

# CENTER for STRATEGIC STUDIES

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## MILITARY INTERVENTION PROJECT @CSSFletcher



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**FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY  
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES  
THE MILITARY INTERVENTION CONFERENCE REPORT**

## **Overview**

In Fall 2019, the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) hosted its inaugural Military Intervention conference. This conference brought together academics and policy experts whose research canvasses many facets of international intervention. The event began on October 4 with a welcome by Tufts University President Anthony Monaco and Fletcher School Dean Rachel Kyte, followed by a keynote discussion with Ambassador Thomas Pickering. The discussion between Professor Toft and Ambassador Pickering centered around the topic of military intervention as a challenge to diplomacy. The remarks highlighted how the profession of the foreign service has changed over Ambassador Pickering's long career serving in (nearly) every continent. Throughout the Keynote, the Ambassador reiterated that Foreign Service Officers are strategists and implementers of US foreign policy who must prioritize serving the national interest. Ambassador Pickering answered questions from the Fletcher community, conference participants, and Pickering Fellows (students from several Boston universities funded by the U.S. Department of State, in preparation for future Foreign Service careers). Overall, more than 80 people attended the Opening Session of the conference.

The next day, October 5, the conference panelists and audience gathered to discuss topics ranging from US military intervention, covert and drone strikes, international humanitarian interventions, western interventions, historical trajectories of intervention, post-conflict involvement and peacekeeping, and cybersecurity as intervention. The five panels on Saturday were comprised of the leading experts in their respective fields who addressed a wide scope of challenges presented by the tendency towards "kinetic diplomacy" and possible directions in future policy development. The conference sought to update academic and public understandings of military missions by exploring definitions of intervention, types of intervention (e.g. conventional, covert, cyber and maritime) and the empirical record of this foreign policy choice by states, historically and in the contemporary period. More than 70 faculty, students, alumni and guests participated in the panels and discussion.

By gathering top academic and policy experts, the conference prompted vital debates on the short-term and long-term costs of the usage of force and provided specific cases of intervention across the eras. A particularly innovative panel on cybersecurity addressed the question of whether cyber might be considered an issue of intervention. This panel discussed contemporary and future cyber conflicts and deterrence, the measures needed to promote the peaceful use of cyberspace, international agreements on information protection and cybersecurity, and the rise of cybersecurity attacks as part of states' foreign policy tools. In addition to the cybersecurity discussions, the empirical, theoretical and policy findings from this event also apply to drones and covert special operations missions undertaken since 2001, which remains a highly underexplored topic in both academic and policy circles. Below are the conference objectives and outcomes in more detail.

***Objectives:***

- Promote debate on costs, gains, and trade-offs of military intervention.
- Derive a new definition for military interventions in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, to include drones, covert operations, and the threat of force.
- Advance knowledge networks on military intervention.
- Promote in-depth study of military interventions.
- Create a central body of literature, data and cutting-edge research on military intervention.

***Outcomes:***

- A volume of conference proceedings, including policy memos and blog posts on individual conference panels, showcased via an interactive website platform.
- A new, interactive community of scholars and policy makers carving out a distinct sub-field within International Relations and National and International Security issue.
- A platform for dialogue on the nature and consequences of the usage of force abroad.
- The formation of new bridges across academic and policy arenas in matters of foreign policy and security, broadly defined.
- The introduction of CSS and the Military Intervention project to a broad academic and policy audience.

Ultimately, the Military Intervention conference concluded that the U.S. relies too heavily on the use of force, to the detriment of its own international image, credibility, diplomatic efforts, and domestic resources. Moreover, the effects of intervention on the target states are predominantly negative, with the exception of robust peacekeeping missions, which can minimize conflict, instability, and the reoccurrence of violence. In addition, all conference attendees agreed on the importance of collecting and disseminating new data and measures on patterns, costs, and outcomes of military interventions across time and countries. Given current trends, the main takeaway from the event was that that the U.S. and its Western partners must recalibrate its foreign policies away from military intervention, for the benefit of the international community and their own domestic politics.

## PANEL SUMMARIES

### **The Opening Plenary of the Military Intervention Conference with Ambassador Pickering**

By Jackie Faselt

The Military Intervention Conference opened on October 4 with introductory remarks from the president of Tufts University, Anthony Monaco, and the dean of The Fletcher School, Rachel Kyte. Both praised the Center for Strategic Studies and the Military Intervention Project (MIP), highlighting a greater need for data in informing policy, especially in a political climate characterized by carelessness with facts.

The keynote conversation between Ambassador Thomas Pickering and CSS Director Monica Toft highlighted the challenges military interventions can pose for diplomacy. Pickering reflected on his long career served on nearly every continent and how the U.S. Foreign Service has changed. Throughout the keynote, the ambassador emphasized that Foreign Service officers are strategists and implementers of U.S. foreign policy who must always prioritize the national interest.

Much of the conversation covered the intersection between military intervention and diplomacy. Pickering noted that when the United States enters a conflict, the military spends a small portion of its efforts on preparing to operate in a specific political context, and much more on warfighting with little thought given to the termination of conflict and its effects. Instead, the ambassador proposed that a significant amount of effort should be spent trying to avoid the use of military force. Should it come to this final option, much more thought needs to be given to how diplomacy can shape the conflict. The goals of a military intervention should be to apply appropriate pressure to enable diplomatic efforts to take shape. When asked to give an example of an intervention with a positive outcome, the ambassador pointed to the effective cooperation in the UN Security Council and U.S. alliances in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Pickering pointed to the second American incursion into Iraq in 2003 as an example of an intervention with a negative outcome, nonetheless stressing that he has nothing but respect for those who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

With many of the State Department Pickering Fellows from Fletcher in attendance, Toft asked the ambassador to give advice to students planning on joining the Foreign Service. Pickering acknowledged that now is a hard time to join the service, and that while younger people may find themselves being promoted more quickly out of organizational necessity, he cautioned that there is no substitute for knowledge gained from experience.

The ambassador ended the talk by answering questions from students and conference panelists on topics ranging from issue linkages in international negotiations to the role of the United States in post-conflict reconstruction. The keynote conversation with Ambassador Pickering was an impressive start to the conference and set up a thought-provoking framework for the panels the following day.

## **Panel 1: Types and Patterns of Intervention**

By Emilio Contreras and Ruijingya Tang

On Saturday October 5, The Fletcher School's Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) post-doctoral fellow Karim Elkady led a panel examining types and patterns of military intervention. The panel included Benjamin Denison, Post-Doctoral Fellow at the CSS; Jeffrey Friedman, Assistant Professor at Dartmouth; and Lise Morjé Howard, Associate Professor at Georgetown. The panel discussed intervention patterns and outcomes as determined by intervention type. It also analyzed the impact of intervention choices on both the target state and intervener goals.

The discussion on peacekeeping, led by Professor Howard, emphasized effectiveness and its distinction from other traditional forms of intervention. According to Howard, literature surrounding the efficacy of peace-keeping missions are divided between qualitative and quantitative research. Qualitative research mostly focus on negative unintentional consequences of peacekeeping missions, such as sexual abuse, spread of diseases, and economic disruption. Quantitative research on peacekeeping surveys all effects of peacekeeping operations, thus yielding more positive conclusions. Close to 30 published quantitative studies have demonstrated correlations between peacekeeping and fewer military and civilian deaths, geographic contraction of conflict, shorter civil wars, less gender-based war violence, and better post-conflict institutions and growth of civil societies.

Professor Howard stated that peacekeeping is a fundamentally different paradigm than counterinsurgency with a focus on consensus-building and impartiality rather than persuasion and coercion. She also identified three major ways that peacekeepers exercise power: persuasion, inducing, and coercion. Peacekeepers often persuade verbally through nonmaterial means such as mediating disputes.

By contrast, to induce behavior, peacekeepers employ material measures in a “carrot and stick” manner, utilizing humanitarian assistance as well as market restrictions. Without the capacity and the legitimacy to coerce, peacekeepers may benefit from co-deployed small military forces as de-facto means of coercion. Amidst her recognition of the merits of peacekeeping missions, Howard also identified one shortcoming of U.S. peacekeeping operations—the “habit” of the creation of impractical ethnocracies instead of democracies. Howard implied that though creating ethnocracies is arguably a historical tendency, the U.S. needs to remodel its behavior.

Professor Friedman examined the decision-making habits of leaders who initiate interventions. He posited two main theories. First was the construal-level theory, that policymakers divide goals into short-term and long-term ones, thereby creating a divide between desired and feasible outcomes. Decision-makers may look to maximize the relative likelihood of success given a particular policy, but without consideration for the objective likelihood of success, a maximized chance may still be a small one. Second is the “good doctor” theory, that policymakers will want to “get caught trying” thereby defaulting to action when considering costs and benefits of a potential intervention.

Benjamin Denison addressed the role of institutions in the outcome of interventions. Denison argued that the likes of past U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan would likely occur in the future, despite a possible drop in American willingness to conduct such occupations. According to

Denison, U.S. military often become trapped in unanticipated lengthy occupations upon arriving in foreign territories for smaller intervention operations. In many cases, the U.S. military had to build the political infrastructure necessary for the success of their intended small-scale missions by themselves, leading to lengthy state-building interventions in foreign countries.

When asked whether interventions for the purpose of regime change would continue in the future, Denison stated that they likely would, though perhaps not under the same terminology. Denison believes future U.S. occupation or regime-change operations might adopt new names, such as “territory administration” and “stability activities.” He further argued that such interventions are often tempting to policymakers who wish to dispense with diplomacy altogether, electing instead to install a new regime understood to be “friendlier” to the intervener. In analyzing the costs of such an intervention, Denison argued that local institutions are key to the post-war phase of an intervention, and that weak partners can limit or even cause failure in interventions.

## **Panel 2: Costs of Intervention**

By Drew Hogan

The second panel of the Military Intervention Conference examined the costs of intervention. Chaired by Sidita Kushi, a postdoctoral fellow with the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), the panel included Jon Askonas of the Catholic University of America, Rebecca Lissner of the U.S. Naval War College, Kaija Schilde of Boston University, and Patricia Sullivan of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The discussion focused on the “hidden” costs of military interventions. Askonas discussed the long-term domestic costs of interventions, including the non-monetary costs, such as substance abuse and PTSD among veterans that have served abroad. He emphasized that even though the casualties from foreign interventions are relatively low, many veterans are left with lifelong injuries and disabilities.

Lissner discussed the future of U.S. military interventions, arguing that as unipolarity diminishes, military interventions will become a smaller part of U.S. grand strategy. The unipolar period created significant incentives for the United States to conduct military interventions abroad as the costs—including opportunity costs—were relatively low. But as other powers begin to exert a stronger influence on the world stage, the costs of U.S. intervention will increase, reducing their frequency.

U.S. military interventions also have a significant impact on the target country. Sullivan emphasized the public health problems that afflict target countries. Unlike military costs, which are generally short-term, public health costs often do not peak until several decades after the intervention. The countries ravaged by the Vietnam War decades ago, for example, are continuing to see significant medical costs to the present day.

Schilde described how military spending can also distort the wider economy, arguing that significant military spending during periods of growth can create far-reaching drag on the economy. Furthermore, attempts at state building, which sometimes follow U.S. military interventions, often have unforeseen negative economic consequences on the target state.

The opportunity costs of interventions also featured prominently in the discussion. Lissner argued that the overwhelming dominance of the military in conducting U.S. foreign policy needs to be re-examined. Future great power competition, which may take the form of “grey zone” competition, will require U.S. military and diplomatic capabilities to adapt.

Sullivan noted that an overreliance on the U.S. military has created a negative cycle. The United States invests significant resources in the military, to the point that it has become the most efficient and functional institution in the U.S. government. As a result, the military is continually asked to solve an ever-increasing array of problems beyond its traditional expertise. There was consensus on the panel that this trend should be countered with greater resources put into diplomacy. The panelists also agreed that a hyper-fixation on fighting radical Islamic terrorism has diminished the focus on other problems that also threaten the security of the United States, such as climate change and domestic terrorism.

A participant raised the question of how the American public can be engaged as responsible

stakeholders in controlling the costs of military interventions. Sullivan suggested that hollowing out the State Department does not help the American government think critically about the long-term effects of interventions. Furthermore, the continual appointment of non-experts to prominent government positions does not encourage long-term thinking.

Overall, there was widespread agreement among the panelists that the costs of U.S. military interventions are significant, and that scholars are starting to uncover many of the “hidden” costs in areas like public health, economic growth, the environment, and others. The panel closed with many of its speakers expressing hope that military interventions would become a less significant part of U.S. grand strategy in the future.



### **Panel 3: Non-Traditional Interventions**

By Grady Jacobsen

The third panel of the Military Intervention Conference focused on non-traditional interventions. The panel, chaired by Lindsay O'Rourke of Boston College, included insights from Neha Ansari, a Fletcher PhD candidate studying drone warfare, Jonathan Schroden, an analyst from CNA, James Siebens, a researcher at the Stimson Center, and retired Colonel Frank Sobchak, an expert on U.S. Special Forces and Fletcher PhD candidate.

As Sun Tzu wrote, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” and Siebens explained that one of the least traditional types of intervention is not intervening at all. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military adopted what Siebens calls a “military operation other than war” doctrine. This new kind of peacekeeping was focused on deterrence, presence, and crisis response, and required practices such as forward troop deployments, engaging in security assistance operations with allied host nations, and conducting joint military operations to signal a readiness and willingness to fight whenever necessary.

When the United States does need to use force, one of the preferred methods in recent decades has been special operations. Sobchak detailed the strengths and weaknesses of both direct action forces and indirect action forces—two key components of special operations employed by the United States. Direct operations include what one might expect—highly trained and motivated military units that disrupt enemy operations to buy time for larger strategic efforts. Policymakers often mistake this short-term tactic for long-term strategy because of the clear, measurable results they produce, which reinforces overreliance and presents legal, ethical, and psychological challenges that the United States has yet to fully address.

Indirect action forces, on the other hand, center their efforts on “hearts and minds” operations. Building civil society, fostering good governance, and promoting effective peaceful messaging often overlaps with and enhances the effects of public diplomacy. However, competition for funding has resulted in an even greater imbalance between the State and Defense Departments and there are now more military Psychological Civil Affairs Officers than there are Foreign Service Officers.

Another tactic that is consistently confused with strategy is drone warfare. As armed Predator drones have grown increasingly effective against non-state terrorist groups, the risk of overuse has skyrocketed. And although the use of drones has significantly reduced both the political and casualty risks to U.S. personnel, Schroden argues they address “exactly zero” of the on-the-ground conditions that create extremist groups in the first place. Ansari added that although her case study showed local populations in Pakistan actually support the U.S. drone offensive against the Taliban (who they also oppose), as soon as drones target someone that is not a shared enemy, she would expect the public backlash to be swift and severe.

Furthermore, although increased precision, better intelligence, and tighter rules of engagement have made drones safer for local populations, the potential for civilian casualty remains and good strategy still requires boots on the ground that can hold territory and provide security. Preferably, those boots would belong to local military partners rather than U.S. soldiers and marines.

In the question and answer session, the panelists agreed that the most serious consequences of a foreign policy that relies too heavily on non-traditional interventions are the erosion of international norms concerning national sovereignty and the potential of losing sight of long-term policy objectives. Some future challenges they identified were a likely increase in international aggression as technological advances lower the barrier for entry and increase plausible deniability for bad actors.

#### **Panel 4: Kinetic Diplomacy**

By Mario Zampaglione

The fourth panel of the Military Intervention Conference focused on the intricacies and implications of “kinetic diplomacy,” a term coined by Monica Toft to describe America’s overreliance on the use of military force. The panel was led by Professor Toft and featured Alan Henrikson, emeritus professor of diplomatic history at The Fletcher School, David Vine, professor at American University, Jacqueline Hazelton, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, and Bridget Coggins, professor at UC Santa Barbara and a fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)

Henrikson presented an analysis of the relationship between diplomacy and war. Throughout the twentieth century the relationship has expressed itself in three different forms: diplomats among warriors, warriors as diplomats, and diplomats at war. However, since the end of the Cold War the relationship has devolved. Henrikson links this devolution to the U.S. electorate’s skepticism of diplomats, which contrasts with its high levels of trust in the military. Thus, making use of military force is more politically viable than before.

For Vine, the United States’ reliance on military force largely predates the end of the Cold War. Vine argues that following the end of World War II, the United States consistently presented itself abroad as militarily dominant, establishing itself as a state primarily focused on national security. Vine points to the immensity of the military-industrial-congressional complex and how it has defined American foreign policy. The Pentagon’s ballooning budget and the more than 800 military bases spread throughout the world are a stark comparison to the modest and dwindling resources afforded to the State Department. Coupled with the 5.9 trillion dollars spent and more than 1.3 million lives lost in the global war on terror since 9/11, there is evidence to suggest “U.S. foreign policy is war.”

Hazelton made a more narrow critique of U.S. foreign policy. In her discussion of the United States’ implementation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) policy initiatives, Hazelton argues that while the policy goals under R2P are worthy, using military force has proven ineffective. The military’s willingness to accept non-military missions, coupled with an institutional aversion to risking failure, has led military R2P programs to promote absolutist strategies such as regime change, which has given rise to the return of great power competition.

Drawing on observations from the Middle East and North Africa, Hazelton explains that by using kinetic diplomacy, the United States has destabilized local leadership to maximize its ability to implement R2P policies. The toppling of regimes to promote U.S. policies recreates the spheres of influence that defined great power politics during the Cold War. Hazelton’s prescription involves breaking the country’s reliance on using the military to implement worthy diplomatic objectives. Instead, the United States should support multilateral institutions, promote Track II diplomacy, and build channels of communication to improve the livelihoods of people on the ground.

The final panelist neatly tied together the discussion by harkening back to the typology of relationships between war and diplomacy that Henrikson presented earlier. “Diplomacy and war are intertwined,” said Coggins. The United States prefers to use violence to engage with terrorist or insurgent groups. She noted that there exists a taboo against diplomatically engaging with insurgent

groups that forces military actions, with dangerous spillover effects.

For Coggins, America's overreliance on kinetic diplomacy is ill fitted to a global environment in which diplomacy has become easier to conduct than ever before. The internet era has spawned a plethora of communication technologies that could be harnessed as diplomatic tools. Terrorist organizations are using these tools to recruit, expand, and grow their financial resources. The United States, however, in focusing on the military over its diplomatic forces, has hollowed out the expertise needed to weaken such groups.

## **Panel 5: Cyber, Digital, and Information Security**

By Lionel Oh

The final panel of the Military Intervention Conference featured a lively discussion about cyber intervention. Chaired by Tufts Political Science Professor Jeffrey Taliaferro, the panel included Ivan Arreguin-Toft, a director and lecturer at Brown University, Major Amanda Current, a Fletcher PhD student, Peter Dombrowski, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, and Josephine Wolff, a cybersecurity policy professor at The Fletcher School. The panelists delved into topics such as conceptualizing cyber interventions, measuring threats in the cyber domain in a way comparable to conventional security threats, and exploring the roles of state and non-state actors in securing cyberspace.

On thinking about cyber as a domain of interventions, the various panelists grappled with the very nature and capabilities of cyber operations. On one hand, cyber capabilities can be thought of as enablers of conventional military operations, and in this respect the fundamental factors driving its associated logics and calculi should not differ much from those of traditional military interventions. On the other hand, cyber can be thought of as a standalone tool for intervention. This raises questions about the efficacy of its use (is it able to achieve the same objectives as conventional force?), the legitimacy of various targets including civilian, political, and military ones, the extent of its kinetic and non-kinetic impacts, and the stakeholders involved in the conduct of such operations. Central to the discussion was an appreciation of the pervasive and interconnected nature of cyberspace, which results in a state of persistent and constant engagement between the different actors, with strategic implications for all operations conducted within the cyber realm.

This conversation segued into the challenge of measuring threats to cyber, digital, and information security in a way that is comprehensive and compatible with our understanding of traditional security threats. The panelists ultimately acknowledged the difficulty of the task, recognizing the all-encompassing nature of cyber threats and their capability to affect strategic political change at larger scales and with lower costs than traditional military interventions. These could take the form of threats to critical infrastructure, intellectual property, espionage, and even societal institutions. To that end, there was general consensus among the panelists that current models for understanding cyber threats were limited in their inherent inclinations towards direct, kinetic, and tactical operations that had clear monetary costs and were conducted by state actors. Existing threat models would thus have to deal with cyber on its own terms, and increase their apertures to account for strategic-level cyber activities, and even activities not within the cyber domain. That said, threat perceptions vary wildly among states and other actors, so prioritization of these threats in consideration of individual interests and circumstances will be crucial.

This naturally led to the question of what roles great powers and international organizations have in securing the cyber and digital space. There has not been any consensus thus far within the international community on what a secure cyberspace would look like. Compounding this problem are the divergent perspectives and strategies employed by Russia, China, and the United States within the cyber realm, stemming from their respective political conditions and domestic and foreign interests. The panelists also expressed worries over the possibility that Western dominance of cyberspace is being challenged and undermined by companies and state actors that do not share compatible values. Progress on codifying norms for operating within cyberspace has been stymied;

increasingly, norms are emerging through state practice instead. It has become important, then, for nations to think hard about resilience, both in terms of infrastructure and societal attitudes to potential threats.

The Military Intervention Conference  
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## PROGRAM

**October 4, 2019**

**Location:** *ASEAN Auditorium*

5 – 7 PM

### **Opening session**

*Welcome remarks by:*

President Anthony Monaco, Tufts University

Dean Rachel Kyte, The Fletcher School

Keynote discussion

*“Military Intervention as a Challenge to Diplomacy”*

Ambassador Thomas Pickering in conversation with

Professor Monica Duffy Toft

7 – 9 PM

Dinner for conference speakers

**Location:** *Cabot 703*



## The Military Intervention Conference Program

**October 5, 2019**

**Location:** *Coolidge Room in Ballou Hall*

- 8 – 8:45 AM                      Registration
- 8:45 – 9 AM                      Welcome remarks by Monica Duffy Toft, CSS Fletcher
- 9 – 10:15 AM                      **Panel 1: Types and Patterns of Intervention**  
Chair: Karim Elkady, CSS Fletcher  
- Ben Denison, CSS Fletcher  
- Jeffrey Friedman, Dartmouth College  
- Lise Morje Howard, Georgetown University
- 10:15 – 10:30 AM                      Break
- 10:30 - 11:45 AM                      **Panel 2: Costs of Intervention**  
Chair: Sidita Kushi, CSS Fletcher  
- Jon Askonas, Catholic University of America  
- Rebecca Lissner, Naval War College  
- Kaija Schilde, Boston University  
- Patricia Sullivan, UNC Chapel Hill
- 11:45 – 12 PM                      Break
- 12 – 1:15 PM                      **Panel 3: Non-traditional Interventions**  
Chair: Lindsay O'Rourke, Boston College  
- Neha Ansari, CSS Fletcher  
- Jonathan Schroden, CNA  
- James Siebens, Stimson Center  
- Col. (Ret) Frank Sobchak, The Fletcher School





1:15 – 2:15 PM

Networking Lunch

2:15 – 3:30 PM

**Panel 4: Kinetic Diplomacy**

Chair: Monica Duffy Toft, CSS Fletcher

- Bridget Coggins, CSS Fletcher
- Jacqueline Hazelton, U.S. Naval War College
- Alan Henrikson, The Fletcher School
- David Vine, American University

3:30 – 3:45 PM

Break

3:45 – 5 PM

**Panel 5: Into the Future: Cyber, Digital, and Information Security**

Chair: Jeff Taliaferro, Tufts University

- Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Brown University
- Major Amanda Current, The Fletcher School
- Peter Dombrowski, Naval War College
- Josephine Wolff, The Fletcher School

5 – 6 PM

Reception

## The Military Intervention Conference

### Panel Details and Speaker Bios



#### Welcome remarks by:



#### **President Anthony Monaco**

President Anthony Monaco became the thirteenth president of Tufts University in 2011. Previously serving as pro-vice-chancellor at Oxford University and professor of biology and neuroscience, Dr. Monaco is a distinguished geneticist whose doctoral research led to a landmark discovery: the gene responsible for X-linked Duchenne and Becker muscular dystrophies. President Monaco was elected to the European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO) in 2006 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2018, and is a fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences (U.K.) and the Royal Society of Medicine and a member of the Association of American Physicians. President Monaco chairs the Steering Committee of the Talloires Network, previously served as the Chair of the Board of the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities of Massachusetts and the New England Small College Athletic Conference.



#### **Dean Rachel Kyte**

Rachel Kyte has just assumed her new role as the 14<sup>th</sup> Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. This appointment follows a distinguished career in international affairs, including leading the United Nations' efforts toward greater access to clean, affordable energy as part of action on climate change and sustainable development as chief executive officer of Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL), and special representative of the UN secretary-general for SEforAll. Prior to these roles, Ms. Kyte was vice president and special envoy for climate change at World Bank Group (WBG), where she also served as vice president of sustainable development. Ms. Kyte has founded and led non-government organizations focusing on women, the environment, health, and human rights and received many awards for leadership, climate action, and sustainable development – including Woman of the Year from the Earth Day Foundation's Women and the Green Economy campaign.

## Keynote discussion “*Military Intervention as a Challenge to Diplomacy*”

### Ambassador Thomas Pickering in conversation with Professor Monica Duffy Toft

This session will examine the key historical trends of international military interventions across the centuries and decades. It will focus on changes in hostility levels, intervention types, regional dynamics, and intervention outcomes by key eras. Special attention will be paid to pre- and post-WWII dynamics and post-9/11 intervention patterns by great powers.

Key questions:

- 1.) What is the relationship between military intervention and diplomacy?
- 2.) How have the diplomatic tools of statecraft changed over time?
- 3.) Given the current state of diplomacy, what might be done to enhance diplomatic efforts to secure U.S. interests better?



#### Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Ambassador Thomas Pickering is currently Vice Chairman of Hills and Company, an international consulting firm, and has served more than four decades as a U.S. diplomat. He last served as undersecretary of state for political affairs, the third highest post in the U.S. State Department. Pickering also served as ambassador to the United Nations, the Russia Federation, India, Israel, and Jordan, and holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador. Ambassador Pickering is a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and is active in a number of not-for-profit boards, including the International Crisis Group, the American Academy of Diplomacy, the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. In his career, Ambassador Pickering has received the Distinguished Presidential Award and the Department of State’s highest award, the Distinguished Service Award.



#### Monica Duffy Toft

Professor Monica Duffy Toft is Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Her research interests include international security, military intervention and American foreign policy, ethnic and religious violence, civil wars, climate change and demography. Before joining Fletcher, Monica taught at Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government and Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. While at Harvard, she directed the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs and was the assistant director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2008, the Carnegie Foundation of New York named Professor Toft a Carnegie scholar for her research on religion and violence. In 2012, she was named a Fulbright scholar and most recently served as the World Politics Fellow at Princeton University. Her most recent books include: *People Changing Places* (Routledge, 2018); *Political Demography* (Oxford, 2012); and *God’s Century* (Norton, 2012).

## Panel 1: Types and Patterns of Intervention

This panel will examine intervention patterns and outcomes as impacted by intervention type. Distinctions will be made between unilateral, multilateral, great power, UN, NATO, and other modes of military intervention. The panel will also analyze the impact of aerial, naval, and full “boots on the ground” intervention choices on both the target state and intervener goals.

Key questions:

- 1.) Do NATO-led interventions possess different costs, benefits, and outcomes from U.S. or coalition-based interventions?
- 2.) What are the biggest shifts in intervention patterns in the post-9/11 era? What implications do these shifts have for US and other great power foreign policies?
- 3.) What differences exist between Western and non-Western military interventions?



### **Chair: Karim Elkady**

Karim Elkady is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School. His book project titled *Alliances that Matter: Why the United States Succeeds in Rebuilding States under its Military Occupation* won the Smith Richardson Strategy and Policy Fellowship in November of 2018. Elkady researches forms of American military interventions, focusing on military occupation and postwar state-building. He is also interested in United States foreign policy toward the Middle East and how competition among major powers shapes political developments in the region. Before joining the Fletcher School, Elkady was a junior research fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. The Harry Truman Library and Institute and the Mellon Foundation have supported his research. Elkady holds a PhD in politics from Brandeis University (2015) and an MA from the American University in Cairo. He is on leave from his research position at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.



### **Benjamin Denison**

Benjamin Denison is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Previously, he was a U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow at Dartmouth College’s Dickey Center for International Understanding. His research interests include international security, military occupation, armed intervention, and regime change. He is currently writing a book manuscript on the local institutional determinants of military occupation strategy. Dr. Denison received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame, where he was a pre-doctoral fellow with the Notre Dame International Security Center and a Dissertation Year Fellow with the Kellogg Institute for International Studies.



### **Jeffrey Friedman**

Jeffrey Friedman is an Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, teaching courses on foreign policy, civil conflict, intelligence analysis, and research methods in security studies. His research focuses on the ways in which risk and uncertainty shape high-stakes decisions, particularly in the domain of national security. Receiving his Ph.D. from the Harvard Kennedy School, Dr. Friedman has held fellowships at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Tobin Project, the Dickey Center for International Understanding, and the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, France. Friedman's book, *War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics* was published by Oxford University Press's Bridging the Gap Series.



### **Lise Morjé Howard**

Lise Morjé Howard is a tenured Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. She was the founding director of the Master of Arts Program in Conflict Resolution at Georgetown and has served as a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Dr. Howard's research and teaching interests span the fields of international relations, comparative politics, and conflict resolution. Her work focuses on civil wars, peacekeeping, U.S. foreign policy, and area studies of sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Her new book, *Power in Peacekeeping*, based on field research in Lebanon, the Central African Republic, DR Congo and Namibia, explores the differences between peacekeeping and military action.

## Panel 2: Costs of Intervention

The direct costs of military interventions, such as battle deaths, civilian deaths, military equipment costs, or the post-conflict outcomes, have been widely debated and measured in the literature. The indirect political and economic costs, however, remain underexplored. This panel will examine the costs incurred by the military intervener related to national credibility, domestic elections, alliance relationships, international status and influence, and international organization interactions. It will also examine the political costs incurred by the target state, such as post-conflict rebuilding, political party formation, new alliance formation, and more. Moreover, the panel will discuss the direct costs of military deployments as well as indirect economic outcomes related to national deficits, debts, unemployment rates, inflation, and development for the target state and intervener.

Key questions:

- 1.) On average, do the costs of US interventions outweigh the benefits? Are there short-term vs. long-term differences?
- 2.) What is the most underexamined, underrated cost of military intervention in contemporary politics?
- 3.) What do we define as costs of intervention and how can we measure these dimensions thoroughly?



### **Chair: Sidita Kushi**

Sidita Kushi is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, where she leads the Military Intervention Project (MIP). She is finishing her first book, *From Kosovo to Darfur: Why Military Humanitarianism Favors the West*. Dr. Kushi is the author of a range of articles on military interventions as well as the gendered dynamics of economic crises, published in *Comparative European Politics*, *European Security*, *International Labour Review*, *Journal of Science Policy & Governance*, *The Washington Post*, among other publications. Sidita holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northeastern University (2018).



### **Jonathan Askonas**

Jonathan Askonas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship at The Catholic University of America. Jon works on the connections between the republican tradition, technology, and national security. He is currently working on a manuscript examining post-war organizational forgetting processes in militaries. He is also working on essays on the deep political, moral, and practical implications of the volunteer military and on the connection between artificial intelligence research and authoritarian surveillance. He has worked at the Council on Foreign Relations, US Embassy in Moscow, and the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin.



### **Rebecca Lissner**

Rebecca Lissner is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. Previously, she was a research fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House; a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and a Brady-Johnson Fellow at Yale University's International Security Studies. Dr. Lissner's research has appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Peacekeeping*, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, and *The Washington Quarterly*, among other publications. She received both her M.A. and Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University.



### **Kaija Schilde**

Kaija E. Schilde is an Associate Professor at the Boston University Pardee School of Global Studies. She is currently working on a book manuscript addressing why states outsource security to firms and industries, titled *Outsourcing Security, Managing Risk: Hiding the National Security State in Global Markets*. Her first book, *The Political Economy of European Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2017) theorizes EU-interest group state-society relations, identifying the political development of security and defense institutions as an outcome of industry interest and mobilization. Her research spans multiple dimensions of comparative national security, including the causes and consequences of military spending; the relationship between spending, innovation, and capabilities; defense reform and force transformation; the politics of defense protectionism; and the political economy of border security. She has published articles in the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *Security Studies*, *European Security*, and *the Journal of Peace Research*.



### **Patricia Sullivan**

Patricia L. Sullivan is an associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a 2015-2017 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. She received her Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Davis in 2004 with a concentration in international relations, comparative politics, and research methodology. Dr. Sullivan's research explores the utility of military force as a policy instrument; the effects of foreign military aid and assistance provided to both state and non-state actors; and factors that affect leaders' decisions to initiate, escalate, or terminate foreign military operations. Her book, *Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict*, was published by Oxford University Press in 2012.

### **Panel 3: Non-traditional Interventions**

Standard literature discusses military interventions within a more traditional scope, including national troop incursions, aerial missions, or naval usage against an unwilling target. But many incidents of force abroad occur in the context of secrecy and special forces within a target country. This panel will discuss the extent of these missions and compare them to traditional military intervention patterns, costs, and outcomes. Drone warfare will also be evaluated in line with national interests, economic costs/benefits, human dimensions, and issues of legitimacy and credibility.

Key questions:

- 1.) Is drone warfare a preferred alternative to traditional military interventions and an effective counterterrorism strategy? Why or why not?
- 2.) What are the consequences of US foreign policy's increasing reliance on drones and special operations?
- 3.) How can we measure and compare drone missions relative to traditional military missions?



#### **Chair: Lindsay O'Rourke**

Lindsey O'Rourke is currently an Assistant Professor in the Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences, joining Boston College's Political Science department in autumn 2014. Her research interests include international relations theory, U.S. foreign policy, international security, and military strategy. She is currently completing a book manuscript on the causes, conduct, and consequences of U.S.-orchestrated covert regime changes during the Cold War. Before joining the faculty at Boston College, O'Rourke was a post-doctoral research fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College and a pre-doctoral fellow at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University. She has a Ph.D. in Political Science and an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago.



#### **Neha Ansari**

Neha Ansari is a PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, studying the impact of armed drones on public opinion in conflict zones and their counterterrorism success. Before joining Fletcher, she was a visiting researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on Pakistan's strategic culture and the Pakistani media. She was also a Research Consultant for the Near East and South Asia (NESA) Center at National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC and has given presentations and briefings to numerous military-security forums, including the U.S. Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) and the U.S. Joint Staff's Strategic Multilayer Conference. Previously, Neha served as a Fulbright Scholar and a journalist in Pakistan. She has a MALD from the Fletcher School, and an M.A. and B.A. (Honors) from the University of Karachi, Pakistan.





### **Jonathan Schroden**

Jonathan Schroden directs the Stability and Development Program. Schroden is an expert in fields including the Marine Corps, special operations forces, terrorism/counterterrorism, indigenous force development, foreign internal defense, insurgency/counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, stability operations and operations assessment. Since joining CNA in 2003, Schroden has deployed ten times to Afghanistan, twice to Iraq, and traveled extensively throughout the Middle East. He served as the CNA Field Representative to several Marine Corps commands, to U.S. Central Command, and to the International Security Assistance Force. Schroden has most recently directed multiple independent assessments of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Schroden holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. from Cornell University and two B.S. degrees from the University of Minnesota-Duluth.



### **James Siebens**

James Siebens is a Research Associate with the Defense Strategy and Planning program, where he is currently working on a book related to US military operations “short of war” since the end of the Cold War. Siebens’ research focuses on grand strategy, foreign military intervention, civil war, and hybrid warfare. He previously served as the Special Assistant to the President and CEO at the Stimson Center. Prior to joining Stimson, Siebens held a contract appointment with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, where he worked as a Data Analyst on a Defense Department project related to Gray Zone conflict. Siebens holds an M.A. in International Affairs with a concentration in Global Security from American University’s School of International Service.



### **Col. (Ret) Frank Sobchak**

Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. During his twenty-six-year career in the U.S. Army, he served in various Special Forces assignments including leading teams and companies in 5th Special Forces Group and representing U.S. Special Operations Command as a congressional liaison. His final assignments included garrison command and leading the Army effort to publish an official history of the Iraq War. That effort spanned five years and included the declassification of over 30,000 pages of documents and several hundred interviews in addition to having access to a similar sized set of documents and interviews that had not yet been released.

#### **Panel 4: Kinetic Diplomacy**

Monica Duffy Toft has labeled contemporary trends of US military intervention as *kinetic diplomacy*, defined as the increasing reliance on military interventions to project power, influence actions, and shape decision spaces. As traditional diplomacy withers, special operation missions, drone strikes, conventional military deployments, and military bases abroad have received robust political and financial support. This panel will discuss the degree to which the US relies on its military power relative to other strategies of statecraft as well as the costs, benefits, and consequences of such a foreign policy strategy.

Key questions:

- 1.) What are the international and domestic implications of the US's increased reliance on the usage of military force abroad?
- 2.) Are contemporary trends of military intervention a new phenomenon or more of the same patterns of international politics?



#### **Chair: Monica Duffy Toft**

Professor Monica Duffy Toft is Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Her research interests include international security, military intervention and American foreign policy, ethnic and religious violence, civil wars, climate change and demography. Before joining Fletcher, Monica taught at Oxford University's Blavatnik School of Government and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. While at Harvard, she directed the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs and was the assistant director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2008, the Carnegie Foundation of New York named Professor Toft a Carnegie scholar for her research on religion and violence. In 2012, she was named a Fulbright scholar and most recently served as the World Politics Fellow at Princeton University. Her most recent books include: *People Changing Places* (Routledge, 2018); *Political Demography* (Oxford, 2012); and *God's Century* (Norton, 2012).



#### **Bridget Coggins**

Bridget L. Coggins is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara and a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She has two ongoing research efforts. One examines the international security consequences of state collapse, and is anchored by a book, *Anarchy Emergent: Political Collapse and Non-Traditional Threat in the Shadow of Hierarchy*. The other studies rebels' strategic use of diplomacy in civil war. In 2013-2014, Coggins was an International Affairs Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations in South Korea and is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Korea Chair. Coggins' first book, *Power Politics and State Formation in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: The Dynamics of Recognition* (Cambridge 2014), explored the international politics of diplomatic recognition.



### **Jacqueline Hazelton**

Jacqueline L. Hazelton (Brandeis Politics 2011) is an assistant professor in the department of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. She previously taught at the University of Rochester and spent two years as a research fellow in the International Security Program at the Kennedy School. Her research interests include international security, security studies, grand strategy, U.S. foreign and military policy, military intervention, and the uses and limits of military power. Her book on success in counterinsurgency, *Governing By Violence*, is scheduled for Fall 2020 publication by the Cornell University Press Studies in Security Affairs series.



### **Alan Henrikson**

Alan K. Henrikson is the Lee E. Dirks Professor of Diplomatic History Emeritus and founding Director of Diplomatic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has written widely on issues including American foreign policy, U.S.-European Union relations, Nordic/Arctic geostrategic issues, the Canadian-U.S.-Mexican “continental” relationship, the diplomacy of Caribbean island countries and other small states, the geographical “mental maps” of American foreign policy makers, and the “consensus” procedures used in the multilateral diplomacy of international organizations—the subject of the volume *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy*. Dr. Henrikson has held a number of scholar positions around the world, including Fulbright Schuman Professor of U.S.-EU Relations at the College of Europe in Bruges and MGIMO University in Moscow.



### **David Vine**

David Vine is a Professor in the Department of Anthropology at American University’s College of Arts and Sciences. His research interests include U.S. foreign and military policy, militarization and human rights, foreign military bases, forced displacement, gentrification, indigenous peoples, race/ethnicity, gender and sexuality, poverty and inequality, the Indian Ocean, urban anthropology, cities and urban development, ethnography and writing ethnography for non-academic audiences, and public anthropology. He is author of *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* and *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia*, with his newest book, *If We Build Them, Wars Will Come: Military Bases, Permanent War, and American Empire from Columbus to Today*, to be released in 2020.

## Panel 5. Into the Future: Cyber, Digital, and Information Security

Cybersecurity stands as a national and global issue. The need to protect critical national infrastructure has been met with the rise of cyber-based offensive and defensive capabilities. To lesser extents, nations have also engaged in diplomatic efforts to reduce cybercrime and encourage a culture of cyber, digital, and information security. This panel will discuss contemporary and future cyber conflicts and deterrence, the measures needed to promote the peaceful use of cyberspace, international agreements on information protection and cybersecurity, and the rise of cybersecurity attacks as part of states' foreign policy tools.

Key questions:

- 1.) How should we think about cyber as an issue of intervention?
- 2.) How can we measure threats to cyber, digital, and information security in a comprehensive and compatible way to traditional security threats?
- 3.) With technologies that are immune to national borders, what is the role and influence of international organizations and great powers (if any) in securing the cyber and digital space?



### **Chair: Jeffrey Taliaferro**

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, where he has taught since 1997. His research and teaching focus on security studies, international relations theory, international history and politics, United States foreign policy, intelligence and U.S. national security. He earned a bachelor's degree in history and political science from Duke University and a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University. Professor Taliaferro is the author of *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* (Cornell University Press, 2004), which won the American Political Science Association's Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Award for the Best Book in International History and Politics.



### **Ivan Arreguín-Toft**

Ivan Arreguín-Toft (Ph.D., The University of Chicago), teaches at Brown University's Watson Institute, where he directs the international relations concentration. A U.S. Army electronic warfare and signals intelligence veteran, Oxford Martin Fellow, and Associate Director, Dimension 1 at the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre at Oxford University. His current research includes the political impact of the harm of noncombatants in war or military occupations and cyber security strategy and policy. While at Oxford, he also served as co-principal investigator on a Norwegian Ministry of Defense project on the future of war. He most recently completed a year-long research fellowship with the Cyber Security Project at Harvard's Kennedy School, where he worked to complete research for his forthcoming book on cyber strategy and policy for W.W. Norton.



### **Amanda Current**

Major Amanda Current is a doctoral student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and an active duty Army Strategic Intelligence Officer. Her interests include U.S. statecraft, organizational theory, policymaking, and U.S. grand strategy. She plans to analyze the systematic relationship between national security organizational cultures and cyber policy development and execution. Amanda spent the first ten years of her Army career as a Blackhawk helicopter pilot and served three combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to Fletcher she was assigned to U.S. Cyber Command where she held positions at multiple echelons of the organization, culminating as the Commander's senior representative to the Central Intelligence Agency.



### **Peter Dombrowski**

Peter Dombrowski is the Director of the Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute and a professor of strategy in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. His areas of expertise include cyber warfare and maritime strategy. Previous positions include chair of the Strategic Research Department, editor of the *Naval War College Review*, co-editor of *International Studies Quarterly*, and associate professor of political science at Iowa State University. Peter is the author of over 65 publications. His most recent book is, *The End of Grand Strategy: U.S. Maritime Operations in the 21st Century* (Cornell 2018). He received his B.A. from Williams College and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Maryland.



### **Josephine Wolff**

Josephine Wolff joined the faculty of The Fletcher School as an assistant professor of cybersecurity policy in 2019. Her research interests include international Internet governance, cyber-insurance, security responsibilities and liability of online intermediaries, government-funded programs for cybersecurity education and the legal, political, and economic consequences of cybersecurity incidents. Her book *You'll See This Message When It Is Too Late: The Legal and Economic Aftermath of Cybersecurity Breaches* was published by MIT Press in 2018. Prior to joining Fletcher, she was an assistant professor of public policy at the Rochester Institute of Technology and a fellow at the New America Cybersecurity Initiative and Harvard's Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society. She received a Ph.D. in Engineering Systems and M.S. in Technology and Policy from MIT, and an A.B. in mathematics from Princeton.