

SYLLABUS

Afghanistan and the U.S. “war of necessity”

Dr. Thomas P. Cavanna

Draft subject to revisions

Course information

- Fall 2017
- Class meetings: Mondays, 3:20 p.m.-5:20 p.m.
- Room: M235

Course description

- Despite a seemingly brilliant victory in the early days of the post-9/11 era, America’s campaign in Afghanistan has become the longest war in US history, with currently no end in sight. Balancing history, theory, and policy this seminar investigates the mechanisms and critical junctures that led to this entanglement. It explores the collision between the US-led coalition’s objectives, the lasting legacies of the Cold War and the specificities of Afghanistan’ society and regional dynamics. All along, we examine successes, failures, and ambiguities in light of history, theory, and policy, using a broad array of sources. Themes addressed include the war on terror, South Asia’s geopolitics, democratization, state-building, insurgencies, and (grand) strategy.

Instructor

- Dr. Thomas P. Cavanna, visiting assistant professor
- Prior to arriving at the Fletcher School, I was a postdoctoral fellow at Southern Methodist University (Tower Center) and a lecturer in international relations at the University of Pennsylvania. I hold a French “Agrégation” in history, a M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Sciences Po, a M.A. in Management from Audencia Business School, and a B.A. in Modern Literature from Paris III Sorbonne Nouvelle. I was also a Fox International Fellow at Yale University. I write widely on grand strategy and American foreign policy. I am the author of two books: *Hubris, Self-Interest, and America’s Failed War in Afghanistan: The Self-Sustaining Overreach* (Lexington, Rowan & Littlefield, 2015); and *Paradigmatic Volatility: US Foreign Policy towards India and Pakistan in the 1970s* (French National Committee for Scientific Research, 2017). I also published an article on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* (“Geopolitics over Proliferation: The Origins of U.S. Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia”, 2016) and various articles in France.

Office hours:

- Fridays, 10:00-11:30 p.m. (if any change, you will be updated in advance via email)

- 114 Curtis Street, conference room (immediately on the left when you enter); if the conference room is taken, I will be in my office on the 3rd floor
- If you can't come to my office hours, appointments are an option (please contact me in advance)

Readings

Required book (**buy it ASAP**):

- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 464 p.

Other readings (book chapters, scholarly articles, reports, op-eds):

- Available on Canvas
- OR
- Free access on the web

Assessment (**SUBJECT TO REVISIONS**)

Final grade (for regular Fletcher students):

- Participation (+ attendance, delays, behavior, responsiveness, etc.): 20 %
- Presentation (+ discussion): 30 %
- Reading response memos: 20 %
- Background briefing paper: 30 %
- NOTE: surprise tests on assigned readings are a possibility, I can also interrogate some of you on specific assigned readings

Requirements for auditing students:

- Participation (+ attendance, delays, behavior, responsiveness, etc.): 30 %
- Presentation (+ discussion): 30 %
- Reading response memos: 40%

Submissions:

- All assignments should be submitted to Thomas.cavanna@tufts.edu, not Canvas (if your Powerpoint/prezzi presentation is too large, send it in several pieces, I will reassemble it)

Participation (+ attendance, delays, behavior, responsiveness, etc.):

- Attention and active participation during class meetings
- Absences will be excused only if justified with documentation (doctor's note...) within a week
- Please arrive on time (part of the grade).

Reading Response Memos (on assigned readings):

- **SEE SPECIFIC GUIDELINES ON CANVAS**
- You will submit four reading response memos, two between week 2 and week 7, and the two others between week 8 and 12

- Each memo should be submitted on the eve of the corresponding session before 11:59 p.m.
- The memos should respond to the readings (**only the assigned readings, not the suggested ones**) for a given session. They should show that you read all the assigned readings but they should not summarize the readings: rather, the memos should demonstrate your critical thinking about the strengths and limitations of a set of readings.
- important note: these readings cannot be from weeks in which you are participating in a presentation

Presentation:

- **SEE SPECIFIC GUIDELINES ON CANVAS**
- Each presentation should explore its topic thoroughly and relate it to policy issues encountered by the US-led coalition
- Professional level is expected (format, audio-visual details, delivery, bibliography, attention to details, etc.) and will make a major difference on your grade
- A list of topics will be provided by mid-September

Background briefing paper

- **SPECIFIC GUIDELINES WILL BE POSTED ON CANVAS IN DUE COURSE**
- You brief an incoming official on a specific aspect of the war, investigating the problem from a historical/theoretical perspective and possibly providing policy recommendations

Academic integrity

- Every student must comply with Tufts' academic integrity policies (<https://students.tufts.edu/student-affairs/student-life-policies/academic-integrity-policy>)
- Failure to do so will have immediate consequences for one's success in this class, and possibly beyond it

WEEK 1: INTRODUCTION

Content

- Overview of the semester
- Afghanistan's geography
- Afghanistan as a "graveyard of empires"

Readings

Required:

- Syllabus

WEEK 2: GREAT GAME AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE AFGHAN STATE

Content

- Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan
- Anglo-Afghan wars
- Central power VS centrifugal forces
- Tradition VS modernity

Readings

Required:

- Go through the syllabus (please let me know if any questions)
- Edward Ingram, "Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction," *The International History Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1980), pp. 160-171.
- Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), "Anglo-Afghan Wars and State Building in Afghanistan," pp. 110-163.
- Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, "State, Tribe, and the International System," pp. 54-80; "Rentier State and Rentier Revolutionaries," pp. 81-105
- Thomas P. Cavanaugh, *Hubris, Self-Interest and America's Failed War in Afghanistan: The Self-Sustaining Overreach*, "US Cold War and Post-Cold War Policy," pp. 4-9
- Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State", in "History and September 11: A Special issue," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 89, n°2 (Sept. 2002), pp. 512-537.

Suggested:

- Gilles Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present* (London: Hurst, 2005), "The Socio-Genesis of the Afghan State," pp. 23-60.
- Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (Cambridge Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2009), "The Rise of Afghanistan," pp. 109-128.
- Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the war against the Taliban* (Cambridge Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2009), "The Great Game," pp. 129-154.
- Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the war against the Taliban* (Cambridge Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2009), "The Triumph of the Tribes," pp. 155-187.

WEEK 3: COLD WAR AND SOVIET EMBRACE

Content

- US/Soviet rivalry in Afghanistan till 1979
- Soviet intervention and agenda in Kabul

- Moscow's defeat: security, state-building, counter-insurgency

Readings

Required:

- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), "Descent into Violence," pp. 3-22, "The Mujahideen Era," pp. 23-40.
- William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), "The Development of the Afghan Resistance," pp. 48-70.
- Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Present Danger," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 27, Issue 19 (March 6, 1980).
- —, "Battling the Mujahideen," in Gregory Fremont-Barnes, ed., *A History of Counterinsurgency* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, ABC-CLIO, 2015), pp. 277-322.
- Bruce O. Riedel, "Comparing the US and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan," *CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)*, Vol. 2, Issue 5 (May 2009), pp. 1-3.
- Artemy Kalinovsky, "The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, # 60 (January 2010), pp. 8-38.

Suggested:

- Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), "The Islamist Defiance," pp. 299-326.
- Rodric Braithwaite, "The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," in Robert John, Timothy Clack, eds., *At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical, and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 196-213.

WEEK 4: THE US AND THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: VICTORY AND LEGACY

Content

- US successful anti-Soviet policies (1979-1989)
- US responsibilities in the region's destabilization
- Civil war (1989-1994)
- Washington and the Taliban (1994-2001)

Readings

Required:

- National Security Archives, "US Policy in Afghanistan (1973-1990)," <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html>
- Stephen F. Cohen, "Hard-Line Fallacies," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1980.

- Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), “The 1980s: The Reagan Offensive,” pp. 331-339 and 348-357 (skip the sections on the war in Nicaragua and on aid and trade)
- Thomas P. Cavanna, *Hubris, Self-Interest and America’s Failed war in Afghanistan: The Self-Sustaining Overreach*, “US Cold War and Post-Cold War Policy,” pp. 13-19
- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), “Uncivil War,” pp. 41-51.
- William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), “The Rise and Rule of the Taliban 1994-2001,” pp. 182-209.
- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), “Al Qaida’s strategic alliance,” pp. 69-86.
- Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), “Romancing the Taliban 1: The Battle for Pipelines 1994-1996,” pp. 157-169, “Romancing the Taliban 2: The Battle for Pipelines, 1997-1999 – the USA and the Taliban,” pp. 170-182.

Suggested:

- Shane A. Smith, “Afghanistan After the Occupation: Examining The Post-Soviet Withdrawal and The Najibullah Regime It Left Behind, 1989-1992,” *The Historian* (2014), pp. 308-343.
- Sean M. Maloney, “Army of Darkness: The Jihadist Training System in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1996-2001,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 26, Issue 3 (May 2015), pp. 518-541.

WEEK 5: 9/11 AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
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Content

- Clinton, Bush, and 9/11
- Onset of Operation Enduring Freedom
- The “light footprint” and its consequences

Readings

Required:

- Anthony R. DiMaggio, *Selling War, Selling Hope: Presidential Rhetoric, the News Media, and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 9/11* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), “The Rhetoric of Fear and Hope in Afghanistan,” pp. 17-25.
- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), “Operation Enduring Freedom,” pp. 86-108, “Light Footprint,” pp. 109-134, “Early Successes,” pp. 134-150.
- Peter Bergen, “The Battle of Tora Bora: The Account of How We Nearly Caught Osama bin Laden in 2001,” *The New Republic*, Dec. 30, 2009.

- Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), “September 11 attacks” pp. 209-218, “Collapse (2001-2003)”, pp. 219-236.
- Sumit Ganguly, S. Paul Kapur, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” *International Security*, Vol. 37, Issue 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 111-141 (you can stop at p. 132).
- Norimitsu Onishi, “A Nation Challenged: The New, Old Order; Afghan Warlords and Bandits are Back in Business,” *The New York Times*, Dec. 28, 2001.

Suggested:

- Gary C. Schroen, *First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York: Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2005) “Jawbreaker (26-28 September 2001),” pp. 85-118.
- Michael O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece: Assessing the Afghan Campaign,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, Issue 3 (May-June 2002), pp. 47-63.
- Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), “Collapse (2001-2003)”, pp. 236-260.

WEEK 6: AFGHANISTAN’S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS
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Content

- Foreign-led democratization: theory and practice
- Afghanistan’s first forays into democracy
- Hollow breakthroughs?

Readings

Required:

- Astri Suhrke, *When More is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), “Introduction: The Liberal Project,” pp. 1-18.
- Tony Smith, “Democracy Promotion from Roosevelt to Obama,” in eds. Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch, Nicolas Bouchet, *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 13-36.
- William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), “The Bonn Conference and Its Aftermath,” pp. 224-229.
- Carol Stabil, Deepa Kumar, “Unveiling Imperialism: Media, Gender and the War on Afghanistan,” *Media, Culture & Society*, Vol. 27, Issue 5 (Sept. 2005), pp. 765-782 (you don’t have to read the last section).
- Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” *International Security*, Vol. 37, Issue 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 90-107 (you don’t have to read the rest).
- Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec.1997), pp. 22-43.

- Antonio Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), “The Explosion of Peace in 2001: Bringing the Warlords Back In,” pp. 87-99.
- Sharon Otterman, “Afghanistan: The New Constitution,” Backgrounder, *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 3, 2005.
- John Sifton and International Herald Tribune, “Afghanistan: Flawed Charter for a Land Ruled by Fear,” *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 2004.
- Scott Seward Smith, “The 2004 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Smith, The 2004 presidential elections, pp. 1-5.
- —, “Afghanistan: Keep Promises to Afghan Women,” Human Rights Watch Report summary, Dec. 6, 2009.
- Scott Levi, “The Long, Long Struggle for Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” *Origins*, Vol. 2 Issue 12 (Sept. 2009).
- Lakdhar Brahimi, “Reflections on UN Experience in Afghanistan,” in eds. Rami G. Khouri, Karim Makdisi, Martin Wählisch, *Interventions in Conflict: International Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), pp. 23-36.

Suggested:

- Matthew Alan Hill, “International Actors and Democratization: Can USAID Deliver a Democratic Culture to Afghanistan?” *International Relations*, Vol. 24, Issue 2 (June 2010), pp. 155-167 (you don’t have to read the rest).
- Romain Malejacq, “Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan,” pp. 31-43, in eds. Gale Mattox, Stephen Grenier, *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 31-43.

WEEK 7: AFGHANISTAN’S STATEBUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION

Content

- Foreign-led state-building and reconstruction: theory and practice
- Afghanistan: a misfit for Western ambitions?
- The US-led coalition’s agenda: promises and ambiguities
- Hollow breakthroughs?

Readings

Required:

- Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008), “Afghanistan I: Economic Reconstruction,” pp. 171-195, “Afghanistan II: Rebuilding Security,” pp. 196-218.
- Thomas P. Cavanna, *Hubris, Self-Interest and America’s Failed war in Afghanistan: The Self-Sustaining Overreach*, “The Promises and Profound Ambiguities of the US-Led Reconstruction and State-Building Agenda,” pp. 131-140.

- Jonathan Goodhand, Mark Sedra (2010), “Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” *Disasters*, Vol. 34 (Jan. 2010), pp. 78-102.
- Peter Marsden, *Afghanistan: Aid, Armies, and Empires* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, distributed in the USA by Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), “The Relationship Between US Strategy and the Aid Process,” pp. 117-136.
- Conor Keane, Glenn Diesen, “Divided We Stand: The US Foreign Policy Bureaucracy and Nation-Building in Afghanistan,” *International Peacekeeping*, May 14, 2015, pp. 205-229.
- ___, “Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the US Experience in Afghanistan,” SIGAR Report, “Introduction,” pp. 1-14, “Failure to Fully Appreciate the Corruption Threat: 2001-2008,” pp. 15-30.

Suggested:

- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), “Collapse of Law and Order,” pp. 163-182.
- Sarah Chayes, Interview with Bill Moyers, from 7m20, <http://billmoyers.com/content/sarah-chayes-on-rebuilding-afghanistan/>
- Fariba Nawa, “Afghanistan, Inc.,” Corpwatch Investigative Report, October 2006, pp. 1-28.

WEEK 8: AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY DEGRADATION

Content

- The enemy’s resurgence: terrorism and insurgency
- Pakistan’s growing instability
- US-led coalition’s setbacks

Readings

Required:

- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), “The logics of insurgency,” pp. 151-162, “The Perfect Storm,” pp. 203-222; “A Three-Front War,” pp. 223-237; “National Caveats,” pp. 238-255; “The Water Must Boil,” pp. 256-278, “Al-Qa’ida: A Force Multiplier,” pp. 279-295.
- Matt Waldman, “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of US Policy-Making Errors in Afghanistan,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, Issue 4 (July 2013), pp. 825-843 (read only to p. 840).
- Moeed Yusuf, “Pakistan’s Militancy Challenge: From Where to What.” in Moeed Yusuf, ed., *Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenge* (Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 15-46

Suggested:

- Gilles Dorransoro, *The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2009), pp. 4-32.

- Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), "In the Eye of the Storm," pp. 296-312.
- Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalachnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), "Sources of the Insurgency," pp. 11-32.
- Tim Foxley, "The Taliban's Propaganda Activities: How Well is the Afghan Insurgency Communicating and What Is It Saying?," SIPRI Project Paper, June 2007, pp. 1-19.

WEEK 9: OBAMA, "AFPAK" AND THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE SURGE

Content

- Policy debates during the Bush-Obama transition
- Obama's strategic review
- The surge: promises and ambiguities

Readings

Required:

- Fotini Christina, Michael Semple, "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, Issue 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2009), pp. 34-45.
- C. Raja Mohan, "How Obama Can Get South Asia Right," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Issue 2 (April 2009), pp. 173-189.
- Barnett R. Rubin, Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, Issue 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2008), pp. 30-44.
- Rory Stewart, "The 'Good War' isn't worth Fighting," *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 2008.
- Sarah Chayes, "Clean Up the Afghan Government, and the Taliban Will Fade Away," *The Washington Post*, Opinion, Dec. 14, 2008.
- Stanley McChrystal, "COMISAF's Initial Assessment," Aug. 30, 2009 (to the end of the intro, pp. 1-18 of the PDF).
- Thomas P. Cavanna, *Hubris, Self-Interest and America's Failed war in Afghanistan: The Self-Sustaining Overreach*, "The Obama Era: New Intentions Same Old Strategic Intentions," pp. 193-224.
- Peter Spiegel, Jonathan Weisman, "Behind Afghan War Debate, a Battle of Two Books Rages," *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 7, 2009.
- Kevin Marsh, "Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 10, Issue 3 (July 2014), pp. 265-288
- Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," *Rolling Stones*, Issue 1108/1109, (July 8-22, 2010).
- Thomas Barfield, Neamatollah Nojumi, "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability," *Middle East Policy*, Vol.17, Issue 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 40-52.

Suggested:

- Jeffrey H. Michaels, *The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), “The Surge, from Iraq to Afghanistan,” pp. 147-166.

WEEK 10: THE “NEW COIN” APPLIED TO AFGHANISTAN

Content

- Counter-insurgency: history (Vietnam, Iraq, etc.) and features
- Emergence of the “new COIN” in America’s national security apparatus
- An overhyped concept?

Readings

Required:

- David Petraeus, James Amos, *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 2006), “Foreword” and “Chapter 1: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency”, pp. 1-29 of the manual (pp. 13-42 of the PDF)
- Montgomery McFate, Janice H. Laurence, “Introduction: Unveiling the Human Terrain System,” in Montgomery McFate, Janice H. Laurence, eds., *Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 1-44.
- Celeste Ward Gventer, M.L.R. Smith, D. Jones, “Minting New COIN: Critiquing Counter-Insurgency Theory,” in eds. Celeste Ward Gventer, M.L.R. Smith, David Martin Jones, *The New Counter-Insurgency Era in Critical Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), pp. 9-31.
- Jeffrey Michaels, “Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unspoken Paradox of Large-Scale Expeditionary COIN,” in eds. Celeste Ward Gventer, M.L.R. Smith, David Martin Jones, *The New Counter-Insurgency Era in Critical Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), pp. 58-81.
- Gian Gentile, “The Selective Use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Army History*, Vol. 72 (Summer 2009), pp. 21-35.
- Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine”, *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 302, Issue 3 (Oct. 2008), pp. 17-18, 20.
- Maren Tomforde, “How Much Culture is Needed? The Intercultural Dilemma of the Bundeswehr in ISAF,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, Issue 4 (Oct. 2010), pp. 526-538.
- Sergio Catignani “‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 35, Issue 4 (April 2012), pp. 513-539.

Suggested:

- Michael O’Hanlon, “Staying Power: The US mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, Issue 5 (Sept.-Oct. 2010), pp. 63-79.

- Torunn Laugen Haaland, “The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007-2012,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 39, Issue 7 (Dec. 2016), pp. 999-1022.
- Thanassis Cambanis, “How We Fight: Fred Kaplan’s ‘Insurgents’ on David Petraeus, Book Review, *New York Times*, Jan. 24, 2013.

WEEK 11: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SURGE: DISAPPOINTING RESULTS

Content

- Results of the surge

Readings

Required:

- John A. Nagl, Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Strategy Begins to Make Gains,” *Politico*, Dec. 6, 2011.
- Frederick W. Kagan, “A Case for Staying the Course,” in Hy Rothstein, John Arquilla, eds. *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War*, eds. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 97-114.
- Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), pp. 134-147.
- Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine: The Other Side of the COIN,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, Issue 5 (Sept. 1, 2013), p. 59-74.
- C.J. Chivers, “Marines Do Heavy Lifting as Afghan Army Lags in Battle,” *New York Times*, Feb. 20, 2010.
- Jonathan Gilmore, “A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism: Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, Issue 1 (Feb. 2011), pp. 21-37.
- Andrew J. Bacevich, “A Case for Withdrawal,” in Hy Rothstein, John Arquilla, eds. *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War*, eds. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 85-96.
- Stephen P. Cohen, “Failure in AfPak: How the U.S. Got It Wrong,” *The National Interest*, July 15, 2011, pp. 1-3.
- ___, “Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the US Experience in Afghanistan,” SIGAR Report, “A Call to Action,” pp. 31-45.
- Christophe Jaffrelot, “US-Pakistan Relations Under Obama: Resilience or Clientelism?” in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), pp. 219-279.

Suggested:

- Trevor McKrisken, “Justifying Sacrifice: Barack Obama and the Selling and Ending of the War in Afghanistan,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, Issue 5 (Sept. 2012), pp. 993-1007.

- Elizabeth Bumiller, "U.S. Tries to Reintegrate Taliban Soldiers," *New York Times*, May 23, 2010.
- Leonard Cutler, "President Barack Obama's Counterterrorism Strategy and Legacy: The Case of Afghanistan," *PS-Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 50, Issue 1 (Jan. 2017), pp. 59-63.
- Robert D. Blackwill, "Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition is the Least Bad Option," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, Issue 2 (Jan.-Feb. 2011), pp. 42-50.
- Conrad C. Crane, *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2016), "Witches and Wizards Revealed: The COIN Wave Recedes," pp. 213-239.
- Elke Krahnemann, "NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: The Problem of Principal-Agent Networks," *International Affairs*, Vol. 92, Issue 6 (Nov. 2016), pp. 1401-1426.
- Peter Bergen, Jennifer Rowland, "Drone Wars," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 6, Issue 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 7-26.

<p>WEEK 12: OBAMA'S DRAWDOWN: ENDING THE LONGEST WAR IN US HISTORY?</p>
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Content

- Security transition and path to coalition withdrawal
- Negotiating with the Taliban: history and prospects
- Afghanistan in the wider regional context
- Persistent insecurity
- Persistent development and political problems

Readings

Required:

- Timothy Clack, Robert Johnson, "Introduction: Principles, Themes, and Problems in Transitions," in Robert John, Timothy Clack, eds., *At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical, and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 1-53.
- Thomas P. Cavanna, *Hubris, Self-Interest and America's Failed war in Afghanistan: The Self-Sustaining Overreach*, "Afghanistan in 2015: Betrayed Promises," (only the two first sections).
- Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, "Afghanistan in 2015: A Year of Fragmentation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 56, Issue 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2016), pp. 187-198.
- Vali Nasr, "The Inside Story of How the White House Let Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy (online)*, March 4, 2013, pp. 1-22.
- James Dobbins, Carter Malkasian, "Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan How to Talk to the Taliban," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94, Issue 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2015), pp. 53-64.
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- Michael Clarke, “China in Afghanistan: Navigating a ‘Terrain of Hazards’ in Search of Geopolitical Opportunity?” in Amin Saikal, Kirill Nourzhanov, *Afghanistan and its Neighbors after the NATO Withdrawal* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 163-178.

Suggested:

- Kirill Nourzhanov, “Russia’s Afghanistan Policy after 2014: Staying at an Arm’s Length and Preparing for the Worst,” in Amin Saikal, Kirill Nourzhanov, *Afghanistan and its Neighbors after the NATO Withdrawal* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 163-178.
- Shahram Akbarzadeh, “A New Phase in Relations Between Iran and Afghanistan,” in Amin Saikal, Kirill Nourzhanov, *Afghanistan and its Neighbors after the NATO Withdrawal* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 35-48.
- Saurabh Kumar, “Indian Engagement in Afghanistan (Post-2001): A Critical Analysis,” in Arpita Basu Roy, ed., *Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Domestic and Regional Dynamics* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), pp. 162-185.
- ___, “Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the US Experience in Afghanistan,” SIGAR Report, “A Limited US Government Response to Corruption, 2010-2014,” pp. 47-70.

WEEK 13: CONCLUSION, LATEST POLICY DEVELOPMENTS, AND PROSPECTS

Content

- Recent developments
- Current policy debates
- Conclusion

Readings (likely to be updated following policy developments)

Required:

- Stephen Walt, “Condemned to Repeat It: Why Washington’s Foreign Policymakers Desperately Need to Study Up on Their History,” *Foreign Policy*, March 10, 2014.
- Christina Lamb, “A Return to the Dark,” *Wilson Quarterly*, Summer 2014.
- Michael G. Waltz, “No Retreat: The American Legacy in Afghanistan Does Not Have to Be Defeat,” *War on the Rocks*, May 12, 2017.
- Michael O’Hanlon, “Time for a (mini) Surge in Afghanistan,” *Brookings*, May 17, 2017.
- Stephen Tankel, “Back to the First Principles: Four Fundamental Questions About Afghanistan,” *War on the Rocks*, May 15, 2017.
- Barnett R. Rubin, “Why More Troops Won’t Help Afghanistan,” *The New Yorker*, June 5, 2017.
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- M. Nazif Shahrani, “US Policies and Practices toward Afghanistan and Central Asia Since 2001,” in Amin Saikal, Kirill Nourzhanov, *Afghanistan and its Neighbors after the NATO Withdrawal* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 17-32.

- Barnett R. Rubin “It’s Bigger Than Afghanistan: US Strategy for A Transformed Region,” *War on the Rocks*, April 25, 2017.
- Barry R. Posen, “It’s Time to Make Afghanistan Someone Else’s Problem,” *The Atlantic*, Aug. 18, 2017.
- C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan’s Anxieties Are Incurable, So Stop Trying to Cure Them,” *War on the Rocks*, June 21, 2017.
- Molly Dunigan, “The Future of US Military Contracting: Current Trends and Future Implications,” *International Journal*, Vol. 69, Issue 4 (Dec. 2014), pp. 510-524.
- Doctors without borders, “Between Rhetoric and Reality: The Ongoing Struggle to Access Healthcare in Afghanistan,” Report, February 2014, pp. 1-55.
- Sam Lebovic, “Limited War in the Age of Total Media,” in Beth Bailey, Richard Immerman, eds., *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), pp. 220-237.

Suggested:

- Aaron B. O’Connell, “Veterans’ Readjustment After the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars,” in Beth Bailey, Richard Immerman, eds., *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), pp. 261-285.

