

Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Action in Spanish Foreign Policy

Mariano Aguirre and Francisco Rey *
Centro de Investigación para la Paz. Madrid

This article originally appeared in *Mediterranean Politics* (Special Issue - Spain: The European and International Challenges, Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, eds), Volume 5 Number 2 (Summer 2000), pp.190-209. Reprinted by kind permission of Frank Cass Publishers: www.frankcass.com/jnls/index.htm

1. Introduction

Over the last fifty years development co-operation has constituted an important aspect of the foreign policy of some countries with global influence. The Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of part of Europe and the plan for the reconstruction of Japan after World War Two coincided with the process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia. In these cases co-operation for development constituted a form of influence both for the nations that had triumphed in the war and for the ex-colonial powers. Although over these last fifty years development co-operation has evolved and incorporated new dimensions (human and sustainable development, gender, etc), it has, to greater or lesser extent, retained its character as a foreign policy instrument.

Humanitarian action in the face of natural disasters or complex political and humanitarian crises became, in the 1990s, another important instrument in international relations and foreign policy of some EU members and of the Union itself.

2. Development co-operation and humanitarian action in a new international scenario

By definition, co-operation –whether it be official or private, bilateral or multilateral- includes direct and indirect aid and credit on advantageous terms for the beneficiary, and excludes commercial transactions in which the donor makes no special concessions (Evans, 1998, p.12). During the Cold War co-operation was more of an arm than an instrument for some global powers, especially the USA, France, Britain and the former Soviet Union. With the aim

Mariano Aguirre is Director of the Centro de Investigación para la Paz (Peace Research Centre) (CIP) at Madrid; researcher for the Transnational Institute (Amsterdam), a member of the Unit on Humanitarian Action, created by Médecins sans Frontiers-Spain, the University of Deusto and CIP.

Francisco Rey is a member of the Centro de Investigación para la Paz, Director of the Study and Analysis Unit of the Spanish Red Cross and a member of the Unit on Humanitarian Action. Both are promoters of IECAH Institute on Studies on Conflict and Humanitarian Action in Madrid.

of containing the USSR in order to check its potential expansion and, at the same time, to maintain or increase their influence in regions of what was then called the Third World, Western countries used co-operation as an instrument in an attempt to impose political, social and economic models and combat revolutionary phenomena in general. Thus, development co-operation was previously used more to support the interests of donor states' than to co-operate in the development and welfare of the beneficiaries. In turn, emergency aid during this period was strongly conditioned by the clash of interests of the Cold War, and in fact counted for only a small percentage of the official development aid provided by donor countries.

Two phenomena which appeared in the 1970s influenced the evolution of official development co-operation. The first was the debt crisis, which was in fact the expression of the crisis of a model of development based on investment and international aid combined explicitly or implicitly within the dependent integration of the peripheral countries. The second was the progressive increase in the involvement of non-state bodies, particularly the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in the sector of co-operation. This marked the onset of tension. On one hand there was a conception of co-operation as an instrument of state realistic interest and on the other the expression of moral concern, of a degree of commitment and solidarity by society. NGOs also began to extend their involvement in the humanitarian field, questioning the interests of states and the traditional neutrality of the classic humanitarian organisations. The near-monopoly of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which had prevailed for many years was broken in the seventies with the emergence of new NGOs with wider perspectives.

Various factors have played a part in the construction of an extensive and relatively loosely structured non-governmental movement concerned about and committed to poor or endangered populations in the periphery. The end of the Cold War, the crisis and collapse of numerous revolutionary movements in the periphery and depoliticisation are among these factors. A similar phenomenon has occurred in peripheral countries themselves, with the NGO replacing the party and the political movement, in Central America, for example (Pearce, 1999, pp. 51-68).

Being an instrument of foreign policy and an expression of a growing moral concern, co-operation became the victim of unrealistic expectations. After several decades of co-operation, both central states and central and peripheral NGOs have serious doubts about the effectiveness of their work, or at least in the way it has been carried out up to now. In the central states this has manifested itself in so-called "aid fatigue", or "donor fatigue", and in the clear drop in aid figures (Alonso, 1999). The argument goes that, in the last twenty years, adverse public opinion with regard to international aid has grown in the central states, because aid has failed to achieve the desired effects (e.g., reduction in poverty); nor in fact has it been seen to guarantee the interests of donors.

Also contributing to this adverse climate for aid has been the change in priorities in economic paradigms, especially from the promotion of the state as the central axis of development to the burgeoning of the global free market as

the sole frame of reference. Thus, the crisis of development was followed by the crisis of aid. The end result was a drying-up of funds. Meanwhile, in the weak and fragile states of the international system there was a growth in social break-up, political crises and armed conflicts, and in some cases this led to complex humanitarian emergencies. In the face of this situation the strong nations hovered between co-operation, caution and military intervention (Aguirre, 1996, pp. 200-212).

In the course of the 1990s a series of crises caused the USA, EU countries, Japan and Australia to respond with diplomatic initiatives, emergency aid and in some cases military deployment. From Somalia to East Timor, situations were produced in which various states felt obliged to intervene even though their interests were not directly affected. Such interventions were also marked by the tension between the particular interests of a state and the general interests of the international community (Roberts, 1999). The role of the UN Security Council was often ignored, as in Kosovo, while the interests of NATO or of particular states prevailed. The limitations of immediate responses, both those from the state and those from multilateral organisations or NGOs, has led some sectors to consider the need to check crises with preventive policies, which it is suggested might be structural in nature and linked to development co-operation.

However, the policies of the principal donors and international aid organisations have not considered the roots of poverty and its effects, nor of armed conflicts and their origins. On the contrary, for many decades they have placed more emphasis on plans for structural cost-cutting, on the opening of and accessibility to markets, and on privatisation, than on the economic impact of these policies on societies. This decrease in interest, manifest in a reduction of aid and, especially, in the abandonment of certain areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa, has been accompanied by an increase in the work of private agencies and non-governmental organisations. These have been faced with the difficult task of finding effective forms of co-operation within a global framework of economic liberalisation and high levels of competition which generally run counter to their projects. At the same time, in the best cases, where co-operation projects are maintained and develop, the peripheral countries have neither the time nor the capacity to find a place in the market other than by offering their natural and human resources at a low price.

This gulf between moral intentions and practical reality has led to different approaches from NGOs. While some adapt to working according to the status quo, others consider co-operation to be a practice from which to question the functioning of the international economic system and the concept of development (Sogge, 1996; Slim, 1996; Escobar). The demonstrations in Seattle during the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting at the end of 1999 were to some extent an expression of this questioning attitude. On the official side, the decrease in official co-operation is related to a higher level of reflection and review with regard to priorities, both on the part of some states -for example, in the White Paper issued by the British Government's Department of International Development, in the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Action Plan on the prevention of conflicts or in the studies commissioned by the Dutch Foreign Ministry- and

on the part of bodies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Development Aid Committee of the OECD (Rey Marcos and González-Bustelo, 1999).

It can be said, then, that in the last 50 years development co-operation has been primarily an instrument of state. From an academic analysis and in terms of political practice, it can be considered as a part of international co-operation between states, multilateral organisations and non-state bodies. Despite the aforementioned limitations, it has been established that, without neglecting their national, individual interests, in some circumstances states can co-operate with each other and with third parties in order to obtain particular and mutual benefits. Also that both international institutions and NGOs may constitute important elements in a plan based not only on the transfer of resources from donor to beneficiary, but one which also considers other variables, including structural changes in the roots of poverty and the problems faced by the beneficiary (Martin, 1999, pp. 51-63).

3. The Spanish Case

3.1. Historical evolution of Spanish co-operation

In Spain both official and non-governmental development co-operation are relatively recent phenomena, in comparison to other European countries such as Britain or France. Officially, Spain had no policy of co-operation during the Franco dictatorship, despite its paternalistic rhetoric with regard to Latin America and the Arab world and the emphasis on *hispanidad* ("Spanishness") as a unifying concept. No Spanish former colony -from Latin America to the Philippines or Equatorial Guinea and Morocco- received special attention from Spain. On the contrary, the Franco *régime* established the basis for relations with regressive sectors in such societies. In some cases these economic and corrupt relationships remain to this day, as in the case of Equatorial Guinea.

Moreover, Spain was a recipient of official development aid until the end of the 1970s, this situation practically coinciding with the final phase of discussions over its entry into the European Economic Community (now the European Union). Furthermore, in multilateral organisations such as the World Bank it was not admitted into the group of countries which introduced international co-operation policies, and it was not made a member of the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the OECD until 1991. Until 1979 the World Bank considered Spain as a country which deserved international aid. From 1975 political change brought improved external relations and a growing role for development co-operation. Co-operation policies have formed part of the interrelationship between Spain and the international system. From the point of view of the theory of interdependence, (Nye, Jr., 1997, pp. 161-170) development co-operation activity has permitted Spain to forge political, economic and social links with peripheral countries and with other European Union members.

A brief chronology of how Spain has incorporated co-operation into its foreign policy and adapted the administrative structure to the new challenges would read as follows (Alonso, 1992, pp. 69-82):

- 1976. Creation of FAD (Development Aid Fund) credits, an instrument combining development aid and commercial promotion, and the setting-up of an Inter-ministerial Commission to administer them.
- 1983. Creation of Foreign Emergency Aid Group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1985. Creation of State Secretariat for International and Ibero-American Co-operation (SECIPI), within Foreign Ministry; first Co-operation Plan.
- 1986. Entry into European Economic Community. Creation of Inter-ministerial Co-operation Commission as a co-ordinating instrument.
- 1988. Creation of Spanish International Co-operation Agency (AECI), with powers to implement programmes and projects.
- 1991. Spain becomes a member of the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the OECD.
- 1992. Parliament recommends a schedule for attaining 0.35 % of GDP for ODA by 1995 and 0.7% by 2000.
- 1994. The DAC makes its first “review” of Spanish co-operation, pointing out its advances but also its shortcomings.
- 1998. Passing of the Law on Co-operation. Second DAC review, which notes substantial improvements with regard to the first.

The passing of the Law on International Co-operation for Development marked the end of a long process of public and political debate and the consolidation of a model of co-operation based on a distribution of responsibilities between the Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs (Grasa, 1998, pp. 66-69). Basically, the Foreign Ministry deals with programmes, projects, technical co-operation, etc., whilst Economy is responsible for FAD credits and financial co-operation. The criteria of the two do not always coincide. The Co-operation Law, the first of its kind in the history of Spain, clearly represents a step forward, but its practical application presents problems, as demonstrated by the paralysis of the Director Plan due to discrepancies between the ministries involved.

3.2. Quantitative development.

From a quantitative perspective Spanish Official Development Aid (ODA) increased during the initial years, subsequently stabilising, and even falling back a little in 1995 and 1996.

Box 1.-Evolution of Spanish Official Development Aid (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1999)

(in millions of pesetas)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Contributions to European Union	35.734,2	44.721,9	41.184,6	34.084,4	46.964,3	55.265,7
International Financial Organisations	7.433,0	7.403,5	17.049,8	2.684,0	15.030,0	16.924,7
Non-financial International Orgns.	3.757,1	8.337,8	8.319,8	9.230,1	6.719,3	8.139,5
Total Multilateral	46.924,3	60.463,2	66.554,2	45.998,5	68.713,6	80.329,9
FAD credits	94.925,8	80.021,0	35.291,7	41.184,4	33.021,5	31.989,1
Non-returnable:						
Foreign debt rescheduling	405,6	8.971,5	7.331,0 ¹	15.261,0	13.727,2	20.342,3
Aid Programmes/Projects	14.758,0	16.649,0	31.040,0	24.005,0	30.998,0	29.902,7
Food Aid	1.184,0	534,0	432,0	1.683,0	418,5	1.814,0
Emergency Aid	368,0	511,0	2.435,0	1.611,0	2.640,6	3.971,1
Aid and subsidies to NGOs	3.102,0	3.187,0	10.073,0	10.984,0	11.245,8	11.608,0 ²
Decentralised co-operation	4.185,5	5.316,0	14.667,2	19.379,6	20.763,2	28.143,1
Total Bilateral	118.928,9	115.189,5	101.269,9	114.108,0	112.814,8	127.770,2
TOTAL ODA	165.853,2	175.652,7	167.824,1	160.106,5	181.528,3	208.100,1
Percentage ODA/GNP	0,28	0,28	0,24	0,22	0,24	0,252
GNP (in 1,000s of millions ptas.)	60.257,8	63.507,9	69.170,8	73.661,0	76.761,7	82.650,3 ³

1. Correction of debt rescheduling figures for 1995

2. Includes only subsidies to development NGOs from the State Administration, basically those of the AEIC.

Subsidies from Regional Governments and Local Authorities are included in the Decentralised Official Co-operation section


3.- GDP figures taken as an approximation of GNP, figures for which will be available **at end of year.**

Source: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1999.


An analysis of the different components of ODA reflects the following:

Graph 1: Evolution of Spanish Official Development Aid (1993-1998)

Source: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1999.



The analysis of Spanish co-operation with respect to the rest of the DAC countries reflects the following evolution in percentages: **Graph 2:**




Source: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1999.

As can be seen, although Spain has not met the commitment solemnly assumed by its Parliament of reaching 0.7 % by the year 2000, it has succeeded in maintaining stable figures for co-operation at a time when those of the other DAC countries, taken as a whole, are in decline.

A more detailed analysis of bilateral co-operation by Spain clearly shows the fragile equilibrium between the financial component, basically FAD credits, and co-operation based around programmes and projects.

Graph 3.

Distribution of Bilateral ODA



Source: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1999.

FAD credits and debt relief programmes are administered by the Ministry of Economy, whilst programmes and projects are the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry's AECI agency. This “split-brain” situation has always existed,

and continues to do so, in Spanish co-operation, giving rise to incoherence and problems.

The graph also shows one of the particularities of the incipient Spanish model, which provides the basis for this stable quantitative situation: what is called decentralised co-operation.

3.3. Decentralised co-operation

Despite the fact that the Spanish Constitution of 1978, in its Article 149.1.3, defines international relations as being the exclusive responsibility of the state, the fact is that, from the 1980s onwards, the Autonomous Regions and other local authorities began to participate in co-operation programmes. These understood co-operation not only to be a branch of the state's foreign policy, but also as a demonstration of solidarity by citizens and their representative institutions. With some reluctance on the part of the state, this reality has eventually become recognised, and since 1991 the Autonomous Regions and local authorities have participated in the drawing-up of the Annual International Co-operation Plans.

Box 2: Distribution of Decentralised Official Co-operation in 1998

Source: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1999.

Autonomous Region	ODA (millions ptas.)	%
Andalucía	1,436.4	9.40
Aragón	315.8	2.07
Asturias	534.0	3.49
Baleares	558.2	3.65
Canarias	499.4	3.27
Cantabria	186.5	1.22
Castilla La Mancha	627.9	4.11
Castilla y León	448.9	2.94
Cataluña	1,555.1	10.17
Extremadura	308.6	2.02
Galicia	257.8	1.69
La Rioja	120.0	0.79
Madrid	1,072.6	7.02
Murcia	136.7	0.89
Navarra	1,681.9	11.00
País Vasco	4,254.5	27.83
Valencia	1,263.0	8.26
Various*	28.0	0.18
Total Autonomous Regions	15,285.1	100.00
Local Authorities	12,858.0	
Total Decentralised Cooperation	28,143.1	

* Information from "H" questionnaires from other public bodies

The Law on International Co-operation for development of 1998 ratified this participation of local authorities, establishing bodies such as the Inter-

territorial Commission on Co-operation for Development, which is as yet not fully operative.

In 1998 decentralised co-operation made up more than 10% of the total Spanish ODA (22% of bilateral ODA), but it has special qualitative importance above all because it is channelled mainly through NGOs and is more sensitive to citizens' demands. In terms of geographical distribution it basically follows the same pattern as co-operation carried out by the AECI.

Finally, we should mention that some Autonomous Regions have embarked on projects in direct collaboration with the European Commission, thus enlarging their scope. For example, those of Catalonia and the Basque Country have begun the co-financing of NGO projects together with the European Commission's General Directorate for Development (Budget Line B7-6000).

3.4. Geographical distribution of Spanish aid

As is logical for historical reasons, Spanish bilateral aid concentrates on Latin America and North Africa. The Annual International Co-operation Plan figures for 1998 are as follows: **Box 3:**

Ibero-America	37%
North Africa	11%
Sub-Saharan Africa	19.4%
Asia-Middle East	5.5%
Central Asia-Far East	6.6%
Central and Eastern Europe	2.5%
Others	The rest

Source: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1999.

Different instruments of aid (credits, programmes, food aid, etc.) are distributed in different ways in different geographical areas, but Latin America tends to predominate in general.

3.5. Civil society and NGOs in Spanish co-operation

Despite Spain's late arrival in the world of co-operation for development, or perhaps because of it, Spanish society has made ground rapidly, and an indication of this is the vitality of the non-governmental sector. The overwhelming support in society for the 1994 and 1995 campaigns in favour of 0.7% of GDP for development aid and the incredible response to the Hurricane Mitch appeal, for which the NGOs collected over 20,000 million pesetas (the Spanish Red Cross alone more than 13,000 million), among other examples, demonstrate a capacity for mobilisation and support that differs greatly from those of many other European countries. Spanish society continues to be more reactive than proactive on such issues, but is beginning to participate in a more stable way in non-governmental associative activities.

In civil society, the Spanish NGOs have developed from three bases:

- a) Aid based on religious groups and linked to religious missions, which still retain some of their functions and prestige.
- b) Political solidarity with national liberation movements
- c) Modern, non-religious, non-political humanitarian co-operation.

In some cases groups with religious or political origins have turned into organisations that fit the third model more closely; in others, the religious base has been conserved, but with a more modern approach to marketing, recruitment, and the planning and development of activities. Moreover, the social prestige of non-governmental activity is on the increase, especially with regard to practical, non-political organisations, such as Greenpeace, *Médicos sin Fronteras* or Amnesty International. The campaign in favour of dedicating 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to development aid had a great impact in the 1990s. It encouraged debate on this issue at state level and resulted in more co-operation initiatives from Autonomous Regions and local authorities.

More recently, and in line with the situation in other European countries, numerous NGOs have appeared which are in some way linked to political parties or trades unions and professional associations. At the same time, the majority of the large international NGOs and NGO networks have set up branches in Spain.

The majority of humanitarian and development aid NGOs fall under the jurisdiction of the State Co-ordinating Committee for development aid NGOs, which has counterparts in each of the Autonomous Regions. The Co-ordinating Committee is the Spanish representative on the European NGO Liaison Committee, based in Brussels. The Spanish Committee, which represented only ten NGOs a dozen years ago, now comprises over a hundred, a fact that reflects the great rise in numbers within the sector.

At the same time, and at a national level, the Council for Co-operation is the organ of liaison between all the co-operation sectors, including NGOs with the government. This body's working functions and characteristics need to be modified to make its involvement in Spanish co-operation more effective.

Since the mid-1980s, NGOs have had access to public subsidies for their projects, subsidies which increased up to 1998, when they amounted to more than 11,000 million pesetas. Nevertheless, the model of the relationship between NGOs and government is considered unsatisfactory, as demonstrated by the DAC report of 1998 (DAC-OECD, 1998, pp. 36-37).

Even so, the real influence of the non-governmental movement on political decisions which are taken on co-operation is less evident. Those campaigns for 0.7%, against debt and for debt relief, and for the Director Plan on Co-operation which stems from the Law on International Co-operation, to mention just a few, have not had the expected effects.

3.6. The influence of the European Union on Spanish co-operation.

Since Spain's entry into the (then) European Economic Community in 1986, EU policy on development co-operation has greatly influenced Spanish co-operation. Firstly, in quantitative terms, since 1986 Spain has been the fifth highest contributor to the European Development Fund (EDF). In 1998 Spain's contributions to the EU's co-operation budget accounted for 26.8% of the total Spanish ODA and 68.80% of multilateral aid.

Secondly, from a more qualitative perspective, Spanish governments since the restoration of democracy have adapted both to domestic public demand and to the models of the European Union. In the latter case development, co-operation and humanitarian action have helped Spain's eligibility to occupy important diplomatic posts and facilitated the development of a credible economic and social space. Spanish diplomats and politicians have held office in the Balkans; Manuel Marin was a Commissioner with important responsibilities in this field; Santiago Gómez Reino and Alberto Navarro were directors of ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office); Carlos Westendorp was a representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Miguel Angel Moratinos was the EU's Special Envoy to the Middle East peace process (While this is a diplomatic post, it can be considered to be associated with development co-operation given the extent of the aid provided by the EU to the Palestine National Authority), and leading member of the PSOE Javier Solana as former NATO's General Secretary and "*Mr. PESC*". All are illustrations of Spain's increasing role in this area.

A special case in which Spain has fulfilled a notable role, linking interests of state, of the EU and of NGOs has been in establishing from 1995 the permanent forum called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With the double intention of stabilising the region and establishing the bases for a free trade zone, in its plan for the Mediterranean region the EU covered a series of issues - encompassing human rights, economic-commercial co-operation and security- to be dealt with through multilateral agreements between states and co-operation with and between non-governmental agencies. Despite the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership limitation in that it concentrates far more on economic than on political and social aspects, the experience of having a multidimensional forum available with a wide range of protagonists is especially significant. Nevertheless, a certain loss of initiative on the part of Spain is noticeable following the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona, and indeed a certain stagnation of the whole process.

Participation in EU forums by Spanish deputies, NGOs, civil servants, etc. has undoubtedly facilitated a process of learning and of bringing Spanish co-operation into line with that of the other European countries. It has also helped Spain to influence EU policy toward Latin America, the Mediterranean region and other areas. Thus, Spain has played an important role in the greater EU commitment to Central America, through its close involvement in the Guatemalan and Salvadorian peace processes.

In the non-governmental sphere the influence of Spain's membership has also been fundamental. The participation of Spanish NGOs in the European NGO Liaison Committee and the access to finance through the European Commission budgets has been of great importance for the initial growth and

subsequent stabilisation of the Spanish non-governmental sector. However, the influence of Spanish NGOs on their European counterparts in terms of an increase in sensitivity to Latin America or North Africa is more doubtful.

3.6. Humanitarian aid in Spanish co-operation

If co-operation in general is, as we have seen, a quite recent phenomenon in Spain, humanitarian aid is an even later arrival. While for the DAC countries as a whole humanitarian aid represents over 5% of total ODA, and in some countries (such as Sweden or Austria) more than 15%, in the Spanish case it accounts for only 2% (1.91%), despite having doubled in 1998. This poor representation of the humanitarian component in Spanish co-operation can be explained by various factors, among which are the following; (1) It is still seen as having a marginal role by the SECIPI and AECL. (2) There is a lack of debate on the relationship between rehabilitation aid and development, the so called "*continuum*" in our co-operation. (3) The recent establishing in Spain of specialised NGOs, which, apart from the Red Cross and Caritas, did not begin to set up here until the 1980s.

Nevertheless, this situation is evolving rapidly. The aborted Director Plan and Strategy for Spanish co-operation propose great advances and more work in co-operation based on conflict prevention, humanitarian aid and post-conflict rehabilitation and rebuilding, within a coherent framework and the search for synergy between the diverse components of aid (Alonso, 1999).

The numbers of specifically humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs that also carry out humanitarian operations, has increased rapidly. This owes a great deal to EU financing provided via ECHO, Spain being the third largest recipient of such subsidies. Today, Spanish humanitarian aid NGOs have as much experience as their European counterparts, and have considerably increased their capacity for obtaining private resources. Nevertheless, the participation of Spanish NGOs in debates on humanitarian issues in the European Union and in international forums has been scarce to date. In discussions on the humanitarian aid Code of Conduct¹, for example, or on the Sphere Project, Spanish NGOs and the Spanish humanitarian aid movement in general, have been notable by their absence.

In this context, and despite the fact that the political and social debate on humanitarian aid within the context of Spanish co-operation has been under way for some years, there remains some conceptual confusion among the different protagonists involved. The conservative Partido Popular government has insisted on including spending on Spain's participation in peacekeeping operations as ODA, a practice expressly forbidden by the DAC. Thus, for example, the Spanish Senate, in its Report on Spanish Policy on Co-operation for Development, states that "at least some aspects of the UN peacekeeping missions, in which our armed forces are playing an important role in

¹ Code of Conduct relating to aid in cases of disaster for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements and NGOs. Signed by more than 150 NGOs throughout the world and also endorsed by some governments and international bodies as a reference for humanitarian action. In force since 1995.

collaboration with civil personnel, will need to be considered as actions representing co-operation for development, and therefore eligible to being regarded as ODA expenditure" (BOCG Senado, 1994).

No specific steps have yet been taken to push forward this initiative. At present it is a hotch-potch, with certain implications of opportunism, between three spheres that should be kept apart: the political, the military and the humanitarians.

4. From humanitarianism to military intervention

Spain was given an important opportunity to become integrated in the mechanisms and institutions of the international community by the UN humanitarian missions following the Cold War. Participation in peacekeeping missions allowed Spain both to find a vocation for its armed forces and to occupy a place in the community of nations. This will to participate manifested itself institutionally in the National Defence Directive of 1992, which established one aim as being to "help to participate in United Nations initiatives for peace, disarmament and arms control, and in its peace and humanitarian aid missions" (Article 11). The Law on International Co-operation referred to above also cites peacekeeping operations as one possible type of action of humanitarian aid (Article 12), which leads to some degree of confusion (Rey Marcos, 1998).

Since 1989, with its involvement in the independence of Namibia and in Angola, Spain has contributed forces to keep the peace in Central America (El Salvador and Guatemala,) and other locations. It has also carried out various military and police training missions in Central America, Angola and Mozambique, and it sent naval forces in non-combatant roles to the Gulf War and to the Adriatic during the Bosnian war to guarantee the arms embargo. In the Balkan wars of the 1990s the Spanish armed forces played a more active role, with a presence from November 1992 in Croatia and Bosnia as part of the UN protection force (UNPROFOR).

After the Dayton Accord Spanish troops became part of the NATO force. In the same year Spanish and Italian military personnel worked together in Albania as a stabilising force in the face of the imminent disintegration of the country. In 1999 the Spanish Air Force participated in the air strikes on Serbia and Serbian targets in Kosovo in order to force Belgrade to retreat from the province. The Spanish government adopted the official NATO line of a "humanitarian war", adopted by US President Bill Clinton and British Premier Tony Blair.

This importation and adaptation of the discourse of humanitarian military intervention by NATO was accepted unquestioningly by the government of José María Aznar, as the Italian government pointed out. This attitude provoked the first disputes between NGOs critical of armed humanitarianism and of the way NATO rode roughshod over the UN with regard to the Kosovo conflict. It is to be expected that in future humanitarian operations with a military component led by NATO this type of confrontation will arise again

Spanish participation in peace missions

Name of mission	Date	Spanish participation	Functions
UNAVEM-I (UN Angola Verification Mission)	1989-1991	21 military observers in relays	Verification of redeployment and retreat of Cuban troops
UNAVEM-II (Angola)	1991-1995	75 military observers in relays	Verification of ceasefire and supervision of police activity
UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia)	1989-1990	250 Air Force troops; 6 C-212 Aviocar aircraft; 1 C-130 Hercules	Control and supervision of elections to ensure Namibian independence
ONUCA (UN Observers Group in Central America)	1989-1992	171 military observers in relays. Leadership of operation	Ensure halt to aid for irregular forces and insurrectional movements. Supervision of demobilisation of Nicaraguan resistance and ceasefire.
ONUSAL (UN Observers in El Salvador)	1991-1995	512 military observers in relays. Leadership of the mission.	Verify ceasefire between FMLN and El Salvador Government
ONUVEH (Supervision Mission in Haiti)	1990	9 officers	Support Haitian Government in supervision of 1990 elections. Assessment of public order and security.
Gulf War	1991	2 corvettes and 1 frigate	Ensure Iraqi retreat from Kuwait by means of force
Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq-Turkey)	1991	Tactical Force with 586 ground troops. 7 helicopters, 80 vehicles, 31 trailers.	Protection of Kurdish refugees (transport, construction of camps, field hospitals, distribution of Spanish humanitarian aid)
ONUMOZ (UN Mission in Mozambique)	1992-1995	50 military observers in relays	Guaranteeing peace accords between Government and RENAMO.
UNAMIR (UN Mission in Rwanda)	1992-1996	20 Air Force troops; 1 CN-235 aircraft	Dispatch of humanitarian aid and support for Spanish NGOs operating in the region.
UNSCOM (UN Special Commission for Iraq)	From 1995, at intervals	5 missile experts	Control of Iraqi chemical weapons capacity
MINUGUA (UN Mission in Guatemala)	1992-date	43 military observers in 1997. Spanish leadership of the mission. Currently, 7 military advisers	Guarantee of human rights agreement between Government and URNG. Later, verification of ceasefire, demobilisation and disarmament.
UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina)	1992-1995	19 Military observers; one tactical force of 1,200 troops; 20 officers at HQ.	Help and protect distribution of humanitarian aid. Setting-up and protection of security zones.
Operation Sharp Guard (NATO/WEU joint operation)	1992-1996	2 frigates, 1 supply ship, 1 sea patrol plane and 1 submarine.	Verification of naval embargo on ex-Yugoslavia
Operation Deny Flight	1992-1995	Air Force detachment; 6 F-18 fighters; 2 airborne refuelling planes and one intermediary plane.	Air support for UNPROFOR and IFOR
IFOR (NATO)	1995-1996	1 brigade with 1,700 men; 1	Continuation of

Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina)		frigate; 6 F-18 fighters and 3 transport planes	UNPROFOR with aim of fulfilling military aspects of Dayton Accords
SFOR (NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina)	1996-date	1 brigade with 1,300 men; 1 frigate; 6 F-18 fighters and 2 transport planes	Continuation of IFOR with aim of permitting fulfilment of civil aspects of Dayton Accords
ECMMY (ECSO Mission for ex- Yugoslavia)	1991-date	Maximum of 50 military and 3 diplomats. Currently 9 military and 1 diplomat	Help EU in search for lasting solution to conflict in ex- Yugoslavia.
ECTF (Special EU Force for humanitarian aid to ex-Yugoslavia)	1994-1995	3 officers at HQ in Zagreb. Spanish leadership of the mission.	Co-ordination of EU humanitarian aid in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
EUAM (European Union Administration in Mostar)	1994-1996	3 officers as military advisers to the EU administrator	Administration of city and demilitarisation
CIAY (Mission of the International Conference for ex- Yugoslavia for control of River Drina frontier)	1994-1995	Commanders and officers transferred from ECMMY	Verification of closure of Serbian and Montenegrin frontiers to Bosnia Serbs (except humanitarian aid)
Guarantee of Danube embargo	1993-1996	<i>Guardia Civil</i> contingent	Control of river traffic for embargo on certain goods to ex-Yugoslavia
IPTF (UN Police Mission for Bosnia-Herzegovina)	1996-date	<i>Guardia Civil</i> contingent	Development of effective police structures and criminal justice procedures.
ESCO Group for Assistance to Chechnya	1995-1997	3 army officers	Promotion of respect for human rights (development of institutions). Support for distribution of humanitarian aid. Return of refugees and displaced persons.
ESCO Mission for Moldova	1996-1997	3 warrant officers	Facilitating negotiations for peaceful solution to conflict
ESCO Mission for Croatia	1995-1996	One officer	Guaranteeing protection of human rights. Promotion of reconciliation.
ESCO Mission for Georgia	1993-date	3 officers	Promotion of negotiations between parties
Operation Alba (Multinational Force for Albania)	1997	Tactical force with 325 men	Helping to establish secure environment. Ensuring rapid and secure provision of humanitarian aid.
KDOM (Kosovo Diplomatic Observation Mission)	1998	One officer	Mission dependant on ECMMY- verification and fact-finding
KVM (ESCO Kosovo) Verification Mission)	1998-1999	12 military observers	Search for peaceful solution to Kosovo and Metohija situation
Operation Alpha-Charlie	1998-1999	1,000 troops. Amphibious vehicles. Medical teams. Transport planes	Humanitarian operation for reconstruction of countries affected by Hurricane Mitch
KFOR (Kosovo Multinational Security Force)	1999-date	One Light Infantry Battalion (1,200 troops); logistic support unit with transmissions; high medical level.	Prevention of resumption of hostilities; checking fulfilment of agreements; support for return of refugees and displaced persons. Provision of public security and basic civil administration

Drawn up from Defence Ministry information.

Spanish participation in peace operations has made notable advances since it began ten years ago, in a process of internationalisation of the armed forces that it is in the interests of the Defence Ministry to support. Apart from its leading role in operations carried out in Central America, where Spanish personnel were in charge, another focus of participation has been in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The tasks taken on reflect the evolution of the concept of "peacekeeping", since they include not only the demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants and the supervision of ceasefires, but also the supervision of electoral processes, the assessment of security and public order, the distribution of humanitarian aid, and so on.

For some military leaders "the future of the armed forces lies in humanitarian aid"², and the recent activity of the Defence Ministry appears to concur with this.

Conclusions

Development co-operation and humanitarian action policies have permitted Spain to increase and strengthen its links both horizontally, with its European colleagues, and vertically, with Latin America and the Mediterranean region.

Co-operative and humanitarian activity is a factor which links large sectors of the Spanish population. At the same time, it is a common political factor in an increasingly depoliticised society. The majority of political groups tend to concur about the role that should be played in foreign policy by co-operation for development and humanitarian aid. Neither Spain's society nor its governments have yet begun to experience the phenomenon of "aid fatigue" found in other countries, though all the indications are that it will not be long before it appears.

After years of isolation and backwardness with respect to other European countries, Spain today has an institutional, judicial and administrative framework capable of supporting a more committed and active co-operation policy. Nevertheless, there remain serious problems with the co-ordination of responsibilities between different ministries which affects some co-operation initiatives.

The participation of local authorities is one of the peculiarities of Spanish co-operation, and a demonstration of its vitality and of the social commitment that underpins it. The non-governmental movement has grown strongly both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that it is now comparable to that of other European countries, and can count on public support which, though unstable, is on the increase.

Spain is situated geopolitically in the Mediterranean area, a zone harbouring diverse potential crises of varying intensity, from the Algerian

² Statement by Spanish Army Chief of Staff Alfonso Pardo de Santayana y Coloma in Pamplona. El Diario de Navarra, 15 October 1999.

situation to the question of immigration from Africa and South America to Europe. At the same time, Spain is linked historically, culturally and economically to Latin America and the Caribbean. Understandably, then, Spain is particularly sensitive to crises of development and eventual complex political crises, as well as natural disasters, in Latin America. The political priorities of our co-operation are oriented in this direction, and there is a wide consensus in favour of such orientation.

Spain has directed its foreign policy over the last twenty years basically towards Europe. The country's entry into NATO implies a strong conditioning of its position in so far as the Atlantic Alliance has defined in its Strategic Concept (May 1999) a wide-ranging potential for work that would cover everything from regional conflicts to international crime. The policies and responses Spain makes in the future, either independently or conditioned by its membership of the EU and NATO, with regard to the Mediterranean and Latin America will shape its foreign policy. The strategic question is whether this proximity to two regions will lead Spain, in the process of constructing a foreign and European security policy, to consider individual contributions and particular perspectives, or whether it will become resigned to the inertia of the most powerful EU states and NATO's concept of extended security.

Bibliography

Aguirre, M.A. (1996) , "Europe and the Challenges from the Southern Periphery", in The Centre for Defence Studies/King's College London, *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1996* (London: Brassey's, pp. 200-212.

Alonso J. A. (1992) "La cooperación al desarrollo en España: balance de una década", *Anuario Internacional CIDOB* (Barcelona: CIDOB), pp. 69-82.

Alonso, J.A. (1999) *Estrategia para la Cooperación Española* (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores).

BOCG Spanish Senate - Senado. V Legislatura. Serie I. 28 November 1994.-Nº201.

Development Assistance Committee, (1998) Spain, Development Co-operation Review Series (Paris: OECD) Series of analyses on development co-operation material, nº 27, pp. 36-37.

Development Assistance Committee (1998) *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* (Paris: OECD).

Escobar, A. (1999) "The Invention of Development", *Current History*, November issue, pp. 382-386.

Evans, G.E. (1998) *Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin). p.12. The Development Aid Committee DAC of the OECD establishes clear criteria for what is considered as Official Development Aid (ODA).

Grasa, R. (1998) "La Ley de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo: ¿una nueva etapa de la aportación española al desarrollo del Sur?", *La realidad de la ayuda 1998-1999*, Barcelona: Intermón), pp.66-69.

Martin, L. L. (1999) "The Political Economy of International Co-operation", in Inge, Paul. I. Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. S. (Eds.), *Global Public Goods. International Co-operation in the 21st Century*, Oxford:UNDP and Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 51-63.

Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (1999) SECIPI, Seguimiento PACI 1998, Oficina de Planificación y Evaluación.

Nye, Jr., J.S. (1997) *Understanding International Conflicts* (New York: Longman), pp. 161-170.

Pearce, J.P. (1999) 'Peace-building in the Periphery: Lessons from Central America', *Third World Quarterly*, vol.20, nº1, 1999, pp.51-68.

Rey Marcos, F. (1998) "Visiones de la acción humanitaria en 1997", in Aguirre, M. Anuario CIP 1998 (Barcelona: Icaria).

Rey Marcos, F. and González-Bustelo, M., (1999) "Comité de la Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD) de la OECD y los conflictos, la paz y la cooperación para el desarrollo" (Madrid: Centro de Investigación para la Paz) (unpublished).

Roberts, A. Et. Al. (1999), *Desafíos de la acción humanitaria*, Icaria with MSF/Universidad de Deusto y CIP, (Barcelona: Icaria/MSF, CIP, Deusto University). (Forthcoming London: Pluto Press, 2000).

Slim, H. (1996) "What is Development?", in Anderson M.B. (Ed.), *Development and Social Diversity* (Oxford:Oxfam).

Sogge, D. (Ed.) (1996), *Compassion and Calculation* (London: Pluto Press/TNI).

The authors thank Mabel González-Bustelo for her assistance on research for this chapter.

Footnotes

¹ Code of Conduct relating to aid in cases of disaster for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements and NGOs. Signed by more than 150 NGOs throughout the world and also endorsed by some governments and international bodies as a reference for humanitarian action. In force since 1995.

² Statement by Spanish Army Chief of Staff Alfonso Pardo de Santayana y Coloma in Pamplona. El Diario de Navarra, 15 October 1999.