NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION
IN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

CLA	Collaborating, learning, and adapting
CSO	Civil society organization
DRG	Democracy, human rights, and governance
FSN	Foreign service national
FSO	Foreign service officer
ICNC	International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
INSPIRES	Illuminating New Solutions and Programmatic Innovations for Resilient Spaces
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
I4C	Innovation for Change
LFT	Local, Faith, and Transformative Partnerships
MDG3	Millennium Development Goal 3
MEL	Monitoring, evaluation, and learning
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OAA	Office of Acquisition and Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PPL	Policy, Planning and Learning
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SMO	Social movement organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Throughout history and in every corner of the world, nonviolent collective action has been central to ending wars and building peace, securing labor rights and environmental protections, opening entire regions to democracy, shifting norms and laws about human rights, expanding electorates, and provoking individuals' imaginations of what is politically possible in their societies. And during the most recent decade, more people than ever before engaged in grassroots organizing, social movements, and other forms of nonviolent collective action. USAID policy and programming will be enriched by a deep understanding of nonviolent collective action due to its catalytic effect on democracy and development globally.

Nonviolent collective action is not only ubiquitous, it is also effective. Political transitions initiated through nonviolent collective action have been three times as likely to lead to democracy as political transitions initiated through all other means.[1] And nonviolent collective action has curtailed corruption and sparked democratic innovations on multiple continents. Labor unions, religious organizations, and professional associations have been particularly powerful players in nonviolent collective action.

Nonviolent collective action is a core strategy of civic participation that touches every aspect of society. It involves regular people building power collectively in their societies and applying that power to bring about meaningful political, social, or economic change without the threat or use of violence. It often involves communities that have been historically excluded from power, building political power in their society and using that power to change hearts, minds, and policy. In some contexts, this entails grassroots organizing by informal groups at the local level. In other contexts, it entails creating a social movement at the national level. In some contexts this entails civil disobedience. And in many contexts it involves relationship building, training and leadership development, coordination and coalition building, and innovative and resilient action.

To date, USAID's support for nonviolent collective action has focused on: protecting and expanding civic space, labor organizing, as well as ad hoc and opportunistic initiatives in key countries. Looking forward, USAID has an opportunity to expand this work transnationally, such as regional and global activities, given its network of missions and partners in nearly every corner of the world. Also, deeper USAID engagement and coordination in multilateral contexts and with non-governmental donors that support nonviolent collective action would often be welcomed.

In many contexts, USAID is well placed to continue to help expand and protect the online and offline civic space ecosystem. In some contexts, USAID is able to offer indirect support to nonviolent collective action via educational materials and training that strengthens local leadership, organizing capacity, nonviolent discipline, agency, and resilience. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives is well placed in many contexts to support resilience in the face of repression, and to otherwise respond to the urgent needs of those engaged in nonviolent collective action.

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1 Pinckney, Jonathan C. 2020. From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions. New York: Oxford University Press.

It is critical that USAID coordinate its support for nonviolent collective action with other U.S. government, bilateral, and non-governmental partners. Coordination is not always easy. But it should not be assumed or be an afterthought since the lack of coordination can be particularly dangerous to organizers and harmful to movements' chances of success.

Five actionable recommendations reflect the untapped possibilities for USAID to more effectively promote democratic development through support for the nonviolent collective action ecosystem. Critically, **USAID should prioritize the guidance of organizers and movement leaders** when it comes to ensuring that our engagement does no harm and supports their work in the manner and the moments that are most helpful.

1	In contexts where USAID personnel are explicitly welcomed, **get proximate to and strengthen relationships** with organizers and movement leaders, especially from historically excluded communities and those outside of capital cities.
2	**Increase and institutionalize collective action expertise within USAID.**
3	Undertake an internal process within USAID to **refine and develop technical guidance for USAID support for nonviolent collective action.**
4	Continue and expand **support for scholarship on the relationship between nonviolent collective action and democratic development.**
5	Collaborate with bilateral and multilateral partners to **improve data collection and technical guidance on external support for nonviolent collective action.**

In boosting support for these efforts, it is imperative that we understand the following: regular people around the world engaged in nonviolent collective action achieve their goals primarily because of the power they build within their communities, not because of the support they get from afar. Therefore, USAID support for nonviolent collective action should—above all else—foster recipients' agency, resilience, and legitimacy in the eyes of their own communities.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the 20th century, nonviolent collective action became known as a powerful force for democratic progress around the globe. From South Africa to India, the Philippines, Ukraine, Chile, and the United States, democratic freedoms were preserved and expanded thanks to nonviolent collective action. In the most recent decade, people around the world participated—online and offline—in civic life through social movements, grassroots organizing, and other forms of nonviolent collective action more than ever before in recorded history.[2] And the effects of nonviolent collective action reverberate from Tunisia to Hong Kong, and from Bolivia to Sudan.

Nonviolent collective action is a core strategy of civic participation. It involves **regular people building power collectively in their societies and applying that power to bring about meaningful political, social, or economic change without the threat or use of violence.** It is interchangeably referred to as nonviolent resistance or civil resistance. Grassroots organizing and nonviolent social movements are two forms of nonviolent collective action. At its core, the story of nonviolent collective action is a story about people-powered politics.[3]

Nonviolent collective action is not only ubiquitous, it is also effective. Scholarship finds that nonviolent collective action—in the form of a social movement— has been twice as effective as violence at achieving stated goals.[4] Nonviolent collective action has curtailed

Social Movement is defined as a widespread, voluntary, civilian-led, collective effort to bring about consequential change in a social, economic, or political order using a diverse repertoire of tactics such as protests, boycotts, and sit-ins. A social movement is composed of social movement organizations. This primer is focused on movements that use nonviolent means to advance human rights, justice, development, and/or democracy. Nonviolent describes a movement's primary strategy regardless of whether violence is used against it. The terms nonviolent movement and social movement are used interchangeably. This primer uses the term "movement" as shorthand for both.

Grassroots Organizing is defined as an activity where homegrown leadership enables a constituency to turn the resources it has into the power it needs to achieve the change that it wants. Grassroots organizing may be used to turn resources into violent or nonviolent power. This primer only refers to grassroots organizing that relies on nonviolent actions. This primer uses the term "organizing" as a shorthand for grassroots organizing.

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2   Chenoweth, Erica. "The Future of Nonviolent Resistance." Journal of Democracy 31, no 3. July (2020): 69-84, https://www.journalofde-mocracy.org/articles/the-future-of-nonviolent-resistance-2/.

3   Nonviolent collective action is one type of collective action. Collective action is a form of strategic collaboration that takes an intentional and agreed-upon process that engages interested parties to take joint actions in support of shared objectives or a shared issue. USAID has used collective action as an approach to multi-stakeholder programming to advance a range of development objectives. More information about the broader concept of collective action is available online: https://usaidlearninglab.org/collective-action-usaid-programming.

4   Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

corruption[5] and sparked democratic innovations[6] on multiple continents. And political transitions initiated through nonviolent collective action have been three times as likely to lead to democracy as political transitions initiated through all other means.[7]

Despite its effectiveness and widespread use around the world, from 2011 to 2019, public charities and private foundations gave only three percent of their total human rights funding to support nonviolent collective action.[8] Multilateral bodies such as the OECD-DAC do not track development assistance for nonviolent collective action.

This primer is designed to assist development professionals at USAID and its partners to deepen their understanding of nonviolent collective action. This includes what it is, how it works, how USAID has supported it in the past, and how USAID can better support it in the future. The primer offers concrete recommendations as well as a wide range of actionable principles, strategies, and practices that USAID personnel can adopt and adapt. The primer highlights ethical and operational considerations as well as the possibilities for USAID to more effectively promote democratic and cross-cutting development objectives through support for nonviolent collective action.

Nonviolent Collective Action is an extra-institutional technique of sustained political, social, psychological and/or economic action that people use to build power and use it without the threat or use of violence. It is extra-institutional in that it operates primarily outside of formal political processes such as elections and lobbying. And it is nonviolent in that its main modus operandi rejects the threat or use of violence.

Nonviolent collective action is not passive. And it is not pacifism. It is active. It often involves communities that have been historically excluded from power, building political power in their society and using that power to change policy, hearts, and minds. In some contexts this entails grassroots organizing at the local level. In other contexts it entails creating a social movement at the national level. Nonviolent collective action is interchangeably referred to as civil resistance, nonviolent resistance, strategic nonviolent conflict, and nonviolent direct action. At its core, the story of nonviolent collective action is a story about people-powered politics.

Civic Space is the environment—including physical and digital spaces—in which people gather to participate in the political, economic, and social life of society. It encompasses the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.

5   Beyerle, Shaazka. 2014. *Curtailing Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, https://www.curtailingcorruption.org/.

6   Della Porta, Donatella. 2020. *How Social Movements Can Save Democracy: Democratic Innovations from Below.* New York, NY: Polity Press.

7   Pinckney, Jonathan C. 2020. From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions. New York: Oxford University Press.

8   Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

To date, USAID's support for nonviolent collective action has been focused on:

1	2	3
Protecting and expanding civic space online and offline	**Labor organizing**	**Ad hoc and opportunistic support for nonviolent collective action**

Many entities that undertake nonviolent collective action—such as grassroots organizations—are decentralized and organized outside of formal institutions by strategic choice. They may be unregistered and have fluid institutional forms. Other entities that participate in nonviolent collective action—such as labor unions—have more fixed institutional forms. These informal and formal entities operate in the same ecosystem as civil society organizations that do not undertake nonviolent collective action - such as many humanitarian assistance organizations and development NGOs. As such, USAID's support for nonviolent collective action complements and expands upon USAID's longstanding efforts to strengthen civil society, nurture local capacities, and promote democratic development globally.

Scholarship and practice, as detailed in this primer, suggest that it is critical for USAID to continue its support while developing a *movement mindset* in how it supports nonviolent collective action.[9] This includes keeping top of mind the fact that movements achieve their goals primarily because of the power they build within their communities, not because of the support they get from afar.[10] Scholarship and practice offer specific ways that external support has had a positive effect on movement success when undertaken with care and in response to the needs, challenges, and opportunities identified by organizers, movement leaders, and their communities.

Grassroots Organization is defined as a local, rural, or community organization with homegrown leadership of a defined constituency. Members of such constituencies are often referred to as the grassroots. Influencers and community leaders in such constituencies are often referred to as grasstops.

*Movements achieve their goals primarily because of **the power they build within their communities,** not because of the support they get from afar.*

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9   Stephan, Maria J., Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala. *Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset.* Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2015, https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/02/aid-civil-society-movement-mindset.

10 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press. and Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

In many contexts around the world, activists seek solidarity and support from external actors. However, overall, external support from donors, such as USAID, tends to be neither necessary, nor sufficient for nonviolent collective action to succeed.[11] In some instances, this support can undermine the legitimacy of social movements or result in unintentional harm.[12] And so, USAID support for nonviolent collective action should—above all else—foster recipients' agency, resiliency, and legitimacy in the eyes of their own communities. One practical way of operationalizing this principle is for USAID to view its support as complementary to—not replacing, but reinforcing—self-generated local support for nonviolent collective action. This approach aligns with USAID's Local Capacity Strengthening Policy, which entails "a mindset and culture shift within USAID towards embracing capacity strengthening that supports local actors' ability to deliver and sustain development results – rather than focusing on local actors' capacity to qualify for and manage awards."[13] Such an approach to nonviolent collective action by USAID can help foster not only local agency, but also a wide range of democratic development outcomes.

> *USAID support for nonviolent collective action should—above all else—**foster recipients' agency, resiliency, and legitimacy** in the eyes of their own communities.*

11 Dudouet, Véronique. "Sources, Functions and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements." In *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle,* edited by Kurt Schock, 168–200. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. and Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

12 Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephan. "The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns: Poisoned Chalice or Holy Grail?" Washington, DC: ICNC Press, 2021, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICNC_Monograph_External_Support_Poisoned_Chalice_or_Holy_Grail.pdf. and Francis, Megan Ming. "The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement Capture." Law & Society Review. January 9, 2019.

13 USAID, Local Capacity Strengthening Policy, October 25, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/policy/local-capacity-strengthening?utm_medium=e-mail&utm_source=govdelivery.

NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION IN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT PRIMER

This primer is a reference tool for USAID personnel, partners, and the public interested in deepening their understanding of social movements, grassroots organizing, and other forms of nonviolent collective action. Around the world, attacks on civic space and changes in how people are using nonviolent collective action have altered the effectiveness of nonviolent collective action and how donors such as USAID can support it. Yet it remains a core strategy of civic participation for people around the globe. Therefore this primer also explores new opportunities and challenges USAID and its partners face when considering whether, when, where, and how to support nonviolent collective action.

HOW TO USE THE PRIMER:

This primer is designed to help development professionals at USAID as well as partners and the public to deepen their understanding of social movements.

The primer **defines and offers examples** of different types of nonviolent collective action.

It **debunks key myths** about nonviolent collective action.

It **describes current trends** in nonviolent collective action and external support for it as well as **common tensions donors have faced** when engaging with those involved in nonviolent collective action.

Finally, it **offers recommendations**—in the form of actionable strategies and practices—**that USAID can adopt and adapt in deciding whether, when, where, and how to support nonviolent collective action.** This includes examples of past USAID support for nonviolent collective action around the world and recommendations for future support.

I

FIVE MYTHS ABOUT NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

MYTH 1 – Nonviolent Collective Action Occurs Only In Revolutionary Social Movements

People use nonviolent collective action to advance a variety of goals including policy reform and oversight related to, for example, corruption, democratization, and service provision. And they pursue these goals using a wide range of tactics. Mass protests are one tactic. So are sit-ins, work slowdowns, and boycotts, such as those used against pro-Apartheid businesses in South Africa. Nonviolent collective action can entail grassroots organizing to build political power at a local level - for example, to improve public services like trash collection as in the #YouStink movement in Lebanon.[14] Alternatively, it can entail mass mobilization at a national level—for example, to demand transparency and anti-corruption legislation such as by the MUHURI in Kenya.[15] In sum, nonviolent collective action has broad application to the pursuit of numerous objectives at local, regional, national, and transnational levels.

MYTH 2 – Nonviolent Collective Action is Ineffective

Nonviolent collective action—in the form of a social movement—has been twice as effective as violence at achieving stated goals.[16] Political transitions initiated through nonviolent collective action have been three times as likely to lead to democracy as political transitions initiated through all other means.[17] And nonviolent collective action has curtailed corruption[18] and sparked democratic innovations[19] on multiple continents. The participation of trade unions, religious organizations, and professional associations have been particularly helpful in these democratic transitions.[20] In short, nonviolent collective action is an effective means of achieving change.

14 #YouStink: The environmental youth movement in Lebanon, World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/youstink-environmental-youth-movement-lebanon.

15 Beyerle, Shaazka. 2014. *Curtailing Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice.* Chapter 10, Highlights from Five Cases: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, Turkey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Beyerle-Curtailing-ch10.pdf.

16 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

17 Pinckney, Jonathan C. 2020. *From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions.* New York: Oxford University Press.

18 Beyerle, Shaazka. 2014. *Curtailing Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, https://www.curtailingcorruption.org/.

19 Della Porta, Donatella. 2020. *How Social Movements Can Save Democracy: Democratic Innovations from Below.* New York, NY: Polity Press.

20 Pinckney, Jonathan, Charles Butcher, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. "Organizations, Resistance, and Democracy: How Civil Society Organizations Impact Democratization." *International Studies Quarterly* (2022) 66. and Iakovlev, Gennadii. "Preconditions for pacted transitions from authoritarian rule." European Political Science Review (2022).

✖ MYTH 3 – USAID Cannot Support Nonviolent Collective Action

USAID has supported nonviolent collective action in a variety of ways including through assistance awards to institutions such as the Solidarity Center[21] and the Prague Civil Society Centre[22] as well as to networks such as Innovation for Change,[23] and—in response to requests from local partners—through in-kind support to movements such as in Mali. USAID has done so in a fiscally responsible manner. Multiple laws including the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, and annual appropriations acts provide USAID with the authority to conduct programming supporting nonviolent collective action. In sum, USAID has the authority to support nonviolent collective action.

✖ MYTH 4 – Effective MEL Is Not Possible When Supporting Nonviolent Collective Action

USAID has effectively monitored, evaluated, and learned from its past support for nonviolent collective action. This includes MEL for its support for formal civil society organizations such as labor unions and organizing.[24] And it includes MEL support for a multi-donor, community-led, global network of activists and civil society organizations.[25] Moreover, a number of bilateral and non-governmental donors including the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the American Jewish World Service, and the Global Fund for Women have developed advanced metrics and frameworks for measuring and evaluating nonviolent collective action that USAID can adapt and innovate on.[26] Such metrics and frameworks complement USAID's Civil Society Assessment Tool (CSAT).[27] They also complement USAID's Guide for Distinguishing Tools for its Local Capacity Strengthening Policy.[28] The guide is particularly helpful for determining which MEL tools are appropriate and which are inappropriate for a given context. It is critical that MEL activities be oriented to help grantees better achieve their goals rather than to meet donor preferences.

21 The Solidarity Center. https://www.solidaritycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Solidarity-Center-Annual-Report-2022.pdf.

22 Prague Civil Society Centre. https://www.praguecivilsociety.org/ and USAID Administrator Mark Green's Remarks to Charles University Students. October 19, 2018. https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/oct-19-2018-usaid-administrator-mark-green-re-marks-charles-university-students.

23 Innovation for Change. https://innovationforchange.net/.

24 DCHA/DRG Learning (L) and Civil Society & Media (CSM) Divisions Labor Learning Agenda, 2019-2020. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1spRfRyIVQIcj0V8ZnBp4X7HSnqDrcvaA7xwXJ-8jvD8.

25 USAID and Counterpart International, Civil Society Innovation Initiative (CSII) Final Program Report September 30, 2015 - January 14, 2020. https://www.counterpart.org/publications/civil-society-innovation-initiative-csii-final-report/.

26 https://www.sida.se/en/publications/sidas-evaluation-handbook, http://ajws.org/smt, and https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/apply-for-a-grant/movement-capacity-assessment-tool/.

27 https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XD1Q.pdf

28 https://www.usaid.gov/policy/local-capacity-strengthening

❌ MYTH 5 – Formalizing Social Movements Increases Effectiveness

The entities that use nonviolent collective action as part of a social movement sometimes lack formally recognized non-profit status (or its equivalent), a board with legally recognized oversight responsibilities, or even a fixed mailing address. Such informality is often a strategic choice as it can provide a level of safety for movement leaders and participants. It can enhance their independence and legitimacy. And it can facilitate adaptation and resiliency when repression occurs. When donors seek partners or grantees that have predetermined institutional forms or require them to structurally become more like traditional civil society organizations, donors can undermine the very form and function of movements that make them powerful. In fact, support for local entities that have informal and diverse institutional forms conforms to USAID's Local Capacity Strengthening Policy.[29]

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29 USAID, Local Capacity Strengthening Policy, October 25, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/policy/local-capacity-strengthening?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery

KEY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR SUPPORTING NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

✓ DO NO HARM

It is critical for donors including USAID to do no harm (to individual activists or to movements) when supporting those involved in nonviolent collective action. Critically, harm and potential harm should be defined not by USAID, but by organizers and movement leaders. Social movements in non-democracies and even in some democracies are often accused of being foreign agents or supporting foreign agendas regardless of whether they receive external support. External support can unintentionally undermine movements' ability to self-sustain themselves by diverting leaders' energy from fostering self-generated resourcing to communicating with and writing reports for foreign donors. Strategies exist to mitigate and avoid this harm. For example, donors can work through trusted intermediary partners who have developed streamlined application and reporting procedures, which in turn can maximize local movements accessibility to resources. Donors can waive branding and marking requirements to enable local partners to self-brand and take ownership of their activities. And because repression of activists is so common, donors should be prepared with pre-allocated funding and emergency processes in place to mitigate the effects of digital and physical repression when it happens.

✓ CULTIVATE RELATIONSHIPS OF TRUST WITH - INSTEAD OF CONTROL OVER - ORGANIZERS AND MOVEMENTS

Donors can develop stronger relationships with organizers and activists when they practice an ethics of listening and learning and explicitly acknowledge power dynamics in those relationships. This is critical because power in donor-social movement relationships is rarely shared evenly. Donors have described themselves as holding the purse strings, having expertise and a checkbook, and being blind to their own power.[30] Organizers have described donors as being paternalistic, not respecting activist autonomy, and having preconceived, fixed demands of organizers that do not seem to consider local perspectives. Donors have some of the most effective partnerships with organizers and activists when they practice *trust with,* instead of *control over* these local partners. This can include treating local partners not only as those who seek support, but also as those with valuable expertise to offer.

The power imbalance between donors and movements can occur when donors seek to engage with communities or individuals who do not want any relationship with a foreign government or a donor. Such unwelcome interactions can

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30 Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

cause reputational harm for or even increase physical risk to movement actors. As such, one way for donors to uphold the do no harm principle is to engage with organizers and movements only when explicitly welcomed.

✓ SUPPORT MOVEMENTS' RESILIENCY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF THEIR OWN CONSTITUENTS

A growing body of research shows that movements are successful primarily because of what they do within their own country, not because of the support they get from outside their country.[31] They succeed by building power and legitimacy within their communities. This includes organizing and mobilizing mass participation from diverse sectors of their society. More specifically, this research shows that external support is neither necessary, nor sufficient for the success of nonviolent collective action. This suggests that all donor support should seek to foster movements' domestic resiliency and legitimacy. This includes not undermining, but complementing and fostering, activists' self-generated or autonomous resourcing from their own communities. This can be done by, for example, donors providing technical assistance in strategic planning, democratic decision-making practices, financial transparency and accountability to their own constituents, and financial sustainability without compelling informal social movements organizations to become formal CSOs.

✓ DEFER TO ORGANIZERS AND MOVEMENT LEADERS IN DECIDING WHETHER, WHEN, WHERE, AND HOW TO SUPPORT THEIR WORK

Organizers and movement leaders are often from historically excluded communities. And nearly 90 percent of nonviolent campaigns that occurred from 1900-2006 and that sought some of the hardest to win goals experienced violent repression by the state.[32] So, organizers and movement leaders are the people who suffer the most from underdevelopment and undemocratic rule. They also tend to come from the communities that have the most to gain from democratic development. In addition, they are likely to be prominent change agents in their societies long after USAID programs end. Having risen to leadership positions in their communities, they have often already proven adept at responding to emerging challenges and opportunities. As such, their sense of the strategic direction a movement should take would likely be more effective than if it were imposed from afar.

Leadership, in the context of grassroots organizing and movements, is defined as the people who accept responsibility to enable others to achieve their shared purpose in the face of uncertainty.

31   Dudouet, Véronique. "Sources, Functions and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements." In *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle,* edited by Kurt Schock, 168–200. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. and Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

32   Chenoweth, Erica, Perkoski, Evan, & Kang, S. (2017). "State Repression and Nonviolent Resistance." *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 61(9), 1950–1969.

DEFER TO ORGANIZERS' AND MOVEMENT LEADERS' RISK ASSESSMENTS AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

Local partners, including movement leaders, are likely to feel the positive and negative effects of external support long after USAID programs and grants end and personnel rotate to another posting. It is critical to take local partners' expertise to heart so that USAID support fosters their safety, resiliency, and legitimacy in the eyes of their own community. This might mean adjusting start or end dates of programming or grant agreements so that partners can operate on the timeline that is most appropriate for them, not the timeline that has been predetermined by a donor. Deferring to local partners can be done while abiding by USAID's Risk Appetite Statement.[33] For example, USAID can use co-creation processes and grants more often. During co-creation, USAID and local partners can discuss partner's risk assessments, theories of change, etc., alongside USAID's expectations, preferences, and constraints. In this way, USAID can incorporate local expertise into grant agreements, and local partners can be fully informed of USAID policies before signing on the dotted line.

BE EXPLICIT ABOUT USAID EXPECTATIONS, BIASES, PROCESSES, AND TIMELINES

USAID should be transparent about the expectations, biases, and limitations that it brings to its relationships with partners. For example, explaining USAID's relationship to the broader USG policy apparatus can be an important step towards partners appreciating the political and bureaucratic constraints that USAID operates within. Being explicit about these things can help avoid assumptions about interests and biases, and actually increases grantee effectiveness.[34] Such transparency may go a long way to starting such relationships on a strong footing based on trust. For example, donors can provide examples of where and how they have supported similar campaigns and groups, and offer references of organizations that can share advice about working with USAID or other donors.

SUPPORT ONLINE AND OFFLINE SAFETY AND RESILIENCY

Repression of people involved in nonviolent collective action is so common and has such negative effects that it is always prudent and ethical to set aside resources in advance to mitigate repression's negative effects. For example, donors can set aside flexible emergency response funding, which could be used for emergency relocation, housing expenses, legal support fees, psychosocial support, and digital security support such as VPNs, cloud storage, and satellite phones. And bilateral donors can be prepared to facilitate visas for organizers and their families when requested and appropriate. One example of such support is the Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund.

Social Movement Organization (SMO) is defined as an entity that is part of a social movement. Entities that could be considered SMOs include: a research center that publishes data on repression of movement leaders, a non-profit organization that provides free legal defense to movement participants, a union that mobilizes its members to participate in a movement, small, informal community groups that undertake grassroots organizing, or national organizations that lead broad coalitions.

33 https://www.usaid.gov/about-us/agency-policy/series-500/references-chapter/596mad.

34 Lambin, Rossa and Rebecca Surender, "The rise of big philanthropy in global social policy: implications for policy transfer and analysis" *Journal of Social Policy* (2021).

A LGBT activist poses for a photo as people gather to celebrate 'Coming Out Day' in Kiev on October 11, 2020. Photo by Sergei Supinsky / AFP.

✓ COORDINATE WITH OTHER USG, BILATERAL, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL PARTNERS

Research shows that the lack of donor coordination can be particularly harmful to social movements.[35] A lack of donor coordination can create conflicting or redundant support as well as competition or rivalries amongst leaders and their organizations. These things can undermine the collective nature of nonviolent collective action, which is the very thing that makes it so effective. Like-minded donors could set up country or region-specific working groups to optimize support for local, informal, and social movement organizations. Donors could support 'pooled funding' models that can streamline support to local groups and promote shared strategic visions. As USAID develops strong relationships based on trust with social movements, helping other USG entities and donors to learn from those relationships can be a good way to support their long-term goals and resilience. Relatedly, coordination within USAID should not be assumed or an afterthought.

✓ BE COURAGEOUS WHEN IT COMES TO COLLABORATING, LEARNING, AND ADAPTING (CLA)

Many people participating in nonviolent collective action do so because they have been prevented from voting, from participating fully in political parties, or from having equal access to public goods such as education and healthcare. As a result, the demands of those engaged in nonviolent collective action might, at first glance, appear to an outsider's intuition to be difficult to achieve or even unachievable. However, these demands often appear unachievable because power in society is imbalanced. In these contexts it may be challenging - but it is crucial - for USAID personnel to listen to movement leaders, to learn from them, and to adapt partnerships and programming to reflect their expertise. For example, USAID can co-create monitoring and evaluation tools and metrics with local partners and their constituencies thereby strengthening local ownership over activities and accountability as movements grow and mature. This could entail expanding the Civil Society Assessment Tool (CSAT) and the Local Works Guidance to incorporate monitoring and evaluation practices from the Global Fund for Women, American Jewish World Service (AJWS), and Sida.

35 Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

III.
NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION – WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

WHAT IS NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION?

Nonviolent collective action is an extra-institutional technique of sustained political, social, psychological and/or economic action that people use to build power and use it without the threat or use of violence. It is extra-institutional in that it operates primarily outside of formal political processes such as elections and lobbying. Sometimes nonviolent collective action involves civil disobedience like in the United States Civil Rights Movement. Nevertheless, such collective action is nonviolent in that its main modus operandi rejects the threat or use of violence. Grassroots organizing and nonviolent social movements are two forms of nonviolent collective action.

We can think of three broad goals of nonviolent collective action. These three types of goals are not mutually exclusive. Social movements and movement organizations can seek one or more of these goals. And movements sometimes add or change goals as they react to changing circumstances.

- **SERVICE PROVISION.** Some movements seek to provide social services including public goods such as education or food. Some examples include the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa, the Saffron Revolution in Burma, and the U.S. Civil Rights Movement provided educational services.

- **POLICY AND LEGAL REFORM, OR OVERSIGHT.** Some movements seek to reform specific laws, regulations, and policies, or to provide civilian oversight around such things as policing or corruption. Examples of movements that seek these goals include the U.S. Civil Rights Movement (policy reform for rights and democracy) and the Honduran "Indignados" (Outraged) movement to establish an anti-corruption commission.

- **REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE.** Some movements seek deeper structural change such as a transition from authoritarianism or military dictatorship to democracy. Two examples are Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution and Ukraine's Orange Revolution that sought the resignation of a longtime authoritarian president and the annulment of fraudulent presidential election results, respectively.

WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND HOW NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION SUCCEEDS

In their award-winning book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, Chenoweth and Stephan documented and analyzed 323 nonviolent collective action campaigns from 1900-2006.[36] They found that these campaigns were twice as effective as violence at achieving their stated goals. They describe the two main reasons why nonviolent collective action

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36 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

A group of Kenyan youth march for peace before the general elections in March 2013. Photo by USAID/Kenya.

campaigns are more successful than violent ones. The first is that nonviolent campaigns have higher levels of participation. This is in part because a larger repertoire exists of low-risk nonviolent than violent actions. Also, deciding to participate in nonviolent collective action such as boycotting a business is less complicated morally than learning to use a weapon and actually using it. This relative ease of participating in nonviolent collective action can increase the diversity of participants. Women, youth, and the elderly often participate in nonviolent collective action.[37] This participation advantage and increased diversity of participants leads to a range of tactical and strategic advantages for nonviolent collective action.

These tactical and strategic advantages are the second major reason for the success of nonviolent collective action campaigns. It is riskier for a government to violently repress a nonviolent campaign that represents a larger part of the population than it is to violently squash a minority. Nonviolent collective action campaigns that represent diverse sectors of society are also likely to have greater and stronger social ties to officials in the government. Those ties can increase and improve the knowledge that the opposition has of how a regime operates. Those social ties also increase the likelihood that the opposition can encourage defections from the government. And finally a more diverse opposition increases the potential diversity of tactics available to campaign participants. This facilitates the campaign's ability to adapt to changing dynamics. However, unity of purpose, disciplined adherence to nonviolent tactics, and long-term strategic planning are often critical features of successful nonviolent collective action campaigns. Diverse participation can make these features challenging to achieve and to sustain.

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37 Pinckney, Jonathan and Miranda Rivers. *Precarity and Power: Reflections on Women and Youth in Nonviolent Action.* Washington, DC: USIP. September 2021. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/pw_178-precarity_and_power_reflections_on_women_and_youth_in_nonviolent_action.pdf.

Throughout history and around the world, nonviolent collective action has been central to shifting norms and laws about human rights, ending wars and securing peace, opening entire regions to democracy, expanding electorates, and provoking individuals' imaginations of what is politically possible in their societies. Nonviolent collective action has succeeded against all regime types and in a wide range of cultures and contexts including Burma, Chile, India, the Philippines, South Africa, Sudan, and Ukraine.

TRENDS IN NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

Nonviolent collective action isn't just being used in every corner of the world. It is being used more often than ever before.[38] From 2010-2019, there were nearly 100 new nonviolent campaigns seeking some of the hardest to win goals. That is a 50 percent increase over the previous decade. Many more nonviolent campaigns sought to achieve policy reforms in their own countries. So, whether for deep structural or reformist ends, people all over the world have been increasingly relying on nonviolent collective action as a way of demanding human rights, justice, and democracy.

Despite people around the world using nonviolent collective action more than ever before, donors have not shifted their funding to match demand. From 2011 to 2019, public charities and private foundations gave only 3 percent of their total human rights funding to support grassroots organizing and nonviolent collective action. From 2015 to 2019, the total amount of human rights dollars committed to grassroots organizing did increase, but the total share remained at 3 percent.[39]

Nonviolent collective action is worth paying attention to not only because of how often it's used. In every decade since the 1950s, nonviolent collective action has been more effective than violence at achieving the hardest to win goals. In fact, in the most recent decade, nonviolent collective action was four times as effective as violence.[40]

Despite this impressive success rate relative to violence, winning is not easy. Repression is almost certain. And success rarely occurs in a linear fashion.

From 2010-2019, nonviolent campaigns achieved their stated goals 34 percent of the time. This is a stark decrease from the 1990s when nonviolent mass campaigns were almost twice as likely to succeed. Interestingly, the success rate of violent mass campaigns seeking the same goals decreased even more dramatically. From 2010-2019, violent mass campaigns succeeded only 8 percent of the time.

38 Chenoweth, Erica and Maria Stephan. *How the world is proving MLK right about nonviolence.* The Washington Post. January 18, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/18/how-the-world-is-proving-mlk-right-about-nonviolence/.

39 Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

40 Chenoweth, Erica. "The Future of Nonviolent Resistance." *Journal of Democracy* 31, no 3. July (2020): 69-84, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-future-of-nonviolent-resistance-2/.

Success Rates of Nonviolent and Violent Mass Campaigns, by Decade (1930-2019)

Source: Erica Chenoweth, "The Future of Nonviolent Resistance," Journal of Democracy 31:3 (July 2020).

While some governments have learned to anticipate and repress nonviolent collective action, the decreased success rate is likely to also be the result of the changing way people are using nonviolent collective action. The digital public sphere (i.e. online spaces) have captured an increasing amount of the public's and government's attention. This shift online has reshaped how movements organize and mobilize, how information and disinformation are disseminated, and how movement decision making happens.[41] People are increasingly reliant on mass protest and online tools such as Facebook and Twitter at the expense of long-term strategizing, organizing and coalition building, and leadership development – things that tend to more effectively build lasting political power. This shows in the data - despite some notably large movements, the average number of participants at the peak of a movement's activity is half what it was two decades ago.

THE POWER OF NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

HOW NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION HELPS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOP AND REMAIN RESILIENT

The effects of nonviolent collection action extend beyond the success or failure of the campaign. Chenoweth and Stephan found that from 1900 to 2006, a given country was eight times more likely to be democratic five years after a successful nonviolent campaign than after a successful violent campaign. And countries where people undertook nonviolent collective action were 15 percent less likely to relapse into civil war. Additional research has found that political transitions initiated through nonviolent collective action have been three times as likely to lead to democracy as political transitions initiated through all other means.

41 Tufecki, Zeynep. 2018. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Other scholars describe how nonviolent collective action has ushered in powerful alternative politics in a number of societies. These democratic innovations from below related to participatory and deliberative practices include crowd-sourced constitutions, referendums from below, and political parties built on movement work.[42]

Nonviolent collective action has also been used successfully to help curtail corruption on multiple continents.[43] These democratic innovations and successes curtailing corruption are two additional ways that nonviolent collective action has helped democracies develop and remain resilient.

Nonviolent collective action's greatest power is arguably not its ability to achieve improvements in policy or governance. It is the ability to expand people's imagination about what is politically possible in their society.

HOW NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION IS MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

For over a decade, rising authoritarianism has led to increasing attacks on civic space.[44] It is useful to think about the differences between traditional civil society organizations and social movements in this context of authoritarian learning and closing civic space. Traditional civil society organizations and social movements are both affected by closing civic space. Yet, people around the world are participating in nonviolent collective action in the form of grassroots organizing and social movements in greater numbers than ever before despite closing civic space. In some contexts, people appear to be participating in grassroots organizing and social movements as a substitute to traditional civil society organizations.

Because organizing and movements are informal and less reliant on formal structures such as registering with a government or having a bank account, laws restricting civil society organizations and blocking external funding may be less effective at preventing organizers and movements from operating than they are against traditional civil society organizations. Having said that, authoritarian monitoring and control of digital civic spaces has severe negative effects on traditional civil society organizations, organizers, and movements alike."

In response, people around the world are innovating in the digital sphere in response to authoritarianism.[45] And they're connecting and learning from each other to defend and strengthen civic space and overcome restrictions to fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, and expression.[46] Yet, the balance of power in a society is constantly evolving, making this a dynamic situation in which either side can deny the other what they want, and it remains to be seen which side wins.[47]

42 Della Porta, Donatella. 2020. *How Social Movements Can Save Democracy: Democratic Innovations from Below.* New York, NY: Polity Press.

43 Beyerle, Shaazka. 2014. *Curtailing Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, https://www.curtailingcorruption.org/.

44 Burrows, Matthew and Maria Stephan. *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* The Atlantic Council April 21, 2015. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/is-authoritarianism-staging-a-comeback-3/.

45 Cebul, Matthew D. Jonathan Pinckney. *Nonviolent Action in the Era of Digital Authoritarianism: Hardships and Innovations.* Washington, DC: USIP. February 16, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/nonviolent-action-era-digital-authoritarianism-hardships-and-innovations.

46 Innovation for Change. https://innovationforchange.net/.

47 Schelling, Thomas C. "Some Questions on Civilian Defense," in Adam Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Nonviolent Action against Aggression.* Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole. 1967.

On November 17, 2021, in Khartoum, Sudan, protesters demonstrated against the military coup that ousted the government the previous month. Photo by Marwan Ali/AP.

TWO NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE THEORIES OF CHANGE

Social, political, or economic change in a society tends to happen through institutional means, extra-institutional means, or a combination of the two. Extra-institutional change is often driven by nonviolent collective action outside of political institutions, for example, via boycotts or protests in the streets and squares of a society. Institutional change is driven primarily from within or in collaboration with political institutions, for example through advocacy with lawmakers, lobbying, or via political parties. Organizations that utilize a combination of institutional and extra-institutional means are referred to as hybrid nongovernmental organizations. HAKI Africa and Integrity Watch Afghanistan are two examples of hybrid NGOs. This distinction between change driven from within institutions versus change driven from outside institutions is critical to effectively supporting nonviolent collective action.

> *"If politics is 'the art of the possible,' then movements expand what is politically possible in a society."*

Traditional civil society organizations with policy experts, lawyers, and development professionals on staff may be the ones that take the lead in the later steps of social change, such as drafting peace agreements, organizing elections, and writing constitutions. But that work often formalizes change that organizers and social movements make possible. If politics is "the art of the possible," then movements expand what is politically possible in a society.[48]

48 Engler, Paul. "Protest Movements Need the Funding They Deserve." *Stanford Social Innovation Review.* July 3, 2018. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/protest_movements_need_the_funding_they_deserve/.

HOW NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION CAN FOSTER DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

Social movements and other forms of nonviolent collective action do not just expand what people imagine to be politically possible in their society. They also facilitate the governance processes that foster democratic development.

Research shows that nonviolent collective action is three times as effective as any other way a country transitions to democracy. It also shows that democracy is an effective driver of development outcomes. So, what are some of the potential downstream effects of nonviolent collective action-led democratization? We see some in the public health domain. For example, a natural experiment in Brazil demonstrated that enhanced political participation of the poor - in the form of voter enfranchisement - led to increased spending on public healthcare, with positive outcomes such as fewer low weight births and increased prenatal visits by healthcare professionals to pregnant women.[49] Similarly a study of the 1990s wave of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa found that when multiparty elections produced a new leader, infant mortality fell.[50] However, there was no such reduction in infant mortality in countries where a dictator held multiparty elections and stayed in power, or where leadership change took place in a nondemocratic way.

Additionally, studies have shown a link between democratic elections and increased spending on public goods[51] such as public education.[52] Democracy not only leads to increased spending on public services but also helps reduce favoritism in public spending. This can reduce bias in public service delivery and thereby improve social outcomes.[53] Democracy tends to lead to improved state capacity to control corruption and increased administrative effectiveness.[54]

NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION, GENDER, AND INCLUSIVITY

Nonviolent collective action and gender equality affect each other in important ways. Chenoweth and Marks have found that when women participate in mass movements, especially on the frontlines, those movements are both more likely to succeed and more likely to lead to more egalitarian democracy.[55] Other scholarship has found that inclusive transition processes lead to more sustainable negotiated settlements and more durable democracy.[56] And inclusion may lead to more inclusion: LGBTQ+ frontline participation in movements is strongly associated with

49 Fujiwara, Thomas. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica,* Vol. 83, No. 2 (March, 2015).

50 Kudamatsu, Masayuki. "Has Democratization Reduced Infant Morality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data." *Journal of the European Economic Association.* (December 2012) 10 (6).

51 Qian, N, G Padró i Miquel, M Martinez-Bravo and Y Yao (eds.) (2012), "DP8975 The Effects of Democratization on Public Goods and Redistribution: Evidence from China", *CEPR Press Discussion Paper No. 8975.*

52 Stasavage, David. "Democracy and Education Spending in Africa," *American Journal of Political Science* (2005) Vol 49 (2).

53 Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya." *The American Economic Review.* Vol. 105, No. 6 (JUNE 2015).

54 Halleröd, Björn, Bo Rothstein, Adel Daoud, and Shailen Nandy. "Bad Governance and Poor Children: A Comparative Analysis of Government Efficiency and Severe Child Deprivation in 68 Low- and Middle-income Countries" *World Development.* Vol. 48 (2013).

55 Chenoweth, Erica and Zoe Marks. "Revenge of the Patriarchs Why Autocrats Fear Women." Foreign Affairs. March/April 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-08/women-rights-revenge-patriarchs.

56 https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00ZSDF.pdf

youth participation.[57] And sustainable peace is more likely if women are meaningfully involved.[58] As such, extensive participation by women on the frontlines of movements and in political transitions leads to more egalitarian and more durable democracy, which in turn leads to better development outcomes.

It is important to note that when inclusive nonviolent movements are defeated, they suffer more than when movements with less involvement by women are defeated. "The greater the proportion of women in the defeated movement, the higher the degree of a patriarchal backlash...In other words, the impressive impact of women's frontline participation on the probability of democratization is contingent on the movement's victory; women's participation leads to democratic change and women's empowerment only when the broader movement succeeds."[59] Similarly, youth participation in movements is associated with increased repression, even though movements with high youth participation are not more likely to resort to violence.[60] This suggests that support for resiliency and activities that mitigate repression, as well as attention to empowerment of youth and women are critical to support for nonviolent collective action.

57 https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00ZSDF.pdf

58 Principe, Marie. "Women in Nonviolent Movements" Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, (2016) https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/12/women-nonviolent-movements.

59 Chenoweth, Erica and Zoe Marks. "Revenge of the Patriarchs Why Autocrats Fear Women." Foreign Affairs. March/April 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-08/women-rights-revenge-patriarchs.

60 https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00ZSDF.pdf

IV.
EVIDENCE-BASED SUPPORT FOR NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

SCHOLARSHIP ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

Recent scholarship offers evidence-based guidance for the types of support that may be most helpful and least harmful for those engaged in nonviolent collective action. This research suggests that external support for civic participation through informal organizations including social movements engaged in nonviolent collective action requires a different mindset than support for civic engagement through formal civil society organizations.[61] External support should not divert activists' attention away from the critical work of organizing and building legitimacy in their own communities and towards fulfilling application and reporting requirements of those thousands of miles away.

> *"**External support** is neither necessary nor sufficient for nonviolent collective action to succeed. It is **always secondary** to local support."*

Critically, research shows that external support is neither necessary nor sufficient for nonviolent collective action to succeed. It is always secondary to local support. And so external support should be viewed as complementary to—not replacing, but reinforcing—self-generated, local support.[62]

Additional research shows that donors should be particularly committed to the principles of humility and "do no harm" when seeking to support nonviolent action. It also finds that external support should broadly seek to, (i) promote mobilization and increase participation, (ii) reduce the effects of repression, (iii) improve nonviolent discipline, (iv) promote coordination and cohesion amongst donors and movements alike, and, (v) promote long-term sustainable change after nonviolent collective action subsides.

At a more detailed level, different types of support for nonviolent collective action are likely to pose different legal, political, or practical challenges for donors.[63] In the period prior to a social movement's peak mobilization, support for printing and distribution of educational materials, or for training that strengthens local leadership, organizing

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61 Stephan, Maria J., Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala. *Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset.* Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2015, https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/02/aid-civil-society-movement-mindset.

62 Dudouet, Véronique. "Sources, Functions and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements." In *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle,* edited by Kurt Schock, 168–200, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.

63 Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephan. "The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns: Poisoned Chalice or Holy Grail?" Washington, DC: ICNC Press, 2021, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICNC_Monograph_External_Support_Poisoned_Chalice_or_Holy_Grail.pdf.

capacity, movement strategy, and resilience may increase participation, lessen the effects of repression, and increase the likelihood of generating defections from the target government. Such skill building is important for movements to succeed. But support for training and convenings of organizers can perhaps more importantly offer opportunities for relationship building, peer learning, and strategic planning.

Additionally, "long-term technical and financial assistance to civic organizations, election monitoring, political parties, think tanks, youth movements, unions, and independent media has helped build the demand side for human rights, civic participation and government accountability."[64] Investment in local and third-party mediation as well as engagement with political, diplomatic, and security actors can mitigate repression and facilitate movement work. Furthermore, efforts to block or decrease external support for violence via arms embargoes can help protect organizers and the civic space in which they work. Some of these types of support, such as support involving engaging certain security actors as part of mediation processes may pose additional legal, political, and practical challenges for USAID and any local or subawardee partners. In some contexts, support for political parties represents activities that USAID cannot support. In other contexts, support for nonviolent collective action and the political parties may intersect. In such cases, assistance is guided by the Political Party Assistance Policy (PPAP). Quantitative and qualitative data offer differing assessments of whether and how external support given directly to movements affects their characteristics and outcomes. However, "flexible donor funding that minimizes bureaucratic obstacles has been most helpful to movements."[65]

THREE MODALITIES OF SUPPORT

There are three main modalities of external support for nonviolent collective action. The first is **support for expanding and protecting online and offline movement ecosystems.** This includes support for human rights defenders, independent media, and advocacy and diplomatic efforts to protect freedom of speech and assembly. This kind of support can often be provided via traditional civil society organizations and implementing partners. This kind of support is often the most likely USAID can undertake in many contexts. The second is **indirect support** for nonviolent collective action via activist-advised multi-donor pooled funds, and trusted non-profit intermediaries or regranters. The third is **direct support** via fellowships, funding, technical assistance, training, and in-kind support such as information technology equipment and office space.

Support for expanding and protecting online and offline movement ecosystems	**Indirect support**	**Direct support**

64 Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephan. "The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns: Poisoned Chalice or Holy Grail?" Washington, DC: ICNC Press, 2021, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICNC_Monograph_External_Support_Poisoned_Chalice_or_Holy_Grail.pdf.

65 Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephan. "The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns: Poisoned Chalice or Holy Grail?" Washington, DC: ICNC Press, 2021, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICNC_Monograph_External_Support_Poisoned_Chalice_or_Holy_Grail.pdf.

SUPPORT FOR EXPANDING AND PROTECTING ONLINE AND OFFLINE MOVEMENT ECOSYSTEMS

Support for civic space can be monetary or in-kind support and it can be offered through a variety of means including, convening and networking across movements, supporting human rights defenders, legal redress and psychosocial services for activists, diplomatic support and advocacy, research and policy centers, digital protections and assistance, and independent media. Likewise, long term support for labor unions and other professional associations can help to ensure not only that civic space is protected, but that it is being used.[66]

Additionally, research shows that support for security sector reform can reduce the likelihood of government repression and that training activists in nonviolent discipline may also be a fruitful avenue for reducing the likelihood of transitional violence.[67]

USAID CASE STUDY: **INSPIRES**

The Enabling and Protecting Civil Society Project INSPIRES Project has piloted interventions to strengthen civil society and supported flexible responses via Missions and Bureaus to address threats to civic space identified by civil society organizations and USAID. INSPIRES implements the Resiliency Plus Framework that helps civil society identify external threats to and internal vulnerabilities of their operations, and provides strategies, tools, and peer assistance to help organizations strengthen key resiliency factors.

INDIRECT SUPPORT FOR NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

Indirect support can be offered via multi-donor trust fund, via a pooled fund, or via intermediaries or sub-granters. Indirect support creates space between the donor and the local partner. This can be helpful in closed spaces where being directly associated with any foreign government could result in repression or other adverse consequences for organizers and movement leaders. This kind of support can also allow for key decisions about how support is used to be made not by USAID, but by key stakeholders in the region of benefit. To facilitate this, subgrants should include flexible support that can cover indirect costs for example through a negotiated indirect cost rate agreement (NICRA).

USAID CASE STUDY: **INNOVATION FOR CHANGE (I4C)**

Through I4C, USAID and its donor partners have fostered seven regional hubs around the world that serve as platforms for organizers, activists, and formal civil society organizations to learn and innovate together, to defend and strengthen civic space and to overcome restrictions to fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. I4C was designed via a two-part co-creation and co-design process that brought together key stakeholders from around the world. Two of those stakeholders – Tides Foundation and CIVICUS – serve as implementing and technical partners, respectively.

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66 Pinckney, Jonathan, Charles Butcher, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. "Organizations, Resistance, and Democracy: How Civil Society Organizations Impact Democratization." *International Studies Quarterly* (2022) 66.

67 Pinckney, Jonathan. "Promoting Peace and Democracy after Nonviolent Action Campaigns." Washington, DC: USIP. August 2, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/promoting-peace-and-democracy-after-nonviolent-action-campaigns.

68 Innovation for Change. https://innovationforchange.net.

✈ DIRECT SUPPORT FOR NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

Direct support can be in the form of financial support such fellowships or travel grants to individuals or organizations. It can also be in the form of non-financial support in the form of training and capacity building, technical assistance, or even in-kind support such as office space and information technology equipment.

USAID CASE STUDY: **MALI**

In Mali, a nascent group of youth began to organize in the wake of the 2012 coup there. USAID was able to provide assistance - in the form of basic office supplies, organizational development, and communications support - to help the group to grow and evolve. The group's goals at the time - to pressure the Malian government to move forward with peace accord negotiations - have broadened to support Malian-led reforms for inclusion and democratic governance and the group, known as ThinkPeace Mali, now has the administrative and financial capacity to partner directly not only with USAID, but also with a wide range of international donors.

Civil Society Participation. Photo by USAID Paraguay.

PAST AND FUTURE OF USAID ENGAGEMENT WITH NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

USAID'S APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE ACTION TO DATE

USAID's approach to supporting nonviolent collective action to date can be segmented into three broad themes, (i) support that shapes and protects the online and offline ecosystem for nonviolent collective action to be effective, (ii) support for labor organizing, and (iii) ad hoc and opportunistic support—in response to requests from local partners—for nonviolent collective action.

USAID has undertaken extensive efforts to shape and protect civic space. This has largely taken the form of support for formal civil society leaders and organizations and less so support for grassroots organizing, social movements, or other forms of nonviolent collective action. This includes support for human rights defenders, civil society resiliency, gender equality and women, independent media, and internet freedom. The Information Safety & Capacity (ISC) Project and the Greater Internet Freedom (GIF) Program are two examples of USAID efforts to protect and secure online civic space in the short and long terms.

In the human rights domain this includes support for CSO Lifeline[69] and the creation in 2016 of a rapid response mechanism to its Human Rights Support Mechanism (HRSM) leader with associates cooperative agreement, to make "targeted, short-term assistance to local actors as they respond to urgent crises or limited windows of opportunity."[70] Building resilience is a USAID priority.[71]

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69 Embattled CSO Assistance Fund. https://www.csolifeline.org/.

70 USAID, Human Rights Support Mechanism (HRSM) Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Midterm Performance Evaluation: Best Practices for Rapid Response Mechanisms. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00Z9J9.pdf.

71 USAID and Resilience. https://www.usaid.gov/resilience.

Activists of the All India Trinamool Congress party hold electric candles during a vigil condemning the recent sectarian violence in New Delhi over the Indian government citizenship law and to demand peace, in Kolkata on February 27, 2020. Sporadic violence hit parts of Delhi overnight as gangs roamed streets littered with the debris of days of sectarian riots that have killed 33 people, police said on February 27. Photo by Dibyangshu SARKAR / AFP.

In the gender equality and women's domain, USAID's Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy seeks to improve the lives of citizens around the world by advancing equality between females and males, and empowering women and girls to participate fully in and benefit from the development of their societies. This includes, but is not limited to, participation in organizations and movements focused on gender equality.[72] In the domain of independent media, Civil Society & Media: Strengthened Together & Advancing in New Directions (CSM-STAND) and International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM) have been important sources of support for the building blocks of pluralistic, democratic societies including independent media, as well as both formal and informal civil society organizations. And with respect to organized labor, USAID has decades of experience including long standing support for the Solidarity Center and its local partners, as well as new forms of innovative support related to informal workers and traditionally marginalized populations - all of which make up USAID's implementation of the Global Labor Program.

In September 2013, President Obama, together with heads of state, civil society leaders, the philanthropic community, multilateral organizations, and the United Nations, launched the Stand with Civil Society agenda. It was intended "to galvanize international attention and spur coordinated action to support and defend civil society in the face of an ongoing assault to freedom of association, assembly, and expression around the world."[73] The previously mentioned I4C network was a direct result of the Stand with Civil Society agenda.

Importantly, USAID's efforts to shape and protect civic space also prioritize new partnerships and local capacity development.[74] The New Partnerships Initiative (NPI) and USAID's localization commitments are two examples. The former was launched in 2019 and seeks to help "the agency partner with new, nontraditional, and local actors to advance their development goals - while elevating the quality of our partnerships through strengthened accountability, capacity, and local leadership."[75] The latter includes a commitment in 2021 by Administrator Power that 25 percent of USAID funding go to local partners by 2025 as well at least 50 percent of programming include local leadership in co-design, implementation, and evaluation.[76] These are notable steps towards developing mechanisms and internal expertise that facilitates support for nonviolent collective action. However, more can be done for these and other initiatives to distinguish between support for new or local partners who work within institutions (e.g. formal civil society organizations) and those who work primarily outside of institutions (e.g. grassroots organizers and many social movement organizations). Moreover, while support for local partners is an important step forward, power inequalities exist at the local level.[77] USAID will need to overcome this challenge as it operationalizes its commitment to locally driven development.[78]

72 USAID, Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment 2023 Policy. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/2023_Gender%20Policy_508.pdf.

73 USAID Stand with Civil Society: Best Practices. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAE863.pdf.

74 USAID, Local Capacity Strengthening Policy, October 25, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/policy/local-capacity-strengthening?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.

75 USAID, New Partnerships Initiative. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/NPI_External_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

76 USAID, Participatory Evaluation Guidance Note. https://usaidlearninglab.org/resources/participatory-evaluation-guidance-note. USAID, Localization Measurement. https://pages.usaid.gov/PPL/localization-measurement.

77 Obradovic-Wochnik, Jelena. "Hidden Politics of Power and Governmentality in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding: The Problem of 'Bringing the Local Back In.'" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 23, no. 1 (January 2018).

78 Ingram, George. "Locally driven development Overcoming the obstacles." *Brookings Global Working Paper #173*. May 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Locally-Driven-Development.pdf.

Ad hoc support for nonviolent collective action has been driven primarily by USAID responding to political openings and opportunities. The "Maps of Women Contributing to Peace in Myanmar" project and the USAID commissioned report, "Reclaiming the State and the Future: Protest Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa and Its Implications for USAID" are two such examples.[79] USAID personnel with prior professional experience or academic training in nonviolent collective action have been central to this work.

FUTURE ENGAGEMENT OF USAID WITH NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

USAID has a unique position with respect to most other bilateral and non-governmental donors in that – through its missions and broader U.S. Government network – it has visibility in nearly every corner of the world. However, the perception of USAID's historic or current interests in a given country may be more complex than that of other donors. Moreover, the timeline for new acquisition and assistance is often greater than 12 months. Combine these factors with scholarship about the kinds of foreign assistance that helps nonviolent collective action succeed and we can narrow the support that USAID is structurally best placed to provide, (i) support that expands and protects civic space, and (ii) indirect support for nonviolent collective action.

79 https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N16D.pdf.

An activist takes part in a demonstration demanding the legalization of abortion outside the Argentinian Congress building during the International Safe Abortion Day in Buenos Aires, on September 28, 2020, amid the coronavirus pandemic. Photo by Juan Mabromata / AFP.

(I) EXPANDING AND PROTECTING ONLINE AND OFFLINE ECOSYSTEMS

Expanding and protecting civic space can include continuing and ramping up support for activities that USAID has deep experience in: strengthening the capacity and financial viability of independent media, supporting the resiliency of activists and civil society leaders, promoting and protecting the safety – physically and online – of civil society and movement leaders, and investing in the legal enabling environment for freedom of expression and assembly. Such support is particularly helpful before peak movement activity. This entails providing support before a movement is on the front page of the local newspaper or at the top of everyone's Twitter feed.

One example of such support is the previously-mentioned INSPIRES project. INSPIRES helps to identify early signs of closing civic space through machine learning, and supports pilot interventions that seek to strengthen CSOs' ability to prevent and respond to closing civic space through a rapid response mechanism that is built into the program.[80] Support for expanding and protecting online and offline ecosystems also includes support for efforts that counter misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation and otherwise strengthen the information environment.

Practically this can also include continuing to support the agency, capacity, and resiliency of civic organizations such as labor unions, which can help build the demand side for human rights, civic participation, and government accountability. Relatedly, the Presidential Memorandum on Advancing Worker Empowerment, Rights, and High Labor Standards Globally is an example of a commitment to pursue a whole-of-government approach to advancing worker empowerment and organizing, workers' rights, and labor standards globally.[81]

(II) INDIRECT SUPPORT

Indirect support may include development and translation of educational materials as well as organizing workshops that strengthen local leadership, organizing capacity, movement strategy, coalition building skills, and nonviolent discipline. Multiple USAID missions have engaged experienced trainers to undertake such training activities.

This can also include support that fosters relationships and networks between organizers and between organizers and traditional civil society organizations. These relationships and networks serve as the foundation for diverse, resilient, and innovative collective action. Such support may entail facilitating travel, visas, and registration fees for in-person gatherings where relationship building, peer learning, and strategic planning can happen. It may also entail supporting movement-led online spaces for similar relationship building. Importantly, USAID is well placed to support such relationship building and networking not only within countries but also regionally and transnationally.

USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia has supported civil society organizations to build relationships between well-established CSOs and emergent grassroots groups. The bureau's programs have elevated the experience and priorities of grassroots activists from the region to international fora including in policy discussions and amongst donors. Additional programs have assisted individual activists and leaders of informal groups to participate in cross border workshops and information exchanges by supporting their travel, venues for convenings, and assistance securing visas.

For this support to be effective, it is critical that USAID undertake the design, implementation, and evaluation of this support with a ***movement mindset*** that is evidenced based and driven by the needs, priorities, and expertise of organizers and movement leaders in the communities of benefit.

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80 https://www.inspiresconsortium.org/

81 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/11/16/memorandum-on-advancing-worker-empowerment-rights-and-high-labor-standards-globally/

(III) FUTURE ENGAGEMENT OF USAID - OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES, CREATIVE MECHANISMS TO SUPPORT NONVIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION

The Office of Transition Initiative's programming practices - which include a reliance on co-creation and locally-led solutions - mean that in-kind support is guided by local theories of change, risk assessments, and needs. This approach - while relying on an implementing partner to ensure that USAID rules and regulations are met - facilitates USAID achieving its localization goals by making a much wider array of local change agents eligible for USAID assistance. Such support has and can help to generate resiliency in peak moments of nonviolent collective action and in moments of repression of that collective action. Furthermore, support to organizations that wouldn't otherwise be eligible for direct USAID assistance can help build capacity, making them both more effective at achieving their social reform goals and leveraging future USAID and international donor assistance.

V.

THREE COMMON CHALLENGES FOR USAID AND EXAMPLES OF OVERCOMING THEM

CHALLENGE 1 – POLITICAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL RISK

Political, ethical, and legal risk (and the perception of those risks) are common obstacles donors face when considering support for nonviolent collective action. A survey of human rights donors found that 27 percent of respondents identified legal or tax concerns, or risks or threats to staff or grantees as primary constraints on support for grassroots organizing and nonviolent movements.[82] And repression of organizers and movement leaders is so common, it's not a question of if they'll be repressed but when and what kind of repression they will face. One study found that nearly 90 percent of nonviolent campaigns that occurred from 1900-2006 that sought some of the hardest to win goals also experienced violent repression by the state.[83] As such, it is ethically critical for donors to be prepared – with digital and physical mitigation efforts as well as pre-allocated funding and emergency processes – for repressive backlash. Additionally, organizers and movement leaders often come from historically excluded communities. So donors' commitment to doing no harm and being prepared to mitigate digital and physical repression is all the more critical to prevent further exclusion of these individuals and their communities.

Multiple laws including the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, and annual appropriations acts provide USAID with the authority to conduct programming supporting nonviolent collective action. USAID's support for nonviolent collective action is consistent with the agency's commitments to localization and new partnerships. And effective support for nonviolent collective action is consistent with the FAA's focus on fostering the self-sustainability of partner activities. Such precedent can be useful when assessing how to react to laws in foreign countries that seek to stigmatize and constrain internationally supported civil society work. Additionally, USAID relies on a range of tools to assess and mitigate risks to implementing partners including tools referenced in ADS Chapter 201, such as marking and branding waivers, and Foreign Assistance Data Redaction System (FADRS) redactions. Relatedly, USAID's internal structures affect whether, when, where, and how the agency supports nonviolent collective action. For example, the dearth of in-house expertise in nonviolent collective action means that it is less likely for USAID to notice or be prepared to take advantage of opportunities for supporting nonviolent collective action. Rules that are meant to protect the safety of Mission personnel may inadvertently prevent USAID personnel from physically leaving the mission to meet with organizers or movement leaders who for a variety of reasons may be unwilling or unable to physically visit the mission or even the capital. And norms around risk mitigation may predispose the agency to consider decentralized or grassroots activities to be risky partners or recipients of support. For example, informal and grassroots civil society entities that may not have an institutional bank account or even be formally registered in their home country.

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82 Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

83 Chenoweth, Erica, Perkoski, Evan, & Kang, S. (2017). "State Repression and Nonviolent Resistance." *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 61(9), 1950–1969.

Theary Seng, a US-Cambodian lawyer and activist who is facing treason and incitement charges, poses in front of Phnom Penh municipal court ahead of her hearing in Phnom Penh on May 3, 2022. Photo by Tang Chhin Sothy / AFP.

"WHAT'S POSSIBLE" –
MITIGATING RISK MINI-CASE OF NORTH MACEDONIA[84]

Research on USG assistance to support pro-democracy nonviolent collective action in North Macedonia from 2015-2017 helps us understand how USAID can mitigate political, legal, and ethical risks. In response to homegrown nonviolent, pro-democracy mobilization in North Macedonia, both the bilateral mission and the OTI program worked hard to avoid any appearance of partisanship. They did not directly support protests. And they avoided engaging with movement leaders in order to avoid the perception that an outside government was disrupting, funding, or controlling the movement. Instead USAID helped to shape the broader political environment in a way that facilitated pro-democracy activities for example by supporting spaces for civic engagement broadly defined. Yet, pro-democracy activism provoked increasingly aggressive and repressive responses targeting activists, USAID partners, and USG employees alike.

Despite USAID's precautions, the ruling party lobbed accusations at the embassy, which echoed through some U.S. media and think tanks, and ultimately, Congress due to the ruling party's extensive lobbying efforts. This resulted in FOIA requests, Congressional letters, and a GAO investigation. The Mission consulted with experts on closing civic space and with Regional Legal Officers in Missions that had faced similar situations. The Mission held a retreat focused on scenario planning. Staff care was brought out to help address staff stress. Experts were brought in to give workshops on digital and personal safety for staff, partners, and media and civil society organizations. While the GAO investigation found that USAID adhered to relevant policies in selecting assistance recipients,[85] an important lesson learned was the need to be very intentional and transparent about programming decisions and to document those decisions.

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84 Connolly, Jennifer. September 2022. DRAFT Case Study. *To Assist or Not to Assist: A Case Study of U.S. Government Assistance During the North Macedonian Political Crisis, 2015-2017.*

85 https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-158.pdf

CHALLENGE 2 – IDENTIFYING SUITABLE PARTNERS

The leaders of nonviolent collective action often come from historically excluded communities. Leadership may be decentralized or change regularly. Sometimes leaders are based outside of capital cities. They may not be fluent in English or the official language of their country. And to protect their personal safety, they may prefer to keep their identity secret. In short, "the more excluded people are, the harder it is [for donors] truly to hear them."[86]

> *"The more excluded people are, the harder it is [for donors] truly to hear them."*

USAID's approach to inclusive development seeks to address exclusion and its impact on marginalized and underrepresented communities through policy, programming, and training. Personnel can refer to the agency's official guidance - "Suggested Approaches for Integrating Inclusive Development Across the Program Cycle and in Mission Operations."[87]

86 Walker, Darren. October, 2015. "Toward a new gospel of wealth." Ford Foundation. https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/toward-a-new-gospel-of-wealth/.

87 https://www.usaid.gov/inclusivedevelopment/inclusion-equity

"WHAT'S POSSIBLE" –
MAPS OF WOMEN CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE

In Burma, women's organizations and civil society groups identified a need to give visibility to the women who were active in the movement for peace and democratic reform. In response, USAID/OTI undertook a co-created project with local stakeholders and an INGO. This collaborative process was supported by a grant from the USAID Women, Peace, and Security Incentive Fund. It resulted in the ccreation of the "Women Contributing to Peace in Myanmar Maps," which identified 677 women peace-builders in 383 organizations, including 146 women who self-identified themselves as participants to the Union Peace Conference, a critical peace-making event intended to make political decisions that would lead to a peace agreement. The maps were distributed across the country and online and provided a practical and easy way to enable linkages and networking; the lone female member of the Joint Monitoring Committee for the Ceasefire expressed optimism that the maps would encourage more women to work on peace; women from political parties stated they intended to use the maps in their election campaigns to identify allies for their interventions in communities; and recipients – both male and female – repeatedly discussed plans to use the maps as an advocacy tool to increase women's visibility during in their own events at the township and state levels, and to advocate for including women in the maps in key activities. The full CLA Case Study - "Mapping Women Contributing to Peace in Myanmar for Networking and Collaboration" - is publicly available.[88]

CHALLENGE 3 – DONOR COORDINATION

Donor coordination takes time and often requires donors to adapt. But it is critical when supporting nonviolent collective action because a lack of donor coordination can be particularly harmful to nonviolent collective action.[89]

Whereas the success of formal civil society organizations depends largely on a small number of experts, lawyers, and advocates, the main way movements win is by increasing levels of mass participation in their society. That is to say, movements succeed through mass collective action. And so, when donors offer conflicting support, or when support leads to competition or rivalries amongst organizers, movement leaders, or between organizations then we are creating collective action problems. The very support intended to foster collective action, hinders it.

Coordination can happen in-country. And it can happen at development agency headquarters. Coordination can also happen through bodies designed specifically for this purpose. The Alliance for Feminist Social Movements, Human Rights Funders Network, and CIVICUS' Grassroots Solidarity Revolution are three examples. Donor coordination should also happen between donors that support formal CSOs and those that support organizing and movements as they are all part of the same ecosystem. Moreover, it is critical for USAID Bureaus to coordinate with each other and with other USG entities such as the Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

Coordination can also helpfully include increasing and improving data collection and analysis at the multilateral level for example in the OECD DAC, information sharing multilaterally and bilaterally, peer to peer learning, and participating in communities of practice and multi-stakeholder communities such as the Alliance for Feminist Movements.

88 https://usaidlearninglab.org/resources/mapping-women-contributing-peace-myanmar-networking-and-collaboration

89 Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf.

"WHAT'S POSSIBLE" – **INNOVATION FOR CHANGE (I4C)**

The previously mentioned I4C network is an example of effective donor coordination. I4C grew out of a larger partnership between USAID and Sida focused on science, technology, innovation, partnerships, and innovative financing mechanisms with the potential to solve long-standing development challenges. Each organization brought different strengths and experiences to the table, making the partnership mutually beneficial. After taking a strategic look at their combined assistance, they noticed a gap in support to civil society at the regional level, inspiring the idea for regional civil society hubs.

USAID and Sida traditionally have had different approaches to program design and engagement with civil society. But in 2014, together, they undertook a two-part co-creation and co-design process to ensure that the initiative would truly respond to the needs of civil society actors. Between 2016 and 2018, I4C launched six regional hubs that count on the participation of more than 200 civil society organizations from 84 different countries across the Global South responding to closing civic space. Today, the I4C network includes 27,000 activists and seven regional hubs. It serves as a positive example of donor coordination and as an inspiration for USAID funding.

VI.
MEASURING AND EVALUATING SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

Donors like USAID require varying forms of accountability from their partners, including annual written reports, regular meetings, or site visits. However, grassroots organizers and social movements may be more rooted in local norms and practices than formal civil society organizations, which may have adopted Western or U.S. organizational practices and language of monitoring and evaluation. And those grassroots traditions and practices may very well not be immediately visible to or valued by outside donors.[90]

This can create a disconnect in determining how, when, and why monitoring and evaluation happens. Moreover, foreign-imposed monitoring and evaluation can alter accountability structures within movements by forcing movement leadership to engage in a balancing act between accountability to foreign donors and accountability to local constituents. Movement leaders end up spending time communicating with foreign donors, which detracts from building power in their communities. Even if donors don't require accountability-oriented monitoring and evaluation, movement leaders might still feel that they need to reorient their priorities towards donors to keep them satisfied. They might think that they need to provide information that the donor wants to hear. As such, it should be made very clear early and often that monitoring, evaluation, and learning activities should be oriented towards strengthening the grantee and the movement, and providing it with the information necessary to help it better achieve its own objectives.

SEEING THE MOVEMENTS FROM THE GRANTEES

In evaluating support for nonviolent collective action, it is important for USAID policies and personnel to distinguish the activities, progress, and setbacks of their partners and grantees, from the activities, progress, and setbacks of the broader movement that the partner or grantee may be a part of. Social movements are rarely made up of one

> *"**Mobilizations** are easy to spot during their peak moments [after a trigger event] when thousands of people are in the streets." But as organizer and trainer, Carlos Saavedra noted, "the organizing and capacity building that takes place during slower, quieter times can also be essential to consolidating movement gains and laying the groundwork for future outbreaks."*
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> *"For funders, the important thing is recognizing what stage a movement is progressing through at a given moment and **adapting their support** to that moment's needs."*

90 Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2000. *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

organization. They often consist of a variety of organizations and individuals that seek similar outcomes. A single donor rarely supports all the organizations and individuals that form a movement. They are more likely to support only some of the organizations or individuals that are part of the broader movement ecosystem. Therefore, donors that conflate individual partners with a larger movement may very well skew their understanding of what that individual partner can reasonably achieve on its own, and the activities, successes, and setbacks it can reasonably be held accountable for.

Moreover, movement life cycles are not linear. "Mobilizations are easy to spot during their peak moments [after a trigger event] when thousands of people are in the streets." But as organizer and trainer, Carlos Saavedra noted, "the organizing and capacity building that takes place during slower, quieter times can also be essential to consolidating movement gains and laying the groundwork for future outbreaks." Sometimes these slower phases of a movement's lifecycle are in the months and years prior to peak activity. Sometimes they come after a movement has experienced losses or repression. These may be periods of disillusionment, but they may also be periods of learning and reflection in which organizers rebuild and movement strategy evolves. "For funders, the important thing is recognizing what stage a movement is progressing through at a given moment and adapting their support to that moment's needs."[91]

The nonlinearity of a movement's life cycle is also important when it comes to donors evaluating a grantee's success at achieving the goals of a given grant, cooperative agreement, etc. For example, if the goals are related not to ends (e.g., policy reform) but to the means organizers use (e.g., training individuals in nonviolent discipline, developing leadership in the movement's ranks, and refining the movement's strategy), then a day of mass action by a movement could be a success even if it results in no policy change. That day of mass action may allow a movement to

> *Donors may facilitate movement success by having deliverables and evaluation metrics **focus on the means** that organizers use to build power, leadership, and agency rather than on ends.*

demonstrate to the media and the world that it can mobilize widespread support without using violence and gain the moral high ground over the regime. It may make a movement more visible and inspire growth, thanks to new and diverse sectors of the population joining the movement. It may also allow up-and-coming movement leaders to practice skills they learned in quieter times and thereby gain experience and confidence. In fact, these successes are measurable, and they indicate that a movement may have the ability to safely scale up in size. In this context, going to scale may not result in immediate policy change, and it may even provoke repression of a movement and its leadership. But it may generate momentum, which can be a crucial ingredient for movement success.[92] This suggests that donors may facilitate movement success by having deliverables and evaluation metrics focus on the means that organizers use to build power, leadership, and agency rather than on ends.

91 Saavedra, Carlos. "Five Ways Funders Can Support Social Movements." *Stanford Social Innovation Review.* July 9, 2018. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/five_ways_funders_can_support_social_movements.

92 Chenoweth, Erica, and Margherita Belgioioso. "The Physics of Dissent and the Effects of Movement Momentum." *Nature Human Behaviour* 3, no. 10 (2019): 1088–1095.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORKS

For USAID, building expertise in nonviolent collective action also entails building expertise in evaluating support for nonviolent collective action. The following section of the primer explores trends in philanthropic evaluation and discusses challenges and examples of evaluating the perceived "messy" work of organizing and movements.

With the rise of strategic philanthropy over the past two decades, many donors have increasingly viewed their grants as carefully calibrated investments, incorporating evaluation into the grantmaking process itself, with outcomes defined in terms of closely monitored deliverables and frequent benchmarking of performance metrics.[93] Critics of strategic philanthropy have argued that it has eschewed 'messier,' movement-based causes in favor of 'neater,' more clearly delineated programs and initiatives, in which a causal link could be firmly forged between the philanthropic intervention and the desired outcome." While social movement-based change may indeed be "messier," it is measurable.

And yet, although movement-based change is measurable, assessment tools must leave open the possibility of unexpected and unimagined outcomes. The greatest power of movements is, arguably, not their ability to achieve policy reform or changes in governance, but their ability to expand the policies and practices that are acceptable to the mainstream population. Because movements change what people believe is politically possible, some outcomes are deemed impossible or are not even imagined until they happen.

Below are three examples of evaluation and assessment tools that USAID can adapt for its own use. These are tools not only for donors to assess movement capacity, but also for movements themselves to document and assess their own capacity so that they can make strategic, evidence-based decisions. USAID personnel can consider adapting these tools for their and their partners' use, as well as funding or facilitating training for movements to help them adapt and use these tools for their own capacity building.

i. The Global Fund for Women's Movement Capacity Assessment Tool 3.0 was designed primarily to help social movements determine their needs in order to most effectively advance their vision and achieve the change they want to see.[94]

ii. The American Jewish World Service's Social Movement Assessment Tool is meant to help movement leaders and donors assess and reflect on the state of a movement, who is participating, how the movement is led, and how it achieves its goals.[95]

iii. Through its Social Movement Learning Project, Innovation Network compiled a set of resources that offer guidance, including indicators for evaluating the strength and capacity of social movements.[96] This project seeks to enhance philanthropic support of social movements by creating practical evaluation tools and guidance to help funders better understand and assess movement power, progress, and impact.

93 Soskis, Benjamin, and Stanley N. Katz. *Looking Back at 50 Years of U.S. Philanthropy*. Menlo Park: William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2016.

94 https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/apply-for-a-grant/movement-capacity-assessment-tool/.

95 http://ajws.org/smt.

96 https://www.innonet.org/news-insights/news-events/social-movement-learning-project/.

USAID's own Participatory Evaluation Guidance Note details how local stakeholders can lead in all aspects of the development process, including determining visions of success, measuring progress, learning and adapting, and evaluating results.[97] And USAID's Listening to Local Voices: Accountability and Feedback Plans guide helps integrate local voices into activity planning and imple- mentation.[98] Likewise, USAID's Guide for Distinguishing Tools for its Local Capacity Strengthening Policy can be helpful in determining which MEL tools are appropriate and which are inappropriate for a given context.[99]

*Regardless of the approach, **MEL activities should be oriented to help grantees** better achieve their goals in addition to monitoring and internal evaluation.*

Regardless of the approach, MEL activities should be oriented to help grantees better achieve their goals in addition to monitoring and internal evaluation.

"WHAT'S POSSIBLE" – DOCUMENTATION FOR ADAPTIVE LEARNING: FROM I4C TO POWERED BY THE PEOPLE

USAID used a Process Historian approach – a strategy for adaptive learning – to capture lessons learned throughout the co-creation, co-design, and implementation phases of the I4C network.[100] The full report about these processes is publicly available as is an interactive, public facing website.[101] The public facing website with stories, images, and quotes from participants offered increased transparency. And the detailed process tracing facilitated learning within USAID that could be easily applied to future initiatives. Lessons learned from I4C and other activities have been applied in the design of a new USAID initiative called Powered by the People, which seeks to provide direct and accessible support that addresses the needs, opportunities, and challenges identified by activists and other civic actors engaged in nonviolent collective action.

Additional examples of CLA include USAID providing resources to hire a full-time CLA advisor in Liberia, establishing a learning team for the Regional Development Mission in Asia (RDMA), and a global labor collective action evidence review.[102]

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97   https://usaidlearninglab.org/resources/participatory-evaluation-guidance-note.

98   https://www.usaid.gov/documents/listening-local-voices-accountability-and-feedback-plans

99   https://www.usaid.gov/policy/local-capacity-strengthening

100 https://usaidlearninglab.org/resources/civil-society-innovation-initiatives-process-historian-approach-cla

101 https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/85_-_dai_-_global_-_the_civil_society_innovation_initiatives_process_historian_ approach_to_cla.pdf and https://csiilearn.org/.

102   https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaac041.pdf and https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TQWR.pdf.

FIVE ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USAID POLICY AND PRACTICE

As USAID personnel consider whether, when, where, and how to support the powerful work of nonviolent collective action, here are five actionable recommendations. They are based on what we know from scholarship and practice about what works and what doesn't with respect to external support for grassroots organizing and nonviolent movements. And they reflect the immense possibilities for USAID to more effectively promote democratic development through support for the nonviolent collective action ecosystem.

I In contexts where USAID personnel are explicitly welcomed, **get proximate to and strengthen relationships of trust** with movement leaders including those from historically excluded communities, those in informally organized groups, and those outside of capital cities to better embrace a movement mindset.

i.   Prioritize engagement and relationship building with a variety of social movement civil society actors recognizing that many of these relationships require long-term investments and trust building over time. As such, *be intentional about determining which personnel are most appropriate to develop and maintain these relationships.*

ii. *Prioritize active listening and learning,* as well as understanding the personal histories of these local actors. Understanding and relating to local actors' lived experiences is critical to building relationships of trust.

iii. *Peer to peer learning and relationship building between State and USAID* personnel could also be productive.

2 Undertake an internal USAID process to **refine and develop technical guidance for USAID support for nonviolent collective action**.

i.   Such technical guidance would *define the comparative advantage of different types of support for DRG or cross sectoral outcomes,* suggest that USAID prioritize support in areas where it has a comparative advantage, and *offer a series of questions that should be answered during the design process of any new mechanism*.

ii. The Civil Society Technical Approaches Inventory includes social movements in its definition of civil society organizations. However, no distinction is made between the activities or technical approaches that are most appropriate for formal civil society organizations versus informal entities. This primer

has highlighted why USAID having a movement mindset is critical to offering effective support for nonviolent collective action. *Updating the Civil Society Technical Approaches Inventory and the Working in Closing Spaces Best Practices (2018) document – amongst other documents – will help USAID personnel operationalize this mindset.*

iii. To facilitate coordination and an all of government approach, *develop a set of U.S. government-wide principles and practices* for external support for nonviolent collective action could be developed.

iv. USAID could *create an ethical review body* composed of organizers, movement leaders, scholars, and other key stakeholders to provide guidance on new initiatives and funding mechanisms related to nonviolent collective action such that they do no harm.

v. *Refine USAID's Program Cycle resources to better reflect a movement mindset.* This is particularly important for DRG resources related to program design, monitoring, and evaluation. However, it would be beneficial to consider refining relevant portions of broader agency resources.

vi. Additionally, USAID should *undertake a review of operational, disciplinary, and promotion procedures* to reduce incentives that assistance is designed around avoiding a low likelihood negative event - such as a partner reallocating funds without prior approval - instead of around the higher likelihood of having a positive impact - such as informally organized youth activists being empowered by long-term, flexible support for training, relationship and coalition building, and resilience. This could involve discussions with OAA, PPL, and/or the LFT Hub that is managing USAID's Local Capacity Strengthening Policy rollout.

During a youth empowerment discussion in Prizren, Kosovo, one participant drew their social media campaign idea for a new "Inter-ethnic Youth Initiative" across their fingers. Photo by Melina Jevtic, NDI Kosovo.

3	Increase and institutionalize nonviolent collective action expertise within USAID.

i. Social movements have played and continue to play a catalytic role in democracy and development in every corner of the world. *USAID needs full-time technical capacity to offer strategic guidance on nonviolent collective action* in order to ensure that all of its programming and assistance take into account the complexities and immense opportunities that nonviolent collective action offers with respect to democratic development outcomes. Full-time, in-house expertise would also allow USAID to more effectively anticipate and prepare for moments of peak activity like the Arab Spring or protest movements in Sudan and Hong Kong. And it would facilitate coordination within USAID, between USAID and the Department of State, and between USAID and other bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental donors.

ii. Expertise in nonviolent collective action should not be concentrated in the hands of a small number of advisors. The DRG global cadre should have a working knowledge of the key elements of nonviolent collective action and external support for it. Additionally, it would be beneficial for all USAID personnel to have a basic understanding of how nonviolent collective action works, why it works, and the effects it has on democratic development. Similarly, it would be beneficial for all USAID personnel to have a basic knowledge of the limitations of external support for nonviolent collective action and the potential for unintended consequences of external support. In past years, the Foreign Service Institute has offered ad hoc events on nonviolent collective action. The Foreign Service Institute and *USAID University could offer a variety of introductory and advanced trainings and courses including a Nonviolent Collective Action and Social Movements 101* course. That course could be modeled on the new hour-long Climate 101 course at USAID University. Additional online and in-person courses and training could build on these introductory courses.

4	Support and share scholarship on the relationship between nonviolent collective action and democratic development

There is a strong and growing amount of scholarship, research, and evidence on external support for nonviolent collective action and the effects of that support.[103] USAID is in a position to continue and expand its support for cutting edge research - at academic institutions and organizations such as USIP - that would inform future programming as well as principles and practices. Building on existing scholarship, two research questions could serve as a starting point: (i) what effect does external support have on the processes and outcomes of nonviolent collective action, and (ii) how does nonviolent collective action affect democratic development processes and outcomes. Support for such scholarship would have to grapple with a wide range

103 Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephan. "The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns: Poisoned Chalice or Holy Grail?" Washington, DC: ICNC Press, 2021, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICNC_Monograph_External_Support_Poisoned_Chalice_or_Holy_Grail.pdf. and Francis, Megan Ming. "The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement Capture." *Law & Society Review*. January 9, 2019. Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. "Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements." Washington: ICNC Press, 2022, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dollars-And-Dissent-ICNC-Special-Report.pdf. Jackson, Jaime, Jonathan Pinckney, Miranda Rivers. "External Support for Nonviolent Action: An Evidence Review." Washington: USIP, 2022, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/External-Support-NVA-Evidence-Review-Paper.pdf. Dudouet, Véronique. "Sources, Functions and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements." In *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*, edited by Kurt Schock, 168–200. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. Amat, Consuelo. "Pioneering Ethical RCTs with USIP's Nonviolent Action Team." https://www.dropbox.com/s/9yih98w0hxddof2/AmatMatus_Learning%40USIP%20Blog_Pioneering%20Ethical%20RCTs_051922.pdf?dl=0.

of ethical questions. And it would be wise for the study design to be co-created with civil society organizations and movement leaders. Likewise, it would be important for such scholarship to be undertaken, at least in part, by individuals in the global south. Such research could yield powerful and innovative insights into how to enhance the effectiveness of external support for nonviolent collective action. This scholarship could then be socialized widely throughout the U.S. government and with USAID's partners.

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5 **Collaborate with multilateral and bilateral partners to improve data collection and technical guidance for donors on external support for nonviolent collective action.**

One avenue for improving data collection could involve collaborating with the OECD DAC to expand the range of information it gathers. Currently, the OECD tracks and measures resource flows for development. Its creditor report system (CRS) tracks resource flows for a range of themes including "Ending violence against women and girls" (15170) and "Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions" (15180) but it does not track resource flows for nonviolent collective action, grassroots organizing, social movements, or activism. Adding a CRS code for nonviolent collective action (and bilateral donors submitting data using this code) would facilitate evidence-based decision making amongst OECD-DAC member states.[104]

A key call to action developed by the Civic Space Cohort of the Summit for Democracy is to elaborate a multilateral toolkit focusing specifically on engagement with and support for nonviolent social movements. Such a toolkit could facilitate evidence-based program and policy development by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. And the process for developing it could help build a community of learning around grassroots organizing, nonviolent social movements, and other forms of nonviolent collective action. It could be developed through the OECD-DAC Community of Practice and/or another multilateral body. And it could reinforce existing multilateral recommendations such as the OECD-DAC recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

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104 DAC and CRS Codes. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/dacandcrscodelists.htm.

ANNEX A:
RESOURCES AND TOOLS

a. Principles and Practices for Supporting Civil Society

   i. User's Guide to Democracy Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) - USAID

   ii. Essential Resources on Supporting Civil Society in Politically Restrictive Environments - USAID

   iii. Working in Closing Spaces: Best Practices - USAID

   iv. Stand with Civil Society: Best Practices - USAID

   v. Guiding Principles for Sida's Engagement with and Support to Civil Society - Swedish Sida

   vi. Strengthening Civil Society Theory of Change: Supporting Civil Society's Political Role - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

   vii. NORAD'S Support to Civil Society: Guiding Principles - Norad

b. Policy Frameworks

   i. Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance - OECD-DAC

   ii. Protecting civic space and the right to access resources - Community of Democracies and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association

   iii. Factsheet: Civil society's ability to access resources - UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai's report to the Human Rights Council

   iv. Right to Receive Funding - World Movement for Democracy

   v. Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association - UN General Assembly

c. Designing Programming

   i. Local Capacity Strengthening Policy - USAID

   ii. Risk Appetite Statement 2022 - USAID

   iii. Local Philanthropy and Self-Reliance Guide - USAID

   iv. Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) - USAID

   v. Civil Society Assessment Tool (CSAT) - USAID

   vi. Political Party Assistance Policy - USAID

   vii. Media for Democracy Assessment Toolkit - USAID

   viii. Social Movement Assessment Tool - AJWS

   ix. Movement Capacity Assessment Tool 3.0 - Global Fund for Women

   x. A Checklist of Potential Actions: Incorporating DEI in your Grant-Making Process - Arbella Advisors

   xi. Measuring What Matters - CANDID and GFCF

xii. [The nine roles that intermediaries can play in international cooperation - Peace Direct](#)

xiii. [Sida's Evaluation Handbook: Guidelines and Manual for Conducting Evaluations at Sida - Swedish Sida](#)

d. USG Program Examples

i. [Innovation for Change](#)

ii. [INSPIRES Consortium](#)

iii. [Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund](#)

iv. [LGBTI Global Development Partnership](#)

v. [IFPIM](#)

vi. [Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation](#)

e. Peer Government-Funded Program Examples

i. [Alliance for Feminist Movements – National Government Steering Group - Government of Canada and Government of Malawi](#)

ii. [Women's Fund Fiji – Australian Government](#)

iii. [Leading from the South - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands](#)

iv. [MDG3 Fund - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands](#)

v. [Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women (FLOW) Fund, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands](#)

vi. [Equality Fund – Canada](#)

f. Non-Governmental Donor Program Examples

i. [Urgent Action Fund – Sister Funds](#)

ii. [FundAction](#)

iii. [African Social Movements Baraza and Fund](#)

iv. [Black Feminist Fund](#)

v. [Zimbabwe Alliance](#)

vi. [FRIDA The Young Feminist Fund](#)

vii. [Buen Vivir Fund](#)

viii. [Clima Fund](#)

g. Online and Offline Spaces for USAID to Develop Relationships with and Learn with Organizers

i. [CIVICUS Grassroots Solidarity Revolution](#)

ii. [Alliance for Feminist Movements](#)

iii. [Human Rights Funders Network](#)

ANNEX B:
ADDITIONAL READING AND VISUAL REFERENCES

a. Short Videos

  i. International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) - Fletcher School Summer Institute for the Advanced Study of Nonviolent Conflict Presentations

  ii. USIP Nonviolent Action Program Events

b. Films

  i. A Force More Powerful

  ii. The Square

  iii. Orange Revolution

  iv. Civil Resistance: A First Look

  v. Eyes on the Prize

c. Books, Articles, and Blogs

  i. Why Civil Resistance Works

  ii. External Support for Nonviolent Action - An Evidence Review

  iii. Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements

  iv. The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns: Poisoned Chalice or Holy Grail?

  v. Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset

  vi. Time to Decolonise Aid: Insights and lessons from a global consultation

  vii. Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A playbook for countering the authoritarian threat

  viii. Supporting Nonviolent Action and Movements [for Anti-Corruption, Transparency, Accountability, and Good Governance]: A Guide for International Actors

  ix. Moving More Money to the Drivers of Change: How Bilateral and Multilateral Funders Can Resource Feminist Movements

  x. Toward a Feminist Funding Ecosystem

  xi. Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy Development Support

  xii. Alliance Magazine Social Movement Philanthropy Special Issue

  xiii. Crossover: Shifting from Civil Society Activism to Politics

  xiv. Sources, Functions, and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements