Currently viewing the tag: "political marketplace"

After the end of the oil rents, it has become much more complex… and much more like the 1990s. President Bashir has to bargain both with those making demands on his resources (the Islamists, the Ministry of Defense, and armed rebels) but also with financiers (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, military industries, the government’s financial institutions).

This is not an auspicious context in which to make peace…

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More important for President Omar al Bashir than the shortage of money is the fact that the squeeze is where it hurts him most: the discretionary budget available for him as ruler. How does he obtain his “political budget” necessary to stay in power? That is the topic of the next (penultimate) post.

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There’s a cycle of violence in the Sudanese peripheries. This post looks at Darfur. In the first phase of the cycle, there is an extremely violent contest between two contending forces. On the one side is the Sudan Armed Forces, paramilitaries and other security forces, and hired militia. On the other side is a coalition [...]

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In the figures in the previous post, the level of defense spending is shown. It rises but not as much as the overall government spending, and hardly at all as a percentage of GDP. Let us examine those figures more closely—with the caveats that post-2006 defense spending estimates are subject to big margin of error, [...]

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This posting examines the paradoxes of the 2000s: the decade of Sudan’s prosperity and hopes for peace. The key peace agreements: the 2002 “Burgenstock” ceasefire for the Nuba Mountains and the Machakos Protocol, the 2003-04 Protocols signed in Naivasha and Nairobi, the 2005 CPA itself, the 2006 Juba Declaration, the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, were all signed during the fastest period of budgetary expansion.

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This is not just a difference in wealth. It points to very different ways in which governance is organized in different parts of Sudan. The difference between the ordered landscape of the Gezira and the organic landscape of the savanna is more-or-less coterminous with the colonial distinction between the riverain regions that received investment, and the “closed districts” that served as labor reserves and areas in which the “native administration” system of tribal chiefs was imposed.

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