Cambodia: U.S. bombing and civil war

U.S. Bombing & Civil War | AtrocitiesFatalities | Ending
Coding | Works Cited | Notes


Introduction: U.S. Bombing & Civil War

Between 1965 and 1973, the expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia aggravated and radicalized internal Cambodian political disputes. These disputes readily became armed contests characterized by shifting alliances, regional struggles for dominance (including the US, Soviet Union, China and Vietnam), and Cambodian efforts to assert different varieties of militant nationalism (whether royalist, communist or otherwise). The result for civilians was devastating.

Atrocities 1965 – 1973

In 1965, Cambodia officially cut ties with the U.S., as Prince Sihanouk, the country’s head of state, tried, in his words, to maintain the country’s neutrality regarding the war in Vietnam. Nonetheless, his policies allowed Vietnamese communists to use border areas and the port of Sihanoukville. The U.S., under Lyndon Johnson’s administration, responded with targeted bombing of military installations and occasional attacks on Cambodian villages by South Vietnamese and American forces. Between 1965 and 1969, the U.S. bombed 83 sites in Cambodia. The pace of bombing increased in 1969, as U.S. B-52 carpet-bombing began, in support of the slow pullout of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Bombers targeted mobile headquarters of the South Vietnamese “Viet Cong” and the North Vietnamese Army in the Cambodian jungle.[i]

In March 1970, a coup was launched against Prince Sihanouk resulting in a new government with Lon Nol at the helm. The coup government made a drastic change in Cambodian policies, deciding to counter the North Vietnamese, in support of the South Vietnamese and U.S. forces. In May 1970, the US and South Vietnamese launched an offensive into Cambodia, with the aim of cutting off North Vietnamese supply routes. The Vietnamese Communists widened and intensified their actions in Cambodia as well, working with insurgent Cambodian communists.[ii] After the U.S. ground invasion failed to root out the Vietnamese communists, in December 1970, Nixon instructed his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to order the Air Force to ignore restrictions limiting U.S. attacks to within 30 miles of the Vietnamese border, expanding the bombing areas. However, extensive bombing forced the Vietnamese communists further west and deeper into Cambodia, and ultimately radicalized Cambodian citizens against the government

An alliance of royalist, Cambodian and regional communist forces fought against the Lon Nol government, US and South Vietnamese forces, and, despite many internal rifts, expanded their areas of control quickly. By 1971, writes Kiernan, the Lon Nol government was secure only in the towns and their outskirts.[iii] As the allied Communist forces gained control of territory, the Communist Party of Cambodia (CPK) attempted to win over the Khmer soldiers fighting with the Vietnamese and to expel the Vietnamese forces. In some places, this effort resulted in heavy fighting between ostensible allies.[iv] As peace talks began in Paris, the CPK adamantly refused to participate in a negotiated solution.[v]

The final phase of the U.S. bombing campaign, from January to August 1973, aimed to halt the rapid advance of the Khmer Rouge on Phnom Penh, in response, the U.S. military escalated air raids that spring and summer with an unprecedented B-52 bombardment campaign that focused on the heavily populated areas around Phnom Penh, but which affected almost the entire country. The sum effect was that while the take-over of Phnom Penh was delayed, hard-liners within the CPK were strengthened, the populace further turned against the Lon Nol government, and the Communists’ recruitment efforts were facilitated.[vi]

After the U.S. bombing campaign ended in 1973, the civil war continued with the Communist forces making steady progress, despite fighting within their ranks and between groups.

Fatalities
Our research indicted a rough low estimate of 250,000 people during this period.

Fatalities from U.S. bombing were concentrated during the period in which U.S. President Richard Nixon’s administration carpet-bombed eastern Cambodia from 1969 to 1973, although bombings and incursions into Cambodia by the U.S. began in 1965 under President Lyndon B. Johnson and ended in 1975 under President Gerald Ford. More than 10 percent of the U.S. bombing was indiscriminate.

Former National Security Adviser than Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, an architect of US policy in Indochina, states in his book Ending the Vietnam War that the Historical Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense gave him an estimate of 50,000 deaths in Cambodia due to the bombings from 1969-1973. The U.S. government released new information about the extent of the bombing campaign in 2000, leaving Owen and Kiernan to argue that the new evidence released by the U.S. government in 2000 support higher estimates.[vii] On the higher end of estimates, journalist Elizabeth Becker writes that “officially, more than half a million Cambodians died on the Lon Nol side of the war; another 600,000 were said to have died in the Khmer Rouge zones.”[viii] However, it is not clear how these numbers were calculated or whether they disaggregate civilian and soldier deaths. Others’ attempts to verify the numbers suggest a lower number. Demographer Patrick Heuveline[ix] has produced evidence suggesting a range of 150,000 to 300,000 violent deaths from 1970 to 1975.

In an article reviewing different sources about civilian deaths during the civil war, Bruce Sharp[x] argues that the total number is likely to be around 250,000 violent deaths. He argues that several factors support this range: 1) Interviews with survivors after the Khmer Rouge period who discussed when and how their family members were killed; 2) research by social scientists Steven Heder and May Ebihara, both of whom (separately) conducted extensive interviews with Cambodians; 3) adding information about the geography of conflict and variations in the intensity of the conflict; and 4) application of insights from documentation of the Vietnam War.

Sharp addresses some reasons why discrepancies may appear in various interview-based sources. First, there may be different perceptions about what is a “war-related” death that would inhibit assessment of increased mortality. Second, deaths calculated in relation to reporting by family members requires that a family member survive and bombs would have high clustering of mortality, potentially killing entire families. Third, the areas heavily targeted by the U.S. bombing campaign were subsequently heavily targeted by the Khmer Rouge, again, potentially leaving a gap in reporting if no family members survived.

Endings

US bombing of Cambodia came to a halt in August of 1973 when the US Congress legislated its conclusion, following the signing of a peace agreement between the US and North Vietnamese. The Khmer Rouge and Lon Nol armies continued to fight for two more years until 1975 when Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge.

On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh and declared Day Zero, ousting the military regime and emptying the cities. The defeat of Lon Nol forces precipitated an end to civil war deaths, but the beginning of the Khmer Rouge’s purge of perceived enemies. The civil war ended when the Khmer Rouge decisively won, an “end” that served only as prelude to a more intensive period of targeting civilians (detailed in a separate case study).

Coding

This case is coded as ending by strategic shift, when the U.S., under Congressional pressure, halted its bombing campaign. We note both international and domestic factors as influencing shift, given the importance of the peace agreement with Vietnam. In this case, the ending of the bombing campaign, noted as a withdrawal of international armed forces, was the most significant factor in the decline in civilian deaths. This case was immediately followed by a new one, during which the Khmer Rouge was the primary perpetrator.

Works Cited

Banister, Judith and Paige Johnson. 1993.”After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia,” in Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, ed. Ben Kiernan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.

Becker, Elizabeth. 1986. When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution. New York: Public Affairs.

Chandler, David. 2008. A History of Cambodia, 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008.

Etcheson Craig. 1984. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, CO: Westview/Pinter.

Etcheson, Craig. 1999. “‘The Number’: Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia.” Mass Graves Study, Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Gottesman, Evan. 2003. After The Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Heuveline, Patrick. 1998. “’Between one ad three million’: Towards the demographic reconstruction of a decade of Cambodian history (1970 – 1979).” Population Studies 52: 49–65.

Hinton, Alexandar Laban. 2009. “Truth, Representation and the Politics of Memory after Genocide” in People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today. ed. Alexandra Kent & David Chandler. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Hinton, Alexandar Laban. 2005. Why did they Kill?: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Kiernan, Ben. 1985. How Pol Pot Came to Power : A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930 – 1975. London: Verso.

Kiernan, Ben. 2008. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kiernan,Ben. 2009. “The Cambodian Genocide” in Century of Genocide, ed. Samuel Totten and William Parsons. Third Edition. New York: Routledge, 340 – 373.

Owen, Taylor and Ben Kiernan. 2006. “Bombs over Cambodia. The Walrus, October 2006, 62 – 69.

“Report of the Research Committee on Pol Pot’s Genocidal Regime.” 1983. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 25. http://gsp.yale.edu/report-cambodian-genocide-program-1997-1999.

Sharp, Bruce. “Counting Hell” Available at: http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/deaths.htm Accessed May 26, 2015.

Sliwinski, Marek. 1995. Le Génocide Khmer Rouge: un analyse démographique. Paris: Editions L’Harmattan.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 1980. “Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe.” Washington, DC, January 17.

Vickery, Michael. 1984. Cambodia 1975 – 1982. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Notes

[i] Owen and Kiernan 2006, 67.

[ii] Kiernan 1985, 305.

[iii] Kiernan 1985, 322.

[iv] Kiernan 1985, 342.

[v] Kiernan 1985, 343.

[vi] Etcheson. 1984, 119.

[vii] Owen and Kiernan 2006, 67.

[viii]Becker 1986, 170.

[ix] Heuveline 1998.

[x] Sharp.

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Indonesia: Assaults against the Communist Party

Introduction | Atrocities | Fatalities | Ending | Coding | Works Cited | Notes


Introduction

In 1957, President Sukarno precipitated an increasingly bitter political standoff, suspending parliamentary rule. He installed a more authoritarian system of “Guided Democracy” into a formulation he called NASAKOM—nationalism, religion and communism—in which none of the three competing groups that these ideologies represented would prevail. By then, all groups were aware that Sukarno’s health was in decline and to many observers it appeared that the main beneficiary of “Guided Democracy” was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).[i] Two years before, in the 1955 first free post-colonial elections, PKI won 16.4% of the national vote and was the 4th largest party, with an estimated 3 million members and 20 million affiliates.[ii]

In early 1965, Sukarno announced that he backed arming and training the workers and peasants to make up a “Fifth Force,” responsible to him personally. PKI’s energetic efforts to recruit support throughout society on a wide variety of issues won itself enemies among the military, the PNI, Muslim and Hindu groups. The army also feared a “shadow war” with the Communists, as sympathizers, agents and double agents were placed in key positions. The army did not know how far the Communist penetration of government institutions had gone.[iii]

Atrocities (1965-1966)

An aborted coup in October 1965 was blamed on the PKI and prompted elements in the Indonesian military, led by then General Suharto, to a purge of the PKI across the country.[iv] In most areas, the killings started with an influx of anti-Communist troops from the outside. Knowledge that the armed forces sanctioned the killing of Communists was enough to set off massacres in some areas. The military often supplied weapons and rudimentary training to anti-Communist vigilantes. The army and vigilantes organized raids on houses and villages suspected of harboring PKI members.

Typically, the victims were attacked at night using weapons like the parang (the single-bladed machetes used by Indonesian peasants, or shot. At times bodies were mutilated. Victims were often detained for weeks or months before being secretly killed. Attackers most commonly referred to “black lists” to identify victims. In some cases entire communities were killed. Victims were strikingly passive and offered little resistance, possibly in the hope that this would prove that the PKI had not been involved in the Jakarta coup. Only in Central Java where PKI was strongest were there attempts by PKI to set up stockades and defend Communist villages and, after most of the killings ended, PKI remnants tried to maintain a guerrilla base in East Java—but these efforts were suppressed.

The violence was perpetrated mostly by anti-Communist army units, civilian vigilantes who were mainly drawn from religious political parties and the Indonesian Nationalist Party PNI. The violence was organized, purposive and systematic.[v] Violence aimed at the decisive destruction of the PKI and the ascendance of General Suharto’s military-dominated regime.

Fatalities 

In thirty-nine articles and studies compiled in 1990 by Robert Cribb, a prominent expert on Indonesian history, the range of victims falls between 78,000 and 2,000,000. In official statements by the Kopkamtib (the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order of Indonesia), the dead are estimated at between 450,000-500,000. [vi]A scholarly consensus has settled on a figure of 400,000–500,000, but the correct figure, as noted by Cribb, could be half or twice as much.[vii]

Endings

Its goals largely met, the army oversaw a normalization of the situation. The purge forced all Indonesians to make an unambiguous choice for or against the PKI, and reinforced the military’s position once it was in power, demonstrating its willingness to kill on a vast scale and do so again if needed. The purge effectively put a lid on open, party politics (not lifted for more than 30 years).[viii] The PKI was formally dissolved on March 12, 1966 by then General Suharto after receiving “Super Semar” or President Sukarno’s order to preserve security and order. Former PKI members remain blacklisted from many occupations including government jobs.

Coding

We coded this case as ending through a process of normalization after the military achieved their goals as planned. We also note that it is characterized by mass popular violence to capture the element of vigilante violence behind the killing, even though much of the violence was instigated by the military.

Works Cited

Cribb, Robert. 2001. “Genocide in Indonesia 1965-6” Journal of Genocide Research 3:2, 219-239.

Cribb, Robert. 1997. “The Indonesian Massacres.” In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts 3rd ed., edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 235-262. New York: Routledge.

Douglas Kammen & Faizah Zakaria. 2012. “Detention in Mass Violence”, Critical Asian Studies, 44:3, 441-466.

Sudjatmiko, Iwan Gardono.1992. “The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali).” PhD diss., Harvard University).

Notes

[i] Cribb 2001, 228.

[ii] Cribb 1997.

[iii] Cribb 2001, 235.

[iv] Cribb 1997.

[v] Sudjatmiko1992, 183.

[vi] Sudjatmiko 1992, 4.

[vii] Cribb 2001, 233.

[viii] Cribb 2001, 235-236.

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