Equatorial Guinea

Introduction | Atrocities | Fatalities | Ending | Coding | Works Cited | Notes

Introduction

The former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea gained independence on October 12, 1968. Francisco Macias Nguema, an ethnic Fang from the mainland province of Rio Muni who had been installed by the Spanish administrators to serve as a trustworthy collaborator, was elected president of the new country. Like many Fang who harbored the militant nationalism of alar ayong, which was characterized by impatience with Spain’s continued colonial presence, Macias resented his Spanish benefactors.[i] Resentment soon turned to distrust and paranoia, and the opportunity to purge the perceived threat of foreign culture in general—and “intellectuals” in particular—presented itself a mere 145 days after independence.


Atrocities (1969-1979)

The precipitating event that ignited the mass killing is generally agreed to have been an attempted coup on March 5, 1969, which reportedly involved support from Spain, which had granted Equatorial Guinea independence in 1968.[ii] A few months earlier, in January 1969, rumors of an attempted coup led by the defeated candidates from the September 1968 election resulted in the detention and execution of the alleged plotters in Bata prison, followed by a state of emergency that resulted in a Spanish military intervention.[iii] After the events of March 5, former political opponents were murdered and senior cabinet members, diplomats, the Catholic Church, and agents of “Spanish imperialism” were soon implicated in plotting the coup as well.[iv] In response, Macias unleashed his paramilitary youth force known as “Juventud en Marcha con Macias” (Youth on the March with Macias) to seek out and expel Spanish citizens. By the end of March 1969, most of the Spanish population of 7,000 had fled the country.[v]

Macias established three security forces, the Guardia Nacional, the JMM and the Milicia, which were embedded in every level of government.[vi] The number of crimes that were punished by death expanded, as a police state monitored every level of life. In March 1969, Macias also closed his country to the outside world–banning journalists, a decision that the former colonial power, Spain, supported. Franco criminalized mention of Equatorial Guinea in the Spanish media.[vii]

Macias’ behavior became increasingly erratic as his despotic rule progressed, and he used his knowledge of traditional witchcraft to bolster his legitimacy and terrify the population into submission. He had fishing boats burned and roads mined to prevent escape. The economy ground to a halt and 90 percent of public services—including electric, power, mail, and transport—came to a standstill.[viii] The cocoa and fishing industries that sustained the economy ceased. He banned Western medicine, claiming it to be “un-African” and thus enabling resurgence in disease that garnered Equatorial Guinea the nickname “Death’s Waiting Room.”[ix] When he was short on money, he ransomed foreigners—$57,600 for a German woman; $40,000 for a Spanish professor; $6,000 for the corpse of a Soviet citizen.[x] He abolished religion, shuttered churches to use as weapons caches, and jailed or expelled priests. He waged a war on intellectuals, whom he cited as the “greatest problem facing Africa today,” and claimed that the educated classes were “polluting our climate with foreign culture.”[xi] By the end of his reign, only two doctors and fewer than a dozen technical school graduates remained.[xii]

Macias also created a cult of personality, renaming the island then known as Fernando Po (now Bioko) “Macias Nguema Biyogo,” after himself, and assuming such titles as “Great Maestro of Popular Education, Science, and Traditional Culture” and “The Only Miracle of Equatorial Guinea.”[xiii] As his jealousy and paranoia grew, he ordered the execution of all former lovers of his mistresses, as well as the husbands of the women he coveted. Before traveling abroad for state visits, Macias had political prisoners executed to dissuade others from conspiring against him in his absence.[xiv]

Despite the fundamental importance of the different ethnic groups that constitute the Equatoguinean population—the repression of the Bubi population by the Fang was institutionalized in the social structure—the mass atrocities committed by the Macias regime were primarily politically motivated. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Bubi population comprised a disproportional number of the deaths, but victims also included the educated classes, the clergy, political opponents and foreigners.[xv] However, as Fegley notes, the ethnic nature of targeting decreased over time: “As time went by, the minority element and Fang chauvinism in the terror became insignificant for Macias’ paranoia had become all-embracing.”[xvi]

Little information exists regarding the rate of killing during the Macias regime. By Christmas 1974, refugees fleeing Equatorial Guinea to Cameroon, Gabon, and Spain were claiming that Macias had ordered the execution of more than 300 people since 1968.[xvii] The first to be arrested and killed were 11 members of the autonomous government that had ruled the country prior to Macias’ ascent in 1968. Subsequent purges included 22 high-ranking officials from Macias’ own government, including 10 of the original 12 cabinet ministers he appointed; nine members out of the 35-member National Assembly; five members of the state’s two Provincial Councils; two of the six members of the Council of the Republic; 67 civil servants; at least two dozen army and police officers and non-commissioned officers; and an indeterminate number of doctors, students, and others deemed to be intellectuals or political opponents.[xviii]

By the end of 1974, more than two-thirds of the members of the 1968 Assembly had “disappeared” and most of the senior civil servants were killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile.[xix] As Randall Fegley writes, what distinguished the scale and ferocity of Macias’ purges was that he not only targeted individuals, but also their families, and at times, their entire village.[xx]

Mass arrests also occurred. State-sponsored executions accelerated from 1974 to 1979.[xxi] According to eyewitnesses, the majority of the later victims were political prisoners from Brigade A of the Bata, Mongomo, and Malabo jails, particularly the notorious Black Beach prison. In its 1979 report, Amnesty International recorded a total of 600 prisoners who had been executed for political reasons or died in prison as a result of torture and other forms of abuse over a 10-year period.[xxii] One survivor of the Black Beach prison reported that during his four years in prison—from 1971 to 1975—he counted 157 prisoners beaten to death with metal rods outside his cell.[xxiii] The majority of deaths were attributed to beating and ill treatment during forced labor and occurred before planned inspections of the prisons by Macias and his bodyguards.[xxiv] Most victims were garroted and forced to kneel before the backs of their skulls were shattered by the blow of a machete or iron bar; others were beaten with whips and sticks.[xxv] A minority of victims were shot at night after being removed from the prisons. One particularly infamous incident of mass murder occurred on Christmas Eve 1969, when 150 political prisoners were lined up and shot in the stadium by security forces wearing Santa costumes while the loudspeakers played the Mary Hopkin song “Those Were the Days, My Friend.”[xxvi] In the same setting, 36 others were told to dig a ditch in which they were subsequently buried up to their necks and left to be eaten by red ants.[xxvii]

By 1978, the violence and depravity had reached such a level that Swedish researcher Robert af Klinteberg labeled Equatorial Guinea the “concentration camp of Africa—a cottage industry Dachau.”[xxviii]


Fatalities

The total number of deaths attributed to the Macias regime during its eleven-year reign generally ranges from 20,000 to 50,000.[xxix] During the Special Military Tribunal, Macias was initially indicted for 80,000 murders, although he was later found guilty of 500.[xxx] The figure of 80,000 corresponds to the estimates of murders cited by exiles interviewed in Madrid after Macias’ fall.[xxxi] Other sources have placed the number as high as 100,000—approximately one-third of the country’s population.[xxxii]

Entire towns were nearly abandoned, pillaged or suffered multiple mass reprisals: Evinayong, Akurenam, Nsok, Rio Benito, Kogo; the islands of Annobon, Corsico, and the Elobeys; Janche, Miseng-Ebu, Lea, Adjelon, Mbea, Malen-Yenvam, Hanoye, Ekuko, Batete, San Fernando, Basacato del Este and Basacato del Oeste.[xxxiii] In response to the widespread killing and political oppression, a large number of civilians fled. The total number of those who fled into exile ranges from 100,000[xxxiv] to the more commonly cited figure of 125,000,[xxxv] which suggests a higher total number for the combined killings and expulsions. Estimates of those who fled to Gabon range from 1,000 (UNHCR) to 60,000 (ANRD). Estimates of those who fled to Cameroon range from 300 (UNHCR) to 30,000 (ANRD). An estimated 10,000 fled to Nigeria.[xxxvi] Between 200 and 3,500 fled to Spain.[xxxvii] Fegley (1989) argues that after 1973, there were no less than 50,000 and more than 100,000 exiles Equatorial Guineans worldwide.[xxxviii]

Endings

Torture, political executions, and repression of minority populations increased markedly in 1978 and 1979 as the economy continued to decline and the refugee outflow increased. The climactic event that turned the tide against the regime was the execution of eleven National Guard officers in the town of Nzan-Ayung in June 1979.[xxxix] Lt. Col. Teodoro Obiang Macias Mbasogo—the brother of one of the slain officers, who was also commander of the Fernando Po military region, vice minister of defense, and nephew of Macias—waged a coup d’état. Macias retaliated with the support of loyal followers, resulting in a two-week bloodbath on the mainland that killed approximately 400 people in what appears to be the last recorded mass atrocity committed by the regime.[xl] After fleeing, Macias was captured on August 3, 1979, and subsequently held in the Marfil Cinema in Malabo.

Killings attributed to the Macias regime ended immediately, political prisoners were freed, forced labor ceased, exiles were granted amnesty, and no acts of retribution were recorded.[xli] Only a few loyal followers of Macias who had directly participated in the atrocities were jailed. Remembering that Obiang was a particularly brutal follower of Macias, the Alianza Nacional de Restoration Democratica (ANRD), the main exile organization, initially claimed that the coup was little more than a “palace revolution.”[xlii] An investigation into Obiang’s crimes during the Macias regime was never conducted.

The Supreme Military Council, which assumed administrative control of the country, decided to convene a trial for crimes committed by the Macias regime between March 5, 1969 and August 18, 1979. The resulting Case 1/979 began in Malabo on September 24, 1979. The charges brought against the former dictator and his accomplices included genocide, mass murder, embezzlement of public funds, material injury, systematic violations of human rights, and treason.[xliii] The Tribunal determined that the main perpetrators directly responsible for the killings were Macias, prison governors, the escorts of political prisoners, the officers and privates in Macias’s personal bodyguard, and the Juventud en Marcha con Macias.[xliv] The worst forms of political repression were carried out by the Juventud en Marcha con Macias, which was responsible for most of the atrocities, including killings, executions, torture, and razing of entire villages.[xlv] Macias was found guilty of 500 counts of murder and was sentenced to death, along with six of his accomplices; four other accomplices received sentences ranging from four to fourteen years. Due to fears of Macias’ alleged supernatural powers, a firing squad was brought in from Morocco to execute the former dictator at Black Beach prison.

Coding

We coded this case as ending through a strategic shift, whereby a more moderate leader came to power. The coup occurred within the existing regime and, while followed by purges, did not represent a complete overthrow of the government.

Recognizing that others may view the coup differently, we provide a secondary coding of this case as ‘defeat.’


Works Cited

Amnesty International. 1979. Amnesty International Report. London: Amnesty International Publications. Publications. 1979http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/POL10/001/1979/en/1df40b59-669e-4ca6-a078-7c9d1b5afa3d/pol100011979eng.pdf

Artucio, Alejandro. 1979. The Trial of Macias in Equatorial Guinea: The Story of a Dictatorship. International Commission of Jurists: Geneva.

Baynham, Simon. 1980. “Equatorial Guinea: The Terror and the Coup.” The World Today, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Feb.), pp. 65-71. Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs. available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395170.

Cronje, Suzanne. 1979. Equatorial Guinea – the forgotten dictatorship: Forced labour and political murder in central Africa. London: Anti-Slavery Society.

Clarence-Smith, W.G1990. Equatorial Guinea. An African Tragedy by Randall

Fegley, Randall. 1981. “The U.N. Human Rights Commission: The Equatorial Guinea Case.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Feb.) 34 – 47.

Fegley, Randall. 1989. Equatorial Guinea: An African Tragedy. New York: Peter Lang.

Gardner, Dan. 2005. “The Pariah President: Teodoro Obiang is a brutal dictator responsible for thousands of deaths. So why is he treated like an elder statesman on the world stage?” The Ottawa Citizen, November 6. Available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20080612161320/http://www.dangardner.ca/Featnov605.html

Harff, Barbara, and Gurr, T. R. 1988. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945.” International Studies Quarterly 32:359–371.

Meredith, Martin. 2011. The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York: Public Affairs.

Newsweek. 1979. “A Quiet Coup In ‘Africa’s Dauchau’,” August 20.

Roberts, Adam. 2006. The Wonga Coup: Guns, Thugs and a Ruthless Determination to Create Mayhem in an Oil-rich Corner of Africa. New York: Public Affairs.

Sundiata, Ibrahim K. 1990. Equatorial Guinea: Colonialism, State Terror, and the Search for Stability. Boulder: Westview Press.

Notes

[i] Cronje 1979 , 10.

[ii] Artucio 1979, 5.

[iii] Cronje 1979, 22.

[iv] Fegley 1989, 37.

[v] Meredith 2011, 239.

[vi] Fegley 1989, 70.

[vii] Fegley 1989, 72.

[viii] Artucio 1979, 14.

[ix] Roberts 2006, 21.

[x] Meredith 2011, 241.

[xi] Roberts 2006, 22.

[xii] Baynham 1980, 69 and Meredith 2011, 242.

[xiii] Roberts 2006, 22.

[xiv] Meredith 2011, 240.

[xv] Gurr and Harff, 364.

[xvi] Fegley 1989, 69.

[xvii] Baynham 1980, 68.

[xviii] Baynham 1980, 68.

[xix] Fegley 1981, 37.

[xx] Fegley 1989, 69.

[xxi] Baynham 1980, 68.

[xxii] Amnesty International 1979, 17.

[xxiii] Baynham, 69.

[xxiv] Artucio 1979, 34.

[xxv] Artucio 1979, 11.

[xxvi] Fegley 1981, 37.

[xxvii] Fegley 1981, 37.

[xxviii] Newsweek 1979, 34.

[xxix] Baynham 1980, 69; Clarence-Smith 1990, 603; Fegley 1989, 1.

[xxx] Meredith 2011, 243. The preliminary inquiries that preceded Macias’s trial produced a list of 441 Equatoguineans assassinated by the regime, with an additional 33 cases added during the course of the trial to bring the total to 474 (Artucio 1979, 32). This figure was meant to be indicative of the regime’s brutality, since the true number of those killed for being alleged “subversives, colonialists, and collaborators” was unknown.

[xxxi] Baynham 1980, 69.

[xxxii] Sundiata 1990, 65.

[xxxiii] Fegley 1989, 155.

[xxxiv] Artucio 1979, 2.

[xxxv] Meredith 2011, 242.

[xxxvi] Artucio 1979, 2.

[xxxvii] Cronje 1979, 25.

[xxxviii] Fegley 1989, 126.

[xxxix] Fegley 1981, 40.

[xl] Baynham 1980, 62.

[xli] Artucio 1979, 20.

[xlii] Fegley 1981, 40.

[xliii] Artucio 1979, 27.

[xliv] Artucio 1979, 35.

[xlv] Artucio 1979, 6.

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Ethiopia: Red Terror and Famine

Introduction | Atrocities | Fatalities | Ending | Coding | Works Cited | Notes

Introduction

In 1974, an array of Ethiopian opposition groups, most from the political left, overthrew Emperor Haile Salessie. Military leaders involved in the revolution quickly sought to consolidate their power–they abolished the monarchy and began eliminating political competitors. Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as leader in February 1977 and intensified a crackdown against the opposition, initiating a period which became known as the “Red Terror.”

The primary targets of state-sponsored violence were members of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP).  The military regime argued that it reacted to EPRP provocations, including urban terrorism, assassinations of those who aligned with the military government, and an attempted assassination of Mengistu.[i]  Without question, the political opposition committed violence against state supporters and those who disagreed with the political agenda as defined by the opposition’s leadership.[ii] Nonetheless, state-sponsored violence preceded and eventually exceeded the violence committed by opposition groups.[iii]

Violence perpetrated by the government was conducted in collaboration with urban and rural dweller’s associations (kebeles), which had their own detention centers.[iv] Kebeles benefited from state authority but were not closely controlled, so local agendas and grievances—as well as tensions between local and regime interests—influenced the dynamics of violence at a micro-level.[v] During the same time period, several armed groups launched attacks against the state: in the north, two insurgencies developed, and, in the south, a Somali intervention was halted only with Soviet and Cuban aid.

One can roughly divide the violence against civilians during the longer period into three contexts. The effort to eliminate political opposition in the capital, Addis Ababa, is the best documented violence during this period. However, secondly, the Terror also extended to outlying regions. Counter-insurgency provided the third context for civilian deaths. There is significant overlap in the time period of these contexts and in the logic of the government’s use of violence, which was to eliminate opposition and consolidate control.

Atrocities, 1976 – 1985

An initial phase of violence began during the Revolution: for example, 61 former officials within the Imperial government were taken into custody and executed in 1974. However, the large-scale targeting of the civilian population, particularly members of the EPRP, began in September 1976. Some consider this period to be the first phase of the Red Terror. Factionalization and infighting within EPRP began, with some members opposed to assassination tactics and others joining the military regime. EPRP defectors provided inside information that facilitated the regime’s efforts to crush the group.[vi] The level of violence against EPRP increased significantly following Mengistu Haile Mariam’s rise to the head of the government on February 3, 1977, when he had his more moderate competitors within the military regime killed. In March and April, prominent EPRP members were killed, and house searches and disarmament efforts commenced.[vii] May Day, on April 29, 1977, represents a key peak in violence and marked the start of the first wave of intense mass killings, with at least 1,000 killed in a few days in Addis Ababa.[viii] Thousands were killed from the end of April to June, with major house searches occurring again in May.[ix] Bahru describes the period starting in May, 1977 as natsa ermejja, meaning “unrestricted license to kill,” with kebeles having full authority to kill suspects without question or a need to justify their actions.[x] By mid-summer, the EPRP in Addis Ababa was obliterated.[xi]

The regime then shifted its target from the EPRP to the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (commonly referred to as MEISON, its Amharic abbreviation), another political group that had previously allied withe the military government. Its members defected and went underground in August 1977.[xii] This wave of violence peaked in October 1977.[xiii] There remained some violence between MEISON and remnants of EPRP, although it is difficult to determine exactly who was responsible for which killings.[xiv] Another group, Abyotawit Seded (or, “Revolutionary Flame”), regime controlled and that reported to Mengistu, was also responsible for killing members of MEISON.[xv] By early 1978, the public displays of violence—with bodies left on the street, for instance—subsided and the regime resorted to more concealed use of violence, much of it in prisons that multiplied across Addis Ababa.[xvi] Red Terror had largely concluded in Addis Ababa by March of 1978, although lower levels of violence and detentions continued through 1978 and the violence was slower to decline in some areas in the rest of the country.[xvii]

Violence also occurred outside of the capital as part of the power consolidation and political repression of the Red Terror, although very little documentation of this violence exists. The regime perpetrated massacres in Gondar, Wollo, Gojjam, Tigray, and elsewhere throughout 1977.[xviii]  The Red Terror hit Tigray worse than any other region outside of Addis Ababa.[xix] The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed in 1975, after the short-lived Tigrayan National Organization (TNO) moved its base of operation to the countryside.[xx] In its first years, the TPLF concentrated on solidifying its support within Tigray and successfully defeating other opposition groups.[xxi]

The government began to commit mass atrocities in Tigray in 1977, as it sought to gain full control over the region by destroying the social and economic base of the TPLF.[xxii] Within Tigray, teachers were especially targeted for imprisonment.[xxiii] Regime officials killed 178 peasants in the town of Abi Adi in July 1977 simply because the area supported the TPLF.[xxiv] Mekelle, the capital of Tigray province, was especially harshly targeted.[xxv] Red Terror tactics had a significant impact on the TPLF within urban areas of Tigray, but ultimately, the Terror, along with other counterinsurgency tactics, served to alienate civilians from the government.[xxvi]

In 1978, after the government successfully pushed back the Somali invasion in southern Ethiopia, it turned its focus to eliminating the northern insurgency.[xxvii] Ongoing counterinsurgency tactics resulted in severe persecution of those from TPLF-sympathizing areas, with rape and arbitrary imprisonment common.[xxviii] There were five main government military offenses in Tigray in the 1970s: November 1976, June 1978, October-November 1978, March-April 1979, and May-June 1979.[xxix]

It is important to note the brutal effects of yet another tool at Mengistu’s disposal for controlling civilians and weakening opposition: famine. Crucial to the fate of Ethiopian civilians during under Mengistu’s reign were the famines in the south and north (1983 – 5). The devastating impact of the famines[xxx] for which Ethiopia would later become a global cause celebre was due in no small part to the failure of governmental policies, including broader agricultural policies, counter-insurgency and famine response. The famine in the north coincided with the war zone and government offensives and, Alex de Waal argues, should be understood as “a war crime”[xxxi] not only for the general destruction of civilian lives, food production capacities, and commerce, all of which amplified the effects of poor harvest, but more directly, hence incorporated into our study, by the policy of forced resettlement. In terms of impact on the civilian population, the government’s actions transformed poor harvest into massive famine.

Resettlement was portrayed as a key part of the government’s relief efforts, although it was in fact a component of their counterinsurgency strategy (similar resettlement programs had occurred in southeast Ethiopia and Eritrea). This blunt policy of “draining the sea to catch the fish” occurred in three phases: November 1984 – May 1985, October 1985 – January 1986, and November 1987 – March, 1988.[xxxii] Much of the resettlement was involuntary, with government representatives using coercion and deception to meet quotas in the north. Direct force was common in Tigray and northern Wollo. The resettlement camps were not equipped to meet the basic needs of the relocated. Many died of illness; lack of food, shelter, and water; and the absence of the tools and seeds needed to plant and survive on their livelihoods.[xxxiii] There was international pressure against the resettlement, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was expelled after blowing the whistle on the abuses resulting from the resettlement in December of 1985.[xxxiv]

Fatalities

We use the figure of a minimum of 60,000 deaths for the period 1974 – 1985. This combines the commonly cited figure of 10,000 – 20,000 people killed as part of the Red Terror, acknowledging that the dearth of data, particularly from areas outside of Addis Ababa. It further includes an estimated 50,000 additional deaths directly resulting from government policy of forced resettlement during the famine in Tigray.

The best minimal estimate of fatalities in Addis Ababa during the Red Terror is 10,000.[xxxv] De Waal further argues for “a comparable number in the provinces in 1977 and 1978.”[xxxvi] There are no figures of the number of civilians killed specifically in Tigray as part of the Red Terror, although there is credible evidence of massacres. For the longer period of Mengistu’s rule, estimate vary widely: for example, Babile (1989), who compiled reports from Amnesty, Reuters, the Derg, survivors, and daily and nightly death rates and argues for an estimate of 150,000 deaths. However, Babile’s figure presumes the majority of those imprisoned were killed, a point disputed by other researchers.[xxxvii]

Overall, estimates suggest that 275,000 – 367,000 people died in the famine.[xxxviii] Additionally, 80,000 out of the 100,000 who died in camps should be added to the overall fatality figure.[xxxix] Half of those deaths can be attributed to human rights abuses committed by the government; the Derg’s military strategies caused the famine to hit one year earlier than it would have had the drought been the sole cause, and their policies caused it to spread to other regions and increase migration. de Waal calculates the number who died as a result of government abuses between 225,000 and 317,000.[xl]

Given the parameters of this study, however, we focus on the deaths caused by resettlement, when populations were directly under government control. Death rates during resettlement were six times the normal rate, while death rates during the famine were only three-and-a-half times the normal rate. Adding deaths caused by people trying to escape resettlement, as well as the fact that those resettled tended to be least vulnerable, with few elderly or children, de Waal gives a minimum estimate of 50,000 people killed specifically because of the resettlement figure, which is also the low estimate given by Clay and Holcomb.[xli]

Endings

Mengistu solidified his position with crucial military support from the Soviet Union, successful crushed political opposition. In Addis Ababa, the political opposition was completely dismantled. Violence declined in Addis Ababa in 1978; major offensives against Somali forces in the south ended in 1978; and the military offensives in the north were largely carried out 1980 – 1985. While the incomplete nature of the data makes it difficult to identify the precise year of the decline in lethal violence directed against civilians, 1985 appears to be a reasonable designation.

Ultimately, Mengistu was militarily defeat in 1991.

Coding

We code this case as ending ‘as planned,’ due to the primary perpetrator’s ability to consolidate control and elimination competitors. We further code for the moderating influence of international actors to account for the aid influx that by 1985, had contributed to some moderation of the resettlement policies and famine deaths.

Works Cited

Africa Watch.1991. “Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia.” New York: Africa Watch, September. Available at:   https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf

Amnesty International. 1977. “Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia.” London: Amnesty International Report, 14 December.

Clapham, Christopher. 1988. Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clay, Jason W. and Bonnie K. Holcomb. Politics and the Ethiopian Famine 1984-1985. Cambridge: Cultural Survival, Inc., 1986.

de Waal, Alex. Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. London: Africa Watch / Human Rights Watch, 1991.

de Waal, Alex. Famine Crimes: Politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa. London: James Currey, 1997.

Getahun, Solomon Addis. The history of Ethiopian immigrants in the United States in the twentieth century, 1900—2000. Dissertation. Michigan State University, 2005.

Inquai, Solomon. 1987. “Famine and Population Manipulation in Ethiopia,” Anthropology Today 3:1, 12-14.

Kiros, Gebre-Egziabher and Dennis Hogan. “The impact of famine, war, and environmental degradation on infant and early child mortality in Africa: the case of Tigrai, Ethiopia.” Genus, Vol. 56, No. 3/4 (December 2000), pp. 145-178.

LeFort, René. 1983. Ethiopia, an Heretical Revolution? London: Zed Press.

Marcus, David. Famine Crimes in International Law. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 245-281.

Tareke, Gebru. 2009. The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Teffera, Hiwot. 2012. Tower in the Sky. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Tola, Babile. 1989. To Kill a Generation: The Red Terror in Ethiopia. Free Ethiopia Press.

Vestal, Theodore M. 1991. “Risk Factors and Predictability of Famine in Ethiopia.” Politics and the Life Sciences, 9: 2, 187-203.

Young, John. 1997. Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wiebel, Jacob. 2015. “ ‘Let the Red Terror Intensify’: Political Violence, Governance, and Society in Urban Ethiopia, 1976 – 78.” International Journal of African Historical Studies 48:1, 13 – 29.

Zewde, Bahru. 2009. “The History of the Red Terror: Contexts and consequences.” in Tronvoll, Kjetil, Charles Schaefer, and Girmachew Alumu Aneme, Eds. The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials. Suffolk: James Currey.

Notes

[i] Clapham 1988, 55-56; de Waal 1991, 102; Wiebel 2015.

[ii] Wiebel 2015; Teffera 2012.

[iii] Zewde 2009, 25.

[iv] Getahun 2005, 48.

[v] Wiebel 2015.

[vi] Zewde 2009, 26-27.

[vii] Chapman 1988, 56.

[viii] Zewde 2009, 27.

[ix] Clapham 1988, 56.

[x] Zewde 2009, 28-29.

[xi] de Waal 1991; Clapham 1988; Tola 1989.

[xii] de Waal 1991; Clapham 1988.

[xiii] de Waal 1991, 104.

[xiv] Clapham 1988, 57.

[xv] LeFort 1983, 222; Amnesty 1977, 6; Clapham 1988, 67-68.

[xvi] Wiebel 2015, 27.

[xvii] Clapham 1988, 57; de Waal 1991, 105; Wielbel 2015, 28.

[xviii] de Waal 1991b; Getahun 2005.

[xix] de Waal 1991, 108.

[xx] Young 1997, 85-87.

[xxi] Young 1997, 115; Tareke 2009, 85-89.

[xxii] de Waal 2010, 537.

[xxiii] Young 1997, 95-96.

[xxiv] Young 1997, 95-96.

[xxv] Kiros and Hogan 2000, 152.

[xxvi] Young 1997, 95.

[xxvii] Young 1997, 118.

[xxviii] Young 1997, 119.

[xxix] de Waal 1991, 63.

[xxx] de Waal (1991) notes that there were two famines one in the southeast and one in the north.

[xxxi] de Waal 1991, 115 – 117.

[xxxii] de Waal 1991, 211.

[xxxiii] Young 1997, 146.

[xxxiv] de Waal 1991, 211-7; de Waal 1997, 120.

[xxxv] Amnesty International 1977; Human Rights Watch 1991; de Waal 1991.

[xxxvi] de Waal 1991, 110.

[xxxvii] Zewde 2009.

[xxxviii] de Waal 1991, 173-6, 224-7.

[xxxix] de Waal 1991, 173-5.

[xl] de Waal 1991, 175-6.

[xli] de Waal 1991, 224-7; Clay and Holcomb, 1986, 102.

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