillingness and decreased institutional capability to pay stipends, pensions and savings, as well as the lack of public announcements to promote reconciliation.

**Sufficient coordination with working-level Haitian officials**

Despite the lack of high-level coordination, there was sufficient (though sometimes difficult) coordination with working-level officials on day-to-day
implementation issues, such as arranging for sites to distribute stipends and the provision of security.

**Few links to other NGO programs**

With the exception of a small number of missionaries and church groups, most NGOs in Haiti did not want to become involved with the demobilization program. The reasons given included that the NGOs:

- Were victims of FAd’H abuses during the embargo
- Did not want their long-term programs tainted by former FAd’H involvement.
- Thought the FAd’H were a privileged group and former oppressors—not a victimized vulnerable group—and therefore not worthy of focused assistance

IOM, therefore, was unable to establish many links with other NGOs to get the FAd’H employment or involved in other NGO programs (e.g., micro-enterprise credits) that might ease their re-entry into society.

**No transition of ORS functions to the Haitian government**

The Opportunity and Referral Service served a critical function of tracking and engaging the former FAd’H, as well as acting as a point of contact for ex-FAd’H complaints and issues. The Haitian government’s lack of interest in helping the FAd’H—and a desire not to be seen as doing so—prevented them from taking over these Opportunity and Referral Service functions. (According to USAID/OTI, other donors made formal offers to fund programs that may have incorporated some of these functions after the IOM infrastructure was disbanded.)

This is not to say that the government should continue providing all Opportunity and Referral Service services (e.g., referrals and job search training), only that it needs to provide an outlet for the concerns of the former FAd’H and a focal point for discussion of outstanding issues in order to diffuse tensions, as well as to maintain contact (and track) the former FAd’H.

**Vocational training**

**Quality training**

Before the embargo, Haiti had a developing vocational training system. Schools that maintained the highest standard for vocational training are run or certified by the Institut National de Formation Professionnelle (INFP). All but two of the schools used in the IOM program were INFP-run or certified—one was the first workshop IOM was able to convince to participate when no INFP schools would, and the other was a computer school (of which there were none certified or run
by INFP). Furthermore, many of the students were enrolled in *Ecole Nationale des Arts et Metiers* (*ENAM*)—perhaps the best vocational school in Haiti.

Thus, while it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to judge the quality of the training in an absolute sense, it is clear that the best schools were used, and that the soldiers probably received the highest quality training available in Haiti.

Getting these schools to participate, despite initial refusals because they did not want former FAd'H as students, was accomplished by getting one workshop/school to sign-on first, persistent entreaties by IOM, and the need for funding on the part of the schools.

**Limited wait for training**

According to IOM, former soldiers waited an average of 10 to 15 days between registration and the start of orientation, and usually proceeded straight to training after that (though there were a very small number that had to wait another 15 to 20 days for schools to prepare for the students).

Given the haphazard manner of demobilization, large number of soldiers, and diverse schools, this short period was a significant accomplishment in keeping the former soldiers engaged. A long lead-time for training would have made it more likely that they would have become frustrated, perhaps leading some to opt-out of training and cause trouble.

**Provision of requested training**

In approximately 95% of the cases, former soldiers received training in the vocation they requested. In the other cases, the soldiers did not have the skill level to pursue the training they wanted. After examining their skills (both during the orientation sessions and at schools), IOM vocational training experts worked with the students to find similar, alternative vocations in which they received training.

**Increased capacity and quality of vocational schools**

The embargo and accompanying economic decline hurt Haiti’s vocational schools, leading many to temporarily close. The IOM program helped the schools significantly. For each student, a school was paid about US$140 per month. Thus, for the 4,867 graduates who spent six months in the schools, IOM paid over US$4 million into the Haitian school system. By advancing money to the schools, IOM was able to provide schools with the funds to: (1) re-open by re-hiring teachers, (2) increase their capacity by building annexes, and (3) improve their equipment and facilities.

All schools did not benefit equally; for example, money spent on consumables for teaching carpentry did not improve the quality of the schools, whereas new tools for auto mechanic schools had a longer effect. But in most cases there was some positive impact on the schools. It is uncertain, however, whether future
economic growth will increase the demand for schools to utilize these improved capacities.

**Limited integration of students**

Ideally, former soldiers would be integrated with other students at the vocational schools to (1) further break the links among soldiers, and (2) help the soldiers integrate into society. But there was limited integration of students within the schools because there were not many other students at the schools. Moreover, there were no other students in six-month courses because the IOM program was the first time that INFP schools taught the INFP Level V course (the six-month “semi-skilled” labor course); most other courses were at higher levels and lasted longer.

In many respects, however, it is not clear to what extent integration would have loosened the connections between former soldiers who were nevertheless concentrated in Port-au-Prince, and were bound together by friendship, shared experiences, and an uncertainty about the future.

**Other program issues**

**Significant ORS referrals, resulting in some employment**

The table on the next page shows enterprises contacted by the Opportunity and Referral Service, referrals made, and students employed for the ten vocations. Many referrals were made, and it seems reasonable to assume that some resulted in former soldiers obtaining employment.

But it is unknown how many graduates *not* in the Service found employment. Therefore, it is impossible to gauge the effectiveness of the Service in helping soldiers find employment (as well as the quality of the referrals). And as discussed below, the main reasons for unemployment among soldiers are probably the poor economic situation and the stigma attached to being former soldiers—not a lack of resume-writing skills.
ORS encouragement of on-going engagement

By providing former soldiers with an office to go to for assistance, to occupy their time, and to talk about problems, the Opportunity and Referral Service continued to engage many former soldiers. It gave them a physically identifiable place to go (there is no ex-FAd’H office in the government), hope to find employment, and a push to continue their job searches.

Partial effectiveness of ORS tracking system

There was one attempt to use the Opportunity and Referral Service to formally track former soldiers. This was only somewhat effective. IOM sent questionnaires to the addresses given by the former soldiers, and 34% returned them. But without this system, there would be no way to track the former FAd’H.

IOM contacts with the former soldiers through the Opportunity and Referral Service, however, allowed IOM to maintain a “feel” for the concerns of the former soldiers. But it was not clear whether that information was used in any way.

Apparently useful tool kits

The provision of tool kits to students appeared to be important for students at the “semi-skilled labor” level because such tool kits are needed in the informal sector, for business start-up, and (occasionally) for employment in the formal sector. They also had symbolic value in helping soldiers identify themselves as mechanics, carpenters, etc.—rather than as former soldiers.

Results from two different polls showed that the tool kits were considered somewhat valuable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vocation</th>
<th>Graduated</th>
<th>Participated in ORS</th>
<th>Referrals</th>
<th>Employed (#)</th>
<th>Employed (% graduated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auto mechanics</td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welding</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumbing</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. mechanics</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masonry</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigeration</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,867</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,572</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,217</strong></td>
<td><strong>304</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Of the soldiers participating in the USAID poll who had received tool kits, 44% rated their value as good, 44% as acceptable, and 12% as poor.

• Of the soldiers who had found employment (as identified in the survey done to test the Opportunity and Referral Service tracking system), 66% said that the tool kit was important in getting the job or performing better, whereas 33% said it was not.

Focus group results, however, indicated that some of the tool kits may have not contained enough tools or had inappropriate components. The first appears reasonable, because with the limit on expenditures, it would be impossible to supply a sufficient set for every different occupation; there is no evidence for the latter.

**Lack of civic education**

Most of the former FAd’H interviewed still felt that they were wrongly accused of oppression and fired without cause. They viewed themselves as victims completely equal in entitlement to those they subjugated before and after the coup.

IOM made two attempts to introduce civic education. First, at the start of the program, IOM and USAID/OTI considered bringing soldiers together to do it (as is done during the containment phase of demobilization programs that bring soldiers in from the countryside). But bringing the soldiers together before they were disarmed was considered too risky.

Second, IOM asked the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) to provide the former soldiers with some type of civic education that would explain to them why the populace viewed them as they do (as oppressors) and what the responsibilities of the former soldiers would be as civilians within society. MICIVIH provided one lecture and written material to soldiers, but contended that this education was not a high priority for them because the former FAd’H no longer held security positions (as opposed to the new police, which was the focus of more intensive civic education efforts).

Yet some education—provided by MICIVIH or another organization—might have dampened the soldiers feelings of entitlement and expectations about reintegration by starting to persuade them that the democratic society being built after the return of Aristide and the end of the repressive regime requires a new public order and standards of behavior, as well as equity and security for the majority of Haitians. The former soldiers must be persuaded to make every effort to support and reintegrate into that new society.

**No systematic attempts to promote local reconciliation**

The OTI grant to IOM was for vocational training as a means of reintegration—not the promotion of reconciliation to assist in reintegration. But in retrospect, it appears that the two may be linked. Some schools (many of them church-affiliated) actively worked to promote local reintegration of the former FAd’H into society through projects for the community; other schools merely provided
training (as they were paid to do). There is limited, anecdotal evidence that the schools that focused on reintegration (as opposed to merely providing training) were more successful in promoting reconciliation and reintegration. This would make sense as it is part of the church’s job to promote forgiveness and peace. Also, the church may replace the military as the structure within which some former soldiers may live.

Although it would have been impossible to implement reconciliation programs in non-church schools because the professional schools are providers of skills (and do not have the dual missions church schools have), there was no systematic attempt to learn from the successes of the efforts of some schools and to apply them elsewhere. And even if there were few successes, new ways should be considered for promoting such reintegration in future programs.

**IOM staffing**

**High degree of personal engagement with the soldiers**

A large part of the IOM program was to keep the FAd’H engaged—not just to provide them with training. To a large extent, the IOM staff performed the engagement function themselves—often listening to problems, diffusing tensions, and reassuring the former soldiers that they have a future within society. These people-to-people skills proved invaluable in the context of the Haiti demobilization program.

**Appropriate experience**

Experienced and competent staff form the foundation of any program. Local IOM staff had experience in vocational training programs, especially in dealing with the Haitian vocational training system. And IOM expatriate staff had excellent political sensitivity, based in part on field experience in other demobilization programs (e.g., El Salvador).

Because the IOM staff had experience in several demobilization programs and were well-read in the literature on other demobilization programs, they had a larger perspective, which worked to prevent a “cookie-cutter” approach to treating the situation in Haiti.

**Comparison to other demobilization programs**

The successes of the program are the result of good field management of a focused, efficiently run program. The difficulties arose in the connections between the program and external political events and other organizations.

Comparing the Haiti demobilization program to other demobilization programs sheds light on why these successes and problems occurred. The table on the next page makes such a comparison, portraying other demobilization programs as single model in that the factors and issues therein occurred in several other programs.
But it is important to note that all demobilization programs are different in many ways, and the single model is a composite only. The comparison is a tool to bring out differences among demobilization programs, and place the Haiti demobilization program in its context—not to draw definitive conclusions. Each demobilization program must be evaluated in its own context.

As the table illustrates, the Haiti demobilization was easier than others in some ways, but harder in others:

- Implementation of the Haiti demobilization program was probably easier than others because it was much more limited in scope than demobilizing two or more large, poor armies or insurgents.

- The political context of the Haiti program made it much more difficult to implement because of the opposition to demobilization on the part of the FAd’H, and opposition to reintegration assistance on the part of other Haitians.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differences Between Other DRPs and Haiti DRP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most DRPs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large programs, demobilizing tens of thousands of soldiers (e.g., 52,000 in Namibia; 116,000 in Nicaragua; 151,000 in Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilized two or more armies or insurgent groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established quartering sites, containment areas and encampments, providing for the soldiers’ needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to identify who was a combatant (especially with insurgent groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants were often in poor health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants were often illiterate or poorly educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants had few assets to fall back on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided some aid to soldiers’ families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided a complex mix of benefits (e.g., land, seeds and tools, training, apprenticeships, micro-enterprise credits, stipends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressed special cases (female, child, and disabled soldiers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited infrastructure available in which to support the reintegration program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization part of a peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army supported the DRP and soldiers did not strongly resist being demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government supported reintegration programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants were largely accepted by much of the population (or at least in areas that supported their movement or army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some combatants could join a unified army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Program impact

This section considers whether the demobilization program met its three objectives.

Program outputs

Based on the information provided in the sections on Background and Implementation, the demobilization program had several outputs:

- 5,482 former soldiers registered with IOM, and 4,867 received an orientation course and a full six months of training.
- 4,572 former soldiers registered with the Opportunity and Referral Service, which contacted 229 enterprises and made 2,217 referrals.

Given the unpredictable pace of demobilization and political constraints on the program, these are significant organizational and administrative accomplishments. **But outputs are not ends in themselves.** Outputs are means to specific ends—the three objectives of the program. In the next three sections we consider whether those ends were achieved, and the roles that the demobilization program played in supporting them.

Objective 1. Short-term neutralization

One objective of the demobilization program was to neutralize the FAd’H to (1) decrease the threat to U.S. soldiers participating in Operation Uphold Democracy, and (2) assist those forces in providing a secure and stable environment. As an armed, organized force, the FAd’H could have threatened both force protection and mission accomplishment.

**By holding out the promise of aid and engaging the former FAd’H in the short term, the demobilization program probably helped to protect U.S. forces and contributed to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment.**

Program success

Many soldiers were quickly engaged in registration, orientation, and training. Some expected to find jobs after the training; others participated to obtain their stipend. Whatever the reason, most participated. And although they were dismayed at being demobilized and by the initially intermittent stipend payments, most appeared content to receive their stipend and attend training, at least in the short term. Perhaps related to this engagement, there were few incidents against U.S. forces in Haiti.
Related considerations

But this conclusion of successful engagement and related neutralization should be somewhat tempered by three considerations.

**Officer engagement**

First, there was almost no officer participation in the program. Eight officers registered with the IOM program, and seven of them came only to receive their last paycheck; they did not enroll in the training. This can probably be explained by several factors:

- The training offered was not appropriate for officers, who may find employment in such vocational trades humiliating.
- Many officers had an economic life outside the military. Their other sources of income and savings could allow them to forgo the stipend.
- Some of the worst human rights violators may have believed that they would be more visible and vulnerable if they participated.

In comparison, the program was very successful in engaging enlisted soldiers, probably for two reasons:

- The training offered was appropriate for enlisted soldiers, who were somewhat educated but had few skills applicable to the civilian workplace.
- The enlisted soldiers had not saved enough money while in the service (in pay or by illegal means) to forgo the stipend.

**Other causes of neutralization**

Second, the successful short-term neutralization of the FAd’H can be attributed to many factors besides the demobilization program. These include the following:

- The U.S. had overwhelming military force, disarmed some soldiers, and found a significant number of weapons in caches.
- The FAd’H was disbanded as a single force, breaking down their command and control structure. This made it very difficult for them to present an organized, large-scale threat.
- Many FAd’H were confused, initially believing they would not be demobilized, and were then thrown off-guard by the quickly changing demobilization and confusion over when and how it would be implemented.

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6 It is not clear that it would have been possible to engage the officers in training unless longer, more expensive educational opportunities (as opposed to vocational training) were offered, such as in business.
The FAd’H were required to turn in their weapons, which reduced some (but by no means most) of the weapons available to them.

Some FAd’H went into the Interim Public Security Force at first, which kept them employed longer than the first soldiers demobilized; some of those have remained in the new police force.

The highest ranking FAd’H officers went abroad; other officers went into hiding or melded into society.

The longer the former FAd’H remained disbanded, the harder it would be to regroup.

It is impossible to prove which factors were the most important in neutralizing the FAd’H threat, though the demobilization program was certainly one of them.

**Timing of training**

Third, an examination of when soldiers entered the demobilization program indicates that only 151 entered before March—the month U.S. forces turned over command to the UN (though some U.S. forces remained with the UN). Some 2,274 former soldiers entered the program between March and June. The way the demobilization program helped keep much of the FAd’H engaged, then, was through the promise of training and stipends—not the actual training.

**Objective 2. Breathing space**

A second major objective of the demobilization program was to provide a “breathing space” by decreasing the FAd’H threat temporarily to allow for other post-conflict transition activities to proceed. In this way, the demobilization program was meant to literally “buy time.” Whereas the first objective was to neutralize the FAd’H during the U.S.-led multinational force mission to Haiti (September 1994—March 1995), this second objective was to neutralize the threat for a longer period.

By continuing the demobilization program over two years as more soldiers were demobilized, the program probably helped to lessen threats from the former FAd’H, which, in turn, provided a breathing space to enable other security, political, economic, and social transition activities to occur.

**Program success**

*Engaging the FAd’H*

The demobilization program helped to engage the former FAd’H enlisted soldiers. Through the time of the evaluation, there were few significant FAd’H threats to the political stability of Haiti. The demobilization program helped neutralize the FAd’H threat during this period by engaging the FAd’H.

There are several reasons to believe this engagement of former FAd’H enlisted soldiers was significant:
High overall registration rate in the IOM program (88% of the total number of demobilized soldiers—enlisted and officers).

High overall rate of participation in training (83% of those who were demobilized, and 95% of those who registered with IOM).

Disciplined and serious attitudes of the students.7

Low drop-out rate (6.5% of those who enrolled in training).

High rate of participation in the Opportunity and Referral Service (94% out of those who completed the training.)

This engagement cannot be viewed as only the result of the stipulation that to receive a stipend, soldiers must attend training. Instead, it is clearly in part a reflection of the soldiers’ positive view of the training experience. In interviews with former soldiers, all spoke highly of the training. In the USAID poll:

79% of those in the program thought the training was the best part of the program (only 3% said the best part was the stipend).

61% of the former soldiers said that they thought the training would help them find employment, whereas 33% did not, and 6% did not know or did not answer the question.

The table below presents other findings from the USAID poll. (The dissatisfaction with program length is discussed below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answers (% of respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where you satisfied with the</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training’s Quality</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Length</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Teachers</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Engagement and neutralization**

Most of the demobilized former enlisted FAd’H were clearly engaged by the demobilization program, and this engagement has played a role in the

7 All of the school supervisors and instructors interviewed as part of the evaluation said that former soldiers were more disciplined than regular students, and that they were seriously engaged in learning the skills being taught.

8 Such engagement was the goal of the training. If the former soldiers were busy at school, they would be less likely to cause problems. The program, however, was focused on giving soldiers every opportunity to stay in the program. So one would expect a low drop-out rate.
neutralization of the FAd’H threat. The neutralization of the FAd’H threat had significant positive impacts. The almost two-year hiatus contributed to transitions occurring in four important areas:

- Political transitions—There has been a partial consolidation of democracy in Haiti, including elections (national and Presidential) and an increasing view among Haitians that democracy is the only legitimate form of government.
- Social transitions—There has been some growth of civil society.
- Economic transitions—The economy has started to rebound from its embargo-era decline, and there have been some moves toward reform.
- Security transitions—The former FAd’H no longer have the ability to take and hold power, an apolitical police force is being stood-up, and the Haitians started to develop a sense of “citizen security” (i.e., they no longer lived in fear as they had during the Cedras regime and previously).

Related considerations
As is the case with the first objective, however, the conclusion of complete engagement and resulting neutralization should be somewhat tempered by three considerations.

Officer engagement and other causes of neutralization
The first two factors are similar to those relating to the first objective: (1) only one officer enrolled in training, and (2) the successful neutralization of the FAd’H during the two years can be attributed to several other factors besides the demobilization program, including the presence of forces from the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and fear among the former FAd’H of vigilantism by the population.

Police capabilities
The third issue is more complex: The tenure of the demobilization program did not last long enough to allow for one important transition activity to completely occur—the establishment of a professional and apolitical police force. As discussed below, the current Haitian police force is simply not capable of handling potential threats from criminals and the former FAd’H. This is not to imply that the demobilization program should have been longer; instead, it is to highlight the importance of the “security gap” in demobilization programs.

Police capabilities
After the U.S. intervention, one plan was to keep the FAd’H to serve in their police function, relieving the U.S. military of that burden. After Aristide’s disbanding of the FAd’H, some former soldiers joined the Interim Public Security Force. Since they were demobilized from that force in mid-1995, the Haitian government and the international community have worked to train and equip a new Haitian National Police.
A force of over 5,000 Haitians has been created in less than 18 months with the assistance of the U.S. Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and other foreign trainers, which provided basic training for the Haitian National Police, and the UN’s Civilian Police (CIVPOL), which has provided monitoring, supervision, and on-the-job training. The new cadets have many of the basic skills required of junior officers. But the late start at forming a police force and other factors have led to problems. Haitian National Police capabilities are limited in several ways:

- The force size is too small to cover a country the size of Haiti.
- The officers are young and inexperienced, with many having been on the job for just over a year.
- The lack of mobility and communications makes it difficult to react to incidents quickly.
- There is a low level of investigative ability.
- There is a lack of training, organization, and equipment to deal with large threats.
- Occasionally irregular pay has resulted in low morale and considerable absenteeism (averaging 20%).
- High-level leaders are political appointees, and often have no law enforcement or management background, while low- and mid-level leaders are not completely in place, and have no more experience than the regular officers.
- It is difficult to ingrain and institutionalize respect for human rights because of the lack of experience and an organizational culture of Inspector General responsibilities and civilian policing.
- There is, as yet, no critical mass of capable police around which to form a common culture of a cohesive, professional force.
- Many of the police stations in rural areas lack basic amenities, which causes poor morale among officers.
- The UN’s Civilian Police has a small staff and limited authority.

Knowledgeable observers of the Haitian security situation believe the police will need another 1 to 2 years to become a capable, credible force—if it ever becomes one.

This discussion of the new police, however, must be put in context in two ways. First, the issue of a “security gap”—in which the old structures of security and authority are destroyed and new ones are slow to be built-up—is not uncommon to a transition period. Second, as discussed below, there was no true security gap in the Haiti case because of the continued deployment of UN forces to fill the void.
Threat from the former FA'd'H

The issue of the threat from the former FA'd'H at the time the demobilization program ended is important because it affects the evaluation of whether the program engaged the former FA'd'H for a long enough period.

Few agree on the exact nature of the threat from the former FA'd'H, and no one seems to know for certain the level of that threat. It is clear that the threat has been reduced by breaking up the former FA'd'H as an organized force and through some disarmament, both of which were linked to (but not part of) the demobilization program. The threat was also limited by the increased confidence of the citizenry to stand up to the former FA'd'H, to the point where it is the former soldiers who are scared of vigilantism. Even without a U.S. or UN presence, the former FA'd'H could not likely stage a coup and remain in control.

But the former FA'd'H remain a vague threat. They conceivably could hold destabilizing demonstrations, conduct assassinations, resort to organized political violence, or be used by a political group hoping to destabilize the government—all of which could lead to a retributive cycle of violence between an angry and vengeful populace and still-armed, aggrieved and isolated former soldiers. The result could be more political instability and uncertainty, further retarding the consolidation of democracy and the financial investments required for economic growth.

Based on the capabilities of the Haitian National Police and potential FA'd'H threats, it is clear that at the time the program ended, the former FA'd'H remained somewhat of a threat, though there is no single likely scenario for their future actions. But the police alone could not handle the FA'd'H threat with any degree of confidence—they had to rely on the UN and indirectly on anti-FA'd'H vigilante groups.

The demobilization program’s engagement of the FA'd'H was one factor in creating a breathing space from the FA'd'H threat. But that breathing space did not turn out to be long enough to allow the police to become a capable force: The police fear the former FA'd'H, and any confrontation could lead to a loss of confidence in the police at this critical juncture.

Program length

When the demobilization program was designed in 1994, six months seemed like the maximum level of training that would be politically acceptable (the three-year program was too long) and it appeared as if that was all that would be needed. After all, in 1994, it was thought that many former FA'd'H soldiers would serve in the police force. Thus, a whole new police force would not be required. At the start of the demobilization program, there was no link between the demobilization program and the new police force because none was required.

But the nature of the demobilization program (six months of training) and political considerations (the feeling that too much money has already been spent on the former FA'd'H relative to more deserving Haitians) argues against any continuation of the program as it was being conducted.
In sum, then, while the demobilization program helped provide a breathing space for most other aspects of the political, economic, and social transitions, its time ran out before the security transitions could be accomplished because of the unexpected decision not to integrate much of the FAd’H into the new police. The UN filled the security gap.

**Objective 3. Foundation for reintegration**

A third goal of the demobilization program was to lay the foundation for the reintegration of the FAd’H into Haitian society. Although this was a tertiary objective of the program (and in some ways more a hope than a real goal), it is often a primary goal of demobilization programs. It is therefore important to understand whether it was achieved.

*Although the demobilization program gave the former FAd’H some of the skills required for employment, full reintegration is not occurring because of the lack of progress in other areas.*

It is too soon to know whether the former FAd’H will eventually reintegrate into society. But there are several indications that few have done so up to this point.

**Employment prospects**

Although it is impossible to know how many FAd’H have found employment because of the nature of the informal economy, it appears that fewer former FAd’H have found jobs than expected. According to data from the Opportunity and Referral Service, of the 4,867 former FAd’H who have completed training, 304 have found employment (approximately 6%). Of the 304 who are employed, 136 are working in the informal sector (self-employed or working on a “contract” basis), while 168 have found employment in the formal sector of the economy (28 of whom are employed as guards).

As the table below shows, former soldiers fared approximately equally regardless of profession, though those in masonry and carpentry did somewhat better.
Although there is no empirical evidence to support this belief, the 6% employment rate is probably lower than reality because of under-reporting of those working in the informal sector (who may not consider this “working”). Many informed observers estimate that the total employment rate of former soldiers is probably 5 to 10%, and that it could reach 10 to 15% as more of those who have graduated in the last six months start to find employment. In comparison, the average un/under-employment rate in Haiti is 70 to 80%.

There appears to be two reasons why the former FAd’H have not done better in the job marketplace—low economic growth and the social stigma attached to being a former soldier. The latter issue is linked to social reintegration and political reconciliation.

### Economic growth

**One major reason for the lack of economic reintegration has been the lack of economic growth.** For the demobilization program to succeed in reintegrating the former FAd’H, there had to be significant economic growth so the FAd’H

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9 In some ways, one may expect the ex-FAd’H to perform *better* than average because they have a high education level by Haitian standards (most attended secondary school), and received good vocational training in the IOM program, though the training was more limited than the typical three-year courses.

10 Program length has also been raised by soldiers from the perspective of wanting more training. Many former soldiers felt the program should be longer (34% in the USAID poll), probably because their courses were shorter than those of other students; a longer application component would have given them more time to practice; and they thought their stipends would continue if their training did (though some said they would continue without it). There is no evidence that (given the lack of economic growth and social reconciliation) more training would have led to significantly more employed soldiers.
could find employment. In hindsight, it is clear that initial planning assumptions about economic growth were simply too optimistic.

Right after the U.S. intervention, there were reasons to believe that there would be significant economic growth:

- There was significant room for recovery from the embargo-era economic down-turn (sanctions and economic mismanagement had led to a fall of 30% in Gross Domestic Product between 1991 and 1994).
- International donors have pledged significant aid to Haiti (a total of US$2.415 billion between FY 1995 and FY 1999 in highly concessional loans and grants, the equivalent of US$75 per capita/year).

From a larger perspective, Haiti has some economic potential. The island is close to extensive North American markets (and has good access to them), and has the lowest labor costs in the Western Hemisphere; there is a significant, relatively prosperous Haitian Diaspora; and Haiti has a small and manageable debt because the government avoided excessive borrowing in the 1970s.

It was hoped that these structural advantages and the unique post-intervention situation would offset the very severe traditional problems with the Haitian economy, including the legacy (and therefore threat) of political and social instability, poverty, poor social services and public administration, corruption, lack of natural resources, a degraded environment, and very low education base.

Throughout the Fall of 1994 and Winter of 1995, it appeared that Haiti would achieve a 4.5% growth rate, due in large part to public-sector programs. The government started on an emergency recovery program, cleared its arrears to donors, started to pursue critical reforms (e.g., stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization), and worked closely with the bilateral and multi-lateral donor community. Donors provided US$500 million in FY 1995, and pledged more for future years.

But two major problems led to slower-than-expected growth of 0-2%. First, donor project-based spending was less than expected because of the low absorptive capacity of Haiti’s public administration. Haiti has underdeveloped public institutions that are administratively over-extended, and inadequately staffed, equipped, and organized. They simply cannot process foreign aid quickly, not to mention support a modern economy efficiently.

Second, popular opposition to Haitian government privatization efforts led to the rejection of the structural adjustment program, which resulted in the loss of important budget support and inflationary pressures. In response to the inflationary pressures, the government has been constricting the money supply to defend the value of the Gourde.

The result of the economic problems has been fewer jobs than expected for the FAd’H, leading to more discouragement and demoralization. According to the USAID poll of the former FAd’H, 88% considered their economic situation “very bad.” Over the next year:
• 32.5% thought the economic situation would become worse and 40% did not know how it would change (reflecting a high degree of uncertainty)

• 35.5% thought their personal economic situation would become worse (18% thought it would be unchanged and 5% thought it would be better).

In the short-term, it seems that there was an underestimation of the difficulty of providing assistance and implementing critical institutional reforms.

Social stigma

A second problem may be discrimination against hiring former FAd’H soldiers. According to the USAID poll, 79% of the former FAd’H believe they will have trouble finding work “because we are soldiers.” There are several possible reasons why being former soldiers would make it harder for the former FAd’H to find employment:

• There may be a social stigma attached to being ex-FAd’H because some view them as character deficient and likely to cause trouble, and others remain embittered by past FAd’H oppressive actions.

• Employers may fear hiring the FAd’H because their businesses may be targeted if it is discovered they have former FAd’H as employees.

• Former soldiers are not part of the common informal networks of friends and relatives through which most people in Haiti are hired, called the “moun par” system (though the former FAd’H may have their own networks).

• Former soldiers will not be hired by the government, which controls or funds most formal sector employment.

Social reintegration

Social reintegration, which has not occurred, is a prerequisite for economic reintegration and important in making the former FAd’H part of civil society. Social reintegration requires a stronger education base and active institutions of civil society. Perhaps most of all, it involves different parts of society to view themselves as one; distinctions disappear as the whole of society unites (or at least tolerates each other) to move forward and progress. Reconciliation among parts of society is key to reintegration. Social reintegration between the FAd’H and other parts of society is important for two reasons:

• Unless the former soldiers are accepted, they will have trouble finding employment.

• Once the former soldiers are accepted, they may decide to “buy into” civil society. Once they have a stake in civil society, there is less chance they will attempt to undermine it through violence.
But such social reintegration has not occurred in Haiti: The FAd’H neither accept their new place in society, nor are they accepted by the population. They remain outcasts for several reasons:

- Continuing resentment over past FAd’H actions (especially the constant demand for bribes)
- View of the FAd’H as a symbol of oppression (though other groups were certainly worse)
- Perception among the FAd’H that they too are victims, entitled to compensation for being unjustly demobilized
- There has been no reconciliation among other parts of society, such as the elite families, rural peasants and urban workers.

The lack of social reconciliation and reintegration has not led the former FAd’H to adopt optimistic attitudes toward social reintegration. Most feel alienated from the rest of society, and threatened by vigilante groups. According to the USAID poll:

- Compared to one year ago, 43.5% of the former FAd’H believe that the security situation in the country has become worse, 11% believe it has improved, and 29% believe it is unchanged.
- 25% indicated that they or a member of their family have been victims of dishonest acts or acts of violence.11

Social reconciliation and reintegration may be more important in the Haiti case than in others because in other post-conflict situations, former members of a demobilized police or army can blend back into society (if it is a larger country) or go to an area where their cause is supported (if the conflict was ethnic or geographic in nature).

In Haiti, however, there is no section of the country into which the former FAd’H can easily blend, and there is no geographic part of the country in which they are supported.

**Political reconciliation**

Social reintegration may be inexorably linked to a larger political reconciliation, which has also not occurred.

There has been no substantial political reconciliation between the government (and, more specifically, Presidents Aristide and Preval) and the former FAd’H. Although President Aristide declared an amnesty for the former FAd’H, there has been little other progress. The government often uses the former FAd’H as a

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11 This poll took place right after heightened tensions between the FAd’H and the populace. Other reports right after heightened anti-FAd’H rhetoric in August 1996 put this number higher; MICIVIH puts it lower. Nevertheless, the figure indicates how the FAd’H feel about their place in society.
scapegoat to buttress support, and the former FAd’H continue to view their
demobilization as unjust. Furthermore, significant anti-FAd’H rhetoric has made
the FAd’H fearful of attacks, which further alienates them.

The lack of political and social reconciliation are linked. How can the population
be expected to accept the FAd’H when the civilian leadership will not? But why
should the government go against the wishes of the majority of the populace and
reconcile with former oppressors?

In other post-conflict situations, however, along with measures to apply
principles of justice and accountability, government leaders have often publicly
reached out to former adversaries, publicly embracing them, and offering a truce,
peace agreement, and/or power-sharing arrangement in exchange for an end to
violence. This reconciliation has been based on an admission on both sides that
no one holds the moral high-ground and that the conflict must end for the good
of the country.

But Haiti is not a typical post-conflict situation because there was no post-
conflict peace agreement. Whereas most conflicts end with an agreement
between former adversaries (or at least an understanding), Aristide was the
winner. He regained office, and Cedras left Haiti under U.S. pressure.

The status of the FAd’H was left open. To the government, the FAd’H was a
force that oppressed the people for years. Cedras leaving was an admission of
FAd’H surrender. The FAd’H could thus be demobilized. No reconciliation was
needed with a defeated enemy.

To the FAd’H, however, Cedras surrendered power, but the FAd’H remained the
security force. The FAd’H did not surrender, so the demobilization was unjust.

These sentiments have led to the current predicament in which the government
believes it owes the FAd’H nothing, and the FAd’H feel they are entitled to get
their jobs back or to compensation for being unjustly dismissed. In such a
situation, reconciliation is very difficult.

From a larger perspective, however, the essential determinant of reintegration
and security is Haiti’s economy. Although former FAd’H unemployment is also
related to a lack of social and political reconciliation, without a stronger
economy, the former FAd’H will remain unemployed, alienated from society,
and a possibly disruptive source of insecurity.
Lessons learned

The Haiti experience resulted in many important lessons—some positive in nature, others in the form of changes to be considered in future programs. This section outlines some of those lessons, taking a broad view of how they may be applied in future demobilization programs.

Implementing demobilization programs

Program design

1. Be flexible. Demobilization programs require flexibility in program design because political and economic considerations may change in fluid post-conflict situations. The types and level of assistance that may seem appropriate in planning may turn out to be inappropriate during implementation. Demobilization programs also require flexibility in program scope because demobilization may occur on a different scale, and may be faster or slower than expected. It is also difficult to predict what percentage of those demobilized will participate in the program.

2. Be skeptical. Programs are often based—implicitly or explicitly—on assumptions about the pace and course of local events. Be skeptical about such assumptions, and plan for less-than-ideal outcomes.

3. Consider external factors and time frames. Often program success depends on external political, economic, security, social, or programmatic factors outside the control of those responsible for the demobilization program. When planning demobilization programs, therefore, it is important to consider and be explicit about the relationship between the demobilization program and these factors. In most instances, there may be a tension between short-term security objectives and longer-term integration objectives. These tensions should be recognized and competing demands balanced according to each situation.

4. Keep it simple. Monetary assistance (as opposed to in-kind aid) eases logistical and administrative burdens. But who provides it is also important. There are several advantages to having one, large organization coordinate and/or implement the program. First, it will make the synchronization of the stages of the program easier (e.g., registration, provision of assistance, training, counseling). Second, if it is a respected, independent entity, it may create a natural distance between the donor and a potentially controversial demobilization program.

5. Provide soldiers with an immediate source of income. In order for the soldiers to participate in training, the level of aid should be enough for them to support of their families so that they can concentrate on the training instead of spending their time trying to make some more money at odd jobs.
If a full assistance package cannot be provided at the outset, former soldiers should be given enough for minimum basic needs and transportation to any training centers.

6. **Embed the demobilization program.** To the extent possible, programs to assist former soldiers should be embedded in programs to aid the surrounding communities. This will help blunt criticism that the soldiers are receiving more than they deserve (relative to other groups) and assist in reintegrating the soldiers into the communities.

**Coordination**

7. **Plan ahead to start quickly.** Demobilization programs must begin at the start of demobilization to ensure that the soldiers are engaged and not left to cause trouble. To ensure such timely start-up, planning for demobilization programs must begin before the conflict ends, and donor funding must not be unduly delayed.

8. **Coordinate extensively.** Demobilization programs require coordination with all levels of the host nation government—high-level officials make policy decisions, while mid- and low-level officials assist in implementation. Such coordination may be difficult in a post-conflict situation, however, because of sensitivities over the program, lack of government capabilities, new or frequently changing officials, and a focus on other issues. Sharing information with other agencies that implement programs that affect (or are affected by) the demobilization program is relatively easy. It is also important for program managers to ensure, however, that programs are mutually supportive and do not conflict with regard to objectives or timing.

9. **Link to other programs.** If a demobilization program is not embedded in larger post-conflict assistance programs, it should be linked to other NGO programs to provide further assistance to demobilized soldiers.

10. **Transition to the government.** At the end of the program, the government should take full responsibility for providing a focal point for outstanding issues regarding demobilized soldiers.

**Vocational training**

11. **Engage as many soldiers as possible.** If vocational training is offered, such programs should ensure that as many former soldiers are engaged in them as possible by (1) starting the training soon after demobilization, and (2) providing the types of training requested by the soldiers (which may mean vocational training for enlisted soldiers and other opportunities for officers).

12. **Use the best existing schools.** The training programs should use the best schools available in the area, funding them to increase their capacity rather than undermining them through the establishment of new programs. By providing the tuition money before the students enroll, the program can assist the schools in increasing their capacity to accept the new students.
13. **Integrate soldiers and students.** If possible, former soldiers should be integrated with other students to break the links among soldiers, and help integrate them back into society. But this may be difficult in cases in which there are few other students in the training programs.

**Other issues**

14. **Provide tool kits.** Tool kits may be a useful complement to vocational training, allowing some former soldiers to more easily find work in the informal sector of the economy, find employment in formal sector occupations that require workers to provide their own tools, or start businesses.

15. **Provide appropriate employment services.** Providing job search counseling and employment referral may continue the engagement of former soldiers, as well as assist them in finding employment. But such assistance must be appropriately designed, taking into account the economic situation. The service can also serve as the foundation for a system to continue to engage and track former soldiers.

16. **Include civic education.** Civic education may help former soldiers better understand (1) their situation, (2) how they are viewed by the populace, and (3) what their responsibilities will be as civilians.

17. **Try to promote reconciliation.** When a lack of social reconciliation between former soldiers and the civilian populace is making reintegration more difficult, program managers should seek to make systematic and creative attempts to find ways to get former soldiers and the local community working together.

**Staffing**

18. **Ensure there is an experienced and appropriate staff.** Expatriate staff should have experience in more than one other demobilization program to ensure that they apply lessons from other experiences, and have a broader perspective that prevents a one-size-fits-all approach. Local staff should have the appropriate expertise, especially if the demobilization program involves technical issues, such as vocational training. All implementing agency staffs should possess the political sensitivity, flexibility, and people-to-people skills necessary to perform the delicate task of engaging soldiers and helping them readjust to civilian life.

**Role of demobilization programs in post-conflict transitions**

The Haiti experience also demonstrates that demobilization programs are an appropriate type of USAID/OTI project because of the specific types of impact they can have. In general, demobilization programs may assist in maintaining
momentum toward sustainable political and economic development in three ways.

1. Assisting peacekeeping forces

DRPs hold out the promise of aid and therefore engage soldiers, which may help to protect peacekeeping forces and contribute to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment.

The promise of assistance makes it more likely that soldiers will voluntarily be demobilized, “buy into” the demobilization program, and focus on the challenges ahead, rather than becoming embittered over demobilization, keeping their weapons, and creating instability.

2. Enabling other transitions

Demobilization programs may engage soldiers for a longer period, and therefore contribute to the lessening of threats from them, which helps provide a breathing space to enable other security, political, economic or social transition activities to occur.

In any post-conflict situation, there are a variety of transition activities occurring. The table below illustrates the complexity of the situation by outlining some of those transition activities in four areas (politics, security, economics, society).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cease fire</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disengagement</td>
<td>Infrastructure rebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encampment</td>
<td>Job creation programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Macro-economic policy reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Civil service retrenchment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merging of armies</td>
<td>Taxation system reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian demining</td>
<td>Banking system establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a new police force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Resettlement of displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights monitoring</td>
<td>Restoring community associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth commission investigations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of justice system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuilding government institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table is not an exhaustive list; it merely represents of the types of activities that are the most common. In most circumstances, transition activities must occur together in all four areas; for example, there must usually be a cease-fire and end to fighting before there can be economic reconstruction and development.

One major purpose of transition programs is to move the process of transitions forward. Demobilization programs may help “buy time” by creating a “breathing
space” from threats by former soldiers. The lack of such threats and the accompanying instability can allow for movement toward sustainable political and economic development. This furthers other transitions because continued stability in the short- to mid-term allows for other transition activities to occur unfettered (e.g., elections and economic growth). Similarly, other transition activities allow demobilization programs to succeed (e.g., economic growth provides employment opportunities for former soldiers).

Whether or not these events occur depends on (1) how long the soldiers are engaged in the demobilization program, and (2) how quickly the other transitions occur (e.g., a new police force is formed, elections held, democracy consolidated, the economy recovers, and citizens feel secure). If the other transitions take longer than expected, a short demobilization program may not meet all its objectives.

3. Reintegrating former soldiers

Demobilization programs provide assistance to demobilized soldiers, which can help reintegrate them into civilian life.

This is the traditional view of the objectives of a demobilization program—the program provides the assistance that soldiers need to give them a fresh start. In this case, training helps them become productive members of society.

But the ability of soldiers to reintegrate into society requires a complex set of transitions to occur. Political reconciliation, social reconciliation and reintegration, and economic reintegration are all linked in many ways.

The Haiti experience, when viewed in the context of other demobilization programs, brings into sharp focus a key question: How possible is it for there to be true reintegration? Based on the Haiti experience and others, it is not clear that many former soldiers can find employment in post-conflict situations. With a war-ravaged economy (or in the case of Haiti, an already dismal economic situation worsened by the embargo) and fierce competition for employment, soldiers are at a further disadvantage because of their lack of civilian skills. When this is compounded by the lack of social reconciliation after years of conflict, expecting full reintegration in a few years in some demobilization cases may simply be asking for the impossible.
Appendix A. Interviews

**USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response**
Fredrick Barton, Director, OTI
Johanna Mendelson Forman, Senior Advisor

**USAID/Haiti**
Lawrence Crandall, Mission Director
C. John Currelly, Monitoring Officer
Gary M. Imhoff, Project Development
Timothy Schimpp, OTI
Thomas Stukel, Consultant
Gabriel Verret, Policy Coordination and Program Support
Hyatt Abdul Wahab, Chief, Economic Growth Division

**American Embassy/Haiti**
William Swing, Ambassador
Maj. Adam Bernandel, Deputy Defense Attaché
Michael Detar, Economic Section
Kathryn Hoffman, Political Section
Rick Lang, International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
Keith Mines, Political Section

**International Organization of Migration/Haiti**
Luca Dall’oglio, Chief of Mission
Sharon Bean, IOM Staff Training Coordinator
Marco Tulio Boasso, Program Manager
Louis Macson Chéry, Vocational Training Expert
Christophe Franzetti, Senior Finance Officer
Javiar Pitarque, Operational Specialist

**United Nations Mission in Haiti**
BGen. Pierre Daigle, Force Commander
Martha Doggett, Political Affairs Officer
Capt. Christian Gagnon, Canadian Army
Col. Robert Pigeyre, Civilian Police
Sidi Szahabi, Political Advisor
International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH)
Colin Granderson
Sandra Beidas
Elizabeth Cullity
Mark Ellis

Other Interviews in Haiti
Rév. Père Antoine Adrian
Edwige Balutansky, Info-Services
M. Enrique Dorfus, Director, Centre Méchanique Auto
Michaele Berrouet Fignole, Haiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Luc Franzoni, United Nations Development Program
Micha Gaillard, National Confederation of Educators of Haiti
Elizabeth Gibbons, United Nations Children’s Fund
Gen. Wiltan Lherisson, FA'd'H (Ret.)
Michel Michaan, United Nations Development Program
Jean Marie Béjoly Monrose, Centre Pilote de Formation Professionnelles
Rév. Père Zucchi A Olibrice, Ecole Nationale des Arts et Métiers
Sally J. Patterson, Winner/Wagner & Francis (USAID Consultant)
Philippe Rouzier, Counselor to the President, Palais Nationale
Leslie Voltaire, Counselor to the President, Palais Nationale
Discussions with several former soldiers

Other interviews in the U.S.
Col. Michael J. Dziedzic, USAF, National Defense University
Appendix B. Sources

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Related information


