

# Putting Security First

Weapons for Development as an Approach to Micro-disarmament

The difficulties of civilian disarmament have long presented a major obstacle to security development in post-conflict countries. The 'weapons for development' strategy recently devised for civilian disarmament is based on the exchange of development aid (often aimed at improving the local security sector) for voluntary, community-wide forfeiture of small arms. This paper will examine the effectiveness of the weapons for development initiative in improving security and in providing a sufficient impetus for widespread civilian disarmament.

Holly Beck  
110027308  
Undergraduate Honours Thesis  
Professor Rex Brynen, advisor  
April 30, 2004



# Table of Contents

<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>PART I: THE PROBLEM OF SMALL ARMS .....</b>	<b>1</b>
SMALL ARMS SUSTAIN CONFLICTS.....	1
SMALL ARMS ENABLE A CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE AFTER THE END OF A CONFLICT .....	2
ARMS AVAILABILITY CAN CREATE ‘CULTURES OF VIOLENCE’ .....	2
ARMS TRAFFICKED WITHIN AND BETWEEN REGIONS.....	3
DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS.....	3
ARMS AVAILABILITY.....	5
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CIRCULATION.....	6
DISARMAMENT , SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT.....	7
<b>PART II: SMALL ARMS COLLECTION AND WEAPONS FOR DEVELOPMENT .....</b>	<b>9</b>
THE CHALLENGES OF SMALL ARMS COLLECTION.....	9
VOLUNTARY WEAPONS COLLECTION PROGRAMS (VWCPS).....	10
WEAPONS FOR DEVELOPMENT .....	12
<b>PART III: ALBANIA CASE STUDY .....</b>	<b>22</b>
PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS IN ALBANIA .....	22
UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION.....	25
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GRAMSH PILOT PROJECT (GPP) .....	27
IMPACT OF THE GRAMSH PILOT PROJECT .....	32
PROJECT EXPANSION: WEAPONS IN EXCHANGE FOR DEVELOPMENT (WED) AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL (SALWC) .....	34
IMPACT OF SALWC.....	37
TRANSITION TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) AND CONCLUSIONS.....	39
<b>PART IV: CAMBODIA CASE STUDY.....</b>	<b>42</b>
PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS IN CAMBODIA.....	42
GOVERNMENT WEAPONS COLLECTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT.....	46
EUROPEAN UNION INTERVENTION.....	47
IMPACT OF WED AND CONCLUSIONS .....	53
<b>PART V: LESSONS LEARNED .....</b>	<b>60</b>
CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS.....	60
EVALUATION.....	62
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	64
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>71</b>



## Introduction

The global spread of small arms since the end of the Cold War has extended violent civil conflicts worldwide, claiming far more casualties annually than conventional weapons have. Small arms also have the potential to militarize societies, normalizing violent means of conflict resolution and undermining trust between neighbours and communities. Long after the end of a conflict, the tools of that conflict are trafficked between and within countries, feeding one conflict after another. Where they proliferate, small arms impede development by facilitating the disruption of livelihoods and aid distribution and discouraging domestic and foreign investment. The arms races of the Cold War era have resulted in an unprecedented availability of military-style small arms in societies worldwide, and due to their low price and portability, small arms in many locations are as easy to come by as basic legal commodities. The majority of small arms in circulation today are held by civilians.

Increasing attention has been paid in recent decades to the linkages between arms, insecurity, and underdevelopment, and new initiatives have sprung up that aim to address all three issues in an integrated manner. Voluntary weapons collection programs have been implemented in societies worldwide, both after the end of a conflict and during peacetime. These programs have traditionally offered incentives to disarming civilians in the form of money, food, or developmentally-oriented tools such as sewing machines and farm implements. These programs have been met with varying degrees of success.

In the late 1990s, an innovative approach to civilian weapons collection was introduced in Albania, replacing individual incentives with community-level development projects. Disarmament was promoted as a collective activity, imperative for community security and

development. The pilot program in Albania sought to address the insecurity that first prompted communities to take up arms while offering an opportunity for civilians to hand over small arms without the danger of legal prosecution.

After the Albania pilot program enjoyed relatively successful results, the model was expanded to other areas of the country, and eventually to other countries facing similar small arms crises. One such country was Cambodia, where 30 years of civil war had littered small arms throughout society. Here, small weapons for development collection were combined with legal reform and steps toward security sector reform under one sweeping campaign. Again, the weapons for development model was deemed successful both in collecting weapons and in providing viable development projects for the disarming communities.

Weapons for development is a worthy model for future civilian weapons collection initiatives, and has been shown to be effective in a number of cases. However, weapons for development remains relatively new, and a few adjustments would have the potential to make future programs more successful and more transparent. Standards should be developed for pre-, mid-, and post-project evaluations, and program priorities should be set at the outset to improve transparency. Development incentives should be kept small and extended to as many communities as is feasible, and awareness campaigning should be a central focus of every future program. A number of variables must also be considered carefully in the planning of weapons for development programs, some of which are different perceptions of public security establishments, differing developmental needs, and varying reasons for arms possession.

## Part I: The Problem of Small Arms

The majority of violent conflicts since the end of the Cold War have not been fought by the formal armies of conflicting, sovereign states, but by non-state groups within countries or regions.<sup>1</sup> In such conflicts, conventional heavy weaponry such as tanks or missiles has been replaced by small arms and light weapons (SALW) as the principal tools of violence.<sup>2</sup>

Small arms have the potential to impede political stabilization and development in the following ways: by sustaining conflicts, enabling a return to violence in post-conflict societies, allowing small disputes to become weaponized, forcing people and governments to divert resources from developmental initiatives, and flowing easily within and between regions.

### **Small arms sustain conflicts**

Not only do small arms and light weapons account for the vast majority of casualties in post-Cold War conflicts,<sup>3</sup> their proliferation in many cases prevents peaceful resolutions to those conflicts: “Although weapons themselves do not cause conflicts, their proliferation and easy availability exacerbate the degree of violence by increasing the lethality and duration of hostilities, and encouraging violent rather than peaceful resolutions of differences.”<sup>4</sup> SALW can easily be hidden in and trafficked through the refugee camps that house populations displaced by war, as has likely been the case in the Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Kenya.<sup>5</sup> The continuous flow of small arms into war-affected regions also has the potential to frustrate attempts to broker peace settlements, as UN Special Envoy Mohamed Sahnoun explains:

In my modest experience in mediation and good offices, one of the most frustrating elements which I encountered, is the disruptive effect of arms supply. Very often in our endeavors, as we came near to a breakthrough in our negotiations, we saw one party or

another suddenly fail to comply with the plan. After investigating into the reasons for such a behavior, often it became clear that an important arms cargo had reached the party concerned so that it felt powerful enough to achieve its ends by military means.<sup>6</sup>

### **Small arms enable a continuation of violence after the end of a conflict**

A formal end to hostilities between warring groups does not necessarily entail a cessation of bloodshed. Rather, the conditions of war may endure long after the war itself has ended. Combatants who have not been disarmed and effectively reintegrated into society often continue to openly wield the military-style firearms at their disposal, “one of the few skills they can claim with confidence.”<sup>7</sup> Where weapons continue to circulate freely after the end of a violent conflict, it is even possible that casualty rates will increase rather than decrease with time: “Surprisingly, arms-related death and injury do not necessarily decrease dramatically when wars come to an end.... The threat of arms-related death or injury to civilians in non-combat settings can surpass rates experienced during conflict periods if weapons remain diffused in society.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Arms availability can create ‘cultures of violence’**

In a region with or without a recent history of war, the pervasive presence of SALW has the potential to fundamentally alter the socio-political environment. Societies undergo processes of “militarization” that are very difficult to reverse: repeated acts of violence factionalize communities, desensitize populations to human rights violations, and foster mistrust between governments and citizens.<sup>9</sup> Small disputes become weaponized, and rivalries are sustained by tit-for-tat acts of gun violence. The values upheld by a society can be fundamentally altered: “In its most benign form, cultures of violence (or ‘consumerist militarism’) entail the normalisation and glorification of war, weaponry, military force and violence through popular media, sport and

recreation... At worst, cultures of violence celebrate armed violence – with small arms elevated to the status of a totem.”<sup>10</sup>

### **Arms trafficked within and between regions**

The weakening of public security often creates opportunities for the trafficking of weapons, since governments of states emerging from conflicts or confronting an increase in gun-related crime or violence will often lack the resources to monitor cross-border or intra-state traffic.<sup>11</sup> Where other opportunities for income generation are limited, the sale of arms becomes an attractive option in regions with a high demand for weapons.<sup>12</sup> The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports that in West Africa, small arms have continuously been trafficked within and between countries, with the result that the same crop of guns is “used in one rebellion after another.”<sup>13</sup>

### **Developmental impact of small arms**

It is estimated that 500,000 people are fatally wounded by small arms each year, either intentionally or unintentionally.<sup>14</sup> The indirect fatalities and injuries – caused by reduced access to health care, forced displacement, intercepted aid delivery, and other problems directly tied to small arms proliferation – are much more difficult to measure.

Where small arms have circulated, governments are frequently unable to pursue political stabilization and developmental initiatives, and are instead forced to divert significant resources to the security sector, including government armament. One example of such political paralysis is post-Apartheid South Africa, where increases in small arms availability, crime, and violence

hindered attempts by the transition government to address social inequity and pervading tensions within society from the Apartheid era.<sup>15</sup> The resources used to address arms threats often result in reduced funding for social services, such as health and education, and domestic savings or investment – all requisites for sustainable economic development.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the “general insecurity” perpetuated in such environments also “wards off long-term investment” from foreign donors.<sup>17</sup>

The instability in a region rife with small arms does affect developmental work directly: development projects have been delayed or permanently abandoned when crime and gun violence endangered personnel or damaged infrastructure, and in some cases armed groups have intercepted development aid meant to reach certain sectors of the population (e.g. refugees).<sup>18</sup> Gun violence also prompts aid agencies to provide short-term humanitarian relief rather than long-term development aid.<sup>19</sup> The underdeveloping potential of small arms is not limited to a small number of case studies, but is an observable pattern: “...where they proliferate, projects are obstructed, infrastructure damaged, materials looted, and workers endangered.”<sup>20</sup> If gun violence proves a sufficient threat to program staff, agencies may not even be willing to put at risk the personnel needed to carry out a security assessment of an area, which would determine the feasibility of launching a program in the region.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, “the unchecked availability of small arms is generating a culture of withdrawal.”<sup>22</sup>

The developmental impact of SALW is not limited to agency interventions. Ongoing violence in a number of regions perpetuated by small arms availability has resulted in the closure or reduced capacity of health centers, allowing the re-emergence of diseases like sleeping sickness in Africa. Even where clinics operate, child mortality remains high because people are afraid to risk the journey to seek medical help.<sup>23</sup> Crime and corruption are also products of a high

availability of small arms: the resulting climate of fear and uncertainty often prompts young people to join gangs or militias that promise opportunities for power and wealth,<sup>24</sup> and leads others to take up arms as a way of “addressing social inequalities.”<sup>25</sup> The corrupting effect of small arms possession on authority figures – both military and civil – will be discussed in more detail in the case study of Cambodia.

Small arms proliferation also disrupts education systems and the livelihoods of affected populations. School grounds in Cambodia and Ethiopia have become targets for armed groups seeking young recruits, and students possessing arms have initiated violent clashes on campuses in Kenya, Nigeria, Cambodia, and the Philippines.<sup>26</sup> In Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, people’s abilities to maintain sufficient levels of productivity have been complicated by theft or forced relocation:

There is ample evidence emerging from Kenya, Colombia and East Timor, that the mere threat of small arms availability and use affects household and individual decision-making regarding (forced) migration and the pursuit of employment or rural livelihoods.... Testimonial evidence gathered from the field suggests that small arms play a significant role undermining socio-economic development because assets are frequently seized and families violently dismantled.<sup>27</sup>

In this way, even in regions recently unaffected by war, small arms continue to systemically drain the resources available for basic social services, deter investment, threaten development projects, and create cycles of violence that destabilize and polarize communities.

## **Arms availability**

Cold War-era arms races resulted in the accumulation of high numbers of SALW in a number of countries that pledged allegiance to one of the two superpowers. The effect of the global armament trend on today’s conflicts is undeniable: “...countries which were caught up in the fighting of proxy wars during the Cold War created an arms market previously unknown....

These weapons are now circulating internally within countries or within regions: there is no need for the import of more weapons and so traditional supply-side restrictions (for example, export bans by supplier states) become irrelevant.”<sup>28</sup> After conflicts, SALW have either been hidden in caches by combatants or governments or “exported indiscriminately.”<sup>29</sup> Illicit transfers have also increased: advances in communication and transportation made during the 1990s as a result of the increasingly globalized economy have made small arms both cheaper and easier to get on the black market.<sup>30</sup> The ready availability of these weapons, their low cost, and the perception that everyone else (including insurgent groups and government forces) is armed leads civilians in many countries to take up arms themselves.<sup>31</sup> The arming of civilians is compounded by the fact that many small arms are quite easy to use – an AK-47 “can be stripped and reassembled by a child of 10 years”<sup>32</sup> – and only perpetuates the damaging socioeconomic trends discussed above.

## **Global and regional circulation**

The number of small arms<sup>33</sup> circulating globally was thought to be over 550 million as of 2001. This includes new small arms being produced and sold, surplus stocks offloaded by militaries, and small arms trafficked from one area to another. This last group of small arms is “traded in informal markets and across frontiers, or trafficked via international brokers and criminal syndicates at exceptional return.” In West Africa, for example, loose border control permitted rampant arms smuggling between Mali, Chad, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; in Central America, arms from the civil conflict in El Salvador have made their way through Panama to Peru.<sup>34</sup>

Of the 550 million small arms believed to be in circulation, only 1 million, or 0.2 per cent, are held by “non-state or ‘rebel’ actors.” In contrast, it is believed that 305 million small arms are in “private civilian hands.”<sup>35</sup>

## **Disarmament, security, and development**

International attention to the symbiotic connections between disarmament, security, and development arose in the 1970s – both the UN’s Second Development Decade and its First Disarmament Decade – and was revived in the 1990s with the creation of Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) and the High-Level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development, two new branches in the UN system that acknowledge in their mandates the importance of pursuing disarmament to further development aims.<sup>36</sup> The past few decades have also witnessed a shift in focus away from the conversion of conventional-weapons manufacturing<sup>37</sup> toward micro-disarmament, or SALW disarmament at the level of the individual:<sup>38</sup> “...international concern about the worldwide proliferation of small arms in post-conflict societies and other settings has burgeoned. Countless resolutions call for the collection and disposal of undesirably held small arms and light weapons. Around the world, efforts at weapons collection and destruction programs are increasing.”<sup>39</sup>

The interdependence of human security, developmental opportunity, and effective disarmament has come to be widely accepted as the new discourse in all three communities – security, development, and disarmament. It is now commonly recognized that micro-disarmament initiatives that fail to sufficiently address the actual or perceived insecurity of the target population are not only unsustainable,<sup>40</sup> they may also be dangerous if they “deprive civilians of an important means of self-defence.”<sup>41</sup> In response to this challenge, the ‘security-

first' approach to micro-disarmament was developed, which addresses security and development as issues bound together in a "reciprocal" relationship.<sup>42</sup>

## Part II: Small Arms Collection and Weapons for Development

### The challenges of small arms collection

A wide range of factors make the collection of small arms from civilians a daunting challenge indeed. Practical factors include the monetary value of the weapon, which in some places may exceed its owner's monthly income, and the potential danger of disarming where public security is inadequate and gun possession is the norm.<sup>43</sup> In such an environment, people may opt to hold onto small arms even if they have no intention of using them for illicit purposes. Such became the case in northern Mali in the 1990s, where the population did not have sufficient confidence in public security to disarm and experts concluded that, "in such a situation, if key development and security concerns were not addressed, enforced arms collection could result in violence."<sup>44</sup>

SALW may also be considered symbols of status or masculinity, engraining their presence in society irrespective of security or economics. Due to images promulgated by entertainment industries and existing cultural conceptions of power, attraction to guns and gun violence is widely considered "a male vice,"<sup>45</sup> one that exists in "traditional and modern cultures alike."<sup>46</sup> Such attitudes, where they exist, can complicate attempts to collect SALW from civilian populations.

The challenge of disarming is further compounded by the sheer number of weapons in circulation and civilian possession, a problem unique to SALW. In regions where SALW are widely available, government interest in disarmament is not enough. Civilians must be equally willing to forfeit weapons in their custody: "Unlike the disarmament of nuclear, chemical or

heavy weapons, the decision to disarm will be made by each and every person who owns a gun.”<sup>47</sup>

## **Voluntary weapons collection programs (VWCPs)**

As the destabilizing potential of forced, government-led disarmament has come to be widely recognized by governments and international agencies alike, voluntary weapons collection programs (VWCPs) have grown in popularity as the destructive effects of SALW have been publicized and attempts at SALW disarmament have become more prevalent worldwide. In general terms, VWCPs entail “responsible government, non-governmental or international organization [motivating] individuals or groups to surrender legal or illegal weapons that are not required for the purposes of national defense or internal security, and may be unsafe or unwanted by civilians.”<sup>48</sup> Motivation often includes amnesty and/or anonymity, both of which protect gun owners who have obtained or used their weapons illegally.<sup>49</sup> VWCPs may also offer material compensation for the forfeiture of arms, including cash, foodstuffs or coupons, farm implements, and other goods deemed useful in a given context. In general, Sarah Meek notes that governments seem more inclined to offer money as a motivator, whereas “community groups and donor agencies tend to favor non-cash incentives.”<sup>50</sup>

It is suggested that one advantage of a voluntary approach to disarmament “lies in its apparent weakness. That is, it is politically appealing and popular because it is the ‘weakest’ intervention...”<sup>51</sup> A more forceful attempt at disarmament would likely stir up more controversy, either locally or internationally. VWCPs are also not particularly labor or capital-intensive.<sup>52</sup> Further, they have the potential to strengthen community ties: “Voluntary weapons collection can go a long way in building confidence, forging collaborative networks in the

community and supporting a longer-term commitment between stakeholders.”<sup>53</sup> But perhaps the most significant reason for the popularity of VWCPs among government and non-governmental agencies is the focus on education and the eradication of violent norms. VWCPs foster dialogue about gun violence within communities, as well as between communities and governments, which has the potential to address the demand at the root of the small arms problem: “The utility of VWCPs lies in that their approach to firearms incorporates multiple actors and organisations, drawing attention to issues that people give little thought to including firearms possession, whether the owner still needs or wants the firearm and, if the option were available, whether the owner would choose to dispose of the firearm.”<sup>54</sup>

However, VWCPs are not without their failings. Rather, “...by their very nature, VWCPs leave many issues untouched and many questions unanswered.”<sup>55</sup> It is important to point out that VWCPs only address the problems caused by arms currently in circulation and in use, not problems on the supply side of the equation.<sup>56</sup> Further, if implementing agencies do not seek to publicize the destructive potential of SALW among civilians in order to stem demand, arms may start reappearing in a society after the VWCP ends. Without educational campaigns tied to the VWCP, the response may also fall short of hopes or expectations. Organizers of a program to collect weapons in South Africa in 1994 acknowledged after the end of the program that too little attention was paid to the aim of changing attitudes toward gun possession, and had the program invested more in education it would likely have been more successful.<sup>57</sup> VWCPs also do not necessarily include attempts to address the underlying causes of SALW possession and misuse, such as mistrust in public security services and underdevelopment. “Weapons collection programs are not viewed as an end in themselves but rather part of a more comprehensive peace building plan that includes development and responsible law enforcement that can attack the root

causes of the violence.”<sup>58</sup> If such issues are not addressed, the success of disarmament efforts will be limited.

Further problems arise specifically in those VWCPs that offer cash incentives, also called buy-backs. For a number of reasons, BICC and SAND have concluded that “In most cases cash incentives are not appropriate and may be detrimental to overall objectives.”<sup>59</sup> Donors are often unwilling to fund such programs, which could be seen as rewarding those members of society who have already done harm to others.<sup>60</sup> Program coordinators may wish to avoid cash incentives for fear of inflation, or in favor of alternative incentives that address the problem of unemployment, as was determined in Albania and Mozambique respectively.<sup>61</sup> Buy-back programs may also inadvertently subsidize arms trading, both by civilians seeking to acquire more weapons to sell to the program<sup>62</sup> and by local arms dealers seeking to offload old or surplus stocks.<sup>63</sup> Finally, and perhaps most problematic, buy-back programs provide participants with cash that can easily be used to purchase new small arms.<sup>64</sup> In fact, “If people feel insecure, they will either hold on to weapons or use the money to buy new and better weapons.”<sup>65</sup> The natural conclusion to be drawn is that VWCPs as a means of tackling armed violence in civilian communities can only be successful if the participants in the program feel secure enough to both forfeit weapons and to refrain from replacing them.

## **Weapons for Development**

Drawing on the lessons learned from different attempts at small arms collection, the United Nations Development Programme pioneered in 1998 the concept of weapons for development (WfD), combining incentive-based disarmament tactics with development-oriented rewards and a community-based approach. The impetus behind WfD was the recognition that

development projects would improve security, that improved security would provide for more successful VWCPs, and that the pitfalls of individual incentives could be bypassed by providing those incentives to whole communities instead.<sup>66</sup> Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson define WfD as “the indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.”<sup>67</sup>

### *Underlying principles*

The details of implementation of WfD necessarily vary from case to case, and will be discussed further in this paper in three case studies. However, WfD programs are generally guided by several underlying principles: the notion that disarmament efforts must address both insecurity and perceptions of insecurity; the favoring of an approach to disarmament that treats problems of underdevelopment; and the distribution of incentives at the collective rather than the individual level.

Proponents of small arms collection programs recognize that one major reason civilians take up arms is that the protection provided by government military or police services is inadequate.<sup>68</sup> In such a case small arms serve as a necessary substitute for public security, and “A programme that aims to reduce gun availability may deprive civilians of an important means of self-defence.”<sup>69</sup> Pike and Taylor swiftly condemn programs that would attempt to “disarm communities whose safety cannot be guaranteed,” calling them “irresponsible and dangerous.”<sup>70</sup>

A general consensus seems to exist today among disarmament experts: citizens who voluntarily forfeit weapons must be guaranteed protection and rule of law by the state.<sup>71, 72</sup> Depending on the nature of each case, necessary steps may include “training for public officials,

judges, police, military, and the wider question of security sector reform,” many of which have in the past been considered solely development initiatives but are now viewed as a “prerequisite for undertaking disarmament.”<sup>73</sup>

A second tenet of WfD is that people must feel comfortable disarming before they will agree to do so. Therefore, in addition to addressing actual security conditions, programs must also address individual and community perceptions of those conditions. In a discussion of factors that will most often affect people’s willingness to forfeit small arms, Faltas includes such considerations as perceived levels of violence and lawlessness and perceived effectiveness of public security services.<sup>74</sup> Vignard asserts that these psychological factors must be addressed by disarmament programs alongside state ineffectiveness: “To be successful, weapons collection must be accompanied by improvements in both the perceived and actual security situation.”<sup>75</sup>

It is important to note that, while perceptions of insecurity are often a reliable reflection of the actual security situation, improvements in the case of the latter are not necessarily enough to change the former. As one participant in the 1999 Durban “Shrinking Small Arms” seminar, organized by the Quaker UN, put it, “Statistics show that you need to target what people currently believe, and then focus on that.”<sup>76</sup> To that end, a number of features of WfD serve to build confidence in transitions to peace and rule of law. Any contributions made to the development of public security in WfD programs are highly visible to the intended beneficiaries and designed to both enhance security capacity and build public trust in security institutions.<sup>77</sup> Implementing agencies, such as the UNDP, can also partner with local, trusted agencies for public outreach campaigns and the planning and realization of incentive development projects.<sup>78</sup> Such partnerships help foster trust in the disarmament project itself. Further, in order to encourage public participation in the program and confidence in the society’s transition to

stability – aims deemed inseparable by micro-disarmament experts – weapons collection programs, including WfD, often entail awareness campaigns conducted through local media to raise awareness of the dangers of gun possession and the benefits of participation in the collection programs.<sup>79</sup>

Once a certain number of small arms have been turned in, programs often destroy them in public burning ceremonies or in other visible ways. Weapons destruction ought to be carried out regardless; it “sends the important signal that arms are no longer necessary” and guarantees that the arms collected will never enter back into circulation and use.<sup>80</sup> Destroying the weapons in public burning ceremonies and titling the display ‘Flame of Peace,’ for example – as has been done in Mali,<sup>81</sup> Cambodia,<sup>82</sup> and the Republic of Congo,<sup>83</sup> among others – is highly visible and carries symbolic importance. In Mozambique, weapons collectors took a different approach: after destroying arms at collection sites, materials from the weapons were given to local artists, who created sculptures that have been put on permanent display in Mozambique or have toured as exhibits around the world.<sup>84</sup> In discussing common lessons learned in the field by participants in the “Shrinking Small Arms” seminar, David Atwood and David Jackman conclude: “It cannot be emphasized too much that all collected weapons must be destroyed – visibly and publicly – if a collection programme is to have a positive, long-lasting effect.”<sup>85</sup>

Micro-disarmament programs in general, including WfD, may also build a certain amount of trust and commitment to peace merely by existing: “...confidence and security building measures are crucial to the success of the peace process and micro-disarmament is one of the most visible of measures.”<sup>86</sup> Therefore, the success of a VWCP does not hinge entirely on the collection of as many guns as possible. Sami Faltas points out that a program that collects only a few guns may still serve a crucial symbolic purpose: “Objectives that are not directly

linked to collecting weapons may be demonstrating to public opinion at home or abroad that the authorities are living up to their commitments or signalling to the population that progress towards peace is practically possible, even if few weapons are actually being retrieved.”<sup>87</sup>

Another underlying principle of WfD has arisen out of the conclusion that “...without addressing the root causes of conflict, creating institutions capable of managing change and transition and providing real support and opportunities to the poor, the sad but inescapable fact is that efforts at lasting disarmament will not be successful.”<sup>88</sup> We have already seen how WfD and VWCPs in general focus on remedying both perceived and actual insecurity. WfD carries this one step further, recognizing that insecurity and underdevelopment are inextricably linked – a notion now widely accepted among both development and security experts<sup>89</sup> – and that even a successful weapons collection program conducted in isolation does not tackle the fundamental inequality and lack of opportunity that, as we have seen, can destabilize communities and drive people to take up arms. Rather, the adoption of a developmental approach to disarmament recognizes that “...the initial focus on the tools of violence must lead to the accomplishment of more basic societal goals.”<sup>90</sup>

Such a concept did not originate with WfD; as early as 1994 development experts were calling for “preventive development” to avoid the destabilization that leads to violent crises.<sup>91</sup> UNDP has since adopted an approach to disarmament that “first identifies countries in a post-crisis and, especially, conflict-prone situations [sic] that may benefit from projects designed to address the proliferation and use of small arms, while also addressing the problems of those who may be willing to (re)use them.”<sup>92</sup> In taking on simultaneous projects in areas of security and development “that work to complement one another’s impact,” UNDP maintains that disarmament becomes sustainable.<sup>93</sup> Other VWCPs before the entrance of WfD recognized this

and tailored their incentives to promote employment or help participants access foodstuffs, methods lauded during the September 1999 Peace Implementation Network (PIN) Forum on SALW disarmament held in Montreal.<sup>94</sup> WfD continues this method of offering developmental incentives for voluntary disarmament, with one significant twist: that of group incentive.

Collective participation and reward, the final underlying principle of WfD, has emerged through observing other VWCPs and gauging the effectiveness of both the weapons collection aspects and the developmental impact of the incentives offered. “The first weapons collection programmes targeted *individuals* by offering incentives such as cash, agricultural tools, toys and so forth in exchange for weapons. These efforts have evolved with the realization that working with a group, rather than individuals, offers a better chance of a successful outcome.”<sup>95</sup> Two main factors make the awarding of incentives to communities rather than individuals more attractive to project planners and donors. First, in VWCPs that seek to aid development alongside disarmament, a project involving group participation might be better suited to the VWCPs’ developmental aims: “Linking disarmament to economic investment and job creation may be more effective if it is handled collectively rather than on an individual basis.”<sup>96</sup> Second, in a region where mistrust and fear of violence have impeded development, working toward a common aim with third-party assistance might help regenerate community ties and restore trust and stability: “Collective incentives promote community cohesiveness and might reduce paranoia over public scrutiny from neighbors and friends.”<sup>97</sup> The group incentive aspect of WfD is its most distinctive feature and characterizes it as a step forward from other VWCPs.<sup>98</sup>

## *Challenges*

Of course, despite the incorporation of lessons learned from past projects, WfD project planners face a number of challenges. First, disarmament in any form is itself a challenge when people have become accustomed to lawlessness and violence.<sup>99</sup> Project implementers may therefore face the daunting task of making improvements to existing security conditions to provide a safe environment for disarming civilians. In addition, unlike the disarmament of larger conventional weapons, SALW disarmament requires the cooperation of a multitude of individual gun owners, requiring project implementers to campaign to win people's confidence in weapons collection as a safe and effective element of peace building.

Constraints also exist regarding when and where weapons collection can be implemented. Faltas concludes that the ideal times for weapons collection are immediately following a major peace agreement in a conflict, while hope for a return to normalcy is high, and following a major accident or tragedy during peacetime that has been caused directly or indirectly by the widespread possession and use of SALW. Any other time may make collection more difficult, as will waiting too long after either of these two events: "In both of these situations, there is likely to be a momentum toward disarmament that, once lost, may be very difficult to regain."<sup>100</sup> Further, as will be seen in the case study of Albania, any significant delay in the delivery of incentive projects may both undermine confidence in the program and threaten to destabilize the security situation, if the projects are crucial for the protection of participants who have already disarmed. Minimizing the gap between the collection of arms and the delivery of incentive projects is critical for maintaining the project's legitimacy and public confidence.<sup>101</sup>

The safety of project participants and implementers is another major challenge faced when dealing with large numbers of SALW. Planners of the project "must ensure that their

activities do not inadvertently make communities or individuals more insecure or vulnerable.”<sup>102</sup> This necessitates improvements to security, which will allow people to turn in their weapons safely. The weapons collection itself also requires extensive safety measures, as Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson point out that many civilians will not be aware of the potential dangers and storage requirements of the ammunition accompanying their weapons.<sup>103</sup> While international safety requirements dictate that no explosives should be transported without first being inspected and deemed “safe to move,” VWCPs have not always made such inspection a feature of the collection process, often because inspectors are not available to assess the condition of the collection ammunition. At the very least, project implementers must make sure participants are aware of potential dangers and safety regulations, information that is not always provided by the local authorities.<sup>104</sup>

Obtaining funding for program implementation is another challenge faced by all VWCPs, including WfD. For reasons discussed earlier, all VWCPs entail an element of controversy that might scare off potential donors.<sup>105</sup> Further, micro-disarmament may not be viewed as a priority for governments: “Unfortunately, states which have spent billions of dollars intervening to impose a cease-fire are often unwilling to spend even a few hundred thousand on these less dramatic tasks which are vital if peace is to last.”<sup>106</sup> Further complicating the challenge of securing funding is the bottom-up, low-level approach of WfD, which may not appeal to donors seeking fast, dramatic results. Those donors who do contribute may be frustrated by what appears to be a lack of progress, and may try to exert pressure that they believe will expedite a lagging process. The problem is summed up by one participant in the “Shrinking Small Arms” seminar: “How do you reconcile the need for patience and recognizing the slowness of things with the demands of funders for tangible changes?”<sup>107</sup> The challenge of donor demands is

compounded further in WfD programs by the very nature of the reward system favoring development initiatives; donors may fail to see the good being done in the reward projects and only look at the statistics for weapons collected. This is a challenge unique to WfD's two-pronged approach to security and development: "Unfortunately, donor governments and affected countries continue to measure the success of disarmament by the quantity of weapons collected and destroyed rather than by its contribution to development."<sup>108</sup>

Organizations conducting WfD projects must also shape the project structure according to the political and cultural climate in which they plan to operate. In politically charged environments, even information-gathering can be viewed as an indication of favoritism for a particular faction or leader if not undertaken with great care.<sup>109</sup>

Implementers must also "learn how to incorporate race, culture and gender perspectives in education programmes," a reasonable enough request that nevertheless requires tremendous research and planning prior to the launching of a program.<sup>110</sup> If local needs are not carefully assessed, failure can occur on a number of levels. The weapons collection aspect of the project may be planned in a way that is incongruous with local practice or ability – e.g., scheduling collection while everyone is at work, or placing the collection point at a police station when the police are not trusted. (In Mozambique, the Christian Council of Mozambique avoided this problem by recognizing a widespread distrust of the police and keeping police presence at collection sites to a minimum.<sup>111</sup>) In addition, in places where weapons possession is synonymous with power, "Insensitive removal of weapons may have cultural and social implications, and indeed may inspire an unexpected political backlash."<sup>112</sup>

Incentive projects must also be carefully planned according to the developmental needs of the intended beneficiaries. People in rural regions will likely be receptive to different forms of

incentive than those in urban areas, and seemingly similar areas may also differ from each other in terms of need. Weapons collection planners in South Africa observed the Mozambique project Tools for Arms, which traded farm implements, bicycles, sewing machines and other tools for voluntary disarmament, but concluded that such incentives would not be effective in South Africa.<sup>113</sup> The South Africa program instead offered gift certificates to stores, chances to win a cash prize, and certificates of thanks from Nelson Mandela.<sup>114</sup> The appropriateness of the incentive offered will influence the overall effectiveness of the collection effort.

A final challenge is the difficulty of gathering accurate information, both in the planning and evaluation stages of the project. This challenge exists for all VWCPs. On the planning end of the process, it can be quite difficult to ascertain how many weapons are present in a region and where they are located. This is largely due to the nature of SALW: “SALW are by definition small, portable, widespread, easily concealed and cheap. They therefore represent a particular challenge to the information gathering staff.”<sup>115</sup> After a project is completed, these same challenges can make evaluation of the project results problematic, as post-conflict countries are often unable to control the flow of arms across their borders or record the volume and nature of these arms transfers. Therefore, “In the absence of this data, it is difficult to place the number of weapons collected by any one programme in the context of the number of weapons possessed in a particular country.”<sup>116</sup> Further, efforts to learn more about the demographic distribution of gun possession by studying the results of a collection program may be hampered by the lack of information available: “meaningful evaluation is complicated by the conditions under which [VWCPs] are generally run: amnesty from prosecution and anonymity.”<sup>117</sup>

Let us now look at how WfD has been implemented and how it has addressed these challenges in two countries, Albania and Cambodia.

## Part III: Albania Case Study

The southeastern European nation of Albania faced a daunting challenge in the late 1990s: destabilized by the fall of Communism and shaken by a devastating financial crisis in 1997, the country was also awash with half a million small arms that obstructed rule of law and economic development. In 1998, UNDP launched a unique program pairing voluntary community disarmament with development projects, which was subsequently replicated across the country. In rounding up small arms, and more importantly in improving public safety and security, the disarmament-for-development approach piloted in Albania was a success, and is now being replicated in other countries facing the challenge of small arms collection.

### **Proliferation of small arms in Albania**

The proliferation of small arms in Albania was fueled by both the Cold War and the turbulent period of transition following the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. During the 1960s, the Communist government of Albania distanced itself from the USSR and grew closer to China, prompting the government to spread massive stores of small arms across the Balkan country “for use by militias in the event of an invasion.”<sup>118</sup> UNDP estimates that these scattered stores consisted of “thousands of tonnes of weapons and ammunition.”<sup>119</sup>

The end of the Cold War led to drastic changes in Albania’s economy as state industries collapsed and both unemployment and emigration surged.<sup>120</sup> It is in this context that fraudulent pyramid investment schemes arose, enticing Albanians with promises of prosperity in exchange for initial investments. When the pyramid schemes collapsed in 1997, costing hundreds of

thousands of Albanians their life savings, people turned to the government for answers. “Many blame the government for not warning people away from the pyramid schemes,” CNN reported in March 1997. “About a third of the country is waiting to see how their main question will be answered: Who will give them their money back?”<sup>121</sup>

Widespread unrest led to the looting of roughly 1,300 government arsenals across the country<sup>122</sup> and the dispersal of roughly 550,000 small arms and light weapons and 900 million rounds of ammunition among a civilian population.<sup>123</sup> Because blame fell on the government for not preventing the financial crisis, “these weapons were considered as almost the only form of recompensation available for the loss of savings.”<sup>124</sup> During the riots that accompanied the looting, protesters bearing stolen government arms engaged in deadly clashes with police, and Albania’s prime minister and ministers resigned.<sup>125</sup> The new government immediately declared a state of emergency, restricting public gatherings, censoring the Albanian media, and announcing that police would be authorized to shoot protestors who did not lay down their arms by declared deadlines.<sup>126</sup> Faltas and Paes write that during this chaotic period, Albania “narrowly escaped civil war.”<sup>127</sup> CNN reported seeing children in southern Albania “who appeared to be as young as 3” in possession of guns, recounting the image of “one group of jovial boys...seen climbing onto an unmanned government tank and firing automatic rifles in the air.”<sup>128</sup>

In addition to the political destabilization in Albania caused by the economic collapse and subsequent rioting, the spread of small arms also had predictably adverse effects long after the riots ended, hampering both the rule of law within the country and regional stability. Civilian possession and misuse of small arms “exacerbated tensions between rival groups and lead [sic] to widespread banditry,”<sup>129</sup> and arms trafficking across Albania’s borders increased,<sup>130</sup> particularly on the northern border shared with Kosovo. In 1998 Smith reported that northern Albania was

“virtually free of weapons,” because so many had been transported to Kosovo and, to a lesser degree, to Macedonia.<sup>131</sup> Enrolment rates in preschools and secondary schools “plummeted” in Albania between the 1997 crisis and 1999, and “adolescents complained of armed violence (including sexual violence) made possible by the abundance of weapons after armed conflicts.”<sup>132</sup> In 1999 the German Ambassador to the UN, reporting on the findings of the UN’s Group of Interested States on practical disarmament, concluded that the socioeconomic impact of the spread of small arms in Albania was inhibiting development in the poorest European country: “The number of weapons per capita in Albania is extraordinarily high. These weapons delay political and economic progress. They endanger the life of each citizen in Albania, increase criminality rates and add further instability to an already explosive region.”<sup>133</sup>

It would be inaccurate to say that the government of Albania made no attempts to recover the looted weapons from civilians; in August 1997, an amnesty was declared,<sup>134</sup> but with limited results: only 10 per cent of weapons looted were recovered.<sup>135</sup>

Smith concluded in 1998 that the government had done as much as it could to control the movement of small arms within and across its borders,<sup>136</sup> and indeed, a number of other factors limited the impact of the amnesty. First, the Albanian government would have been unable to follow the amnesty with enforcement of weapons laws, since it “exercise[d] effective control only in the capital, Tirana.”<sup>137</sup> Second, civilians expected to be compensated for each weapon collected, but the government was neither able to provide the expected compensation on such a large scale nor was it willing to pay for the return of what it considered state property.<sup>138</sup> Third, a “long Albanian tradition” of weapons possession,<sup>139</sup> particularly by men, might have frustrated the government’s attempt to encourage voluntary disarmament.<sup>140</sup>

Finally, civilians were by and large unwilling to disarm without guaranteed public protection. Police infrastructure in Albania did not extend to several parts of the country, leaving gaps in law enforcement that undermined public trust in Albania's security sector.<sup>141</sup> The failure of public security to offer protection to all Albanians, compounded by the "confrontational political atmosphere" in Albania following the wave of riots and by the turbulence in neighboring Kosovo discouraged many civilians in Albania from turning in their arms,<sup>142</sup> seen in this climate as a "means of defending themselves, their families and their communities."<sup>143</sup> The result was a classic prisoner's dilemma: without police protection, those who might have otherwise turned in their arms were dissuaded, unwilling to be the first to disarm in a region littered with weapons.<sup>144</sup>

## **United Nations intervention**

The government of Albania turned to the United Nations for assistance, and in June 1998 Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala headed a mission to assess the arms situation in the country. Concluding that a buy-back program was impossible, due to the inflationary effect that financial compensation for several hundred thousand weapons would likely have on the economy, the mission instead recommended implementing a VWCP offering community-level development projects as the incentive, rather than individual rewards. The mission recommended testing the method in a pilot program in central Albania's Gramsh district. A second mission was conducted by the UNDP to "assess the feasibility" of such a program in the Gramsh district and determine a framework for its implementation.<sup>145</sup> The mission met in Tirana with representatives of the government, the national development agency, Albanian media and NGOs, and international organizations operating in Tirana, and then visited

the Gramsh district, meeting and discussing the proposed project with several levels of local leaders and visiting a number of villages to assess the concerns of residents.<sup>146</sup>

The Gramsh district contains a single municipality, Gramsh, in addition to nine communes and 91 villages.<sup>147</sup> When government arsenals were looted following the collapse of the pyramid schemes, it is estimated that 10,000 small arms<sup>148</sup> fell into the possession of the district's roughly 56,000 residents.<sup>149</sup> Simply put, "Gramsh, with four army depots and a weapons factory, became a munitions market."<sup>150</sup> But by 1998 the district was also fairly stable politically,<sup>151</sup> and large numbers of weapons and ammunition had already been voluntarily surrendered to police. The UNDP mission reported that residents indicated "a general willingness" to participate in a VWCP and that the first UN mission to the region had prompted further arms forfeitures by families in the Gramsh district.<sup>152</sup>

The UNDP mission reported that good relations existed between the Gramsh district police and the population.<sup>153</sup> However, while a climate of confrontation was absent, people in the district still lacked confidence in the ability of the police to protect them. "A marked lack of resources, together with the difficult terrain," slowed the response time of the police and made it hard for them to reach certain parts of the district.<sup>154</sup> Residents indicated that this would be particularly problematic if residents of Gramsh were to disarm, expressing the fear that they would be left vulnerable to groups in nearby areas still bearing arms.<sup>155</sup>

The UNDP mission concluded that due to gaps in the existing security infrastructure in Gramsh, the incentive development projects accompanying the weapons collection program would have to improve the ability of the police to protect residents, and suggested purchasing police vehicles and portable forensic equipment to widen the areas accessible to the police.<sup>156</sup> The mission also recommended constructing a "rural road and social infrastructure system, and a

public telephone and/or radio relay system,” both of which would better connect the villages within the district.<sup>157</sup> UNDP consultation with local residents, leaders, and NGOs determined both the most appropriate projects<sup>158</sup> and their prioritization.<sup>159</sup> From these early stages, it was recommended that should the pilot project in the Gramsh district be successful, the program ought to be implemented across the country.<sup>160</sup>

### **Implementation of the Gramsh Pilot Project (GPP)**

The GPP was conducted from December 1998 to January 2000 by the UNDP in partnership with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the UN Group of Interested States on disarmament issues, and the Albanian government.<sup>161</sup> The methodology – strengthening police protection capacity in exchange for disarmament – was based on the “security first” approach, which treats development and security as interdependent.<sup>162</sup> Weapons collection, the provision of development projects, and the parallel awareness campaign were tackled as three separate components of the GPP.<sup>163</sup>

Encouraging popular support for the GPP was considered a crucial step in the project’s implementation. From the outset, the UNDP enjoyed the cooperation of Albania’s national media outlets, who agreed to “pledge their full collaboration and support for an arms awareness information effort in support of the planned weapons collection project in Gramsh, together with a national campaign to raise the awareness level of the overall population regarding disarmament.”<sup>164</sup> By late February, media efforts to publicize both the dangers of small arms possession and the pilot project taking place in Gramsh included a TV ad aired nightly on national television, a series of BBC radio programs, and other “extensive national and international media coverage.”<sup>165</sup> In addition, a coalition of Albanian NGOs formed to

disseminate information on the necessity of voluntary disarmament nationwide.<sup>166</sup> Due to these combined publicity efforts, IANSA reports that “the WfD scheme became the highest profile project in the country” and was able to secure additional funding from a number of governments.<sup>167</sup> More importantly, the awareness campaign was able to turn the GPP from an unknown, isolated experiment in disarmament into a national movement. Less than two months into the project’s implementation, four other districts were swayed by the progress in Gramsh and declared their own “intention to disarm.”<sup>168</sup> While the basis of those announcements had more to do with actual weapons collection completed in Gramsh than with televised ads, the national publicity campaign served the crucial function of relaying the GPP’s successes to Albanians and their leaders across the country.

Within the Gramsh district itself, awareness campaigning took on a multimedia dimension. A concert held in the district’s one municipality in January to publicize the benefits of disarming drew 1,000 residents. Posters and T-shirts supporting voluntary weapons surrender were distributed, and essay and poster contests were held in Gramsh district schools to disseminate the benefits of disarmament to children. Further, the delivery of three police vehicles to the local law enforcement in the early stages of the GPP – in addition to increasing police responsiveness – tackled local *perceptions* of insecurity by buttressing the police force in a tangible, visible manner.<sup>169</sup>

Collection took place several times per month between January and September 1999.<sup>170</sup> Not all communes took part in collection at the same time – a rotational method was adopted, partly due to funding limitations. Collection was completed in some communes before beginning in others, while collection in the Gramsh municipality was “ongoing.”<sup>171</sup> All collection was

conducted during the broader period of amnesty established by the Albanian government, helping assuage civilians' fears of criminal prosecution.<sup>172</sup>

Collected weapons were temporarily stored at police stations before being transferred to and stored in government arsenals.<sup>173</sup> Any weapons surrendered that were legitimately owned and not looted from government arsenals were still accepted at collection sites and transported for storage and eventual destruction.<sup>174</sup> The method of storing collected SALW is appealing in that it is inexpensive, and the weapons come under the control over a government or international authority. However, a disadvantage of this method is that stored weapons may fall into misuse again "if there is a significant political change of circumstances."<sup>175</sup>

Neither the GPP nor the expanded Weapons in Exchange for Development project included provisions for weapons destruction, since the weapons in question had mostly been stolen from the Albanian military during the riots of 1997.<sup>176</sup> Rather, it was left to the government of Albania to oversee the destruction of weapons, which it indicated it would do during UN Under-Secretary Dhanapala's 1998 mission to the country.<sup>177</sup> Since then, the Albanian government has initiated SALW destruction efforts. In 2000, Albania signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, Norway, and Germany to begin the destruction of 100,000 SALW.<sup>178</sup> The first 40,000 were destroyed by the German military, and a private UK-based company – EOD Solutions, Ltd. – was commissioned by the US and Norway to destroy the remaining 60,000.<sup>179</sup> EOD Solutions also developed a site for future weapons destruction to be carried out by the government of Albania, and was contracted to help the Albanian military destroy surplus ammunition.<sup>180</sup>

Safety is naturally a principal concern in the undertaking of weapons collection. In a progress report issued in February 1999, UNDP stated that "The local authorities, the police and

the military have the lead in the weapons collection cycle, with technical and logistical support from the Programme as and when required.”<sup>181</sup> However, Faltas and Paes deem UNDP’s initial safety provisions insufficient, pointing out that prior to the launch of the GPP, the local authorities had been unable to establish and enforce safe procedures for weapons collection:

[In December 1998], people were throwing boxes of ammunition out of third-floor windows into the streets of Gramsh and sending children with guns and unexploded ordnance to the collection sites. The UNDP staff had failed to consider any technical implications for the safe collection of weapons and explosive ordnance during the project development and the police were at a loss how to deal with the problem.<sup>182</sup>

Only with the intervention of NATO’s Ammunition Technical Officer, they continue, was a safe and transparent collection methodology adopted.<sup>183</sup> To UNDP’s credit, Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson note that no international standards of safety existed to serve as a guide for weapons collection programs, and that the Gramsh pilot, once NATO’s safety recommendations were adopted, “made great progress towards the development of such standards.”<sup>184</sup> Those practices originally recommended by NATO were later implemented and revised by EOD Solutions, whose web site proclaims that the company’s “professional standards, qualifications and safety policies...*exceed* that required by the UN and NATO for EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] operations.”<sup>185</sup>

The projects comprising the developmental component of the GPP, as noted earlier, were selected by UNDP based on the most pressing security and developmental needs identified by residents and leaders in the Gramsh district. Such needs included a street-lighting system, telecommunications (specifically radio and telephone systems), and roads.<sup>186</sup> The bulk of funding channeled through UNDP, as of February 1999, was committed to the building of roads and the establishment of a telecommunications system in the district, though money was also set aside for a street-light system in the Gramsh municipality and the repair of local post offices.<sup>187</sup> As mentioned earlier, three vehicles were also delivered to the local police. Most of the

development projects undertaken were designed to be participatory and labour-intensive,<sup>188</sup> which is particularly important in a region where the unemployment rate was only slightly below 40 per cent.<sup>189</sup>

UNDP coordinated the implementation of the GPP through its project unit in Albania,<sup>190</sup> linking the many organizations involved in the previously untested program and securing funding for the project's implementation. To attract donor interest, UNDP established a trust fund for the GPP,<sup>191</sup> and donations were secured from a number of individual governments, in addition to funding supplied by UNDP itself.<sup>192</sup> While UNDP announced that its goal was to supply the GPP with \$1 million (US) for development projects, by February 1999 – one month into weapons collection activities – only \$450,000 had been raised.<sup>193</sup> UNDP anticipated this shortage of funds and planned for the staggering of weapons collection and development projects in different communes to allow for further fundraising.<sup>194</sup>

UNDP also brought together a range of groups to implement the project. The participation of a number of different actors was deemed ideal by UNDP in its 1998 assessment mission in Albania, largely because the mission recognized that lingering political tensions in the country would be best offset by including as many organizations in the project as was practically possible.<sup>195</sup> The final project description drawn up by the mission included the courting of aid and collaboration from the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and individual governments, and the direct participation of the Albanian Defence and Interior ministries, disarmament commissions at the prefecture, district, and national levels, local and national NGOs, local and national media outlets, and district-level political parties and military units.<sup>196</sup> In addition, UNDP sought to establish a “bottom-up” governing structure involving steering committees at both the commune and district levels,<sup>197</sup>

creating the need for a coordinator to distill recommendations and concerns raised in these decentralized bodies. Because the Gramsh pilot involved three parallel projects and a broad range of contributors, the coordination carried out by UNDP<sup>198</sup> was central to the success of the pilot project.

Since the GPP was not simply a weapons collection program, but rather a combination of disarmament and development projects, it was naturally more expensive to implement than a simple weapons collection project.<sup>199</sup> However, limited funding was available for the project; therefore pilot coordinators were required to avoid “grandiose” projects and instead focus on basic infrastructure.<sup>200</sup> Faltas and Paes report that roughly \$812,000 US was spent on development projects in the Gramsh district.<sup>201</sup> UNDP claims that the investment in development in Gramsh during the GPP equaled all development spending in the district over the entire previous decade.<sup>202</sup> Personnel and operations cost another \$424,000, bringing the total project costs to about \$1,235,800 US.<sup>203</sup>, <sup>204</sup> Faltas and Paes also argue that the relatively high cost of the GPP per weapon collected – \$207 US – had less to do with inefficiencies in the project and more to do with donor influence: “UNDP justifiably argues that [the high cost per weapon collected] is the result of donor insistence on supporting that particular project, rather than expanding the concept into surrounding areas after additional funds were made available, which would have significantly lowered the price per weapon.”<sup>205</sup>

### **Impact of the Gramsh Pilot Project**

For a number of reasons, it is difficult to judge the success of the weapons collection aspect of the GPP with a reasonable degree of accuracy. UNDP reports – and Faltas and Paes concur<sup>206</sup> – that 5,981 small arms were collected during the Gramsh pilot.<sup>207</sup> However,

discrepancies exist regarding the percentage this figure constitutes relative to the total number of weapons in the district. While UNDP estimates that 80 per cent of weapons in the district were collected,<sup>208</sup> other estimates place the figure as low as 40 per cent.<sup>209</sup> But these estimates are largely guesses. It is impossible to pinpoint an exact figure, because the number of weapons in Gramsh was never verified prior to the start of the pilot project.<sup>210</sup> Regardless, the GPP fell short of the 10,000 small arms it had set out to collect.<sup>211</sup> Therefore, Pike and Taylor conclude that the number of small arms collected in the Gramsh pilot “represents an impressive result *and* signifies that much remains to be done.”<sup>212</sup>

However, the GPP was never meant to be judged by “counting numbers of collected weapons and ammunition,” but rather by “the public order situation compared to the situation before the pilot project.”<sup>213</sup> While evaluations of human security and the rule of law are far less cut and dry than a simple tally of weapons collected, it seems clear that the GPP succeeded in improving the security situation in the Gramsh district. After an initial delay in the provision of the development projects threatened to undermine public confidence in the GPP, the projects themselves – once delivered – bolstered the rule of law in the district and improved perceptions of security as well.<sup>214</sup> They facilitated easier communication between the police and civilians, better police access to remote areas, and safer streets in the Gramsh municipality.<sup>215</sup> According to UNDP, a drop in the Gramsh district’s crime rate following the completion of the GPP is evidence of its positive impact.<sup>216</sup>

One weakness of the pilot, according to the BICC, was the failure of the Albanian government to promptly destroy the weapons collected,<sup>217</sup> although the systematic destruction of weapons and ammunition has since been initiated in Albania with the assistance of partner governments.

## **Project expansion: Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) and Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC)**

Because of the security improvements in Gramsh resulting from the GPP, the Albanian government asked UNDP to reproduce the pilot in other districts.<sup>218</sup> From June 2000 to February 2002, UNDP ran a project dubbed Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) in the districts of Elbasan and Diber, the methodology of which was similar to that of the GPP.<sup>219</sup> WED collected 5,700 SALW,<sup>220</sup> less than the GPP, but also included provisions for arms destruction, which the GPP lacked. In sum, WED destroyed about 16,000 weapons.<sup>221</sup> The cost of the program, at \$557 US per weapon collected, was much higher than the GPP. However, because there have been no major studies evaluating WED, no conclusion can be made as to whether the developmental and security benefits of the project justify its high price.<sup>222</sup>

It is also difficult to assess the impact of the changing arms situation in Albania on WED and its successor, the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control project (SALWC). While Albanian civilians – anticipating the end of government amnesty, witnessing the decline in tensions since the 1997 riots, and seeing others disarm around them – may have been more willing to turn in weapons, it is also possible that the civilians still in possession of weapons viewed them as a necessity, which is why they had not previously surrendered them to the authorities or the UNDP collection programs.<sup>223</sup>

It is in this uncertain environment that one final project was undertaken in 2002, meant to give Albanians the opportunity to surrender small arms before the amnesty law expired that summer and the government started enforcing weapons control laws.<sup>224</sup> SALWC was launched in 15 of Albania's 36 districts, and marked a departure from the GPP and WED projects in that

the weapons collection and disposal aspect of the program has been handled entirely by Albanian authorities.<sup>225</sup>

SALWC was also different in that not every community participating in the program was rewarded with development projects – in fact, the premise of the program was competition between communities for the ‘prize’ of development work. Any community that surrendered arms to the program was entered in the competition, and communities could choose to compete at the village or the commune level. The majority, Faltas and Paes report, chose to compete at the village level. Performance in the competition was based on the number of weapons forfeited, with some adjustments made to offset the advantage enjoyed by larger communities.<sup>226</sup>

In fact, this innovative approach was arrived at by serendipitous blunder:

In early 2002, a few months before the SALWC project was to be launched, the newly appointed project manager realised that the resources available for this project would not allow it to carry out enough public works to have a national impact, if all participating communities were to be offered such an inducement. This could not even be achieved by making the projects smaller and cheaper.<sup>227</sup>

While it was initially feared that the adoption of a competitive approach to the awarding of incentives would foment hostility and jealousy between communities, by mid-2003 it seemed that no such ill will had materialized. “Neither our interviews in Albania nor any of the written information we found suggests that the losers were seriously disgruntled,” Faltas and Paes report.<sup>228</sup> They also note that the competitive nature of the program and the smaller size of the projects awarded were less likely to suggest to civilians that they should hold onto their weapons until someone offered them a reward for them, as the GPP and WED programs might have suggested to Albanians outside the Gramsh, Elbasan, and Diber districts. Furthermore, competition ensured that communities would not be rewarded for token arms surrenders, and it allowed program coordinators to avoid setting a fixed (and possibly arbitrary) goal and then falling short of achieving it, as had happened in Gramsh.<sup>229</sup>

The SALWC program was greatly aided by the awareness-raising efforts employed during the two weapons collection programs that preceded it. Due to the attention of the national media, campaigning by NGOs, and such publicity stunts as the 1999 visit of actor and “UN Messenger of Peace” Michael Douglas,<sup>230</sup> disarmament had already become a familiar topic in public discourse. However, the interest of the Albanian media in the weapons collection programs had declined over time in favor of ‘sexier’ news,<sup>231</sup> requiring SALWC to devote part of its limited resources to publicity. The program provided free transportation for journalists to remote collection sites, and paid for the airing of “round table discussions on the need for disarmament” on local TV stations.<sup>232</sup> SALWC staff also relied on informal top-down channels to spread awareness of and enthusiasm for the program, meeting with district leaders who disseminated information to the village leaders, who in turn spread it to local “disarmament working groups” of intellectuals and other respected civilians. In this way, residents of each village involved in the program heard news of it through town hall meetings, in the classroom, or door-to-door.<sup>233</sup> SALWC sought to publicize both the benefits of disarmament and the threat of arrest and prosecution following the end of the nationwide amnesty on August 4, 2002.<sup>234</sup>

The SALWC program secured funding from the European Union, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.<sup>235</sup> The costs of the program are necessarily higher than those of the GPP or WED, since it is always more costly to operate in a larger area<sup>236</sup> – a total of \$3,432,689 US had been spent by SALWC, \$1,500,000 of which went toward development projects and \$1,932,689 of which was spent on personnel and operating costs.<sup>237</sup>

However, some disagreement exists regarding the accuracy of these figures, owing to the disruption of the program in the summer of 2002. Instead of enforcing weapons possession laws when the nationwide amnesty expired in August 2002, the Albanian government declared a new

amnesty but disbanded the state personnel required to carry out an effective collection program. As a result, SALWC collection efforts “came to a standstill...while according to plan, they should have continued.”<sup>238</sup> Therefore, SALWC’s project staff prefer to evaluate the costs of the program up until April 2003, most likely because that is when the last of the development projects awarded before the end of amnesty on August 4, 2002 were completed.<sup>239</sup> If the costs are evaluated on this basis, the total project cost per weapon collected decreases significantly, dropping from \$404 per weapon to \$297 per weapon.<sup>240</sup> On the question of which figure is more appropriate, Faltas acknowledges that “the SALWC project staff and the evaluators amicably disagree on how best to calculate the real costs of weapons collection.”<sup>241</sup>

## **Impact of SALWC**

In light of these significant challenges that threatened to influence the impact of SALWC in Albania, “it is surprising that all Albanians interviewed for [the Faltas-Paes] study agreed that public safety and security had improved tremendously since the start of the programme *because* of the SALWC programme.”<sup>242</sup> By the summer of 2003 SALWC had collected roughly 8,000 SALW, and that figure was expected to rise by another 500 or 1,000 by the project’s end. While collection slowed considerably after August 4, 2002, Faltas and Paes conclude that in the “comparatively short time window” before that date the program’s weapons collection component was a “remarkable success.”<sup>243</sup> Collection also snowballed in the months leading up to the August 4 amnesty expiration date, due to the effects of awareness campaigning by SALWC and the threat – which in hindsight was rather empty – of a government crackdown on illegal weapons possession.<sup>244</sup>

SALWC has also had a clear impact through the development projects implemented in the areas in which the program operated. A poll conducted by Albanian researchers in those areas showed that “opinions about the development projects of the SALWC campaign were overwhelmingly positive.”<sup>245</sup> Facing a relatively short window for implementation, SALWC launched several of the initial development projects as early as possible to foster public confidence in the program. Furthermore, by selecting projects that had already been proposed in the different regions but had not been realized due to funding shortages, SALWC avoided the delay in project delivery that marred the GPP.<sup>246</sup>

However, the most significant achievement of SALWC was its success in raising awareness of the dangers of small arms possession and offering an alternative. Faltas and Paes maintain that “this element of the project, which is often overlooked by superficial analysis...is in our view the single most important aspect of voluntary SALW collection programmes.”<sup>247</sup> While no studies of civilian attitudes toward gun possession were carried out before the implementation of the program, a change in people’s views of gun violence and disarmament has been observed and noted by a wide range of Albanians: “Across the social spectrum from villager to prefect and police chief, people agreed that SALWC had a major impact at changing the ‘mentality’ of the Albanian population towards firearm ownership and thereby has contributed towards an increase in public safety.”<sup>248</sup>

However, the impact of the project may have been diminished by a number of weaknesses. First, the terms of the competition were not sufficiently explained to participating communities, resulting in unnecessary confusion over the exact goals and rules.<sup>249</sup> Second, due to unavoidable time constraints, the project failed to encourage forfeiture of the most dangerous weapons by offering more credit for them in the competition. As a result, as many as half of the

weapons collected – because of their condition or original purpose (e.g., blank-firing guns) – were determined to be relatively harmless.<sup>250</sup> Third, no independent monitoring of the police units conducting weapons collection took place, meaning that the safety of the collectors and the legitimacy of the process was not ensured by the program.<sup>251</sup> Fourth, when the Albanian government reneged on its commitment to weapons collection after August 4, 2002, “project staff were not reduced because as a result of government indecision and inactivity, it was for many months totally unclear what was going to happen. Rather than cut jobs when the trouble began, the project soldiered on, trying to make the best of a bad situation.” Faltas concludes that this approach was “successful in some ways and ill-advised in others.”<sup>252</sup>

### **Transition to security sector reform (SSR) and conclusions**

UNDP has since shifted its focus in Albania to security sector reform (SSR), which can be simply defined as a coordinated effort “to create functionally differentiated, professional armed forces that are under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use, and are able to provide security for the population.”<sup>253</sup> In the case of Albania SSR involves “bringing the communities and the police closer together through the application of community policing principles.”<sup>254</sup> The new program, Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR), is scheduled to run until 2005, and aims to crack down on police corruption, encourage “democratic standards of policing,” target organized crime, foster cooperation with international policing institutions, and improve the local and national “organizational structures” of the Ministry of Public Order.<sup>255</sup> Among the stated goals of the new program is an increase in the tendency of civilians to report crimes to the police, of the police to effectively enforce rule of law, and of the public image of the police to be positive.<sup>256</sup> While the program was designed to

operate in those areas where SALWC had already established an operations infrastructure, UNDP maintains that it could be expanded if sufficient will and funding existed to support the program's growth.<sup>257</sup>

Noting that a continuation of weapons collection could no longer be successful in the absence of commitment from the national government, Faltas and Paes conclude that UNDP has made "a bold and prudent move" by building on "the excellent rapport established between the SALWC team and local authorities, as well as with the police force" and bringing "the primary focus of the programme in line with the changed political circumstances in Albania."<sup>258</sup> Indeed, the underlying principle of SSSR is the same as the weapons exchange programs that have preceded it: namely, the recognition of the need to tackle "the widespread belief that the state is unable to guarantee security."<sup>259</sup> While Faltas and Paes stop short of predicting the success of UNDP's involvement in SSR in Albania,<sup>260</sup> they paint an optimistic picture of the overall security situation in Albania compared to the previous decade:

The reform attempts of international organizations working with the Albanian security apparatus finally seem to bear some fruit, while improved regional cooperation has done a lot in curbing organized crime and trafficking, particularly on the Adriatic Sea. Economically, socially, and politically, the country seems to be experiencing modest improvements, which are likely to have a positive impact on public safety and security.<sup>261</sup>

As of the summer of 2003, the Albanian government was attempting to sell internationally a large number of weapons amassed through the various collection programs. In this effort it has enjoyed the political support of Albanians, who oppose the destruction of state property that could be sold for a profit, even if destruction is the safer option. Faltas and Paes, however, have expressed skepticism that a buyer can be found for the weapons, many of which are in questionable condition.<sup>262</sup>

Assessing the impact of weapons collection programs in Albania is a complex, since their chief aim of improving public security "is also the one where success is most difficult to

measure.”<sup>263</sup> UNDP has pointed to such quantitative indicators as crime rates to argue that its programs have worked in Albania. However, since data on crime and weapons possession before and during the intervention of the UN is not readily available for many of the areas in which collection programs operated, the few statistics that exist can only be analyzed out of context.<sup>264</sup> For example, the possibility has been raised that public security in areas of UNDP operation was not as low from the outset as in other areas of the country, which would affect the perceived success of UNDP’s collection programs, but such valid questions cannot be conclusively answered due to the lack of information available.<sup>265</sup>

However, despite its shortcomings, the case of weapons collection in Albania between 1998 and 2002 has confirmed the usefulness of a model exchanging development projects for voluntary disarmament. UNDP has noted that such a model is more likely to win the cooperation of local authorities and law enforcement, since the impact of the development projects is farther-reaching than the individual incentives involved in traditional VWCPs.<sup>266</sup> In demonstrating the ability of this new approach to both collect small arms and improve basic infrastructure critical to public security, the GPP, WED and SALWC programs in Albania opened the door for other countries facing problems with civilian arms possession to adopt similar strategies. We now turn to a case study of one such country, Cambodia.

## Part IV: Cambodia Case Study

Over a period of 30 years, the Southeast Asian country of Cambodia was littered with small arms and light weapons that enabled civil and military authorities to abuse their powers and promoted a sociopolitical climate in which violent conflict resolution became the norm. In 1999, the Cambodian government began an effort to collect and destroy small arms, and in 2000 the European Union established Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (EU ASAC). As part of a wider integrated program that involved legislative reform, awareness campaigning, reform of the government's weapons registration and storage system, and public arms destruction, EU ASAC launched a number of weapons for development (WfD) programs that have provided developmental and police-support incentives for communities surrendering arms to the police. Where it has operated, WfD has succeeded in encouraging substantial small-arms forfeiture and has led to improvements in the relationship between residents and authorities.

### **Proliferation of small arms in Cambodia**

From the 1960s into the 1990s, Cambodia was torn apart by Cold War confrontations, devastating economic policy implemented by a brutal communist regime, and “one of the worst genocides in human history.”<sup>267</sup> The accumulation of small arms throughout the country during these three decades of conflict occurred unchecked by Cambodia's governments; in fact, it occurred largely because of them.

US military action in Vietnam in the 1960s destabilized the Cambodian government that had led the country since its independence, ironically allowing the radical communist Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, to eventually assume power. American bombing of Cambodian border areas began in earnest in 1969, but Cambodia had already effectively been drawn into the conflict “by waves of ethnic Khmer refugees fleeing Saigon’s persecution, Vietnamese communists seeking neutral sanctuary, anti-communist troops in ‘hot pursuit,’ and U.S. Special Forces incursions and jet-fighter raids.”<sup>268</sup> Delegitimized by the economic crisis brought on by the war, the Cambodian government was overthrown. During the short-lived military dictatorship that followed, warring factions from Vietnam and within Cambodia fought each other and US troops: “Both sides in the Vietnam conflict now treated Cambodia as a theatre of their ground and air war.”<sup>269</sup>

In 1975 the Khmer Rouge captured the capital, Phnom Penh, and initiated the forced resettlement and feudalization of the entire population and the systematic persecution of the country’s ethnic minorities. Over the next four years, these policies would kill 1.7 million people, or 21 per cent of the country’s population.<sup>270</sup> The Khmer Rouge were overthrown by the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh in 1979, but because every Western power continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge as Cambodia’s legitimate government, “[their] flag flew over [United Nations headquarters in] New York until 1992.”<sup>271</sup>

During these three decades of violent conflict, small arms spread throughout the country, and the peace process of the early 1990s failed to sufficiently address the problem.<sup>272</sup> When the Paris Agreement on Cambodia was signed in 1991, the Khmer Rouge “refused to implement the cease-fire, disarm their troops, or demobilize.”<sup>273</sup> In 1993, the UN peacekeeping force sent to Cambodia – the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) – was unable to

initiate a comprehensive weapons collection.<sup>274</sup> The failure of weapons collection in 1993 had its roots in the political instability created by three decades of conflict: “Only with a strong rule of law, only when all sides believe they will be physically and politically safe if they fail in elections, will true democratic transition take place. UNTAC could not fulfill the demobilization and disarmament aspects of its mandate because none of these elements was present.”<sup>275</sup>

Most estimates place the number of SALW in Cambodia after three decades of conflict somewhere between 500,000 and 1 million.<sup>276</sup> As a director of the Cambodian National Police put it, “Just as the waters of the mighty Mekong River often flood our country, so we were uncontrollably flooded with small arms.”<sup>277</sup> These weapons have been widely available to civilians, particularly in rural areas, where hidden caches of small arms were scattered by combatants. In the Cambodian countryside, therefore, if a household does not possess one or more weapons, it is likely they know where they can acquire one.<sup>278</sup> Weapons are also inexpensive: Janz reported in early 2000 that AK-47s are “readily available almost everywhere” and cost between \$5 and \$15 (USD).<sup>279</sup> The Executive Coordinator of the independent Cambodian NGO Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) told the July 2001 BICC workshop on Weapons and Development that one villager in Cambodia had claimed “he could exchange a small radio for an AK-47.”<sup>280</sup> In a 1999 government survey of arms possession in Phnom Penh, 9,922 of 15,000 households admitted they possessed small arms, and “the actual number of weapons in Phnom Penh, legal and illegal, was believed to be significantly higher” than the number reported.<sup>281</sup>

Despite a lack of conclusive knowledge of the number of small arms in Cambodia, the presence of these weapons has undeniably been “a significant obstacle to the post-conflict transformation of Cambodia, and hence to its sustainable development.”<sup>282</sup> The impact of small

arms is inconsistent across regions: in areas unaffected in recent years by violent conflict, the threat posed by SALW is relatively low, while in areas where conflict has had a sustained impact, both the concentration and impact of weapons is markedly higher.<sup>283</sup> In such environments, communities have reported “a range of weapons misuse and abuse instances... including kidnapping, robbery, intimidation and threats, extortion, assault, and murder,”<sup>284</sup> which sustain the conditions of war despite the war’s official conclusion.<sup>285</sup> Therefore, while the impact of small arms on the contribution and use of development aid has been small,<sup>286</sup> small arms have slowed development in Cambodia nonetheless through the destabilization that accompanies their availability and misuse.<sup>287</sup> Specifically, competition for control of natural resources has been weaponized by “gun-wielding soldiers” forcing peasants from their land<sup>288</sup> and armed forest rangers who force rural Cambodians to pay for access to the forests.<sup>289</sup>

This speaks to a larger pattern of abuse by armed authorities in much of Cambodia. A 2003 study of several countries published by Small Arms Survey concluded that in Cambodia, as in the other case studies, “small arms figured prominently, were brandished openly, and frequently used coercively” by those entrusted with the protection of citizens and the maintenance of security.<sup>290</sup> This has given rise over time to a well-entrenched mistrust of authority,<sup>291</sup> and is a key reason many civilians acquire and maintain possession of small arms.<sup>292</sup>

It would be an oversimplification to say it is only fear of armed authorities that make small arms attractive to a defenseless Cambodian population. The threat often comes not just from “...the ‘big guys’ but often neighbors, local leaders or relatives. But regardless if it concerns a powerful company or rich businessman who evicts people from their lands in order to do business, or if it concerns a soldier encroaching on other's land, or a fellow villager disputing

ownership of land, it is the gun that makes the difference.”<sup>293</sup> At an increasing rate in the 1990s, small arms were used to settle disputes, including domestic arguments and “traffic incidents.”<sup>294</sup>

Therefore, while broad support exists for the collection of SALW, such support hinges on improvements to security throughout the country,<sup>295</sup> and any attempt at disarmament faces the daunting challenge of overcoming Cambodia’s so-called “culture of violence.”<sup>296</sup> Undoubtedly, the widespread availability of SALW and the history of their use in Cambodia have made it nearly impossible for previous attempts at weapons collection to enjoy widespread success:

As a result of the legacy of conflict, Cambodians have in large part been socially conditioned to settle disputes by resort to weapons. As a result, small arms and light weapons are now being used by those with the greatest access to them, to settle or claim resources as their own. This, in spite of repeated efforts on the part of the government and multilaterals to disarm the population.<sup>297</sup>

## **Government weapons collection and law enforcement**

In 1999, the municipal government of Phnom Penh launched a weapons buy-back program, but it enjoyed only limited success: of the over 10,000 weapons thought to be in Phnom Penh, only 665 small arms and 70 grenades were turned in for the cash rewards.<sup>298</sup> In that same year, the Cambodian government issued a sub-decree making it illegal for anyone but a small margin of civil servants, police officers, and soldiers to possess arms, and encouraged citizens to voluntarily surrender their now-illegal weapons to the government.<sup>299</sup>

At that point, the government began searching for and confiscating illegally-held weapons in Phnom Penh and other large towns. This effort enjoyed greater success, resulting in the collection of over 112,500 arms, according to WGWR. Of these arms, 50,600 were publicly destroyed – burned or crushed by bulldozers – in 10 separate ceremonies.<sup>300</sup> In June 2000, a national commission was also established by the government to oversee weapons collection efforts throughout Cambodia.<sup>301</sup> Cambodia now has some of the most progressive weapons

control laws in Southeast Asia: those civil servants and security personnel allowed to possess weapons for work purposes are not permitted to keep them after the completion of a mission,<sup>302</sup> and the importing of arms by non-government actors is forbidden.<sup>303</sup> As of 2001, Cambodia was the only country in Southeast Asia to outlaw the civilian storage of small arms.<sup>304</sup>

However, despite the success enjoyed in larger towns, government efforts to collect small arms from civilians were limited by a pervading climate of insecurity. In rural areas, “villagers feared for their own safety if they had no weapons to protect themselves.”<sup>305</sup> This perception was compounded by reports of misconduct by collections officials, as observed by the WGWR, and the persistence of mistrust of the government’s ability to protect its citizens. In addition, “only a fraction of the collected weapons has been destroyed, leading to the diversion and recirculation of many of the others.”<sup>306</sup> These factors, despite widespread support for weapons collection among Cambodian civilians, seriously limited the impact of the government-led weapons collection.

## **European Union intervention**

In response to an appeal for assistance from the government of Cambodia, whose ability to more broadly tackle the small arms problem was limited by a lack of resources, the European Union launched a program called Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (EU ASAC), which began operating in 2000<sup>307</sup> in partnership with the Cambodian government’s National Commission for Weapons Management and Reform.<sup>308</sup> The EU program consisted of a number of weapons for development (WfD) programs, awareness campaigning about the ills of gun violence, destruction of collected arms, support for the drafting of new

weapons-control legislation, and support for an initiative by the Defence Ministry to reform the methodology and infrastructure of government weapons registration and storage.<sup>309</sup>

The focus of this case study will be the WfD aspect of the program, which EU ASAC adopted as one means to change the underlying conditions that create demand for small arms in Cambodia. Under the EU ASAC program, two large pilot WfD programs were launched in the provinces of Kratie and Pursat, and the WfD approach was later expanded to other areas in smaller programs.

The Kratie and Pursat programs operated between April 2001 and November 2002.<sup>310</sup> Awareness campaigns accompanying the programs were implemented for three months in each of the two locations, and spent a total of \$20,000 US – \$10,000 in each of the two provinces.<sup>311</sup> Among the focuses of the campaigns was an emphasis on encouraging others to surrender weapons and informing people how to inform the police of the location of a hidden weapons cache.<sup>312</sup> EU ASAC staff were trained in cultural sensitivity, weapons regulations, and the rights and responsibilities of civilians and authorities by four Cambodian human rights and/or disarmament NGOs with a history of providing such training.<sup>313</sup>

The incentive projects offered by the pilot programs served two purposes: fortifying the relationship between civilians and the police, and improving developmental opportunities for the population as a whole. Recognizing insecurity as a main concern among civilians in possession of weapons, EU ASAC targeted a number of projects toward improving the professionalism of police officers where WfD programs were operating. Contributions included motorcycles and bicycles to assist police transportation, radio equipment, and training. “Such efforts aim not only at enhancing the mobility, visibility and effectiveness of the police in target communities, but also at familiarising them with the concept of a police that works in the service and for the

protection of the public.”<sup>314</sup> EU ASAC also learned that the low salaries of police officers commonly fostered corruption,<sup>315</sup> and aimed to improve the earning power and “morale” of police families by providing them with livestock and animal-raising training, sewing machines and sewing training, agricultural training, motorcycle repair training, and other incentives deemed useful for income generation.<sup>316</sup>

Other incentive projects aimed at improving development for the population in general included the construction of a health clinic and clean water wells in Kratie, and schools and roads in both Kratie and Pursat.<sup>317</sup> While the clinic, schools, and wells were constructed by contractors, the roads were constructed by villagers employed “on a Food for Work basis.”<sup>318</sup> The program further devoted resources to raising awareness of WfD in Kratie and Pursat through the distribution of posters and the making and screening of films on the dangers of gun violence.<sup>319</sup>

The weapons collection aspects of the Kratie and Pursat programs were managed mostly by the local authorities: rather than collect weapons themselves, EU ASAC instructed people to turn arms over to the police.<sup>320</sup> In both cases, the results of arms collection reveals a wide disparity between the expectations drawn from pre-project assessments and the true number of weapons present in the two provinces. In both cases, the number of weapons voluntarily turned in to police – 3,251 in Kratie and 2,028 in Pursat – were a far cry from the several hundred anticipated by EU ASAC.<sup>321</sup> The gap can be attributed to a lack of information regarding the arms situation in both locations: “Whilst collecting more weapons than initially estimated was a success for the pilot project, it also demonstrated the difficulty in accurately assessing the numbers of weapons that exist in any given area, both before the project begins and once it is completed.”<sup>322</sup>

The costs of these two major WfD programs break down as follows: a total of \$220,996 US was devoted to police support in the two provinces (\$114,532 in Kratie and \$106,464 in Pursat), and \$294,846 US was spent on other development projects (\$174,563 in Kratie and \$120,283 in Pursat).<sup>323</sup>

The expansion of the WfD model to other locations took place in 2002 after EU ASAC witnessed the success of public awareness campaigns run by local Cambodian NGOs in concert with the weapons collection efforts. EU ASAC then shifted its methodology toward smaller-scale development projects proposed and carried out by local NGOs in the provinces of Kompong Spue, Kompong Som, Kompong Cham, Kampot, Battambang, Pailin, and Takeo.<sup>324</sup>,  
325

EU ASAC chose to standardize the different programs by providing uniform project-management training to the implementing NGOs<sup>326</sup> and offering as incentive in the different locations a single development project: water wells.<sup>327</sup> Throughout the weapons collection and project distribution, EU ASAC played a key coordination role, responding to problems and successes quickly.<sup>328</sup> Public awareness campaigning took place in each location for a period of seven to eight months, whereas such campaigning had only occurred over three months in the Kratie and Pursat pilots.<sup>329</sup>

Between April and November 2002, it was reported that 3,500 small arms were collected between the seven small scale WfD programs.<sup>330</sup> However, the number of weapons collected in this second phase of WfD implementation is difficult to substantiate, largely because civilians turning in weapons are assured anonymity and their weapon registration numbers are not recorded. The statistics released by the police are also not corroborated by EU ASAC, which only has a mandate to assist the government in weapons collection and not to conduct the

weapons collection itself. “Therefore the project has little evidence that confirms the legitimacy of the figures the police are releasing, neither from the figures before the project, nor from the figures of collected weapons within the project.”<sup>331</sup> Furthermore, it is unknown how many weapons were in the communities before weapons collection began. Therefore, even if collection figures reported by the police are taken as fact, it remains difficult to assess the impact of small arms collection in the different regions in which WfD programs operated.<sup>332, 333</sup>

In total, awareness campaigning in the seven provinces cost \$86,500 US, and the development projects cost \$52,100 US. The most expensive of these projects was in the Takeo province and cost \$15,800, a figure far lower than the \$120,283 spent on development in the Pursat pilot program, the cheaper of the two pilots. No funds were dedicated to providing equipment for local police departments in the seven small-scale WfD programs, though “community relations training” for the police was to be provided beginning in 2003.<sup>334</sup>

The WfD programs initiated in Cambodia were conceived and implemented as part of a larger effort to curb the demand for and availability of small arms by EU ASAC in partnership with the Cambodian government. The arms-reduction effort has also included support for new weapons legislation and storage regulations, public awareness campaigns, and weapons destruction.

EU ASAC has assisted the Cambodian government in passing legislation limiting arms possession and use, working to generate support both within the Defence and Interior ministries and among the Cambodian population. A legal advisor was also employed by EU ASAC to assist in the wording of the legislation, though EU ASAC has said maintaining Cambodian ownership over the legislation is its priority. At the same time, EU ASAC provided assistance to the Defence ministry in developing a registration system for weapons held by the Cambodian armed

forces, having concluded in a 2000 feasibility study that no such registration system was in place. EU ASAC also provided funding for the construction or renovation of storage facilities and training for military officials in weapons registration procedure.<sup>335</sup>

The awareness campaigns financed by EU ASAC have sought to highlight the threat to human security posed by small arms and the benefits of disarmament. These campaigns have been run by Cambodian NGOs and funded by EU ASAC, and have included open public meetings at the village, communal, district, and provincial levels; public performances on holidays; exposure through such media outlets as radio shows, documentaries, and televised debates; the production and dissemination of stickers, posters, pamphlets, and billboards; and a training manual for police to improve relations with community members.<sup>336</sup> In addition, a coordinated campaign was run in the fall of 2002 by EU ASAC and three Cambodian NGOs to publicize new weapons legislation.<sup>337</sup>

Finally, EU ASAC facilitated the destruction of collected weapons using the public burning method that the Cambodian government had successfully employed in its 1999 weapons collection program, and has also produced a manual for the safe and effective implementation of a weapons burning ceremony.<sup>338</sup> Between January 2001 and July 2003, EU ASAC assisted in the destruction of 74,656 weapons in burning ceremonies entitled “Flames of Peace,” a name pioneered in 1996 in Mali. Combined with the 36,505 small arms crushed by the Cambodian government between 1999 and 2000, the Flames of Peace – by the summer of 2003 – brought the total of destroyed weapons in Cambodia to 111,161.<sup>339</sup> The burning ceremonies have been held in 14 different provinces and have been attended by government officials,<sup>340</sup> and they are still taking place – as recently as March 30, 2004 a Flame of Peace ceremony was held in Siem Reap and was attended by one of Cambodia’s Defence ministers. According to EU ASAC, the

ceremony was scheduled to destroy 5,000 weapons that were deemed surplus stocks by the military after registration and safe storage efforts were undertaken in the region.<sup>341</sup>

## **Impact of WfD and conclusions**

Weapons for Development in Cambodia has been declared successful both by internal EU ASAC assessment and by external evaluations, though all evaluations noted areas of implementation that could benefit from reconsideration and revision. In a 2003 report on EU ASAC's weapons control activities in Cambodia, program manager David de Beer wrote that the model used by EU ASAC, which combined WfD, awareness campaigning, legislative support, registration and storage reform, and weapons destruction, "can certainly be used as a model in other countries or by other agencies."<sup>342</sup> Johan Buwalda, who conducted an independent assessment of the WfD aspect of EU ASAC operations, concurs that the program has been effective in reducing possession and misuse of small arms where it has operated: "Increase of the number of collected weapons, decrease of the number of armed crimes, sense of security, confidence in the police, acquaintance with the project in and outside the target areas, etc. are clear indicators that the project has gained an appreciated place within the civil society and with the authorities."<sup>343</sup> WfD has also brought civil society and the authorities closer together, fostering trust and enabling security services to better protect the population through training in human rights and responsiveness.<sup>344</sup> According to a director of the Cambodian National Police, a reduction in the visibility of small arms in some areas has resulted in a change in the sociopolitical climate: "Weapons in the countryside are now no longer really visible and this itself has increased security."<sup>345</sup>

The implementation of WfD in Cambodia naturally entailed several departures from the methodology used in Albania. Most obvious is the integration of WfD into a larger program of weapons control, where it operated simultaneously with nationwide awareness programs, reform of Cambodia's weapons legislation and storage practices, and weapons destruction ceremonies. In addition, EU ASAC was never authorized to conduct weapons collection itself, but rather its mission was to assist the Cambodian government in weapons collection.<sup>346</sup> In this manner, the mandates of the WfD programs in Cambodia have been narrower and more focused than those in Albania, where UNDP was initially responsible for weapons collection as well as the provision of incentives. Furthermore, unlike the Albania programs, not all the development projects offered were explicitly tied to security improvement – for example, the schools and water wells. Rather, the aim in providing such projects was to link the concepts of disarmament and development in communities where WfD operated: “The appeal was to a sense of loyalty to the community underlining that a community without weapons is more likely to receive development than a community with weapons.”<sup>347</sup>

EU ASAC also integrated the concept of security sector reform (SSR) into the WfD methodology by offering training meant to professionalize police in Cambodia and improve relations between police departments and communities. In Albania, SSR was not explored fully until years after weapons collection was undertaken by UNDP. This speaks to the different attitudes toward law enforcement in the two countries: while in Albania the concern among citizens pertained mainly to the *ability* of the police to protect them, Cambodians have grown to distrust the police after witnessing repeated *abuses* by gun-wielding authority figures – military figures and forest rangers, for example. Such perceptions and the realities that gave rise to them needed to be addressed if weapons collection was to be successful.

A number of strengths contributed to WfD's success in Cambodia. Chief among these was the support given to police forces, both in terms of equipment and training. In addition, EU ASAC helped initiate a wave of awareness campaigns on the dangers of gun violence where no effort of a comparable scale had been previously undertaken by the Cambodian government.<sup>348</sup> EU ASAC was also prudent in its decision to utilize the Flame of Peace model for the destruction of weapons. Highly visible and symbolic, weapons burning is also culturally appropriate, according to de Beer: "The symbolism of burning the weapons on a pyre fits in well with the Buddhist culture in Cambodia."<sup>349</sup> The burning ceremonies were also held in a number of locations, with the aim of involving as much of the population as possible. This attempt to foster wider participation and EU ASAC's development of a manual standardizing weapons burning to ensure safety and efficient destruction are both laudable achievements.

A number of other accomplishments also deserve mention. By involving Cambodian NGOs in the project planning and awareness campaigning aspects of the program, EU ASAC was able to utilize preexisting civil society channels to disseminate the message that disarmament is desirable and to select and execute the WfD incentive projects. Not only has such an approach facilitated the positive reception of EU ASAC and its programs in Cambodia, but it has also served to strengthen Cambodian civil society organizations.

EU ASAC also demonstrated a willingness and ability to learn as it went, adapting methodology to reflect the lessons learned from completed projects. After implementing the two large scale pilot projects in Kratie and Pursat, for example, EU ASAC was prompted by budget constraints to reduce the size of the development projects. However, after witnessing the relatively lengthy gestation period of the large projects – partly due to the fact that EU ASAC was "acting as a small development agency while it is really a weapons management and

destruction project” – the responsibility for overseeing incentive projects was passed to local NGOs and EU ASAC focused on monitoring the implementation of the seven smaller scale programs.<sup>350</sup> EU ASAC also learned in the process that small-scale projects can be just as effective as large-scale incentives in terms of fostering an understanding of the link between disarmament and development.<sup>351</sup> Further, between 2002 and 2003, a number of areas where improvements could be made were identified, including awareness campaigning, police support, safety and monitoring techniques, and the execution of incentive development projects.<sup>352</sup> Adjustments to the framework of subsequent projects were made accordingly. One such adjustment was a decrease in collaboration with a number of local Cambodian NGOs, for reasons that will be discussed below. Perhaps the most significant alteration of EU ASAC methodology is its shift away from WfD projects – the program is now focusing on training local governing councils that were formed in February 2004 to work with the government and police on weapons management and education. This change came as a result of the observed decline in the impact of WfD as more and more weapons were collected and destroyed, a trend which, according to project officer Neil Wilford, shows that “extensive proliferation of small arms among the civil population is a thing of the past.” Wilford identifies the training of local councils as EU ASAC’s “exit strategy from civil weapon collection activities.”<sup>353</sup>

However, the success of WfD in Cambodia has also been limited by a number of weaknesses. The Cambodian government has expressed a hesitancy to encourage the development of “a strong civil society,” and therefore has sought to discourage EU ASAC from working too closely with Cambodian NGOs. This posturing has created some tension between the government of Cambodia and EU ASAC, which is an EU agency with its own mandate: “For a good relationship with the government, it is essential that the responsible ministers, generals

and other officials understand that EU ASAC also has to fulfil [sic] its mandate from the Council of Ministers of the European Union and is not merely in Cambodia to do what the Cambodian Government requests. This sometimes requires a fine balancing act.”<sup>354</sup>

The presence of EU ASAC and its association with the task of weapons collection may have also unduly taken pressure for such weapons control off of the government, which is ultimately responsible for the security of its citizens. In 2001 the executive director of WGWR reported that government weapons collection efforts, which had begun in 1999, had “gradually come to a halt” since WfD programs began operating in the country, and that “WfD is being regarded as a replacement to the on-going government collection and confiscation of weapons in the provinces.” However, the lasting impact of WfD will be diminished if the government fails to take the initiative in enforcing existing weapons laws and continuing collection efforts.<sup>355</sup>

In addition, despite the successes of awareness campaigning, the scope of education efforts was limited in the first stages of WfD in Cambodia. Campaigns focused solely on informing the public of the weapons collection taking place at the time, and as a result, campaigning did not continue past the collection phases or address the more general but relevant issues of gun violence and peaceful conflict resolution.<sup>356</sup> Buwalda has noted that information provided in training material focuses too much on the technicalities of weapons legislation and not enough on the underlying tenet of present-day disarmament discourse: “‘Security is peace. Peace is development.’ This message needs more emphasis.”<sup>357</sup>

The reach of the awareness campaigning must also be questioned, given that widespread popular support for weapons collection already existed when the first WfD programs were launched, and indeed before the establishment of EU ASAC. Janz reports the results of a 1999 WGWR public opinion survey, which found that “94 percent of the respondents support[ed] the

collection of illegal weapons and 74 percent believe[d] that disarmament will improve the safety of their families.”<sup>358</sup> Surely the campaigning of EU ASAC and partner NGOs helped foster awareness of the collection efforts taking place, but support for disarmament cannot solely be attributed to such campaigns. Rather, future campaigning should focus on the value of peaceful conflict resolution and the linkages of disarmament, security, and development, and assessments of the campaigns should test attitudes toward these concepts to gauge the effectiveness of current education efforts.

In addition, some unnecessary confusion arose regarding the purpose of the WfD programs because aims were not explained properly. Partner NGOs in Cambodia were not properly briefed on the primary purpose of WfD: the removal of weapons and the improvement of security. Therefore, some NGOs working with EU ASAC viewed WfD as primarily a developmental initiative, and in some cases promised their communities development projects that were never delivered.<sup>359</sup> The disappointment that arises from unfulfilled promises may have undermined people’s confidence in EU ASAC’s work, and could have been prevented with more thorough explanations of the program and its purpose to those working alongside it. Furthermore, it seems that while people in Kratie were aware that the police were collecting weapons, and they also knew that EU ASAC was facilitating the provision of development projects, many residents were *not* aware that there was a link between the two initiatives.<sup>360</sup> The fact that the development projects were provided as rewards for weapons forfeiture ought to have been made clear, and the fact that it wasn’t raises questions about what in fact motivated people in Kratie to disarm if they were not aware of the rewards involved. This question will be discussed further in the following section.

And lastly, EU ASAC was confronted with administrative obstacles that impeded the smoother planning and implementation of programs. Project staff encountered problems working with local Cambodian NGOs, many of which turned out to be “little more than family businesses designed to attract donor funding.” They found these NGOs were limited in their ability to work with each other and with the government and uphold EU ASAC’s professed standards of transparency.<sup>361</sup> In addition, EU ASAC is only granted its budget once a year, at which point the extension of EU ASAC by another year is formalized. However, this only happens weeks before the end of EU ASAC’s current operations mandate. Therefore, while EU ASAC’s mandate in Cambodia is to effect long-term change, there is never any guarantee that the program will exist past the current year. This makes it difficult to formulate long-term plans: “While activities are implemented each year as if they were part of a longer-term plan, there is no guarantee that this is the case and each year the arguments for extending the project for another twelve months must be made.” Specifically, it is difficult to secure funding from bilateral donors for a project that may not even exist if EU ASAC is not renewed. The funding that must be obtained from outside donations has, in the past, been for the developmental and police-support aspects of WfD, and so this administrative hurdle has the potential to limit the funding available to WfD projects.<sup>362</sup>

## Part V: Lessons Learned

The strategy of providing security-oriented developmental incentives for collective, voluntary disarmament has proved successful in light of the numerous challenges that limit the success of any weapons collection initiative. It has been shown to reduce the availability of small arms and light weapons while addressing insecurity and inequality, two root causes of demand for arms. As a result, UNDP has “continued promotion of ‘weapons for development’ programmes in over 15 countries of the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America.”<sup>363</sup> Some debate has arisen about the appropriateness of the titles given to such programs (e.g. WED, WfD), since the implication of a direct exchange rate between guns and incentive may obscure the underlying message that disarmament begets security and security begets human development.<sup>364</sup> However, “There is no doubt about the success of the formula ‘Weapons for Development’, despite all discussions and criticism on the adverb ‘for’ and the proper meaning of the word ‘development’.”<sup>365</sup> Where such a strategy has been used, fundamental improvements to human security and human development have been achieved.

### Challenges and limitations

A number of challenges must be planned for in the initial stages of a WfD program. First, incentives can only go so far in encouraging people to forfeit small arms. Ultimately, only those arms perceived to no longer be necessary or valuable will be turned in to a WfD program, and no promise of development aid will diminish the perceived value of other weapons unless the perceptions and reality of insecurity are both addressed.<sup>366</sup> Another challenge of linking

developmental incentives to disarmament is conveying that connection to the intended beneficiaries of the program. As has been pointed out by Faltas and Paes, the provision of development projects may be interpreted as a kind of formulaic buy-back scheme. Alternatively, as has been documented in the case of Cambodia, the fact that a connection even exists between development projects and weapons collection may not be understood by the people (unwittingly) participating in the program. This is more likely to occur when the connection is not publicized and the reward projects are not visibly linked to security improvement. However, it may be more difficult to secure funding for projects that do entail a visible link to security issues; for example, Japan contributed generously to the EU ASAC program in Cambodia but refrained from offering any funding to EU ASAC's police support efforts.<sup>367</sup>

Ensuring that WfD programs are implemented with the utmost regard for the safety of program staff and civilians is also a challenge – collected weapons may be dangerously faulty, and collection sites may also receive unsolicited explosives and ammunition. Such was the case in Albania, and the UNDP program staff was initially ill-equipped to provide safe storage and transport for the collected weapons. Significant improvements were made with the help of NATO explosives experts, and certain safety benchmarks have become standardized, but it remains unclear whether progress has been made toward establishing firm international standards for the safe implementation of weapons collection and destruction.<sup>368</sup>

Another challenge is ensuring that the impact of a WfD program is sustainable beyond the program's end date. Regardless of the success of weapons collection, a community or society can easily revert to a pattern of gun violence if laws controlling gun possession and use are not passed and enforced. In El Salvador, for example, a weakening of gun control laws has resulted in an increase in the number of circulating weapons despite the relative success of the Goods for

Guns VWCP (1996-1999).<sup>369</sup> Similarly, any continuation of arms misuse by military personnel – something Anders has identified as an ongoing pattern – will undermine any progress made through WfD.<sup>370</sup> The sustainability of WfD is also threatened if the regional environment remains one of gun proliferation and misuse, as is true in the case of WfD in both Niger<sup>371</sup> and Cambodia.<sup>372</sup>

It should by now be apparent that a WfD program that is not planned with diligent observance of differing local conditions – including the regional environment, existence and enforcement of weapons laws, and the level of trust between civilians and military and civil authorities – is bound to be hindered by unanticipated difficulties. However, it may also be difficult to obtain accurate and thorough information about such conditions in many cases. In both Cambodia and Albania, for example, estimates of the number of weapons present were either unavailable or seriously inaccurate. Therefore, information-gathering remains a formidable challenge for WfD and all VWCPs.

## **Evaluation**

The implementing agency of a WfD program should take careful account of the perceived and actual security situation before the program begins, and a methodology for a post-project assessment of WfD should be planned before the program is launched.<sup>373</sup> Ideally, separate evaluations should be conducted by the implementing agency, the host government, and an independent auditor. The evaluative process is necessary both to identify areas for improvement and to report results to donors, participants, and the international community: “By

their nature, VWCPs are very high profile and can be controversial. The citizens of the community, the governments involved, and the sponsors and funders will all demand to know the results of the program.”<sup>374</sup> The results of a WfD program should be compared to its objectives, and may also be compared to other WfD programs. However, because the aim of WfD is not purely the collection of weapons but also a change in the socioeconomic climate, WfD programs should not be compared to other VWCPs, “because their objectives, outcomes and impacts are so different.”<sup>375</sup>

One way to assess the impact of WfD on security and development is to compare violent crime rates before, during, and after the program.<sup>376</sup> Case-specific evaluations of other subjective indicators can also be conducted – in Cambodia, EU ASAC noted that there had long existed a “Khmer practice of shooting into rain clouds to drive away bad spirits. A lack of gunfire during a rain storm is a good proxy indicator that attitudes towards weapons have changed.”<sup>377</sup> However, such evaluative tools do not eliminate the need for consultative methods – surveys, interviews, etc. Quantitative measures of weapon possession and use “do not take into account the intent of the population who possess weapons, the political situation, or the overall economic situation. They are only indicators and should not be used as the definitive tool for the measurement of success.”<sup>378</sup> People’s perceptions of the program, of their own security, and of their relationship with civil and military authorities can and should be assessed through surveys before, during, and after the WfD program.<sup>379</sup> Improvements to local infrastructure and the degree to which a program has fostered community dialogue are also useful criteria for gauging a program’s success.<sup>380</sup>

Weapons collection remains a central aim of WfD programs and must be evaluated; however, evaluation efforts are often frustrated due to an lack of information regarding the

number of weapons present before collection efforts began. In the Gramsh Pilot Project, program staff offered a figure for “lives potentially saved” by weapons collection. That figure was derived by multiplying the quantity of arms collected by the “risk rating” (or effectiveness in harming) of the different weapons.<sup>381</sup> Another way to estimate the change in weapons availability when the number of weapons present before collection is unknown is to note any changes in the going street price for a weapon compared to the price before the start of the program. Presumably, a reduction in the stock of weapons would result in a higher price for the remaining weapons.<sup>382</sup> However, as has been noted, estimates of weapons totals in a particular area are often inaccurate, owing largely to the ease with which SALW can be transported (legally or illegally) between regions. In post-conflict countries, governments may also not have the resources or infrastructure to track and record weapons flows within and across their own borders.<sup>383</sup> Therefore, assessments that rely too heavily on measuring the change in weapons availability run the risk of being arbitrary. It must also be stressed that a reported decline in weapons availability is only one aim of WfD; Faltas and Paes even argue that its purpose in Albania was largely figurative: “Clearly the symbolic value of local SALW collection far outstrips the contribution to objective security made by removing a limited number of guns from circulation.”<sup>384</sup> The full impact of a WfD program can only be understood if the socio-political climate and the state of human security are also assessed.

## **Recommendations**

### *Establish preconditions for WfD program*

Like other VWCPs, WfD should not be implemented in the presence of open conflict.<sup>385</sup> Nor should it be attempted during an extended period of peace, when people “have long grown accustomed to the availability and wide-spread possession of weapons.” Rather, WfD has the greatest chance of success if it is attempted after the signing of a peace agreement or in the wake of a shocking violent event in a peacetime environment.<sup>386</sup> In both of these scenarios, it is more likely that the population will be cognizant of the benefits of disarming and will be willing to attempt it if it means human security will improve. The cooperation of both civilians and government is necessary if WfD is to be successful.

There must also be some sense of community among the target population, since the concept of collective participation and incentive requires individuals to feel a responsibility for the well-being of the group and pressure others to participate in the program. By that same logic, WfD is less effective when those possessing guns view the weapons as their private property and not as common or collective property.<sup>387</sup>

Other conditions that should be verified before a WfD program is initiated are a high volume of weapons in the area, a consensus that these weapons facilitate acts of violence and impede human development, established NGOs or civil society groups to implement awareness campaigning and development projects,<sup>388</sup> and gun control laws that will be enforced after a limited period of amnesty. In Albania, weapons were surrendered at an increasing rate as the end of amnesty approached, largely due to the fact that it was widely expected that collection would begin taking place by coercion after the amnesty expired.<sup>389</sup>

### *Adjust programs to reflect arms situation and civilian relationship with authorities*

It is unrealistic to expect a WfD program to collect all the weapons in a given area, and program planners may therefore wish to focus on one or two types of SALW in their outreach campaigning. How they choose to narrow their weapons collection will depend entirely on the local context and the particular threats to security that WfD is meant to combat.<sup>390</sup>

Programs must also take into account the level of trust that exists between civilians and civil and military authorities in the area – a relationship that differs widely between case studies. Mistrust of authority figures existed in both Albania and Cambodia. However, Albanians seemed to mainly doubt the *ability* of the authorities to protect them. This differs starkly from the case of Cambodia, where people doubted the *willingness* of authorities to protect them. It follows that civilians who have been abused by soldiers in recent memory will be less willing to turn in their weapons at a military outpost than at a religious center, school, or health center. Such considerations must play a part in the planning of weapons collection, incentive projects, and awareness campaigns.

### *Set priorities in mission statements*

A post-program assessment will be far fairer and more accurate if the priorities of the program have been established and documented before the program's start. The question of focusing weapons collection has already been raised: does the program seek to collect all kinds of guns, or simply a select few? It should be made clear to both donors and participants whether the implementing agency seeks to round up the most dangerous (or smallest, or most widely available) arms in the area, or rather collect any and all arms to maximize the symbolic impact.<sup>391</sup> Another question that should be resolved before a program is launched is whether it

will prioritize broad consultation over efficiency. WfD programs generally seek to implement development projects selected by popular consultation, having found that they are “more sustainable” and that popular involvement “assures practicality, relevance to local needs, ownership by residents and participation by them.”<sup>392</sup> However, donors supporting such projects may expect quick results. Agencies seeking funding for a WfD program should therefore make their priority in this matter clear when seeking funding from outside sources.

### *Integrate WfD with other initiatives*

As previously noted, the physical act of collecting weapons will not do much to prevent people from obtaining other weapons if they still feel the need to do so. Therefore, initiatives such as demobilization and reintegration of combatants after a conflict settlement, and measures to support the rule of law in peacetime, must accompany WfD: “Not only will it otherwise fail, it may in fact be counterproductive.”<sup>393</sup> Also, since SALW are so easily transported within regions, WfD should be combined with regional initiatives as well. In discussions of the long-term viability of Niger’s WfD experience, for example, it has been suggested that a regional WfD program be launched.<sup>394</sup>

### *Make awareness a central focus of WfD programs*

In a 2003 WGWR survey that posed the open-ended question of how “gun-related incidents” could be prevented, the top response given by Cambodians was “information campaigns aimed at people and law-enforcers.”<sup>395</sup> Awareness campaigns should convey the purpose of the WfD program and the value of disarmament. If an amnesty period has been

established for the duration of the weapons collection, the campaign should publicize the fact that weapons laws will be enforced and collection by coercion will begin at the end of the amnesty period. The penalties for illegal weapons possession should also be made clear by the WfD program staff and partner NGOs.<sup>396, 397</sup> In Albania, widespread awareness of the looming end of amnesty encouraged weapons forfeiture at an increasing rate as the deadline approached. After the end of the WfD program, awareness campaigning should continue in the form of peace education, encouraging the resolution of conflict through non-violent means. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched one such program in four countries where WfD has been completed or is currently in process: Albania, Cambodia, Niger, and Peru.<sup>398</sup>

### *Keep incentive projects small and simple*

It has been demonstrated that large-scale incentive projects are not necessary to encourage participation in weapons collection. In both Albania and Cambodia, where WfD programs only rewarded the forfeiture of small arms, people nonetheless turned in explosives and ammunition for which they received no incentive. In the province of Kratie in Cambodia, many people who turned in weapons had no idea that the development projects being offered by EU ASAC were at all tied to the collection of weapons.<sup>399</sup> According to Buwalda, disarmament is incentive enough for those who are sick of war.<sup>400</sup>

This does not make the provision of incentives unnecessary. The projects provided as a result of weapons collection still succeed in conveying the links between disarmament and security, and between security and human development. This is true irrespective of the size of the projects. Furthermore, because smaller projects are cheaper,<sup>401</sup> they can be implemented in more locations and benefit a greater number of people, and the potential for resentment between

neighbouring communities and toward the program for rewarding bad behaviour are significantly reduced.<sup>402</sup> The distribution of solar-powered radios to communities in Niger is a good example of the potential for small projects to have a big impact – the radios will bring to otherwise isolated areas news of weapons collection, peace support initiatives, and development opportunities, and are also intended to allow a network of radio stations to develop in the country.<sup>403</sup>

### *Destroy weapons publicly*

Not only is weapons destruction an important symbolic step toward establishing trust between governments and populations, it is also necessary to ensure the sustainability of the program: “If disarmament is to be effective, it is essential that all weapons are publicly destroyed. It is the only guarantee that weapons are not recycled by trafficking rings.”<sup>404</sup> WfD in Niger included a small weapons destruction ceremony *before* the start of weapons collection to establish a cooperative climate for the program.<sup>405</sup> However, the majority of destruction ceremonies will take place during or after the weapons collection period.

A number of destruction methods exist, including crushing, cutting, dumping at sea, detonating, and shredding, but none of these have the aesthetic and symbolic impact of burning. Weapons burning ceremonies require minimal planning, are relatively inexpensive, and naturally attract widespread media attention.<sup>406</sup> The image of the implements of war being melted away by a “Flame of Peace” is a powerful symbol, and can be reproduced on a smaller scale in outlying areas to involve more of the population and provide an appropriate accompaniment to local WfD programs. The impact is also greater when people can see ‘their’ weapons being destroyed first-hand.<sup>407</sup> Of course, certain safety precautions should be taken: pyre sites should

be swept for mines and other unexploded ordnance beforehand, weapons should be checked before burning to make sure no live ammunition is accidentally tossed on the fire,<sup>408</sup> and they should also be checked after burning to verify that they have been sufficiently destroyed. If not, they should be burned again.<sup>409</sup>

### *Adapt as you go*

In any program, valuable lessons can be learned from stage to stage and adjustments can be made to reflect these lessons. UNDP learned in Albania that creating a competition for incentive projects was an effective solution to a tight budget, and EU ASAC learned that awareness campaigning would be more effective if undertaken over a longer time period. In future WfD programs mistakes are bound to be made, but if there exists a willingness to adapt on the part of the program staff, such errors can produce stronger, more effective, more beneficial programs, and ultimately more secure societies.

## References

- “Albania.” International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), 1999-2004.  
[www.iansa.org/regions/europe/albania.htm](http://www.iansa.org/regions/europe/albania.htm).
- “Albania’s government resigns after clashes become deadly.” CNN World News. 1 March 1997.  
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/01/albania.resigns.update/index.html>.
- “Albanian government threatens firepower against rioters.” CNN World News. 3 March 1997.  
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/03/albania.update/index.html>.
- Anders, Nils Holger. “Small Arms Control in Cambodia: A Field Report.” *Peace, Conflict & Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 3 (June 2003). Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. [www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/latest.asp](http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/latest.asp).
- Annan, Kofi A. “Small Arms, Big Problems.” United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. New York, 9-20 July 2001.  
<http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/smallarms/sg.htm>
- “Annex 6: Table Showing Costs of Large Scale WfD Against Small Scale WfD.” External Programme Evaluation 2002, EU ASAC. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_collection.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_collection.htm)
- Atwood, David and David Jackman. “Working Where It Hurts: Perspectives From the Field on Small Arms Demand.” *Small Arms Control: The Need for Coordination*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000. [www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art149.pdf](http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art149.pdf).
- “Background.” UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project.  
[undp.org.al/salwc/?background](http://undp.org.al/salwc/?background).
- Brown, Mark Malloch. “United Nations Development Programme Statement.” United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, 13 July 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/smallarms/statements/undpE.html>.
- and Jayantha Dhanapala. “Let’s Go Out Into the World and Gather Up the Small Arms.” *International Herald Tribune*, 26 January 2000.  
[www.undp.org/dpa/statements/oped/26jan00.htm](http://www.undp.org/dpa/statements/oped/26jan00.htm).
- Brzoska, Michael. “Security Sector Reform: The Concept.” In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation*. BICC. February 2000.
- Buwalda, Johan P. “Report of an evaluation mission in Cambodia from September 21 to October 19, 2002.” WfD External Evaluation Mission Report. Buwalda BNA, 17 October 2002.  
[www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_collection.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_collection.htm)
- Chandara, Mao. “Small arms control in Cambodia.” INWENT Conference Paper. Bonn, April 2003. [www.iansa.org/issues/publications.htm](http://www.iansa.org/issues/publications.htm).
- “Children wielding weapons in Albania.” CNN World News. 8 March 1997.  
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/08/albania.children/index.html>.
- de Beer, David. *An Integrated Approach to Small Arms Management: The EU ASAC Programme on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia*. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2003. [www.gtz.de/smallarms/downloads/decosac-cambodia.pdf](http://www.gtz.de/smallarms/downloads/decosac-cambodia.pdf).
- DeClerq, David. “Destroying Small Arms and Light Weapons.” In *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*. Sami Faltas and Joseph Di Chiaro III, eds. Baden Baden: Nomos, 2001.

- Di Chiaro, Joseph III. *Brief 11: Reasonable Measures: Addressing the Excessive Accumulation and Unlawful Use of Small Arms*. Bonn International Center for Conversion. August 1998. [www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief11/brief11.pdf](http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief11/brief11.pdf)
- Dorn, A. Walter. "Small Arms, Human Security and Development." *Development Express* 5. International Development Information Centre (IDIC), 1999-2000.
- "EOD Solutions, Ltd. (Demilitarization, disarmament and EOD specialists)." EOD Solutions, Ltd. [www.eod-solutions.com/thecompany.htm](http://www.eod-solutions.com/thecompany.htm).
- "EU ASAC Programme – Public Awareness." The European Union's Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons (EU ASAC) in the Kingdom of Cambodia. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/public\\_awareness.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/public_awareness.htm).
- "EU ASAC Programme – Weapons Destruction." The European Union's Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons (EU ASAC) in the Kingdom of Cambodia. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_destruction.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_destruction.htm).
- Faltas, Sami. Interviewed by author. 20 April 2004.
- . "In Search of a 'Best Practice' of Micro-disarmament." In *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*. Sami Faltas and Joseph Di Chiaro III, eds. Baden Baden: Nomos, 2001.
- . "Weapons Collection Programmes: Questions to Answer and Challenges to Face." Conference on Possible Alternatives and Ways for the Collection of Arms in Albania. Tirana: Albanian Atlantic Association, 24-25 October 1998. <http://sand.miis.edu/research/1998/oct1998/Challeng.PDF>.
- and Joseph Di Chiaro III. "Introduction." In *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*. Sami Faltas and Joseph Di Chiaro III, eds. Baden Baden: Nomos, 2001.
- , Glenn McDonald, and Camilla Waszink. *Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes*. Small Arms Survey, July 2001. [www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP02.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP02.pdf).
- and Wolf-Christian Paes. "You Have Removed the Devil From Our Door": *An Assessment of the UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC) project in Albania*. South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Summer 2003. [www.bicc.de/publications/other/undp\\_albania/seesacpd20.pdf](http://www.bicc.de/publications/other/undp_albania/seesacpd20.pdf).
- "Five-thousand weapons to be destroyed in Siem Reap on Tuesday, 30 March 2004." The European Union's Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons (EU ASAC) in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 25 March 2004. [www.eu-asac.org/whatsnew/march\\_25\\_2004.html](http://www.eu-asac.org/whatsnew/march_25_2004.html).
- "Flame of peace ignites hope in Brazzaville." UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 20 April 2001. [www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/news/20apr2001.htm](http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/news/20apr2001.htm).
- "Flames of Peace – Kampot, Cambodia." International Action Network on Small Arms, 5 June 2003. [www.iansa.org/action/flames\\_of\\_peace.htm](http://www.iansa.org/action/flames_of_peace.htm)
- Garlichs, Dietrich. "They Kill 500 Children Every Day: Small Arms – A Lethal Global Scourge." *BICC Bulletin* 20 (1 July 2001). [www.bicc.de/publications/bulletin/bulletin20.pdf](http://www.bicc.de/publications/bulletin/bulletin20.pdf)
- "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development: Progress Report, 23 February 1999." UNDP, 23 February 1999. <http://sand.miis.edu/research/1999/feb1999/programme.pdf>

- Hughes-Wilson, John, and Adrian Wilkinson. *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures*. United Nations Development Programme, July 2001.  
[www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/docs/sa\\_prac\\_meas.pdf](http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/docs/sa_prac_meas.pdf).
- Janz, Edgar. "Civil Disarmament in Post-Conflict Cambodia." In *Brief 16: Practical Disarmament*. Herbert Wulf, ed. Bonn International Center for Conversion, August 2000.  
[www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief16/content.html](http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief16/content.html).
- . "Destruction of Small Arms in Cambodia." In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation: Proceedings of an International Conference, 30-31 August 1999*. Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 2000.
- Jorgensen, Lotte. "Giving Up Arms for Progress." *Choices*, December 1999. UNDP Division of Public Affairs. [www.undp.org/dpa/choices/december99/december.htm](http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/december99/december.htm)
- Kastrup, Dieter. "Practical Disarmament: A Year-Old 'Group of Interested States' Takes Stock of Successes and Plans for New Projects." *United Nations Chronicle* 1 (1999). Online Edition. UN Department of Information.  
[www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1999/issue1/0199p76.htm](http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1999/issue1/0199p76.htm)
- Kiernan, Ben. "Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002." *Critical Asian Studies* 34:4 (December 2002). [www.yale.edu/cgp/conflict.html](http://www.yale.edu/cgp/conflict.html).
- Kramer, Katherine. *Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia*. Small Arms Survey, July 2001. [www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP03.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP03.pdf).
- Krasniqi, Afrim. "Demilitarizing Communities in Albania." *Choices Magazine*, December 2002. UNDP. [www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2002/december/Pages14-15.pdf](http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2002/december/Pages14-15.pdf).
- Kushti, Nora. "Weapons in Exchange for Development: Albania." International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).  
[www.iansa.org/oldsite/documents/un/gramsh/update\\_undp.htm](http://www.iansa.org/oldsite/documents/un/gramsh/update_undp.htm).
- Laurance, Edward J. "Conclusions, Working Group 4: Collection of Excessive Weapons from Civil Society." Removal of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Peace Missions (seminar). Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 11-12 March 1999.  
<http://sand.miis.edu/research/1999/mar1999/Peac.PDF>.
- Louise, Christopher. "UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 59: The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation." Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995.
- Meek, Sarah. *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*. Monograph No. 22. Institute for Security Studies (ISS), March 1998.  
[www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No22/Contents.html](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No22/Contents.html).
- Mehrotra, Lakhan. "The Peace Process in Cambodia." In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation: Proceedings of an International Conference, 30-31 August 1999*. Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 2000.
- Menglang, Keng. "Cambodia: Rural livelihoods and Small Arms: Impacts on the lives of rural villagers dependent on forest products." In *Whose Security Counts? Participatory Research on Armed Violence and Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia*. Robert Muggah and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, eds. Small Arms Survey, December 2003.
- "Modus Operandi for a Weapons Destruction Ceremony." EU ASAC. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_destruction.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_destruction.htm)

- Muggah, Robert. "Caught in the Crossfire: the Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms." In *Small Arms Survey 2002*. Small Arms Survey, 2002.  
[www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb\\_2002.htm](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2002.htm)
- and Eric Berman. *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Small Arms Survey, July 2001.  
[www.smallarmssurvey.org/SReports/SReport1.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/SReports/SReport1.pdf)
- "New UNDP Project in Niger Seeks to Collect Small Arms through Development Incentives." UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 18 May 2001.  
[www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/news/18may2001.htm](http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/news/18may2001.htm)
- "NIGER: Former conflict zone chooses between arms and development." UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2 April 2003.  
[www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=33225&SelectRegion=West\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=33225&SelectRegion=West_Africa)
- "Obstructing Development: the effects of small arms on human development." In *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 8 July 2003.  
[www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb\\_2003.htm](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2003.htm)
- "Peace and Disarmament Education Project in Albania." UNDP.  
[www.peace.undp.org.al/?description](http://www.peace.undp.org.al/?description)
- Pike, Claire. *Facing the Challenges of Microdisarmament: A Case Study Review of Practices in Post-Conflict Countries*. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, March 1999.
- and Mark Taylor. *Swords for Ploughshares: Microdisarmament in Transitions from Conflict*. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science and Programme for International Co-operation and Conflict Resolution. Norway: Centraltrykkeriet AS, 2000.  
[www.faf.no/pub/rapp/332/332.pdf](http://www.faf.no/pub/rapp/332/332.pdf)
- Ratha, Sourn, Long Dianna and John L. Vijghen. *Guns & Livelihood: The Use of Small Arms and Their Impact on People's Livelihood*. Phnom Penh: Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR), December 2003. [www.wgwr.org/txt/reading.htm](http://www.wgwr.org/txt/reading.htm)
- Regehr, Ernie. "Militarizing despair: the politics of small arms." *New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action* 2:4 (1997).  
[www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/mond97d.html](http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/mond97d.html)
- "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms." UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. A/52/298, 27 August 1997.  
<http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/smallarms/docs/rep52298.pdf>
- Sahnoun, Mohamed. "Arms Supplies Fueling Conflicts in Africa." In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation*. Herbert Wulf, ed. Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 2000.
- Sinthay, Neb. "Practical Disarmament: Weapons and Development in Cambodia." BICC workshop on Practical Disarmament: Weapons and Development, 10 July 2001.  
[www.bicc.de/events/unconf/workshop\\_texts/workshop\\_sinthay.html](http://www.bicc.de/events/unconf/workshop_texts/workshop_sinthay.html)
- "Small Arms and Light Weapons." *Essentials* 9. UNDP Evaluation Office, November 2002.  
[www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/docs/essentials.pdf](http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/docs/essentials.pdf)
- "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project." Project document, UNDP Eastern Europe and CIS Sub-Regional Resource Facility.  
[www.ecissurf.org/index.cfm?module=Database&page=project&projectID=287](http://www.ecissurf.org/index.cfm?module=Database&page=project&projectID=287)

- Smith, Chris. "Illegal Arms in Albania and European Security." Palais des Nations: Geneva Forum seminar, 16 September 1998. [www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/salw\\_vol1/19980916.pdf](http://www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/salw_vol1/19980916.pdf).
- "Some Albania rebels agree to lay down arms." CNN World News. 10 March 1997. <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/10/albania.rebels>.
- "Stories: Albania." BICC Help Desk for Practical Disarmament. [www.bicc.de/helpdesk/stories/albania.html](http://www.bicc.de/helpdesk/stories/albania.html).
- "Story from the field – Arms become art in Mozambique." Canadian International Development Agency. [www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/0/6692547B2A41129385256CE7006F2065?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/0/6692547B2A41129385256CE7006F2065?OpenDocument).
- "Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR): Programme Document." United Nations Development Programme ALB/01/003, 31 March 2003. [www.undp.org.al/salwc/?sssr](http://www.undp.org.al/salwc/?sssr).
- Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collection and Destruction.* Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and Program on Security and Development (SAND) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 2000. [www.bicc.de/publications/books/guide\\_smallarms/guide\\_smallarms.pdf](http://www.bicc.de/publications/books/guide_smallarms/guide_smallarms.pdf).
- "Taking Aim at Small Arms: Weapons collection programmes." UNICEF. [www.unicef.org/smallarms/exhibit/html/sa05/weapons.html](http://www.unicef.org/smallarms/exhibit/html/sa05/weapons.html).
- "Turn in guns and tune in peace in Niger," UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. 20 December 2001. [www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/news/20dec2001.htm](http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/news/20dec2001.htm).
- "UN Messenger of Peace, Michael Douglas, concludes visit to Albania." Press release DC/2669. United Nations. 19 October 1999. [www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991019.dc2669.doc.html](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991019.dc2669.doc.html).
- "UN pilot project for weapons collection in Albania holds first meeting." Press release DC/2626. United Nations, 29 January 1999. [www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990129.dc2626.html](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990129.dc2626.html).
- "UNDP & Small Arms Control and Reduction: a Primer." UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. [www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/undp3\\_prim.htm](http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/undp3_prim.htm).
- Vignard, Kerstin. "Beyond the peace dividend – disarmament, development, and security." *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2003).
- "Weapons Destruction Table, 2001-2003." EU ASAC, March 2004. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_destruction.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_destruction.htm).
- "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Kratie Final Report." EU ASAC. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_collection.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_collection.htm).
- "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Pursat Final Report." EU ASAC. [www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons\\_collection.htm](http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/weapons_collection.htm).
- "The Weapons for Development Project: Monitoring and Evaluating Weapons for Development Experiences." *Disarmament Forum* 4. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2002. [www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1828.pdf](http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1828.pdf).
- "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District – Albania." UNDP, 4 September 1998. <http://sand.miis.edu/research/1998/sept1998/Development.PDF>.
- Wilford, Neil. Interviewed by author. 22 April 2004.

*Whose Security Counts? Participatory Research on Armed Violence and Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia.* Robert Muggah and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, eds. Small Arms Survey, December 2003.

“Working for solutions to crises: the development response.” UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. [www.undp.org/erd/archives/box4](http://www.undp.org/erd/archives/box4).

“Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program: Introduction.” Yale University, 2004. [www.yale.edu/cgp/index.html](http://www.yale.edu/cgp/index.html).

## Notes

---

### Part I: The Problem of Small Arms

1. John Hughes-Wilson and Adrian Wilkinson, *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures* (UNDP: July 2001), 1.

2. Christopher Louise, “UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 59: The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation” (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995), 1. Small arms can be defined as any conventional weapon “that can be carried by an individual or light vehicle.” Included in this umbrella category are small arms, defined as automatic weapons of up to 20 mm and including rifles, handguns, and sub-machine guns.

3. Dietrich Garlich, “They Kill 500 Children Every Day: Small Arms – A Lethal Global Scourge,” *BICC Bulletin* 20 (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1 July 2001).

4. “UNDP & Small Arms Control and Reduction: a Primer,” UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

5. Robert Muggah, “Caught in the Crossfire: the Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms,” In *Small Arms Survey 2002* (Small Arms Survey, 2002), 168.

6. Mohamed Sahnoun, “Arms Supplies Fueling Conflicts in Africa,” In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation*, ed. Herbert Wulf (Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 2000), 60.

7. Ernie Regehr, “Militarizing despair: the politics of small arms,” *New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action* 2:4 (1997).

8. Muggah, 163.

9. Louise, 16.

10. Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Small Arms Survey, July 2001), 2.

11. Joseph Di Chiaro III, *Reasonable Measures: Addressing the Excessive Accumulation and Unlawful Use of Small Arms* (Bonn International Center for Conversion, August 1998), 11.

12. Claire Pike and Mark Taylor, *Swords for Ploughshares: Microdisarmament in Transitions from Conflict*. (Norway: Centraltrykkeriet AS, 2000), 16.

13. “New UNDP Project in Niger Seeks to Collect Small Arms through Development Incentives,” UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (18 May 2001).

14. Muggah, 156-157.

15. Claire Pike, *Facing the Challenges of Microdisarmament: A Case Study Review of Practices in Post-Conflict Countries* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, March 1999), 54.

16. “Obstructing Development: the effects of small arms on human development,” In *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 8 July 2003), 129, 144.

17. Di Chiaro, p 10.

18. A. Walter Dorn, "Small Arms, Human Security and Development," *Development Express* 5 (International Development Information Centre, 1999-2000), 3.
19. "Obstructing Development," 148.
20. Dorn, 1.
21. "Obstructing Development," 149.
22. *Ibid*, 148.
23. Muggah, 170, 173.
24. "Obstructing Development," 147.
25. Pike, 47.
26. "Obstructing Development," 141.
27. Muggah and Berman, iii.
28. Sarah Meek, "Introduction," In *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes* (Institute for Security Studies, March 1998).
29. Di Chiaro, 9.
30. Louise, 5, 19.
31. Di Chiaro, 10.
32. Louise, 10.
33. This figure does not appear to include other light weapons.
34. Pike, 31, 37.
35. Muggah and Berman, 1-2.
36. Kerstin Vignard, "Beyond the peace dividend – disarmament, development, and security," *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2003), 6-8.
37. "Obstructing Development," 128.
38. Pike, 4.
39. Sami Faltas and Joseph Di Chiaro III, "Introduction," In *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*, eds. Sami Faltas and Joseph Di Chiaro III (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2001), 7.
40. Mark Malloch Brown, "United Nations Development Programme Statement," United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (13 July 2001).
41. "Obstructing Development," 130.
42. Pike, 27-28.

## Part II: Small Arms Collection and Weapons for Development

1. Sami Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes: Questions to Answer and Challenges to Face," Presented to the Conference on Possible Alternatives and Ways for the Collection of Arms in Albania (Tirana: Albanian Atlantic Association, 24-25 October 1998), 1-3.
2. Pike and Taylor, 16.
3. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 2.
4. *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collection and Destruction* (Bonn International Center for Conversion and the Program on Security and Development of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 2000), 8.
5. Pike and Taylor, 15-16.
6. *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 6.
7. *Ibid*, 6.
8. Meek, "Factors in Planning and Implementing a VWCP," In *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*.
9. Meek, "Using VWCPs to Reduce Weapons Availability," In *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*.
10. *Ibid*.
11. "Small Arms and Light Weapons," *Essentials* 9 (UNDP Evaluation Office, November 2002), 9.
12. Meek, "Conclusion," In *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*.
13. *Ibid*.

14. Meek, "Using VWCPs to Reduce Weapons Availability."
15. Meek, "Case Studies from Four Regions," In *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*.
16. Edward J. Laurance, "Conclusions, Working Group 4: Collection of Excessive Weapons from Civil Society," Removal of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Peace Missions seminar (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 11 -12 March 1999), 3.
17. *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 8.
18. Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson, 25.
19. Pike and Taylor, 16-17.
20. Dorn, 11.
21. Sarah Meek, "Amnesty, Buy-Back and Exchange Programmes,," In *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*.
22. Brown.
23. Louise, 21.
24. "The Weapons for Development Project: Monitoring and Evaluating Weapons for Development Experiences," *Disarmament Forum 4* (UNIDIR, 2002), 63.
25. Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson, 28.
26. "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms," UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298 (27 August 1997), 15.
27. "Obstructing Development," 130.
28. Pike and Taylor, 17.
29. Dorn, 11.
30. Laurance, 3.
31. Vignard, 9.
32. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 7.
33. Vignard, 9.
34. David Atwood and David Jackman, "Working Where It Hurts: Perspectives From the Field on Small Arms Demand," In *Small Arms Control: The Need for Coordination* (UNIDIR, 2000), 18. Emphasis in text.
35. "Small Arms and Light Weapons," 2.
36. Pike and Taylor, 18-19.
37. Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson, 17.
38. Pike and Taylor, 32.
39. Pike, 27.
40. "Flames of Peace – Kampot, Cambodia," International Action Network on Small Arms (5 June 2003).
41. "Flame of peace ignites hope in Brazzaville," UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (20 April 2001).
42. "Story from the field – Arms become art in Mozambique," Canadian International Development Agency.
43. Atwood and Jackman, 19.
44. Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson, 2.
45. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 6.
46. Brown.
47. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 4.
48. *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 7.
49. Louise, 23, 27.
50. "UNDP & Small Arms Control and Reduction: a Primer."
51. *Ibid*.
52. Pike and Taylor, 15.
53. "The Weapons for Development Project," 63.
54. *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 8.
55. *Ibid*, 8.
56. "The Weapons for Development Project," 63.
57. Louise, 16-17.
58. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 7.
59. Pike and Taylor, 25-26.

60. *Ibid*, 35.
61. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 12-13.
62. *Ibid*, 13.
63. Meek, "Introduction."
64. Kofi A. Annan, "Small Arms, Big Problems," United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (New York, 9-20 July 2001).
65. Atwood and Jackman, 23.
66. "Obstructing Development," 154.
67. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 4.
68. Atwood and Jackman, 21.
69. Meek, "Case Studies from Four Regions."
70. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 4.
71. Pike and Taylor, 17.
72. Meek, "Case Studies from Four Regions."
73. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 4.
74. Pike and Taylor, 26.
75. Meek, "The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes."

### Part III: Albania Case Study

1. Chris Smith, "Illegal Arms in Albania and European Security" (Palais des Nations: Geneva Forum seminar, 16 September 1998), 15-16.
2. "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project," UNDP Eastern Europe and CIS Sub-Regional Resource Facility, 1.
3. *Ibid*.
4. "Some Albania rebels agree to lay down arms," CNN World News, 10 March 1997.
5. "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project," 1.
6. "Background," UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project.
7. Smith, 16.
8. "Albania's government resigns after clashes become deadly," CNN World News, 1 March 1997.
9. "Albanian government threatens firepower against rioters," CNN World News, 3 March 1997.
10. Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes, "You Have Removed the Devil From Our Door": *An Assessment of the UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC) project in Albania* (South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and Bonn International Center for Conversion, Summer 2003), 5.
11. "Children wielding weapons in Albania," CNN World News, 8 March 1997.
12. "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project," 1.
13. Afrim Krasniqi, "Demilitarizing Communities in Albania," *Choices*, December 2002, 15.
14. Smith, 17.
15. "Obstructing Development," 141.
16. Dieter Kastrup, "Practical Disarmament: A Year-Old 'Group of Interested States' Takes Stock of Successes and Plans for New Projects," *United Nations Chronicle* 1 (1999).
17. "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project," 1.
18. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District - Albania" (UNDP, 4 September 1998), 1.
19. Smith, 21.
20. Smith, 15.
21. Smith, 16.
22. "Albania," International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), 1999-2004.
23. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 2.
24. *Ibid*.
25. Pike and Taylor, 23.
26. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 2.
27. *Ibid*.

28. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 1-2.
29. *Ibid*, 2-3.
30. *Ibid*, 3.
31. "Taking Aim at Small Arms: Weapons collection programmes," UNICEF.
32. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 3.
33. Mark Malloch Brown and Jayantha Dhanapala, "Let's Go Out Into the World and Gather Up the Small Arms," *International Herald Tribune*, 26 January 2000.
34. Pike and Taylor, 23.
35. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 3.
36. *Ibid*, 4.
37. Pike and Taylor, 23.
38. *Ibid*, 23.
39. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 3.
40. *Ibid*, 4-5.
41. Pike and Taylor, 24.
42. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 4.
43. *Ibid*, 1.
44. "UN pilot project for weapons collection in Albania holds first meeting," United Nations DC/2626, 29 January 1999, 1.
45. "Stories: Albania," BICC Help Desk for Practical Disarmament.
46. "UN pilot project for weapons collection in Albania holds first meeting," 2.
47. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 8.
48. "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development: Progress Report, 23 February 1999," UNDP, 23 February 1999, 2.
49. *Ibid*, 2.
50. "Albania," IANSA.
51. "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development," 2.
52. *Ibid*, 2.
53. "UN Messenger of Peace, Michael Douglas, concludes vis it to Albania." United Nations DC/2669, 19 October 1999, 2.
54. "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development," 1.
55. Pike and Taylor, 21.
56. Nora Kushti, "Weapons in Exchange for Development: Albania," International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).
57. *Ibid*.
58. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 43.
59. Pike and Taylor, 32.
60. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District– Albania," 7.
61. Sami Faltas, Glenn McDonald, and Camilla Waszink, *Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes* (Small Arms Survey, July 2001), 18.
62. "EOD Solutions, Ltd. (Demilitarization, disarmament and EOD specialists)," EOD Solutions, Ltd. Weapons were destroyed by cutting through several places to prevent the possibility of future use.
63. *Ibid*.
64. "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development," 1.
65. Faltas and Paes, 8.
66. *Ibid*, p 8.
67. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 15.
68. "EOD Solutions, Ltd. (Demilitarization, disarmament and EOD specialists)."

69. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 18.
70. "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development," 2.
71. "Working for solutions to crises: the development response," UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.
72. "UN pilot project for weapons collection in Albania holds first meeting," 2.
73. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District – Albania," 12.
74. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 18.
75. "UN pilot project for weapons collection in Albania holds first meeting," 2.
76. "Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development," 2.
77. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District – Albania," 14.
78. *Ibid*, 11-12.
79. *Ibid*, 12.
80. *Ibid*, 10.
81. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 18.
82. Faltas and Paes, 4.
83. Pike and Taylor, 25.
84. Faltas and Paes, 30.
85. Krasniqi, 15.
86. Faltas and Paes, 30.
87. Unfortunately, I was unable to find a breakdown of costs incurred by NGOs in connection with the awareness campaign or by law enforcement, NATO, and other actors in connection with weapons collection and storage.
88. Faltas and Paes, 5-6.
89. *Ibid*, 30.
90. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 18. UNDP also reports that almost 138 metric tons of ammunition was turned in at collection sites.
91. Lotte Jorgensen, "Giving Up Arms for Progress," *Choices*, December 1999.
92. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 18.
93. *Ibid*, 7.
94. Faltas and Paes, 22.
95. Pike and Taylor, 26.
96. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District – Albania," 13.
97. Pike and Taylor, 26-27.
98. Jorgensen.
99. *Ibid*.
100. "Stories: Albania."
101. Kushti.
102. Faltas and Paes, 4.
103. *Ibid*, 30.
104. "Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR): Programme Document," United Nations Development Programme ALB/01/003, 31 March 2003, 11.
105. Faltas and Paes, 6.
106. Faltas and Paes, 6-7.
107. *Ibid*, 7.
108. *Ibid*, 5.
109. *Ibid*, 22-23.
110. *Ibid*, 6.
111. *Ibid*, 15.
112. *Ibid*, 22.
113. "UN Messenger of Peace, Michael Douglas, concludes visit to Albania."
114. Faltas and Paes, iii.
115. *Ibid*, 19.

116. *Ibid*, 19.
117. *Ibid*, 8.
118. Krasniqi, 15.
119. Faltas and Paes, 31.
120. *Ibid*, 30.
121. *Ibid*, 30.
122. Sami Faltas, interviewed by author, 20 April 2004.
123. Faltas and Paes, 30.
124. Faltas, 20 April 2004.
125. Faltas and Paes, 36. Emphasis in text.
126. *Ibid*, 37.
127. *Ibid*, 25.
128. *Ibid*, 15, 17
129. *Ibid*, 32-33.
130. *Ibid*, 18.
131. *Ibid*, 18.
132. *Ibid*, 23.
133. *Ibid*, 24.
134. *Ibid*, 27-28.
135. Faltas, 20 April 2004.
136. Michael Brzoska, "Security Sector Reform: The Concept," In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation* (BICC, February 2000), 39.
137. "Background," UNDP Albania.
138. "Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR): Programme Document," 17.
139. *Ibid*, 16.
140. *Ibid*, 17.
141. Faltas and Paes, 37.
142. Smith, 20.
143. Faltas and Paes, 37.
144. *Ibid*, 35.
145. *Ibid*, 29.
146. *Ibid*, 35.
148. *Ibid*, 35.
148. *Ibid*, 36.
149. "Support to Security Sector Reform (SSSR): Programme Document," 15.

## **Part IV: Cambodia Case Study**

1. Lakhan Mehrotra, "The Peace Process in Cambodia," In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation: Proceedings of an International Conference, 30-31 August 1999* (Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 2000) 56.
2. Ben Kiernan, "Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002," *Critical Asian Studies* 34:4 (December 2002), 484.
3. *Ibid*, 485.
4. "Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program: Introduction," Yale University, 2004.
5. Kiernan, 487-488.
6. Edgar Janz, "Destruction of Small Arms in Cambodia," In *Report 14: Disarmament and Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation: Proceedings of an International Conference, 30-31 August 1999*. (Bonn International Center for Conversion. February 2000), 36.
7. Kiernan, 490.
8. Neb Sinthay, "Practical Disarmament: Weapons and Development in Cambodia," BICC workshop on Practical Disarmament: Weapons and Development, 10 July 2001.
9. Mehrotra, 56.
10. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 21.

11. Mao Chandara, "Small arms control in Cambodia," INWENT Conference Paper (Bonn, April 2003), 1.
12. Nils Holger Anders, "Small Arms Control in Cambodia : A Field Report," *Peace, Conflict & Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 3 (June 2003), 4.
13. Janz, February 2000, 36.
14. Sinthay.
15. Edgar Janz, "Civil Disarmament in Post-Conflict Cambodia," In *Brief 16: Practical Disarmament*, ed. Herbert Wulf, (Bonn International Center for Conversion, August 2000), 40.
16. Anders, 2.
17. Janz, August 2000, 39.
18. Sinthay.
19. Muggah, 175.
20. Sourn Ratha, Long Dianna and John L. Vijghen, *Guns & Livelihood: The Use of Small Arms and Their Impact on People's Livelihood* (Phnom Penh: Working Group for Weapons Reduction, December 2003), 59.
21. Katherine Kramer, *Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia* (Small Arms Survey, July 2001), 24.
22. Janz, August 2000, 42.
23. Sourn, Dianna and Vijghen, 57.
24. *Whose Security Counts? Participatory Research on Armed Violence and Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia*, eds. Robert Muggah and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan (Small Arms Survey, December 2003), 40.
25. Sinthay.
26. Janz, August 2000, 42.
27. Sourn, Dianna and Vijghen, 56.
28. Janz, August 2000, 39-40.
29. *Ibid*, February 2000, 36.
30. *Ibid*, 37.
31. Keng Menglang, "Cambodia: Rural livelihoods and Small Arms: Impacts on the lives of rural villagers dependent on forest products," In *Whose Security Counts? Participatory Research on Armed Violence and Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia*, 23.
32. Janz, August 2000, 40-41.
33. *Ibid*, 41.
34. Sinthay.
35. David de Beer, *An Integrated Approach to Small Arms Management: The EU ASAC Programme on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia* (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ], 2003), 5.
36. Kramer, 10.
37. *Ibid*, 16.
38. *Ibid*, 14.
39. de Beer, 5.
40. Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 21.
41. Chandara, 2-3.
42. de Beer, 7.
43. *Ibid*, 8.
44. "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Kratie Final Report" and "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Pursat Final Report," EU ASAC, 2-4.
45. "Annex 6: Table Showing Costs of Large Scale WfD Against Small Scale WfD," External Programme Evaluation 2002, EU ASAC.
46. Johan P. Buwalda, "Report of an evaluation mission in Cambodia from September 21 to October 19, 2002" (Buwalda BNA, 17 October 2002), 17.
47. *Ibid*, 17.
48. Anders, 7.
49. de Beer, 12.
50. "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Kratie Final Report" and "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Pursat Final Report," 2-4.
51. *Ibid*, 2-4.
52. Buwalda, 3.

53. "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Kratie Final Report" and "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Pursat Final Report," 2-4.
54. Buwalda, 9.
55. "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Kratie Final Report" and "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Pursat Final Report," 2.
56. "Weapons for Development Pilot Project Kratie Final Report," 5.
57. "Annex 6: Table Showing Costs of Large Scale WfD Against Small Scale WfD."
58. Buwalda, 13.
59. "Annex 6: Table Showing Costs of Large Scale WfD Against Small Scale WfD."
60. de Beer, 14.
61. Buwalda, 13.
62. Buwalda, 13.
63. "Annex 6: Table Showing Costs of Large Scale WfD Against Small Scale WfD."
64. de Beer, 14.
65. Buwalda, 18.
66. *Ibid*, 18.
67. Neil Wilford, interviewed by author, 22 April 2004. In 2003, WfD was implemented in nine provinces, and roughly 1,000 weapons were collected. Water wells were constructed in 87 locations in eight of the provinces. Further information on program costs and results are unavailable, pending the release of the final report for the 2003 program.
68. de Beer, 14.
69. de Beer, 8-10.
70. "EU ASAC Programme – Public Awareness," EU ASAC.
71. de Beer, 16.
72. *Ibid*, 15.
73. "Weapons Destruction Table, 2001-2003," EU ASAC, March 2004.
74. "EU ASAC Programme – Weapons Destruction," EU ASAC.
75. "Five-thousand weapons to be destroyed in Siem Reap on Tuesday, 30 March 2004," EU ASAC, 25 March 2004.
76. de Beer, 21.
77. Buwalda, 3.
78. Anders, 8.
79. Chandara, 3.
80. Buwalda, 18.
81. de Beer, 12.
82. Janz, August 2000, 43.
83. de Beer, 15.
84. de Beer, 13-14.
85. Buwalda, 18.
86. *Ibid*, 15.
87. Wilford, 22 April 2004.
88. de Beer, 7.
89. Sinthay.
90. de Beer, 13.
91. Buwalda, 22.
92. Janz, August 2000, 43.
93. Sinthay.
94. Buwalda, 10.
95. Wilford, 22 April 2004.
96. de Beer, 19-20.

## Part V: Lessons Learned

1. "Obstructing Development," 154.

2. Faltas and Paes, 4-5.
3. Buwalda, 23.
4. Faltas and Paes, 14, 21.
5. de Beer, 18.
6. Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson, 15.
7. Pike and Taylor, 20-21.
8. Anders, 9.
9. "NIGER: Former conflict zone chooses between arms and development," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2 April 2003.
10. "WGWR Annual Report 2003," 18.
11. Faltas and Paes, 35.
12. *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 12.
13. Faltas and Paes, 32.
14. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 22.
15. "Kratie final report," 5-6.
16. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 24.
17. Faltas and Paes, 18.
18. Pike and Taylor, 27.
19. "Gramsh Pilot Programme: Weapons in Exchange for Development," 1.
20. Hughes -Wilson and Wilkinson, 22.
21. Pike and Taylor, 26.
22. Faltas and Paes, 37.
23. Pike and Taylor, 23.
24. Faltas, "Weapons Collection Programmes," 7.
25. Faltas and Paes, 4, 25-26.
26. Buwalda, 16.
27. Faltas and Paes, 25.
28. This is not to say that certain weapons should be turned away from collection sites, and in fact WfD programs in both Albania and Cambodia have received weapons that were not among those sought by the programs. It is and should continue to be standard practice to accept these weapons and destroy them with the others.
29. Faltas and Paes, 24.
30. Atwood and Jackman, 15-16.
31. Sami Faltas, "In Search of a 'Best Practice' of Micro-disarmament," In *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*, p 229.
32. "NIGER: Former conflict zone chooses between arms and development."
33. Ratha, Dianna, and Vijghin, 61.
34. "Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons," 8.
35. Faltas, "In Search of a 'Best Practice' of Micro-disarmament," 223.
36. "Peace and Disarmament Education Project in Albania," UNDP.
37. Buwalda, 10.
38. *Ibid*, 21.
39. *Ibid*, 21.
40. Faltas and Paes, 22.
41. "Turn in guns and tune in peace in Niger," UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 20 December 2001.
42. Janz, February 2000, 36.
43. "Small Arms and Light Weapons," 9.
44. de Beer, 15.
45. *Ibid*, 15-16.
46. "Modus Operandi for a Weapons Destruction Ceremony," EU ASAC, 7.
47. David DeClerq, "Destroying Small Arms and Light Weapons," In *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*, 195.