

1798 France

NAME: Quasi War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 9, 1798- December 21, 1801

TARGET STATE(S): France (FRN), 220

SUMMARY:

Just before the turn of the Nineteenth Century, the young American Republic engaged in its first major conflict since the Revolutionary War. The Quasi War was an undeclared war waged with Revolutionary France between 1798 and 1800, although a peace treaty was not officially ratified by the U.S. Senate until 1801. Often referred to as America's first limited war, the Quasi War was almost exclusively fought on the high seas, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off the Eastern coast of the United States by naval and privateer forces on both sides.

Following the execution of Maximilien Robespierre during the height of the French Revolution, executive control of the French state was exercised by a ruling body of five men known as The Directory (*le Directoire*). In short, the Directory was fully committed to the ideals of the French Revolution and sought to spread revolutionary ideology across Europe. In accomplishing this, the Directory declared war on Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and the Netherlands — all monarchical empires and in stark contrast to the democratic French state. In response to the French declaration of war, the British seized a number of islands in the Caribbean under French control. Livid, the French Directory protested to the Americans that they were obligated under the 1778 Treaty of Alliance (the treaty which helped bring France into the Revolutionary War) to help defend French holdings in the Caribbean if they were attacked. The United States disagreed; they claimed that because the French had made the first move in declaring war on the European powers, British aggression was warranted and the American military was not obligated under the 1778 treaty to defend the islands. While the French acknowledged their role as the aggressor in this situation, they maintained that war was the last option and that they had exhausted all other avenues to maintain peace with the kingdoms of Europe and were insistent that America recognize this. The young Republic did not. In addition to American inaction in the Caribbean, the French were also incensed at American foreign policy towards the British. Following the Treaty of Paris and the conclusion of the American War for Independence, a number of issues still lingered between the Americans and the British, despite the establishment of formal peace. These issues included final agreements over the location and manning of British forts/garrisons in North America and the impressment of American citizens into the Royal Navy. In the mid-1790s (1794), the United States and Great Britain concluded Jay's Treaty. While not perfect (and would later become a central part of the push towards war in 1812), helped to reconcile the relationship between the two nations and even went so far as to allow British privateers exclusive rights to American ports— a right which used to exclusively belong to France. Additionally, Jay's Treaty also prevented the U.S. from

trading war materiel with Britain's adversaries, which at the time included Revolutionary France. This close relationship between the British and the Americans helped to sow the seeds of conflict. In response to these actions, the French began to attack American merchant ships in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, particularly around the island of St. Domingue. The United States was helpless to do anything; the young republic had no official navy and relied on a ragtag collection of revenue cutters which were middle effective against the French.

Not looking to make trouble or become engaged in a war with France, President Adams dispatched a negotiating team to France to attempt to strike peace. The American delegation was rejected by the French who refused to meet with the diplomats. Instead, the French demanded the U.S. provide the Directory with money, loans, and an apology for accusing France of meddling in the domestic affairs of the United States; the American refused outright which prompted the XYZ Affair. When the American delegation attempted to leave, they were threatened by the Directory that should they depart France, the French Navy would begin an unconditional war against American merchants. Unwilling to take such a chance, the American delegation debated France and left Eldridge Gerry behind; however, should the French have followed through on their promise, it would have likely backfired on them and drawn the U.S. and Great Britain closer together against France.

As the situation with France became more fraught and diplomacy no longer an option, Congress was faced with the difficult choice. Never before had the American Republic been faced with such a situation and although some called for war, it was not the prevailing opinion. The first step was to suspend all political ties, trade, and diplomatic exchange with the revolutionary state. Second, Congress passed and President Adams signed into law 'An Act to Further Protect the Commerce of the United States' on July 9, 1798, officially beginning the Quasi War. This legislation allowed American merchants and warships of the nascent Navy to seize armed French ships anywhere in the world in an effort to protect American commerce. Military action against traditional, unarmed French ships was prohibited. Despite the aggression of France, Congress opted against a formal declaration of war, instead choosing to steer the United States into a grey area of conflict; lawmakers likely realized that an open war with France would have been devastating to the young Republic, as it would have probably involved the Dutch and the Spanish. While the Quasi War was a conflict primarily fought on the sea, however, land battles occurred every now and then. The most well known example occurred at Puerto Plata Harbor in what is now the Dominican Republic, when American forces on board the *USS Constitution* captured a French privateer and rendered the local fort's guns unusable. More importantly for American military lore, it represents the first deployment of U.S. Marines on foreign soil.

By time the Quasi War broke out, the United States had a very limited fighting force. While the U.S. had an unknown number of merchant vessels armed and outfitted for combat, in total, 49 U.S. Navy ships fought in the Quasi War. These ships included 14 frigates and 11 smaller ships, 2 sloops, 4 brigs, 3 schooners, 8 revenue cutters, and 7 galleys. In addition to military vessels, best estimates suggest that the United States started with 452 armed merchant ships which rose to 933 ships, each outfitted with an average of 18 men and seven guns. Tragically, during the three year conflict, 40 American belligerents lost their life at sea and given the nature of France attacks on merchant ships, an unknown number of civilians lost their lives. As for ships, the United States only had one sunk, while two others disappeared at sea; an unknown number of merchant ships were also lost. As the war progressed, the American posture became more war like, which in turn

prompted France to more robustly seek peace. Following a number of coups against the Directory, Napoleon Bonaparte successfully ascended to the French throne. The Adams Administration, acting against hawkish Senators led by Alexander Hamilton, began to negotiate with the Napoleon Court to bring an end to the war. On September 30, 1800, the Treaty of Mortefontaine was signed between French and American diplomats, however peace was not officially made until the U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty more than a year later on December 21, 1801.

Following the hard won peace, Franco-American relations (as established by the 1778 treaty) were severed and the U.S. did not enter into another formal alliance until the United States entered into another formal alliance until the 1950s, nearly a century and a half later. Additionally, at the war's end, the United States chose not to disband its navy as it had done following the American Revolution and the conclusion of the Quasi War also saw the establishment of the United State's first peacetime navy. The Quasi War, while not often remembered too much in history, has left a lasting impact on the United States. Firstly, it was during this conflict where the United States Navy was created and battle tested. Secondly, the Quasi War was not only the first war fought by the independent American states, but also the nation's first limited war, as it was fought entirely on the high seas. Despite misgivings during the last 1790s, in hindsight, the war has been seen as legitimate. The Supreme Court twice ruled in the 18th Century that Congress has power to declare formal war, as well as undertake more limited actions (see *Bas v. Tingy* and later *Talbot v. Seemen*). In the modern era, the Rehnquist Court in *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez* case ruled that the war was constitutional (in the broader issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applied to an alien's foreign residence).

SOURCES:

An Act to Authorize the Defence of the Merchant Vessels of the United States Against French Depredations, U.S. Code (1798)

Clodfelter, Michael. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015*. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc, 2017).

DeConde, Alexander. *The Quasi-War; The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801*. New York: New York Scribner, 1966.

Fehlings, Gregory E. "America's First Limited War." *Naval War College Review* 53 no. 3 (Summer, 2000): 1-43. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2563&context=nwc-review>

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Rak, Michael (CPTN, USN). "The Quasi War and the Origins of the Modern Navy and Marine Corps." United States Naval War College, 2020

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. "The XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1800." Milestones: 1784–1800. Accessed February 27, 2021.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/xyz>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS:

American: 40

French: 91-113

TOTAL DEATHS:

American: 40

French: 91-113

COSTS: 49 U.S. naval ships deployed, 933 U.S. Merchant ships requisitioned for the conflict.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The Quasi War is included in the CRS's comprehensive record of notable deployments of the United States military.

1801 Libya

NAME: First Barbary War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 14, 1801 - June 12, 1805

TARGET STATE(S): Libya (LIB), 620

SUMMARY: Most of North Africa between Morocco and Egypt was historically governed as a set of city states, officially with a loose allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, which engaged heavily in piracy against the lucrative international trade on the Mediterranean and collectively known as the Barbary States. Britain and France paid local rulers handsome sums of money to let ships under their flag pass without incident. Until the United States declared independence, then, its sailors were covered by British agreements, an arrangement that stopped abruptly after 1776. U.S. diplomats easily concluded treaties with Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis but the Pasha of Tripoli (in present-day Libya) proved more recalcitrant and an agreement was not to be found.

In 1801 the Pasha declared war on the United States, citing insufficient and late payments. In response, President Jefferson dispatched several warships to the region to mark their presence. At some points, these warships bombarded Tripoli from the sea. However, in October 1803 the U.S.S. *Philadelphia* ran aground on the rocks near Tripoli and her crew was captured. In response, in a combined naval and ground operation, navy warships bombarded Tripoli while U.S. Marines approached the city on camelback from Cairo.

The assault on Tripoli was successful in early 1805, and the U.S. government imposed their terms on the Pasha as the two countries reached a formal peace treaty. The U.S. paid \$60,000 in ransom for their troops that had been held hostage but otherwise did not agree to pay future tribute for shipping privileges in the area. Thus, the war was a success for the United States. However, peace only held for ten years as the First Barbary War was followed by a second that broke out in 1815.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE:

Policy Change; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Unclear, possibly zero

TOTAL DEATHS: Unclear (small number)

COSTS: Loss of the *U.S.S. Philadelphia*, whose crew was taken hostage; small deployments of a squadron of warships over the course of several years; \$60,000 in ransom; about 500 Marines and 107 camels.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features only in the CRS report. We confirm it as an instance of U.S. military intervention abroad.

1806 Mexico

NAME: Arrest of Pike's Expedition Team

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 27 - February 26, 1807

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

In July 1806, President Thomas Jefferson sent Captain Zebulon Pike and 21 additional men to explore the south and west of the recent Louisiana Purchase. During the winter of 1806 to 1807, Pike's expedition was in search of the Red River.

On January 27th, 1807, Pike's expedition, now down to 11 men in total, found what they presumed was the Red River and built a fort along the shore that would help them survive the winter. After one month, on February 26th, 1807, Spanish forces located Pike's expedition team and arrested them without incident. From the Spanish, Pike learned he was not on the Red River, but on the Rio del Norte which was inside of Spanish controlled Territory (now contr. In Pike's journal, he expresses a sudden awareness of his mistake and believes the border violation can be solved by explanation. The Spanish took him to Santa Fe and then to Chihuahua before finally releasing him back into the Louisiana Purchase territory in July 1807.

The overall long-term consequences are best spelled out in Pike's journal. Pike kept detailed notes throughout his time in the Spanish territory and gained valuable information about the military capabilities and settlements. Some of the information he wrote down was seized by the Spanish, but Pike kept a journal hidden amongst his men that eventually stayed with Pike after his release. Spain complained to the US about the violation of territory, but no diplomatic or economic consequences occurred.

SOURCES:

"Pike's Expeditions: Part II: The Arkansaw Journey." In *The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike, to Headwaters of the Mississippi River, Through Louisiana Territory, and in New Spain, During the Years 1805-6-7, Vol. 2*, edited by Elliott Coues, 137-158. New York, NY: F.P. Harper (Publisher), 1895.

Pike, Major Z. M. "ARTICLE 7: AN ACCOUNT OF EXPEDITIONS TO THE SOURCES OF THE MISSISSIPPI, AND THROUGH THE WESTERN PARTS OF LOUISIANA, TO THE SOURCES OF THE ARKANSAW, KANS, LA PLATTE, AND PIERRE FAUN, RIVERS;

PERFORMED BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE YEARS 1805, 1806, AND 1807. AND A TOUR THROUGH THE INTERIOR PARTS OF NEW SPAIN, WHEN CONDUCTED THROUGH THESE PROVINCES, BY ORDER OF THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL IN THE YEAR 1807." *The General Repository and Review (1812-1813)*, Apr 01, 1812, 374

"Pike, Zebulon Montgomery." In *The Columbia Encyclopedia*, by Paul Lagasse, and Columbia University. 8th ed. Columbia University Press, 2018.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory.

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 10 U.S. Deaths

COSTS: Deployment of 21 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS dataset. While Pike's expedition was intended to be entirely domestic it crossed borders. Therefore we have chosen to code this expedition with the defense of U.S. territory. Also, the case is coded as occurring in Mexican territory, however the conflict occurred in territory controlled by Spain at the time. In modern times, the land is now held by the United States.

1806 Spain

NAME: Gulf of Mexico Piracy

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: 1806 - 1810

TARGET STATE(S): SPN and FRN

SUMMARY:

In 1803, Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana territory from the French for the low price of \$15 million. Included in the purchase, was the city of New Orleans, which sat at the mouth of the Mississippi River and on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Disconnected from the seat of government in Washington, D.C., the New Orleans Naval Station was a standalone facility, with no large ships-of-the-line or capital ships. Founded in 1806, the station under Captain John Shaw boasted four gun boats, along with two smaller bomb-ketches, for a total of 16 guns and almost 200 men. The idea was to use the Atlantic Ocean as a natural barrier and allow the navy to serve in a joint role of national protection and territorial expansion in the West. To this end, the New Orleans Naval Station was critical to the projection of American power along the Mississippi River. Internationally, the New Orleans port was located within striking distance of the Spanish colonies in modern-day Florida and the French in the Caribbean, and could protect American interests in the Gulf of Mexico with the aforementioned gunboats.

Privateer action in the Gulf of Mexico is not well documented; much of the focus of 1806-7 New Orleans was the traitorous action of Aaron Burr and his march West following his fall from political grace at the beginning the 19th Century, as well as revolutions action in Mexico, and then later conflict in the War of 1812. At the end of the 18th Century, the French colony of Saint-Domingue (present day Haiti) gained its independence from France following an uprising by the island's enslaved Africans. More than a decade later, the island retained a fragile independence, however, it was seen as a threat throughout the Caribbean, the United States, and even Europe. In particular, American elites, particularly white southerners worried that the 1790s revolution in Saint-Domingue would inspire their own slaves to undertake a similar action against plantation owners. To help prevent this, the United States, under President Jefferson, sought to isolate the island nation. In addition to the restrictions placed on shipping to and from Saint-Domingue, the United States' passage of the Embargo Act of 1807 prohibited the importation of British or French goods in response to the Napoleonic Wars and violations of American neutrality. The embargo was a robust failure. Privateers, many of them French, would attempt to break this embargo and import their goods. At the same time, Congress also passed (and Jefferson signed into law) an Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves which took effect in 1808. Given an overwhelming demand for slaves by Southern plantation owners which could not be met by American-born slaves (which at

the time was the only legal course of action), privateers operating out of Spanish holdings were known to import slaves in violation of the 1807 Act Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves. Two of the most notorious privateers were Jean Lafitte and his brother, Pierre. The Lafittes, especially Jean, were expert smugglers who operated with the Baratarians, a similar band of smugglers. While the American government Lafitte claimed was a pirate, the smuggler claimed to have letters of marque from the city-state of Cartagena in present day Colombia making him a privateer; nevertheless the United States still sought to curb his activities, along with those of his compatriots, claiming they did not recognize the government located in Cartagena.

While the official end of this particular conflict was 1810, tensions in the region (and between the US and her European nations) was still fraught. Within 18 months, the United States would be at war with her former colonial subjugator and the Gulf of Mexico would become a battle front again; this time with a more sophisticated naval presence. By the end of that war, New Orleans would be a critical battle to establish American military power and by 1822, Florida had been ceded by the Spanish and organized into the Union. While the panhandle would not become a state until the 1840s, the decade following the War of 1812 gave the young American republic control of the North American territories bordering the Gulf of Mexico with the exception of Mexico and Texas.

SOURCES:

Fick, Carolyn. "Revolutionary Saint Domingue and the Emerging Atlantic: Paradigms of Sovereignty." *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 31. No. 2 (2008): 121-144.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241711>.

Head, David. "Slave Smuggling by Foreign Privateers: The Illegal Slave Trade and the Geopolitics of the Early Republic."

Lewis, James E. "The Burr Conspiracy" in *New Orleans, New Orleans Territory: November 1806 through May 1807: Uncovering the Story of an Early American Crisis*. 209-245. Princeton, Princeton University Press, n.d.

National Parks Service. "Jean Lafitte: History & Mystery." *National Historical Park and Preserve Louisiana*. Accessed March 17, 2021.

<https://www.nps.gov/jela/learn/historyculture/jean-lafitte-history-mystery.htm>.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara and Sofia Plagakis. "Instances of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020." *Congressional Research Service*. January 13, 2020.

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United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. "The United States and the Haitian Revolution, 1791–1804." Milestones 1784-1800. Accessed March 17, 2021.

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/haitian-rev>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: Unknown costs. At a minimum there were six ships engaged in hunting privateers, given there were four gunboats and two additional bomb-ketches at the New Orleans Naval Station in 1806.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Much of the literature which focuses on this time period in this region overlooks the American action against Spanish and French privateers. Rather, there is a greater emphasis towards the fear of Aaron Burr's actions in the West and revolutions in Mexico against the Spanish.

1810 West Florida

NAME: The US Annexation of West Florida 1810 (from the Mississippi River to the Pearl River)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 6, 1810 – December 10, 1810

TARGET STATE(S): The Republic of West Florida, Spain, SPN 230; United Kingdom, UKG 200; France, FRN 220.

SUMMARY:

Since the Congress ratified the United States' treaty to purchase Louisiana from France under Napoleon on October 20th, 1803, the US government maintained that West Florida – the area south of the 31st parallel from East of the Mississippi River to the Perdido River – was part of purchase. However, Spain, the colonial possessor of West Florida, opposed this American claim. Out of Washington's interest in avoiding war with Spain and Britain, President Thomas Jefferson and, later on, President James Madison refrained from pursuing America's legal claim in West Florida militarily. With the outbreak of the Peninsular War in Europe in 1808, the French invasion of Spain undermined Madrid's control over its colonial possessions in North America, including in West Florida.

By September 1810, a group of White Anglo-American settlers revolted against the Spanish colonial regime in West Florida, defeated the colonial forces and gained control of major cities, such as the capital St. Francisville and Baton Rouge. On September 26th, the rebels declared the end of Spain's colonial rule and the independence of the Republic of West Florida. Monitoring the situation closely, the Madison administration recognized an opportunity to control a territory that it believed was legitimately part of its Louisiana purchase, and decided to intervene militarily in West Florida. By doing so, James Madison would continue expanding the US territories South, create an American access to the Gulf of Mexico, and deny Great Britain an opportunity to intervene in West Florida. On October 27th, 1810 President Madison made a proclamation where he instructed Governor William C. C. Claiborne of the Orleans Territory to occupy West Florida. On December 10th, 1810, using 5 gunboats from the navy and 450 soldiers from the army, the United States occupied West Florida, from the Mississippi River to the Pearl River, ending the independence of the Republic of West Florida.

On April 10th, 1812, the Congress approved the annexation of West Florida to the State of Louisiana. The US occupation of this part of West Florida signaled the beginning of America's territorial expansion in West Florida and the end of Spain's colonial rule.

SOURCES:

Isaac Joslin Cox, "the American Intervention in West Florida," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (January, 1912), pp. 290- 311

Isaac Joslin Cox, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1918.)

William Davis, *The Rogue Republic How Would-Be Patriots Waged the Shortest Revolution in American History*, (Boston: Mifflin Harcourt, 2011)

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection.

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: N/A

COSTS: Deployment of five ships and 450 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: You might consider integrating this case with other cases in West Florida that happened in later years. The interventions for annexing West Florida began in 1810 and the US concluded them in 1819.

1812 East Florida

NAME: The Patriot War of 1812 (US occupation of East Florida)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 17, 1812 – May 5, 1814

TARGET STATE(S): Spain, SPN 230; United Kingdom, UKG 200; France, FRN 220

SUMMARY: On January 15th, 1811, the Congress authorized the Madison administration to use military force to change the Spanish colonial regime in East Florida and annex the region to the United States territories. The authorization offered President James Madison the option to either occupy East Florida by invitation from local residents or by force in case another major power – Great Britain or France – attempted to replace the Spanish colonial rule. The Congress also appropriated \$100,000 to the Madison administration to fund the annexation policy.

During his term, President Madison wanted to continue his predecessor's -Thomas Jefferson- policy of territorial expansion in North America, especially that Spain's colonial rule in Florida was weakened due to the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in Europe in 1808 and Napoleon's efforts to change the monarchical regime in Spain. As a result, the Madison administration exploited Spain's distraction with fending off the French invasion and worked to gain control of Spain's colonial possession in East Florida. By doing so, Madison would expand the US territories South, create access to the Gulf of Mexico, and prevent Great Britain from replacing Spain in East Florida. Furthermore, members of Congress, and southern states, especially South Carolina and Georgia, wanted to end the Spanish colonial rule in East Florida because Spain had adopted a sanctuary policy whereby runaway black slaves would be freed from slavery if they settle in East Florida. Spain also encouraged native Americans to settle there too.

Building on the congressional authorization, the Madison administration appointed General George Matthews, former governor of Georgia, to secretly organize a revolution whereby White owners of plantations in East Florida would rebel against the Spanish colonial government, change the regime by force, and then officially request from the United State government to annex the region to the US union. By March of 1812, General Matthews had succeeded in orchestrating the rebellion with the assistance of a detachment from the US Army (75 soldiers) and three gunboats from the US Navy. After receiving an official invitation from the rebels, the United States army occupied Fernandina city in Amelia Island on March 17th, 1812 and marched to St. Augustine the other major city in East Florida to occupy it too. The Spanish colonial government with the help of native Indian Americans (Seminoles) and black militias succeeded in defending St. Augustine, but still the US army under cover from the Navy's gunboats managed to put the city under siege. As France failed to occupy Spain in Europe, the Spanish

colonial regime in East Florida became more empowered to resist the United States. Out of fear that the situation in East Florida might escalate to a military confrontation with Spain, President Madison deescalated his military efforts and lifted the siege of St. Augustine on September 12th, 1812. However, the US army maintained its presence in East Florida until 1814 when it reached an agreement with Spain to completely withdraw its forces.

SOURCES:

James G. Cusick, *The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East Florida*, (Gainesville: Florida State University, 2003.)

Peter Kruse, "A Secret Agent in East Florida: General George Mathews and the Patriot War," *the Journal of Southern History* Vol. 18 No.2 (May 1952) pp. 193-217.

J.C.A Stagg, "James Madison and George Matthews: The East Florida Revolution of 1812 Reconsidered," *Diplomatic History*, Vol.30, No.1 (January 2006) pp.23-55.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Acquire Territory; Economic Protection; Protect own Military Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Not available

TOTAL DEATHS: Not available

COSTS: The Congress appropriated \$100,000 (historical dollars) to fund the annexation of East Florida. The Navy used three gunboats and the Army deployed from 75-250 troops in East Florida.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS dataset. It is considered one of the earliest cases of American covert regime change operations.

1812 United Kingdom

NAME: War of 1812

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 18, 1812- February 17, 1815

TARGET STATE(S): UKG

SUMMARY:

The War of 1812, a conflict fought between the United Kingdom (along with a host of Native American allies) and the United States, has its origins in the early 19th Century Europe. These origins can be observed in the simplistic, yet politically charged, message of “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” which came to dominate the period preceding and during the War of 1812, however, debate continues to rage in academic circles over the true motivations for war with the United Kingdom. Following destabilization caused by the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte gained absolute control of the nation. Four years into his reign (1803) brought the European continent into total war in an effort to extend his empire and the United Kingdom, not wanting French control of the nations of Europe, fought to contain Napoleon’s spread. Only in its infancy, the United States declared that they wished to remain out of European affairs and publicly stated a position of neutrality. Additionally, the United States reasoned that as a neutral power, it would have the ability to conduct trade with all European powers, regardless of which side of the Napoleonic Wars they fought. This idea of free trade was ingrained in the American mentality and to the majority of Americans, the ship of a neutral party state could trade with either belligerent power. This belief was not shared by the nations of the Old World, the United Kingdom and France included; in the European mindset, trade, especially in war, was inherently indicative of allegiance and a nation’s neutral status mattered little. If the U.S. were to trade with one of the major powers in war, it would alienate the other. As American merchants regularly conducted business in French (and French occupied) ports, the British government issued a dozen Orders in Council which allowed the Royal Navy— who at the time had control of the seas— to search European bound American ships, effectively rendering free trade impossible and refusing to respect American neutrality and the self declared rights that obligated. The second critical issue which brought the United States and Great Britain to war was the treatment of American sailors on the high seas. To help ensure a strong military capability, the Royal Navy, operating under the direction of the aforementioned Orders in Council, would engage in a practice known as ‘impressment.’ Impressment was the practice of capturing American sailors and forcing them to join the ranks of the Royal Navy against their wishes. Between the birth of the American republic in 1789 and the end of the War of 1812 in 1815, an estimated 10,000 American citizens were pressed into the service of the Royal Navy, many of them natural born British subjects who had achieved American citizenship via naturalization. It is worth noting,

however, that while these were the two main causes which lead to the outbreak of war with Britain, smaller factors also helped to stoke the flames of war such as perceived British agitation of Native Americans against settlers in the Northwest and a desire to invade and occupy Canada and Florida.

Taken together, these actions by the British evoked a nationalistic response from “war hawk” lawmakers in Congress and to more a more contested degree, President James Madison. These hawkish politicians viewed the British refusal to accept the American position of neutrality and the impressment of American citizens into the service of the Royal Navy as an English rejection of American legitimacy in global affairs and an affront to the nation's ability to develop its own foreign policies. After years of this mistreatment, President Madison and members of Congress believed the time was ripe to launch a ‘Second War of Independence.’ Voting in June of 1812, the Congress narrowly passed a declaration of war after much debate and with little support from Northern states. Even at its onset, the War of 1812 was a divisive issues and of the five times the United States has formally declare war, the vote totals from June 1812 remains the closet margins ever; in the United States the war was seen as purely a game of the President and his political party (the Republicans) by many in the opposition Federalist Party, as evidenced by the derogatory nickname for the war as ‘Mr. Madison’s War.’

Geographically, this Federalist opposition was clustered in New England, a region which had nothing to gain from a second war with England and believed would have an adverse impact on the young nation. This is evident in the theatres of the war which focused on the borders of the United States. The War was concentrated in four major theatres of operation: the US-Canadaian Frontier, the Northwest, the Southwest (modern day Lousiania and Alabama), and the Chesapeake Bay. Throughout the War, the British relied on Native Americans to help alongside Canadian militia and regular troops and in 1814, began to recruit American slaves into the ranks of His Majesty’s army. Looking for a place to quarter this army, the British were allowed by the Spanish (who remained neutral in the War of 1812) to take control of the garrison at Pensacola in order to protect it from a hostile and threatening army under the command of Andrew Jackson. Following a successful defense of Mobile, Jackson turned his attention to Pensacola, which he believed to be the heart of British control in the South. In addition to expelling the British from the South, Jackon’s additional (and zealous) aim was to punish the Spanish for their neutrality in the war. In the late fall of 1814, Jackson issued an ultimatum to the Spanish political authorities in Pensacola requesting they evict the Native American forces under British command and revoke their permission for British occupation of Fort San Carlos de Barrancas. By time the American army arrived from Mobile, the Spanish governor had not provided a response to the ultimate and so Jackson’s forces attacked the town and Fort). Jackson’s nearly 3,500 men easily sacked the town and forced the British to abandon their position and evacuate via the Royal Navy fleet in harbor. The success of the U.S. Army in Florida dealt the British a massive blow and following the evacuation of Pensacola, were unable to re-establish a presence in the south. Once the British had been expelled from Pensacola, American forces returned command of the town and fort to the Spanish, which, in combination with poor treatment they received from British occupiers, likely helped to avoid Spain’s entry into the war against the U.S. Once finished

in Florida, Jackson moved back into the Mississippi Territory to continue to counter the British until the war's final battle at New Orleans.

As war broke out, figures place the size of the federal military between 7,000 and 12,000 and on the water, the US Navy had a command of 20 vessels which consisted of 6 frigates (evenly divided between 44-gun boats and 38 gun boats) and 14 other ships. Because of the conflict in Europe, Britain was unable to muster the entire force of its superior military. Estimates suggest that British and Canadian Regulars numbered 7,000 in the Upper and Lower Provinces of Canada and were able to muster approximately 10,000 militiamen; additionally, the British army was more successful at enticing Native Americans into alliance than the American Army was. Moreover, the Royal Navy could only spare a fleet of approximately 79 ships which were thinly spread patrolling the Western Atlantic, protecting British trade, blockading American ports, and protecting the St. Lawrence River. By the end of the war two years and eight months later, as a result of a push by the Federal government to swell the ranks of the army, enlistment in the regular army rose to between approximately 35,000-60,000 troops, while nearly 458,000 militiamen and 10,000 volunteers were raised for service of the nation; however, more conservative estimates place the total number of American servicemen closer to 286,730. On the British side, with peace in Europe achieved in 1814, resources that did not exist at the onset of the war became available. In total, it is estimated that 58,000 regular British troops served in North America, alongside 4,000 militia men, and almost 10,000 Native Americans. In terms of casualties, official figures place American battle deaths at 2,260, but death resulting from other means at between 15,000-17,000 and the cost of the conflict at \$158 million; for the British and her Native American allies, casualties numbered only 10,000 for the British and close to 7,500 for the Native Americans.

Despite this immense human and economic cost, the War of 1812 was a war without a winner. Almost as soon as the war began, there were immediate calls for peace with Britain, however, negotiations failed throughout 1812-1814. The Treaty of Ghent was signed on December 24, 1814 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in February 1815. Under the provisions of the treaty, any conquered territories were returned to their original holder and conditions/relations in North America between the British and the Americans returned to the *status quo ante bellum*. More importantly, the War of 1812 was the last major Anglo-American conflict and in the long term helped to usher a close alliance that is still present.

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<https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/war-of-1812-faqs#How%20many%20people%20fought%20in%20the%20War%20of%201812?>.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection; and Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS:

United States:	2,260; 7,738
Great Britain/Canada:	3,000; 8,774
British Native American Allies:	~1,000

TOTAL DEATHS:

United States:	15,000-17,000
Great Britain:	10,000
British Native American Allies:	10,000

COSTS: \$158 million

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is referenced in both the MID and CRS dataset. The CRS dataset notes a separate intervention against British forces occurring in 1814 in Pensacola, Florida. Closer research indicates that this 1814 dyad was a result of a mobilization of British forces from Pensacola to intervene against U.S. forces in the War of 1812. This British mobilization allowed U.S. forces to deploy into Pensacola. As a result, MIP has aggregated the 1814 case into the War of 1812.

1813 West Florida

NAME: The US Military Occupation of West Florida and Mobile City

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 14, 1813 – April 13, 1813

TARGET STATE(S): Spain, (SPN), 230 and United Kingdom, (UKG) 200,

SUMMARY:

On February 12th, 1813, President James Madison signed a congressional bill that authorized his administration to occupy West Florida, south of the 31st parallel from the Pearl River to the Perdido River along the Gulf of Mexico coast. At the time, the United States was at war with Great Britain in North America (the War of 1812.) Furthermore, Spain – the colonial power in West Florida – was an ally of London. Out of fear that Spain might allow Britain to deploy its military forces, including the royal navy, in Mobile city West Florida, the United States decided to occupy the area. Washington was also concerned that Spain might invite Indian Seminoles and African slaves to settle in the area between the Pearl and the Perdido Rivers. The new settlers, according to the Spanish colonial forces, would serve as a buffer between Spanish and American forces in West Florida.

On March 14th, 1813, General James Wilkinson ordered the United States army in New Orleans to invade West Florida, East of the Pearl River. The US deployed 800 soldiers and 5 navy gunboats. General Wilkinson marched with his forces toward Mobile city where Spain stationed its forces. On April 14th, 1813, Wilkinson reached an agreement with the commander of the Spanish forces in Mobile whereby Spain retreated East of the Perdido River and withdrew toward Pensacola.

The occupation of West Florida represented the only territorial gain that the US secured during the War of 1812 with Great Britain. The occupation also marked the completion of America's control over all its territorial claims that resulted from the Louisiana purchase of 1803. After consolidating the occupation, the United States annexed the city of Mobile to the Mississippi territory.

SOURCES:

Isaac Joslin Cox, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1918.)

Robert Higgs, "Not Merely Perfidious but Ungrateful: The US Takeover of West Florida," *The Independent Review*, Fall 2005, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 303-310.

James Innerarity, "General Wilkinson's Occupation of Mobile, April, 1813: A letter of James Innerarity to John Forbes," *The Florida Historical Society Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Oct., 1932), pp. 88-90.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Maintain an Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Deployment of 800 troops and five ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS dataset. It is similar to an earlier case of U.S. intervention in West Florida in 1810. MIP originally considered aggregating this case with the 1810 case. However, on closer inspection the cases are different given that the context of either case is different.

1815 Libya

NAME: Second Barbary War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 3, 1815 – December 23, 1815

TARGET STATE(S): Present-day Libya 620 / Algeria 615

SUMMARY: The Second Barbary War technically began in 1812 as the Dey of Algiers – one of the Barbary States centered on the leader of present day Libya – renounced the established treaty with the United States guaranteeing free passage of U.S. merchant ships in the Mediterranean from piracy. In practice, the renunciation coincided on purpose with the War of 1812 and the British attack on the United States. Because of this war, Congress and the U.S. military could not respond at first to this act.

In 1815, however, Congress authorized a naval squadron to deploy into the Mediterranean. This naval force went on to capture several Algerian ships and take their crews hostage. Eventually the ships arrived in Algiers, which by then was under the control of a new leader: Dey Omar. Dey Omar wanted political stability and rapidly negotiated a new treaty with the United States. The Dey at first disobeyed the treaty, but eventually signed a new and virtually identical one on December 23, 1815 after U.S. warships bombarded Algiers that same month. The Second Barbary War was thus a success for the United States.

SOURCES:

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<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/barbary-wars>

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Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Policy Change; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Very small numbers, possibly zero.

TOTAL DEATHS: Very small numbers.

COSTS: Deployment of two naval squadrons for most of the year of 1815

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report. We merge two separate entries for Tripoli (Libya) and Algiers (Algeria), respectively, to create a single entry for the Second Barbary War.

1817 Spain

NAME: Amelia Island Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 23, 1817

TARGET STATE(S): Spain (SPA), 230

SUMMARY:

During 1817, the Spanish Empire was collapsing. With this weakening, the Spanish controlled Amelia Island, off the coast of Florida, became desired land for both the United States and Latin America countries. In June 1817, the island was briefly captured by Latin American insurgents led by General Gregor MacGregor and the island quickly became the home to privateers, pirates, and smugglers. In September, MacGregor fled the island and Spain attacked but failed to recapture it. A privateer and friend of MacGregor, Louis-Michel Aury, took control of the island and then declared it under control of the Republic of Mexico.

President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams saw the island's privateers as problematic to the United States as the illicit actions originating from the island would put the United States into conflict with Spanish controlled territory. This was particularly important because Spain and the United States were at that point negotiating boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase. The United States notified Aury of their decision to take the island in which Aury replied that he would peacefully surrender control. The island was brought under American control on December 23, 1817. Six American ships with 200-250 men were used to capture the island.

The immediate outcome of the capture was Spain asking for the island to be returned. However, Monroe resisted claiming that the island was a source of conflict for the United States and that since Spain could not adequately defend it, the United States had to act. The long-term consequences of this action were not significant. Spain was angered by the American action, however, ceded Florida to the United States in its entirety in early 1821 after being unable to financially support the territory.

SOURCES:

Bowman, Charles H. "Vicente Pazos and the Amelia Island Affair, 1817." *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (1975): 273-95. Accessed January 18, 2021.

Heckard, Jennifer. "The Crossroads of Empire: The 1817 Liberation and Occupation of Amelia Island, East Florida." Order No. 3249538, University of Connecticut, 2006.

Milgram, James Willard. "A Florida Cover under American Occupation of Spanish Territory." *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (1961): 93-100. Accessed January 18, 2021.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: 6 Ships, 200-250 men. Sources are mixed on the exact number of troops used.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS dataset. MIP confirms this as an instance of U.S. force.

1817 Spain

NAME: First Seminole War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3239

DATES: November 21, 1817 - February 22, 1819

TARGET STATE(S): Spain (SPA), 230

SUMMARY:

The First Seminole War was the first of three conflicts in present-day Georgia and Florida between the Seminole Indians and the United States. The First Seminole War is unique in that it was fought on Spanish controlled territory.

The causes of the war stems from the War of 1812. Runaway slaves and the Seminoles sided with the British causing the United States to engage in conflict with them in Georgia. After the War of 1812, these groups moved into southern Georgia. The United States continued to fight with the Seminoles over the next couple of years with most sources agreeing that the United States was motivated by a desire to recapture runaway slaves that were supported by the Seminoles.

The exact start date of the conflict is somewhat disputed amongst historians but the consensus is that the conflict began on November 21, 1817 when the United States attacked the Seminole village of Fowltown in Georgia. On March 15, 1818, Andrew Jackson and his army of roughly 4,000 entered Spanish controlled territory to pursue the Seminoles marking the first intrusion into Spanish territory during the war. In Florida, Jackson led a campaign against the Seminoles resulting in numerous deaths as described below. On February 22, 1819, the Adams Onis treaty was signed giving the United States control over Florida in exchange for \$5 million. While it would take two years to go into effect, the treaty ended all diplomatic conflicts between the United States and Spain over American war efforts in the area.

On September 18, 1823, the Treaty of Moultrie Creek was signed as a peace agreement between the United States and the Seminole Indians ending the conflict and relegating four million acres of land and assistance to the Seminole Indians. The land was considered poor and the assistance never came. Peace lasted up to 1835 when increased tension between the Americans and the Seminole Indians caused conflict in the form of the Second Seminole War. The Second Seminole War would prove far more deadly for both the Americans and Seminole Indians.

Historian Colonel Raymond K Bluhm claims 47 Americans were killed during the First Seminole War. Total Seminole deaths is far less certain but estimated to be at least 99.

According to Dale Cox, six to eight died during the battle of Fowltown, 43 (33 soldiers, 6 women, and 4 children) died during the Scott Massacre, and 10 died during the battle of Upper Chipola. Haki Shakur claims 40 died in a battle along the Suwanee River. It is certain that many more combatant and civilian Seminoles died in the conflicts, though numbers are unknown.

SOURCES:

Bauer, P. "Second Seminole War." Encyclopedia Britannica, December 21, 2020.

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Second-Seminole-War>.

Bluhm, Colonel Raymond K. *US Army A Complete History*. Universe, 2005.

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Seminole Wars." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, July 4, 2019.

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<https://www.exploresouthernhistory.com/fowltown.html>.

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Shakur, Haki K. "April 18 1818 New Afrikans & Seminoles Survive U.S. Attack by Andrew Jackson & U.S. Army on The Suwannee River Florida." newafrikan77, April 18, 2020. <https://newafrikan77.wordpress.com/2020/04/18/april-18-1818-new-afrikans-seminoles-survive-u-s-attack-by-andrew-jackson-u-s-army-on-the-suwannee-river-florida/>.

U.S. Department of State. Adams-Onis Treaty. Accessed February 7, 2021.

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/florida>.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 146

- 47 Americans total (Bluhm)
- 6-8 Seminoles in the Battle of Fowltown, GA (Cox)
- 33 Seminoles in the Scott Massacre, FL (Cox)
- 10 Seminoles in the battle of Upper Chipola, FL (Shakur)
- 40 Seminoles in the battle along the Suwanee River (Shakur)

TOTAL DEATHS: 146

- 47 Americans total (Bluhm)
- 6-8 Seminoles in the Battle of Fowltown, GA (Cox)
- 43 Seminoles in the Scott Massacre, FL (Cox)
- 10 Seminoles in the battle of Upper Chipola, FL (Shakur)
- 40 Seminoles in the battle along the Suwanee River (Shakur)

COSTS: Roughly 4,000 American troops were used to fight the war.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is found in CRS and Gilbert. This case's objective is labeled as Economic Protection because it was fought over returning and preventing further support of runaway slaves. The objective is also labeled as Acquire/Defend Territory as the invasion in Spanish Florida had a direct intention of also giving the United States influence to buy the land. This case's casualty count for the Seminoles is coded as being 101 to account for the unknown number of soldier and civilian deaths occurred but are not accounted for. Finally, the case is filed under 1816 Spain as that is the date claimed by CRS. However, the date for when the First Seminole War first started is disputed amongst scholars. November 21, 1817 is used in this case as the official state date as it constitutes when the war was "formally" initiated in Fowltown. The end date of the conflict has been listed as February 22, 1819 as it describes the end of hostilities with a foreign power. After that the conflict with Seminole's becomes a domestic dispute which is not the purview of MIP.

1818 Oregon Territory

NAME: Oregon Territory Claims

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 19, 1818 - August 20, 1818.

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS) 365, Spain (SPN) 230, Great Britain (UKG) 200, France (FRA) 220

SUMMARY:

The Oregon Territory was originally claimed by several countries prior to 1818. The United States, Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and France all claimed some part of the west coast of North American in present day California up through Canada to Alaska. In 1818, the United States wanted to “reaffirm” its claim over the territory by sending in a military vessel to claim the land. The previous American claim to the Oregon Territory was based on the Lewis and Clark expedition from 1803 to 1806 and another American named Robert Gray who named the Columbia River in 1792.

On August 19th, 1818, Captain James Biddle and the *USS Ontario* arrived at the Columbia River to claim the land under American control. The *USS Ontario* was too big to enter the Columbia River so Captain Biddle took “three boats well-armed and manned with more than fifty officers and seamen” into the river to Cape Disappointment. There he nailed a plate to a tree claiming the territory on both sides of the Columbia river under American control. The rest of the day and into the following morning, Captain Biddle visited nearby settlements inland and claimed more land for the United States. He ceased claiming land on August 20th, 1818, though stayed in the area for provisions until August 30th, 1818.

The immediate and long-term consequences of James Biddle’s actions were relatively minimal as they served more as a symbol than claiming territory. In October 1818, Great Britain and the United States agreed to joint occupation and settlement of the Oregon Territory. Other countries dropped their claims to the territory shortly after. In 1846, the Oregon Territory would officially become part of the United States in the Oregon Treaty.

SOURCES:

"Documents." *The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* 3, no. 3 (1902): 310-13.

"Gray, Captain Robert." In *The Great American History Fact-Finder*, by Pam Cornelison, and Ted Yanak. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

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"Treaty of 1818." In *The Great American History Fact-Finder*, by Pam Cornelison, and Ted Yanak. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The *USS Ontario*, three accompanying boats and at least 50 men.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS dataset. We confirm it as an instance of military force.

1820 Liberia

NAME: African Slave Trade Patrol and Resettlement

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: May 15, 1820 - 1823

TARGET STATE(S): Liberia (LBR), 450

SUMMARY:

In 1818, the American Colonization Society sent representatives to West Africa to search for suitable land for a colony to “resettle displaced blacks”. The Society was working to solve the “racial problem” in the U.S. by seeking to establish a colony on the African coast to return displaced Africans. This idea was modelled by the British efforts to resettle blacks in what is now Sierra Leone. In 1819, Congress introduced a bill declaring slave trade as piracy. The three key components of this bill included authorizing the President to deploy navy ships to combat the slave trade, a \$25 bounty to crew members of a ship for capturing slave vessels, and \$100,000 to help implement the law. Signed in May 15, 1820, The Slave Trade Act made participating in the transatlantic slave trade punishable by death. It became illegal to build a vessel for slaving, to participate in slaving, and to introduce slaves into the United States.

The Slave Trade Act was strengthened by the deployment of the U.S. Navy to suppress American slave trading off the African continent.. The presence of the Navy also assisted in the American Colonization Society's mission of establishing a colony in West Africa. In 1820, three U.S. ships began seizing American slave traders off the coast of West Africa. The most notable events of these were a capture by a US sloop of war *John Adams* along with the British brig *Snapper* off of Rio Pongas on October 22nd, 1820. In 1821, the schooner *Alligator* led by Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton, captured four slaver vessels near Sherbro Island. On November 5th, 1821, *Alligator* neared a ship that appeared to be distressed. The ship hoisted the Portuguese flag and began to fire. *Alligator* was ill-equipped and out of range, suffering several casualties before she eventually was able to capture her. In October 1821, Lieutenant Commandant Matthew C. Perry sailed on the schooner *Shark* to join the anti-piracy and anti-slave trade mission. On this journey, Perry also brought Dr. Eli Ayers, the Society’s representative who would settle the purchase of the land.

With the goals of the Society in mind, Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton convinced the administration to give him command of the *Alligator* from 1820-1822. In addition to his anti-slaving operations, Stockton landed in Cape Mesurado on December 12, 1821 to secure land for the new colony. With Dr. Ayers, Stockton coerced the native King Peter of Cape Mesurado to

cede the land that would eventually become the Republic of Liberia. In exchange for the land, the Society offered trade goods, supplies, weapons, and rum (approximately \$300).

By 1822, Perry had heard nothing new of American slaving activity off the West African coast. It was a general consensus that piracy and slaving activity in the region had significantly declined due to the Navy's activities. As a result of low slaving activities, patrolling and surveillance was reduced.

SOURCES:

"1820 To 1847 : History Of Liberia: A Timeline : Articles and Essays : Maps of Liberia, 1830-1870 : Digital Collections : Library of Congress." The Library of Congress. Accessed January 30, 2021. <https://www.loc.gov/collections/maps-of-liberia-1830-to-1870/articles-and-essays/history-of-liberia/1820-to-1847/>.

Alligator III (Schooner). Accessed January 30, 2021. <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/a/alligator-iii.html>.

Canney, Donald L. *Africa Squadron: the U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1842-1861*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006.

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U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed January 30, 2021. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/liberia>.

Shark I (Schooner). Accessed January 30, 2021. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/shark-i.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire Territory; Social Protection & Order; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: "Several", exact number is unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: \$100,000 dollars to support the Slave Trade Act, deployment of three navy ships, the schooner *Shark*, the schooner *Alligator*, the *Cyane*.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is referenced in the CRS Report. While the primary target in this case was patrolling for American slavers, there was also an incident of hostility with natives of Cape Mesurado (now Liberia) when Stockton acquired the land by force. In addition, there was the encounter with the Portuguese pirates. For this case the target has instances of hostility against itself, Portugal (POR, 235) and of State B (LBR, 450).

1822 Cuba

NAME: Landings in Cuba to Suppress Piracy (I, II, and III)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 16th, 1822 – October 23rd, 1824

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

The Spanish empire began to break apart in the early 19th century, and conditions in the West Indies became conducive to piracy. In 1819, US President James Monroe authorized the use of American ships to capture pirate vessels. In 1822, the West Indies Squadron was created as part of the US Navy's broad anti-piracy effort. Soon, American naval ships were patrolling the country's southeastern coastline, as well as the Gulf of Mexico.

During this period, it was common for pirates to use the northern coast of Cuba as a base. Although Cuban authorities tried to prevent American landings, US ships sent personnel ashore in pursuit of pirates on at least two occasions in early 1822. On January 16th, 1822, the American ship *Porpoise* sailed for northern Cuba. There, American personnel landed, burned a pirate base, destroyed five pirate vessels, and arrested three pirates. On March 8th, 1822, the *Enterprise* landed at Cape San Antonio (on the far western edge of Cuba) and destroyed another pirate base.

In 1823, the US expanded its efforts to suppress Atlantic piracy, adding several ships to the West Indies Squadron. Throughout 1823, American ships patrolled the waters near Cuba, occasionally landing forces in pursuit of pirates.

On April 8th, the *Gallinipper* and the *Mosquito* ran the pirate vessel *Pilot* ashore near Havana, killing two pirates and capturing a third. The *Jackal* and *Fox* also aided in this operation. On April 16th, the *Gallinipper*, *Mosquito*, and *Peacock* captured a small pirate vessel in waters near Cuba. *Gallinipper* and *Mosquito* also captured the pirate vessel *Catalina* in July near Siquapa Bay. During this incident, the American ships pursued fleeing pirates to a nearby village, killing most of the pirates over the course of the engagement. On July 21st, the *Beagle* and *Greyhound* sent troops ashore to attack pirates near Cape Cruz. Although the pirates escaped, the troops destroyed their base.

Lieutenant C.W. Skinner commanded the *Porpoise*, one of the schooners in the West Indies Squadron. On October 19th, 1824, Lieutenant Skinner sent Lieutenant Hunter to survey the area around Matanzas for pirates. On October 22nd, Hunter returned in possession of a pirate schooner and three prisoners, who the Americans handed over to the Governor of Matanzas.

On October 23rd, the American force pursued a pirate vessel near Camarioca, close to the Bay of Matanzas. The pirates fled onto the shore, and though the American force pursued them, the pirates were not captured. There do not appear to have been any combat deaths.

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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

US: 0

Pirates: 67-78 (1823 Incident)

TOTAL DEATHS: 67-78

COSTS: Estimated number of ships in squadron is seven. With ships listed being the *Greyhound*, *Jackal*, *Beagle*, *Gallinipper*, *Mosquito*, *Porpoise*, and *Enterprise*. Cost of maintaining a naval presence in the West Indies.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case appears in the CRS dataset, but not in the MIDs dataset. CRS also notes two other military interventions that occurred in 1823 and 1824 respectively. Both cases were a continuation of the West Indies Squadron's protection of U.S. economic assets. MIP has aggregated these cases together given the consistency in U.S. objectives and outcomes across the cases.

The true number of ships used throughout these interventions is unknown but estimated to be seven given data from the U.S. Navy. The number of troops deployed onland is unknown.

1824 Spain

NAME: Fajardo Affair/Expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 1, 1824 - November 14, 1824

TARGET STATE(S): Spain (SPN) 230

SUMMARY:

By the early 19th century, the U.S. was actively using the military in expeditions to suppress piracy. This was most prominent in the West Indies, where piracy threatened U.S. maritime trade. What exacerbated the problem was the territorial disputes the U.S. had with the European nations. Spain, in particular, was slow to react to the piracy around Cuba and Puerto Rico; partly because piracy hurt U.S. commercial interests.

Spanish officials in Puerto Rico helped facilitate piracy in the U.S. In October of 1824, pirates stole \$5,000 worth of goods from a U.S. company. An U.S. official traveled to Puerto Rico to investigate, but was arrested and detained by local officials. Upon release, he reported the incident to his superior officer Porter. Commodore David Porter had gained a reputation in the early 1800s for his actions against piracy. Angered by his subordinate's imprisonment, Porter sent an unauthorized expedition to Puerto Rico with three ships and 200 marines and sailors.

After arriving in Fajardo, Puerto Rico, Porter demanded an explanation and full apology for the imprisonment and support of pirate activities. He ordered the 200 soldiers to disembark but was met with Spanish soldiers prepared to defend Fajardo. After a tense standoff and diplomatic negotiations, Spanish officials gave their apology. As punishment for the unsanctioned expedition, Porter was court martialed.

SOURCES:

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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: 200 Marines and Sailors Deployed. 3 Ships: *John Adams*, *Grampus*, and *Beagle*

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The intervention was mentioned in the CSR, but it did not include specific start and end dates. The intervention occurred in Puerto Rico, which was still a colony of Spain.

1825 Cuba

NAME: Multilateral Battle against Piracy

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 25, 1825

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba 40

SUMMARY:

During the period of 1821 to 1825, piracy increased dramatically in the Gulf of Mexico. To counter the pirates and protect merchant vessels from their countries, the British and American governments routinely sent naval ships to the area. Commander Isaac M Keever of the US Navy was dispatched to fight the pirates in the Gulf. In March 1825, while stopped at Stone Key, he met British commander who also was looking to decrease piracy in the region. They agreed to form a team and attack a pirate enclave in Sagua la Grande, Cuba.

A force was assembled of two barges and four cutters equally split one barge and two cutters per nation. Each cutter had five men and the barges were "well manned." They immediately went to Sagua la Grande. After several days, on March 25th they found a ship down river. After a brief attempt at a peaceful resolution, a fight ensued. Eight pirates were killed, and 19 prisoners were taken, six of which were wounded. It is unclear but suspected that a significant proportion of pirates escaped into the forest along the river. Only one British soldier was wounded. No American soldiers were killed or wounded. The following morning, another pirate boat was chased down but was abandoned by the pirates before conflict occurred. Armaments are unspecified from the American and British side. The pirates attempted to use large weapons on the pirated ship, but none successfully fired.

The only lasting consequence of this action was a decrease in piracy in the region. According to a few sources, piracy operations were successful in the early 1820's and piracy was generally eliminated by the end of 1825.

SOURCES:

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Pirates Captured: U. S. Schooner Shark, Thopson's Island, April 3, 1825 U. S. Steam Galliot Sea Gull. Washington: American Periodicals Series II, 1825. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Nov. 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 8 killed, all pirates. 7 wounded – 6 pirates and 1 British. 19 taken prisoner.

TOTAL DEATHS: 8

COSTS: One barge (Gallinipper) which was “well-manned” and two cutters with five men each. Troop number is guessed to be 25 on the Gallinipper and 10 total for the cutters.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS dataset. We confirm it as an instance of U.S. military intervention against a non state actor.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1827 Greece

NAME: Anti-Piracy Operations in the Cyclades

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 25, 1827 - December 6, 1827

TARGET STATE(S): Greece (GRE), 350

SUMMARY:

In 1827, during the Greek War for Independence, there was a rise in Greek piracy as a result of the power shift in the Mediterranean Sea. While the United States remained neutral in the conflict, they aimed to continue and protect American trade with the Ottoman Empire. Due to the rise in piracy and Greek pirates viewing any ship trading with the Ottomans as fair game, the United States deployed the Mediterranean Squadron to actively stop Greek piracy and to escort merchant ships. The Squadron sailed for the Mediterranean on February 22, 1827. From September 25 to December 6, the Mediterranean Squadron formed a convoy that sailed between Smyrna and Malta. During this time, the most notable tactical anti-piracy operations took place between October and November with the *USS Sloop Warren* and the *US Schooner Porpoise*.

In September, under the command of Lieutenant Louis M. Goldsborough, the *Porpoise* and three other ships left for Malta with a convoy leading 11 merchant vessels (5 of which were American). On October 16, while sailing through the Doro Passage at night, a British vessel, the *Comet*, fell under attack by five Greek pirate vessels from Andros and Negroponte. Despite being outnumbered with at least 200 pirates (possibly 300) and only 35 officers and men, *Comet* was recovered. One American was killed, 80-90 pirates were killed, and Lieutenant John A. Carr managed to kill the pirate chief himself. On September 25th, under the command of Master Commandant Lawrence Kearny, *Warren* escorted American merchant ships with the convoy from Smyrna, separating at a halfway point from Sicily. On October 4th, *Warren* captured their first pirate boat of 15 men. That same day, off of Gramvousa (Grabusa/Carabusa), they captured another pirate ship armed with 16 guns. Over the next few weeks, *Warren* continued to engage with Greek ships, patrolling the area and escorting merchant ships in transit. On October 25th, *Warren* captured and sank a 10-gun pirate ship on Kimolos (Argenteero/Argentière), however the pirates managed to escape ashore. That same day, while sailing near Milos (Melo/Milo), Kearney learned that two American ships, *Rob Roy* and *Cherub*, had been attacked by Greek pirates. On the 28th, Warren located the *Cherub* at Syros (Syra) and retook possession. That night, *Lexington* came to guard the *Cherub* while *Warren* resumed its pirate hunt. The following day, they found an Austrian ship (*Silence*) robbed of its cargo and sails. The *Warren* brought the *Silence* back to Syros to be guarded by *Lexington*. On October 30th, while sailing around Mykonos (Miconi), *Warren* captured a 40-oar pirate ship. Upon landing on Mykonos on

November 1st, Kearny found some stolen property, including sails, rigging, and opium, from *Cherub*, *Rob Roy*, and *Silence*. The crew fired at the town in order to obtain the stolen property and the locals handed over four men who were supposedly pirates, meanwhile the crew captured a fifth from the mountains. Kearny and the crew also captured a pirate ship of Mykonos and burned it. On November 7th, *Warren* returned to Syros to return the stolen property and continued on to Andros Island (reputable for pirates), meanwhile, *Cherub* headed for Smyrna with the protection of *Lexington*. Lieutenant William L. Hudson led a boat expedition from *Warren* to observe the coast of Andros. On November 9th, they captured a pirate boat, burned a second pirate boat, and blew up a house which the Americans believed to have been the home of a pirate.

Warren continued sailing between Andros and Giaros (Yiaros/Jura) until November 14th. While on Andros, the local people handed over a pirate ship containing a 12 pound carronade and some stolen tools from *Cherub*. On November 18th, *Warren* sailed into the harbor of Milos Island. On the 27th, two American ships, *Sarah* and *Esther*, and six others arrived. On the 30th, *Warren* rejoined a convoy en route to Smyrna where they arrived by December 6th. *Warren* remained in the Mediterranean for the next two years, patrolling and protecting American trade until she returned to the US in the summer of 1830.

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“Warren IV (Sloop-of-War).” Naval History and Heritage Command, November 17, 2015.
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/warren-iv.html>.

Wombwell, A. James (2010). *The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends*. Volume 32 of Occasional Paper. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-9823283-6-1.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 1 American (at the Battle of Doro Passage), 80-90 Greek pirates

TOTAL DEATHS: 1 American (at the Battle of Doro Passage), 80-90 Greek pirates

COSTS: Deployment of the Mediterranean Squadron, particularly the deployment of the *US Schooner Porpoise* (35-40 officers and men), and the *US Sloop Warren* (Unknown number of men). Known number of ships deployed is four.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is referenced in the CRS report. The exact number of men and ships involved in the Mediterranean Squadron is unknown.

1832 India

NAME: First Sumatran Expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 6, 1832 - February 9, 1832.

TARGET STATE(S): India (IDN), 750

SUMMARY:

On February 7, 1831, the *Friendship*, an American spice trading vessel, was in port at Quallah Battoo, Sumatra to purchase pepper. While the spices were being loaded, the locals attacked the Americans on the ship killing several and forcing its immediate departure. Word quickly spread back to Washington and Captain John Downes of the *USS Potomac* with 480 men was sent to Sumatra to seek compensation and, if necessary, destroy pirate boats or capture those involved in the attack on the *Friendship*.

On February 5, 1832, the Americans tried for a peaceful resolution to no success. In the morning of February 6, American troops advanced on the town and fighting began. After two and a half hours, several of the town's forts were captured. Of the 480 Americans, 282 were sent to fight on land. Two men were killed in action and 11 wounded. An estimated 150 Sumatrans died which included an unspecified number of women and children. During the following days until February 9, the *USS Potomac* continually cannoned the village. Francis Warriner, who was on the *USS Potomac*, claims the Malays said at the time of surrender that 60 men were killed from the shelling. Other sources indicate 300 were killed or wounded during the bombardment.

On February 9, 1832, the Malays surrendered and promised to maintain peace with American traders. This was short-lived, however, as another American ship was attacked in 1838 leading to a second expedition against the Malays by the Americans in December 1838. Additionally, the expedition was viewed in the United States as being an excessive response, but President Jackson claimed it built respect for the American flag in Asia. Notably, Captain John Downes never sailed again presumably because of the severity of the attack.

SOURCES:

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Foltz, J. M. "ART. VI.--Medical Statistics of the United States Frigate Potomac, Commodore John Downes, Commander, during a Three Years' Voyage of Circumnavigation of the

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"John Downes." In *Dictionary of American Biography*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. *Gale In Context: Biography* (accessed November 20, 2020)

WARRINER, FRANCIS. "Chapters 6 - 10." Essay. In *CRUISE OF THE UNITED STATES FRIGATE POTOMAC ROUND THE WORLD: during the Years 1831-34, 75-124*. Place of publication not identified: FORGOTTEN Books, 2015.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 2 Americans, an estimated 210 Malays

TOTAL DEATHS: 2 Americans, an estimated 210 Malays

COSTS: 480 troops were used, 282 landed on February 6th. The Remaining troops stayed on the *USS Potomac* to assist with cannoning the city.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only mentioned in the CRS dataset. There is some discrepancy with the amount of Malays killed by cannoning. Francis Warriner, a primary source, claims the Malays said 60 were killed. Other sources indicate up to 300 killed or wounded. No peer-reviewed or primary sources were found to corroborate the 300 killed or wounded.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

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Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1833 Argentina

NAME: Landing to Protect Foreign Interests During Unrest in Argentina

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 31, 1833 – November 15, 1833

TARGET STATE(S): Argentina (ARG), 160

SUMMARY:

In October 1833, a rebellion broke out in Argentina. The American ship *Natchez*, under the command of John Zantzinger, was in the harbor near Buenos Aires when hostilities began. At the request of American business interests in the city, the *Natchez* remained in the harbor.

Upon learning of the unrest in Buenos Aires, Commodore M.T. Woolsey of the *Lexington* left Montevideo for the Argentine capital, arriving on October 21st. Woolsey sent a representative from the *Lexington* ashore to communicate with the Argentine President and ascertain the situation, as the US had no diplomatic representation in Argentina at the time.

On October 31st, unrest spread throughout the city, and Commodore Woolsey sent 43 personnel ashore, where they protected foreign interests until November 15th, at which point the instability subsided. US forces do not appear to have suffered any losses.

SOURCES:

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Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Maintaining two ships in the harbor near Buenos Aires.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS dataset.

1835 Mexico

NAME: Ingham Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1556

DATES: June 14, 1835

TARGET STATE: Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

The U.S.-Mexico relationship was strained during the 1800s. For years, the U.S. expanded its territory into North America, which led to several battles over Mexican territory. Mexico, meanwhile, was plagued by political and economic problems. In this situation, Mexico began to assert more control over its Texas territory in the 1830s. This development began to cause civil unrest in Texas.

The Mexican Navy began to capture ships they suspected of carrying illegal goods and arms to the growing rebellion. The most notable incidents were when the Mexican schooner *Montezuma* seized the American schooner *Martha* and the Texan ship *Columbia* for customs violations on May 7, 1835. Outrage (from the public, businessmen, and President Jackson) over these seizures eventually drove the U.S. military to order the schooner *Ingham* to rescue the captive U.S. citizens. After traveling for several weeks, they found and engaged *Montezuma* on June 14, 1835. Several shots were fired, until the captain of *Montezuma* crashed his own ship to avoid capture and the U.S. citizens were rescued.

The Ingham Incident (also sometimes referred to as the Montezuma Affair) was the first naval battle between Mexico and the U.S. It is also seen as a major trigger for the Texas Revolution and a precursor to the eventual Mexican-American War. As a side note, scholars argue the Ingham Incident was the origin of the Coast Guard motto "Semper paratus."

SOURCES:

"Revenue Cutter Ingham." Published June 19, 2015.

<https://www.maritimeprofessional.com/blogs/post/revenue-cutter-ingham-14786>.

Wells, William R. II. "Every Protection That Was Asked For..." The United States Revenue Cutter Ingham, Texas Independence, and New Orleans, 1835." *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association* 39, no. 4 (1998): 457-79.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4233538>.

Wells, William R. II. "SEMPER PARATUS: The Meaning." Published 2006.
<https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jul/01/2001772265/-1/-1/0/SEMPERPARATUSTHEMEANING.PDF>.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Social Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Released (for Seizures)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS:

- Navy Sailors: 22
- One Navy ship: *Langham*

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

- The military intervention does not appear in the CSR dataset of military interventions.
- The incident was mentioned in the MID list. However, in the MID, the ships involved had different names, such as *Paragon* or *Texas*. There were no ships that had those names, and we could not find any interventions around the same time-period that involved those ships and Mexico. Thus, we determined the names in the MID were incorrect and resolved the error.
- The MID also mentioned the involvement of Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico Powhatan Ellis; however, he was an envoy in 1839, and he did not have any relation with the Incident.
- The MIP dataset listed the Incident happening during 1839, but this is probably due to the inclusion of envoy Ellis.

1835 Peru

NAME: Protection of the American Consulate in Callao and Lima

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 10, 1835 to December 7, 1836

TARGET STATE(S): Peru (PER), 135

SUMMARY:

In 1835, a civil war broke out in Peru. Due to the conflict, on December 6th, American citizens in Callao petitioned for marines to land for protection. The *USS Brandywine*, in harbor at the time, complied with this request on December 10, and deployed between 40 and 50 marines to the area where they quartered with the Americans living there. The marines returned to the *Brandywine* on January 24th, 1836. The protection proved successful as no hostilities against the Americans occurred.

Additional deployments occurred throughout the remainder of 1836. In one instance, a single private was sent to Lima to the American Consulate on an unspecified mission though it is implied that he was sent to aid in defense of the consulate. Details of other troop deployments and numbers were not found in the available literature. There is, however, no mention of other ships in the area, suggesting that the *USS Brandywine* was likely the only American naval ship in the area during the Peruvian Civil War.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson. "Peru." Essay. In *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934: a Brief History in Two Parts ...*, 137-38. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

Mooney, James L. "Brandywine." June 26, 2015.
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/b/brandywine-i.html>.

"Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad ...," January 13, 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 1 Naval Ship – *USS Brandywine* and an estimated 45 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS dataset. CRS indicates that only two deployments occurred. We confirm the double instance of U.S. military intervention and continue to code it as one single instance given the same objective of protecting U.S. diplomatic interests.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. ‘Peacekeeping’ operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, ‘humanitarian’ operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1836 Mexico (1) Urrea

NAME: *General Urrea* Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1554

DATES: December 1836 – April 16, 1837

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

After the Texan victory in the Battle of San Jacinto in March 1836, the northern territory claimed independence from Mexico. Leading up to the defining victory, tensions between Mexico and Texas reached a boiling point; in January 1836, Mexico announced a blockade of Texas ports in an attempt to starve the separatist movement of support. The United States, confined by the Neutrality Act of 1818, was caught in the middle. One of the first acts the newly independent Texas carried out was to create a navy, initially used to transport troops in the ongoing conflict with Mexico. However, the entrance of the Texas navy into the Gulf of Mexico created numerous problems for American commerce.

Multiple examples of state-sponsored piracy characterized the relationship between Mexico and Texas, which complicated United States' commerce. In April 1836, the Mexican brig of war *Libertador* captured the Texas schooner *Independence* and imprisoned its crew in Matamoros. The Texas navy retaliated by attacking Mexican vessels and coastal towns. The Texan *Invincible* captured an American ship thought to be carrying military support to Mexico and was immediately declared a pirate by the United States naval command. In the same month, the Mexican port of Matamoros denied entrance to four American merchant vessels, renegeing on the 1831 Mexican-American Commercial treaty that governed trade between the two countries. The United States navy began to convoy both Texas and Mexican ships to facilitate trade.

In April 1837, two American vessels, the *Champion* and the *Louisiana* were captured outside of Texas by a Mexican squadron led by the brig of war, *General Urrea*, and imprisoned in Matamoros. American Commander Mervine led the *Natchez* to liberate the two American ships and their crews, and captured the *General Urrea* in the process (which was eventually returned to Mexico). In April 1838, the United States and Mexico agreed to arbitration of the events that occurred. A drawn-out tribunal concluded investigations in February 1842 which left neither the United States nor Mexico satisfied with the result. These naval confrontations undoubtedly led to

increased resentment between the United States and Mexico, culminating years later in the Mexican-American War.

SOURCES:

Bauer, K. Jack. 1970. "The United States Navy and Texas Independence: A Study in Jacksonian Integrity." *Military Affairs* 34, no. 2: 44-48.

Haugh, George F. 1960. "History of the Texas Navy." *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 63, no. 4: 572-79.

Moore, Marc A. 1967. "Marines of the Texas Republic." *Southwest Review* 52, no. 2: 164-76.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire, Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

COSTS: Deployment of five United States ships (*Constellation, Concord, Natchez, St. Louis, Boston*) to Matamoros.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This dispute features in the MID dataset on intervention.

1836 Mexico (2) Gaines

NAME: General Gaines in Nacogdoches

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1555

DATES: April 4, 1836 – December 18, 1836

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

In the 1830s, the relationship between the United States and Mexico started to fray as American settlers began to rapidly populate the Mexican state of Texas. Both countries were operating under their April 1831 Treaty of Commerce, and as more Americans moved to Texas, President Jackson publicly practiced a policy of “strict neutrality”. After their victory in the Battle of San Jacinto on April 28, 1836 and the signing of the Treaty of Velasco, Texans declared their independence from Mexico. However, Mexico declined to accept the document, as their general and President, Santa Anna, had been captured during the battle and signed the treaty under duress.

The borderlands and Texas were heavily populated by native American tribal populations during this time. The 1831 Commerce Treaty attempted to make both countries accountable for the violence committed by native American communities that crossed the border. In January 1836, President Jackson sent General Edmund Gaines, commander of the Western Department of the U.S. Army, to the eastern side of the Sabine River, the geographical marker long established as the border between Mexico and the U.S., to defend national territory. Gaines explained to the Mexican and Texan generals how any army recruiting native Americans living in U.S. territory would be punished severely. He was given large discretion to manage his 1600 troop force.

On July 31, 1836, acting based on rumors of native American insurrection, Gaines moved his troops across the Sabine River into Nacogdoches. Mexico maintained that the territory still belonged to them as the Treaty of Velasco was void; Texas claimed the treaty still held; the United States kept “neutrality”. Manuel Edward Gorostiza, Mexico’s minister plenipotentiary to the United States, was furious that their northern neighbor was using government funds in this manner and resigned in October. Gaines was heavily criticized for his decision and recalled to Washington for an investigation. Troops were removed from Nacogdoches on December 18, 1836. Louisiana and other Southern states rose to Gaines’ defense and ultimately changed public opinion in the United States to push for annexation of Texas years later. In the absence of a Mexican diplomatic mission in Washington, tensions between the two countries continued to rise, ultimately leading to the Mexican-American War.

SOURCES:

Jones, Robert L. and Jones, Pauline. 2012. "Occupation of Nacogdoches." *East Texas Historical Journal*: Vol. 50 : Iss. 2, Article 8. Available at: <https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol50/iss2/8>

Kent Barnett Germany. 1996. "Patriotism and Protest: Louisiana and General Edmund Pendleton Gaines's Army of Mexican-American War Volunteers, 1845-1847." *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association* 37, no. 3: 325-35.

Silver, James W. 1935. "Edmund Pendleton Gaines and Frontier Problems, 1801-1849." *The Journal of Southern History* 1, no. 3: 320-44.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexico: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexico: 0

COSTS: Deployment and maintenance of 1600 troops for five months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in both Gibler's (2018) *International Conflicts* database and the CRS report.

1838 India

NAME: Second Sumatran Expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 24, 1838 to January 3rd, 1839

TARGET STATE(S): India (IDN), 750

SUMMARY:

Following the First Sumatran Expedition in 1832, the United States believed that the Sumatra people would remain friendly to American trading vessels. On August 26th, 1838, the American trading vessel *Eclipse* was robbed in a similar manner to the 1832 robbery of the *Friendship* while in port near Mukie (spelled sometimes as Muckie). Commodore George C. Read learned of the robbery and immediately took two frigates, the *USS Columbia* and *USS John Adams*, to Qualla Battoo (spelled sometimes as Kwallah Batu) where some of the robbers were located in an attempt to reobtain the goods stolen.

The frigates arrived on December 22nd, 1838 and attempted to retrieve the stolen goods to no avail. On December 25th, 1838, the frigates cannonaded the town destroying two of the forts. No troops landed in this battle and no indication is made that the Malays fought back. The frigates then proceeded to Mukie. On January 1st, 1839, the frigates cannonaded Mukie and then landed 350 men to destroy the town. The Malays again did resist the destruction of Mukie and the town was left “a mass of ruins.” The frigates set sail away from Mukie on January 3rd, 1839. Sources indicate that the Americans suffered zero casualties across both conflicts. William Murrell, a primary source, indicates that the Malays suffered an unknown number of casualties in the battle at Qualla Batoo and presumably zero at the battle at Mukie.

There are no overall long-term consequences as piracy and theft continued in the region for many years to come. There are no indications in the primary or secondary sources found of Dutch involvement in the conflict.

SOURCES:

“Important from Sumatra.” *The Baltimore Sun*, May 30, 1839, 4–4.

Logan, James Richardson. “The Piracy and Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago.” *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* 4 (1850): 623–25.

Murrell, William Meacham. "9." Essay. In *Cruise of the Frigate Columbia around the World, under the Command of Commodore George C. Read, in 1838, 1839, and 1840*, 103–11. Boston, MA: B.B. Mussey, 1840.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. &

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Two frigates, the *USS Columbia* and *USS John Adams*, and 350 marines/sailors.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: There are unsupported sources that claim Dutch involvement as primary and secondary sources do not make any mention of the Dutch playing a role in the battles. Additionally, dates across all sources are conflicting but generally within one or two days of each other.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

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Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an

intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1839 United Kingdom

NAME: The Aroostook War (The Pork and Beans War)

DISPUTE NUMBER: 15

DATES: February 15th, 1839 to March 21st, 1839

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom, 200. Location: Canada, Canada CAN 20.

SUMMARY:

The Treaty of Paris in 1783 officially ended the American Revolutionary War and established boundaries for the United States and British controlled New Brunswick. However, the boundary between Maine and Canada was never explicitly established in this treaty. The sides interpreted the vague language differently over the next few decades, causing land claim disputes over roughly 12,000 square miles of land.

The repercussions of an unclear boundary reached a critical point in 1838 and early 1839. Both the United States and Canada frequently arrested “trespassers” in the disputed territory. On February 15th, 1839, Maine passed legislation for 10,000 troops to be sent to the border to secure the territory. Other states pledged support and Congress soon passed funds for an additional 50,000 troops, however, these troops were never actually deployed. Immediately following, the British began sending troops to the area. Seeing the potential for conflict, President Van Buren sent General Winfield Scott to negotiate peace foremost until a diplomatic solution could be arranged. Lt. Governor of New Brunswick John Harvey and Scott exchanged letters throughout March and reached an agreement on March 21, 1839. For the sake of preventing conflict, both sides would retract troops deployments and allow for diplomats to solve the border dispute.

The long-term consequence to this dispute was the Webster-Ashburn Treaty of 1842 which formalized the boundaries between Maine and New Brunswick. The United States is universally viewed to have received a better outcome as they received 2/3 of the disputed land and control of the St. John River.

SOURCES:

"Aroostook War." In *The Great American History Fact-Finder*, by Pam Cornelison, and Ted Yanak. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

Britannica Academic, s.v. "Aroostook War," accessed January 25, 2021.

McCue, Michael Westaway. 2000. "The Aroostook War." *Beaver* 80 (4): 12.

Ring, Elizabeth "Aroostook War ." Dictionary of American History. *Encyclopedia.com*. (January 12, 2021).

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: 10,000 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the MID data by Gibler (2018). Because of the speedy exchange between Scott and Harvey, the 50,000 Congressional troops were never deployed to the conflict. Only the 10,000 troops Maine sent were deployed with a large number still traveling to the border at the time of the agreement. The start date of the conflict is the day Maine passed legislation to send troops as it provoked a response by the British. The end date of this conflict is stated as March 21st, 1839 as a military truce was formally established on that day and troops were retracted. Coding of this instance assumes that both countries had legitimate ownership of the land at the time. Therefore, troop deployments by both parties were strictly to fortify the borders and not seize opposing land.

1840 Fiji

NAME: Fiji punitive expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 12, 1840 - July 26, 1840

TARGET STATE(S): Fiji (FIJ), 950

SUMMARY: In 1838, Congress issued orders to a squadron of U.S. naval ships to enter the South Pacific Sea on a mission of exploring and surveying local islands in areas thought to be relevant and valuable for future U.S. commercial maritime trade. When arriving in the area in 1839, the commander of the squadron contacted local native tribes and negotiated a set of commercial regulations to guide future interactions.

Over the next year locals – who may or may not have understood that they were supposedly bound by these treaties – flagrantly violated the regulations, for instance by looting a stranded U.S. ship and (in a separate incident) murdering two U.S. officers who had surveyed local territory and took a local hostage when they were scared by hostile natives.

In response, U.S. forces landed and burned multiple villages to the ground. After this demonstration of force, local actors no longer attacked U.S. ships or personnel in the area.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Westerfield, Donald. 1996. *War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War*. Westport: Praeger.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain Empire; Economic Protection; Protect Own Military/Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 2 Americans, 7 Fijians

TOTAL DEATHS: 2 Americans, 7 Fijians

COSTS: The squadron of six ships deployed included the *Vincennes*, *Peaco*, the *Porpoise*, the *Relief*, *Flying Fish*, and *SeaGull*. The number of troops deployed on the island is unknown.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1841 Kiribati

NAME: Battle of Drummond's Island

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: April 6, 1841 - April 9, 1841

TARGET STATE(S): Kiribati (KIR), 946

SUMMARY:

During the Wilkes Exploring Expedition (expedition by the US between 1836-1842 to map uncharted territory/oceans, and for scientific and commercial expansion) while sailing around the Gilbert Islands, aboard the Peacock, Lieutenant William L. Hudson heard of a shipwreck that happened some time ago in the area. Supposedly, the whole crew was massacred, except for a woman and her child. On April 6, Lieutenant Hudson anchored his ship four miles out from the town of Utirod on Drummond's Island (where the catastrophe supposedly took place). With four armed boats, two officers, and the Scientific Corps, Hudson landed on the island to make scientific observations and collect information, and to determine if the woman and child were on this island.

Upon landing, the crew was initially cordially greeted by the natives. Despite this, the natives kept their homes closed to the Americans, and no information was obtained when the Americans inquired about the woman and child. However, remnants of the shipwrecked vessel were found. At the end of the day, Hudson and his crew returned to the ship with plans to continue their search the following day. On April 7, the Americans continued searching for several hours before returning to their ships. Hudson realized one of his men, John Anderson, was missing. A search for Anderson was made and Hudson even offered a reward. The natives became hostile and took arms. As the Americans returned to the ships, leaving the shore, the natives crowded around stoning them and waving their weapons. The Americans waited for Anderson for two days before concluding that he was murdered.

On April 9, Hudson decided to attack the natives to punish them for the death of Anderson. The schooner, the Flying Fish (which had arrived the previous day), was ordered to cover the party in boats (7) as a haven for the landing party should the men need to retreat. Under Lieutenant William M. Walker, eighty armed and equipped marines were deployed and they were met with a force of roughly 800 natives. Walker fired a rocket, which caused the natives to flee into the bushes. However, the natives soon returned to surround the boats. The Americans fired a volley of musketry bringing many natives to fall. When the Americans landed, they immediately set out to destroy the village. In less than two hours, all huts (approximately 300) in the town were burnt

to ashes. They continued on to burn the neighboring village, Aita, before returning to the ships. In total, twelve natives were killed and John Anderson, the woman, and child were never found.

SOURCES:

Bryan, G. S. 2018. "The Wilkes Exploring Expedition". The International Hydrographic Review, no. 1 (May). <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/ihr/article/view/27222>.

Clark, George B. "5. Between the Wars." Chapter. In Battle History of the United States Marine Corps: 1775-1945, 49. Jefferson, NC: McFarland et Company, Inc., 2014.

"Drummond's Island (Tabiteuea)." Naval History and Heritage Command. Accessed January 7, 2021. <https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/art/exhibits/exploration-and-technology/alfred-agate-collection/1841/-drummond-s-island--tabiteuea-.html>.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. "Drummonds Island 1841." Chapter. In One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934, 72–74. 1974.

Walker, James. "United States Exploring Expedition (1838-1842)." The Oregon Encyclopedia, February 6, 2020. https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/united_states_exploring_expedition_1838_1842/#.X_i8dthKjid.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Yield by US

BATTLE DEATHS: 1 American, 12 Natives

TOTAL DEATHS: 1 American, 12 Natives

COSTS: Deployment of the Peacock and the schooner the Flyish Fish, a few navy officers, and 80 marines and seamen.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is referenced in the CRS report.

1841 Samoa

NAME: Retaliation for treaty abrogation

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 24, 1841

TARGET STATE(S): Samoa (WSM), 990

SUMMARY: In the early 1800s trade grew rapidly between the U.S. and a range of islands in the South Pacific, and in 1839 the United States government decided to upgrade the commercial agency on Samoa to a formal consulate. About a year later, an American sailor was killed by natives. According to the treaty signed in 1839 to establish the U.S. consulate, the suspects were supposed to be handed over to U.S. authorities. However, local authorities refused to comply with this request.

The U.S. Navy sloop *Peacock* and schooner *Flying Fish* were ordered to the island to seek redress. When local authorities continued to refuse, naval commanders decided to land 70 Marines. On February 24, 1841 the Marines approached the villages where the suspects lived, but found them deserted. As retribution for the murder and the refusal to hand over the suspects, the Marines burned several villages to the ground. At that point they decided that they had fulfilled their mission as stipulated and sailed away.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Westerfield, Donald. 1996. *War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War*. Westport: Praeger.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain Empire; Economic Protection; Protect Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

COSTS: Deployment of two naval ships and 70 Marines.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1842 Mexico

NAME: Capture of Monterey

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2116

DATES: October 19 - 21, 1842

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico 70

SUMMARY:

Sometime before the conflict, Commodore Thomas Ap Jones heard that British ships were moving north along the coast of South America. There was a fear that if a war broke out between the US and Mexico, Britain would take advantage of the conflict in the east to take the valued Pacific ports. Jones was under orders at the time to capture any Pacific ports if a war began between Mexico and the US to prevent the British from taking them. Under these orders and misinterpreting the movement of British ships, Jones assumed the US was going to war with Mexico and therefore took his ships north to Monterey.

On October 19th, 1842, Jones' ships arrived in port and requested the immediate surrender of Monterey by the next morning. Monterey's forces were insufficient to defend the fort and the governor peacefully surrendered the city on October 20th, 1842. A landing party of 100 sailors and 50 marines took control of the city that day. The next morning on October 21st, Jones learned that a war had not begun and immediately gave the city back to the governor. This was widely considered a blunder on Jones' part and he was censured but not punished for his actions.

The long-term consequences of this intervention was a signal to the Mexican government of American eagerness to take over Mexican territory. Over the next couple of years Monterey increased its defenses and in 1846, when the Mexican-American war broke out, the Battle of Monterey caused heavy casualties on both sides.

SOURCES:

GUINN, J. M. "THE CAPTURE OF MONTEREY OCT. 19, 1842." *Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California, Los Angeles* 3, no. 4 (1896): 70-73. Accessed November 10, 2020. doi:10.2307/41167605.

Smith, Gene. "Jones, Thomas Ap Catesby." *American National Biography*. Oxford University Press, February 2000.

"Thomas Ap Catesby Jones." In *Dictionary of American Biography*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. *Gale In Context: Biography* (accessed November 10, 2020).

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Yield by US

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS:100 sailors, 50 marines, 1 frigate (USS United States), 2 sloops-of-war (USS Dale and USS Cyane)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Many sources incorrectly state the city was given back to Mexico on October 20th. However, this is inaccurate according to primary sources. Commodore Jones arrived on the 19th, peacefully took the city on the morning of the 20th, and then relinquished control on the 21st.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. ‘Peacekeeping’ operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, ‘humanitarian’ operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1843 China

NAME: Landing to Protect Americans in Canton

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 1843

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

During the 19th century, the Qing dynasty was under intense pressure from European commercial interests to open China to trade. From 1839 to 1842, China and Britain fought the First Opium War, which ended with the Treaty of Nanjing.

In June 1843 (or 1844, see Definitional Issues below), a dispute broke out between Americans and Chinese at a trading post, or possibly a factory. The dispute occurred in the southern city of Canton (Guangzhou), a major trading port. The USS *St. Louis*, under the orders of Lieutenant Edward G. Tilton, landed sixty marines and sailors at Canton in order to protect the Americans until the clash subsided. American forces do not appear to have been drawn into combat, although there was one Chinese death in the clash preceding deployment.

SOURCES:

Emerson, J. Terry. "War Powers Legislation," *West Virginia Law Review* Vol. 74 Nos. 1-2 (1971), pp. 53-119.

Haviland, Aaron. "Misreading the History of Presidential War Power, 1789-1860," *Texas Review of Law & Politics* Vol. 24, No. 3 (2020), pp. 481-530.

Long, David F. 1988. *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of US Naval Officers, 1798-1883*. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.

US Department of State. No Date. "United States Relations with China: From Trade to the Open Door (1784-1900)." <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/90392.htm>. Accessed January 17, 2021.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actors

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS:

China: 1 (Long 1988, p. 214)

US: 0

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Cost of maintaining naval presence near China.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: There is a dispute in the literature concerning whether this intervention occurred in June of 1843 or 1844. Torrean & Plagakis (2020) and Terry (1971) date the incident to 1843, but do not provide specific dates. Haviland (2020, p. 486) claims that Torrean & Plagakis misdate the incident, and that it actually occurred in 1844. The supporting citation is Long (1988, p. 214), which dates the incident to 1844. Terry suggests “June and July” of 1843, but we cannot establish a firm start or end date.

1846 Mexico

NAME: Mexican-American War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1552

DATES: April 25, 1846 – February 2, 1848

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico 70

SUMMARY: Prior to the Mexican-American War beginning in 1846, Texas declared independence from Mexico in 1836 and was annexed by the United States in 1845. Mexico's President Jose Joaquin Herrera was extremely displeased with these events and severed relations with the United States in 1845. American President Polk, however, wanted to continue relations and sent a diplomat to Mexico City to purchase New Mexico and California from Mexico. Herrera did not allow the negotiations to occur so Polk, motivated by expanding US territory through force if necessary, pushed for Congress to prepare for war. In what is today viewed as a questionable and very provocative act, Polk stationed troops along the U.S.-Mexican border as an attempt to provoke an attack from Mexico. He was successful on April 25, 1846, as Mexico attacked American troops along the Rio Grande in what is known as the Thornton Affair. The US formally declared war on May 13, 1846.

The war lasted until February 2, 1848 when the U.S. and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Due to the scale of the war, exact troops numbers and deaths remain somewhat disputed. The Defense Casualty Analysis System of the Department of Defense gives the total number of American troops to be 78,718 with 13,283 deaths of which 1,733 are from battle and 11,550 from other causes. Most sources indicated that disease was the major cause of the non-battle deaths. According to K. Jack Bauer, an estimated 66 US Naval ships were used throughout the war. On the side of Mexico, the total number of battle deaths is estimated to be around 5,000 with an additional 4,000 civilian casualties (Clodfelter 2017:249). The exact number for Mexican battles deaths and civilian deaths is unknown.

The long-term consequences of the war are best seen in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The US was able to maintain Texas as a state, settled the border dispute to be along the Rio Grande, and received all of then California in exchange for roughly \$15M. The territory, including Texas, received would eventually become the states located in the present day southwest (California, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado and parts of Oklahoma and Wyoming). Area along the southern border of present-day Arizona and New Mexico remained disputed until the Gadsden Purchase of 1854.

SOURCES:

Bauer, Jack K. *Surfboats and Horse Marines: U.S. Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 1846-48*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1969.

Britannica Academic, s.v. "Mexican-American War," accessed January 30, 2021.

Clodfelter, Micheal. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: a Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2017.

DCAS Reports - Principal Wars, 1775 - 1991. Accessed January 30, 2021.

"Mexican-American War." Naval History and Heritage Command. Accessed January 30, 2021.

"Mexican War." In *The Great American History Fact-Finder*, by Pam Cornelison, and Ted Yanak. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin, 2004.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- American - 1,733 (DCAS)
- Mexican - 5,000 (Clodfelter 249)

TOTAL DEATHS: 22,283

- 1,733 American deaths in battle (DCAS)
- 11,550 Americans from other causes (DCAS)
- 5,000 Mexican battle deaths (Clodfelter 249)
- 4,000 Mexican civilian deaths (Clodfelter 249)

COSTS: 78,718 troops and at least 66 naval ships (DCAS, Bauer)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The Mexican-American war features in both Gibler/MID and the CRS report, although with varying dates. We use the dates during which the U.S. officially recognized that it was at war with Mexico (in practice, the same as the CRS report).

1850 Spain

NAME: The Cardenas Expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1566

DATES: May 7 - November 16, 1850

TARGET STATE(S): Spain (SPN) - 230

SUMMARY:

The mid 1800's was the height of America's expansionist endeavors and it was also a tense period surrounding the slavery discourse - eventually leading to the Civil War. The Mexican-American War had just ended in 1848, resulting in the annexation of Texas. After the war, the U.S. public and government hoped to acquire additional territory in the Caribbean. Despite the U.S. government making its own efforts to acquire Cuba, private citizens, particularly many pro-slavery individuals from the South, and veterans from the Mexican American War, took matters into their own hands by embarking on their own filibustering expeditions. These expeditions were an embarrassment to the Taylor/Fillmore administration, leading the President to deploy U.S. Navy ships (steamer *Saranac*, *USS Germantown*, steamer *Vixen*) to observe and prevent escalation of the expeditions. Such expeditions threatened U.S. diplomatic relations with Spain.

Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan-born American, headed three filibustering expeditions, with the last resulting in his execution in 1851. Lopez's first attempt in 1849 failed before even departing for Cuba. In his second attempt, on May 7, 1850, Lopez set out for the expedition on the *Creole*, along with the Liberation Army of about 550 men on the *Georgiana* and *Susan Loud* (three fourths of which were veterans from the Mexican-American War). Before reaching Cuba, on May 14, they stopped in Contoy Island and Mujeres Island for preparations. On the 17th, they sailed for Cuba. On the 19th, the Liberation Army landed in Cardenas, a town in the northwest of Cuba. Initially, Lopez briefly occupied the town before Spanish authorities arrived. However, the expedition failed, as Lopez thought he would be seen as a liberator and he expected to receive the support of the locals. The Spanish had been warned and Lopez and his men became outnumbered without the support of the locals. The filibusters lost 26 men and 60 were left injured. The Spaniards, on the other hand, suffered only ten casualties. Lopez decided to retreat to the *Creole*, managing to escape the Spanish force and returned to the U.S.

While fleeing Cardenas, the *Creole* managed to escape, however 52 men from *Georgiana* and *Susan Loud* were captured by Spanish *Habanero* and *Pizzaro*. These men became prisoners accused of piracy. The U.S. was outraged and demanded the release of its citizens. Meanwhile in Spain, news of the events in Cuba was not taken well, escalating tensions between the U.S. and

Spain. After months of negotiations, the prisoners were released on November 16, 1850, a diplomatic victory for Secretary of State Clayton.

SOURCES:

Caldwell, Robert Granville. "The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba 1848-1851." Dissertation, Princeton University Press, 1915.

De La Cova, Antonio Rafael. "The Kentucky Regiment That Invaded Cuba in 1850." *The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* 105, no. 4 (2007): 571-615. Accessed March 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23387257>.

"Counter-Case Presented on the Part of the Government: Of Her Britannic Majesty to the Tribunal of Arbitration, Constituted Under Article 1 of the Treaty Concluded at Washington on the 8th May, 1871, Between Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of America." Google Books. Harrison and Sons, October 12, 2010.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=N35RAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA36&lpg=PA36&dq=1850%2Bspain%2Braid%2Bcuba%2Bamerican&source=bl&ots=jtU2wflUbO&sig=ACfU3U2FPWDEXCk04OghUaNYbvIQj0JOSw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjSkcGbjfDuAhUKFVvKfHfSQD1E4ChDoATAPegQIFRAC#v=onepage&q=1850%20spain%20raid%20cuba%20american&f=false>.

Langley, Lester D. "The Whigs and the Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1849-1851: A Chapter in Frustrating Diplomacy." *Revista De Historia De América*, no. 71 (1971): 9-22. Accessed March 10, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20138980>.

"Territorial Expansion, Filibustering, and U.S. Interest in Central America and Cuba, 1849–1861." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 10, 2021. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/territorial-expansion>.

United States. Government Printing Office. "Congressional Serial Set, Issue 561." Google Books. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1850, March 21, 2013.
https://books.google.com/books?id=o0Q4AQAAMAAJ&pg=RA6-PA60&lpg=RA6-PA60&dq=uss%2Bbalbany%2Bpensacola%2B1850%2Bcuba%2Bspain&source=bl&ots=hL5QZMhosl&sig=ACfU3U3pvPTHZL6rXU5w-JLHEkVo4yxYBQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiH8u73uLDvAhUqU98KHU_xCuUQ6AEwEXoECBAQAw#v=onepage&q=1850&f=false.

Zemler, Jeffrey A. "The Texas Press and the Filibusters of the 1850s: Lopez, Carvajal, and Walker," 1983.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: Spain: 10

TOTAL DEATHS: Spain: 10
U.S. Citizens: 26

COSTS: Deployment of the *USS Georgetown, Saranac, and Vixen*

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

In the backlogger, Fillmore is input as the president. However, President Taylor was president when this intervention began, up until he passed away July 9th, 1850. Fillmore became president July 10th, 1850, midway through this intervention.

There are discrepancies about the landing date in Cardenas, Cuba.

- The book, "Counter-Case Presented on the Part of the Government," says that they landed in Cardenas on May 17th.
- De La Cova says the filibusters landed on May 19th after sailing for Cuba from Contoy and Mujeres on the 17th.

Discrepancies in intervention end date:

- MID says the intervention July 8th, 1850, when the prisoners were released.
- The book, "Counter-Case Presented on the Part of the Government," says the prisoners were released July 15th.
- Meanwhile both Caldwell, and Zemler say that the prisoners were released on November 16th, 1850.

Discrepancies of number of men in the filibustering expedition:

- The book, "Counter-Case Presented on the Part of the Government," says there were approximately 500 men.
- De La Cova says there were 610 men - including 230 from the Kentucky Regiment, 170 from the Louisiana Regiment, and 170 from the Mississippi Regiment.
- Zemler notes "Lopez's force declined from 570 to 520 men" when Lopez offered the opportunity to return to the U.S. instead of sailing on to Cuba.
- Caldwell describes something similar, that before sailing for Cuba from Contoy, the force was reduced from 570 to 521.

Discrepancies of ships deployed:

- The book, "Counter-Case Presented on the Part of the Government," notes that on July 15th when the prisoners were released, the *USS Albany* was sent to receive them. This is not noted in other sources.

1852 Johanns Island

NAME: Freeing of U.S. merchant ship

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 5, 1851 – August 29, 1851

TARGET STATE(S): Johanns Island (N/A)

SUMMARY: In 1851 a U.S. merchant ship in the whaling business had its captain unlawfully seized by King Selim of the Johanns Island in the South Pacific. The U.S. Navy sloop *Dale* happened to be in the area as part of its regularly scheduled voyage across the South Pacific islands, and it was diverted to respond to this indignity.

Upon its arrival, the sloop fired multiple rounds of shells onto the fortress of King Selim who rapidly put up a white flag. After a series of negotiations, and at least one further round of artillery shelling, the King agreed to release the U.S. merchant captain and even paid a small amount of money as financial redress.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Westerfield, Donald. 1996. *War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War*. Westport: Praeger.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of one U.S. naval ship. The United States received \$1,000 in compensation from King Selim, and the one ship intervening in Johanns Island was already in the area as part of a regular patrol.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1851 Turkey

NAME: Mediterranean Squadron Deployment after Jaffa Massacre

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 1851

TARGET STATE(S): Turkey - 640; Location: present-day Israel - 666

SUMMARY: A massacre took place in Jaffa in January 1851 where foreigners, including Americans, were killed. Following the massacre, the U.S. deployed the Mediterranean Squadron of the Navy to the Turkish (Levantine) coast. During this intervention, no shots were fired but the presence of the Mediterranean Squadron was used as a display of force.

SOURCES:

Black, Jeremy. "Building Empires, 1830-1913." Essay. In *Introduction to Global Military History: 1775 to the Present Day*, 77. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014.

Blum, William. "Appendix II." Essay. In *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II*, 456. London: Zed Books, 2003.

Rep. *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020: Updated July 20 2020 Citation Metadata*. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs, 2020.

Terry Emerson, J. "War Powers Legislation," August 1971.

<https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3054&context=vwlr>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of a naval squadron (maximum 500 personnel).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS report. We cannot ascertain the exact dates of the intervention, but estimate that it took approximately 30 days as the sources discuss it as events of January 1851.

1852 Argentina

NAME: Buenos Aires protective mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 3, 1852 – April 15, 1853

TARGET STATE(S): Argentina (ARG), 160

SUMMARY:

The territory that today constitutes Argentina was originally a set of largely autonomous provinces and city states that gained independence from Spain as a consequence of Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula and abolition of the Spanish Monarchy in 1808. Buenos Aires, the most powerful city state, staged an extensive campaign – including both diplomatic overtures and military conquests – to merge this territory into one state, which concluded in the 1860s as the new country adopted a formal constitution.

At various points during this long process of state unification the territory witnessed extensive military campaigns that were enormously disruptive to ordinary social and economic life. One such campaign rocked the territory in 1852-53 as two competing generals led their respective forces in a fierce competition for power. As law and order deteriorated, riotous crowds pillaged and looted stores; there was a general sense that foreigners were facing an elevated threat from crime, riots, and looting.

Several foreign governments, including not only the United States but also Britain and France, landed troops at various points during this time period to protect consular and diplomatic posts as well as commercial interests and specific companies and agents thereof. By April, 1853 the threat had subsided and the United States withdrew its forces.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Periodic deployment of U.S. ships and small contingents of Marines at various points over the course of about 15 months. Ellsworth states that it remains unknown exactly when in April 1853 that the Marines withdrew; we enter April 15 as an estimate.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1852 Peru

NAME: Lobos Islands Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1755

DATES: June 16, 1852 - August 25, 1852

TARGET STATE(S): Peru 135

SUMMARY:

During the 1840s, the fertilizer guano became increasingly popular throughout the world for its regenerative properties in depleted soil. Peru was the leading exporter of guano and the government claimed a monopoly over its procurement and sale in 1841. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, American farmers complained that there was inadequate supply, irregular deliveries, and high prices for guano and relayed these concerns to Congress. Numerous attempts were made during the 1840s and early 1850s to secure guano for a cheaper price, but the Peruvian government remained firmly against price reductions or treaties to regulate the prices.

Seeking a way to obtain guano from a different source than the Peruvian government, an American merchant, James C. Jewett, proposed that he could take guano from the uninhabited Lobos islands 25 miles off the coast of Peru. Secretary of State Daniel Webster approved of this action and complied with Jewett's further request for a "vessel of war" for protection on June 5th, 1852 with the Secretary of the Navy Graham approving the protection vessel on June 16th. Following intense debate over sovereignty of the islands and the right to take the guano, the June 16th letter for the protection vessel was retracted on August 25th, 1852 and Webster left Washington on September 2nd, 1852 due to illness. On November 16th, Webster's successor, Edward Everett, recanted Webster's June 5th letter and agreed to Peru's control over the islands. Peru in exchange allowed the vessels that left the United States between June 5th and August 25th to be filled with guano.

The actions taken by Webster throughout the affair are considered the worst during his two terms as Secretary of State. Historians agree that Webster blundered and was willfully deceptive throughout the entire affair. While an embarrassment to the United States, Peru and the United States had no further confrontation after the November 16th change of policy. The search for guano continued in the United States leading to the passage of the 1856 Guano Islands Act which eventually led to over 100 uninhabited islands in the Pacific to be annexed by the United States, some of which are still under United States control today.

SOURCES:

Graham, William A. "Mr. Graham to Commodore McCauley." Received by Commodore McCauley, 16 June 1852, Washington, D.C.

Kennedy, John P. "Mr. Kennedy to Commodore McCauley." Received by Commodore McCauley, Navy Department, 25 Aug. 1852, Washington, D.C.

"The Lobos Islands and Guano." *The Cultivator (1834-1865)* 9, no. 11 (11, 1852): 377.

"THE LOBOS ISLANDS AND THEIR GUANO." *Examiner*.2328 (1852): 578-9. *ProQuest*. Web. 10 Dec. 2020.

"THE LOBOS ISLANDS." *The Albion, A Journal of News, Politics and Literature (1822-1876)*, Aug 28, 1852, 414.

SHEWMAKER, KENNETH E. "'Untaught Diplomacy': Daniel Webster and the Lobos Islands Controversy." *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 4 (1977): 321-40. Accessed December 10, 2020.

Webster, Daniel. "THE LOBOS ISLANDS." *New York Observer and Chronicle (1833-1912)*, Sep 02, 1852, 286.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Comprise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Costs: Secretary of the Navy Graham's June 16th letter requested a vessel from Commodore Charles S. McCauley to defend the Americans traveling to the Lobos islands. Orders were suspended in a second letter dated August 25, 1852. No information is found about which vessel was chosen and how many men were on the vessel.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset. While the intervention was largely a failure we still verify it as an instance of U.S. force projection.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1853 Austria-Hungary

NAME: Koszta/Smyrna Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: 121

DATES: July 2, 1853

TARGET STATE(S): Austria-Hungary 300

SUMMARY:

Martin Koszta was a Hungarian refugee who came to the United States in 1850 via Turkey after protests in 1848-1849 in the Austria-Hungarian Empire. He then declared his intentions to become an American citizen. A few years later, in 1853, he travelled back to Turkey for commercial business, where he obtained a *teskereh*, or travelling pass, from the American consulate proving that he was entitled to rights and protections as an American. In Smyrna on June 23, 1853, Austrian authorities abducted him and imprisoned him on the Austrian warship, *Hussar*, intending to bring him back to Austria. The American counsel in Smyrna and the chargé d'affaires in Constantinople tried to convince the Austrians to let him go, but to no avail.

On July 2nd, the chargé d'affaires requested Captain Duncan Ingraham on the nearby *USS Saint Louis* to investigate the situation and if need be, use force to demand Koszta's release. The Austrians agreed to transfer Koszta to French custody while the two countries worked out a solution. Secretary of State William Marcy argued that he was no longer an Austrian citizen and he had a right to protection as if he were already an American citizen, as well as the fact that regardless of citizenship, the Austrians had no right to seize him in Turkish territory. Koszta was eventually released to the US under the condition that the Austrians could arrest him if he ever returned to Turkey. The Koszta Affair led to a wider debate on the process of citizenship and the rights of naturalized citizens.

SOURCES:

Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958, 271.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, for the Year 1887, Transmitted to Congress With a Message of the President, June 26, 1888. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1888, 338.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress With the Annual Message of the President, December 1, 1873. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1873, 1298.

“The Smyrna Affair.” *The New York Times*. August 11, 1871.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1853/08/11/87863661.html?pageNumber=2>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own diplomatic interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The Saint Louis threatened the Hussar and then Koszta had to be transported back to the US.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in MID/Gibler 2018 (dispute number 121).

1853 Japan

NAME: Perry Expedition to Japan

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 8, 1853 – June 28, 1854

TARGET STATE(S): Japan, 740

SUMMARY:

The Tokugawa Shogunate was the military government of Japan between 1603 and 1868. During this period, Japan maintained an isolationist foreign policy. Due in part to Japan's rumored coal deposits, the US had been interested in opening diplomatic and trade relations for some time. For example, Commodore James Biddle embarked on a diplomatic mission to Japan in 1846, but did not succeed in establishing relations.

Commodore Matthew Perry was sent to Japan with a letter from President Fillmore addressed to the Emperor, asking that Japan open itself to trade. Perry entered Edo Bay on July 8, 1853 with four warships, carrying approximately 300 armed personnel. Perry delivered the letter and promised to return the next year for Japan's reply. While awaiting a response, Perry sailed to the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands, and extracted coal concessions from a local ruler on Okinawa.

In February 1854, Perry returned to Japan with more ships and negotiated the Kanagawa Treaty, which opened two Japanese ports, Hakodate and Shimoda, to American ships. It also contained a most-favored-nations clause, creating a foundation for future trade, and created an American consul in Japan. Perry left in late June of 1854.

Japan's isolationist foreign policy largely ended after the Perry Expedition. In 1868, the Shogunate fell and the Emperor regained political authority in an event known as the Meiji Restoration. This event marked the beginning of Japan's rapid modernization.

SOURCES:

Department of State, Office of the Historian. "The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853." Accessed September 8, 2020. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to-japan>.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters.

Public Broadcasting Service. 2003. "Memoirs of a Secret Empire: Timeline." Accessed October 6, 2020. https://www.pbs.org/empires/japan/timeline_1800.html

Perdue, Peter C. 2011. "East Asia & Central Eurasia," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

US Navy. 1953. "Brief Summary of the Perry Expedition to Japan, 1853." Accessed September 8, 2020. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/brief-summary-perry-expedition-japan-1853.html>

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Accessed September 10, 2020. *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Cost of maintaining squadron of four warships and supporting vessels (ten vessels in all), carrying approximately 300 personnel.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This intervention also appears in the CRS dataset, but not in MID.

1853 Nicaragua

NAME: Burning of San Juan del Norte

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 11, 1853 – July 15, 1854

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC), 93

SUMMARY: Nicaragua, like the other Central American states, gained independence from Spain in the early 1800s after Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the Iberian Peninsula. However, it was far from clear how to turn a set of often overlapping jurisdictions – provinces, captaincies, city states, and other formations – into independent and sovereign states. A large number of jurisdictions in Central America merged in 1823 to form the Central American Republic, which collapsed in 1838 as a result of political violence and a near-constant state of low-grade civil war. These conflicts carried over after the split from the Central American Republic and rocked most of the resultant countries; Nicaragua was at least as badly affected as any other country in Central America. The United States had major commercial interests throughout Central America, which were often impacted by political instability and violence.

In 1853 a major bout of violence rocked Nicaragua, and U.S. troops deployed for multiple days to protect the property of private commercial firms such as the American Steamship Company, the Nicaraguan Transportation Company, and the Accessory Transit Company. However, violence subsided and U.S. forces withdrew after a few days.

At a later point in late 1853 the American Minister to Nicaragua (a top diplomat) was assaulted, held for a night, and prevented from returning to his ship by unknown local actors. The commander of the ship U.S.S. *Cyane* was directed to set sail for Nicaragua and demand an apology and compensation from local authorities for the assault of a U.S. diplomat as well as for unspecified damages to the property of the U.S.-owned firm Accessory Transit Company. When local authorities refused to comply with the U.S. commander initiated a series of escalating punitive missions that culminated in the bombardment of the town San Juan del Norte.

This instance of force is of particular note as it opened the door for judicial review. The *Durand v. Hollins* is a precedent in how the Executive is able to utilize military force to protect U.S. citizens abroad.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Waxman, Matthew. 2019. "[Remembering the Bombardment of Greytown](#)." The Lawfare Blog. July 13.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of the *USS Cyane*, deployment of small contingents of Marines at several points in time.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report as two interventions, in 1853 and 1854. U.S. forces did deploy at two distinct points in time, but for the same reasons and in response to the same civil war raging inside Nicaragua. For these reasons we merge the cases into a single intervention.

1854 China

NAME: Battle of Muddy Flat

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 4, 1854 to June 15, 1854

TARGET STATE(S): China 710

SUMMARY:

In 1854, China was amid multiple rebellions with many emperors claiming territorial control. In Shanghai, there was a growing number of foreigners being harassed and attacked by rebels so much so that British and American leaders decided something needed to be done to protect their citizens.

On April 4th the USS Plymouth stationed offshore from Shanghai received a signal asking for assistance in the area. 60 Marines assembled and were sent to shore with an additional 11 sent later in the evening to protect the American Mission. On April 5th, a rebel group was advancing on the foreign settlements so American and British military leadership decided to unite and stop the advancement. 60 additional American marines (131 total), accompanied with a Howitzer, landed ashore, and joined forces with about 150 English men and 30 American volunteers from nearby merchant ships. A diplomatic attempt was made unsuccessfully, leading to conflict. The battle began around 4 pm and the rebels retreated around 4:30pm. After the battle, 35 Marines remained at the Consulate and 11 at the American Mission until June 15th, 1854. Casualties pertaining to the American military only were as follows: one sailor killed, two marines wounded, one sailor wounded. No record of rebel casualties was found. The rebels reportedly vowed vengeance after the battle but there was no further conflict against foreigners in the area.

Immediate consequences saw no further conflict against the British and American foreigners in the area. Notably, this is believed to be the first time British and American troops fought as allies in a land battle.

SOURCES:

Annand, A. McKenzie. "NOTES ON THE SHANGHAI VOLUNTEER CORPS." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 53, no. 214 (1975): 98-102. Accessed October 13, 2020.

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson. "China." Essay. In *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934: a Brief History in Two Parts ...*, 21–22. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

The Battle of "Muddy Flat", 1854. Shanghai: North China Herald, 1904.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 1

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS:

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Case features in CRS

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. ‘Peacekeeping’ operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, ‘humanitarian’ operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1854 Spain

NAME: The Black Warrior Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1565

DATES: February 28 - April 8, 1854

TARGET STATE(S): Spain (SPN) - 230

SUMMARY:

In the 1850's, the U.S. was dealing with conflicts at home and abroad. Domestically, the slavery question was left open with demands to organize the western territories. This would eventually create the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, prelude to the American Civil War. Abroad, the Pierce administration maintained its expansionist interests in acquiring Cuba. With these aspirations, Pierce considered several means of acquisition, by purchase, filibustering, or war.

The *Black Warrior* was an American steamer whose trading route traveled between New York and Mobile, often stopping in Havana. The ship had been on this trade route for eighteen months, with its first time docking in Havana being September 11, 1852. During that time it landed in Havana thirty-six times to receive passengers and mail. Whenever in Havana, *Black Warrior* only had cargo intended for either New York or Mobile. Each time, Spanish customs authorities routinely permitted clearance and entrance to Havana, following a visit on the ship and manifesting the cargo as "ballast." On February 28th, the *Black Warrior* arrived with fourteen passengers and nine-hundred bales of cotton for New York. The ship was late, as it was meant to arrive on the 25th and was "cleared" to enter Havana the 26th. *Black Warrior* was stopped for this technicality, and officials informed the captain that the manifest was false. The steamer and her cargo were then seized and detained and the crew was fined \$6,000. While the steamer was stopped for these violations, these had never before been enforced. The Pierce administration was outraged and demanded indemnity. Supported by the Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, the Attorney General Caleb Cushing proposed a blockade of Cuba. However, Secretary of State Marcy discouraged this.

Initially, Spain refused to accept responsibility. Though the *Black Warrior* and its cargo had been released on March 16th and the \$6,000 fine was removed, there were still demands for remedy and indemnity. Despite the urge to take serious action, restraint was encouraged due to domestic instability and conflict. Meanwhile, diplomatic exchanges were ongoing, including US Minister to Spain Pierre Soulé's persistent efforts to purchase or threaten war in order to acquire Cuba. This eventually led to the Ostend Manifesto of October 18, 1854, drafted by three U.S. diplomats (U.S. Minister to Spain Pierre Soulé, U.S. Minister to Great Britain James Buchanan, and U.S. Minister to France John Mason), urging for the seizure of Cuba from Spain - this was

immediately rejected by Marcy. After months of discourse, Spain eventually agreed to pay \$53,000 of the indemnity and by May 3rd, 1855, and the U.S.-Spain relations had been re-established.

SOURCES:

Gleijeses, Piero. "Clashing over Cuba: The United States, Spain and Britain, 1853–55." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 49, no. 2 (2017): 215-41.

Janes, Henry Lorenzo. "The Black Warrior Affair." *The American Historical Review* 12, no. 2 (1907): 280-98. Accessed March 8, 2021. doi:10.2307/1834051.

"The Kansas-Nebraska Act." U.S. Senate: The Kansas-Nebraska Act, December 12, 2019. https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Kansas_Nebraska_Act.htm#:~:text=It%20became%20law%20on%20May,territories%20to%20sway%20the%20vote.

McDonald, J. G. *The American Political Science Review* 4, no. 3 (1910): 431-35. Accessed March 7, 2021. doi:10.2307/1945881.

Rogers, Kara, ed. "Ostend Manifesto." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. Accessed March 6, 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Ostend-Manifesto>.

Webster, Sidney. "Mr. Marcy, the Cuban Question and the Ostend Manifesto." *Political Science Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (1893): 1-32. Accessed March 7, 2021. doi:10.2307/2139870.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released (for seizures)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: NA

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We follow MID in stating that the intervention ended on April 8th, 1854. However, the ship and cargo were released and the fine was removed on March 16th, 1854. Additionally, the ongoing tensions and threats of war were not concluded until May 3rd, 1855 when the indemnity was paid.

1854 United Kingdom

NAME: Bombardment of Greytown

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 13th, 1854

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom (UKG), 144

SUMMARY:

On July 13th, 1854, the United States dispatched a naval warship, the USS Cyane, to bombard the city of Greytown, Nicaragua, which functioned as a trade port and protectorate under the United Kingdom. In addition, a contingent of 200 U.S. marines were deployed to set fire to the British Consulate in Greytown and the surrounding buildings. While the destruction to the town itself was substantial, there were no casualties given the U.S. had warned the town's residents to evacuate prior to the attack.

The attack was justified by the United States as retaliation for the assault and kidnapping of the American Minister to Nicaragua, Solon Borland, by the U.K.'s provincial government, after Mr. Borland interfered with the local arrest of an American citizen. However, while the incident with Mr. Borland was cited by the U.S. as grounds for the assault, the destruction of Greytown actually served a much broader purpose as part of the U.S.'s foreign policy objectives in Central America.

The United States was seeking to expand its economic and political influence in Latin America and limit the influence of European powers in the Western Hemisphere. Greytown served as a strategic point for trade and commerce between the Eastern and Western United States during the California gold rush, and the U.K.'s preoccupation with the Crimean War ensured retaliation for taking the port would be non-existent. The U.K. did not respond to the incident diplomatically nor militarily and the U.S. maintained transit routes through the territory, unencumbered.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry A. One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

“NICARAGUA: The Bombardment of Greytown.” The New York Times, July 26, 1854.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1854/07/26/archives/nicaragua-the-bombardment-of-greytown.html>

Waxman, Matthew. Remembering the Bombardment of Greytown. Lawfare. 2019.
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/remembering-bombardment-greytown>

OBJECTIVE: Acquire Territory, Protecting Economic Interests, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies.

BATTLE DEATHS: None

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: 200 Marines and one naval warship

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case study comes from the Congressional Research Services database.

1855 China

NAME: Anti-Piracy Efforts in Shanghai and Ty-ho Bay

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 19, 1855 – August 5, 1855

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

By 1855, the Qing government was weakened by internal rebellions and the imposition of unequal treaties by foreign powers after the First Opium War (1839-1842). The Qing government could not effectively curb piracy in Chinese waters, which was a growing concern for foreign merchants and the British government, to which Hong Kong had been ceded under the Treaty of Nanjing (1842).

The *USS Powhatan* was stationed in the waters near Shanghai, where piracy threatened merchant activity. On May 19th, 1855, 41 personnel from the *Powhatan* went ashore at Shanghai to protect American property holders. They stayed for two days, and returned to the ship on May 21st. Sometime between May 21st and August 3rd, 1855, the *Powhatan* relocated to the waters near Hong Kong. On August 3rd, 100 American personnel from the *Powhatan* joined their British counterparts aboard the *Rattler*, in order to launch a joint British-American attack on pirates operating in nearby Ty-ho Bay. On August 4th, the American and British forces attacked the pirates, captured 17 of their vessels, and took several of them as prisoners. The American forces returned to the *Powhatan* on August 5th.

SOURCES:

Chappell, Jonathan. 2017. "Maritime Raiding, International Law and the Suppression of Piracy on the South China Coast, 1842-1869." *International History Review* Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 473-492.

Cowles, W. Laird. 1901. *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, Vol. 6* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.).

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Accessed September 10, 2020. *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- US: 5 (Ellsworth 1974: 24)
- Britain: 4 (Cowles 1901: 390)
- Pirates: 500 (Cowles 1901: 390)

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: 509

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Cost of maintaining American naval presence near Chinese shores

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This intervention is listed in the CRS dataset, but not in the MIDs dataset. While there are two distinct events in the case summary, we consider them part of the same anti-piracy effort taking place in 1855. We therefore treat this observation as a single intervention ending on August 5, rather than on May 21, 1855.

1855 Fiji

NAME: Fiji punitive expedition, 1855

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 12, 1855 – November 4, 1855

TARGET STATE(S): Fiji (FIJ), 950

SUMMARY: After the hostilities of 1840, the island of Fiji was pacified for a number of years and locals did not disturb U.S. naval or commercial ships. Eventually, however, the situation changed and locals began to violate their obligations to local U.S. traders and shipwrecked sailors. In response, the sloop-of-war *John Adams* was deployed from Samoa to intervene.

The commander of the ship at first tried to negotiate with the King of Fiji, but, dissatisfied with the results, instead landed a party of marines and burned several villages to the ground. After this punitive expedition, the islands of Fiji remained pacified for multiple years.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Westerfield, Donald. 1996. *War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War*. Westport: Praeger.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain Empire; Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 1 American, 0-10 Fijians

TOTAL DEATHS: 1 American, 0-10 Fijians

COSTS: The ship and its sailors were deployed for about three months, although they were already deployed to the South Pacific Sea as part of their regular patrol duties.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1855 Mexico

NAME: Callahan's Raid

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1550

DATES: October 1 - 6, 1855

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico, 70

SUMMARY:

Leading up to the conflict, Texan slave owners wanted to negotiate with the Mexican government for the return of runaway slaves. However, the Mexican Reform War began in 1854 signifying that there was no true central government that the Texans could go to for a diplomatic exchange. In 1855, a group of Texas Rangers led by James H. Callahan were in Texas under orders from the Texas' governor to attack Indian raiders that were pillaging towns. Seeing as the Mexican government had no legitimate central authority at the time, Callahan wanted to cross into Mexico on September 29 to follow some raiders but was rejected by Major Sidney Burbank at Fort Duncan. Callahan defied orders and on October 1st, 1855 crossed the Rio Grande about three miles south of Fort Duncan with roughly 113 men. The Mexicans at Piedras Negras did not object to their entry because it was understood that Callahan only wanted to punish the raiders.

Callahan and his troops reached the Indian camp on October 3rd. Later that day, a Mexican/Indian army of roughly six to seven hundred attacked the men forcing them to retreat to Piedras Negras. Upon arrival at Piedras Negras, Callahan could not cross due to flooding and sought help from Burbank who denied assistance. However, sometime between October 3rd and October 6th, Burbank received an offensive note from a Mexican military official that caused him to change his mind and decide to aid Callahan. On October 6th, Callahan and his men looted Piedras Negras and began crossing the river when they were attacked by the Mexican/Indian army which now numbered around 1,300. Callahan ordered his troops to burn the houses between his men and the army and Burbank fired artillery from Fort Duncan. These factors enabled Callahan and his troops to escape. Estimates to the number of wounded and dead on both sides are not found across any sources.

The raid generated a lot of controversy. Most Texans agreed with it while the Mexican government that took power after the Reform War sought compensation. In 1876 150 Mexicans were awarded a total of \$50,000 in damages because of the raid. In modern academic context, the reasoning for Callahan's raid is still disputed. Texas historians claim the raid was to attack Indian raiders while Mexican historians claim the raid was to capture runaway slaves, some of whom were linked to Callahan. Evidence on both sides is substantial and therefore the case is noted as defense of territory, social protection, and economic protection.

SOURCES:

Anonymous, "Fort Duncan," *Handbook of Texas Online*, accessed March 4, 2021, <https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/fort-duncan>.

Chubb, Curtis. "Revisiting the Purpose of the 1855 Callahan Expedition: A Research Note." *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 121, no. 4 (2018): 417-30.

Johnson, Nicholas (2014). *Negroes and The Gun: the black tradition of arms*. Amherst, New York: Prometheus. 133.

Thompson, R.A., 2004, *Fort Duncan, Texas: Rock of the Rio Grande Line of Defense*, Austin: Nortex Press.

Tyler, Ronnie C. "The Callahan Expedition of 1855: Indians or Negroes?" *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (1967): 574-85. Accessed March 5, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30236412>.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection;

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: 113 Troops. This is average between the 111 and 115 number found in sources.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is found in MID (Gibler). It is not found in CRS. Deaths from the conflict are not mentioned in any source.

1855 Uruguay

NAME: Protection of Foreign Nationals During Instability in Montevideo

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 25, 1855 – November 30, 1855

TARGET STATE(S): Uruguay (URU), 165

SUMMARY:

In August 1855, a domestic political movement against Uruguayan President Venancio Flores began. In late November of the same year, an uprising occurred in the Uruguayan capital, Montevideo.

There was an international naval presence anchored in the harbor of Montevideo, including British, French, and Spanish forces. Also nearby was the USS *Germantown*, operating under Commander W.F. Lynch. Fearing for the lives and property of foreign residents in the city, the diplomatic representatives and commanders of the foreign vessels held a meeting to address the instability. At the meeting, the diplomatic representatives and commanders agreed to launch a joint landing to protect foreign lives and property.

The landings began on November 25th, and by November 27th, approximately 100 US personnel were ashore protecting a customhouse and the consulate. By November 29th, the Uruguayan government had put down the uprising, and prepared to massacre the insurrectionists after they had surrendered and disarmed. Under Lieutenant A.S. Nicholson, the Marines intervened to prevent the massacre by separating the hostile parties. The Marines withdrew on November 30th.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

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US Navy. 2015. "Germantown." Naval History and Heritage Command.
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/g/germantown.html>.
Accessed November 28, 2020.

"Interesting from South America: Revolution in Uruguay." *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1855.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1855/11/13/76450172.html?pageNumber=1>.
Accessed November 28, 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Protect Economic Interests; Protect Own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Cost of maintaining ship carrying at least 100 personnel in waters near Uruguay.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS dataset. While descriptions of the unrest in Montevideo during this period suggest that it was violent, the American forces do not appear to have engaged in combat or lost personnel, and it is difficult to find estimates of the number of deaths during the uprising.

1856 China

NAME: Battle of the Barrier Forts

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 22, 1856 – December 6, 1856

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

This intervention took place against the backdrop of two major processes that severely weakened China's ruling Qing Dynasty. The first was the opening of Chinese ports by Britain and other foreign powers, culminating in the Second Opium War (1856-1860). The second was the unfolding of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a religiously inspired uprising during which approximately 20 million people were killed in China.

On October 22, 1856, the American Consul at Canton (present day Guangzhou), Oliver Perry, sent word to Captain Andrew Foote of the *USS Portsmouth* that he expected military clashes between British and Chinese forces. Perry requested that Foote sail to Canton to protect Americans holding property in the area. The *Portsmouth* landed at Canton the next day, and was reinforced by the *USS Levant* on October 27th. On November 14th, these ships were reinforced by Marines sent from the *USS San Jacinto*.

In mid-November, Captain Foote sailed to Hong Kong to meet with Commodore James Armstrong. On November 15th, soldiers in the Chinese forts along the Pearl River fired on his unarmed boat during the return trip to Canton. On November 16th, the *Portsmouth*, *San Jacinto* and *Lancet* sailed to the scene of the attack, and fighting commenced between an American landing party (approximately 300 personnel) and Chinese forces (approximately 5,000 personnel). By November 22nd, the American forces had taken all five Chinese forts in the area. By December 6th, US forces had dismantled the forts, destroyed the available Chinese weapons, and withdrawn.

SOURCES:

Clark, George B. 2001. *Treading Softly: US Marines in China, 1819-1949* (Westport, CT: Praeger).

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Lowe, Scott. 2011. "Chinese Millennial Movements," in *The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism*, ed. Catherine Wessinger (New York: Oxford University Press).

Perdue, Peter C. 2011. "East Asia & Central Eurasia," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Accessed September 10, 2020. *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 256-506

China: 250-500 (Lillich 2002: 124; Clark 2001: 10)

United States: 6 (Ellsworth 1974: 27)

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: 256-506

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Cost of sending three ships to capture and destroy Chinese forts; the *Portsmouth* fired 230 shells and suffered multiple hits.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This event also appears in the CRS dataset, but not in MIDs.

1856 Colombia

NAME: Isthmus Mail Tax

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1522

DATES: June 25, 1856 - October 11, 1856

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100; location: present-day Panama 95

SUMMARY:

On June 25, 1856, the Senate and Chamber of Representatives of New Grenada passed a decree that would implement a tax on all mail and all tonnage crossing the Isthmus in September. The Americans believed that this law violated an 1835 act that declared the Cantons of Portobello and Panama, “free for all commerce and trade,” and showed bad faith on the part of New Grenada. The U.S. Post Office Department estimated that these taxes would cost the U.S. over \$2 million a year. Commodore William Mervine of the US Pacific Squadron had two ships, the USS Saratoga and St. Mary’s, in the Panama Bay for intimidation in the face of these taxes.

Mervine believed that the Governor of the Panamanian state wanted to enforce the tax, which would have led to hostilities. He received intelligence in September that the tax would not actually be enforced, which he credited directly to his ship’s presence, which would remain until the consequences of the upcoming local elections were revealed. However, local officials tried to collect the tax from the *John S. Stephens* mail steamer later that month. After speaking with the Governor, who remained steadfast in his conviction on the enforcement of the taxes, Mervine, under the approval of Secretary Marcy, told him that the U.S. would not acquiesce and would view any subsequent enforcement regarding its ships or trains as a hostile attack, which would be met accordingly with force. As a result, the New Grenadians abandoned all attempts at enforcement of the tax. The New Grenadian leaders did not want to appear completely vulnerable to American aggression, so they often tried to implement lower taxes or seek reparations for damages done by the Americans, but ultimately to no avail.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018, 32.

“Important from New Grenada and Costa Rica.” *The New York Times*. August 30, 1856, 3.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1856/08/30/77057112.html?pageNumber=3>

“Interesting from Panama.” *The New York Times*. August 15, 1856, 2.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1856/08/15/91428838.html?pageNumber=2>

“News from New-Grenada.” *The New York Times*. October 29, 1856, 2.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1856/10/29/issue.html>

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 238-240.

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 87-88.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The costs of two ships being stationed in the Panama Bay, ready to defend against tax collection.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case was found in the MID/Gibler set, dispute number 1522.

1856 Panama

NAME: 1st U.S. Military Intervention into Panama

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 19, 1856 - September 22, 1856

TARGET STATE(S): Panama 95

SUMMARY:

US-Panamanian relations had been tense since the April 15, 1856 Watermelon Riots in Panama City that left eighteen dead, including 16 Americans and 2 locals. Immediately following, the U.S. demanded reparations for its dead citizens and destroyed property, but tensions remained high throughout the summer. In September, Panama's political parties were embroiled in hostile electoral disputes. The Conservatives wanted to reestablish control of the legislature against the liberal Arrabaleños, who included thousands of black locals in their ranks ready to fight for their politicians. The Arrabaleños were worried about American filibusters, which were private American mercenaries conquering nearby territories.

The Governor of the Panamanian state, Fábrega, requested that the commander of the U.S. Pacific Squadron, Commodore William Mervine, move his ships closer to shore to prevent hostilities, but the Americans were also interested in protecting the railroad station. Mervine wanted the request in writing so that other countries could not accuse the Americans of acting unilaterally. On September 19th, 160 marines came ashore to be stationed in town at the main railroad depot. The Conservatives reestablished control by the 22nd and Mervine's troops reembarked their ships without ever firing a shot once he was sure the railroad station was safe. The Conservatives continued to entrench their control over the state and sought retribution against the liberal Arrabaleños.

SOURCES:

"Article 3 --No Title." *The New York Times*. September 29, 1856.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1856/09/29/77060235.html?pageNumber=4>

"Article 7 -- No Title." *The New York Times*. October 31, 1856.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1856/10/31/78496872.html?pageNumber=4>

Daley, Mercedes Chen. "The Watermelon Riot: Cultural Encounters in Panama City, April 15, 1856." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 70, no. 1 (1990), 85-108.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Lindsay-Polland, John. *Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. in Panama*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003, 15.

McGuinness, Aims. *Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, 171-172.

“The Panama Massacre -- Mr. Corwine’s Report.” *The New York Times*. September 23, 1856. <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1856/09/23/77059538.html?pageNumber=4>

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 4, 89.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of landing marines to be stationed during a local dispute

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the CRS Report.

1856 United Kingdom

NAME: Gulf of Mexico Show of Force

DISPUTE NUMBER: 380

DATES: May 10, 1856 – May 31, 1856

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom (UKG), 144

SUMMARY:

On May 10th, 1856, William Walker, an American filibuster (A United States citizen who engages in unauthorized military expeditions into foreign countries/territories to foment revolutions and/or establish English-speaking colonies) was in route to Nicaragua on an American mail ship as part of his efforts to incite unrest in the country and establish colonies he would personally rule. The U.K. believed Walker's actions endangered the lives of British subjects in the region due to the insurrections being provoked and sought to contain the emerging insurgencies. As a result, the U.K. ordered its naval vessels to stop and search the U.S. mail ship transporting Walker.

The United States protested the stopping of the American mail ship, given the U.S. during this period had begun asserting itself as the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere. Both the U.K. and the U.S. increased their naval presence in the Gulf of Mexico in response to the incident as a show of force.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. 2018.

Solomon, Jeffrey H. "Tortured History: Filibustering, Rhetoric, and Walker's War in Nicaragua." *Alif* (Cairo, Egypt) 31, no. 31 (2011): 105.

Zeledon, Sergio Alejandro. *Fighting Intervention in Nicaragua in the Age of British -American Conflict 1820–1920: Dr. and General Benjamin F. Zeledón Supreme Chief of Government of Nicaragua in Rebellion 1909–1912*, 2010.

OBJECTIVE: Protecting Economic Interests, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: None

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Several naval warships

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case study comes from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset (Gibler 2018).

1857 Nicaragua

NAME: William Walker's Surrender

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: April 15, 1857 - May 1, 1857; November 24 - December 9, 1857

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua 93

SUMMARY:

William Walker was an American filibuster in the nineteenth century who fomented and exacerbated several revolutions and revolts in Central America. His filibustering was an extension of American Manifest Destiny expeditions before the Civil War, initially having substantial support from the American public seeking to "Americanize" Central America. Walker exploited the local hostilities in Nicaragua that began in 1854. A peace treaty was established on October 23, 1855, with Patricio Rivas as President of Nicaragua and William Walker as the new Nicaraguan Army's General. The regime sought to stabilize the country by establishing transit routes and through various methods, Walker increasingly exercised influence over Rivas, establishing himself as the real leader of Nicaragua in July 1856, expanding Americanism and slavery in Central America. The other Central American countries of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador determined the Walker-led Nicaraguan regime to be a threat and declared war against the regime. Walker's failure to stabilize the region led to his loss of support from within the United States.

The countries allied against Walker closed off his transit route in April 1857 and compelled mass desertion from his troops, essentially sealing Walker's fate. Commander Charles Davis of the *St. Mary's* offered his help in ending the local hostilities and would transport the remaining filibusters back to the US. The Allied countries favored this proposal as a means to quickly end the conflict, but Walker persisted for a while, until he ultimately surrendered on May 1st and returned to the US. New transit contracts in the region were concluded, but the Nicaraguan government insisted that all filibustering had to stop, not just that of William Walker. Complicating matters, Walker set out on a second expedition to take control of Nicaragua that November. The US government wanted to stop him as soon as they could to protect the transit contracts. He arrived in Greytown on November 24th with approximately four hundred men, bypassing the *Saratoga*, which was sent to stop him. Soon after in early December, Captain Hiram Paulding and 300 landed marines from the *Saratoga*, *Wabash*, and *Fulton* apprehended Walker and his men on December 9th and returned them to the US to be tried for breaking neutrality laws.

In the region, Nicaragua and Costa Rica signed a treaty together, leading to greater cooperation and peace. The US also signed a convention with Nicaragua, allowing for open and neutral transit, as well as leaving future military intervention to protect American interests on the

table. However, in 1858, questions as to the legality of Paulding capturing an American abroad came under question, some allegedly from pro-slavery imperialists in the US government. General of the Nicaragua Forces, Maximo Gerez, claimed the Nicaraguans were wholly satisfied with the intervention.

SOURCES:

“La Guerra Nacional.” *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Nicaragua*. 2006.

https://web.archive.org/web/20150724171819/http://www.cancilleria.gob.ni/sjacinto/noticias/separata_5.shtml

Mangipano, John. “William Walker and the Seeds of Progressive Imperialism: The War in Nicaragua and the Message of Regeneration, 1855-1860.” *The University of Southern Mississippi*. Spring 2017.

<https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2406&context=dissertations>

Mead, Rebecca Paulding. *Life of Hiram Paulding. Rear-Admiral U.S.N.* (New York: The Baker & Taylor Company, 1910), 180-200.

Scroggs, William. “William Walker and the Steamship Corporation in Nicaragua.” *The American Historical Review*. 10, no. 4 (July 1905): 792-811.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1834476.pdf>

“The Central American News.” *The New York Times*. May 29, 1857.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1857/05/29/78499375.html?pageNumber=1>

Woodward, Jr, Ralph Lee. “Review: William Walker and the history of Nicaragua in the Nineteenth Century.” *Latin American Research Review* 15, no. 1 (1980): 237-240.

OBJECTIVE:

Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of two separate expeditions to capture William Walker in Nicaragua.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case can be found in the CRS Report. The exact dates are unclear. Walker was first captured on May 1st, so Davis had to be there some time in April, so we have selected April 15th as our best estimate in the absence of any firm evidence. In November, it is unclear exactly when the US ships first arrived to re-capture Walker, but they were there by November 24th and he surrendered on December 9th.

1858 Fiji

NAME: Fiji punitive expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 6, 1858 - October 16, 1858

TARGET STATE(S): Fiji (FIJ), 950

SUMMARY: U.S. forces had already deployed to Fiji in 1840 and 1855 to force the natives to respect U.S. commercial and military personnel and to adhere to a set of commercial regulations to facilitate trade. Despite these interventions, in 1858, two U.S. businessmen operating on the islands were killed by natives.

In response, the U.S. sent two ships to Fiji and deployed 54 troops deployed to the islands and demanded that local authorities surrender the suspects. 54 U.S. triLocal leaders refused, and a party of 300 local warriors gathered near U.S. forces displaying overt hostile attitudes. Combat ensued, and U.S. Marines beat local forces into a disorganized retreat; local forces took heavy casualties, but U.S. forces did not sustain any.

After this expedition local authorities and other actors respected the commercial regulations that the U.S. government had insisted upon ever since the 1840 negotiations formally resulted in a treaty with the King of Fiji.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Westerfield, Donald. 1996. *War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War*. Westport: Praeger.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain Empire; Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0 Americans, 10-300 Fijians

TOTAL DEATHS: 0 Americans, 10-300 Fijians

COSTS: The two ships, and 54 U.S. service members on the island. Both ships had already been stationed in Fiji prior to their deployment.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1858 Paraguay

NAME: Paraguay Expedition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 2, 1858 - February 13, 1859

TARGET STATE(S): Paraguay 150

SUMMARY:

The years leading up to the Expedition were plagued by strained relations between the U.S. and Paraguay. Paraguay by this time was only beginning to end its isolationist policy, but it was still distrustful of foreign powers that may or may not try to exploit them. Dictator Carlos Antonia Lopez was considered an annoying hindrance to U.S. interests in the country. The two sides did not maintain diplomatic ties. Paraguay was only beginning to open up to the rest of the world, and the U.S. lacked local diplomatic representation. This led to several careless mistakes and misunderstanding. Tensions culminated in 1853, when Lopez refused to ratify a commercial and navigational treaty with the U.S. and began confiscating the property of American citizens.

The situation got worse in February of 1855. Known as the Water Witch Incident, the U.S.S. Water Witch was engaged in a scientific survey of the Parana River. Once again, due to lack of communication and diplomatic connections, Paraguayan soldiers fired upon the American ship when it got too close to the border. The incident went unnoticed in American public opinion, but President James Buchanan gave an annual message to Congress in 1857 denouncing Paraguay's actions.

In 1858, Congress approved another expedition including 19 vessels and 2,500 sailors and marines under the command of Commodore William B. Shubrick. It was at that point the largest military expedition during peacetime in U.S. history. Despite the large force, Lopez was not easily intimidated since he knew about the volatile situation in the U.S. and was confident they could not sustain a blockade or military force on the ground. He agreed to negotiate, though, because he didn't want another enemy while dealing with Brazil. After several talks, the countries agreed on a treaty of commerce and navigation, and Paraguay had to pay a small fine (\$9,412) to the family of the slain sailor.

The Expedition exposed several weaknesses in the Navy, including lack of resources and organization with land operations. The operation ended up costing around \$3,000,000.

SOURCES:

“The War With Paraguay.” Accessed October 17, 2020.

<https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/1859-war.htm>.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Flickema, Thomas O. “The Settlement of the Paraguayan-American Controversy of 1859: A Reappraisal.” *The Americas* 24, no. 1 (July 1968): 49-69. <https://doi.org/10.2307/980097>.

McKanna, Clare V. “The Water Witch Incident.” *The American Neptune* 31, no. 1 (January 1971). <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015018430689&view=1up&seq=21>.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” Congressional Research Service, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: United States: 0
Paraguay: 0

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: Total Deaths: 0

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: 19 vessels and 200 guns were sent for the Expedition. The whole operation cost around \$3,000,000.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We treat the time from Congress agreeing to the Expedition to the end of the operation (1858-1859) as one intervention. This case features in the CRS report, but is reported as an 1859 engagement. We start earlier as it is not entirely clear when the forces left the U.S., when they entered Paraguayan territory, when they engaged the enemy etc.

1858 Turkey

NAME: Response to the “Outrages” in Jaffa

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 1858

TARGET STATE(S): Turkey - 640, Israel -666, Lebanon - 660

SUMMARY:

In the mid-19th century, the United States increased its involvement in the East by the arrival of Americans as private citizens or official emissaries. In Jaffa, an American agricultural colony founded by the Dixon/Dickson family was established with the idea to support local Jews to cultivate the land and establish sovereignty. On January 11, 1858 at about ten in the evening, the Dickson family was brutally robbed, raped, and attacked by local Arabs leaving Mr. Steinbeck murdered and the property destroyed. Sparking fury and international attention, this event became known as the “Outrages at Jaffa”. This evoked a strong American response to hold the criminals accountable. Following the “Outrages at Jaffa”, there was extensive correspondence and a collective effort and between the Legation in Turkey, the Department of State, the Navy, the American-Consul in Jerusalem, the Vice-Consul at Jaffa, the Consul-General at Alexandria, and the Consul in Beirut to see that there was justice.

Walter Dickson notified the American Vice-Consul and requested that Mr. Saunders go to Jerusalem to inform the family members and request that Dr. Gorham, the American Consul, sort the matter with Pasha. Once word was received by Mr. Edwin De Leon at the Consul-General in Alexandria, he immediately embarked on a ship, the Austrian Steamer, to Jaffa to investigate the issue. He was due to arrive February 22nd, however their ship caught wind carrying them north to Beirut. While in Beirut, Mr. De Leon had a conference with the Pasha of Beirut to discuss taking actions to hold the criminals accountable. The Pasha sent orders to Jerusalem and Jaffa. When Mr. De Leon finally arrived in Jaffa on the French Steamer, he met with Dr. Gorham to discuss the atrocities at Jaffa and work together to avenge the Americans from the incident. At this point, the Medjilis had still not made any progress in capturing the criminals. With the United States’ increasing impatience to see justice, they threatened Ottoman authorities with war by dispatching warships.

After the conference with the Medjilis, the Governor’s police began a search for the criminals in the bazaar. As of October 1858, four out of five criminals were in prison, two were proved guilty and two confessed their crimes. However, without the show of force, it was thought unlikely that they would be hung. By late October, the Wabash and Macedonian warships had sailed for Beirut and Jaffa to secure the punishment of the criminals. Uriah Levy, commander of the USS Macedonian battleship, sailed the warship off the coast of Syria to prove that war was a possibility.

As of April 1859, more than a year later, it was reported that the Outrages at Jaffa case had still not met justice. Two-hundred dollars was proposed to be paid to the Dickson family for the damages and four of the men were in prison and would be sent to the galleys if the fifth criminal at large were to be caught. This was insufficient and the dollar amount was refused. In the final agreements, on August 5th of 1861 the Department of State drafted amounts payable to Mrs. Steinbeck and Mrs. Dickson. They received 55,000 piasters/\$2,203.26 and the Turkish authorities agreed to continue the search for the fifth criminal.

SOURCES:

Dickson, Walter. "The Outrage Upon Americans at Jaffa." The Boston Journal. Accessed October 22, 2020.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1858/03/10/78531265.html?pageNumber=3>.

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<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1858/12/02/78880586.html?pageNumber=2>.

Miller, David Hunter, ed. "Turkey 1860." Essay. In *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, 519–32. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1931.

https://books.google.com/books?id=fW3RqmYIM_4C&pg=PA520&lpg=PA520&dq=january+1858+jaffa+outrage&source=bl&ots=zuHpGtlRR5&sig=ACfU3U3t2Fff-RIalrn00HN6f5iiVIEdjA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjD1rChmszsAhUNn-AKHbabC7UQ6AEwEnoECAgQA#v=onepage&q=january%201858%20jaffa%20outrage&f=false

"The Outrage Upon American Missionaries in Syria." The New York Times. Accessed October 22, 2020.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1858/04/07/78533251.html?pageNumber=5>.

"Turkish Justice--The Jaffa Outrage." The New York Times. Accessed October 23, 2020.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1859/06/01/78892674.html?pageNumber=5>.

"1858 Senate Report on Outrage at Jaffa: American Dickson Colony Brutalized." Shapell, January 17, 2018. <https://www.shapell.org/manuscript/1858-senate-report-outrage-at-jaffa-american-dickson-colony/>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of two warships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS report.

1858 United Kingdom

NAME: Forgotten Crisis of 1858

DISPUTE NUMBER: 207

DATES: May 1858 - August 1858

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom (UKG)

SUMMARY:

In March of 1807, nearly fifty years before the events of this intervention, then President Thomas Jefferson signed a piece of legislation known as the *Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves* which took effect on January 1st of the following year. This policy allowed slavery to be practiced in the United States and sustained by way of the population of enslaved peoples already living in America at the time. Around the same time as President Jefferson's declaration, the British Parliament enacted similar laws regarding the slave trade within the British Empire (however, slavery remained a legal practice across the empire). Moreover, following the passage of this legislation, Britain became a leading (and vocal) critic of the global slave trade, often times utilizing the naval supremacy she enjoyed at the time to stymie the Trans-Atlantic slave trade by way of arbitration, persuasion, or, if necessary, force.

Throughout the first half of the Nineteenth Century, both the United States and the United Kingdom deployed forces to patrol the Atlantic— both on the African Coast and the coast of North and South America— however, successive American administrations demonstrated a reluctance to enforce its own domestic law, as well as international treaties signed with Britain (and occasionally other powers). As a result, the slave trade was still a successful business along the Eastern coast of the United States and prevalent in the Caribbean islands and along the South American coast. In the US in particular, local (and even federal officials) would turn a blind eye and allow ships clearly outfitted for the transportation of slaves to depart for Africa. Additionally, decades of conflict on the Continent occupied the attention (and resources) of the European states, further allowing the slave trade to go unscrutinized. It is also important to note that during this period, Spain still allowed slavery in her Caribbean island colonies and American slavers play a leading role in sustaining this practice on the island.

In the 1850s, the United Kingdom accused the US— and more specifically American flagged ships— of proliferating the slave trade across the Caribbean. As a result, in April of 1858 Britain dispatched the Royal Navy to the Caribbean where 'zealous' captains began stopping and boarding American vessels to determine what type of cargo they carried; in some cases, British ships even fired on American trading vessels. Scarred by the recent memory of impressment which, in part, led to the outbreak of the War of 1812, the American reaction was swift.

American diplomats reprimanded their British counterparts and politicians espoused rhetoric defending the sanctity of the American flag and the evilness of the British Empire in hindering freedom on the high seas. To those in America, the use of the American flag in the slave trade, while bad, was not as bad as the abuses by the Royal Navy. Additionally, war hawks in Congress and the Court of Public Opinion believed this was the necessary justification to go to war with Britain and finish what the War of 1812 had started, however, cooler heads on both sides of the Atlantic worked to avoid this scenario. Initially, Britain attempted to resolve the crisis via monetary compensation to the US and while this certainly helped keep tensions low, Britain continued its robust policy of searching American ships and outrage continued. In May, four warships were dispatched to Cuban waters and in June, President James Buchanan ordered all American warships to deploy to the Caribbean. From this deployment, four additional ships joined the four already stationed there and records indicate the combined force of this naval deployment provided 125 guns with which to protect American interests.

On June 18, 1858, the British Parliament ordered the Royal Navy to discontinue its search and detention of American ships and their crews. However, this withdrawal and process of standing down was executed slowly and was likely not completed until the early fall. Overall, there does not seem to have been any military/merchant deaths or loss of ships from this incident and the Anglo-American relationship was saved. Following the incident, the US became a more sincere partner in combating the illicit trans-Atlantic slave trade and more committed to enforcing its domestic law and international treaty obligations. While there is no easily identifiable figure of the cost of this operation from either side, the United Kingdoms **total** efforts to combat the slave trade stand at \$5 million dollars over the first half of the Nineteenth Century.

SOURCES:

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Landry, Herral E. "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Atlantic Diplomacy, 1850-1861." *The Journal of Southern History* 27, no. 2, (May 1961) 184-207, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2205277>

Maris-Wolf, Ted. "'Of Blood and Treasure': Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression." *Journal of the Civil War Era* 4, no. 1 (March 2014): 53-83. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26062124>.

"The British Aggressions." *The New York Times*. June 8, 1858.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection and Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Approx. eight (8) ships with a combined 125 guns

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This event is not chronicled in the Congressional Research Service's report on American intervention, however, it appears to be included in Gibler's work as this event has a Dispute Number (207).

1858 Uruguay

NAME: Landing During Instability in Uruguay

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 2, 1858 – January 27, 1858

TARGET STATE(S): Uruguay (URU), 165

SUMMARY:

In early 1858, a Uruguayan army officer attempted to lead a revolution against the government in Montevideo. The *USS St. Lawrence* and the sloop-of-war *Falmouth* were near Montevideo when instability threatened the capital, as was a British vessel.

The American and British commanders held a conference, and at the request of the Uruguayan government, launched a joint landing similar to that of 1855. All of the Marines aboard the *St. Lawrence*, along with their British counterparts, went ashore to protect a custom house, as well as the American and British consulates in the capital. The joint force was commanded by Flag Officer French Forrest of the *St. Lawrence*.

In mid-January, the insurrection faltered. British reinforcements relieved the Americans, who returned to the *St. Lawrence* on January 27th. The Marines remained neutral during the conflict and were not drawn into fighting.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Milton Offutt. 1928. *The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States*. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

US Navy. 2015. "St. Lawrence." Naval History and Heritage Command. Accessed December 2, 2020. <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/st-lawrence.html>

United States Solicitor of the Department of State. 1929. *Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces: Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State*, 2nd edition. (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), p. 60.

“Revolution in Montevideo.” Mar. 3, 1858. *New York Times*. Proquest Historical Newspapers. Accessed December 2, 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of maintaining two ships near Montevideo.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in CRS dataset. Sources do not list the number of personnel that went ashore during the instability in Montevideo. However, Ellsworth (1974: 161) writes that “the entire Marine Guard” from *the St. Lawrence* was sent. The *St. Lawrence* had a complement of 480 personnel, so we assume that this represents the maximum number of personnel that could have been sent ashore during the episode.

1859 China

NAME: Landing at Shanghai During Period of Unrest

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 31, 1859 – August 2, 1859

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

At the time of this intervention, China was experiencing a high degree of instability. The Second Opium War (1856-60), the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), and asymmetric treaties with foreign powers were weakening the Qing government's rule. In 1859, as anti-foreign sentiment grew in Shanghai, reports that Chinese laborers were being kept prisoner aboard a French ship motivated unrest in the city.

William L.G. Smith, the American Consul in Shanghai, requested protection for Americans in Shanghai during the unrest. The *USS Mississippi*, captained by William Nicholson, had recently arrived in the nearby waters off Wusong. On July 31st, the *Mississippi* sent 60 armed marines ashore to protect US interests in the city. The marines stayed in Shanghai for three days, and Chinese authorities were able to calm the disorder. The marines departed on August 2nd, 1859.

SOURCES:

Cranston, Earl. 1936. "Shanghai in the Taiping Period." *Pacific Historical Review* Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 147-160.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Accessed September 10, 2020. *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

United States Solicitor of the Department of State. 1929. *Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces: Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State*, 2nd edition. (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), p. 62.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Cost of maintaining American naval presence in waters off the Chinese coast.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This intervention appears in the CRS dataset, but not in the MIDs dataset.

1860 Angola

NAME: Kisémbó Unrest

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 1, 1860 - March 3, 1860

TARGET STATE(S): Angola (ANG), 540

SUMMARY:

In early 1860, there was rising tension between the colonial Portuguese power and African natives in what was then Portuguese West Africa (modern day Angola). Prince Nicolas of Kongo, an *assimilado* (African with a European education and upbringing) was traveling north of Portuguese authority to Kisémbó, a small port town with British, American, and Dutch trading factories. Nicolas was despised by locals and was commonly viewed as a traitor by Africans. When the natives heard of Nicolas' arrival in Kisémbó, an attack was made and Prince Nicolas was murdered. When the Governor General Amaral heard of this news, he set out for Kisémbó to avenge Nicolas' death. However, his expedition failed as he was met with foreign resistance and attacks by natives. When it became clear that natives would attack the Portuguese settlement in Kisémbó, American residents had requested aid in the form of protection in fear that American lives and property were also at threat.

On March 1st, British and American ships landed in Kisémbó to protect lives and property. The *U.S.S. Marion*, a ship that was lying in the harbor, and 40 seamen and marines under Commander Brent arrived to guard American factories. The following day, forces were withdrawn. On March 3, 1860, a battle broke out between the Portuguese and natives and another force of 50 men arrived to protect American interests. The forces from the *Marion* had successfully prevented several attempts by the natives to burn American factories. Forces were withdrawn the next day. It should be noted that the US role was neutral during this conflict.

SOURCES:

"137 Cases of Executive Action." Wall Street Journal, Jan 15, 1987, Eastern edition.

<https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/newspapers/137-cases-executive-action/docview/397979075/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Abbot, Willis John. "Blue-Jackets of 1812." Essay. In *The Naval History of the United States*, 560. Dodd, Mead, 1896.

"ANNIVERSARIES." Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994) 7, no. 1 (03, 1922): 56-61.
<https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/trade-journals/anniversaries/docview/206301119/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Wheeler, Douglas L. "Nineteenth-Century African Protest in Angola: Prince Nicolas of Kongo (1830?-1860)." African Historical Studies 1, no. 1 (1968): 40-59. Accessed January 1, 2021.
doi:10.2307/216190.

Wingfield, Thomas C, and James E Meyen, eds. "A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II." International Law Studies 77, no. 1 (2002): 125.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: Deployment of the USS Marion and 40 marines and bluejackets on March 1st, and deployment of the USS Marion once again with 50 men on March 3rd.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is referenced in the CRS report. This case had limited sources, however in the article by Douglas Wheeler, a similar instance was described but for the month of February, and with a different ship name, *USS Union*, alongside the British Falcon. The CRS report along with numerous other sources, cite the instance to have taken place on March 1st and 3rd with the *USS Marion*.

1860 Colombia

NAME: U.S. Intervention in 1860 Colombian Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 27, 1860 - October 8, 1860

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100; location: present-day Panama 95

SUMMARY:

The United States was the first country to recognize an independent Colombia in 1822 and developed railroad infrastructure along the Isthmus. Colombia saw an increase in revolutionary activity in the late 1850s as the local Black population protested forced conscription and other exploitative policies. Commander William D. Porter on the U.S.S. *St. Mary's* had been sent to the Bay of Panama to observe and stand by for further instructions beginning in July 1860.

Local American railroad workers requested support to protect the railroad and its station in Aspinwall (Colón), so on September 27th, 25 marines landed ashore to protect the Depot. Two days later, Lieutenant Thomas Buchanen led an additional 50 sailors ashore to defend American interests. These forces remained ashore until October 8th, when they re-embarked on the *St. Mary's*. Within this same time period, the British ship H.B.M. *Clio*, also stationed itself in Panama City and occupied the city with about 140 men, causing American unease at this extension of a British Protectorate in the area. Nevertheless, even though tensions arose once again as soon as the Americans re-embarked, their interests were believed to be safe enough with the British remaining. The *St. Mary's* moved to protect other American interests in the region in the face of calls from local American workers to never leave American ports unattended by the U.S. Navy.

SOURCES:

“Arrival of the Northern Light.” *The New York Times*. October 8, 1860, 8.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1860/10/08/77869814.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 46.

“New Grenada.” *The New York Times*. October 24, 1860, 2-3.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1860/10/24/102640404.html?pageNumber=1>

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 288.

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 6-7.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of stationing a ship in the Bay of Panama and landing both marines and sailors to protect the Depot.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the CRS Report.

1860 Mexico (1) Cortina

NAME: Border Incursions in Pursuit of Juan Cortina

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1548

DATES: February 4th, 1860 – April 4th, 1860

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

In late September 1859, Mexican political/military figure Juan Cortina raided the border town of Brownsville, Texas. A local militia eventually forced Cortina and his supporters out of Brownsville, but Cortina won several skirmishes with Rangers and local militia before a joint force of regular US troops and Texas Rangers defeated Cortina in the Battle of Rio Grande City on December 27th, 1859.

After this defeat, Cortina fled across the Rio Grande into Mexico. On February 4th, 1860, a joint force of Rangers and regular troops crossed the Rio Grande into Mexican territory, killing twenty-nine in a confrontation. One Texas Ranger was killed during the operation. In March of 1860, after Robert E. Lee became the Commander of the Department of Texas, approximately 200 soldiers and Rangers crossed into Mexico searching for Cortina. Between April 3rd and 4th, 1860, another American force crossed the Rio Grande and rode into the town of Reynosa, again in search of Cortina, who was not found.

SOURCES:

“Border Land: The Struggle for Texas, 1820-1879.” 2021. Center for Greater Southwestern Studies, University of Texas at Arlington. <https://library.uta.edu/borderland/event/880> (Accessed January 30, 2021).

“Juan Nepomuceno Cortina and the ‘First Cortina War.’” No Date. Rio Grande Valley Civil War Trail, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. <https://www.utrgv.edu/civilwar-trail/civil-war-trail/cortina-first-war/index.htm> (Accessed January 30, 2021).

Matthews, Matt M. 2007. “The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective.” The Long War Series Occasional Paper 22. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press).

McCaslin, Richard. 2012. “Rangers, ‘Rip’ Ford, and the Cortina War,” in *Tracking the Texas Rangers: The Nineteenth Century*, eds. Bruce Glasrud & Harold Weiss, Jr (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS:

US: 1

Mexico: 30

TOTAL DEATHS:

US: 1

Mexico: 30

COSTS: Cost of maintaining troop presence along US-Mexico border. Estimated at 200 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

MIDs dates the dispute between the US and Mexico between November 21st, 1859 and January 4th, 1860. We date the intervention to the Battle of La Bolsa, which represented an American incursion into Mexican territory. Although the battle occurred in the context of an ongoing conflict known as the Cortina Wars, we include only the deaths resulting from US incursion into Mexican territory, not fighting that occurred within American territory. McCaslin (2012) writes that during the conflict, between 150 and 230 Mexicans and 15 Americans were killed overall.

1860 Mexico (2) Anton Lizardo

NAME: Battle of Anton Lizardo

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1549

DATES: March 6th, 1860

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico, 70

SUMMARY:

This intervention took place in the context of the Wars of Reform, a civil war between Conservative and Liberal parties in Mexico from 1858 to 1861. On March 5th, 1860, Conservative General Miguel Miramon attacked the Gulf city of Veracruz. An allied General, Tomas Marin, attempted to impose a blockade on the city using two ships purchased from Havana, anchoring off the town of Anton Lizardo.

However, on March 6th, the USS *Saratoga*, commanded by Thomas Turner, intercepted Marin's ships. Turner was supported by detachments from the American ships *Preble* and *Savannah*, and the steamers *Indianola* and *Wave*. Marin's ships refused to show their colors, and the two sides exchanged fire. The American naval force captured Marin and members of his crew, and transported them to New Orleans to be tried as pirates.

SOURCES:

Hamnett, Brian. 1998. "Wars of Reform (Three Years War)." In M. S. Werner (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society & Culture*. Routledge. Credo Reference: https://search.credoreference.com/content/title/routmex?tab=entry_view&heading=wars_of_reform_three_years_war&sequence=0 (Accessed February 3, 2021).

Moore, John Bassett. 1906. "A Digest of International Law." Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). https://books.google.com/books?id=WfE_AAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (Accessed February 3, 2021).

New York Times. March 22, 1860. "Official Dispatches from the Squadron." <https://www.nytimes.com/1860/03/22/archives/official-dispatches-from-the-squadron.html> (Accessed February 3, 2021).

US Navy. 2015. "Saratoga III (Sloop-of-War)." Naval History and Heritage Command. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/saratoga-iii.html> (Accessed February 3, 2021).

US Navy. No Date. "NH 74246-KN Capture of the Mexican Steamers MARQUES OF HAVANNA and GENERAL MIRAMON, Admiral Marin Commandant."
<https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/NH-74000/NH-74246-KN.html> (Accessed February 3, 2021).

US Navy. 2017. "Casualties: US Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Wounded in Wars, Conflicts, Terrorist Acts, and Other Hostile Incidents."
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/casualties1.html> (Accessed February 3, 2021).

OBJECTIVE: Protect Own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

US: 1 (US Navy)
Mexico: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS:

US: 1 (US Navy)
Mexico: Unknown

COSTS: Cost of maintaining naval presence in Gulf of Mexico. Five ships noted in the intervention

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

The MID's dataset dates this dispute from March 2nd, 1860 – March 20th, 1860, although we limit the intervention to March 6th, when the naval battle took place. MID's also codes this confrontation as a stalemate. However, given the US naval victory, we code the outcome as a victory for the US.

1860 United Kingdom, France, Spain

NAME: American Rejection of Foreign Intervention in Mexican War of Reform

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1631

DATES: December 20, 1860

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom (UKG) 200, France (FRA) 220, Spain (SPA) 230

SUMMARY:

Mexico's civil war named "War of Reform" began in February 1854. The liberal side, headed by Benito Juarez, sought a treaty with the US in 1859 through talks with US Ambassador to Mexico Robert McLane. The treaty would grant the US significant access to Mexican territory in exchange for immediate and future funding for the civil war efforts. The treaty, named the McLane-Ocampo Treaty, failed in the US Senate in 1860.

McLane likely worried that other powers would try to intervene in Mexico and issued a letter on December 20th, 1860 to all foreign ministers in Mexico stating the US would "to the extent of its power defend the nationality and independence [Mexico]." While not a direct threat to any country, the letter was an extension of the Monroe doctrine and pushed against European affairs in the Western Hemisphere.

The warning would not be successful. The US Civil War began in 1861 distracting the US from Mexico and France began what is known as the Second French Intervention in Mexico in late 1861. As late as 1865, Secretary of State William Seward expressed concern about France's intervention. French involvement ended in 1866 and the War of Reform officially concluded in 1867.

SOURCES:

Callahan, James Morton. *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967. 274-275

Rankin, Samuel Harrison, Jr. *Union and Confederate Diplomacy in Response to French Intervention in Mexico, 1861-1867*, 1966.

William R. Manning, James Morton Callahan, John H. Latané, Philip Brown, James L. Slayden, Joseph Wheless, and James Brown Scott. "Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the

Monroe Doctrine and of More or Less Allied Doctrines." *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1907)* 8 (1914): 101.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests;

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is mentioned in Gilbert/MID dataset. Although no force was deployed, Ambassador McLane's comments justify a threat of force from the United States. For this reason we code it as an intervention.

1861 United Kingdom

NAME: The Trent Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: 225

DATES: November 8, 1861- December 27, 1861

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom (UKG), 200

SUMMARY:

In the beginning of 1861, seven Southern American states declared their independence from the United States and established the Confederate States of America (CSA) following a complicated ideological battle on the legality of slavery in the Union and the degree to which states had unalienable rights from the federal government. In April, the military of the Confederacy launched an attack on the Union garrison at Fort Sumter and thus began the American Civil War. The CSA was never formally recognized as an independent nation by the remaining loyal states of the Union, nor any foreign government at the time. As war broke out in North America, the United Kingdom announced its neutrality in the conflict and soon most European states followed suit, not wanting to get mired in the American conflict. However, England, France, and Spain did recognize the CSA's belligerency status in the war, which granted them "the right to contract loans and purchase supplies in neutral nations and to exercise belligerent rights on the high seas."

The Union government, under President Abraham Lincoln, responded to the CSA's rebellious hostility by implementing a blockade of Southern ports to prevent the 'nation' from engaging in international trade, particularly in the textile industry which was the main economic output of the region, as well as prevent the import of weapons and other war material. Before the cession of the Southern American states, the Northern states were very much the industrial powerhouse of the Union and the Southern states, with a more agricultural society, exported raw textile materials to the factories of Europe, in particular England. As a result of this close, pre-War trade, the leaders of the CSA believed they could successfully establish diplomatic relationships with European states.

Seven months in the war, two Confederate diplomats, James Mason and John Slidell, travelled from the CSA to Europe on board the *HMS Trent*, a neutral British mail ship, on a mission to secure English and French support (and diplomatic recognition) in the war effort. Success would almost certainly increase Confederate legitimacy and provide access to vital lines of trade and alliance. On November 8th, Charles Wilkes, a Union naval officer in command of the *USS San Jacinto*, intercepted the *Trent* (without authorization from his commanding officers or officials in the Capital) and while conducting a search, discovered the Confederate envoys and arrested them and their private secretaries. With Mason and Slidell in custody, the *Trent* was allowed to

continue its voyage back to Great Britain. In the Union, the capture of these envoys was widely celebrated as a critical victory in the diplomatic contest to woo European nations and sway their neutrality each side engaged in. However, the opposite reaction occurred in England; both the public and the government were outraged by the illegal search of a neutral ship on the high seas, the mishandling of British mail, and the capture of the Confederate men. In response to the incident, which widely came to be known as ‘The *Trent* Affair,’ the British demanded the release of the men and an apology from the US government. Additionally, this event tested British neutrality and in response, the British government ordered troops stationed in Canada to be mobilized and dispatched a contingent of its navy in the event the Trent Affair should amount to war, however stressed that neutrality was the ultimate desire of the nation.

As ambassadors from both nations sought to defuse the tension caused by the Trent Affair, Mason and Slidell were taken to Fort Warren in Boston and held. Following skilled negotiation by President Lincoln, Secretary of State Seward, and Senator Charles Sumner on the American side and Lord Lyons and Prince Albert on the British side, Mason and Slidell were released from Fort Warren on December 27 and allowed to board a ship to Europe via the Caribbean. President Lincoln acknowledged that Capt. Wilkes had acted in error when he seized the British ship, but did not go so far as to offer the English a formal apology. In the end, however, the envoys were unable to secure British or French diplomatic recognition and all European powers remained committed to their previous statements of neutrality.

SOURCES:

Caroll, David. “The Trent Affair” in *Henri Mercier and the American Civil War*. 97-118. Princeton: Princeton University Press, n.d.

Tryon, James L (Rev.). “Peace Brought Out of All War Talk Attending Trent Affair.” *The Christian Science Monitor*. April 1, 1911.

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. “The Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861-1865.” Milestones 1861-1865. Accessed January 15, 2021.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20131023110139/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/Blockade>

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. “Preventing Diplomatic Recognition of the Confederacy, 1861-1865.” Milestones 1861-1865. Accessed January 15, 2021.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20131022123353/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/Confederacy>

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<https://web.archive.org/web/20131023110202/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/TrentAffair>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect Own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Deployment of the USS San Jacinto

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only noted in the MID dataset. This incident **does not** feature in the Congressional Research Service's report, nor in the United States Marine Corp book. A potential issue with this event is that it occurred during the American Civil War and while the US Navy was involved in the interception of the *HMS Trent*, the crisis was more of a diplomatic nature. However, because of the presence of a military ship, the event is coded as an intervention.

1863 Japan

NAME: The Shimonoseki Campaign

DISPUTE NUMBER: 13

DATES: July 16, 1863 – September 14, 1864

TARGET STATE(S): Japan, 740

SUMMARY:

In 1854, Commodore Matthew Perry had established diplomatic and trade relations between the US and Japan. The Perry Expedition foreshadowed the end of Japan's centuries-long isolation, and precipitated the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. However, some *daimyo* (feudal lords) resisted Japan's opening, and sought to expel foreigners from the country. The Choshu daimyo was one of the most active participants in this movement.

On June 26th, 1863, the American merchant ship *Pembroke* was attacked in the Straits of Shimonoseki by forces loyal to one of the isolationist *daimyo*, the Prince of Nagato. The *Pembroke* escaped, and the American Minister Resident in Japan, Robert H. Pruyn, ordered Commander David McDougal of the USS *Wyoming* to go to the Straits to retaliate.

On July 16th, 1863, McDougal found three of the Prince's ships in the Straits of Shimonoseki. A battle ensued, and the *Wyoming* destroyed two of the Prince's vessels. French ships landed in Choshu four days later and destroyed the Japanese forts there. In July of 1864, Pruyn went with a group of marines to Edo aboard the *Jamestown*, and extracted a payment from the Shogun for damages to the *Pembroke*.

The domestic movement against the shogunate, and its perceived failure to protect Japan from foreign incursions, continued during this period. In June of 1864, Choshu forces fired on foreign ships in the Straits of Shimonoseki as part of a broader effort to keep the straits closed.

American, French, British and Dutch ships joined together to retaliate in September of 1864. The multilateral flotilla consisted of 17 ships, carrying approximately 5,000 men. The ships came to the coast of Choshu on September 4th, and opened fire on the Choshu batteries on September 5th. The Choshu forces fired on two Western ships on the morning of September 6th, prompting the Western ships to send 2,000 men onto the shore and destroy the Choshu batteries. A ceasefire was signed on September 14th.

Japan was charged a heavy indemnity. The Choshu daimyo agreed to keep the Shimonoseki Straits open, and to forego rebuilding coastal batteries. However, the shogunate continued to lose its domestic control, and eventually fell in the 1868 Meiji Restoration, which shifted political authority back to the emperor.

SOURCES:

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Huffman, James L. 2001. "Edward H. House: Questions of Meaning and Influence." *Japan Forum* 13(1): 15-25.

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Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Accessed September 10, 2020. *Congressional Research Service*.
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Economic protection

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- United States: 5 (Ross 1934, Ellsworth 1974)
- Japan: 42 (Ross 1934, Ellsworth 1974, Jaundrill 2016)

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: 47

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Deployment of the *Wyoming* and the *Takiang* to the Shimonoseki Straits, and the *Jamestown* to Edo. The *Wyoming* fired three or more 32-poud shells and two XI-inch shells in the battle (Ross 1934: 151).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

- We treat the period from 1863-4 as a single intervention to protect American and allied economic interests in Japan generally, and in the Straits of Shimonoseki specifically.
- For the year 1863, the CRS dataset refers only to a battle on July 16th, 1863, while the MID dataset refers only to the threat to use for on July 20th.
- For the year 1864, CRS records both a show of force by the US beginning on July 14th, and a battle beginning on September 4th. MID does not record these events.

1865 France

NAME: The French Intervention in Mexico

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1800

DATES: May 17 - October 12, 1865

TARGET STATE(S): France 220

SUMMARY:

After the civil war in Mexico (where with U.S. support, Liberal forces led by Benito Juárez took control of Mexico City), Mexico owed its debts to many, including European powers such as Britain, Spain, and France. The three nations came together in a tripartite agreement to land forces in Mexico to collect their payments. However, both Britain and Spain abandoned the mission as they quickly learned that France had ulterior expansionist motives. Taking advantage of the U.S. being preoccupied with the Civil War, France began its intervention in 1862. In 1864, France seated Maximilian of Habsburg, Archduke of Austria as the puppet Emperor of the Mexican Empire. Though the U.S. was embroiled in its own conflicts at home, it saw this as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. President Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward opted for a diplomatic route with France to avoid another war and also out of fear that France would support the Confederacy. Meanwhile others, particularly General Ulysses S. Grant, who had fought in the Mexican War, opted for military intervention.

On April 9th, the Union won the Civil War, and soon after on April 15th, President Lincoln was assassinated and Andrew Johnson became president. While most of the country was preoccupied with this transition, Grant ordered General Philip Henry Sheridan to the South with troops on May 17th. This action was based on the pretense that the rebel Army was still a threat. However, the rebel Army surrendered on May 26th, and Sheridan and his troops arrived in Brownsville on June 1st. After a month at the border on Rio Grande, his force grew to approximately 32,000 troops. Eventually, the force grew to 50,000, outnumbering the French troops by almost two to one. For the next few months, Sheridan's troops maintained their position along the border as a show of force. By October 26th, Sheridan's efforts had produced their desired effects. With a combination of this show of force, Seward's diplomatic efforts to convince the French to leave, decreasing French public support of the intervention in Mexico due to the Prussian threat in Europe, Napoleon ultimately decided to withdraw.

In January 1866, Napoleon notified Maximilian of his plans to draw back French support. On the 31st, Napoleon ordered the withdrawal of his troops which took place in three stages from November 1866 to November 1867. Without Napoleon's support, Maximilian was unable to maintain power. He was later captured by Mexican liberal forces and was executed.

SOURCES:

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Hardy, William E. "South of the Border: Ulysses S. Grant and the French Intervention." Civil War History 54, no. 1 (2008): 63-86.

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Matthews, Matt, and Combat Studies Institute. The U.S. Army on the Mexican Border : A Historical Perspective. Long War Series Occasional Paper ; 22. 2007.

Selcer, Richard. “Now on to Mexico!” HistoryNet. HistoryNet, January 2014.

<https://www.historynet.com/now-on-to-mexico.htm>.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 50,000 U.S. troops

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: It is unclear if the U.S. troops withdrew as soon as they heard Napoleon planned to withdraw (October 1865). For end dates and cumulative duration in the backlogger, the original values have not been changed due to this uncertainty.

1865 Panama

NAME: The “Glorious Revolution”

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 9 – 10th, 1865

TARGET STATE(S): Panama (PAN), 95

SUMMARY:

Panama declared its independence from Spain in November 1821 and joined Simon Bolivar’s movement to form the federation of Gran Colombia (present day Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama). The California Gold Rush of 1848 brought immense wealth to Panama, as eager explorers favored its railroad – completed by an American company to connect the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean – to traversing the American west. For most of the 19th century, Panama’s domestic government remained subservient to that of Gran Colombia, and fierce and volatile contests between liberals and conservatives characterized its domestic politics.

On March 9, 1865, a small force broke away from the national troops, stormed to the President’s house, and opened fire. Multiple Panamanians were killed, either civilians hit by stray bullets or national troops that resisted the betrayal. The liberal acting-President, Calancha, was able to escape and found refuge in the United States consulate. From there, he was brought to the U.S. sloop-of-war *St Marys*, which was in the bay at the time. Thirty men were sent from the vessel, at the request of the U.S. Consul at Panama (and approved by Calancha), to defend the Consul and guard the railroad buildings. When tensions calmed the next day, the American troops returned to their ships and a new provincial government was established in Panama, with Gil Colunje as President. He appointed loyal conservative prefects throughout the country, virtually guaranteeing Conservative Party victories in subsequent elections. Although their rebellion found little resistance, Conservatives hailed this day as the “glorious revolution of the 9th”. A few months later, Calancha, who had escaped to Bogota, marched back to Panama with 200 troops in an attempt to reestablish liberal rule. However, he was apprehended by Colunje’s troops 60 miles from the city and, after a short skirmish, surrendered. The following years were marked by intense tension and violence between the two parties: 26 different presidents held office from 1863 to 1886. The U.S. maintained a strong commercial relationship with Panama and – after Colombia shunned its efforts to construct the Panama Canal – would eventually assist in its independence efforts in 1903.

SOURCES:

“FROM THE ISTHMUS.; Military Revolution in Panama, The State Government Overthrown. Naval Intelligence. General News Items. CENTRAL AMERICA.” *The New York Times*. March

26, 1865. <https://www.nytimes.com/1865/04/06/archives/from-the-isthmus-military-revolution-in-panama-the-state-government.html>

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<https://www.nytimes.com/1865/09/24/archives/united-states-of-colombia-end-of-the-war-how-revolutions-are.html>

Wingfield, Thomas C, and James E Meyen, eds. “Appendix I.” Appendix. In *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad 77, 77:115–84*. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2002.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Panamanian: 0; U.S.: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: Panamanian: 4; U.S.: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 30 sailors for one night. Presence of one U.S. naval ship.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is featured in the CRS, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020*, report.

1866 Brazil

NAME: Blockade Dispute

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2043

DATES: November 3, 1866

TARGET STATE: Brazil (BRA), 140

SUMMARY:

During the 1860s, South America was embroiled in the Paraguayan War, otherwise known as the War of the Triple Alliance. Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay - the Triple Alliance - went to war against Paraguay (the reasons for the war are complicated and are still debated at present). The United States took a neutral position in the war, all the while trying to negotiate an end to hostilities. The U.S. had economic interests in South America; in addition, adhering to the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. did not want European powers to use this chance to intervene in the Americas.

Diplomat Charles A. Washburn traveled to Paraguay on the *Shamokin* as a part of these diplomatic efforts; however, a Brazilian blockade prevented them from landing. The admiral of the Brazilian boarding party offered to take Washburn to Paraguay on another ship, but the U.S. admiral refused and threatened to use force. The Brazilian admiral relented and allowed passage, while making note of the violation of Brazil's blockade.

SOURCES:

"Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward." Extract from *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress*. Office of the Historian. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1867p2/d441>.

Peterson, Harold F. "Efforts of the United States to Mediate in the Paraguayan War." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 12, no. 1 (1932): 2-17. doi:10.2307/2506427.

Washburn, Charles A. *The History of Paraguay, with Notes of Personal Observations, and Reminiscences of Diplomacy under Difficulties*. New York: AMS Press, 1973.

OBJECTIVE:

Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The use of the ship *Shamokin*

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

The military intervention does not appear in the CSR but is mentioned in the MID dataset.

1866 China

NAME: Protection from Chinese rebels

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 20, 1866 to July 7, 1866

TARGET STATE(S): China 710

SUMMARY:

Background: Xianfeng, Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, died in 1861 amid various rebellions. This lasted until 1864 when the leader of the rebellion, Tien Wang, committed suicide after losing a possession of Nanking. By 1866, the rebels that had followed Tien Wang had mostly dispersed. The U.S. had played some role with Britain in organizing the Chinese military that was used to fight the rebellions.

In 1866, a group of rebels led by Sword Rack Hoo attacked the American Consul Francis P. Knight in Newchwang (Yingkou). Rear Admiral Henry H. Bell sent the USS Wachusett led by Robert Townsend to secure arrest and punish perpetrators as the USS Wachusett was in the area searching for the CSS Shenandoah, an infamous commerce raider from the American Civil War. A landing force of 50 sailors and Marines from the USS Wachusett led by Lt. John W. Phillip located all members of the attack, but the Chinese authorities would not or were powerless to arrest the leader Sword Rack Hoo. Townsend sent 100 marines and sailors (50 additional) to arrest Sword Rack Hoo who was captured quickly and placed on trial the following day. 25 men remained on shore until July 7th when Sword Rack was tried and punished.

The immediate consequence it rightful trial of a criminal and defense of an American Consul. Overall, the long-term consequence was likely signaling to Chinese rebels that the US will not allow attacks on its consuls to go unpunished.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson. "China." Essay. In *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934: a Brief History in Two Parts ...*, 28–29. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

"Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad ...," January 13, 2020. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42738>.

McCabe, David H. "Tribute to Embassy Marines." *Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994)* 57, no. 11 (11, 1973): 66-67.

Thacker, Joel D. "Leathernecks and Top Hats." Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994) 34, no. 7 (07, 1950): 52-55.

Wachusett I (ScSlp), October 23, 2015.

<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/wachusett-i.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: N/A

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Case appears in CRS but not in MID and therefore does not have a case number.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent

protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1866 Mexico

NAME: 1866 US Occupation of Matamoros, Mexico

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 24, 1866 to November 27, 1866.

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

During the second French intervention in Mexico, the town of Matamoros was under siege by Mexican loyalists who were fighting the French backed troops. This town was a geographically important notable because it sits on the US-Mexico border along the Rio Grande. Brownsville sits on the other side of the river which was a gateway for Confederate forces leaving America to Mexico following the end of the U.S. Civil War.

In November 1866, the leader of the Mexican loyalist in Matamoros, Canales, sent a message to American General Sedgwick in Brownsville asking for help to defend against French forces. Canales stated that he did not have enough money to pay his troops to fight off the French siege. General Sedgwick agreed to help on the condition the town surrendered to American occupation as he wanted to protect American people and interests in the town. Canales agreed as this would provide protection to the town using the United States as a defense.

On November 24th, 1866, General Sedgwick sent at least 300 men into the town to secure it and claim it as surrendered to the United States. On November 27th, 1866, the town successfully ward off an attack from the French backed troops. The American troops did not engage in the hostilities. Later that day, General Sedgwick reportedly heard from Washington that his actions were not approved and that he was to immediately leave the city. General Sedgwick and his men withdrew that day. 50 Troops remained as a neutral party to the conflict and were guaranteed protection from both warring sides regardless of the outcome.

President Johnson publicly disapproved of General Sedgwick's actions. Johnson believed that the United States should remain outside of the conflict but nonetheless condemned the actions of France. Many sources indicate this was a serious diplomatic blunder by Sedgwick and he was reassigned shortly after.

SOURCES:

Message Of The President Of The United States, Of January 29, 1867, Relating To The Present Condition Of Mexico, In Answer To A Resolution Of The House Of December 4, 1866.
Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1867.

"Mexico.: Important Report. Gen. Sedgwick Said To Have Invaded Mexican Territory On The Rio Grand--he Holds Matamoras--great Excitement. Escohedo Before Matamoras -- Canales Retuses To Surrender -- Ortega At Brazon. Colima Besieged By The Liberals-- french Troops Defeated In A Battle On The Rio Guilano." *new York Times (1857-1922)*, Nov. 28, 1866.

“On The Mexican Border, U.S. Army Troops Make A Brief Incursion Into Matamoras.” On The Mexican Border, U.S. Army Troops Make A Brief Incursion Into Matamoras | House Divided, November 24, 1866. [Http://Hd.Housedivided.Dickinson.Edu/Node/46069](http://Hd.Housedivided.Dickinson.Edu/Node/46069).

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 300 U.S. troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only noted in the CRS dataset. The number of troops deployed is listed in CRS as 100. However, primary sources list at least 300 troops deployed. Additional sources show 50, but this is in regard to a subsection of the 300 that remained afterwards to protect American interests. These 50 men were to report to the invading force immediately should the city be captured as they were guaranteed protection from both sides.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize

territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1866 Spain

NAME: The Bombardment of Valparaiso

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1714

DATES: March 1 - 31, 1866

TARGET STATE(S): Spain, 230

SUMMARY:

Following the Chincha Islands War of April 1864 (where Spain seized Peru's guano rich island in an attempt to reassert its influence in South America), many of Peru's neighbors became weary of Spain. During the political crisis in Peru, a Spanish ship requested to resupply coal in Chile. The local authorities refused this request, infuriating Spanish Vice Admiral Juan Manuel Pareja. In response, Pareja demanded that the locals fire a salute to the Spanish flag, which the Chileans refused. Taking this as an insult to his country, Pareja threatened to retaliate and did so with a blockade. Chile then responded by declaring war in September 1865. Since then, Spain attempted to blockade Chilean ports (though this was difficult to enforce due to Chile's long coastline). Chile had an early victory when they seized a Spanish ship and captured its crew in the Battle of Papudo. Following this development, Peru joined Chile in the war against Spain and La Moneda turned to the U.S. for help. While Secretary of State William Seward wanted Spain to withdraw, he did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine. He was concerned that if the U.S. pressured Spain, they might retaliate by granting the Confederacy diplomatic recognition. In addition, these events unfolded at a time when the U.S. was dependent on Spain's cooperation to build the trans-Caribbean telegraph system.

Rather than intervening, the U.S. along with British forces remained neutral and acted as mediators. Under the command of John Rodgers, the Pacific Squadron was deployed to Valparaiso, Chile, arriving on March 1st, 1866. Chile refused to negotiate until Madrid abandoned the blockade and dropped some of its demands. As a result of U.S. and British mediation efforts Madrid reduced its demands, but still requested that both nations exchange salutes and that Chile must initiate. Chile refused and Spain threatened to bombard Valparaiso on the 31st. Though the Anglo-American naval squadron (eight vessels in total) was anchored in the harbor, Rodgers would not act without the British. London's minister to Santiago did not give permission for their navy to act, resulting in the Anglo-American forces withdrawal. The port of Valparaiso was left unfortified and defenseless. After three hours of bombardment, the Spanish fleet withdrew.

The port of Valparaiso was destroyed. The damages consisted mostly of foreign owned property and merchandise, totalling approximately twenty-two million dollars and several lives were lost

(eight or ten). As the bombardment of Valparaiso could have been prevented with the help of the Anglo-American Squadron, Chile would not forgive the U.S. and relations suffered.

SOURCES:

"BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO." New York Times (1857-1922) (New York, N.Y), 1866.

"BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO.: OFFICIAL DISPATCHES FROM COM. RODGERS. HIS EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE BOMBARDMENT--THE ENGLISH ADMIRAL DECLINES TO CO-OPERATE WITH HIM." 1866. New York Times (1857-1922), May 03, 1. <https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/historical-newspapers/bombardment-valparaiso/docview/92264081/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Harry, Stephanie. "John Rodgers III (DD-983)." Naval History and Heritage Command, January 9, 2018. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/j/john-rodgers-iii.html>.

Johnson, John J. Pacific Historical Review 20, no. 2 (1951): 172-74. Accessed April 3, 2021. doi:10.2307/3634861.

Sater, William F. *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict*. University Georgia Press, 1990.

"The Chinchas War – Inside the Little-Known Conflict Between Peru and Spain Over Animal Turds." MilitaryHistoryNow.com, July 10, 2012. <https://militaryhistorynow.com/2012/07/10/a-shitty-little-war-peru-fights-spain-over-animal-turds/>.

"THE PACIFIC SQUADRON." New York Times (1857-1922) (New York, N.Y), 1866.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Social Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 8-10

Per capita total deaths: 8-10

COSTS: Deployment of the Pacific Squadron (*USS Vanderbilt, Tuscarora, Powhatan, and Monadnock*)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in Gibler/MID (#1714).

1867 Nicaragua

NAME: Presidential Transition

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 6, 1867 – Unknown

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua, 93

SUMMARY:

In the 1840s and 1850s, Nicaragua experienced multiple civil wars and general political turmoil. In 1856, William Walker, an American not sponsored by the U.S. government, took control of Nicaragua and declared himself President. He was ousted the following year by Nicaraguan forces and replaced President Tomas Martinez. The U.S. supported both actions as it was pursuing a canal through Nicaragua to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

In 1867, Martinez retired from the Presidency. The U.S. did not want to lose influence over the region. It sent marines to occupy the cities of Managua and Leon as a show of force to ensure a smooth transition of power to new President Fernando Guzman Solorzano.

The transition went smoothly. A new treaty was signed between the United States and Nicaragua in 1867 called the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. No sources specify the number of marines sent or the end date of the deployment. Additionally, no sources indicated any conflict occurred during the transition.

SOURCES:

“History Is a Weapon,” www.themapofbloodandfire.com/map/1867/928.

United States Marine Corps, Historical Branch, I, “A Chronology of the United States Marines Corps 1775-1934,” 1965. 92.

“War Powers Legislation, 1973: Hearings, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session, on S. 440.” U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 133.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

Cost: Unknown number of troops deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in CRS. Government sources do not give an end date of the deployment. We code it as a one-day event as the deployment appears primarily concerned with marking a show of force.

1867 Taiwan

NAME: Formosa Expedition of 1867

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: June 13, 1867

TARGET STATE(S): Taiwan (TAW), 713

SUMMARY:

On March 12th, 1867, an American merchant vessel, *Rover*, was shipwrecked on the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) on its way from Swatow to Neuchwang. Thirteen of the fourteen crew members aboard were murdered by the island natives. The only survivor, a Swatow Chinese, escaped and arrived in Takao (Kaohsiung). After hearing of the incident, Commander Broad (British) was on a mission to rescue the survivors (if any) as he organized an expedition to the site of the murder. On March 26th, Commander Broad, Charles Carroll, and his crew (including the Chinese survivor) anchored in the south bay of Formosa, finding the remains of the shipwreck. Upon their landing, the crew was fired at. The mission was immediately abandoned and Commander Broad reported the event to the Americans.

Upon learning of this, the US sought to remedy this by sending troops to Formosa to punish the “savages” that murdered the American crew from the March 12th shipwreck. Secretary of State William H. Seward provided clear instructions to prevent future attacks while making clear that the US had no desire to seize or hold possession of the island. The expedition to Formosa set out on the *Hartford* with Commander Belknap and with Lieutenant Commander Carpenter on the *Wyoming*. On June 13th at 9:30 in the morning, the crew of 181 officers, sailors, and marines & privates landed on the south side of the Island of Formosa. They came armed with muskets, howitzers, and rifles, and prepared with four days rations and water. Once they landed, the men marched onward into the hills and jungle while the natives retreated, frequently ambushing the soldiers. Fighting continued this way until two in the afternoon, when Lieutenant Commander A.S. Mackenzie walked into an ambush and was killed by a musket ball. Commander Belknap thought they could regain momentum on the beach. During this trek back, many soldiers’ conditions suffered from the heat. Belknap decided to go back to the ships with the troops. There, the fleet surgeon reported the casualties, one dead, fourteen sunstruck, and four dangerously so. Given the situation and these considerations, it was decided that they would not continue. They did all that they could, having burnt some native huts and chased the natives until they couldn’t anymore. The fleet left that evening at 9 in the evening for Takao and arrived the next day. Lieutenant Mackenzie was buried in the garden of the British Consulate in Takao. Following the events at Formosa, there was an increased interest in Taiwan. Gideon Wells notes that the only remedy for the deaths of the Americans from the shipwreck, is for the Chinese to occupy the bay by settlement and supported by military force. Pressure was then placed on China

to take control of the situation. However, the Chinese insisted that they had no control over the “cannibals”. In September 1867, General Charles LeGendre at the US Consul at Amoy (Xiamen) took initiative and set out on his own mission to Formosa. LeGendre bypassed local officials and negotiated directly with Tooke-tok, the leader of the 18 aboriginal tribes of the region. In this new treaty, the natives promised not to attack future shipwrecked Westerners.

SOURCES:

Leonard H. D. Gordon. "The Cession of Taiwan: A Second Look." *Pacific Historical Review* 45, no. 4 (1976): 539-67. Accessed December 29, 2020. doi:10.2307/3638102.

“PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANYING THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FORTIETH CONGRESS.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed December 26, 2020. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/>.

"THE PIRATES OF FORMOSA.: OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES WITH THE SAVAGES OF THE ISLE." *New York Times* (1857-1922), Aug 24, 1867. <https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/historical-newspapers/pirates-formosa/docview/92346296/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Thomson, Sandra Caruthers. "Filibustering to Formosa: General Charles LeGendre and the Japanese." *Pacific Historical Review* 40, no. 4 (1971): 442-56. Accessed December 29, 2020. doi:10.2307/3637704.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 1

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

COSTS: Deployment of a crew of 181 men, including officers, sailors, marines, two ships (The Hartford and Wyoming), muskets, howitzers, rifles, and four days rations and water.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only referenced in the CRS report.

1868 Colombia

NAME: Chiriquí Intervention

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 7, 1868 - April 28, 1868

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100; location: present-day Panama, 95

SUMMARY:

In April 1868, the local president passed away, leading to social unrest in Chiriquí. Because the local Aspinwall garrison was absent, the Americans sent a small number of troops into the town to protect American citizens and “treasures.” A total of fourteen marines, including two officers, disembarked the *USS Penobscot* on April 7th as a precautionary measure to protect American interests. No actual violence ensued and the troop re-embarked the *Penobscot* once it was clear there would be no further danger, as evidenced by the fact that the *Penobscot* soon took a short cruise from Aspinwall to “air her crew.”

SOURCES:

“Central and South America.” *The New York Times*. May 7, 1868, 5.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1868/05/07/78914828.html?pageNumber=5>

Annual reports of the Navy Department. Report of the Secretary of the Navy. Miscellaneous reports. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1868, 21.

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States, 1765 - 1935*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 226, 257.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of deploying fourteen troops in the town and keeping the ship in port.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the CRS Report. No official end date for the intervention can be found, but the *Penobscot* set sail from Aspinwall on April 28th, so the troops had to have re-embarked by then, explaining why this end date was chosen.

1868 Japan

NAME: The Boshin War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 4, 1868– September 26, 1868

TARGET STATE(S): Japan, 740

SUMMARY:

Civil war broke out in Japan in 1865, and the Tokugawa Shogunate's power diminished rapidly. The Choshu daimyo, loyal to the emperor and hostile to Western influence in Japan, defeated the shogun's forces in the Choshu War (1865-6). The Boshin War (1868-9) began shortly afterward, and a final series of military confrontations between imperial loyalists and shogunal forces ended in the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

During the Boshin War, the United States remained neutral, while attempting to protect its interests in Japan. From February through September of 1868, US naval and marine forces landed in several Japanese ports to protect foreigners in Japan, American economic interests, and the American consulate.

On February 4th, 1868, Japanese forces fired on a group of foreigners in Hyogo, and wounded a crew member of the *USS Oneida*. In response, the US landed marines and navy personnel in Hyogo, leaving on February 8th. That same day, the *USS Shenandoah* landed in Nagasaki to protect the American consulate there. The new Meiji government also assured the US that it would protect foreigners in Japan, and executed the leader of the Hyogo attack, Taki Zenzaburo.

Approximately two months later, in April 1868, the *USS Monocacy* and the *USS Iroquois* undertook a joint landing with French, British, Italian, and Prussian forces in Yokohama to protect foreign persons living in the city. The American contingent withdrew on May 12th. One month later, on June 12th, personnel from the *USS Iroquois* boarded a Japanese ship, the *Kaugi no Kami*, to prevent it from leaving Yokohama harbor. In July, the US assumed responsibility for one of four guard posts in Yokohama, to protect foreign residents during a period of unrest in the city. Finally, on September 25th, 1868, the *USS Piscataqua* landed to protect American citizens in Niigata, where riots had broken out.

While the Boshin War did not formally end until 1869, the restoration of the emperor to political primacy had largely taken place by 1868. Ultimately, the United States would accept the outcome of the Boshin War, and attempt to cooperate with the new Meiji government.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters.

Jaundrill, D. Colin. 2016. *Samurai to Soldier: Remaking Military Service in Nineteenth-Century Japan*. (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Minohara, Tosh & Kaoru Iokibe. 2017. "America Encounters Japan, 1836-94," in *The History of US-Japan Relations*, eds. Iokibe & Minohara. (Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Accessed September 10, 2020. *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Costs of maintaining several ships and landing personnel on Japanese coasts.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This is a series of related episodes, which we treat as a single intervention. This intervention does not appear in the MIDs dataset, but does appear in the CRS dataset. The CRS dataset includes the landing at Niigata, but not the date (September 25th).

1868 Uruguay

NAME: Montevideo Uprising

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 7, 1968 – February 26, 1868

TARGET STATE(S): Uruguay (URU), 165

SUMMARY:

In the middle of the 19th century, Montevideo was a commercial hub, providing a great harbor between the bustling economies of Argentina and Brazil. In 1868, two-thirds of the population was foreign-born. This time can also be categorized by foreign intervention by neighbors and European powers, who were attempting to secure their investments abroad, and internal political conflict between the liberal *Blancos*, and the conservative *Colorados*. After the ten-year Great War between the three countries, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay formed The Triple Alliance in 1865, establishing a unified front against Paraguay. Uruguayan General Venancio Flores, a former head of state under the *Colorado* party and longtime friend of the Brazilians, became the provincial governor of Montevideo.

In 1868, Colonel Fortunio Flores, the governor's son who was in command of the city guard, gathered his men and revolted against his father. The governor appealed to the American consulate for support in the face of the insurrection. At the time, it was common for European and American ships to stand in the harbor, facilitating commerce. U.S. Admiral Charles Davis, who was already in the port with five vessels, received the communique and on February 7, sailed ashore with Italian and British forces (who were also asked for aid). The 45 American sailors quickly helped establish peace and were gone by the next day. A few weeks later, Governor Flores was assassinated by agents of the political opposition. His supporters sought retribution and the city was soon in chaos. Again, American support was requested to secure the safety of the American consulate, the custom house, and foreign residents. 50 U.S. sailors took to the shore, and after tensions calmed, were asked to leave a week later by the new President. Political conflict between the *Colorados* and the *Blancos* continued in Uruguay, leading to military rule from 1875 to 1890.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson, and United States. Marine Corps. History Museums Division, Issuing Body. One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934. 1974.

Foreign Relations of the United States, March 9, 1868. Volume 61, eds. William H Seward and J. Watson Webb (Washington: Government Printing Office), Document 179.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1868p2/d179>

Hudson, Rex A, Sandra W Meditz, Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division, and Thomas E Weil. Uruguay: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 1992.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interest

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Deployment and maintenance of roughly 50 sailors for nine days in foreign territory.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1869 Haiti

NAME: Haitian interference in the Dominican Republic

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1532

DATES: November 1869

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

The late 1860's was a tumultuous time for the Dominican Republic, which had experienced re-occurring periods of instability and civil unrest. In 1869, Haiti sought to project its power and influence within the Caribbean region in a similar fashion to the United States' approach in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. Haiti seized the opportunity presented by the instability within the Dominican Republic to prepare an invasion and re-assert control over the country it had previously ruled for 22 years. In addition to territorial conquest, Haiti hoped such a move would establish it as a regional power in the Caribbean.

The United States, still operating predominately under the Monroe Doctrine, felt its own interests within the Caribbean would be threatened if Haiti invaded the Dominican Republic and promptly responded. The U.S. dispatched seven warships to the Dominican Republic to deter Haiti's planned invasion. Instead, the United States attempted to annex Santo Domingo as a United States territory. The effort ultimately failed but it did deter Haiti from further interventions within the Dominican Republic.

SOURCES:

Davidson, Matthew. "Haiti." In *The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives*, edited by Joseph, Paul, 850-769. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2017.
<http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/10.4135/9781483359878.n294>.

Gibler, Douglas M. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. 2018.

Martinez-Fernandez, Luis. "Annexation of Dominican Republic". *Oxford Bibliographies: African American Studies*. June 28, 2016. Retrieved From:
<https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190280024/obo-9780190280024-0036.xml> (accessed 26 Mar. 2021).

Polyne, Millery. "Expansion now!: Haiti, 'Santo Domingo,' and Frederick Douglass at the intersection of U.S. and Caribbean Pan-Americanism." *Caribbean Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2006, p. 3+. Gale Academic OneFile,

link.gale.com/apps/doc/A186436744/AONE?u=mlin_m_tufts&sid=AONE&xid=742f2cdb.
Accessed 26 Mar. 2021.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: None

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Seven naval warships

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case study comes from the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset found in the International Conflicts book by Douglas M. Gibling.

1870 China

NAME: Tianjin Massacre

DISPUTE NUMBER: 220

DATES: July 25 – October 5, 1870

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY: Anti-foreign feelings were mounting in Tianjin, a treaty port with foreign concessions, that had previously been occupied by Anglo-French forces twice. In 1870, rumors circulated that the French Sisters of Charity were kidnapping, forcibly baptizing, and even mutilating Chinese children, causing people to gather to protest the rumored horrors. On June 21, the French consul, Henri Fontanier, fired into a hostile crowd, killing the district magistrate's servant. The shot set off a riot, in which the French consul and 11 to 20 other foreigners were killed (the exact number is disputed), and several churches were burned.

European powers issued demands for swift punishments of those involved and sent French, American, and British gunboats to anchor off Tianjin. Hostilities nearly escalated to armed conflict, but on October 5, Chinese courts punished between two and 16 (the exact number is disputed) men who had been involved in the riot with execution or lifelong exile. A mission was also dispatched to take China's apology to France.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. MN: Rowman & Littlefield.

"Tianjin Massacre." *Chambers Dictionary of World History*, 2005, *Chambers Dictionary of World History*, 2005.

"Tianjin Massacre." *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2020, *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2020-07-02.

"Tianjin (Tientsin)." *Encyclopedia of Modern China* 3 (2009): 572-73.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

China: 0
United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

China: 0
United States: 0

COSTS: Cost of anchoring gunboats in support of European allies.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) report (Gibler, 2018).

1870 Mexico

NAME: Battle of Boca Teacapan

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2117

DATES: June 17th to 18th 1870

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico 70

SUMMARY:

A British merchant ship called *Forward* was seized by Mexican pirates at some point between 1869 and May 27th, 1870 and was being used to rob ships and towns in the Gulf of California. On May 27th 1870, the pirates robbed the United States Consul in Guaymas, Mexico of coal for their ship. General William W. Low, U.S.N., was informed by US Consul Isaac Sisson about the incident on June 6th, 1870 and decided to pursue the *Forward*.

On June 17th, the boat was located about 40 miles up a river. The *Forward* was quickly captured. However, a small boat left and was fired upon by the marines. Aggressive return fire from pirates onshore followed causing the marines to promptly retreated into the armored *Forward*. After about approximately one hour, it was decided the situation was too bad to salvage, so they intentionally damaged the boat beyond repair and fled.

The pirates' return fire killed one marine and wounded two others, one mortally, according to Ellsworth. Naval History and Heritage states 2 naval officers were killed, 7 naval officers wounded, and one marine wounded. No numbers are given for pirate casualties. It is estimated that 79 marines and 170 pirates engaged in the conflict. The marines used muskets. The pirates used muskets and 4 artillery units. In total 7 boats were used by the US, the USS Mohican and 6 smaller armed boats. Immediate outcome was the removal of a pirate ship that was harassing towns in the area. British Admiral Farquhar praised the Americans for their quick response to the news.

SOURCES:

“Casualties: US Navy & Marine Corps Personnel.” Naval History and Heritage Command, August 29, 2017.

<https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/casualties1.html>.

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson. “China.” Essay. In *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934: a Brief History in Two Parts ...*, 114–115. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

“Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad ...,” January 13, 2020.

<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42738>.

Rentfrow, Frank H. "A June Adventure of 1870." *Leatherneck (Pre 1998): Quantico* 19, no. 6 (June 1936): 61.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own, Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- Two killed. One during the battle and one upon returning from the battle.

TOTAL DEATHS: 2

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Case is listed in the CRS and MID.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. ‘Peacekeeping’ operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, ‘humanitarian’ operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1871 Korea

NAME: Korea Shipwreck Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 10-12, 1871

TARGET STATE(S): Korea, 730

SUMMARY: In 1866, after historically treating shipwrecked sailors, including Americans, well, a confrontation took place with the stranded merchant ship USS General Sherman in which all the crew were killed. On a follow-up fact finding mission to Korea, another US ship was fired upon from shore. These incidents resulted in a small flotilla being sent in 1871 to sue for an apology and negotiate trade and shipwreck conventions.

After a positive interaction with the Korean officials, the ships received permission to survey up the Salee River. While surveying, one of the boats was fired upon by forts on shore. An accompanying gunboat drove off the aggressors and rescued the surveyors. An ultimatum delivered to the Korean government demanding an apology within 10 days was never answered.

After the 10 days passed, a battalion of marines and brigade of seamen infantry were sent back up the Salee River on June 10. The boats were fired upon again and returned fire, destroying the guns on shore. They made a difficult landing, and the marines and seamen, backed by canons from the boats, stormed two forts with ease (each was abandoned by the garrison as the US force advanced). After spending a night, the first night spent by a western force on Korean soil, the force turned their attention to the citadel, Kwangsong.

After bombarding the citadel walls with the guns, the marines and seamen scaled them and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Korean force, killing nearly all of them. After this, another fort capitulated immediately. The marines and seamen returned to their ships on June 12. The victory did lead to a halt in aggression toward Americans, but it did not forward their diplomatic cause for trade and also created some consternation in the US press.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Congressional Research Service, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Winkler, David F. "Marine Amphibious Landing in Korea, 1871." *Sea Power* 42, no. 11 (1999): 22.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

Korea: ~250

United States: 2 or 3 (depending on source)

TOTAL DEATHS:

Korea: ~250

United States: 2 or 3 (depending on source)

COSTS: Deployment of flotilla to Korea and of battalion of marines and brigade of seamen for three days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1873 Colombia

NAME: 1873 Isthmus Revolutions

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: May 7 - May 22, 1873, September 23 - October 9, 1873

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100; location: Panama 95

SUMMARY:

Local revolutions on the Isthmus were not uncommon in this era, but the local Americans often felt that political instability threatened interests and property in the area. In May 1873, two American naval vessels were stationed in the Bay of Panama, the USS *Tuscarora* and the USS *Pensacola*. On May 7th, one hundred sailors from the *Tuscarora* came ashore to protect the railroad station. Clashes between local factions continued, so another hundred marines landed in the town the next morning. By May 22nd, the Americans believed that they had secured their property and local interests, so all of the troops reembarked on their ship.

The local clashes continued over the summer and in September, the Governor of Panama informed the Americans that he would not be able to supply appropriate protection to the railroad station and other property. On September 23rd under the command of Admiral John Almy, 150 men from the *Pensacola* and *Benecia* landed ashore to once again protect the railroad and its cargo. Similarly to the May conflict, the local clashes continued to threaten the railroad, so forty more men disembarked. By October 6th, all but thirty of the men had embarked on their ships. The *Pensacola* sailed away a few days later, but the *Benecia* ultimately remained in the harbor until December 1873 to monitor local conflicts.

SOURCES:

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Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 227.

“The Spanish Republics.” *The New York Times*. May 20, 1873, 5.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1873/05/20/461032802.html?pageNumber=5>

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 97-101.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of stationing three ships and hundreds of men in the local area, with 30 troops remaining.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the CRS Report and the Marine Landings Report.

1873 Mexico

NAME: Border Crossings by U.S. Troops

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1545 and 1547

DATES: May 1873 - July 1882

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

From at least the 1870s onward, the United States military was permanently stationed on the U.S.-Mexico border to protect U.S. settlers and cattle ranchers. The troops augmented the local law enforcement and continuously patrolled the sparsely populated terrain; for example, in 1879 alone, the U.S. military launched 120 expeditions covering over 40,000 miles. While bandits operating on both sides of the border were a perennial threat, the U.S. and Mexico were mainly focused on fighting Apache, Lipan, Comanche, Mescalero, and Kickapoo tribes that still dominated the area until the late 1880s. As bandits and Native Americans would often conduct raids on U.S. settlements from across the border, and then flee to safety back over the river, the U.S. frequently protested that Mexico was not doing enough to maintain order from their side. These protests eventually evolved into threats by the U.S. military to take matters into their own hands if the Mexican government did not increase its military presence on the border. Between May 1873 and July 1882, when a reciprocal border crossing agreement was finally signed, U.S. troops did occasionally cross to pursue Native Americans or Mexican bandits—with or without permission from either government.

The exact number of border crossings by U.S. troops before the agreement in 1882 is unclear, but significant instances included:

- **May 1873:** Col. MacKenzie pursued Kickapoo Native Americans across the border, killing 19 men (officially) and capturing 450 near El Remolino. MacKenzie Crossed with 400 men and Native American scouts and did so without authority from the U.S. government. The incursion only lasted three days.
- **June 1875:** General Ord ordered an unknown number of U.S. troops to cross the border to pursue “raiders” and shortly afterward ordered the *USS Plymouth* and *USS Rio Bravo* to patrol the Rio Grande.
- **November 1875:** Captain Randlett and his men pursued cattle thieves to the Rio Grande and engaged in a small skirmish at the river’s edge. Captain McNally of the Texas Rangers continued the pursuit (unsuccessfully) into Mexico and was ultimately surrounded by Mexican government forces. 40 U.S. troops crossed the border to support McNally when they heard the situation, but these men were quickly ordered to return.

- **April-July 1876 (multiple crossings):** At the alleged request of the Mexican government, Lt. Bullis and Col. Shafter crossed to track Lipan Native Americans into Coahuila. In the last incursion, U.S. troops fought the Native Americans near Saragossa and “recovered” nearly 100 horses. Three U.S. troops were killed in the battle.
- **January 1877:** Lt. Bullis and Col. Shafter, along with more than 200 U.S. troops, advanced over 125 miles into Mexican territory in pursuit of Native Americans.
- **September 1877:** An estimated 500 U.S. troops briefly crossed into Mexico to pursue Lipan Indians near Piedras Negras.
- **October and November 1877:** Lt. Bullis crossed the Rio Grande on October 28th in pursuit of Apache Native Americans who had stolen horses. He returned to Texas when he realized he was outnumbered but re-crossed on November 10th with reinforcements.
- **June 1878:** General MacKenzie, with a large force of 1,000 men, crossed near Newton, Texas. They were met in Mexico by the Mexican Army that attempted to obstruct their invasion, and the two militaries narrowly avoided a conflict. The U.S. troops took possession of 60 cattle and destroyed a small amount of property in the State of Coahuila before returning to Texas.
- **April 1881:** Lt. Bullis chased Lipan Indians over the border towards the Burro Mountains with 27 men. The U.S. troops killed or captured all of the Native Americans and “recovered” stolen animals.

Furthermore, in June of 1877, General Ord was instructed by the Hayes administration to cross the border at his discretion in pursuit of bandits. Naturally, the Mexican government protested vigorously against this policy, but the order was not withdrawn until March of 1880.

SOURCES:

"A MEXICAN OUTRAGE.: A COMPANY OF TEXAS TROOPS CROSS THE RIO GRANDE IN PURSUIT OF CATTLE THIEVES THE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES TREAT THEM AS OUTLAWS AND FILIBUSTERS. MOVEMENTS OF UNITED STATES TROOPS. A MURDER AT ALLENTOWN. A SHIP'S CREW SICK WITH YELLOW FEVER. BEATEN AND ROBBED. THE THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLAR RACE." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Nov 21, 1875. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/mexican-outrage/docview/93453691/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Callahan, James Morton. *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations*. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

Carter, Robert Goldthwaite. *On the Border With Mackenzie: Or, Winning West Texas From the Comanches*. New York, NY: Antiquarian Press, 1961.

From the San Antonio (Texas) Herald, Aug. 12. "THE MEXICAN BORDER.: GEN. ORD CO-OPERATING WITH THE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IN SUPPRESSING MARAUDING GOOD RESULTS ATTAINED." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Aug 20, 1876.

<https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/mexican-border/docview/93520092/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"GEN. MACKENZIE'S RAID.: RETURN OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS AN ENCOUNTER WITH MEXICANS." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Jun 24, 1878.

<https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/gen-mackenzies-raid/docview/93748635/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"NEWS of the WEEK." *Prairie Farmer (1843-1877)*, Nov 27, 1875, 384,

<https://www.proquest.com/magazines/news-week/docview/127554334/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1874, Mexico, 1874, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), Documents 452-497.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/comp22>

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875, Mexico, 1875, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), Documents 98-163.

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Special Despatch to The Boston Globe. "THE BORDER BRIGANDS.: THE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED TO STOP THE MEXICAN RAIDS. HISTORY OF CORTINA AND HIS HAUNTS. THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES--DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTRUCTIONS. CORTINA'S HISTORY--THE BARDER REFUGE, VIGOROUS MEASURES TO BE USED TO STOP THE RAIDS--THE FLEET. THE DUTY OF THE NAVAL OFFICERS--A COMBINED EFFORT." *Boston Daily Globe (1872-1922)*, Jun 26, 1875. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/border-brigands/docview/491969840/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Special Despatch to The Boston Globe. "THE TROOPS IN MEXICO.: COLONEL SHAFTER'S OFFICIAL REPORT OF HIS MOVEMENTS--THE MEXICAN FORCES ORDERED NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OUR SOLDIERS." *Boston Daily Globe (1872-1922)*, Oct 04, 1877. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/troops-mexico/docview/492175152/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Special Dispatch to the New-York Times. "THE MEXICAN BORDER RAIDS.: GEN. MACKENZIE'S EXPEDITION INTO MEXICO." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Jun 14, 1878. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/mexican-border-raids/docview/93638437/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"TEE MEXICAN FRONTIER RAIDERS.: GEN. ORD'S EXPLANATION OF THE CROSSING OF THE RIO GRANDE BY LIEUT. BULLIS AND COL. SHAFER--RETURN OF THE TROOPS TO THE AMERICAN SIDE WITHOUT CATCHING INDIANS." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Oct 03, 1877. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/tee-mexican-frontier-raiders/docview/93583852/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"THE RIO GRANDE GUN-BOAT." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Aug 12, 1875. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/rio-grande-gun-boat/docview/93451635/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"TROOPS CROSSING INTO MEXICO." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, May 29, 1881. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/troops-crossing-into-mexico/docview/93869128/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Wallace, Edward S. "General John Lapham Bullis: Thunderbolt of the Texas Frontier, II." *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (1951): 77-85. Accessed February 28, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30241885>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Acquire or Defend Territory; Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 100; Mexican: 10

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 100; Mexican: 100

COSTS: The cost of these interventions was spread out over more than a decade. Well over one thousand troops crossed the U.S.-Mexico during this time period, if not more. There were also two ships that patrolled the Rio Grande for an unknown amount of time.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The number of deaths for all categories are orders of magnitude estimations. The vast majority of the deaths resulting from these interventions were Native American deaths, which are not tallied in this write-up. This case includes two MID cases that were coded separately: 1545 and 1547.

1874 Hawaii

NAME: Honolulu Courthouse Intervention

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 12 – 20, 1874

TARGET STATE(S): Hawaii

SUMMARY:

On February 3, 1874, William Charles Lunalilo, King of Hawaii, died of pulmonary tuberculosis without naming a successor. On February 12, the Hawaiian legislature voted 39-6 to elect David Kalākaua (favored by some native Hawaiians and the Americans) over anti-American Queen Emma (favored by other Hawaiians and the British). In response to the vote, Queen Emma's supporters attacked the Honolulu courthouse where the vote was undertaken, targeting legislators who voted for Kalākaua and who had a *kanaka* ethnic identity. A quarter of the legislature were injured. Legislator J. W. Lonoaea died from injuries from the attack a month later.

That day, on the request of the new King Kalākaua and King Lunalilo's ministers, the U.S. landed 150 troops from two U.S. warships, sloop *Portsmouth* and screw sloop *Tuscarora*. Great Britain also landed HMS *Tenedos*. U.S. troops occupied the courthouse, posted sentries at other public buildings, and quelled the riot. 37 of the 150 troops were marines. Over 50 Hawaiians were fined or jailed, no more disturbances followed, and the new king was inaugurated. On February 16, U.S. troops left, except for 19 marines and 14 sailors, who stayed until February 20.

Though Kalākaua was elected in his own right, this event contributed to the complicated relationship between the U.S. and Hawaii. This relationship was increasingly challenged by a growing contract labor population from China and Japan, a declining local Hawaiian population, and a sharp growth in commercial and political power of the white American minority.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, esp. p. 92.

Goodspeed, M. Hill. 2003. *U. S. Navy: A Complete History*. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Foundation, esp. p. 252.

Morgan, William Michael. 2011. *Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese Rivalry Over the Annexation*

of Hawai'i, 1885-1898. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, esp. p. 51.

Osorio, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole. 2002. *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, esp. pp. 147-159.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Social Protection;

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 1 (one Hawaiian legislator died in March 1874 from injuries sustained in the February courthouse attack)

Per capita battle deaths: 1 for Hawaiian population (53,900 in 1876)

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

Per capita total deaths: 1 for Hawaiian population (53,900 in 1876)

COSTS: No additional costs noted outside the cost of a brief 9-day deployment from warships already stationed in Hawaii.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1874 Mexico

NAME: The *USS Saranac* incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 23, 1874–October 18, 1874; March 23, 1875–April 1, 1875

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

Twice within a short period of time, the *USS Saranac* was ordered to Mexican port cities in response to unrest that threatened U.S. lives and businesses. The Benito Juarez government, while friendly to the United States, had limited control outside the central areas of Mexico, and U.S. citizens and diplomats still relied on the U.S. government to guarantee their security in certain areas of Mexico.

The first incident took place near La Paz in Baja California. The local governor was deeply unpopular among the people, and in early September 1874, a brief uprising took place against the local government. At the insistence of U.S.-owned Triunfo Mining Company, based just outside the city, the U.S. consul in La Paz requested a U.S. ship to provide security. The *USS Saranac* arrived in La Paz on September 23rd and stayed at least until mid-October.

The second intervention by the *USS Saranac* occurred on March 13th, 1875, and lasted until at least early April. Captain W. W. Queen was ordered to Acapulco to investigate a massacre of Protestant worshipers in which one American was killed and another wounded. The massacre took place on January 25th when a mob of local townspeople, allegedly whipped up by the local Catholic priest, stormed the Protestant church with the worshippers inside. In total, five people were killed and 11 wounded, and the U.S. reverend fled for safety to San Francisco. In his request for the *USS Saranac*, the U.S. consul in Acapulco also mentioned several U.S. businesses in Acapulco that he feared could be damaged if the local uprising became more generally targeted at foreigners. This church was one of roughly a dozen known protestant churches in Mexico at the time that were targets of harassment and violence. This violence was likely, at least in part, political in nature given the main political division at the time between the Church-aligned conservative party and the opposition liberals.

SOURCES:

"LOWER CALIFORNIA.: THE RECENT CIVIL WAR MIDNIGHT ATTACKS ON OFFICIALS, AND ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS TOWNS CAPTURED." *New York*

Times (1857-1922), Nov 11, 1874. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/lower-california/docview/93350129/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1874, Mexico, 1874, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), Documents 452-497.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1874/comp22>

"THE ACAPULCO MASSACRE.: REPORT OF CAPT. QUEEN, OF THE SARANAC, ON THE ATTACK ON A PROTESTANT CONGREGATION BY CATHOLIC ASSASSINS." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Apr 17, 1875. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/acapulco-massacre/docview/93447180/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"THE EL TRIUNFO MINE AFFAIR." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Oct 13, 1874. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/el-triunfo-mine-affair/docview/93387712/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"THE MASSACRE OF PROTESTANTS.: AT ACAPULCO, MEXICO." *New York Observer and Chronicle (1833-1912)*, Apr 22, 1875, 126, <https://www.proquest.com/magazines/massacre-protestants/docview/136664303/se-2?accountid=14434>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 1; Mexican: 1

COSTS: The *USS Saranac* sailed to two different ports in separate instances. It stayed for several weeks in La Paz and at least one week in Acapulco.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: These interventions do not occur in either CRS or MID/Gibler. The 1875 case in the MID database (1545) references a different intervention.

1876 Mexico

NAME: Evacuation of Matamoros

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1544

DATES: May 18, 1876 – May 25, 1876

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

General José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz Mori launched his first rebellion against the Mexican state in 1872 when he lost the presidential election to the incumbent Benito Juárez. Porfirio Díaz had previously fought for Juárez when the French invaded in the 1860s, but by 1872 Juárez had become his political rival. Federal forces quickly crushed the 1872 rebellion. In January of 1876, after another possibly rigged election, Porfirio Díaz again took up arms against the Juárez government. By March that year, Porfirio Díaz and his forces captured the town of Matamoros on the border with the U.S.—a strategic victory that gave him access to supplies and weapons procured in the United States.

In early May of 1876, Mexican government forces led by General Escolido were making their way towards Matamoros to dislodge the rebels. Contemporary newspapers reported on May 15th that General Escolido was 100 miles from Matamoros with 2000 men and expecting another 2000 reinforcements in the next several days. The rebels led by General Gonzalez decided to abandon Matamoros on May 18th. That same day, the U.S. consul in Matamoros requested U.S. troops to keep the peace until Mexican federal troops arrived. A small force of marines from the nearby *USS Lackawanna* entered the city for at least several days until General Escolido and his men arrived.

By November of 1876, Porfirio Díaz and his men ultimately defeated the government forces and took power in Mexico. Despite this fact, Matamoros would not come back under Porfirio Díaz's control until early 1877. It would take until April 1878 for the U.S. to officially recognize Porfirio Díaz's government, but he would remain in power until the Mexican Revolution in 1911.

SOURCES:

Callahan, James Morton. *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations*. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

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<https://www.proquest.com/magazines/news-week/docview/127550359/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Offutt Milton. *Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States*.
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1928.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876, Mexico, 1876,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), Documents 204-222.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1876/comp19>

"THE REVOLUTIONISTS MOVING OUT OF MATAMOROS." 1876.*New York Times (1857-1922)*, May 19, 1. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/revolutionists-moving-out-matamoros/docview/93551166/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"THE TROUBLES IN MEXICO.: AN ATTACK ON MATAMOROS EXPECTED PROTECTION TO AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS." 1876.*New York Times (1857-1922)*, May 15, 1. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/troubles-mexico/docview/93568777/se-2?accountid=14434>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

COSTS: A small force of marines (exact number unknown) occupied Matamoros for roughly a week.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset.

1882 Egypt

NAME: Alexandra intervention

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 14, 1882 - July 18, 1882

TARGET STATE(S): Egypt (EGY), 651

SUMMARY:

A series of Egyptian rulers in the mid-19th century ran up ill-advised debts to European creditors in order to modernize the economy. By 1881 this debt was so mismanaged, and economic reforms so unsuccessful, that servicing the debt cost about 60% of government revenue. In response to this and other developments, a coterie of nationalist Army officers led by Colonel Ahmad Urabi ascended into government in 1882 on a vaguely defined program to assert control over Egyptian finances (the country being, at this point, technically a province of the Ottoman Empire). These developments alarmed Britain and France, and British naval ships bombarded the city of Alexandria in June 1882 in response to anti-foreign riots. Law and order rapidly broke down in the city, at the time one of the most important economic and maritime hubs of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The United States intervened to protect American economic and diplomatic interests as well as to protect American civilians and their material property. Three U.S. naval ships, dispatched to the area with orders to intervene if deemed necessary, landed troops (73 Marines and 57 sailors) in the city of Alexandria for four days during the month of July. Their objectives were to restore order, put out fires threatening to demolish the city, and to protect the American consulate. Britain followed suit shortly thereafter by landing 4,000 troops in the city as well.

As a result, conditions improved so quickly that American commanders decided to withdraw their forces after only four days. In a larger sense the result of the war of 1882 was to incorporate Egypt into the British Empire, in the orbit of which it remained effective until the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in the 1950s and radically redefined this relationship.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of three U.S. Ships and ~120 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1885 Panama

NAME: Rebel Takeover of Colón and Panama City

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 18, 1885 – May 25, 1885

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia COL 100

SUMMARY:

As part of an 1846 treaty with the Republic of New Granada (the predecessor state to Colombia), the U.S. was granted the right to ensure safe transit across Panama, then a province of New Granada, while guaranteeing the sovereignty of New Granada. Over the following decades, the 1846 treaty enabled U.S. interventions to protect the Panama railroad (and U.S. life and property) during moments of disorder and rebellion on the isthmus.

The 1884 re-election of Rafael Núñez, who sought to centralize control as President of Colombia, led to large-scale rebellion in Colombia. Colombian troops previously stationed in Panama returned to quell those rebellions, leaving only a token force in Panama at Aspinwall (now Colón). In this tense atmosphere, a U.S. Marine guard landed in Colón to protect the railroad on January 18, 1885, leaving the next day.

With Colombian troops now only in Colón, an insurgent force in Panama City led by Rafael Aizpuru took control of Panama City. In response, Colombian troops were moved from Colón to force out Aizpuru. But that left Colón vulnerable to another rebel leader (unconnected to Aizpuru), Pedro Prestan, who then seized power in Colón. In mid-March, dozens of U.S. marines landed in Colón as a response to this general state of affairs. On March 29, desiring arms aboard a U.S. steamer, Prestan held hostage the U.S. consul, U.S. naval officers, and agents of the railroad and Pacific Mail. The commanding U.S. officer, Theodore Kane, secured the release of several hostages and landed 145 men at Colón on March 30. That day, Colombian troops returned from Panama City, and defeated Prestan, who set fire to the entire city, displacing 8,000 people and leading to 18 deaths. More U.S. ships arrived at Colón in early April, landing an additional 750-1000 marines and sailors, who then moved to Panama City, where Aizpuru had retaken control in the absence of Colombian troops. By the end of April, Colombian troops joined U.S. reinforcements and Aizpuru surrendered in a U.S.-mediated meeting.

At the time, this incident represented the largest landing of U.S. troops to date. Though the U.S. was acting in accordance with treaty law, interventions like this – some invited, some not – reinforced its image as an imperialist crusader among many observers in the region.

SOURCES:

Cooney, David M. 1965. *A Chronology of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1965*. New York, NY: Franklin Watts, Inc., esp. pp. 175-176.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, esp. p. 93.

Sweetman, Jack. 2002. *American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, esp. pp. 90-91.

Weeks, Daniel H. 1980. "Dress Rehearsal: United States Intervention on the Isthmus of Panama, 1885." *Pacific Historical Review*. November, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 581-605.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 18 (non-US deaths; unclear whether civilian, rebel, or Colombian)

TOTAL DEATHS: 18 (non-US deaths; unclear whether civilian, rebel, or Colombian)

COSTS: None apart from the landings and deployment of vessels and troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This incident features in the CRS report but is not included in the MID dataset. Additionally, sources are inconsistent and/or vague on the precise number of troops landed, the arrival dates of U.S. vessels, the landing dates of troops, the date of the March 30 incident itself (some say it was on March 31), the extent to which U.S. troops participated in combat against rebels.

1888 Germany

NAME: The Samoan Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 191

DATES: December 18, 1888 - March 16, 1889

TARGET STATE(S): German Empire 255

SUMMARY:

With the transition from sail-powered to steam-powered ships, states needed coaling stations in the Pacific in order to make it across the ocean and the Samoan Islands became a key interest for Naval powers. Germany supported Tamasese for King of Samoa in the ongoing Samoan Civil War, threatening American military and local property interests through seizing property and imposing martial law, despite previously agreed-upon neutrality on the Islands. The United Kingdom also had interests in the area and, with the Germans, jointly proposed to the Americans a form of government to implement in Samoa, rejecting a previous American proposal for a separation of powers system. The Americans rejected this counter-proposal, leading to the naval standoff.

Refusing to concede to German proposals, the U.S. sent Rear Admiral Lewis Ashfield Kimberly and three warships to join three German warships led by Captain Fritze in the Apia Bay. The six ships, the *USS Vandalia*, the *USS Trenton*, the *USS Nipsic*, *SMS Adler*, *SMS Olga*, and *SMS Eber* were also joined by the British *HMS Calliope*, captained by Henry Coey Kane, who monitored the situation. Captain Kane noted that the Bay was not big enough for so many ships to be anchored safely. The standoff lasted until March 15/16, 1889, when a cyclone made its way through the Islands, wrecking all of the warships, except for the *Calliope*, which escaped and then returned after the storm to help. Only the *Olga* and *Nipsic* were able to be redeployed in the aftermath. The civil war continued, but the immediate threat of a clash between the Germans and Americans ended. By the end of the year, the parties agreed to the Tripartite Convention, establishing a dual-protectorate, with German control over the western islands and American control over the eastern islands.

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OBJECTIVE:

Remove Foreign Regime; Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate (all ships destroyed by hurricane)

BATTLE DEATHS: US:

- 51-60 deaths

Germany:

- 86-150 deaths

TOTAL DEATHS: US:

- 51-60 deaths

Germany:

- 86-150 deaths

COSTS: Steamer shipwrecks on both sides on top of casualties

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in both MIS/Gibler 2018 (dispute number 191) and the CRS report

1888 Haiti

NAME: Haitian Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1530 and 1599

DATES: August 18, 1888 – September 20, 1889

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

Starting in the fall of 1888, Haiti experienced a prolonged period of acute political instability. This was caused by competing claims to the presidency following the ouster of President Lysius Salomon in August of 1888. In response to that instability, on August 18, 1888, the flagship of the U.S. North Atlantic Squadron, the *Galena*, commanded by Stephen B. Luce, was ordered to protect American interests in Haiti. It stayed for a month, and then returned to New York. The unfolding political events continued to attract significant U.S. diplomatic and naval attention.

Later in 1888, one claimant of the Haitian presidency, General Francois Legitime, assumed control of the government and blockaded the waters around Haiti's north and west, where his challenger's supporters were based. The American steamship *Haytian Republic* was captured leaving the western port of St. Marc on October 21st, having apparently ignored or misinterpreted the Haitian ship *Dessalines*'s warnings to stop. The *Dessalines* seized the *Haytian Republic* and transported it into Port-au-Prince, the capital city.

On November 7, 1888 Rear Admiral Stephen Luce was ordered back to Port-au-Prince with two ships, the *Galena* and the *Yantic*, which carried 45 Marines and one officer. These ships sailed on December 12th, and arrived in Port-au-Prince on December 20th. The American Minister in Haiti, John E.W. Thompson, negotiated the ship's release, aided by Luce's display of force. The Haitian government released the *Haytian Republic*, and agreed to pay an indemnity for its seizure. The *Haytian Republic* was eventually towed back to the U.S. by the *Ossipee*.

Over the course of the next year, a combination of U.S. warships rotated in and out of Haiti to continue to monitor political events, report back to Washington, and as a precautionary measure in case U.S. interests were harmed. Ships tended not to stay for long durations, given the risk of yellow fever in the region (it was unknown at the time that yellow fever was transmitted by mosquitoes). Indeed, because of a yellow fever outbreak, the *Yantic* left Haiti on January 5, 1889. The *Galena* spent another two weeks before returning to the U.S. The *Galena* then came back to Haiti from February 17, 1889 until May 29, 1889. It was relieved by the *Ossipee*, which stayed for the duration of the summer (June 2 until August 29), and was joined by the *Kearsarge* from July 3 until September 19. The *Galena* arrived on September 4, 1889 and stayed in Port-au-Prince until September 20, 1889, when it was called to investigate a labor riot and the killing of a few Americans on the nearby "guano island" of Navissa.

By the time the *Galena* left for Navassa, the political situation had stabilized significantly in Haiti. Legitime had fled on a French vessel, leaving Florvil Hyppolite, his rival, title to the presidency. Hyppolite won a popular election on October 9, 1889.

Following Hyppolite's election, the U.S. sent its new minister to Haiti, Frederick Douglass, to Port-au-Prince. Douglass was transported on the *Kearsarge*, which returned to Haiti several weeks later with the *Galena* and Rear Admiral Barncroft Gherardi (who commanded the North Atlantic Squadron). Douglass and Gherardi were tasked to secure a naval station at Môle St. Nicholas, which was soon visited by a third U.S. warship, the *Dolphin*. The presence of warships were likely a means to intimidate, though they were officially there on diplomatic orders to negotiate a lease. That negotiation was unsuccessful.

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<<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85058130/1889-12-04/ed-1/seq-1/>>.

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Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*.
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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of sending four ships for a total of six visits to Port-au-Prince

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The MIDs dataset has two separate disputes relating to Haiti in 1888 and 1889. The first (1530) concerns the *Haytian Republic* seizure. While this was an acute dispute, it took place in a broader set of force deployments to Haiti in response to political instability. Legitime’s blockade was a consequence of those political events.

The second MID dispute (1599) is listed as having taken place between September 20, 1889 and September 30, 1889. It details the deployment of warships to pressure the Haitian government to relent on leasing a naval station to the United States. Oddly, this order does not appear in any naval history consulted, nor in the CRS report, nor in journal and book-length studies of Haitian-U.S. relations, PhD dissertations, nor in newspapers. Based on newspaper articles (which reported naval movements), September 20, 1889 to September 30, 1889 was one of the few weeks of the year that witnessed no U.S. warships (as the *Kearsarge* and *Ossipee* were back in the U.S., and the *Galena* had been sent to Navissa).

The United States did send an excessive number of warships for the political negotiation Douglass and Gherardi undertook after Hyppolite assumed the presidency. We have not included it in our dataset. While it was subtle intimidation, it was part of an official diplomatic negotiation and had some legitimate claim to be there given the ongoing Douglass and Gherardi mission.

1888 Korea

NAME: 'Baby Riots' Korea Intervention, 1888

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 19-30, 1888

TARGET STATE(S): Korea, 730

SUMMARY: Korean suspicion of foreigners was commonplace after being forcibly opened for trade and diplomacy with the outside world. Following the clash between US and Korean forces in 1871, some anti-foreign feelings were exacerbated. Protestant missionaries came to Korea in 1884, increasing the foreign population of Korea significantly. Though the Interdict of 1888 forbade the teaching of Christianity, most missionaries were focused on education efforts and medical care.

In June 1888, rumors were started that foreigners were purchasing Korean children to eat or use their body parts. The proliferation of the rumors, led to harassment and threats against foreigners, culminating in the June 10-25 "Baby Riots." Though no foreigners were harmed, in a mob effort to track down the dealers of children, an innocent Korean man was lynched while walking home with his own baby. Per the request of the American minister, Hugh Dinsmore, 12 marines and 13 sailors, under joint marine/navy command were deployed ashore to protect the consulate and American citizens residing in Seoul on June 19, 1888.

The Korean government cracked down on the rumors, partly to rid the city of the American soldiers, and the unrest died down quickly. Accordingly, the feared boiling over in Seoul never took place, and the soldiers returned to their ship, moored at Chemulpo, on June 30 without incident.

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Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Congressional Research Service, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 12 marines and 13 sailors for 11 days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1888 Samoa

NAME: Samoa protective mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 14, 1888 – March 20, 1889

TARGET STATE(S): Samoa (WSM), 990

SUMMARY: U.S. forces had intervened in Samoa in 1841 to enforce a set of diplomatic and trade regulations between the two countries, and U.S. commercial interests had operated in the area peacefully ever since. However, in September, 1888 a revolt broke out against the local government. Foreign governments feared for the life and property of their subjects and for their consulates and diplomats.

In response, the U.S. naval ship *Nipsic* landed a rather sizable contingent of Marines to protect U.S. interests, citizens, and its consulate. After about four months the commander judged that the dangers had resided and withdrew his ship and forces.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

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OBJECTIVE:

Maintain Empire; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of one ship and around 100 U.S. troops. The ships and sailors were deployed as part of a mission, authorized by Congress, to explore and survey; the intervention thus carried no costs other than those already authorized for these purposes.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1889 Hawaii

NAME: Marine landing during 1889 coup attempt

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 30, 1889 – July 31, 1889

TARGET STATE(S): Hawaii

SUMMARY:

In 1887, members of the non-indigenous white minority organized an insurrectionist group called the Hawaiian League. The Hawaiian League, through its militia called the Honolulu Rifles, forced Hawaiian monarch, King Kalākaua, to accept a new Hawaiian constitution, called “the Bayonet Constitution.” The Bayonet Constitution empowered wealthy, landholding elite and diluted the political influence of native Hawaiians and the monarchy. As a consequence, over the next several years, Hawaiian entered a period of acute political fragmentation between the King’s loyalists, the empowered white minority, and other native Hawaiian’s hoping to restore the monarchy’s integrity through the King’s sister and heir, Lili`uokalani.

In mid-July 1889, Hawaiian revolutionary Robert Wilcox and 100 others attempted a unsuccessful coup to depose the King and install Lili`uokalani (his heir). They occupied the Government Building and palace grounds, but were surrounded and trapped by government troops, who killed 6 insurgents.

The gunboat U.S.S. *Adams* was in the Honolulu harbor at the time. In consultation with the American Minister to Hawaii, Commander Edwin T. Woodward ordered marines to land at 10:30am on July 30th to guard American citizens and “as a precautionary measure in the event any assistance to preserve order might be required.” The Hawaiian government did not invite American troops, nor did American troops take part in the fighting. They left the island the following day.

Nothing came of the U.S. landing in the short-term. It likely strengthened the perception of a delicate political balance on the island.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, esp. pp. 92-93.

Goodspeed, M. Hill. 2003. *U. S. Navy: A Complete History*. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Foundation, esp. p. 261.

Morgan, William Michael. 2011. *Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese Rivalry Over the Annexation of Hawai'i, 1885-1898*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, esp. pp. 56-58.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0 (6 Hawaiians died, but this preceded U.S. involvement).

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: No additional costs noted outside the cost of a brief 2-day deployment from a gunboat already stationed in Hawaii.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1890 Argentina

NAME: Buenos Aires Protective Mission 1890

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 3, 1890-July 30, 1890

TARGET STATE(S): Argentina, ARG 160

SUMMARY:

The late 19th century was a tumultuous time in Argentine politics, marked by short-lived governments, attempted revolutions and multiple economic crises. Argentina's economy grew robustly during the early years of the "Long Depression" that lasted from 1873-1896 and significantly slowed economic growth across the world. Argentina's raw materials such as beef and silver made Buenos Aires a significant export hub, and massive immigration from Spain and Italy increased the country's productive capacity. However, the immigrants also brought "Old World" ideologies like communism and anarchism, and the first labor union was formed among the bakers of Buenos Aires in 1886.¹

The good times could not last forever, and inflation became a particularly serious problem as the Argentine government printed additional currency to cover their debts.² The economic woes coincided with increased union activism, and rail workers, bakers, and metalworkers all went on strike in 1888.³ The combination of increased left-wing radicalism, economic hardship and a unpopular conservative government created serious instability. American Marines landed in Buenos Aires on June 3, 1890 from the schooner *USS Tallapoosa*.⁴ The Marines were present "for the protection of the American Consulate and the residence of the Minister, John R.G Pitkin."⁵

The Marines returned to the *Tallapoosa* almost two months later, on July 30, 1890. Ironically, the "Revolution of the Park" occurred just days before the Marines departed, on July 26, 1890.

¹King, Elizabeth. "How Argentina's Baked Goods Reveal Its Political Past." Atlas Obscura. November 14, 2017. Accessed January 04, 2019. <https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/argentina-pastries-political>.

²Mitchener, Kris James, and Marc Weidenmier. "The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 1890s." *National Bureau of Economic Research*, September 2007. Accessed January 4, 2019. doi:10.3386/w13403.

³"Revolutionary Unionism in Latin America - the FORA in Argentina." Libcom.org. March 29, 2007. Accessed January 04, 2019. <https://libcom.org/library/revolutionary-unionism-latin-america-fora-argentina>.

⁴United States of America. House of Representatives. *Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fifty-First Congress*. 129.

⁵Ellsworth, Captain Harry Allanson. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines: 1800-1934*. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

The left-wing Civic Union took over the Buenos Aires Artillery Park and sought to unseat the conservative government of President Juárez Celman. The revolutionaries were seriously outgunned and outmanned by the Argentine military, and the attempted coup was defeated within days. However, the government's public image was grievously wounded by the uprising, and President Celman resigned on August 6, 1890. The Baring Crisis, or Panic of 1890, would begin in November of the same year as the contagion effect of the Argentine debt crisis nearly bankrupted the Barings Bank in London.⁶

OBJECTIVE:

Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Marines landed in Buenos Aires to protect the American embassy and delegation during a period of social unrest in Argentina

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies; Marines depart after almost two months ashore and no combat recorded. Violence, instability and near financial collapse would follow for Argentina after the Marines' departure, however, no obvious harm came to any Americans or American property during that time.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Dispatch of a U.S.S. schooner and "a small number" of U.S. Marines.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: N/A

⁶ Mitchener, Kris James, and Marc Weidenmier. "The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 1890s." *National Bureau of Economic Research*, September 2007. Accessed January 4, 2019. doi:10.3386/w13403

1891 Chile

NAME: Chilean Civil War/Baltimore Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1512

DATES: January 30, 1891 – January 26, 1892

TARGET STATE(S): Chile (CHL), 155

SUMMARY:

In January 1891, civil war broke out in Chile as a consequence of growing tensions between President José Manuel Balmaceda and the Chilean congress. To protect U.S. property and interests amidst the instability, on January 31, the United States sent two ships to Chile, the *Pensacola* (previously stationed at Montevideo, Uruguay), and the *Baltimore* (in Toulon, France). The *Pensacola* arrived on February 20. The *San Francisco* joined in early May.

Around the time of the *San Francisco*'s arrival in Chile, Chilean rebels had deployed an agent to the U.S to buy arms and return to Chile. A U.S. Marshal boarded the Chilean ship *Itata* in California to prevent this transfer, and was kidnapped by the ship's captain and taken to Chile with the arms. The U.S. cruiser *Charleston* pursued the *Itata* to Chile. In fear of violent retribution from the U.S., the Congressionalists returned the arms (and the U.S. Marshal) to the United States upon the *Itata*'s arrival.

In August 1891, the Congressionalists landed near Valparaiso to capture the city. U.S. Minister to Chile Patrick Egan requested for a guard to protect the U.S. legation in Valparaiso. 36 marines and 36 sailors from the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* landed on August 28 until August 30.

At this time, Chilean antagonism toward the U.S. was growing. For at least a decade, Chileans had perceived the U.S. as inappropriately interfering in Chile's sphere of influence. During the civil war itself, rebels additionally suspected the U.S. of sympathizing with Balmaceda. On October 16, a detachment of men from the *Baltimore* was granted a "liberty call" in Valparaiso, now under rebel control. A number went to the True Blue Saloon, and a fight broke out with Chilean rebels. Outside the True Blue Saloon, one U.S. sailor was killed by a Chilean mob and Chilean police. Other fights broke out elsewhere in the city. Over the course of the evening, another U.S. sailor died, and thirty other U.S. servicemen were jailed and beaten.

The U.S. and Chile both independently launched inquiries, each which contradicted the other about the causes and significance of the fight. U.S. President Benjamin Harrison was outraged by Chile's slow investigation and by the comments of the Chilean foreign minister trivializing the incident (and demanding Harrison replace U.S. Minister Egan). In response, Harrison issued an

ultimatum to Chile: repudiate the foreign minister's statement, issue an apology, and offer reparations to the families of the dead sailors, otherwise the U.S. would break diplomatic relations. When Chile had not responded after several days, Harrison informed Congress on January 25, 1892 in what is widely perceived to have been a threat of war. He asked Congress "for such action as may be deemed appropriate."

Within one day, the new Chilean Foreign Minister Luis Pereira had sent a note to the U.S. Secretary of State James Blaine repudiating the previous foreign minister's comments, apologizing, and agreeing to reparations. Ultimately Chile paid \$75,000 to the families of the slain sailors. This agreement resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars more in reparations for property damage. Having nearly gone to war, the incident soured U.S.-Chilean relations for decades.

SOURCES:

"A Swift Cruiser: The San Francisco Arrives at Payta En Route to Chile." 28 April 1891. *The Morning News* (Savannah, Ga.). P. 1. *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Library of Congress. Available: <<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86063034/1891-04-28/ed-1/seq-1/>>.

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Harrison, Benjamin. 28 January 1892. "Message Regarding US-Chilean Affairs." Accessed via *University of Virginia Miller Center*. Available: <<https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-28-1892-message-regarding-us-chilean-affairs>>.

"Navy Department Criticised." 6 February 1891. *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer*. P. 1. *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Library of Congress. Available: <<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045604/1891-02-06/ed-1/seq-1/>>.

"Our Representatives in Chile." 25 February 1891. *Richmond Dispatch*. P. 3. *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Library of Congress. Available: <<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038614/1891-02-25/ed-1/seq-3/>>

Sater, William F. 1990. *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Sater, William F. 1999. "Chile: Clash of Global Visions II" in Thomas M. Leonard, ed. *United States-Latin American Relations, 1850-1903: Establishing a Relationship*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, pp. 169-198.

"War Vessels for Chile." 5 February 1891. *The Morning News* (Savannah, Ga.). P. 1. *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Library of Congress. Available: <<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86063034/1891-02-05/ed-1/seq-1/>>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 2 U.S. sailors

TOTAL DEATHS: 2 U.S. sailors

COSTS: Deployment of ships, landing parties, and the Naval Board of Inquiry investigation into the Baltimore Affair

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

There are many definitional issues. The CRS report does not have this case anywhere in its list. The MID database has this event beginning in December 1891 (presumably because of the first demand of President Harrison of the Chilean government). Neither, thus, incorporate the October 1891 murder of 2 U.S. sailors in the Baltimore Affair, the kidnapping of a U.S. Marshal in the *Itata* incident in May 1891, nor the January order of the *Pensacola* and *Baltimore* to Chile. (The qualitative writeup of the MID dispute does describe the Baltimore Affair, though it – and the dataset – nevertheless have the dispute starting in December 1891).

The best summaries and analysis come from the very few articles and books on the subject and broader U.S.-Chilean relations. Though even those historical works miss the precise timeline of force deployment (i.e. in January and again in May), which was only found in newspaper articles that would regularly track the U.S. navy's movements.

The MID dispute writeup claims there was an official break of diplomatic relations, but there was not; Harrison merely threatened it. The MID dispute writeup claims that the U.S. supported Balmaceda, but it was only perceived to have done so. The U.S. Embassy actually provided safe haven to Congressionalists escaping harm before they eventually took the capital. Afterward, the

embassy provided safe haven to Balmaceda loyalists escaping harm, thus strengthening the perception of sympathy, despite the embassy's earlier favor to the rebels.

Sater (1999) mistakenly writes that there were 3 U.S. deaths, but his earlier work (1990) and all other sources list that there were 2.

Lastly, a few histories of the navy have this crisis ending on January 27, 1892, but the Chilean Foreign Minister's apology was received by the U.S. state department on January 26, 1892. The MID dataset has the dispute ending on January 25, 1892.

1891 Haiti

NAME: Attempt to Lease Môle St. Nicolas

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1529

DATES: January 26, 1891 – April 22, 1891

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

Môle St. Nicolas is a town in northwestern Haiti, along the strategically valuable Windward Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola. By January 26th, 1891, Rear-Admiral Bancroft Gherardi had arrived in Port-au-Prince aboard the *Philadelphia*, with instructions to acquire Môle St. Nicolas as a naval station for the United States.

At the time, Frederick Douglass was the American Minister in Haiti. On January 28th, Douglass joined Admiral Gherardi and Haitian President Florvil Hyppolite in a meeting to persuade the latter to lease Môle St. Nicolas to the United States.

In early February, after Gherardi submitted an application for the lease, the USS *Petrel*, *Philadelphia*, and *Kearsarge* conducted a demonstration in the waters near Haiti. This caused discomfort in Haiti, and may have been interpreted as a show of force. The negotiations dragged, and the Haitian government resisted leasing the station to the US. In mid-April, five US ships appeared at Port-au-Prince, and the Haitian government reacted by ending negotiations and refusing to lease Môle St. Nicolas to the US. Ultimately, the US yielded to the Haitian government on the matter.

SOURCES:

Douglass, Frederick. 1891. "Haiti and the United States: Inside History of the Negotiations for the Môle St. Nicolas." *The North American Review* 153(418): 337-345.

Polnye, Millery. 2006. "Expansion Now!: Haiti, 'Santo Domingo,' and Frederick Douglass at the Intersection of US and Caribbean Pan-Americanism." *Caribbean Studies* 34(2): 3-45.

Sears, Louis Martin. 1941. "Frederick Douglass and the Mission to Haiti, 1889-1891." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 21(2): 222-238.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Yield by US

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of deploying 6 ships to waters near Haiti.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

The MIDs dataset dates the start of this dispute to February 21st, 1891. We date the beginning of the intervention to January 26th, 1891, when Rear-Admiral Gherardi had landed in Port-au-Prince on the *Philadelphia*. This dispute is distinct from that listed in the CRS dataset between Haiti and the US in the same year, which refers to US intervention in a labor dispute on the uninhabited Navassa Island, where an American company was mining guano. While Haiti claimed the island, the episode does not appear to constitute an interstate dispute.

1893 Hawaii

NAME: Hawaiian Coup Troop Landing

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 16 – April 1, 1893

TARGET STATE(S): Hawaii

SUMMARY:

In the late 19th century, the non-indigenous white minority in Hawaii, which favored U.S. annexation, increasingly challenged the Hawaiian monarchy. In response to that political threat, in January 1893, Queen Lili'uokalani attempted to restore the monarchy's power. Over a few days, she replaced the cabinet with loyalists, prorogued the legislature, and then announced a new constitution on January 14, 1893. This sparked the rebels to organize a coup.

When the rebellion began on January 16, 1893, Captain Gilbert Wiltse landed 164 U.S. troops in Honolulu from the U.S.S. *Boston*, with the blessing of the U.S. Minister John L. Stevens. It included 109 sailors, 30 marines, 11 officers, and a color guard of 14 men. Wiltse feared social unrest, though no threat was actually posed to U.S. citizens, and no diplomatic solutions were ever attempted to mediate the crisis.

After landing, U.S. troops marched through Honolulu and by the palace. One quarter of them guarded U.S. government property (the consulate and Minister's office and residence), while the rest eventually occupied an American-owned hall next to the palace and Government Building (legislature). The troops did not move until the rebellion was over, despite a formal request from the rebels. The coup was essentially peaceful, with the exception of one Hawaiian police officer who was shot by a rebel. Minister Stevens recognized the new government about one hour after rebels proclaimed the establishment of a provisional government.

Before the coup, it was the perception of both the rebels and the Queen that Minister Stevens was sympathetic to the rebels. After surrendering, the Queen announced that she was deterred from fighting the rebels because she feared a clash with U.S. troops. The presence of U.S. troops symbolically favored the rebels and they could have prevented the coup's success. Yet, even before the U.S. landing, royalist forces never attempted to arrest the rebels, patrol the streets, or guard government buildings. It is therefore debated whether U.S. troop presence was the deciding factor for rebel success, though it is universally agreed to be an important element.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, esp. p. 93.

Morgan, William Michael. 2011. *Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese Rivalry Over the Annexation of Hawai'i, 1885-1898*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, esp. pp. 69-109.

Sweetman, Jack. 2002. *American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, esp. pp. 90-91.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests;
Remove Foreign Regime

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: No additional costs noted outside the cost of the deployment from the warship already stationed in Honolulu.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1893 Mexico

NAME: Havana Ranch Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1541

DATES: September 1, 1893 – September 12, 1893

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

The lack of a definite border between the U.S. and Mexico had been an issue since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago in 1848 at the conclusion of the Mexican-American War. The original boundary markers were poorly built and placed far apart, and since a large section of the boundary was defined as the midpoint of the Rio Grande, the border continually shifted with the erosion of the riverbed. Leading up to the 1890s, border commissions were convened in 1882 and 1889 to resolve boundary line disagreements between the two nations.

In September of 1893, Mexican officials along the Rio Grande near Matamoros, Mexico seized two American citizens and 3,000 sheep on the Havana Ranch. The Havana Ranch was located at a point where the Rio Grande shifted periodically, causing confusion as to the exact boundary between the two countries. The Hildago Country sheriff asked for help from nearby Fort Ringgold, and roughly 100 U.S. troops responded. They arrested the three Mexican customs officials on the disputed land and reclaimed the sheep. However, the Mexican military still held the American landowner and his herders. Secretary of State Walter Gresham intervened to negotiate the release of the U.S. citizens in Mexican custody in exchange for the three Mexican customs officials. This incident followed another border flare-up involving Texas Rangers near El Paso in August. To ease tensions, the two governments agreed to form a boundary commission in October of 1893. However, this commission would not be the last; the final status of the U.S.-Mexico border would not be established until the late 20th century.

SOURCES:

"A SURRENDER.: THE MEXICAN OFFICIALS TO BE RELEASED BY MAJ. KEYES." 1893.*Los Angeles Times (1886-1922)*, Sep 12, 2. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/surrender/docview/163604854/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Alvarez, Chad J. 2014. "The Shape of the Border: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide, 1848-2010." Order No. 3628055, The University of Chicago. <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/shape-border-policing-u-s-mexico-divide-1848-2010/docview/1560685280/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Callahan, James Morton. *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations*. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

"OUR MEXICAN FRONTIER.: THE BOUNDARY LINE TO BE DEFINITELY FIXED BY A COMMISSION." 1893. *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Oct 12, 1.

<https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/our-mexican-frontier/docview/95160837/se-2?accountid=14434>.

"THE RIO GRANDE TROUBLES." 1893. *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Sep 10, 4.

<https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/rio-grande-troubles/docview/95041286/se-2?accountid=14434>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Acquire of Defend Territory; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Released

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 0

COSTS: Roughly 100 troops, mostly cavalry, were deployed to the Havana Ranch along the border with Mexico for about 10-12 days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset. However, that dataset references a separate dispute involving the Chamizal tract that does not appear in this intervention.

1894 Brazil

NAME: Rio de Janeiro Affair

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 29th, 1894

TARGET STATE(S): Brazil 140

SUMMARY:

In 1893 and into 1894, Rear Admiral Saldanha da Gama led a naval revolt against the government of Rio de Janeiro. During January of 1894, American merchant ships were constantly harassed and fired at by ships under da Gama leadership while at port in or near Rio de Janeiro. On January 24th, 1894, Admiral Andrew Benham of the United States Navy directly told da Gama that American merchant ships cannot be attacked and threatened military action should the attacks continue. Several more talks occurred over the next few days that did not yield any change in da Gama's behavior.

On the morning of January 29th, 1894, an American cruiser, *USS Detroit*, accompanied an American merchant vessel into port at Rio de Janeiro with instructions to return fire if fired upon. At 7am, the insurgents fired a single musket shot from a cruiser over the merchant vessel as a show of force. The *USS Detroit* returned one six-pound mounted shot at the cruiser which hit causing light damage and immediately threatened further damage if provoked again. At 7:30am, the insurgents fired a full broadside shot intentionally above the merchant vessel to again show force and protest trade with the Rio de Janeiro government. The Americans replied with a single shot that hit the insurgent's ship in the stern causing heavy damage. The *USS Detroit* then sent a cadet to meet with da Gama and state that the American Navy was there for defensive purposes only. Da Gama was apparently unaware of the recent kinetic conflict and replied that should conflict break out again, he would immediately surrender and that the second shot was only in protest of the Navy's interference. No casualties were reported by either side in the conflict.

The following day, da Gama sought further clarification on the American Naval presence asking whether it was defensive only. Admiral Benham replied that the American Navy only wanted to preserve merchant safety and would not interfere in the domestic dispute. Additionally, Admiral Benham threatened that further attacks would be viewed as piracy and that the Navy would act to fight the pirates. The talks worked as American merchant vessels were never fired upon again by the insurgents for the remainder da Gama's naval revolt.

SOURCES:

Calhoun, Charles W. "American Policy Toward the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893–94: A Reexamination." *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 1 (January 1980): 52–54.

E.G.D. "A Plucky American Admiral: How the American Flag Was Protected in Rio Harbor." *The New York Times*, March 15, 1894.

McCloskey, Michael B. "The United States and the Brazilian Naval Revolt, 1893 - 1894." *The Americas* 2, no. 3 (January 1946): 313–21.

"NO CHANGE AT RIO DE JANEIRO: NEWS OF A SPEEDY END OF THE REVOLUTION EXPECTED AT WASHINGTON." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Feb 04, 1894.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection.

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The *USS Detroit* was the only ship used in the conflict. More ships were stationed at a distance but were not directly involved in the conflict.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only mentioned in the CRS dataset. We confirm it as an instance of U.S. military intervention.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1894 China

NAME: Landings to Protect Foreign Residents During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 12, 1894 - May 16, 1895

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

As China's power deteriorated toward the end of the 19th century, Japan modernized and began to compete for influence in Korea. In 1894, China helped Korea's government suppress the Tonghak rebellion, and Japan responded by sending thousands of troops to Korea. These escalations culminated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. Over the course of the war, the Japanese military expelled Chinese forces from Korea, and moved into Manchuria.

Fearing riots, anti-foreign sentiment, and uncertainty over Japanese advances into China, the United States sent Admiral Charles Carpenter to protect the American Legation in Peking (Beijing). Carpenter left Nagasaki aboard the *Baltimore* and landed on the Shandong Peninsula on December 4th, 1894. From there, a group of 51 marines traveled inland to the city of Tientsin (Tianjin) and boarded the *Monocacy*. Captain George F. Elliot proceeded from Tientsin to Peking, accompanying the American Minister in China during a meeting with the Chinese Emperor. Along with various European forces, the US marine presence remained in Tientsin until May 1895, when the war ended.

During the same period, the *USS Petrel* was sent to Newchwang (Yingkou), a port city across the Bohai Sea from Tientsin, to protect foreign residents there. The *Petrel* landed in Newchwang on November 12, 1894, and constructed a fort that remained until April 24, 1895. The fort is credited with preventing the outbreak of rioting in the area, although it never encountered the Chinese or Japanese militaries.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Greve, Andrew Q. & Jack S. Levy. 2018. "Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895." *Security Studies* Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 148-178.

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Costs of maintaining American naval presence in the region. Deployment of 51 U.S. troops and three U.S. naval vessels.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This intervention is cited in the CRS dataset, but not in the MIDs dataset. Because these landings occurred in relatively close geographic and temporal proximity, and were meant to protect foreign residents during the uncertainty of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, we treat these events as a single intervention.

1894 Korea

NAME: Korea Crisis in Sino-Japanese War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 23, 1894 – April 3, 1896

TARGET STATE(S): Korea, 730

SUMMARY: In May 1894, peasant revolts escalated in Korea, alarming both the American Minister and Korean King for Americans' safety. King Gojong requested that President Cleveland send assistance, and the U.S.S. Baltimore was deployed to Chemulpo Bay, so troops would be close by if escalation posed a direct threat to American lives. The King had also asked for support from China in suppressing the revolts, and Chinese troops were deployed. However, Chinese troops failed to notify Japan of these military movements on the Peninsula, breaking an agreement regarding disclosure of military operations in Korea.

Japan responded by sending forces to Korea, escalating tensions. On July 22, 1894, Japanese troops seized the palace in Seoul and detained the king. As a result, on July 23, a contingent of 21 marines were sent on foot, and the following day 29 sailors were sent by boat, to guard the American consulate and protect Americans living in Seoul. The Sino-Japanese War officially began just days later.

Marines were rotated into Seoul in contingents of 20-30. Some forces were there for 30 days, other rotations lasted nearly four months, but there was a period from June 19 to October 11, 1895 where no marines were in place. The Sino-Japanese War ended in the spring of 1895, but the last marine guards were not withdrawn until April 3, 1896, likely due to the chaotic conditions created by local tensions related to the 1894 revolts and overall regional turmoil following the war.

SOURCES:

Bisno, Adam. 2020. The U.S. Navy and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. Naval History and Heritage Command.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Congressional Research Service, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Korea: 0

United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Korea: 0

United States: 0

COSTS: Cost of keeping a contingent of marines in Seoul almost continuously from July 1894 to April 1896.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1894 Nicaragua

NAME: Nicaragua Protective Mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 6, 1894 – August 7, 1894

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC), 93

SUMMARY:

Nicaragua continued to be rocked by intense conflict between Liberal and Conservative factions during most of the 1800s. In 1893, after thirty year of Conservative dominance, a Liberal politician named Jose Santos Zelaya rose to power. The region faced considerable tensions at this point in time, and Zelaya wanted to increase Nicaraguan control over de facto independent enclaves under British influence or controlled by local pirates. In addition, he also harbored ambitions to unify other Central American countries with Nicaragua to create a larger entity under his control; in short, his tenure was rife with internal and external conflict, violence, plots, and intrigue.

The United States was affected on numerous occasions because of its economic and commercial interests in the country. After Zelaya rose to power in 1893, the U.S. permanently maintained two cruisers in Nicaraguan waters to lend assistance as and when needed. On July 6th, 1894 the American Consul in Nicaragua requested military assistance to protect U.S. interests, and a landing party entered the town of Bluefields. However, after about a month the threat seemed to have subsided and the force was withdrawn.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Two cruisers were stationed in Nicaraguan waters for several years to provide assistance as and when necessary. Around 100 troops were deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1895 Colombia

NAME: Bocas del Toro Landing

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: March 7-9, 1895

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100; Location: Panama, 95

SUMMARY:

Local revolutions and insurrections continued on the Isthmus into the late nineteenth century, requiring American monitoring of their local interests. In early March 1895, the Americans received intelligence that a Mexican filibuster, García, and his small force were heading to Bocas del Toro. Captain B.J. Cromwell arrived with the USS *Atlanta* on March 7th, but the situation and the American consulate seemed to be protected well by the local force of fifty-eight men. The *Atlanta* left for the night to have target practice, returning on the 8th.

Upon return on the 8th, Cromwell learned that García's force had attacked the town. Even though the local force killed five of the attackers, including García, and forced the rest out of town, Cromwell sent seventy men under Commander Edward Taussig ashore to protect the consulate and American shops until the next day. Early afternoon on the 9th, the troops re-embarked on the *Atlanta*, but stayed in the area for another month.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 51-52.

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 231.

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 160-164.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The costs of having to be stationed near Bocas del Toro for longer to monitor the situation.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the CRS Report and the Marine Landings Report. The start date was changed to March 7th to reflect the arrival of the *Atlanta* in Bocas del Toro.

1896 Nicaragua

NAME: Nicaragua protective mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 2, 1896 – May 4, 1896

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC), 93

SUMMARY:

Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya proved a polarizing figure in Nicaraguan politics, and he ruled with strongman tactics deemed authoritarian by his opponents who denounced his rule as a dictatorship. In 1896 Zelaya was reelected but his opponents alleged that the election had not been free and fair, and the episode resulted in significant political unrest. There was a widespread perception that foreigners were particularly at risk in this wave of unrest.

At one point the Nicaraguan Commandant of the town of Corinto asked the American Consul to assemble a landing party as local authorities could not guarantee that they would be able to protect foreigners. The Consul relayed this request to the naval commander of the U.S.S. *Alert* which had already been stationed in the area as part of an ongoing mission. The commander complied and dispatched a landing party of 34 troops for three days until such a time as the perceived local threat had subsided.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Two cruisers were stationed in Nicaraguan waters for several years to provide assistance as and when necessary. Deployment of 34 U.S. troops on land.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1898 China

NAME: Establishing the Legation Guard at Beijing and an unnamed guard at the American Consul in Tientsin

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 4th (Beijing) and November 12 (Tientsin), 1898

TARGET STATE(S): China 710

SUMMARY:

In 1898, a Chinese Emperor attempted to initiate reforms in China that resulted in a coup. Given this context, the United States Minister to China decided that a marine presence was required at the Legation in Peking (Beijing) and the Consulate at Tientsin.

Three cruisers, *Baltimore*, *Boston*, and *Raleigh* were dispatched to Beijing. On November 4th, 1898, five men from the *Boston*, five men from the *Raleigh*, and eight men from the *Baltimore* (18 total, all marines) stayed at Beijing and established the Legation Guard. On November 12th, 1898, a collection of 30 marines from the three ships were posted with one gatling gun and “a large supply of ammunition” at the Consulate in Tientsin. A breakdown of which of the three ships the 30 men originated from was not found.

This was a purely defensive action. Comments in the New York Times article state China was displeased by the posting of troops in Tientsin. Other European countries are mentioned to have taken similar precautions. No commentary was found regarding the marines being stationed in Beijing.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson. “China.” Essay. In *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934: a Brief History in Two Parts ...*, 32-33. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

Jones, Mel. "OUTPOSTS OF THE CORPS." *Leatherneck* (Pre-1998) 45, no. 11 (11, 1962): 50-55,82

"WE LAND MARINES IN CHINA: MEN FROM THE BOSTON SENT TO GUARD OUR LEGATION. THE IDEA IS NOT A NEW ONE OTHER POWERS HAD TAKEN SIMILAR PRECAUTIONS AGAINST POSSIBLE OUTBREAKS IN THE CITY OF PEKING." *New York Times* (1857-1922), Nov 27, 1898.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: N/A

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Both instances are mentioned in CRS.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent

protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1898 Nicaragua

NAME: Nicaragua protective mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 7, 1898 - February 8, 1898

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC), 93

SUMMARY:

Nicaragua remained rocked by political conflict during the reign of controversial Liberal President Jose Santos Zelaya, denounced by his opponents as a brutal dictator. Conflict and tensions occasionally flared up as violence between opposing factions, and one such episode broke out in the city of San Juan del Sur in early 1898. At this point opposing factions were engaged in regular fire fights using muskets and occasionally artillery pieces. As such, there was a present threat to U.S. lives and property. The United States at this time maintained a permanent presence of multiple warships in Nicaraguan waters in case their services should be needed as a result of turmoil and violence.

The U.S. Consul in San Juan del Norte had discussed the situation with the commander of the U.S.S. *Alert* and agreed on procedures for various contingencies. On a given signal, a landing party of 33 troops entered the town on February 7th. However, they withdrew the next day as local Nicaraguan authorities ensured that they had sufficient resources to protect local foreigners and their property.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Two cruisers were stationed in Nicaraguan waters for several years to provide assistance as and when necessary. 33 troops were deployed to land.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1898 Spain

NAME: The Spanish-American War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1557

DATES: January 17 – December 10, 1898

TARGET STATE(S): Spain (SPN), 230

SUMMARY:

Cuba had been of interest to the United States for decades before the Spanish-American War. On at least five occasions, the United States had offered to buy Cuba from Spain. By the mid-1890s, considerable bilateral trade existed between the two countries (\$103 million), though it still represented a fraction of U.S. GDP at the time. Most of that trade was in sugar, which represented 59% of U.S. cane sugar imports.

In 1895, a rebellion broke out in Cuba. Cubans had rebelled earlier in the century, most significantly in the Ten Years War from 1868-1878. The Spanish responded with ruthless killing and brutal policy, including re-concentration camps, that led to hundreds of thousands of Cuban deaths. Rebels resorted to scorched earth tactics, burning fields and agricultural land.

President Grover Cleveland, who tilted pro-Spanish, decided against any kind of intervention. Cleveland's successor in 1897, William McKinley, tilted pro-rebels, though he had little desire to get involved. Throughout 1897, he slowly applied diplomatic pressure on Spain, which made modest reforms.

As the situation deteriorated further and American property grew increasingly at risk, McKinley deployed the *USS Maine* to Havana harbor, a standard response to disorder abroad, on January 17, 1898. The ship arrived on January 25, and was shortly followed by the *USS Montgomery*.

Two events in February 1898 increased tensions with Spain. On February 9, the *New York Journal* published an undelivered letter from the Spanish Minister to the U.S., Enrique Dupuy de Lôme to a friend. The letter was intercepted by the Cuban Junta and passed to the paper. In it, de Lôme insulted McKinley and revealed that Spain was making empty promises of reform to stall. Upon publishing of the letter, de Lôme resigned from his posting. Less than a week later, on the night of February 15, the *USS Maine* blew up in Havana harbor from a mysterious explosion. 266 Americans died from the explosion.

In response, McKinley requested from Congress to appropriate \$50 million for national defense and naval buildup, approved within a day. McKinley did not blame Spain for the *Maine*. He also

did not want war, but he did want to be prepared in the case that Spain did not reform further. In late March, the Naval Court of Inquiry issued a report investigating the *Maine*. It absolved Spain, but it could not identify the perpetrator. It also concluded the explosion was externally-caused, intensifying suspicion among the public that Spain did in fact have a hand. Neither McKinley nor his Secretary of Navy believed Spain was responsible for the disaster.

McKinley continued to pressure the Spanish. A flurry of last minute diplomatic efforts, including one by Pope Leo XIII and another by six European powers, also failed. Spain had conceded to a suspension of hostilities, but not an armistice (implying political recognition of the rebels), which McKinley and the rebels demanded. In response, McKinley requested authorization to use military force on April 11, 1898. Congress granted it a week later. McKinley then ordered a naval blockade of Cuban ports and made a call for 125,000 volunteers to join America's army. He formally requested a declaration of war on April 25, and Congress responded that war had existed since April 21.

The Spanish-American War took place in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—all Spanish possessions at the beginning of the war. The first battle was fought in the Pacific. On April 27th, Commodore George Dewey sailed his squadron of nine ships from China to the Philippines, and on May 1st, completely destroyed the Spanish naval squadron at the Battle of Manila Bay. However, Dewey did not have enough men to capture Manila, and he requested reinforcements. It took roughly a month to mobilize the men, but by the end of May a force of 20,000 troops began leaving San Francisco for the Philippines. On the way, these men also captured Guam (without resistance).

Back in Cuba, 13 U.S. ships began the blockade of Santiago Harbor on May 29th, trapping the vastly inferior Spanish fleet. On June 22nd, 16,000 men landed in Daiquirí and joined roughly 4,000 Cuban revolutionaries to take Santiago. Over the next 11 days, on their 30 miles march to the harbor, the U.S. and Cuban forces fought and won three battles: Las Guasimas, El Caney, and San Juan Hill. These were the major engagements of the war and resulted in the majority of the deaths and casualties incurred throughout the campaign.

On July 7th, as the Cubans and U.S. troops approached from the land, the Spanish fleet attempted to escape Santiago harbor. In a resounding victory for the U.S., every single Spanish ship was destroyed in the attempt. A siege and bombardment of Santiago quickly ensued. The Spanish garrison surrendered on July 17th, thereby ending the hostilities in Cuba. On July 25th, 18,000 U.S. troops began the invasion of Puerto Rico. After two short but decisive U.S. victories at Caomo and San German, Spain accepted President McKinley's terms of peace on August 9th. The official peace protocol suspending hostilities was signed on August 12th. While this agreement ended hostilities between the two countries, word of the peace took several days to reach the Philippines, where the Americans were preparing their assault on Manila.

By the end of July, the majority of the 20,000 U.S. troops had arrived in the Philippines. The situation was complicated by the thousands of Filipino rebels surrounding the city under rebel

leader Emilio Aguinaldo's command. Realizing their position was hopeless, the Spanish negotiated a faux-battle that would allow them to surrender to the U.S. forces without needing to fight the Filipinos. On August 13th, the U.S. forces fired several shots from their ships, marched through Filipino lines, and entered Manila with minimal resistance. The Battle of Manila was the last conflict of the Spanish-American War.

The peace conference between the U.S. and Spain began on October 1st in Paris. Spain quickly ceded Puerto Rico to the U.S., along with Guam in the Pacific, and Cuba was granted its independence. The central issue of the conference was the fate of the Philippine Islands. After significant protest, but without any leverage, the Spanish agreed to sell the Philippines to the United States for \$20 million. The two countries signed the official peace treaty in Paris on December 10th. In comparison to other major wars, it was a relatively short and bloodless conflict. Over the 327 days, between 300-400 U.S. troops and roughly 800 Spaniards were killed in battle, which does not count casualties from the *USS Maine* or deaths from diseases. Although over 290,000 U.S. troops would be trained and mobilized by the end of the war, only about 54,000 participated in the fighting abroad. The inherited guerilla war in the Philippines would cost the U.S. far more lives in the years ahead.

SOURCES:

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Hendrickson, Kenneth E. *The Spanish-American War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003.

Leffler, John Joseph. "From the Shadows into the Sun: Americans in the Spanish-American War." Order No. 9128283, The University of Texas at Austin, 1991. <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/shadows-into-sun-americans-spanish-american-war/docview/303968031/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Offner, John L. 1992. *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

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Pérez, Louis. 1998. *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina.

“Ships of the Spanish-American War.” 2017. *Naval History and Heritage Command*. Accessed 21 February, 2021. <https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/spanish-american-war/ships-of-the-spanish-american-war.html>

Trask, David F. 1996 reprint (1981 original). *The War with Spain in 1898*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Humanitarian Intervention; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 330; Spanish: 800

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 3,550; Spanish: Unknown

COSTS: 134 ships deployed and 290,000 men trained. Only 54,000 of those 290,000 men were deployed in the conflict.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020”. Total deaths include deaths from disease, which also counts those who died of disease while in training in the United States, and the deaths from the *USS Maine* explosion.

1899 Nicaragua

NAME: Nicaragua Protective Mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 22, 1899 – March 5, 1899

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua 93

SUMMARY:

Nicaragua remained rocked throughout most of the 19th century by political conflict between Liberal and Conservative political factions, which occasionally turned violent and resorted in brief episodes of civil war. One such occasion arose in 1899 when General Juan Reyes staged an insurrection against sitting President Juan Santos Zelaya. As violence affected U.S. commercial interests, the U.S. at this time maintained a permanent naval presence with the *Marieta* in Nicaraguan waters to respond to local disturbances.

In response to the insurrection U.S. and British forces landed a small force of 16 troops in the town of San Juan del Norte on February 22. However, they withdrew after a couple of weeks as the threat had subsided.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Two cruisers were stationed in Nicaraguan waters for several years to provide assistance as and when necessary. Deployment of 16 troops to the coast.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report. We confirm it as an instance of U.S. military intervention.

1899 Philippines

NAME: Philippine-American War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 4, 1899 – March 8, 1906

TARGET STATE(S): Philippines PHI 840

SUMMARY:

During the Spanish-American War of 1898, U.S. forces partnered with Filipino rebels to wrest control of Manila from Spain, which had colonized the Philippines. The rebels, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, hoped and expected to be liberated from colonial rule following U.S. victory. However, after the August 12, 1898 peace protocol ending the Spanish-American War, U.S. and Spanish representatives gathered in Paris in the fall of 1898 to hammer out a peace treaty. Signed on December 10, 1898, the treaty awarded the Philippines to the U.S. for \$20 million.

Tensions between rebels and U.S. occupiers mounted over the months following the August protocol and December treaty. An unplanned firefight (of disputed details) between a Filipino and an American patrol on the outskirts of Manila on February 4, 1899 developed into the first, largest, and bloodiest battle of the entire war. (Though the provocation is disputed, it is generally acknowledged that a U.S. soldier fired the first shot). Two days later, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, and the Philippines formally became U.S. territory. The battle in Manila continued sporadically for three weeks, ending in a decisive U.S. victory.

At the time, the U.S. had roughly 21,000 troops stationed in the Philippines (against an estimated 20,00 - 40,000 Filipino rebels). The number of U.S. troops increased to 50,000 by August, 1899, and 71,500 by December, 1899. Overall, the U.S. committed 125,000 troops to the war. The first phase of the war, from February to November, 1899 was a conventional war mostly fought in the main island of Luzon (and the Visayas). It then transitioned to guerilla warfare. On March 23, 1901, U.S. forces, with the critical help of Philippine Scouts and a Spaniard, tracked down and captured Aguinaldo. He acquiesced to U.S. rule, and the next year, on July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war over, though sporadic violence continued for at least a decade. The last major battle with rebels occurred in Jolo in March, 1906, which led to the deaths of 1,000 Filipinos.

Militarily, the Philippine-American War was arguably America's most successful overseas counterinsurgency campaign in history. U.S. forces were better trained and armed than Filipino forces. The rebellion lacked effective central control and officer corps cohesion, which were compounded by a series of Aguinaldo's decisions. The war itself is often characterized as being constant and brutal, exemplified by stories of torture of Filipinos (e.g. the "water cure") and the

horrific 1901 massacre in Samar. However, roughly 50% of the provinces saw little to no fighting. Though there were instances of extreme tactics, far more Filipino civilians died from the policy of “re-concentration camps” than in battle. That policy, undertaken during the guerilla phase to separate civilians from suspected guerillas, crowded Filipinos in “protected zones,” where they starved and died of cholera and fever. Estimates of civilian death average 200,000.

The Philippine-American War was, by its nature, a colonial and imperial war. U.S. military governance was soon replaced by civilian leadership until 1946, when the Philippines gained independence. The war cemented U.S. control of the Philippines, and furthered its stake in Pacific affairs. It also contributed to its image as a ruthless, imperial power.

SOURCES:

Capozzola, Christopher. 2020. *Bound by War: How the United States and the Philippines Built America’s First Pacific Century*. New York: Basic Books, esp. pp. 13-80.

Cooney, David M. 1965. *A Chronology of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1965*. New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., esp. pp. 191-204.

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Plante, Trevor K. 2000. “Researching Service in the U.S. Army During the Philippine Insurrection.” *Prologue Magazine*. Washington, D.C.: National Archives, Summer 2000, Vol. 32, No. 2, Available: <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/summer/philippine-insurrection.html>.

Silbey, David J. 2007. *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: US: 4,200
Philippines: 15,000-20,000

TOTAL DEATHS: US: 4,200
Philippines: 15,000-20,000
Philippines (civilian): 100,000-300,000

COSTS: \$400 Million (Plante 2000)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

The Philippine-American War does not appear in the MID database, but it is included in the CRS report (though, only as 1899-1901). The timeline of the Philippine-American War (a.k.a. The Philippine War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Filipino-American War or the Fil-American War) is traditionally listed as 1899-1902, when Roosevelt declared it finished. Sporadic violence, however, did continue for many years later. The last great battle against the rebellion (at this point concentrated in the southern Philippines) was in 1906 and led to approximately 1,000 battle deaths. For this reason, we code 1906 as the end date of the war.

Another definitional issue is that the Philippines, according to the Correlates of War (CoW) state system database, did not exist as an independent state in 1899. For that reason, the Philippine-American War is typically conceived of as a colonial war, not a war with another state (CoW codes it as an “extra-state war type 2,” or a colonial conflict between a state and a colony). However, the fighting really began before the U.S. had formally annexed the Philippines through treaty ratification. The U.S. was not at war with Spain any longer, so we code it as being at war with the Philippines.

1899 Samoa

NAME: Samoan War of Succession

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 15 - May 15, 1899

TARGET STATE(S): Samoa, 990

SUMMARY: U.S. forces had intervened in Samoa in 1841 to enforce a set of diplomatic and trade regulations between the two countries, and in 1888-89 to protect U.S. interests during local strife. In 1899, violent hostilities broke out in Samoa over the line of succession between competing local chiefs.

U.S. and British naval forces intervened to protect their local interests as well as to actively support one side in the conflict against the other. As part of their deployment, U.S. ships fired on local forces on multiple occasions. A U.S. landing party pursued hostile native forces inland; as part of this mission the party came under attack and suffered a small number of casualties.

The result of the intervention was to pacify the island and install a pro-U.S. chief.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Westerfield, Donald. 1996. *War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War*. Westport: Praeger.

OBJECTIVE:

Change foreign regime; Maintain Empire; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 2-10 U.S. troops, 0-200 local forces

TOTAL DEATHS: 2-10 U.S. troops, 0-200 local forces

COSTS: The ships and sailors were deployed for three months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This is only featured in the CRS dataset.

1900 China

NAME: The Boxer Rebellion

DISPUTE NUMBER: 31

DATES: May 24, 1900 – September 28, 1900

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

This intervention occurred in the context of the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxers were a Chinese nationalist movement that came to prominence in the late 1890s. Western powers had imposed a series of unequal treaties on China earlier in the 19th century, and Japan had recently defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.

The Boxers began attacking foreign missionaries, diplomats, businesspeople, and Chinese Christians in May of 1900. Western powers perceived the Dowager Empress Cixi, and some factions of the Chinese Imperial Army, to be supportive of the Boxers. The Boxers' attacks motivated a multilateral military effort to suppress the movement, culminating in an invasion pitting American, Austrian, British, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian forces against Boxers and Chinese troops in the summer of 1900.

In May 1900, the foreign legations in Peking (Beijing) called for protection from the Boxers. 56 Marines from the USS *Oregon* and USS *Newark* landed at Taku on May 24th and 28th, and arrived in Peking on the 29th. The Boxers began a siege of the foreign legations in Peking, and on June 10th, 112 American Marines left the city of Tientsin for Peking. They did so as part of a 2,000-strong multilateral expedition, led by British Vice Admiral Edward Seymour. Overwhelmed by Boxers and Chinese troops, these forces returned to Tientsin.

Reinforcements poured in, and by August, 100,000 foreign troops were stationed at Tientsin, (of which 5,000-6,000 were American). 20,000 troops (of which approximately 2,000 were American) departed Tientsin for the capital under British General Alfred Gaselee. This expedition won several battles on the way to capturing Peking on August 14th, 1900.

The foreign forces looted Peking, and divided the city into different zones of control. They soon began a military campaign against Boxers in the city and elsewhere in the region. The American forces departed on September 28th, with the exception of a smaller legation guard that remained in Peking on a permanent basis.

In February 1901, the Chinese government outlawed the Boxer movement, which had largely dissipated. Remaining Boxers were executed, and the Chinese government agreed to pay war indemnities. Ten years later, the Qing government was overthrown in the 1911 revolution.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Holmes, Richard. 2004. "Boxer Rebellion (1900-1)," in *The Oxford Companion to Military History*. (Oxford University Press). Accessed November 17, 2020. Available at: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198606963.001.0001/acref-9780198606963-e-188>

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

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Oullett, Eric. 2009. "Multinational Counterinsurgency: The Western Intervention in the Boxer Rebellion 1900-1901." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20(3-4): 507-527.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>

United States Navy. 2015. "Boxer Rebellion & the US Navy, 1900-1901." Accessed November 18th, 2020. Available at: <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/boxer-rebellion-usnavy-1900-1901.html>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 10,983 (MIDs)

- US: 21 (MIDs)
- UK: 34 (MIDs)
- France: 24 (MIDs)
- Russia: 302 (MIDs)
- Japan: 602 (MIDs)
- China: 10,000 (MIDs)

TOTAL DEATHS: 41,215 – 111,215

- 231-233 foreign civilians (Lillich 2002: 141; Oullett 2009: 511)
- 30,000-100,000 Chinese civilians (Oullett 2009: 511)
- 10,000 Chinese Troops (MIDs)
- 983 Foreign Troops (MIDs)

COSTS: Cost of two American warships and the deployment of 5,000-6,000 US military personnel.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This intervention appears in the CRS and MIDs datasets. The MIDs dataset codes the conflict as beginning on June 17th, 1900, and ending on August 15th, 1900. However, we follow the CRS dataset and code the intervention as beginning when US troops landed on May 24th, and ending on September 28th, when most of the United States military presence departed.

There is little agreement on the exact number of fatalities on the Chinese side. It is especially difficult to determine the exact number of Chinese civilians killed, although it appears to have been in the tens of thousands.

1900 Dominican Republic

NAME: Protective Mission to Santo Domingo in Anticipation of Unrest

DISPUTE NUMBER: 68

DATES: January 13, 1900 – January 17, 1900

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic (DOM), 42

SUMMARY:

In early January, 1900, the French government sent a small fleet of warships to Santo Domingo to pressure the new Dominican government to pay the remaining balance on a longstanding debt owed to France. The two countries had experienced tensions surrounding the payment of this debt for many years. Foreseeing the potential (but not probability) of unrest, the American schooner-rigged gunboat, *Machias*, was ordered to Santo Domingo to safeguard American interests.

The *Machias* was responsible for patrolling the Caribbean and had been in Santo Domingo up until January 4, when it left for San Juan for more coal. Due to the potential unrest, it was ordered back to Santo Domingo, arriving on January 13, 1900, the same day the Dominican Republic and France formally and peacefully resolved their dispute (President Jimenez of the Dominican Republic reportedly privately raised the sum of the debt for repayment). The *Machias* stayed until January 17, 1900, when it returned to San Juan. No troops were landed during its stay in the harbor.

The United States evidently saw no issue with France's actions in this case, differing from its position in 1894. Back then, in response to essentially the same French action over the same debt, the United States made a strong diplomatic representation to France not to pursue a blockade against Santo Domingo. The 1894 incident occurred under the presidency of Grover Cleveland. This incident occurred under the presidency of William McKinley.

SOURCES:

“American Aid Asked: Citizens of This Country in Santo Domingo Fear France.” 9 January 1900. *Washington Evening Star*. P. 2. Accessed via *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Library of Congress. Available:

<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1900-01-09/ed-1/seq-2/>.

“Asks for a Warship: Upon Request of the American Minister the Machias is Ordered to Return to Santo Domingo.” 9 January 1900. *New York Times*. P. 1. Accessed via *ProQuest Historical Newspapers*.

“Mission of the Machias.” 9 January 1900. *Washington Evening Star*. P. 14. Accessed via *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Library of Congress. Available: <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1900-01-09/ed-1/seq-14/>.

“Movements of Naval Vessels.” 18 January 1900. *New York Times*. P. 5. Accessed via *ProQuest Historical Newspapers*.

“Naval Arrivals and Departures.” 7 January 1900. *The Washington Post*. P. 2. Accessed via *ProQuest Historical Newspapers*.

“The Machias Reaches Santo Domingo.” 13 January 1900. *New York Times*. P. 7. Accessed via *ProQuest Historical Newspapers*.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The cost of movement of the *Machias* from San Juan to Santo Domingo and the anchoring in Santo Domingo for 5 days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#68), but is missing from the CRS report. Apart from the MID database, references to this incident were exclusively found in contemporary newspapers, which reported on U.S. naval movements and political tensions in the Caribbean. One difference between those documents and the MID database is that the MID database codes this as having occurred from January 3, 1900 – January 13, 1900 (amended from the original coding from January 1900 – February 9, 1900). But, as reported at the time, the *Machias* did not arrive in Santo Domingo until January 13, 1900, and stayed until January 17, 1900. This difference appears to be a conflation of the dispute itself (between the Dominican Republic and France), which resolved on January 13, and the U.S. deployment of force, which began on January 13.

Additionally, the MID dataset seems to have coded the US as originating the dispute, which was not the case. The dispute was already in motion when the US deployed the *Machias*. So it participated, in a sense, with the first incident (the arrival of French warships, which preceded the *Machias* by a few days), but it did not originate it.

1901 Colombia

NAME: Retaking Colón

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: November 20, 1901 - December 4, 1901

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100

SUMMARY:

Local revolutions and skirmishes continued on the Isthmus into the twentieth century. In mid-November 1901, the clashes interrupted transit on the American railroad and Liberal insurgents took control of Colón. Commander Henry McCrea of the USS *Machias* sent one hundred troops ashore at Colón on November 20th to quickly retake possession of the railroad station and protect the American consul. No fighting occurred between the Americans and any local forces.

On November 24th, Captain Thomas Perry of the USS *Iowa* landed two hundred fifty troops in Panama to help secure free transit along the railroad and protect against Liberal forces mobilizing against an incoming Colombian ship, *Pinzon*. On November 28th, McCrea held a conference aboard the *Machias* to negotiate a deal between the Nationalists and Liberals. They decided that the American, British, and French naval officers present would take control of the Colón from the Liberals, protect the peace, and eventually pass control back to the Nationalists. The Liberals officially surrendered on November 29th. Foreign forces would eventually withdraw once it was clear that their railroad and interests were secured. By December 4th, all of the American troops had returned to their ships, satisfied that the railroad was safe: the USS *Machias*, USS *Iowa*, USS *Marietta*, and USS *Concord*. The *Machias*, *Marietta*, and *Concord* would remain near Colón for a little while longer. This security was not long-lasting, requiring similar tactics less than a year later.

SOURCES:

“Colombian Liberals Meet with Reverses.” *The New York Times*. November 26, 1901.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1901/11/26/102629958.html?pageNumber=1>

“Colombian Liberal Troops Surrender.” *The New York Times*. November 30, 1901.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1901/11/30/102630650.html?pageNumber=3>

“Colon Captured by Colombian Rebels.” *The New York Times*. November 21, 1901.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1901/11/21/102629703.html?pageNumber=1>

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 52-53.

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 232.

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 200-225.

“United States Vessels to Leave Isthmus.” *The New York Times*. December 7, 1901.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1901/12/07/102639546.html?pageNumber=8>

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs lost when transit was interrupted on the railroad and the costs of landing hundred of troops and stationing 4 ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MIP and CRS dataset. It can also be found in the Marine Landings Report. The end date was changed to December 4th to reflect when the troops reembarked on their ships. We confirm it as a instance of U.S. military intervention given troop and ship deployment.

1902 Colombia (1) Bocas del Toro

NAME: Return to Bocas del Toro

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: April 16, 1902 - May 17, 1902

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia (COL), 100

SUMMARY:

Liberal and government forces reignited tensions in April 1902. Captain Henry McCrea, aboard the *Machias*, returned to Bocas del Toro and landed a force of thirty men on the 16th to protect American property in case there was an attack on the town. There was heavy fire overnight, leading to another landing force coming ashore. On the 17th, the Liberals asked McCrea to organize a meeting with the government forces, which was scheduled for that evening. The next morning, more Marines were sent ashore to facilitate the Liberal surrender. They remained ashore when the landing force returned to the *Machias* on the 19th.

However, on the afternoon of the 19th, two Colombian government ships under the command of General Gomez, the *Pinzon* and the *Marcellus*, arrived in the harbor. Despite being told about the previous negotiations for Bocas del Toro, his ships and soldiers remained in the harbor, so McCrea re-landed the thirty men in case tensions sparked again. Once the government soldiers disembarked, more American forces landed in case of violent hostilities on the 21st. These forces re-embarked on the 22nd and the ships sailed to Aspinwall (Colón). The *Machias* had to return to Bocas del Toro the following month, arriving on May 17th, but any potential hostilities were resolved without any troops landing, allowing the *Machias* to patrol up and down the coast for the next few months.

SOURCES:

“American Citizens Safe.” *The New York Times*. April 20, 1902, 1.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1902/04/20/118468184.html?pageNumber=1>

“Colombian Insurgents Give Up Bocas del Toro.” *The New York Times*. April 24, 1902, 9.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1902/04/24/118468701.html?pageNumber=9>

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 54-55.

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 232.

“ThanksCommander McCrea.” *The New York Times*. May 21, 1902, 8.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1902/05/21/108287974.html?pageNumber=8>

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 333-334.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of the *Machias* and deployment of 30 service members, twice.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case can be found in the CRS and Marine Landings Reports. The end date was changed to reflect when the *Machias* returned to Bocas del Toro in case of another threat, but no soldiers had to come ashore.

No exact troop numbers could be found. 45 troops has been logged because 30 troops landed and reboarded the *Machias* twice, while there are other references for more marines landing, without exact numbers, putting the estimate at an additional 15 or so troops.

1902 Colombia (2) Isthmus Unrest

NAME: Continued 1902 Isthmus Unrest

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: September 15 - November 18, 1902

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100

SUMMARY:

Tensions and hostilities continued to develop on the Isthmus throughout the summer of 1902. Commander William Potter on the *Ranger* had been patrolling the Panama region since July 1902. Beginning on September 18th, the *Ranger* sent a landing force ashore in Panama City daily until September 23. The *Wisconsin* was stationed nearby in case the *Ranger's* troops needed reinforcements.

On September 11th, the Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Russel of the USS *Panther* to lead a battalion of 16 officers and 325 men to guard American interests and property in Aspinwall/Colón. This battalion left for Colón on the 14th, landing ashore on the 23rd, remaining ashore until November 16th. Meanwhile, the *Cincinnati* arrived at Colón on the 15th and landed 52 men on the 17th to protect rail travel between Panama and Colón. Later that day, another 30 men went ashore for protection. All of these troops returned to the ship in the evening and about 20-66 troops went ashore daily until October 8th. All of the ships left the harbor by November 18th, when they deemed their interests protected enough for withdrawal. On November 21st, a treaty between the government and the Liberals ended the local revolutions for the time being.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 55.

Naval History and Heritage Command. "List of Expeditions: 1901-1929." April 14, 2020. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/1/list-of-expeditions-1901-1929.html#1902>

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 232.

United States Congressional Serial Set, Volume 4589. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1904, 333-334.

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target State

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: US: 1 Marine died of Yellow Fever

COSTS: The costs of stationing four ships and landing over 400 troops over the course of around 2 months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case can be found in the CRS and Marine Landings Reports. The start date was changed to better represent when the first ship arrived at Colón to protect American interests. The exact number of troops landed is unclear because some references only include a “landing force,” and many troops reembarked on their ships at night. For the purposes of the dataset, all of these factors were estimated to be about 450 total troops landed during this time period in the American interventions.

1902 United Kingdom

NAME: Alaska Boundary Dispute

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2

DATES: May 28, 1902 – October 20, 1903

TARGET STATE(S): United Kingdom (UKG), 2

SUMMARY:

This dispute stemmed from an 1825 treaty between Russia and the Britain. When the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, it adopted the agreed boundaries from 1825. After the discovery of gold in the Canadian Yukon in 1897, Canada (then a part of Britain) began disputing those boundaries, especially around the Alaskan panhandle.

As a result of this growing tension and his refusal to settle the issue through arbitration, President Theodore Roosevelt quietly dispatched roughly 400 troops of the Eighth Infantry to the region. Though his order was given on March 27, 1902, troops did not move until May 28, 1902. That summer, Canadian Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier relinquished his demand for arbitration and conceded to a tribunal (i.e. no third party). The Hay-Herbert Treaty, signed on January 24, 1903, provided for six tribunal commissioners (three each appointed by the United States and Canada/UK) to settle the issue in the fall of 1903 in London.

Roosevelt appointed three hardliners, two serving U.S. senators, Henry Cabot Lodge and George Turner, and his serving Secretary of War, Elihu Root. Canada appointed two lawyers, A. Jette and A. B. Aylesworth, while Britain selected Chief Justice R. E. W. Alverstone. Roosevelt undertook a back-channel pressure campaign, through Lodge, Root, Oliver Wendell Holmes, U.S. Ambassador Joseph Choate, and Choate's First Secretary Henry White, to subtly threaten war if U.S. demands were not met. Evidence suggests these threats made it to top British officials, including Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, and Lord Alverstone himself.

After wavering significantly during the tribunal, Alverstone ultimately voted with the American representatives (4-2), delivering a victory for Roosevelt. Canada felt betrayed, though they managed to secure two small islands (Wales and Pearse) as a result of the negotiations.

SOURCES:

Annual reports of the War Department For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902. 1902. Volume IX. Washington: Government Printing Office, esp. pp. 38-40 for troop movements.

Beale, Howard K. 1956. *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, esp. pp. 110-131.

Collin, Richard H. 1985. *Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, esp. pp. 173-186.

Gould, Lewis L. 2011. *The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt*. 2nd ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, esp. pp. 77-81.

Kurizaki, Shuhei. August 2007. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 543-558.

McCulloch, Tony. 2011. "Chapter 17: Theodore Roosevelt and Canada: Alaska, the 'Big Stick' and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1901-1909" in Serge Ricard, ed. *A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 274-292.

Penlington, Norman. 1972. *The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS:Deployment of four companies of the Eighth Infantry from continental U.S. to Alaska, and costs associated with organizing and supporting the London-based tribunal in September and October 1903.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#2), but is missing from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on U.S. military interventions.

Further, MID lists this dispute as having occurred from July 1902 to January 24, 1903. As shown through Secretary of War Elihu Root's private letters, Root received the order to move troops to Alaska on March 27, 1903 via Roosevelt's secretary George B. Cortelyou. The U.S. War Department's 1902 Annual Report (Vol. 9) further shows that those troops – taken from the Eighth Infantry (Companies A, B, C, D; roughly 100 in each) – began moving on May 28, 1902.

Furthermore, the issue did not resolve on January 24, 1903. That was the date the Hay-Herbert Treaty was signed, but that only set up the tribunal for further negotiations. In the lead-up to and duration of the tribunal, Roosevelt issued additional subtle threats to the British through intermediaries in London. It was not until October 20, 1903, when the tribunal's vote was announced, that the border issue was finally settled.

Lastly, MID lists the US as the originator of the dispute, which it was not. The U.S. adopted territory that Canada subsequently challenged. The U.S. never began disputing the territory that it believed it already controlled. Though the U.S. participated in the first "incident" of the dispute (i.e. the disagreement, since it was on the other side of it), it was not on the initiator's side (Canada). It was on its own side.

1902 Venezuela Crisis

NAME: Venezuelan crisis of 1902–1903

DISPUTE NUMBER: 254

DATES: December 8, 1902 – February 19, 1903

TARGET STATES: United Kingdom, UKG , Germany, GMY & Italy, ITA

SUMMARY:

Venezuela under the rule of dictator Cipriano Castro was indebted approximately 62 million bolivars to a consortium of European powers, the largest of which were Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Cipriano's regime had begun looting the nation's treasury and murdering political dissidents. The European powers, pressured by European bankers at home, sent joint naval forces (the largest contingent was Germany's 29 vessels) to 5 Venezuelan ports to enforce a blockade.

At the time, the United States under President Theodore Roosevelt subscribed to the Monroe Doctrine, opposing any form of European colonization in the Americas. There were reasons to doubt imperial Germany wouldn't attempt to seize Venezuelan land. No European power had yet tested the Monroe Doctrine. The United States mobilized navy forces sending 53 warships under the command of Admiral Dewey to Puerto Rico for pre-planned exercises. In a meeting at the White House with the German diplomat, Roosevelt delivered an ultimatum that Germany must acknowledge that it would not attempt to seize any territory in Venezuela or the Caribbean, otherwise Dewey and the fleet would head for Venezuela with authorization to use force.

The blockade turned violent the day after the ultimatum. European forces seized 4 Venezuelan gunboats, three of which were destroyed by Germany. Venezuelan President Castro immediately approached American Ambassador Herbert Bowen, requesting that the United States oversee arbitration for the dispute. The British signaled their agreement for such an outcome, but it was not until Admiral Dewey moved his vessels to Trinidad and Roosevelt again levied threats of war at the German ambassador that the Kaiser's government also agreed to arbitration on December 19, 1902. The blockade concluded with the signing of a protocol in February 1903. The Arbitration overseen by the Hague Tribunal wasn't finalized until November 1904. It awarded 30% of the custom receipts from the ports of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello to the European nations, with preferential treatment going to the largest creditors Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The Venezuela Crisis' legacy would be the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, stating that the United States would act as an "international police power" intervening on behalf of European nations' interests in the western hemisphere.

SOURCES:

Bowen, Herbert W. 1919. "Roosevelt and Venezuela". *The North American Review* 210, no. 766: 414–417.

Morris, E. 2002. "A Matter of Extreme Urgency": Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902. *Naval War College Review*, 55, no. 2: 73-85.

Parsons, Edward B. 1971. "The German-American Crisis of 1902–1903", *Historian*, 33, no. 3, 436–452.

UN General Assembly. 1904. "The Venezuelan Preferential Case (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Venezuela et al)." *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*. 9. Awarded 22 February, 1904: 99–110.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 25 Venezuelan Civilians (German inflicted)

COSTS: Movement to Trinidad minimally affected operational costs of the American vessels; there were pre-planned exercises in Puerto Rico.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Due to the post-1945 timeframe of other datasets, this incident is only recorded in MID and the CRS listing of US usage of force abroad. But the Gibler (2018) book on MID narratives presents with several inconsistencies. The case states that Herbert Bowen was the US Secretary of State, when he was instead the ambassador to Venezuela. The Gibler account also doesn't take into consideration the American navy vessels maneuvering at one point only 60 miles away off of Trinidad, or the coercive diplomacy used by Roosevelt detailed in the Naval War College Review. We make sure to correct these omissions in our case narrative. Lastly, casualty numbers only appear in the Edward Parsons source, which required access via Harvard University. It claims that there were 25 Venezuelan civilians that died during the attempted bombardment of a fort by a German vessel during the blockade.

1903 Colombia

NAME: US Recognition of Independent Panama

DISPUTE NUMBER: 159

DATES: November 2, 1903 - January 21, 1914

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia 100

SUMMARY:

Following independence from Spain, Panama was part of Gran Colombia. The United States had been negotiating with Colombia a treaty that would give the U.S. rights over the Isthmus of Panama to build and control a canal. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1901 and other treaties were negotiated, but none of them were ratified by the Colombian legislature, hoping to force American concessions. The Americans also received intelligence that the Panamanians were likely close to revolting and declaring independence, so they sent several warships and marine troops on November 2, 1903 to Colon to observe the situation, because they wanted to protect local Americans, their consulate, and the railroad, and to prevent Colombian ships from reaching Panama City, "to prevent bloodshed." The *USS Nashville* arrived first. On November 3rd, the Panamanians declared independence, which the U.S. officially recognized on the 6th and signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which granted the U.S. the land and legal authority needed to build the Panama Canal.

The American ships in the blockade were the *USS Nashville*, led by Commander John Hubbard and 12 marines, the *USS Dixie*, led by Commander Francis Delano and 400 marines, the *USS Mayflower*, led by Rear Admiral Coghlan and 300 marines, the *USS Prairie*, led by Commander A.V. Wadhams and 300 marines, and the *USS Boston* and *Atlanta*, with 25 marines each. Rear Admiral Glass led the *USS Marblehead*, *Wyoming*, and *Concord* on the Pacific side of the Isthmus. The Colombian ship, *Bogota*, was already in Panama, reportedly bombarding the city. The *Nashville* received instructions to tell the *Bogota* to stop or be sunk. Marines from both sides disembarked their ships and set up camps, but without any violent hostilities as the U.S. government mainly wanted to protect its interests in the area rather than begin prolonged fighting. The American marines remained until January 1914 and almost immediately began construction of the Panama Canal, while the area remained an American protectorate.

SOURCES:

"A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Panama." Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed on October 15, 2020. <https://history.state.gov/countries/panama>

“America to Send Warships.” *The New York Times*. November 4, 1903.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/11/11/105065814.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1914, 295-304.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

“Nashville Orders Held by Bogota.” *The New York Times*. November 5, 1903.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/11/05/105064628.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

“New Revolt in Colombia.” *The New York Times*. November 2, 1903.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/11/02/102028643.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

“Orders to More Warships.” *The New York Times*. November 6, 1903.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/11/06/105064979.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

“Panama Secedes from Colombia.” *The New York Times*. November 4, 1903.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/11/04/102028959.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1903, Documents 230-231, 292.

“To Stop Colombia Troops.” *The New York Times*. November 11, 1903.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/11/11/105065814.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Several warships and marines over the course of over ten years were deployed to the area.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in MID/Gibler 2018 (dispute number 159) and has been combined with another case not in MID/Gibler, but listed as Panama 1903 in the CRS Report and the Marine Landings Report.

1903 Dominican Republic

NAME: Landing During 1903 Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 30th, 1903 – April 21st, 1903

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic, 42

SUMMARY:

On March 23rd, 1903, a military force led by General Alejandro Wos y Gil overthrew Dominican President Horacio Vasquez. The revolutionary forces took control of the Dominican Republic's capital city, Santo Domingo. In response, Vasquez led a counter-revolutionary force to retake the capital in April.

Campbell Maxwell, the American Consul-General in the Dominican Republic, asked that Marines be landed in order to protect foreign lives and property. The *Atlanta*, commanded by William H. Turner, arrived in Santo Domingo on March 30th. On April 1st, 29 Marines from the *Atlanta* landed and went to guard the Consul-General's house, leaving on April 21st, 1903. Possibly deterred by the presence of the American forces, Vasquez resigned on April 23rd, 1903.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps Headquarters).

Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

Mullenbach, Mark J. "Dominican Republic (1902-Present)." Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project, Department of Political Science, University of Central Arkansas. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/> (Accessed January 21, 2021).

Salazar Torreon, Barbara & Sofia Plagakis. 2020. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.

Tillman, Ellen. 2016. *Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press).

US Navy. 2015. "Atlanta II (Protected Cruiser)." Naval History and Heritage Command. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/a/atlanta-protected-cruiser-ii.html> (Accessed January 21st, 2021).

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actors

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Cost of maintaining the *Atlanta* in Dominican waters.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: It is not clear how many people were killed during the struggle between Wos y Gil and Vasquez. We code the Deaths variables as zero, because US forces do not appear to have engaged in combat with the warring factions during the intervention. This case appears in the CRS dataset, but not in the MIDs dataset.

1903 Ethiopia

NAME: The Skinner Mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October, 1903 - January, 1904

TARGET STATE(S): Ethiopia (ETH), 530

SUMMARY:

In 1896 Emperor Menelik II of Abyssinia (Kingdom of Ethiopia) successfully defended his country against the Italian invasion. In the preceding two decades, European powers had been conquering and gaining influence across the African continent. Robert P. Skinner, U.S. Consul of Marseilles, saw Ethiopia's independence as an opportunity to pursue American interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in establishing trade networks and diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. At first, he had proposed this to President William McKinley who took no action. However in 1903, Skinner tried again with President Roosevelt who took an interest. Skinner was requested in Washington by the Acting Secretary of State, Francis Loomis, and was given the new title as the commissioner of the first U.S. trade mission to the Ethiopian Kingdom.

In October 1903, Robert P. Skinner, U.S. Consul of Marseille sailed for Adis Adaba with 30 marines on a mission to establish diplomatic relations with the independent nation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and in hopes of signing a treaty of reciprocity. Skinner arrived in Abyssinia that December. Upon Skinner's arrival, they were greeted in grandeur with a 5,000 man guard of honor and cavalry. Though European diplomats had warned the Americans to expect to stay for months, King Menelik II was impressed that the American's treaty proposal was written in Amharic and the treaty was rewritten in 9 days.

In a time period where European powers were carving out their influence in Africa, watching an African nation like Ethiopia defeat the Italians and maintain its independence led to new perspectives of Africa and Africans. There was a deep interest and curiosity in Ethiopia, a place that was previously viewed as barbaric simply because it was African, but at the same time, Ethiopia was considered "some level of civilized" because they were an independent nation and did not "need" outside powers to dominate and help it move towards development. This mission marked the beginning of new perspectives and attitudes of race, during the Progressive Era.

SOURCES:

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https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A12058631/AONE?u=m_lin_m_tufts&sid=AONE&xid=cc639ff2.

"CONSUL SKINNER'S MISSION.: REACHES HARRAR ON HIS WAY TO VISIT KING MENELEK." 1903.New York Times (1857-1922), Nov 22, 4.
<https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/docview/96372034?accountid=14434>.

McVety, Amanda Kay. "The 1903 Skinner Mission: Images of Ethiopia in the Progressive Era." The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 10, no. 2 (2011): 187-212. Accessed November 21, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23045157>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 30 marines

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is featured in the CRS report.

1903 Honduras

NAME: Conservative Rebellion of 1903

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 15, 1903 – March 31, 1903

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

The 1902 election in Honduras was a bitter contest between the liberals, led by Juan Angel Arias, and the conservatives, led by General Manuel Bonilla. The president at the time, Terencio Sierra, himself a liberal, as well as the liberal regime in Nicaragua next door heavily favored Arias. As General Bonilla's campaign gathered momentum, the liberals privately proposed a power-sharing agreement where Bonilla would be given the Ministry of War if he dropped out. When Bonilla refused and made the offer public, popular opinion began to move heavily in his favor. In October of 1902, General Bonilla handily won the elections, but the liberals in Congress refused to concede. On January 1st, when Congress adjourned without certifying Bonilla as the new president, civil war became imminent. Terencio Sierra resigned as president and fled to Nicaragua, and in his absence, the Congress selected Juan Angel Arias to lead Honduras. By February 1st, 1903, General Bonilla had set up a provisional government in Amapala. Soon after, Bonilla declared his rebellion with support from key members of the Honduran military and President Tomás Regalado's conservative government in El Salvador.

The United States became involved on March 15th, 1903, when a squadron of five ships was sent to Puerto Cortés from Culebra, Puerto Rico. These five ships were the *USS Marietta*, *Olympia*, *Panther*, *Raleigh*, and *San Francisco*. They arrived in Puerto Cortés on March 21st, and then separated to visit the ports of La Ceiba, Trujillo, Tela, and Puerto Sierra. Most of the coastal cities were quiet, but there was unrest in Puerto Cortés and the American consul requested a marine guard. On March 23rd, 13 marines from the *USS Marietta* went ashore to defend the consulate, and the next day 30 marines from the *USS Olympia* disembarked at Puerto Cortés to defend the steamship wharf. By March 31st all the marines had returned to their ships as the civil war was coming to a close.

Despite expectations that Nicaragua would intervene, the liberals had no outside help. General Bonilla, with his force of over 4,500 men, reached Tegucigalpa by early April. On April 15th, the liberals surrendered, and on April 24th, the United States officially recognized Bonilla's government. The Honduran Congress officially recognized Bonilla as president on May 23rd. General Bonilla would stay in power until 1907 before being overthrown by a Nicaraguan-backed liberal coup.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines*. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

“Honduras (1902-Present).” University of Central Arkansas: Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed October 7, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/>

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903, Guatemala and Honduras, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), Documents 553-557. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1903/ch71>

PELOSO, VINCENT CHARLES. "THE POLITICS OF FEDERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 1885-1921." Order No. 7001682, The University of Arizona, 1969. <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/politics-federation-central-america-1885-1921/docview/302381669/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Stokes, William S. *Honduras: An Area Study in Government*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1950.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

COSTS: Roughly 45 troops and 5 ships were engaged from March 21st to March 31st. Of those 45 troops, 30 marines were only ashore for two days from March 24th to March 26th.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020”.

1903 Syria

NAME: Intervention in Beirut

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 7, 1903 – October 17, 1903

TARGET STATE(S): Syria 652

SUMMARY: In September 1903 the Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire was rocked by political difficulties and severely strained tensions between Christian and Muslim inhabitants. Local communities had clashed before including with two civil wars between Maronite Catholics and Druze in the 1840s and 1860s as well as massacres of Jewish and Christian inhabitants of Damascus in 1860.

As tensions once again flared, Rear Admiral Cotton, Commander of the European Squadron of the U.S. Navy, directed two warships (flagship and armored cruiser *Brooklyn* and cruiser *San Francisco*) to the port of Beirut as he feared that tensions could once again erupt into deadly riots. More than civilian casualties, however, he was concerned about protecting the U.S. consulate in Beirut. The two ships landed a small force of Marines and sailors who guarded the consulate for six days (September 7-12), at which point the tensions appeared to have calmed down and it was decided that the U.S. forces were no longer needed in the country. They returned to their ships and left Beirut.

Amid renewed unrest one month later, another landing party of sailors and marines from the *San Francisco* went ashore in Beirut, staying for one week (October 10-17) to safeguard American interests.

SOURCES:

Cooney, David M. 1965. *A Chronology of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1965*. New York, NY: Franklin Watts, Inc.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Goodspeed, M. Hill. 2003. *U. S. Navy: A Complete History*. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Foundation.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Sweetman, Jack. 2002. *American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

Traboulsi, Fawwaz. 2007. *A Modern History of Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of two U.S. ships and small number of forces, ordinarily stationed in the Mediterranean area, for five days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

1904 Dominican Republic

NAME: The Seven Red Flags Battle

DISPUTE NUMBER: 247

DATES: January 17 - June 10, 1904

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic (DOM), 42

SUMMARY:

The Dominican Republic in the late 19th century was characterized by political violence and near-constant rebellions. Of the country's 22 heads-of-state who governed from its declaration of sovereignty from Haiti in 1843 to the American occupation in 1915, only one served his full term. European powers, including Italy, Germany, Spain, and Britain, had private commercial interests in Dominican sugar and, amidst the constantly changing regimes, began to worry their debts (USD \$30-40 million) would not be repaid. President Theodore Roosevelt, operating under the Monroe Doctrine – although constrained by an upcoming election – aimed to prevent European aggression in the region, but strictly opposed annexation for fear of domestic backlash.

The first five years of the 20th century were especially turbulent: in April 1902, President Juan Jimenez was overthrown by his Vice President, Horacio Vásquez, who was then subsequently deposed by General Wos y Gil, to be ousted by General Morales Languasco in December 1903. At this point, there were two warring parties, supporters of former President Jimenez and supporters of former President Vásquez, *jimenistas* and *horacistas*, respectively. The *jimenistas* laid siege to the economic hub and commercial port of Puerto Plata, destroying an American-owned United Fruit plantation in the process. The provincial-government leader, Morales, aligned with the *horacistas* and asked the Americans for help to defend the city. Fearing European seizure of the customs house in compensation for unpaid debt and mounting violence, Morales offered the United States Dominican territory to build a naval base and the establishment of a Dominican-U.S. relationship to mirror that of Cuba. Washington rejected this plan and largely dictated policy through the U.S.S. *Detroit's* Commander Dillingham, who was in Puerto Plata at the time. On January 17, 1904, Dillingham aimed to divert violence from the city and, working with the Captain Robertson of the British *Pallas*, convinced both sides to conduct battle in a “civilized” manner, outside of the city and in an area demarcated by seven red flags. Dillingham organized “two companies of seaman infantry from the *Detroit*, another company from the *Hartford*, three Colt automatic guns and...fourteen British marines from the

Pallas.”¹ The *jimenista* forces, no match for the heavy artillery, unconditionally surrendered and Morales’ troops took the city.

This initial victory led to further violence in *jimenista* strongholds throughout the country. On February 1, an *U.S.S. Yankee* sailor, E.J. Johnson was murdered, prompting a naval bombardment siege of insurgent positions in Santo Domingo until February 15. By June, the Northeastern city of Monte Cristi was one of the last remaining rebel positions. After a naval blockade of the city, Dillingham invited insurgent General Rodriguez Arias and Morales aboard the *Detroit* where they concluded a “proclamation of peace in the Dominican Republic” on June 3, in which Arias would become governor of Monte Cristi and would join the government of Morales. Many foreign envoys attended the signing ceremony to give credibility to the new government. However, the peace was short-lived. Morales was ousted in December 1905. By this time, Roosevelt had won re-election and he began to take a more aggressive approach to Latin America, appending the “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. This would lead to U.S. administration of the Dominican financial system and economy, and military occupation, from 1916 to 1924.

SOURCES:

Blassingame, John W. "The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904-1920." *Caribbean Studies* 9, no. 2 (1969): 27-43.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25612127>.

Collin, Richard H. "The 1904 Detroit Compact: U.S. Naval Diplomacy and Dominican Revolutions." *The Historian* (Kingston) 52, no. 3 (1990): 432-52.

“Dominican Republic (1902-present),” University of Central Arkansas: Political Science, UCA. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

Haggerty, Richard A., and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Dominican Republic: A Country Study*. 1989.

Mitchener, Kris James, and Weidenmier, Marc. "Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary." *The Journal of Economic History* 65, no. 3 (2005): 658-92.

Rippy, J. Fred. "The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 17, no. 4 (1937): 419-57.

¹ Collin, Richard H. "The 1904 Detroit Compact: U.S. Naval Diplomacy and Dominican Revolutions." *The Historian* (Kingston) 52, no. 3 (1990): 432-52.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.; 1, DOM; 100

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.; 1, DOM; 100

COSTS: 300 American troops to Puerto Plata; deployment of U.S.S. *Detroit, Hartford, Yankee*.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in both Gibler's (2018) *International Conflicts* database and the CRS report, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020*. While some sources erroneously describe it as a 1905 intervention, the events described took place from January to June 1904 as we show above.

1904 Korea

NAME: Korea Crisis in Russo-Japanese War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 5, 1904 – November 11, 1905

TARGET STATE(S): Korea, 730

SUMMARY: Increasing unrest amongst the Korean populace, an attack on an American legation car and driver by unruly Korean soldiers, and escalating regional tension between Japan and Russia led to marines once again being deployed to protect Americans in Seoul. One-hundred-and-two marines were deployed in January 1904, and according to the records available, the same contingent stayed through the entire deployment. The Russo-Japanese War began a month after their arrival and ended in September 1905, but the marines stayed in place until November 1905, after which they returned to the Philippines.

Their withdrawal was concurrent with a November agreement signed between Japan and Korea, moving all Korean foreign relations management under Japanese control. Per the agreement, the American legation in Seoul was withdrawn the same month, and all matters related to Korea were handled through the American legation in Tokyo.

SOURCES:

"American Marines Landed in Korea." *Los Angeles Herald* (Los Angeles, CA), Jan. 6, 1904.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1904, 1904, Korea, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), Documents 447-450.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 5, 1905, 1905, Korea, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), Documents 615-627.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Congressional Research Service, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Korea: 0

United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Korea: 0

United States: 0

COSTS: Cost of keeping a contingent of marines in Seoul continuously from January 1904 to November 1905.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1904 Morocco

NAME: Tangier Hostages Intervention

DISPUTE NUMBER: 164

DATES: May 31, 1904 – June 28, 1904

TARGET STATE(S): Morocco 600

SUMMARY:

In 1904, a Moroccan tribal leader, Ahmed Raisouli, took several Western citizens – including two Americans – as hostages to exert pressure on the Sultan in a local dispute. As a result, fear spread among the local Christian population of a general outbreak of ethnic or sectarian tensions or violence.

The U.S. government ordered a naval squadron under Rear Admiral Chadwick to deploy to Tangier to mark the gravity of the situation and signal resolve. Together with the U.S. Consul in Tangiers he met with the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs to mark U.S. displeasure and desire for the safe return of its citizens. For about one month a force of Marines were also deployed to guard the U.S. Consulate.

As a result of this intervention, the hostages were eventually released and local sectarian tensions never inflamed.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of a naval squadron and Marine guards for about one month.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#164) and the CRS report.

1904 Panama

NAME: Huerta's Resignation

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: November 17, 1904 - November 24, 1904

TARGET STATE(S): Panama (PAN), 95

SUMMARY:

In mid-November 1904, there were threats of a Panamanian military insurrection threatening American interests in the Canal construction. The Commander of the Canal Zone, General Davis instructed Admiral Goodrich to have a single Pacific Squadron warship station at Ancón. 200 Marines came from Camp Empire to Ancón on the morning of November 17th as a precautionary measure to guard the local ammunition.

The American forces informed Panamanian General Huertas that they expected his resignation and if he stayed in power and tried to lead his forces in an insurrection, he could expect American resistance. Despite some opposition to resignation, Huertas resigned. The immediate threat of the military coup disappeared by the time an American congressional arrived on November 24th. A few days later, William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War, arrived in Panama on November 27th.

SOURCES:

“All Quiet in Panama Now.” *The New York Times*. November 19, 1904.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1904/11/19/101349210.html?pageNumber=1>

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Minger, Ralph. “Panama, the Canal Zone, and Titular Sovereignty.” *The Western Political Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1961): 544-554.

“Our Marines Guard Panama.” *The New Times*. November 18, 1904.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1904/11/18/100478615.html?pageNumber=1>

“Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 4, 1904.” Department of State, Office of the Historian. Accessed on November 21, 2020.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1904/d589>

Parks, E. Taylor. *Colombia and the United States 1765-1934*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935, 232.

“Rebellious Soldiers in Panama Resign.” *The New York Times*. November 20, 1904.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1904/11/20/120289886.html?pageNumber=4>

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target State

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 200 troops and 1 Naval ship. Costs of securing the Isthmus in preparation for an American contingent’s arrival

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case can be found in the CRS Report.

1906 Cuba

NAME: 1906-1909 Military Occupation of Cuba.

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 23, 1906 — January 23, 1909.

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

During the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) and the American-Spanish War (1898), The United States successfully aided Cuba in securing its independence from Spain and dislodging Spain from its colonial possessions in the Caribbean, and as a result, the U.S. asserted itself as the dominant power in the Caribbean region. In the following years, a newly independent Cuba experienced several reoccurring periods of instability and civil uprising. The United States, under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, felt obligated to ensure Cuba's transition into a democratic state to protect the U.S.'s interests in the country and the wider Caribbean region. As a result, U.S. troop battalions were commonly deployed to maintain peace and security within Cuba as the country experienced periods of political turmoil and internal conflict from 1906-1914.

The inauguration of Tomás Estrada Palma as Cuba's first president in 1902, was a welcome sign of political and financial stability. However, soon after taking power, Palma engaged in overt acts of widespread corruption and election rigging and did little to address the popular grievances that brought about the initial push for independence. Eventually, the opposing Liberal Party, which represented aggrieved workers, peasants, and former soldiers, and headed by General José Miguel Gómez, called for a revolution to oust Palma. The United States intervened diplomatically to broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict, which resulted in an impasse and Palma resigning on September 28, 1906. With Palma's resignation, the United States established a military occupation force to fill the power vacuum in hopes of enabling transparent and unfettered elections. The U.S. force consisted of 2,892 marines and was primarily deployed to the Cuban capital, Havana. After several years, elections were held and José Miguel Gómez was elected president in 1909. The force remained in Cuba until January 23, 1909, when president-elect Miguel Gómez assumed office.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry A. "One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934" History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C. (1974) pp. 62

Leonard, Thomas M. "United States Interventions: 1906–1920." Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations. *McFarland*. 2010.

http://ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?auth=tufts&url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/mcf/cubus/united_states_interventions_1906_1920/0?institutionId=991

Office of the Historian. "Foreign Relations of the United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of The United States, With The Annual Message Of The President Transmitted To Congress December 3, 1906, Insurrection and intervention of United States in Cuba". *U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian*. 2010. Documents 390-436.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests,

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 2,892 Marines

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) data set. We confirm it as an instance of U.S. military intervention abroad.

1907 Honduras

NAME: Honduran Rebellion of 1907

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 18, 1907 – June 08, 1907

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

Honduran President Terencio Sierra lost the presidential election in 1903 to General Manuel Bonilla, but the congress refused to recognize General Bonilla and prevented a peaceful transition. In response, Bonilla set up a provisional government in Amapala and started a civil war that he ended victoriously in May of 1903. President Bonilla was initially very popular, both domestically and abroad, but by 1906 his rule had turned into a dictatorship. His grip on power appeared secure. On September 15 that year, President Bonilla pushed a new constitution through congress, and on September 25th he signed a treaty of peace and friendship with El Salvador and Guatemala. However, in February of 1907, Honduran rebels invaded across the border from Nicaragua in support of General Dionisio Gutierrez's rebellion against President Bonilla. On March 11th, 5,000 troops from El Salvador intervened on behalf of the government. Shortly after, on March 25th, Nicaragua sent in their regular army in support of the rebels.

As fighting picked up in mid-march, the U.S. responded by sending four warships and one supporting cargo ship to the region. The *USS Marietta* arrived in Trujillo on March 18th and landed 20 marines and seamen to protect the U.S. consulate. The cargo ship *USS Nero* then stayed behind in Trujillo while the *Marietta* sailed on and disembarked 20 more troops in La Ceiba. On March 26th, the *USS Marietta* arrived in Puerto Cortés, and an additional 20 marines went ashore. These marines in Puerto Cortés would then move to San Pedro on April 5th to protect U.S. interests. On April 10th, the *USS Paducah* began landing additional forces in Trujillo, Ceiba, and Puerto Cortés. On April 28th, the *USS Paducah* sailed to Laguna, and 12 more marines went ashore. During this same period, the *USS Princeton* was patrolling the waters off Nicaragua, and the *USS Chicago* was sailing along the Salvadorean coast.

The war ended soon after the Nicaraguans intervened. They quickly captured Tegucigalpa, the capital, and on April 11th the last of General Bonilla's forces surrendered in Amapala. General Bonilla took refuge on the *USS Chicago*. Back in Tegucigalpa, the Secretary of the American Legation organized a peace conference that included President Zelaya of Nicaragua and President Figueroa of Salvador. General Miguel Dávila was selected as the next president of Honduras and was sworn in on April 18th, 1907. All U.S. marines left Honduras by May 21st, except for those that had landed in Laguna. On May 23rd, these marines traveled to Cholomo

and would remain in Choloma to continue protecting foreign property until June 8th. In November, Dávila, Zelaya, and Figuera were among five Central American leaders who traveled to Washington, D.C. for the Central American Peace Conference of 1907. At the conference, all five countries agreed to the General Treaty of Peace and Amity in an attempt to avoid similar conflicts in the future.

SOURCES:

"AMERICAN MARINES LAND IN HONDURAS: COMMANDER FULLAM PUTS MEN ASHORE FROM THE MARIETTA AT THREE PORTS. INTERVENTION LOOKED FOR DIPLOMATISTS IN WASHINGTON THINK THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO WILL STOP THE WAR." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Mar 22, 1907.

<https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/american-marines-land-honduras/docview/96685046/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines*. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.

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Merrill, Tim, and Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Honduras: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: U.S. G.P.O, 1995. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/94043036/>.

Stokes, William S. *Honduras: An Area Study in Government*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1950.

"Surrender of the Honduran Army." *The Independent ...Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature, and the Arts (1848-1921)*, Apr 18, 1907, 876. <https://www.proquest.com/magazines/surrender-honduran-army/docview/90478882/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Wingfield, Thomas C, and James E Meyen, eds. "Appendix I." Appendix. In *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad* 77, 77:115–84. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2002. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1325&context=ils>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

COSTS: Roughly 100 troops and 5 ships were engaged from March 16th to at least May 21st. Of those troops, 12 marines stayed in Honduras until June 8th.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Congressional Research Service's (CRS) "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020".

1908 Panama

NAME: 1908 Panamanian Election

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: June 26, 1908 - July 31, 1908

TARGET STATE(S): Panama (PAN), 95

SUMMARY:

Panama held elections during the summer of 1908. Two ships, the USS *Idaho* and USS *New Hampshire*, carried a total of 786 marines to Colón to oversee the elections and protect local American Government property during the Panama Canal's construction. The *Idaho* landed on June 26th and the *New Hampshire* on the 27th, where they joined a permanent local battalion to protect the docks and railroads. Jose Obaldia of the Partido Liberal won the presidency handedly. The American election inspectors all left Colón on July 11th, but the last of the Marines did not sail until July 31st.

SOURCES:

“List of Expeditions 1901-1929.” *Naval History and Heritage Command*. April 14, 2020.
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/l/list-of-expeditions-1901-1929.html#1908>

“Obaldia Elected President.” *The New York Times*. July 13, 1908.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1908/06/29/106715596.html?pageNumber=1>

“Panama at Peace.” *The New York Times*. July 6, 1908.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1908/07/06/104737642.html?pageNumber=4>

“Panama Elections Today.” *The New York Times*. July 12, 1908.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1908/07/12/104738301.html?pageNumber=8>

“Troops at Panama Election.” *The New York Times*. June 29, 1908.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1908/06/29/106715596.html?pageNumber=1>

OBJECTIVE:

Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Yield by Target State

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of two U.S. naval ships and 786 U.S. troops. Other Costs of securing the Isthmus in preparation for an American contingent's arrival

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS dataset. We confirm it as a military intervention in the mobilization of military resources.

1910 Nicaragua

NAME: Nicaraguan civil war

DISPUTE NUMBER: 249

DATES: February 22, 1910 - September 4, 1910

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC) 93

SUMMARY: Nicaragua became an independent country after the Central American Republic finally collapsed in 1838. However, after it gained independence it experienced a rocky political history with frequent civil wars between liberal and conservative elites, compounded by interventions by the United Kingdom and the United States. The regional situation was also quite difficult with numerous political, and occasional military, conflicts between the states of Central America.

In 1910 Nicaragua once again found itself engulfed in civil war. The United States had deployed naval forces to the region to try to preserve its interests. During one particular episode in 1910 a battle for the capital city raged between liberal and conservative armed forces. However, a local U.S. naval commander decided to intervene to stop fighting as many foreigners resided in the city. He therefore dispatched 100 soldiers into the city, and the fighting quickly subsided.

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of a small number of warships and 100 U.S. troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#249) and the CRS report.

1911 China

NAME: American Deployments to the Chinese Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 1911 to July 1913

TARGET STATE(S): China 710

SUMMARY:

Beginning in October 1911, the Chinese Revolution was the source for a lot of civil unrest and turmoil within China's territory. A number of American deployments occurred during this time to protect U.S. interest in the region. For all actions, the only lasting consequence was that the US maintained presence in the region. U.S. forces did not engage in any hostilities in these deployments. The following paragraphs outline instances of U.S. troop deployment in the years during the Chinese Revolution.

In October 1911, the *USS Helena* deployed a small number of marines and sailors to guard the American Consulate, the Standard Oil plant, and the power and light company. The exact number of troops and munitions are not specified. The *USS Abarenda* reinforced troops at Peking. Troop numbers and munitions are not specified. On October 10th, the *USS Rainbow* deployed 15 officers and 360 marines to Shanghai.

On November 4th, 1911, a Chinese officer informed the *USS Albany* that revolutionary forces had taken control over the river in Shanghai. The property of two American cable companies, Great Northern and Commercial, were deemed at risk. The *USS Rainbow* deployed 12 troops to each (24 total) of the cable stations on November 4th where they remained until November 14th. Munitions accompanying the troops were not found during research.

On March 3rd, 1912, 229 soldiers from the US Army's 15th Army Infantry from the *USS Huron* arrived in Peking from Tienstin to reinforce the Legation Garrison. On March 5th, the *USS Buffalo*, *Cincinnati*, and *Abarenda* left from Shanghai to deploy troops at Taku. The number of troops and munitions deployed are unspecified.

On August 24, 1912, a landing force from the *USS Rainbow* was deployed to Kentucky Island and then recalled on the 26th. Another landing force from the *USS Rainbow* was deployed on August 26th, 1912 to Kentucky Island and then were recalled on the 30th. These islands were leased by the US military at the time. The number of the marines in the landing force to both locations is unspecified in all found literature with the only indication being "one company" sent

to Kentucky Island. Given the United States had 55 enlisted men, it is very roughly estimated that 25 marines were in the landing party at both locations.

On July 28, 1913, a landing force from the *USS Rainbow* and *USS Albany* was deployed to Shanghai to protect the International Settlements from rebels and Chinese government troops. This was a cooperative effort with Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and Holland. A total of 40 marines and an unspecified number of machine guns were taken to shore. Troops from the *USS Albany* remained ashore until August 14th and *USS Rainbow* troops remained until August 17th.

SOURCES:

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OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection & Order;
Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: It is estimated that the maximum number of troops deployed were at 1,000. And the maximum number of ships at 6 (*USS Rainbow, Abarenda, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Helena, Albany*) and 15 naval ships were in Chinese waters.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: All cases are very broadly mentioned in CRS. In particular, there is a blanket statement about interventions between 1912 and 1941. The MID dataset does not include any of these interventions. We have chosen to aggregate certain discrete instances of U.S. deployment into one case study.

There are a few interventions that did not have enough supporting evidence to include. A 1911 deployment of one company of troops to Peking (Beijing) from the USS Abarenda does not have any peer reviewed sources. A 1911 deployment to Chinkiang (Zhenjiang) is mentioned in CRS but no sources or dates are found to corroborate this intervention. The March 5th deployment of troops to Taku is briefly mentioned in a peer reviewed source but no follow up sources were found.

1911 Haiti

NAME: Intervention During Rebellion Against Antoine Simon

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2234

DATES: July 16, 1911 – August 3, 1911

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

Between 1911 and 1915, Haiti experienced a series of coups and rebellions. Foreign interests were beginning to invest in Haiti, and by 1911, American laborers were in the process of building a railroad in the country.

In the summer of 1911, a rebellion against Haitian President Antoine Simon took place. The US began maintaining a naval presence in various Haitian ports to protect American lives and interests in the country. On July 16th, the USS *Petrel* was in Port-au-Prince, but by July 22nd, it had left for the northern city of Gonaives. The American Minister in Port-au-Prince cabled the State Department to convey the necessity of an American warship in the capital, and the US cruiser *Des Moines* was dispatched to Port-au-Prince. Three days later, the US Cruiser *Chester* arrived in the harbor of Cap Haitien, and the *Petrel* returned to the capital to monitor the situation as rebels advanced on Port-au-Prince. By July 29th, the US had sent the *Salem* to Port-au-Prince as well.

By August 3rd, Antoine Simon had been deposed. It does not appear that the US landed troops or engaged in combat in Haiti during this intervention. The next four years in Haitian presidential politics would be highly unstable, and the US would ultimately launch a military occupation of Haiti in 1915.

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“Haitian Rebels Win; Simon Now an Exile,” *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1911. Proquest Historical Newspapers. Accessed Nov. 26, 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Protect Economic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of deploying four ships to waters around Haiti.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MID and CRS dataset. We confirm it as a display of force.

1911 Honduras

NAME: General Bonilla's Counter-Rebellion

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 10, 1911 – March 10, 1911

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

When President Manuel Bonilla was overthrown in a rebellion in 1907, his Vice-President Miguel Dávila took power. Once in office, one of President Dávila's most pressing issues was the Honduran national debt, which had grown to over \$120 million. Honduras owed part of this debt to England, and the United States was working with Honduras to refinance the debt so that the U.S. would be their only creditors. By 1909 the U.S. had proposed a plan financed by J.P. Morgan Bank, but by early 1911 President Dávila had still not signed the "Morgan Plan." This debt issue was one of the United States' primary concerns in Honduras during this period.

After leaving the presidency in 1907, General Manuel Bonilla fled to Belize, and then later on to New Orleans. By January 1911, with the Cuyamel Fruit Company's financial backing, General Bonilla was ready to launch his counter-rebellion. He left New Orleans on a ship loaded with military weapons and supplies, and on January 10th, he and his men took Trujillo on the coast of Honduras. The U.S. responded by sending the *USS Tacoma* to Puerto Cortez and tasking the ship's commanding officer with enforcing a neutral zone in and around the city. On January 27th, General Bonilla took La Ceiba, and the next day President Dávila asked for U.S. intervention. The U.S. assistance would only be forthcoming if President Davila signed the Morgan Plan. Reluctantly, President Dávila signed, and the U.S. quickly sent two more ships to Honduran waters: the *USS Marietta* and the *USS Caesar*. The U.S. also landed roughly 230 men, along with 100 British sailors, to protect Puerto Cortez and ensure the safe evacuation of government officials.

From February 21 to March 6, the two sides in the civil war met with U.S. representative Thomas Dawson aboard the *USS Tacoma* to negotiate the peace deal. The conference selected Francisco Bertrand as the provisional president, and on March 10th, the U.S. withdrew from Honduras. One U.S. noncombatant was killed under unknown circumstances during the rebellion. General Bonilla won the presidential elections in October, but the debt issue did not go away. The Honduran legislature rejected the Morgan Plan, and the debt crisis would boil over again, resulting in further U.S. intervention in early 1912.

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OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Policy Change; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 1; Honduran: 0

COSTS: 170 troops and three ships were deployed for roughly 60 days between early January and early March 1911.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Congressional Research Service's (CRS) "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020". The MID case number #1734 was originally assigned to 1911 Guatemala but actually refers to this intervention. It is possible that the *USS Tacoma* passed through Guatemalan waters in January of 1911 in an attempt to intercept General Bonilla when he was on his way to Honduras. However, there is no well-documented U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1911.

1911 Mexico

NAME: The Mexican Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1653; 136; 1775; 321; 2184; 2185

DATES: March 6, 1911 – September 5, 1919

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

The spark that set off the Mexican Revolution was the rigged election of 1910. Mexican President José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz had come to power in 1876 in a coup and had viciously had onto power for nearly 35 years. In the outrage after the staged election, a heterogeneous coalition of opposing political forces organized behind Francisco Ignacio Madero: a wealthy intellectual from the north of Mexico. Fighting erupted all over the country, primarily led by Pancho Villa in the north and Emiliano Zapata in the south. Although nominally in charge, Madero had very little control over the majority of the armed groups fighting on his behalf. With nearly 50,000 U.S. citizens living in Mexico during this time and over \$1 billion in investments, the U.S. had a significant interest in Mexico. The United States first entered the picture on March 6th, 1911, when President Taft ordered 30,000 soldiers to the border in response to the widespread violence in northern Mexico. Although the U.S. did not overtly threaten Porfirio Díaz, this move was interpreted in Mexico as a signal of condemnation for his regime.

On May 24th, 1911, Porfirio Diaz ordered his men to fire on crowds assembled in the capital to protest his rule. The next day he resigned, and shortly after fled the country for Paris. Francisco Madero won the presidential elections held in November of 1911, and the U.S. quickly recognized his government. Soon after Madero came to power, rebellions broke out all over Mexico. On February 4th, 1912, President Taft ordered even more forces to the border in an effort to discourage a revolution to the south. In March, the U.S. placed an arms embargo on all non-government military leaders in Mexico, and in June, Taft sent multiple warships to the coast of Mexico. In September, the U.S. State Department implicitly threatened the Mexican government to pacify the rebellions quickly or face U.S. intervention. Mexican government troops led by General Victoriano Huerta successfully defeated some of the rebellious groups, but the security situation was largely out of control.

In February of 1913, General Huerta deftly suppressed a coup attempt in Mexico City and took advantage of the chaos to depose Madero. One of the February coup's original planners had U.S. support and escaped Mexico on a U.S. warship. By October, General Huerta had firmly cemented his dictatorship, although rebellions led by numerous disconnected factions continued to rage all over Mexico. Pancho Villa re-started his rebellion in the north once Madero fell, and a significant

new challenger named Venustiano Carranza entered the mix. In response to the coup by Huerta, the U.S. government levied sanctions and refused diplomatic recognition. Woodrow Wilson had since become the U.S. president, and Wilson vehemently opposed Huerta. Many Americans were at this point attempting to leave Mexico, and the U.S. sent the *USS Buffalo* to the Yaqui Valley on September 4th to evacuate citizens. In November 1913, Wilson threatened Huerta to resign or the U.S. would support the rebels in the north of Mexico. Wilson backed up this threat by sending the U.S. Army 2nd division to Texas and ordering five U.S. battleships to sit off Mexico's coast near Tampico and Veracruz.

U.S.-Mexican tensions heated up dramatically in April 1914 when Mexican soldiers arrested nine U.S. sailors near the port of Veracruz. The arrests were mostly a misunderstanding, but it provided Wilson with an opportunity to take action against Huerta. On April 21st, Wilson ordered the U.S. Navy to seize Veracruz. Over 6,000 U.S. troops took part in the seizure, and five U.S. ships participated in the battle. The Navy also launched aircraft to bomb the city—a first in U.S. military history. 17 Americans and 126 Mexicans were killed in the battle. The ploy worked, and Huerta resigned in July 1914. The U.S. would occupy Veracruz until November of 1914.

In the wake of Huerta's resignation, there was general chaos in the countryside. Small bands called *caudillos* competed for influence with more powerful actors like Venustiano Carranza and his ally General Álvaro Obregón. Carranza controlled the capital between August and November of 1914 before Pancho Villa, with U.S. backing, took over. Shortly after, in January 1915, General Obregón retook Mexico City, and Carranza was back in charge. Meanwhile, there was significant cross-border violence in the north of Mexico. For years there had been skirmishes between small groups of Mexican bandits and the U.S. Texas Rangers or national guardsmen, but these clashes intensified in 1915. Mexican raiders killed at least 11 U.S. soldiers in 1915 and an unknown number of civilians. The Texas Rangers would respond to these attacks by killing Mexicans and Mexican-Americans indiscriminately. In one incident on August 8th, the Texas Rangers murdered up to 300 Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.

Amid this chaos in June 1915, President Wilson threatened Carranza with military intervention but never took action. By October of 1915, Carranza had consolidated his power sufficiently for the U.S. to finally recognize his government. By then the conflict had narrowed into a war between Carranza and Pancho Villa. In an effort to embarrass Carranza, Villa began more frequent attacks on American citizens. He murdered 16 Americans on a train in Chihuahua on January 6th, 1916, and then on March 9th he launched a raid into Columbus, New Mexico. 18 U.S. soldiers and citizens died in the fighting along with over 100 of Villa's men. In retaliation, President Wilson authorized a large-scale incursion into Mexican territory to go after Villa. In total, over 12,000 U.S. soldiers crossed over into Mexico. The largest battles were fought in Parral and Carrizal Mexico, and there was more violence on the border in Glenn Springs and Boquillas, Texas. The campaign lasted 11 months.

In January 1917, the Mexican government adopted a new constitution that placed Carranza solidly in charge. He won re-election to another four-year term on March 11th, and the conflict

began to cool. However, there continued to be significant violence on the border. U.S. troops entered Mexico to pursue bandits at least three times in 1918 and six times in 1919. The largest of these clashes took place on June 15th in Juarez and El Paso. Over 3,600 U.S. troops crossed into Mexico. At least 150 of Villa's men died in the battle, and at least 35 U.S. soldiers were killed. Throughout 1919, conflicting sources put the number of American troops on or near the border between 20,000-80,000. On August 19th, 1919, an expedition of U.S. soldiers chased bandits across the border near Ojinga, Mexico, and remained in Mexican territory for one week. The last incursion of American troops on Mexican territory during the Mexican Revolutionary War took place between August 28th and September 5th when two U.S. planes flew over the city of Chihuahua on three separate occasions.

On May 21st, 1920, General Obregón turned on Carranza. Along with several other generals, Obregón launched a successful coup, and Carranza was murdered as he fled the capital to Veracruz. Obregón won the presidential elections in September and officially took power in November. Pancho Villa also surrendered in 1920, and the Mexican Revolution officially ended. The United States did not recognize the Obregón government until 1923 when it became evident that General Obregón had a firm grasp on power.

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OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Maintain/Build Foreign Regime; Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 131; Mexican: 554

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 265; Mexican: 878

COSTS: There were 30,000 soldiers stationed on the border in 1911. Taft sent an unknown number of warships to Mexican water in 1912 for at least three months. Four marines landed for one day in September of 1913 from *USS Buffalo*. One source mentions 5 US battleships stationed in Mexican water in July of 1913. In October of 1913 the US evacuated a Mexican revolutionary on a US warship. In April of 1914, 6,000 marines, 4 ships, at least 1 plane participated in the battle for Veracruz. 4000 men remained to occupy the port for 11 months. In March 1916, 12,000 soldiers began an 11-month expedition in Mexican territory. At least 8 aircraft were temporarily involved in those 11 months. By June 1916 there were 112,000 national guardsmen assembled on the border. 10 U.S. troops engaged in a skirmish with Mexican forces in April of 1918. An unknown number of soldiers and cavalry engaged Mexican bandits in March 1918. Small numbers of U.S. troops briefly crossed into Texas in January 1918. There were between 20,000-80,000 troops stationed on the border through 1919, including 9 army air corps units and 10 balloon companies. 5,000 U.S. troops crossed into Mexican territory in June 1919 for 24 hours. In August 1919, a U.S. expedition of unknown size supported by 1 aircraft entered Mexico for 1 week. Between August 28th and September 5th, 1919, two U.S. airplanes made several passes over the city of Chihuahua in northern Mexico.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case was coded as multiple separate interventions in the MID data set as well as in the CRS report. We have chosen to aggregate MID # 1653, The start and end dates listed represent the period in which the U.S. was directly involved in the Mexican Revolution; the revolution actually began slightly before and ended roughly a year after the dates for this case. Given that Mexico's government was continually changing, battles between any Mexican rebel group and U.S. government forces are included in "Battle Deaths."

1912 Cuba

NAME: Confronting Cuban Rebels

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 23, 1912—August 5, 1912.

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

After several years of turmoil following Cuba's liberation from Spain during the American Spanish War and a failed attempt at democratic self-governance that resulted in a brief period of military occupation under the United States, Cuba re-established itself as a weak and fledgling democracy in 1909 with the election of José Miguel Gómez as president.

However, three years after Gomez came to power and the United States relinquished control of Cuba back to a civilian government, an armed uprising again threatened political stability within the country. In 1912, the Gómez administration was confronted with an armed uprising by Afro-Cubans, mainly veterans of the War for Independence. The rebels prior to the uprising established themselves as the political party, Partido Independiente de Color, with the goal of greater representation in government posts through the dismissal of those persons not loyal to the Cuban independence cause and their replacement by war veterans. The party also sought an end to other forms of racial discrimination, improved working conditions, and a free university education. Unable to achieve their objectives in the political arena, in May 1912 the party took to armed rebellion. In response, President Gómez directed a brutal campaign against the rebels. When the latter threatened to destroy foreign property (i.e., American), the U.S. government dispatched 9 naval ships to Havana and Nipe Bay and 500 marines to Guantánamo Bay to prepare for the protection of U.S. lives and property. Although Gómez described these as acts of intervention, he agreed to cooperate with U.S. forces should they be needed, but they were not. The revolt collapsed in June 1912. A majority of the U.S. forces withdrew from Cuba by August 1912, with the exception of one battalion that remained posted in Guantanamo Bay.

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests.

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 500 Marines, 9 Naval ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). We confirm it as a military intervention.

1912 Honduras

NAME: Attempted Seizure at Puerto Cortez

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 7, 1912 – February 15, 1912

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

In early 1912, Honduran President Manuel Bonilla was in negotiations with U.S. banks, including J.P Morgan and company, to secure a loan that would allow Honduras to finance its enormous debt with the United States. President Bonilla had only recently come back to power in late 1911 after a counter-rebellion in which he overthrew ex-President General Miguel Dávila. The \$10,000,000 loan in question in early 1912 was originally proposed to Dávila in early 1911, who accepted the loan and its conditions but failed to get it approved by the Honduran Congress. Part of this loan was needed to make payments on a U.S.-built railway and wharf in Puerto Cortez. On February 6th, 1912 J.P. Morgan's offer for a loan expired. With no avenue for paying their loan obligations, on February 7th the Honduran government issued a decree seizing control of U.S.-owned property Puerto Cortez.

When the U.S. consul in Puerto Cortez learned of the Honduran plans to seize the wharf and railway he asked the commander of the nearby *USS Petrel* for assistance. The gunboat commander appealed to the governor of Puerto Cortez to delay the seizure for 24 hours while the U.S. consulate could consult Washington. The governor refused to wait, and the *USS Petrel* disembarked 75 sailors to protect the wharf and railway office. In response, President Bonilla sent Honduran troops to towns south of Puerto Cortez to stop the trains and prevent shipments of fruit from reaching their cargo ships in Puerto Cortez. The crisis was short-lived, and the U.S. troops withdrew sometime before February 15th. However, after this incident, the Honduran government never followed through on their threat to take the railway and wharf.

With \$124,000,000 in debt to the United States, the Honduran government continued to negotiate for a loan. By April the government was in talks with a different U.S. bank for a much smaller loan of \$500,000.

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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 0

COSTS: 75 U.S. marines deployed for at most 8 days in the town of Puerto Cortez. *USS Petrel* deployed to Puerto Cortez for about 8 days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is listed in the CRS document of U.S. usage of force abroad. The exact duration of the invention is unclear, but it lasts at most 8 days.

1912 Nicaragua

NAME: Liberal Uprising

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 4, 1912 - November 3, 1912.

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC), 93

SUMMARY:

Following Jose Estrada's Rebellion and the 1909 revolution that the US helped facilitate, Nicaraguan representatives signed the Dawson Agreements on October 27, 1910. This required Nicaragua to hold free elections in 1912 (after President Jose Estrada and Vice-President Adolfo Diaz had served two years), Nicaragua and the US would form a commission to deal with the debts Nicaragua owed to American and European creditors, and that the US would give loans to Nicaragua until it regained financial stability. On June 6, 1911 the US and Nicaragua signed a treaty for the post of customs collector by the U.S. Government and private bank approval. Diaz had also essentially given control of the Nicaraguan national rail to a U.S. company. The Senate refused to ratify the Knox-Castrillo Treaty that would have provided loans to Nicaragua. Pressed for funds, Nicaragua turned to private banks in New York for loans. This received the support of the US Department of State but not of the US Senate. In this way, fiscal control of the Nicaraguan government shifted to private American hands.

In 1911, instability rose within the Nicaraguan government. After Emiliano Chamorro, leader of the National Assembly, drafted a new constitution that limited the presidential powers, Estrada forced Chamorro to flee. General Luis Mena filled the new assembly with his own supporters, which led Estrada to attempt to jail him for "contemplating treason". This was not well received and Estrada was forced to resign, elevating Diaz to President. Meanwhile, General Mena continued as Minister of War and leader of the National Assembly. Mena gave his support for President Diaz in exchange for Diaz's support of Mena in the next election.

On July 29, 1912, Mena initiated a violent revolt against the Conservative party. In light of this, the United States demanded the safety of American lives and property. However Diaz could not guarantee this without U.S. support given Mena's army. Diaz invited American troops to land in Nicaragua to protect American interests themselves. On August 4th, 2,500 US marines and sailors landed in Corinto on the Western coast of Nicaragua. At this time, in Nicaragua, there was a general sentiment of strong hatred for Americans. Although the US forces were sent to "protect American lives and property" they also actively supported the Conservative Party under Diaz. US forces were also deployed to provide relief to Americans in Nicaragua. After landing on the coast, the US forces secured the Pacific Railway, moved on to Mangua, and proceeded to

attack Masaya Hill and Leon. Although many battles were won by the Conservatives and US forces, in Managua, two American citizens were killed and American property was seized and sacked. On October 6th, the Liberal rebels surrendered, and by October 10th the revolt was over. US forces remained until the general election on November 2, 1912. The Conservative Party under Diaz won the elections, and with US pressure Mena left the country. US forces were gradually withdrawn with the exception of a small force of 100 to 130 marines who remained stationed in Managua as a Legation Guard through August 5, 1925 to ensure the stability of Nicaragua.

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"Nicaragua." *Outlook* (1893-1924), Oct 19, 1912, 325, <https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/magazines/nicaragua/docview/136625104/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Pandolfe, Frank C. *The Role of the United States in Nicaragua from 1912-1933*. Digital Collections and Archives, Tufts University, 1985. <https://dl.tufts.edu/concern/pdfs/41687v319>.

"The Revolt in Nicaragua." *The Independent ...Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature, and the Arts* (1848-1921), Sep 12, 1912, 586, <https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/magazines/revolt-nicaragua/docview/90607290/se-2?accountid=14434>.

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"U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 1911/1912." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 2009. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108629.htm>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 7 Americans, Unknown number of Nicaraguans

TOTAL DEATHS: 7 Americans, Unknown number of Nicaraguans

COSTS: Deployment of 2,500 marines and sailors

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only referenced in the CRS Report.

1912 Panama

NAME: 1912 Panamanian Elections

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: May 13, 1912 - January 21, 1914

TARGET STATE(S): Panama (PAN), 95

SUMMARY:

On May 3rd, 1912 President Pablo Arosemena requested American oversight of Panama's presidential elections after a few years of presidential turnover following Obaldia's death in March 1910 out of concern that they be fairly conducted. On May 13th, the U.S. agreed to monitor the elections and sent 215 personnel, along with selling Panama 500 rifles to arm the police guarding the polls as well.

The elections were held on June 30th and on July 14th, Belisario Porras of Partido Liberal won the presidency after the Union Patrioca party's nominee, Pedro Diaz, withdrew two days earlier. American troops remained in Panama until January 21, 1914.

SOURCES:

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"Panama (1903 - present)." University of Central Arkansas. Accessed December 5, 2020.

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"Porras Wins Panama." *The New York Times*. July 15, 1912.

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"Want US to Intervene" *The New York Times*. May 4, 1912.

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OBJECTIVE:

Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of stationing 215 soldiers to oversee elections and remain in Panama

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the CRS Report.

1912 Turkey

NAME: Constantinople Intervention

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 18, 1912-December 3, 1912

TARGET STATE(S): Turkey, TUR 640

SUMMARY:

The First Balkan War began between on October 8, 1912 when Montenegro of the Balkan League (the kingdoms of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece) declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The remainder of the Balkan kingdoms declared war on the declining Ottomans in the following weeks. The conflict arose so that the Balkan kingdoms could conquer the Ottoman Empire's remaining European territory and divide the spoils among themselves and the Russian Empire-their Great Power protector.¹

Within weeks, the Balkan allies had pushed the Ottoman forces back to the capital, Constantinople. On November 17, the State Department informed the Ottoman government that the United States would land "about 2,500 soldiers...with some 26 guns"² in Constantinople to protect foreign residents and their property, the American embassy and delegation, and a girl's school in Arnaukeul.³ The American soldiers were joined by troops engaged in similar missions from Russia, France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy.

The Ottomans rapid defeat lead to an armistice on December 3, 1912. The American soldiers and guns returned to the USS *Scorpion* the following day, December 4, 1912.⁴ War returned the following year, as the radical nationalist Young Turks completed a coup of the in January 1913 and the First Balkan War resumed. The War finally ended on May 30, 1913 with a peace agreement that handed the remaining Ottoman territory in Europe to the various Balkan kingdoms and establishing the independent state of Albania.⁵

¹ Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Balkan Wars." Encyclopædia Britannica. October 01, 2018. Accessed January 06, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars>.

² United States. Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919. 1352-353.

³ "United States First to Land Marines at Constantinople." *Sausalito News* (Sausalito, CA), November 23, 1912, 28th ed., sec. 48. Accessed January 6, 2019. <https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=SN19121123.2.23&e=-----en--20--1--txt-txIN-----1>.

⁴ United States. Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919. 1352-353.

⁵ Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Balkan Wars." Encyclopædia Britannica. October 01, 2018. Accessed January 06, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection; Protect Economics Interests; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies: American and related foreign interests were protected without any loss of life

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Information not available

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: N/A

1914 Dominican Republic

NAME: Intervention During Instability in the Dominican Republic

DISPUTE NUMBER: 69

DATES: June 26th, 1914 – December 4th, 1914

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic, 42

SUMMARY:

In 1905, the US assumed control of Dominican customs houses after Santo Domingo failed to pay its European creditors. The US collected and dispersed Dominican customs revenues, giving it substantial influence over the country's finances and politics. Theodore Roosevelt had advocated this arrangement in order to curb European influence in the region.

In November 1911, Dominican President Ramon Caceres was assassinated, and the Dominican Republic entered a period of instability. After a series of short interim presidencies, Jose Bordas Valdez became the president in April 1913. In September 1913, an anti-Bordas revolutionary movement developed, and the US attempted to mediate. In March of 1914, General Desiderio Arias launched a rebellion against Bordas.

On June 26th, the Bordas government began shelling the town of Puerto Plata. The same day, the American ship USS *Machias* fired on the location of the Bordas forces, ending the bombardment. The *South Carolina* had also attempted to prevent the bombardment. This was done to protect foreign lives and property, rather than to assist the revolutionary forces.

On August 6th, the US oversaw a ceasefire between the opposing sides, and presided over presidential elections later that year. Juan Isidro Jimenez assumed the presidency on December 4th, 1914. While American forces do not appear to have suffered any losses, approximately 500 people were killed in the course of the instability.

Desiderio Arias would launch another rebellion in April 1916, and US forces would return for a multi-year occupation of the Dominican Republic.

SOURCES:

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Moore, Colin D. 2017. *American Imperialism and the State, 1893-1921* (Cambridge University Press).

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US Department of State. No Date. "Dominican Republic, 1916-1924." <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/108649.htm> (Accessed January 30, 2021).

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US Navy. 2016. "Machias I (Gunboat No. 5)." Naval History and Heritage Command. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/m/machias-i.html> (Accessed January 30, 2021).

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

US: 0

Dominican: Unknown

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS:

US: 0

Dominican: 500 (Mullenbach)

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Cost of maintaining naval presence near the Dominican Republic; cost of overseeing elections.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

- The complement of the *Machias* was 154, although it is not clear how many were aboard the *Machias* and *South Carolina* at this time.
- The dyadic MIDs dataset (3.1) lists no fatalities on either side, although Mullenbach lists 500 killed in the course of the instability.
- The dyadic MIDs dataset (3.1) lists the highest action taken by the Dominican Republic as 1, but because the Bordas government was bombarding Puerto Plata in the context of a domestic insurrection, we interpret the US intervention as a clash.
- The MIDs dataset dates this dispute from March 25th, 1914 to November 29th, 1916. We follow the CRS dataset and date the beginning of this episode to the protection of Puerto Plata in June 1914. We date the end of this episode to the inauguration of a new president in the Dominican Republic on December 4th, 1914. We treat separately the sustained American occupation of the Dominican Republic, which began in May 1916.

1914 Haiti

NAME: Landings During Revolutionary Instability in Haiti

DISPUTE NUMBER: 100

DATES: January 27, 1914 – December 27, 1914

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

Haiti suffered from chronic instability between 1911 and 1915. Coups and revolutions occurred regularly, and several European states began deploying ships near Port-au-Prince to protect their consulates and commercial interests, as did the United States.

In January of 1914, Haitian President Michel Oreste was overthrown by General Oreste Zamor. On January 27th of that year, US Marines from the *South Carolina* began landing in Haiti, deploying 120 personnel in Port-au-Prince to protect the American consulate, alongside French and German naval personnel. The Marines departed on February 9th. On February 16th, Marines from the *USS Wheeling* landed in the northern city of Port-de-Paix, departing again after six days. On February 20th, 65 Marines from the *Wheeling* landed at Cap-Haitien on February 20th to protect foreigners and their property during unrest in the city.

In October 1914, a revolutionary attempt against the Zamor government brought a new round of instability. On October 19th, 117 men from the *USS Tacoma* landed at Cap-Haitien, again to protect foreign residents and property. This force departed on November 7th. On October 30th, the *USS Hancock* was sent to Cap-Haitien with 800 Marines, while the *USS Kansas* was sent to Port-au-Prince, but no landings were made. American signalmen from the *Hancock* were also sent to protect the French legation between November 2nd and November 6th, where members of the ousted Zamor government had taken refuge.

Finally, in December 1914, a group of Marines took \$500,000 from the Haitian National Bank, with orders to transport the money to New York City. The Haitian National Bank was controlled by French, American, and German commercial interests, and functioned as the Haitian treasury. Haitian heads of state periodically attempted to appropriate money from the bank, and fearing that Haitian President Theodore would attempt the same, the bank requested that the US transport a portion of the bank's assets out of Haiti. On December 14th, Marines oversaw the transport of \$500,000 in gold from the bank to the American warship *Machias*. The money was then taken to the National City Bank of New York.

SOURCES:

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Lillich, Richard B. 2002. "Appendix I: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II," in *Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, eds. Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen. *International Law Studies*, Vol. 77 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College).

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US Navy. "Machias I (Gunboat No. 5)." 2016. Naval History and Heritage Command. Accessed December 15, 2020. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/m/machias-i.html>

US Navy. "Kansas II (Battleship No. 21)." 2016. Naval History and Heritage Command. Accessed December 15, 2020. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/k/kansas-ii.html>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of maintaining continuous naval presence near Haiti, including at least six ships near Haitian waters and deployment of 302 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We characterize the multiple landings in 1914 as a continuous intervention, because they were all meant to address threats to foreign lives and property during a period of heightened political instability. We differ from MID (Dispute # 100), which dates the Haitian National Bank dispute from December 13th, 1914 to September 16th, 1915. This overlaps with the nearly twenty-year US occupation of Haiti (1915-1934), which we treat separately.

1915 Haiti

NAME: U.S. Occupation of Haiti

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 28, 1915 – May 18, 1920

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti, 41

SUMMARY

Several revolutions took place in Haiti between 1911 and 1915. The United States and some European countries maintained naval presences near Haiti during these years, landing occasionally to protect their consulates and various economic interests. The United States launched a long-term military occupation of Haiti beginning in July 1915, shortly after Haitian President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was overthrown by domestic rivals. The US occupation sought to stabilize Haiti and weaken European political and economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

On July 28th, 340 personnel from the USS *Washington* landed in Port-au-Prince. At about the same time, American troops from the USS *Nashville* and USS *Eagle* landed in the northern city of Cap Haitien. The USS *Connecticut* and USS *Tennessee* provided reinforcements, and approximately 2,000 marines had landed in Haiti by the end of August. That same month, the United States installed Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave as the new president of Haiti. The US also established a Haitian gendarmerie, and assumed control of state finances through the Haitian-American Treaty of 1915. The occupation forces dissolved the legislature, prevented local elections, and censored critical journalism.

The occupation undertook several major infrastructure projects, including the construction of roads, telephone networks, irrigation systems, schools, and hospitals in Haiti. In order to build the new road network, the American occupation relied on corvee labor. A peasant army led by Charlemagne Peralte rose up against the abusive corvee system, launching an insurgency in 1919. American forces conducted a counterinsurgency campaign against the guerrillas, killing Peralte in October 1919. In May of 1920, US forces killed the de facto leader of the remaining insurgents, Benoit Batrville. Although the insurgency had ended, the United States maintained an occupying presence in Haiti until August 15th, 1934.

SOURCES:

Downing, Timothy J. 2017. "Responsive Approaches in Small Wars: The Army and Marine Corps in the Philippines, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic." (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College).

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Schmidt, Hans. 1995. *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press).

Streng, Peter J. 1995. "Lessons from the Marine Intervention in Haiti, 1915-1934." Master's Thesis. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College) <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA299770.pdf>. Accessed February 1, 2021.

US Navy. "US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934." <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-occupation-of-haiti-1915-1934.html>. Accessed January 11, 2021.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for US and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

US: 14-16 (Schmidt 1995, p. 102); 13 (Lillich 2002)

Haiti: 2,250 - 3,250 (Schmidt 1995, pp. 102-3)

TOTAL DEATHS:

US: 14-16 (Schmidt 1995, p. 102); 13 (Lillich 2002)

Haiti: 2,274 – 3,274 (Schmidt 1995, pp. 102-3; p. 200)

COSTS: Costs of continuous military occupation; costs of administering and governing in Haiti for 19 years.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This intervention appears in the CRS dataset, but not the MID dataset. Although the US occupation continued until 1934, we date the end of the conflict to May 18th, 1920, when US forces killed insurgent leader Benoit Batrville, effectively ending the stage of armed conflict with major combat operations and yielding an era of ongoing U.S. military occupation.

1916 China

NAME: Nanjing Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 29, 1916

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

In the early 20th century many western powers deployed military personnel to China to protect their economic investments. The United States and the United Kingdom stood as the two main western powers patrolling areas of economic activity. The Yangtze river was an especially important location as it constituted the area with large industrial investment. In 1900, the United States deployed a number of gunboats to patrol the Yangtze river for a number of decades.

On March 29, a naval landing party from the *USS Quiros*, a river patrol ship, went ashore in Nanjing to subdue a riot and protect American property on the premises of the International Export Company. The riot was quelled the same day, and the sailors returned to their boat immediately.

SOURCES:

Angus Konstam & Tony Bryan. Yangtze River Gunboats 1900-49. *New Vanguard 181*. Osprey Publishing. 2011.

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Cost of sailors going ashore for one day.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1916 Dominican Republic

NAME: Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic

DISPUTE NUMBER: 322

DATES: May 13, 1916 — November 29, 1924

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic (DOM), 42

SUMMARY:

Following the Dominican Republic's liberation from Spain in 1865, the country experienced a continuous pattern of presidential turnover, civil wars, and financial insolvency. Many of the *de facto* governments after 1865 and prior to 1916 borrowed substantially from foreign governments to the point where debt and financial collapse were unavoidable unless another entity stepped in to aid in economic and financial reconstruction. As a result, the United States took over control of Dominican finances at the request of the government. Meanwhile, the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to deteriorate until the government of Juan Isidro Jimenes finally collapsed in 1911. Jimenes' Secretary of War, General Desiderio Arias, launched an insurrection in an attempt to seize power from the Jimenes regime, which threw the Dominican Republic into a state of chaos and civil war.

During the ongoing conflict, the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo was struck several times by artillery fire provoking a U.S. military response to provide protection to threatened U.S. citizens and end the insurrection. Several naval ships and marine regiments deployed into San Domingo City to stabilize the region and then quickly put down General Arias' revolution. The arrival of U.S. naval forces in San Domingo forced General Arias to retreat to the city of Santiago where he fortified himself and re-established his forces. All naval forces were placed under direct command of Colonel Pendleton, who was tasked with capturing General Arias and putting down the rebellion. However, General Arias and his revolutionaries surrendered on July 6, 1916, as Colonel Pendleton's forces prepared to launch an offensive on Santiago.

After failure to reach a compromise between the hostile parties, the U.S. established a military occupation and government to promote peace and stability while working to build a civilian-led Dominican government. The U.S. occupation lasted until July 12, 1924, when a constitutional government was inaugurated, and all responsibilities of the military government were relinquished to the newly elected civilian government. American force withdrawal was finalized on September 17, 1924.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry A. "One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934" History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C. (1974) pp. 69-71

Fuller, Stephen M, and Cosmas, Graham A. "Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924." Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps : for Sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests.

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: United States: 16 Marines
Revolutionaries: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: 195

COSTS: 3,000 marines. 2 Naval ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MID and CRS dataset.

1917 China

NAME: Chungking Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 3 - 5, 1917

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY: By the second half of the 1910s, China was in political disarray. Centralized power was in turmoil and thousands of individuals were killed due to political violence. During this period, American Naval gunboats on the Yangtze went ashore regularly to protect American interests and lives.

On December 3, 1917, a landing party of armed guards came ashore at Chungking in response to a political crisis to protect the U.S. consulate and the lives of the legation. Landing parties from Japanese and British gunboats were also sent ashore to protect their respective consulates. Troops stayed onshore for two nights and two days before returning to their boats.

SOURCES:

Angus Konstam & Tony Bryan. Yangtze River Gunboats 1900-49. *New Vanguard 181*. Osprey Publishing, 2011.

“Appendix A: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II.” *International Law Studies*, Volume 77: Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, (2001).
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United States. Department of State. Office of the Solicitor. *Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces: Memorandum*. Third Revised Edition with Supplemental Appendix up to 1933. ed. Department of State Publication; 538, pg. 88. 1934.

“2. China (1900-present).” Political Science. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed 7 April 2021. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/china-1900-present/>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

COSTS: Deployment of at least one U.S. flagged gunboat. Unknown number of troops deployed onshore.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1917 Cuba

NAME: Disputed Cuban Election

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 1, 1917 - February, 1922

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

Cuban politics remained volatile for a number of years after it secured independence from Spain with the assistance of the United States during the American-Spanish War in 1898. Following a period of military occupation by the United States, several attempts at peaceful democratic transition and interventions by the United States, civil unrest continued to be prevalent in Cuba well into the country's entrance into World War I.

The United States again threatened intervention in 1917 when incumbent President Mario Garcia Menocal resorted to electoral fraud to continue his presidency. The Liberal Party took up arms in February 1917, as a response to President Menocal's efforts to corrupt the election process. As a result of the rising volatility, The United States sought to mediate an end to the fighting and the electoral issues that caused it, but Menocal rejected the offer. With the United States fully engaged in the European theater of World War I, it reluctantly took to supporting Cuba's Menocal's regime to preserve stability and to protect its own interests in the country. The United States mainly supported Menocal through arms and munitions, but on March 1, the following ships of the Atlantic Fleet landed their Marine detachments at various places, mostly in Oriente Province: Connecticut, Machias, April, Michigan, Montana, New York, Olympia, South Carolina, and Texas. In addition to these detachments, the 24th Company stationed at the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay was moved to the interior of the country from March 1st to 27th. Nothing materialized as the revolt fizzled following government military victories in March and April 1917. While the uprisings were quickly put down by Menocal's regime, the last of the marine detachments did not fully withdraw until February 1922.

SOURCES:

Ellsworth, Harry A. "One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934" History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C. (1974) pp. 63-64

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http://ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?auth=tufts&url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/mcf_cubus/united_states_interventions_1906_1920/0?institutionId=991

Office of the Historian. "Foreign Relations of the United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of The United States, With The Annual Message Of The President Transmitted To Congress December 4, 1917, Cuba: Political affairs. Election disputes. Attitude of the United States. Plot against the life of President Menocal. Revolutionary outbreaks in several Provinces. Attitude of the United States towards insurrection. Reelection and inauguration of President Menocal." U.S. Department of State. 2010. Documents 431-564.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests.

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: 600-1,200 Marines. 9 Naval ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) data set, page 9.

1917 Germany

NAME: Seizure of German vessels in American ports

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 6th, 1917

TARGET STATE(S): Germany (GMY), 255

SUMMARY:

1917 represented a consequential year and a major turning point in World War I. The Allied Powers consisting of France, Britain, Russia, Italy, and Japan were embroiled in several military engagements with the Central Powers, consisting of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The United States adopted a policy of neutrality when the war began in 1914 to avoid the global conflict and maintain positive relationships with both the Allied and Central Powers. However, the United States' relationship with Germany rapidly deteriorated as the conflict progressed in part due to Germany's unrestricted use of submarine warfare.

Over the course of the war, Germany began deploying U-boats and submarines to attack and sink Allied owned and operated ships in the Atlantic Ocean. A number of these ships, many of which were unarmed cargo, trade, and commercial vessels, were US controlled and/or carried American citizens.¹ The increasing number of American casualties because of Germany's aggressive naval tactics led to an antagonistic posturing between the United States and the Imperial State of Germany. Despite several promises to restrict their attacks to war vessels, in February 1917 Germany reneged and re-engaged in their unrestricted submarine warfare campaign. This, along with several other factors, led the United States to declare war against Germany on April 2, 1917, and join World War I, aligning with the Allied Powers.

On April 6th, 1917, the United States seized 87 German ships docked in various American harbors. On June 30th, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed Executive Order No. 2651, which authorized the possession and commandeering of these vessels for use in the United States' war effort.

SOURCES:

Blazich Jr., Frank. "United States Navy and World War I: 1914–1922" *Naval History and Heritage Command: United States Navy*. 2015. pp 42-43.

Doenecke, J. (2011). And the War Came: March–April 1917. In *Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I* (pp. 278-299). University Press of Kentucky. Retrieved February 5, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jcfv4.14>

¹ Scott, James Brown. A survey of international Relations between the United States and Germany, August 1, 1914-April 6, 1917 : Based on Official Documents. New York (State): Oxford University Press, 1917, C1918, 1918.

Scott, James Brown. *A survey of international Relations between the United States and Germany, August 1, 1914-April 6, 1917 : Based on Official Documents*. New York (State): Oxford University Press, 1917, C1918, 1918.

Woodrow Wilson, "Executive Order 2651, June 30, 1917" *The Office of the Historian, The United States Department of State*.1917.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917Supp02v02/d396>

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change, Protecting Economic Interests, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies.

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: None

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the CRS and MID dataset. The date in the backlog of this case study has been changed to 1917. Originally, the dataset had incorrectly indicated this case took place in 1916.

1917 World War I

NAME: World War I

DISPUTE NUMBER: 257

DATES: April 6, 1917 – November 11, 1918

TARGET STATE(S): Germany (255), Austria-Hungary (300), Ottoman Empire (Turkey) (640), Bulgaria (355)

SUMMARY: After reviewing the broad outlines of the war, this narrative focuses on U.S. participation in the conflict.

World War I began as an immediate consequence of the July 28, 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne) in Sarajevo at the hands of a separatist Bosnian Serb. Tensions across Europe had otherwise been simmering for decades, with political crises, secret alliances, arms races, and smaller wars that had managed to avoid widespread destruction. After Serbia, backed by Russia, refused to honor all of Austria-Hungary's strict demands as a response to Ferdinand's assassination, Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, declared war on Serbia. France, meanwhile, had an ongoing alliance with Russia. Within just days of the assassination, great power war had broken out across Europe.

In an attempt to conquer France quickly so that it could focus on Russia, Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914 as part of the Schlieffen Plan. This move brought Great Britain into the fold, on the side of France and Russia ("the Allies"). Britain also had an ongoing alliance with Japan, which soon sided with the Allies. Within another few months, the Ottoman Empire joined Germany and Austria-Hungary ("the Central Powers"). Later, in 1915, Bulgaria also joined the Central Powers, while Italy abrogated its defensive alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary to join the Allies. Other powers would participate (or be forced to participate, in the case of colonies) as violence spread across the world; European leaders originally envisioned that the war would end before 1915, but it dragged on for years, with little to no change in boundaries on the Western Front from the fall of 1914 until the spring of 1918.

Throughout this time, the United States remained neutral. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had been re-elected in 1916 with the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War." Still, Wilson's policies were not strictly neutral. For instance, he turned a blind eye to Britain's effective blockade of Germany and minefields in the North Sea while arguing with Germany over its submarine policy targeting mercantile shipping. The U.S. did not want innocent Americans on merchant ships killed (as happened with the *Lusitania* in 1915). Germany, meanwhile, did not want ships transporting weapons or supplies to its enemies.

Tensions eventually bubbled over in February 1917, when Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare and sank several U.S. merchant ships. In response, Wilson broke off diplomatic relations and asked Congress to declare war on Germany, which it did on April 6, 1917. Apart from Germany's submarine policy, scholars also argue that Wilson's entrance to WWI stemmed from a desire to shape the postwar settlement and the future international system.

The United States joined the war as an "Associate" of the Allies, not as a formal part of the alliance itself. This characterized the U.S. conception of its role: on the side of the Allies, but playing its own part in the war effort. Still, French and British armies were in deep need of help and pressed the U.S. to supply troops for "amalgamation" (integration). Throughout the rest of the war, both strategies were executed: the U.S. supplied troops to French and British armies in moments of emergency, but it also demarcated its own sector to conduct independent operations.

To support the Allied war effort, Wilson had to raise significant forces to ship to Europe. At the time, the U.S. Army was about 208,000 strong, a fraction of the size of major European armies. Wilson signed the Selective Service Act in May, which added millions of Americans to the military in the first conscription since the Civil War. Over 4.7 million Americans would join the U.S. military during WWI. Over 2 million made it to France, and 1.25 million of those saw combat.

U.S. troops in France formed the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), which primarily fought on the Western Front (a small number also fought on the Italian front in late 1918). The vast majority of U.S. engagements and battles were on land. Still, the U.S. Navy contributed significantly by shipping troops and supplies, supplying dreadnoughts to the British fleet, mining the North Sea, battling German U-Boats, and providing reconnaissance through naval aircraft. A number of marine brigades also fought on the Western Front throughout 1918. The arrival of U.S. forces, at a more general level, buoyed Allied morale. When the first American troops arrived in Paris in July 1917, hundreds of thousands of French people cheered them on in a parade along the Champs Elysee.

The depth of American participation in the war effort paralleled its readiness and force strength on the European continent, which built slowly throughout 1917 and 1918. The U.S. suffered its first combat deaths in September 1917. As only 174,664 U.S. troops had arrived in France by December 31, 1917, most of the year was spent training or in scattered engagements.

The majority of U.S. participation was contained in four primary campaigns: the May-July 1918 campaign to repel a German drive toward Paris in the Aisne-Marne region, the July-August 1918 counteroffensive against the Germans in the Aisne-Marne, the St. Mihiel operation in September 1917, and the Meuse-Argonne campaign immediately afterward until the end of the war.

By March 1918, 300,000 American had landed in France and were preparing for action. A May 27 German offensive pushed the French to 50 miles outside of Paris. Together with the Americans, the French prevented a German drive toward Paris and blunted any further advance.

By July, 1 million Americans had landed in France and were arriving at a rate of 10,000 per day. Soon, the French and Americans launched a successful counteroffensive in the Aisne-Marne, cutting off German supply lines, causing the Germans to withdraw, and removing the threat to Paris.

The St. Mihiel operation was General John Pershing's (who led the American forces) first engagement leading an independent U.S. Army ("First Army") in France. He had been building toward this arrangement since the U.S. joined the war (though it was not entirely independent as 4 French divisions joined the 7 U.S. divisions at St. Mihiel, and the U.S. had relied on the French and British for training, supplies, and artillery). The operation, which began on September 12, was a massive success, as U.S. forces quickly overwhelmed a base the Germans had held for 3 years.

Following St. Mihiel, Pershing led his forces to the Meuse-Argonne area alongside the French to cut vital German rail communications, launching their first attacks on September 26. The Meuse-Argonne offensive was part of a larger campaign, involving 220 divisions across the Western Front. This "grand offensive" was organized by French General Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Allied commander, to sever German supply lines and push the Germans out of France. The United States focused on Meuse-Argonne, but also contributed divisions to British and French sectors elsewhere along the front, contributing 42 divisions in total.

The Meuse-Argonne was a slow and bloody campaign involving 1.2 million U.S. troops. Roughly 26,000 Americans lost their lives in this campaign (half of the total U.S. dead from WWI), and the U.S. suffered an additional 95,000 casualties. Ultimately, the Allied campaign reversed gains made by Germany during their spring offensive and pushed them even further back behind the so-called "Hindenburg Line." With compromised supply and transport lines, Germany began retreating.

At this stage, in late October, 1918, Germany faced near certain military defeat, a shortage of food and supplies, an exhausted public, and revolts. The leader of Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II, fled the country, as a new government (the Weimar Republic) sued for peace. On the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month (11am, November 11), an armistice was signed.

The terms of the postwar peace crystallized in the Versailles Treaty signed on June 28, 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference. Apart from high debts Germany was made to pay the Allies, Germany relinquished territory in Europe and abroad. Both Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire dissolved and the League of Nations was established, though without U.S. support.

The significance of the war is difficult to overstate. The world witnessed an unprecedented amount of death and destruction, outdone only by WWII two decades later. Excepting the Russo-German front, the battles of WWI were, on average, deadlier than the WWII ones. European countries suffered massively. WWI represented a pivot to modern warfighting, given its widespread use of planes, submarines, radio, machine guns, and tanks. And the United States

established itself, not just as a major power on the world stage, but one that was willing to commit millions of troops to faraway conflicts for the first time in its history. Finally, the structural deficiencies of the Versailles Treaty and its implementations (giving Germany both the motive and capabilities to re-arm) directly contributed to the outbreak of World War II only twenty years later.

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Congressional Research Service. 2020. "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics." <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf>. (Accessed April 21, 2021).

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“US Ship Force Levels, 1886-Present.” 2017. Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html> (accessed April 21, 2021)

OBJECTIVE: Defend/Acquire Territory; Policy Change; Economic Protection

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- US: 53,402 (CRS report, 2)
- Russia: 1.7 million (Clodfelter, 431)
- France: 1.37 million (Clodfelter, 431)
- Great Britain: 908,371 (Clodfelter, 431)
- Italy: 320,000 (Clodfelter, 431)
- Romania: 335,706 (Clodfelter, 432)
- Serbia: 45,000 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Belgium: 13,715 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Portugal: 1,935 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Greece: 5,000 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Montenegro: 3,000 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Albania: unknown
- Japan: < 1,000
- Germany: 1.8 million (Clodfelter, 434)
- Austria-Hungary: 1.29 million (Clodfelter, 434)
- Ottoman Empire: 243,598 (Clodfelter, 434)
- Bulgaria: 75,844 (Clodfelter, 434)

Per capita battle deaths:

- US: 1.1% of 4.7 million mobilized
- Russia: 14.2% of 12 million mobilized
- France: 16.3% of 8.41 million mobilized
- Great Britain: 10.2% of 8.9 million mobilized
- Italy: 5.4% of 5.9 million mobilized
- Romania: 45% of 750,000 mobilized
- Serbia: 6.4% of 707,343 mobilized
- Belgium: 5.1% of 267,000 mobilized
- Portugal: 3.0% of 65,166 mobilized
- Greece: 2.2% of 230,000 mobilized
- Montenegro: 6% of 50,000 mobilized
- Albania: unknown
- Japan: < 1% of 800,000
- Germany: 16.4% of 11 million mobilized
- Austria-Hungary: 16.5% of 7.8 million
- Ottoman Empire: 8.1% of 3.0 million
- Bulgaria: 6.3% of 1.2 million

TOTAL DEATHS:

- US: 116,516 deaths (CRS report, 2)
- Russia: 3.7 million (2 million civilians) (Clodfelter, 431)
- France: 1.41 million (40,000 civilians) (Clodfelter, 431)
- Great Britain: 939,004 (30,633 civilians) (Clodfelter, 431)
- Italy: 463,000 (98,000 disease; 45,000 as POWs) (Clodfelter, 431)
- Romania: 610,706 (275,000 civilians) (Clodfelter, 432)
- Serbia: 327,000-777,000 (82,000 disease; between 200,000-650,000 civilians) (Clodfelter, 433)
- Belgium: 67,715 (24,000 other military deaths; 30,000 civilian) (Clodfelter, 433)
- Portugal: 7,222 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Greece: 155,098 (18,098 other military; 132,000 civilians) (Clodfelter, 433)
- Montenegro: 3,000 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Albania: 10,000 (Clodfelter, 433)
- Japan: 1,344 (Clodfelter, 433)
- China: 2,500+ (Clodfelter, 433)
- Germany: 2.6 million (762,106 civilians) (Clodfelter, 434)
- Austria-Hungary: 1.59 million (300,000 civilians) (Clodfelter, 434)
- Ottoman Empire: 2.85 million (466,759 non-battle dead; 2.15 million civilians) (Clodfelter, 434)
- Bulgaria: 375,000 (25,500 other military/disease; 275,000 civilian) (Clodfelter, 434)

- **Total:** 8.6 million combatant + 6.6 million non-combatant = 15.2 million deaths (Clodfelter, 430)

Per capita total deaths:

- US: .005% of population
- Russia: 0.93% of population
- France: 3.5% of population
- Great Britain: 1.7% of population
- Italy: 1.2% of population
- Romania: 4.2% of population
- Serbia: 8.3% of population
- Belgium: 0.88% of population
- Greece: 2.7% of population
- Japan: .002% of population
- Germany: 3.1% of population
- Austria-Hungary: 2% of population
- Ottoman Empire: 16% of population
- Bulgaria: 0.5% of population

COSTS:

The Congressional Research Service estimates that World War I cost the U.S. \$334 billion in FY 2011 dollars. The U.S. mobilized 4.7 million Americans at its highest point. Clodfelter estimates 740 U.S. planes were in operation, and the Naval History and Heritage Command estimates the U.S. Navy had 774 active ships on November 11, 1918.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

The US technically did not declare war on the Ottoman Empire or Bulgaria, but there is no mistaking that it was effectively at war with them (it declared war on Germany on April 6, 1918 and Austria-Hungary on December 7, 1917).

Data on casualties are notoriously imprecise, especially for civilian deaths. Given that the 1918 flu overlapped with the war, disentangling civilian deaths (especially from disease) that were war-related is especially complex.

For State B deaths (in battles and total) we use the combined figures for Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire, although most of those deaths were not caused by U.S. actions.

1918 Croatia

NAME: The Adriatic Question

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 10, 1918 - October 7, 1920

TARGET STATE(S): Italy (ITA), 325, Croatia (CRO), 344

SUMMARY:

Following the end of the First World War, Italy claimed to areas on the Eastern Adriatic coast. These areas had long been disputed between Italy and Yugoslavia, then named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Commanding the whole of the Adriatic provided Italy with a substantial increase in security. Italy's claims were also promoted by Irredentism, a movement that sought to restore all the territory formerly belonging to it. This claim was strengthened by the presence of Ethnic Italian communities living along the Dalmatian coast.

On October 30, 1918, Italy laid claim to the coastal city of Fiume after the retreat of Austro-Hungarian troops and announced its impending occupation of the city. To preempt the Italian occupation of Fiume, Yugoslavian officials deployed 2,000 Serbian troops to the city. Having been allied with victors of World War One by the time of the signing of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of London, France, the UK, and the United States, supported Italy's claims to the Dalmatian coast. However, the United States was primarily concerned with maintaining peace throughout the continent and therefore ordered both Italy and Serbian forces to refrain from entering Fiume. On November 10, 1918, the U.S. deployed three naval ships to the Dalmatian coast alongside the French and British navy in an attempt to deter the Italians from encroaching on the Dalmatian coast. This method of deterrence did not work and a few days later, more than 20,000 Italian troops mobilized to the coastal town of Cattaro to commence its occupation of the Dalmatian coast. Still concerned with maintaining peace, U.S. forces also deployed on land to give the appearance that the occupation was Allied and not solely Italian.

The deployment of American, and allied troops, alongside the Italians was successful in preventing hostilities between Italians and Serbian forces. The United States retained a general posture of appeasement toward Italy's ambitions in the Adriatic. However, in intervening alongside the Italians it dragged down the mobility and hostility of Italian forces, maintaining peace. U.S. troops and ships monitored the situation in Adriatic for an additional 35 months.

SOURCES:

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Seton-Watson, Hugh, & Seton-Watson, Christopher. (1981). *The making of a new Europe : R.W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary*. University of Washington Press.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Deployment of Three American submarine chasers, Unknown number of U.S. troops deployed on land.

Definitional Issues: This Case is only noted in the CRS dataset and notes that the intervention occurred in 1919. Further research finds that the U.S. intervention in the Dalmatian coast began in late 1918 and continued throughout 1920.

1918 Panama

NAME: Election Unrest and Chiriquí Rebellion

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 28, 1918 – August 1, 1920

TARGET STATE(S): Panama (PAN), 95

SUMMARY:

In the first quarter of the 20th century, the United States became deeply involved in Panama's political and security affairs. From 1903 onward, the U.S. had 10,000 troops permanently stationed in Panama's Canal Zone to guard the strategically significant waterway. When Panama's president disbanded the Panamanian military in 1904, the U.S. assumed full control of Panama's national security. Article 135 in Panama's 1904 Constitution went even further, allowing U.S. troops to "intervene in any part of the Republic of Panama to reestablish [sic] public peace." The United States used its authority to insist on supervising nearly every national election between 1906 and 1918, which in reality were largely fraudulent. Panama City and Colon, two of Panama's largest cities, were technically excluded from the Canal Zone even though they were situated within its geographical limits. Nevertheless, by 1916, the United States had succeeded in disarming the police in these two cities and incorporating U.S. troops into their police forces.

Following the death of President Ramón Valdés in June of 1918, Ciro Urriola took over as provisional president with elections set for later that month. However, Urriola was aligned with ex-president and candidate Belisario Porras, and Porras needed more time to build his coalition before the election. When Urriola issued a decree delaying the election by six months, widespread protests broke out across the country. U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing demanded that Urriola hold the election on time, and when Urriola refused, U.S. troops moved in to occupy Panama City and Colon. Although Urriola quickly backed down, and Belisario Porras won the election anyway, civil unrest sparked by the election had turned into a rebellion in Panama's northern province of Chiriquí. Asserting U.S. privilege under the 1904 Constitution, Lansing ordered an unknown number of U.S. soldiers to Chiriquí to crush the uprising. The fact that the United Fruit Company had significant holdings in Chiriquí undoubtedly influenced Lansing's order. U.S. troops would remain as an occupying force in Chiriquí until August of 1920.

SOURCES:

Baker, George W. "The Wilson Administration and Panama, 1913-1921." *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 8, no. 2 (April 1966): 279–93. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165110>.

Meditz, Sandra W, Dennis Michael Hanratty, and Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. Panama: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 1989. Pdf.

<https://www.loc.gov/item/88600486/>.

“Panama (1903-Present).” University of Central Arkansas: Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed November 14, 2020.

<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/panama-1903-present/>

"PANAMA PROTESTS OUR POLICING ZONE CITIES.: UNITED STATES TROOPS WILL STAY THERE AND IN COLON TILL AFTER ELECTIONS." *Los Angeles Times (1886-1922)*, Jun 30, 1918. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/panama-protests-our-policing-zone-cities/docview/160542585/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Pearcy, Thomas Lee. "The Military and Politics in Modern Panama." Order No. 9401828, University of Miami, 1993. <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/military-politics-modern-panama/docview/304071340/se-2?accountid=14434>.

Special to The New York Times. "AMERICA ASSUMES CONTROL IN PANAMA: GENERAL BLATCHFORD WILL TAKE OVER POLICE IN CITIES OF PANAMA AND COLON. POLITICAL SITUATION ACUTE SERIOUS DISORDERS FEARED THROUGH POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT." *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Jun 29, 1918. <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/america-assumes-control-panama/docview/100022853/se-2?accountid=14434>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: Unknown; Panamanian: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: Unknown; Panamanian: Unknown

COSTS: An unknown number of troops deployed to Panama City and Colon to occupy the cities for roughly 10 days before and during the 1918 election. An unknown number of U.S. troops deployed to the province of Chiriquí to fight an insurgency and occupy the territory for over two years.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020”.

1918 Russia

NAME: Marine Guard deployments to Vladivostok

DISPUTE NUMBER: 197

DATES: June 29th, 1918—August 10th, 1918 & February 16, 1920—November 19, 1922.

TARGET STATE(S): Russia, 365

SUMMARY:

Vladivostok is the largest Russian port on the Pacific Ocean, and the chief economic, scientific and cultural center of the Russian Far East, which houses many foreign consulates and business.¹ Against the backdrop of the ending of the First World War (1914-1918), the Bolshevik revolutionary party overthrew the Czarist regime in 1918, leading to social unrest and political turmoil breaking out across Russia as the civil war (1918-1920) intensified.

the United States, under the Wilson Administration, grew concerned about the Central Powers' (German Empire, Austria-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire) imperialistic ambitions for Russian territory following the collapse of the Russian Empire as well as the emerging Soviet communist movement led by Vladimir Lenin, which began growing increasingly hostile to the global power-blocs. In 1918, the Allied Powers (United Kingdom, United States, France, and Japan) intervened in the Russian Civil War to support the White Movement—a confederation of anti-communist forces. This led to a limited establishment of U.S. military forces across Russia, particularly in Russia's Far East, where the U.S. maintained a consulate, trade routes, and businesses.²

On June 29th, 1918, as Bolsheveiki and Czech troops (backing the White Movement) constantly clashed, the United States deployed a contingent of 31 Marines to guard the U.S. Consulate. The Consulate guard maintained its post until August 10th, 1918. During this time, the Allied Powers established an occupation force in the city in hopes of transitioning control to the White Movement.³

On February 16th, 1920, the U.S. deployed a Marine guard (18 troops, est.) to defend a small United States Navy operated radio station in Vladivostok due to a series of battles between communist and anti-communist forces close to the city. This deployment lasted until November

¹ "Vladivostok." 2020, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2020-07-02.

² Daugherty III, Leo J. "In Snows of Far Off Northern Lands': The U.S. Marines and Revolutionary Russia, 1917-1922." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 18, no. 2 (2005): 227-303.

³ Ellsworth, Harry A. "One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934" History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C.(1974) pp. 142

19th, 1922. ⁴ As the White Movement in Siberia collapsed and Soviet-communist forces took power, the U.S. and Allied powers withdrew from Vladivostok, accepting defeat and seeing no further strategic potential for a military footprint with the termination of hostilities in the region.⁵

SOURCES:

Daugherty III, Leo J. "In Snows of Far Off Northern Lands': The U.S. Marines and Revolutionary Russia, 1917-1922." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 18, no. 2 (2005): 227-303.

Ellsworth, Harry A. "One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934" *History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C.*(1974) pp. 143

McClellan, Edwin N. U.S.M.C., "American Marines in Siberia During the World War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 5, no. 1 (June 1920) pp. 173–181.

"Vladivostok." 2020, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2020-07-02.

OBJECTIVE: Defend Territory, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests,

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS:

- None

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: 49 Marines (18, 31)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: These two cases feature in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) data set, page 9. Initially, the cases were divided into specific U.S. interventions in 1918

⁴ Ellsworth, Harry A. "One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934" *History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C.*(1974) pp. 143

⁵ Daugherty III, Leo J. "In Snows of Far Off Northern Lands': The U.S. Marines and Revolutionary Russia, 1917-1922." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 18, no. 2 (2005): 255.

and 1920. However, these cases are part of the same larger U.S. intervention in the Russian Far East, during the Russian Civil War (1918-1920), and have been merged. The 1918 intervention also features in MID (#197) as a stand-alone operation.

1919 Honduras

NAME: Tegucigalpa Uprising of 1919

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 8 - 12, 1919

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

Francisco Bertrand assumed control of Honduras in 1913 following the death of his predecessor, General Manuel Bonilla, and subsequently won an uncontested election in 1915. Four years later, in the lead up to the 1919 presidential elections, President Francisco Bertrand declared himself dictator of Honduras. On July 22nd, General Rafael López Gutiérrez, the governor of Tegucigalpa, responded by launching an armed rebellion against Bertrand. The United States attempted to pressure Bertrand diplomatically by communicating their disapproval and threatening non-recognition of his government, but Bertrand did not back down.

On September 5th, the United States escalated their threats and told Bertrand to either hold a fair election or face direct U.S. intervention. Then on September 8th, a small contingent of U.S. marines entered Tegucigalpa ostensibly to protect American lives and property amidst the rebellion. Bertrand resigned that day. Immediately following his resignation, unrest erupted in Tegucigalpa and 10 Hondurans were killed in the streets. On September 9th the U.S. transported Bertrand to Panama on the *USS Chicago*, and on September 12th the marines left Tegucigalpa.

Roughly 100 Hondurans died during the course of the rebellion. The interim government put in place after Francisco Bertrand fled the country had promised to hold fair elections, but rebel leader General López Gutiérrez used his control of the military to force his election in October of 1919. Nevertheless, the United States recognized López Gutiérrez as president. Roughly four years later, in 1924, the marines would return to Honduras when López Gutiérrez refused to cede power following a contested election.

SOURCES:

“Honduras (1902-Present).” University of Central Arkansas: Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed October 7, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/>

Merrill, Tim, and Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Honduras: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: U.S. G.P.O, 1995. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/94043036/>.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Volume II, Honduras, 1919, eds. Joseph Fuller and Tyler Dennet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), Documents 322-334. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919v02/ch29subch1>

Wright, Theodore P. "Honduras: A Case Study of United States Support of Free Elections in Central America." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 40, no. 2 (1960): 212-23. [doi:10.2307/2510022](https://doi.org/10.2307/2510022).

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Social Protection and Order; Protect Own Economic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: 100

COSTS: Unknown number of U.S. marines that deployed for 4 days in the capital of Honduras.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS document of U.S. usage of force abroad, not in any other datasets on US military intervention. The intervention takes place outside the ACD and IMI timeframe, does not meet the troop threshold of MIPS, and is likely excluded from MID since intervention does not target the Honduran government directly.

1919 Turkey

NAME: Allied Occupation of the old Ottoman Territories

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: May 11 to June 1919

TARGET STATE(S): Turkey 640

SUMMARY:

Following World War I the Ottoman Empire collapsed, broaching the “Eastern Question” of how to divide the Ottoman territories between the Great Powers. At the end of WWI, the Allied Powers (Greece, Italy, France, and Britain) rushed to occupy cities in Anatolia. This became a tense and chaotic situation due to secret agreements of partition among the allied powers.

The United States and the Japanese (also part of the Allied Powers) were present but acted more as observers. During the partition of the old Ottoman Empire territories, there was some local support for an American mandate. Despite this, President Wilson had a strong anti-Turk sentiment and had no intentions of occupying or taking control of Ottoman territories. American interests in the region were to maintain friendly relations with the Allied powers, to observe and and keep informed of the political situation in Turkey, to protect Americans and American interests, and to remain informed of Turkish attitudes towards American citizens and institutions. There was no intent to resume the ruptured diplomatic relations with the Turkish government.

After the peace conference in Paris, Italian forces had temporarily withdrawn from Asia Minor, allowing Greek forces to take claim. By authorization of the Allied Supreme Council, British, French, Italian, and Greek forces occupied the harbor in Smyrna (Izmir) on May 14th. The following day, Greek forces occupied the city. To maintain the aforementioned American interests, President Wilson ordered battleship Arizona and destroyers Dyer, Gregory, Luce, and Manley, with Captain J. H. Dayton, to reach Smyrna by May 11th. The next day, Admiral Bristol left for Constantinople with destroyers Luce, Gregory, and Stribling by orders of Vice Admiral Knapp. During the occupation of Smyrna, the Arizona battleship arrived with a legation guard of twenty men who remained in Smyrna through May 28th. On June 9th, the Arizona battleship, and destroyers Barney and Hazelwood left for Constantinople where they remained for a brief period.

SOURCES:

Criss, Nur Bilge. "Occupation during and after the War (Ottoman Empire)." International Encyclopedia of the First World War, August 5, 2015. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/occupation_during_and_after_the_war_ottoman_empire.

Göknar, E. (2014). Reading Occupied Istanbul: Turkish Subject-Formation from Historical Trauma to Literary Trope. *Culture, Theory and Critique*, 55(3), 321–341. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14735784.2014.882792>

"PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1919, VOLUME II." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 13, 2020. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919v02/d783>.

"US Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919-1924." Naval History and Heritage Command, June 18, 2020. <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-naval-detachment-turkish-waters-1919-1924.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

Per capita battle deaths: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

Per capita total deaths: Unknown

COSTS: Deployment of eight naval ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is featured in the CRS report. There is no specified end date, only stated that the intervention occurred in June; based on this information we estimate a duration of about 50 days.

1920 China

NAME: Kiukiang Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 14, 1920

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY: On March 14, 1920, sailors disembarked from the *Elcano* and *Samar* at the request of the British legation in Peking, due to concern over local unrest. Though they were only in place for a few hours, there were clashes between the Chinese police and laborers, and the sailors engaged in the conflict.

Following the clash, Japanese press reported that two Chinese men had been killed by American sailors. Upon further investigation by the American and British legations, it was found that three men had been wounded by American forces during the unrest, but all had received medical attention, paid for by the British consulate, and all had either recovered or disappeared of their own accord. Though no one had actually been killed, the Japanese report still fomented anger toward British and Americans in Peking.

SOURCES:

Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1920 (Including Operations and Recommendations to December 1, 1920), 1920, (Washington Government Printing Office, 1920). <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/y/yangtze-river-patrol-and-other-us-navy-asiatic-fleet-activities-in-china.html>

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Volume I, China, 1920, eds. Joseph Fuller and Tyler Dennet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935), Documents 846-849. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v01/d849>

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." Congressional Research Service, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

COSTS: Cost of deploying a contingent of sailors to Kiukiang for a few hours.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1920 Guatemala

NAME: The Unionista Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 26 - April 27, 1920

TARGET STATE(S): Guatemala (GUA), 90

SUMMARY:

Manuel Estrada Cabrera assumed the presidency of Guatemala in 1898 and soon after amended the constitution to allow for this repeated re-election. He would go on to rule as one of Central America's longest-ruling dictators. However, by 1919 his power had begun to erode. Cabrera no longer enjoyed unconditional U.S. support, and the U.S. began to insist more forcefully that Cabrera respect the political rights of Guatemalan citizens. By the end of 1919, the fragmented opposition had begun to coalesce into a new party called the *Unionistas*, or Unionist Party.

By February of 1920, the U.S. legation in Guatemala suspected a revolution and requested U.S. forces to protect American life and property. On February 7th the U.S. deployed three destroyers to the nearby Honduran port of Puerto Cortez. In early March, the National Assembly of Guatemala officially recognized the Unionist Party. A subsequent Unionist parade through the city came under attack by government troops in a significant escalation. On March 26th the *USS Tacoma* and *USS Niagara* docked at Guatemalan ports in anticipation of further unrest.

Meanwhile, the U.S. decided to remain officially neutral and received delegations from both sides at the embassy through early April. They consistently repeated to the Unionists that the U.S. would not support a revolution while also attempting to convince the Cabrera government of political reform. However, by early April, the Cabrera government had lost support within the National Assembly and critical segments of the military. Revolution became inevitable. On April 8, President Cabrera was impeached and declared mentally unfit for office. That day Carlos Herrera, Guatemala's richest citizen, was selected as the provisional president of Guatemala.

On April 9th wide scale fighting erupted in the capital between Unionist Party members and Cabrera's men. Called the "week of tragedy," this fighting led to over 800 dead and 2,000 wounded, including at least one American citizen. At least 50 marines from the *USS Niagara* had arrived in the capital by April 9th with a larger detachment then en route from San José. The U.S. facilitated meetings between the two sides on April 12th, and by April 14th Cabrera's government agreed to official terms of surrender.

Cabrera was subsequently placed under arrest and imprisoned at the military academy just outside Guatemala City. The U.S. forces left Guatemala on April 27th, and on August 29th Carlos Herrera officially won the presidential elections. Herrera's term as president would prove short-lived, and just over a year later, in 1921, he was deposed in a military coup. Despite U.S. requests that Cabrera be set free, he was never released. Cabrera was eventually moved under house arrest in a modest home in Guatemala City, where he died of a stroke in 1924.

SOURCES:

"Guatemala (1903-Present)." University of Central Arkansas: Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed October 24, 2020. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/guatemala-1903-present/>

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Volume II, Guatemala, 1920, eds. Joseph Fuller and Tyler Dennet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), Documents 607-669.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v02/ch38subch1>

Rendón, Catherine. 1988. "Manuel Estrada Cabrera." PhD thesis, University of Oxford.

<https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f51e5514-9a9e-49e8-8c82-d7e1b128fa5c>

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Guatemalan: 500

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 1; Guatemalan: 800

COSTS: Between 100-200 U.S. troops were dispatched from multiple ports to protect American lives and property in Guatemala City between April 9th and April 27th. Between 3-5 ships participated in the intervention. It is unclear if the *USS Tacoma* and the *USS Niagara* were among the three destroyers sent to Honduras on February 7th. The *USS Tacoma* and the *USS Niagara* spent at least 33 days deployed in Guatemalan territory.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is mentioned in the CRS report on the "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad." The intervention's start date was changed from April 9th to March 26th since U.S. naval ships arrived in Guatemalan ports on March 26th. This case describes an intervention in Guatemala, but it appears that the U.S. did use Honduran territory (Puerto Cortez) as part of the operation.

1921 Cuba

NAME: Disputed Cuban election of 1920

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1665

DATES: January 6, 1921

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY: Cuba held an election in 1920 but the results were inconclusive and both sides claimed victory. The situation grew increasingly tense and threatened to erupt into civil war. The U.S. State Department eventually reached the conclusion that there was no peaceful way to resolve the stalemate. As a result, the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson appointed a special representative to Cuba and sent this person to Cuba in January, 1921.

The State Department conveyed subtle threats of using force to Cuban representatives, and deployed a military warship to Havana ostensibly merely as transport for the special representative but in practice constituting a threat of open military intervention. In this climate, local parties quickly reached an agreement to resolve the election results.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Munro, Dana. 1964. *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of one U.S. ship.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#1665) and the CRS report.

1921 El Salvador

NAME: Naval deployment to deter invasion of Honduras by El Salvador

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1666

DATES: May 1921

TARGET STATE(S): El Salvador (SAL), 92

SUMMARY: Honduras and El Salvador had various political and geographical disputes dating back to the 19th century. At one point in 1921, these disputes escalated and Honduras feared that El Salvador was about to invade their territory.

The Honduran government issued an urgent request to the United States to deploy forces to prevent war from occurring between the two states. In May of 1921, the U.S. government responded by sending a warship to Honduras to send a signal to El Salvador to back off. El Salvador yielded to this display of resolve, and backed down from the dispute.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Karnes, Thomas. 1961. *The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Yield by Target State

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Negligible

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#1666). While the ship deployed to

Honduran waters, it was clearly in response to actions by (and targeting) El Salvador, and we thus code the incident as an intervention against the latter country. Dates for this intervention are unclear with reporting only noting the month of the mobilization.

1921 Panama

NAME: Settling Panama-Costa Rica border dispute

DISPUTE NUMBER: 158

DATES: February 21 – August 23, 1921

TARGET STATE(S): Panama (PAN),95

SUMMARY: Panama and Costa Rica had a border dispute over the Coto region between the two countries, which escalated to the point where Panama eventually sent forces to occupy the region. However, the United States sided with Costa Rica in the dispute and intervened by deploying a battalion of Marines to Central America. In the face of military and diplomatic pressure, Panama withdrew its forces from the region and relinquished its claim.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Karnes, Thomas. 1961. *The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 25 - 100

COSTS: Deployment of one Marine battalion (usually 500-1,200 troops). We thus code an interim value of 800 marines.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in MID (#158) and the CRS report.

1922 China

NAME: Miscellaneous Landings

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 28 – May 25, 1922

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

1920s China was filled with factional fighting and uprisings, and unrest increased in 1922. To protect business interests and diplomatic legations from unrest, the United States marines performed a series of landings that year.

On April 28, a detachment of 156 marines under the command of Captain Charles H. Martin came ashore from the USS Albany as reinforcements to the legation guard at Peking due to the fighting between the Chang Tso-lin and Chihli forces. They were withdrawn on May 25.

A separate battalion of marines under the command of Captain Roy G. Swink was landed on May 5, 1922 from the USS Huron to protect U.S. interests in Shanghai. The marines remained in place guarding the legation until May 11.

SOURCES:

Angus Konstam & Tony Bryan. *Yangtze River Gunboats 1900-49. New Vanguard 181. Osprey Publishing.* 2011.

“Appendix A: A Chronological List of Cases Involving the Landing of United States Forces to Protect the Lives and Property of Nationals Abroad Prior to World War II.” *International Law Studies, Volume 77: Lillich on the Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad*, (2001).

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1325&context=ils>.

“Asheville I (Gunboat No. 21).” *Naval History and Heritage Command*. 1 March 2017.

<https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/a/asheville-gunboat-no-21-i.html>

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

COSTS: Landing marines on two separate occasions.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017). There may have been additional landings in 1922, but we lacked adequate sources to definitively corroborate.

1922 Turkey

NAME: Evacuation of Americans and Anatolian Christian refugees at Smyrna (Izmir) - Greco-Turkish War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September to November, 1922

TARGET STATE(S): Turkey - 640

SUMMARY:

The Great Fire of Smyrna (also known as the Catastrophe of Smyrna) was one of the final events that concluded the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. In the Ottoman Empire's mission to expel the Christians in Anatolia, they drove the Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians west towards the Mediterranean. Smyrna was one of the final coastal cities where refugees fled. The city was captured by Turkish forces on September 9th and was eventually set ablaze causing thousands if not hundreds of thousands of deaths and refugees (exact number is unknown). In response to this crisis, three American Navy destroyers, were deployed to Smyrna to assist American interests in the form of protecting American lives and property in the region. It was initially communicated that U.S. leaders were not inclined to do more than send destroyers, and that the situation at the time (September 5th) did not merit for the US Government to assume the role of a voluntary mediator. Later however, when the severity of the crisis in Smyrna was realized, American merchant vessels, two charter ships, and twelve destroyers were deployed to protect American interests, property and lives, to assist in humanitarian aid efforts and in the evacuation of refugees.

The destroyers arrived in Smyrna by September 9th with the High Commissioner at Constantinople's Chief of Staff, Captain Hepburn, left in charge. On September 13th, the severity of the situation in Smyrna was realized, with nearly 300,000 left destitute. The U.S. destroyers evacuated American citizens, provided humanitarian relief, and worked with allied forces (France, Italy, Britain, and Greece) to evacuate a total of 262,587 refugees from Smyrna and the vicinity. Originally, with the destroyers there was no intention to take part in naval or political demonstrations. There was also no intent for the U.S. to act as a voluntary mediator. Despite this, on September 22nd the US acted as an information carrier when a US destroyer received an official answer to a request from Turkish officials to allow Greek vessels into Smyrna for evacuation purposes.

The mission to protect American lives was successful with the exception of one recorded death of an American citizen, Mr. Tara, who was killed in his house mid-September. On September

14th the High Commissioner at Constantinople reported that he had received news from his chief of staff at Smyrna that all American naturalized citizens and women of native born Americans have been evacuated on the destroyer "Simpson" to Athens.

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Humanitarian Intervention, Protect own Military & Diplomatic interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

Per capita battle deaths: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

Per capita total deaths: Unknown

COSTS: Deployment and maintenance of twelve destroyers. Additionally the U.S. allocated approximately \$200,000 towards the repatriation of Americans and \$300,000 in relief funds for refugees.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS report.

1924 China

NAME: Shanghai Landing

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 9 - October 23, 1924

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY: The 1920s were an unstable period in Chinese history, particularly from the perspective of the United States, who had significant business interests in China and considerable consular detachments residing there. In the mid-1920s, factional fighting broke out in Shanghai, where the largest foreign settlement in China resided.

In September 1924, a contingent of marines were landed in Shanghai during factional hostilities in order to protect Americans and other foreigners. British, Japanese, Italian, and French forces were also deployed to protect their respective foreign settlements. By mid-October, the danger was considered to have passed, and the marines withdrew on October 23.

SOURCES:

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

China: 0

United States: 0

COSTS: Landing marines for over a month.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report (Salazar Torreon, 2017).

1924 Honduras

NAME: Honduran Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 28, 1924 – September 15, 1924

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

After fair elections in 1923 provided no clear winner, General Rafael López Gutiérrez refused to step down from the presidency. Following 17 failed coups and uprisings in Honduras between 1920-1923, the United States feared serious instability after the contested election. Diplomatic appeals to form a coalition government and threats of non-recognition went unheeded by General López Gutiérrez, and by the winter of 1923, U.S. naval ships were on their way to Honduras. In February of 1924, fighting broke out between government forces and various opposition groups. The main opposition was led by General Tiburcio Carías Andino, who had won a plurality of votes in the 1924 election.

General Carías Andino initiated a conflict with Honduran government forces on February 28th around La Ceiba. In response, U.S. troops from the *USS Denver* went ashore to protect American lives and property. Fifty people were killed in the battle at La Ceiba between the government and rebel forces, including one U.S. citizen. Elsewhere in the country, General Vicente Tosta and General Gregorio Ferrera led separate uprisings against the government. From February 28th to March 31st, U.S. marines and sailors disembarked in various Honduran cities, including Tela, Puerto Cortez, and the capital Tegucigalpa, in an attempt to maintain order and protect U.S. interests. Between 400-500 marines and sailors from five different naval ships took part in the peacekeeping initiative. The last U.S. troops withdrew from Honduras on March 31st.

On April 28th, a U.S. mediated settlement placed General Vicente Tosta in charge of an interim government with elections planned for December. The Civil War of 1924 was the bloodiest in Honduran history, claiming thousands of Honduran lives. Despite the peace agreement, General Gregorio Ferrera attempted a failed coup from August to October of 1924, which led the U.S. to land 110 marines in La Ceiba between September 10th and 15th to protect U.S. property and citizens. A new Honduran constitution was adopted in September of 1924, and fair elections in December of 1924 saw a peaceful transition to civilian leadership.

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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 1 (civilian); Honduran: > 1,000.

COSTS: Deployment of five US Navy ships and 400–500 U.S. troops of the Navy’s Special Service Squadron for at least five weeks in early 1924. At least one ship and 110 troops deployed briefly in September of 1924.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS document of U.S. usage of force abroad, not in any other datasets on US military intervention. The intervention takes place outside the ACD and IMI timeframe, may not meet troop threshold of MIPS, and is likely excluded from MID since intervention does not target the Honduran government directly. Additionally, the intervention is coded as only one event, but there are actually two discrete interventions: one from February 28–March 31 and the other from September 10–September 15.

1924 Mexico

NAME: De la Huerta Rebellion

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 15, 1924 – June 16, 1924

TARGET STATE(S): Mexico (MEX), 70

SUMMARY:

For three years since taking power in 1920, Mexican President Álvaro Obregón had unsuccessfully lobbied for diplomatic recognition from the United States. The main point of contention between the two governments was Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution that nationalized all natural resources in Mexico. At the time, Mexico produced one-quarter of the world's oil supply, and many of the oil fields were owned by U.S. companies. President Obregón insisted that he would not apply this principle to U.S. oil companies but refused to sign an official agreement given the anti-American political sentiment in Mexico. However, in September of 1923, with upcoming presidential elections in Mexico, Obregón relented and signed the Bucareli Agreements. These agreements protected U.S. oil fields in Mexico, and in return, President Coolidge normalized diplomatic relations.

The normalization came just in time for President Obregón. In December of 1923, Obregón's former Secretary of the Treasury, General Adolfo de la Huerta, launched a rebellion from the port city of Vera Cruz. De la Huerta had substantial support from many of Mexico's generals, and Obregón needed U.S. assistance to stay in power. At Obregón's request, the United States quickly placed an arms embargo on De la Huerta and provided significant war materiel to Obregón, including airplanes. When the rebels aligned with De la Huerta threatened to blockade and mine the oil port of Tampico in early January of 1924, the U.S. became directly involved in the conflict. On January 15th, 1924, the *USS Tacoma* was sent to Vera Cruz, near Tampico. The *USS Richmond* quickly followed the *Tacoma*, and then the *USS Omaha* arrived escorted by six destroyers. The rebels reversed their decision to blockade Tampico by January 25th, but the U.S. continued to play a significant role in the conflict.

Throughout the rebellion, the U.S. stationed warships off the coast of Mexican cities under De la Huerta's control as an implicit threat of intervention should the rebels take action against American interests. The U.S. warships in Vera Cruz occupied the port until Obregón's men retook the city on February 6th. The *USS Tulsa* was sent to Tuxpam, Mexico on February 22nd to evacuate American oil workers fleeing the conflict. On February 11th, the *USS Milwaukee* was sent to Manzanillo, and shortly after to Acapulco. On March 7th, as fighting in the city intensified, a squadron of U.S. warships consisting of one destroyer, two cruisers, and seven other warships also

arrived in Acapulco. Some troops disembarked to protect the embassy, but the ships departed on March 16th when the fighting ended. Around the same time, the *USS Tulsa* returned to the region and traveled between Puerto Mexico and Progreso. The last phase of the conflict took place near Frontera, where the *USS Cleveland* was anchored offshore from mid-May until June 16th. In total, 20 U.S. warships and one repair ship were in Mexican waters at some point during the rebellion.

The United States also provided direct support to the Mexican air forces. A small number of U.S. service members traveled to Mexico to train their allies on the new aircraft that recently arrived from the U.S. However, these American troops became directly involved in flying bombing missions on at least several occasions. One U.S. colonel took charge of commanding an entire Mexican aviation squadron for an extended period during the conflict. U.S. pilots may have even participated in the bombing of civilians at Morelia in February of 1924.

By March 11th, 1924, De la Huerta had fled to the United States. Although the rebellion lasted for almost another two months, De la Huerta never returned to Mexico. In July, Obregón's chosen successor, Plutarco Elías Calles, was elected in a rigged contest and held the presidency for the next four years. As president, Calles refused to abide by the Bucareli agreements and quickly fell out of favor with the United States. Obregón was assassinated four years later in 1928, right after winning the presidential election and returning to power.

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OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 100

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Mexican: 100

COSTS: At least 21 U.S. ships entered Mexican water as some point in the conflict between mid-January and early June of 1924. As many as 20 U.S. aviators participated in multiple bombing

raids in early February. A small detachment of marines disembarked in Acapulco for several days to defend the embassy in early March.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case does not appear in any other databases of military interventions. MIP had originally coded this intervention as occurring in 1923. However, after closer research, we have chosen to narrow the dates of U.S. intervention to dates within 1924. The number of Mexican battle deaths is an order of magnitude estimate based on U.S. aviators' participation in bombing raids.

1925 China

NAME: Protection of Shanghai

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 15, 1925 - August 29, 1925

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY: In 1925 Chiang Kai-Shek assumed leadership of the Koumintang (KMT) party, and began planning a military strategy for national unification. At the time, the KMT maintained a relatively ambivalent stance to certain foreign powers. Western powers economic investments along the Yangtze river, especially in and around the city of Shanghai proved to be a particularly sensitive topic for KMT leadership.

In February 1925, anti-foreign protests broke out in Shanghai with the tacit support from the KMT. In response to the political strife threatening U.S. economic interests, the United States deployed a number of ships and troops pertaining to its fleet of Yangtze river gunboats that had first began patrolling the river area since 1900.

Between February 15, 1925 and August 25 of that same year, the United States deployed various contingents of U.S. marines onshore to protect American industry from protests. In February, First Lieutenant Howard S. Stent led 28 marines ashore from the *Sacramento* gunship. The group of marines were relieved with the arrival of Captain James P. Scherwin's 128 marines that arrived from the Philippines sailing on the *Borker*, *Barie*, and *Whipple*. The troops remained in Shanghai until August 29, 1925 when they were transferred offshore.

The marines managed to protect the American economic interests amid the unrest. However, the continued presence of foreign powers in China only aggravated the domestic political turmoil in the country.

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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown. **U.S Deaths:** None

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: Deployment of a total of 156 U.S. marines aboard four separate gunboats.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Congressional Research Services report. The dates in the CRS report indicate that the intervention ended on August 25, 1925. Closer research indicates that the troops under the command of Captain Scherwin actually left Shanghai in August 29, 1925. Dates have been altered accordingly.

1925 Honduras

NAME: Uprising of 1925

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 19, 1925 – April 21, 1925

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

By late April 1924 the civil war in Honduras was largely decided in favor of the rebels, and the U.S. sent Summer Welles to Honduras to negotiate peace. On April 28th, onboard a United States cruiser, the combatants signed the Treaty of Amapala. The agreement placed General Vicente Tosta in charge of an interim government with elections planned for December. On the basis of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923, the U.S. and neighboring countries pushed hard for fair elections and civilian leadership of Honduras. This separate U.S.-drafted treaty, signed by nearly all Central American countries in 1923, stipulated that revolutionary leadership would not be officially recognized in any Central American government.

Elections were held in December of 1924, and civilian Miguel Paz Barahona ran uncontested to become the president under a newly adopted constitution. However, not all the combatants were satisfied by this outcome. General Gregorio Ferrera, after attempting a failed coup in August of 1924, again instigated an uprising in April of 1925. The fighting started in La Ceiba on April 10th, and from April 19–21 165 marines from the *USS Denver* went ashore in La Ceiba to maintain peace and protect U.S. lives.

Telegrams from U.S. diplomats claimed that Ferrera was directing the uprising from Guatemala. Again invoking the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, which also prohibited any signatory from aiding revolution in a neighboring country, the U.S. applied diplomatic pressure to Guatemala to restrain Ferrera's activity. On July 6th, 1925 General Gregorio Ferrera was transported to El Salvador to be kept under strict surveillance, and the uprising ended. Fair elections were again held in Honduras in 1928.

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OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Social Protection and Order; Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: Unknown.

COSTS: Deployment of *USS Denver* to Honduras for an unspecified amount of time. 165 troops deployed on land for two days.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS document of U.S. usage of force abroad, not in any other datasets on US military intervention. The intervention takes place outside the ACD and IMI timeframe, does not meet the troop threshold of MIPS, and is likely excluded from MID since intervention does not target the Honduran government directly.

1925 Panama

NAME: Panama Rent Riots

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 12, 1925-October 23, 1925

TARGET STATE(S): Panama, PAN 95

SUMMARY:

Panama separated from Colombia on November 3, 1903 with the assistance of the United States and support of the U.S. Navy. On November 18, 1903, Panama and the United States agreed upon the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which gave the United States authority over the 10-mile strip of land that would come to be known as the Canal Zone. The treaty also gave the United States the right to fortify the Zone, as well as the right to intervene militarily in Panama to support the nation's independence. The Canal was completed in 1914, and while the Panamanian government appeared happy to have the security guarantee of the United States, many Panamanian citizens resented America's imperial influence.¹

Small rebellions erupted across Panama in the 1920s, including the Cuna rebellion of 1925 that killed 20 Panamanian police officers on the San Blas Islands.² On October 11, 1925 the Tenant's League, a group of unionists and left-wing organizers, started a riot in Santa Ana Plaza in Panama City that killed one and wounded eleven others. Panamanian police fired on the rioters, who were protesting a recent tax levied on income gained from rentals which proprietors had passed on to poor tenants.³ The next day the Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the support of 300 American soldiers to restore order alongside the local police.⁴ 600 American soldiers entered Panama City that same afternoon from the nearby Canal Zone.⁵ The only action incident recorded involving American forces was a clash between soldiers and a group of workers who refused the soldiers' order to disperse. A number of the workers were wounded, and one died after falling from a balcony.⁶ Order was quickly restored, a commission of tenants

¹ "Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty." Encyclopædia Britannica. August 10, 2016. Accessed January 06, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Hay-Bunau-Varilla-Treaty>.

² Fearon, James, and David Laitan. *Panama*. Stanford University. June 27, 2006. Accessed January 6, 2019. [https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random Narratives/PanamaRN1.3.pdf](https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/PanamaRN1.3.pdf).

³ Zumoff, J. A. "The 1925 Tenants' Strike in Panama: West Indians, the Left, and the Labor Movement." *The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Latin American History* 74, no. 04 (October 22, 2017): 513-46. Accessed January 6, 2019. doi:10.1017/tam.2017.88.

⁴ United States. State Department. *PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1925, VOLUME II*. Edited by Joseph Fuller. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1940. 664.

⁵ *ibid*

⁶ *ibid*

and landlords was organized to hear the complains of the angry Panamanian citizens, and the American soldiers departed Panama on October 23, 1903.⁷

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority: maintain authority of American-backed Panamanian government in the face of popular uprising

Maintain Empire: maintain American legal authority to intervene in Panamanian politics due to the Varilla Treaty

Acquire/Defend Territory: defend American economics interests, specifically in the Canal Zone

Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection: defend American economics interests, specifically in the Canal Zone

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 1 Panamanian accidentally killed by U.S. forces⁸

Per capita total deaths: .219 per 100,000 Panamanians

COSTS: Information not available

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS report.

⁷ ibid

⁸ ibid

1926 China

NAME: Hankow deployment

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 16 - November 24, 1926

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

In July 1926, the National Revolutionary Army which served as the military arm of the Kuomintang—the Chinese Nationalist Party—launched a military campaign against the Beiyang government to re-unify China which had splintered following the 1911 Revolution. Western powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom maintained diplomatic and economic interests within China, particularly in the northern region where the Chinese nationalists launched their offensive. However, the U.S. and U.K. decided to stay out of the domestic Chinese conflict to reach favorable terms with the victor.

The U.S. and U.K. remained impartial for most of the campaign but felt it necessary to deploy a marine and naval presence on September 16, 1926 as fighting intensified in and around the Hankow province of Wuhan where the U.S. and U.K. maintained consulates and commercial trade hubs. The force did not engage with any parties to the conflict but deterred any further attacks on U.S. possessions and citizens. As the National Revolutionary Army's forces moved towards Shanghai, the United States and the United Kingdom further expanded its naval presence in Kiukiang to protect foreign nationals and Americans displaced by the on-going conflict. Once the situation within the region stabilized and the Chinese Nationalist Party declared victory, the U.S. withdrew some of its forces on November 24, 1926.

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<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1926v01/ch27>

Wilbur, C. Martin. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-8. Cambridge University Press, 1984. 49-143.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protecting Economic Interests, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Several naval warships and a battalion of marine guards deployed for multiple months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case study comes from the Congressional Research Services list. The case was erroneously associated with a dispute number (#2209) referencing the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset found in the International Conflicts book by Douglas M. Gibler. However, the MID case referenced did not feature the United States as a party and bore no relationship to a U.S. intervention.

1926 Nicaragua

NAME: Removal of Nicaraguan president

DISPUTE NUMBER: 151

DATES: May 2, 1926 – November 14, 1933

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua (NIC), 93

SUMMARY: Nicaragua was going through a period of civil war in the 1920s, and in 1926 the United States intervened by sending military warships to the region to protect its interests. First, rebel forces hostile to the United States had captured the town of Bluefields on the coast, and threatened to harm U.S. nationals. Second, rebel forces expelled a U.S. customs official, which violated a 1920 financial agreement between the two countries. Finally, the United States took issue with the acting President of Nicaragua, Emiliano Chamorro, and wanted to see him removed.

The United States maintained two warships in the region, the *U.S.S. Cleveland* and *U.S.S. Tulsa*, and exercised an element of gunboat diplomacy. Among other things, the United States imposed an arms embargo and requested the presence of all parties at a peace conference onboard one of the ships in October, 1926. Eventually Nicaraguan President Chamorro resigned, under intense U.S. pressure, on November 14 and the crisis abated. Adolfo Diaz ascended to the Presidency, with the approval of U.S. leaders.

However, political instability remained a persistent concern in Nicaragua. In 1927 additional U.S. ships and marines entered the country, invited by President Diaz, to maintain order and to protect foreign lives and property. These forces withdrew in the middle of 1927, only to be called back in even greater numbers in January of 1928 to combat the lawlessness and banditry that accompanied renewed civil war. This cyclical pattern of instability and intervention persisted until early in 1933.

SOURCES:

Bethell, Leslie. 1984. *Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellsworth, Harry Allanson. 1974. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Salisbury, Richard. 1986. "Mexico, the United States, and the 1926-1927 Nicaraguan Crisis." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 66 (2): 319-339

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Maintaining several warships and a large contingent of Marines in the region for a period of several years.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The main incident in MID (#151) captures the U.S. intervention in 1926 only. The CRS report codes the entire period of 1926-33 as one continuous intervention as multiple deployments of force all concerned the same set of goals in the same country undergoing a continuous period of political instability with frequent bouts of violence. We follow the CRS report on this matter.

1927 China

NAME: Nanjing Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 21-27, 1927

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

In 1926, the National Revolutionary Army which served as the military arm of the Kuomintang—the Chinese Nationalist Party—launched a military campaign against the Beiyang government to re-unify China, which had splintered following the 1911 Revolution. Western powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom maintained diplomatic and economic interests within China particularly in the northern region where the Chinese nationalists launched their offensive. However, the U.S. and U.K. decided to stay out of the conflict to reach favorable terms with the victor. The U.S. and U.K. remained impartial for most of the campaign but felt it necessary to deploy marine and naval forces in 1926 as fighting intensified where the U.S. and U.K. maintained consulates and commercial trade hubs.

As the National Revolutionary Army's forces moved towards Shanghai, the United States further expanded its naval and marine presence in Nanjing, where America maintained diplomatic and economic interests. After the NRA moved through Nanjing, large-scale rioting and attacks against foreign interests erupted. American, British, and Japanese citizens and business were targeted by NRA troops and rioters supporting the NRA. As the attacks and threat to foreign citizens intensified, the U.S. and the U.K. deployed warships to bombard the Chinese forces to end the riot. After several hours of bombardment, the mob was successfully dispersed, and the foreign citizens were evacuated onto the warships.

On March 27, Chiang Kai-Shek, who led the NRA, regained control of and disarmed the Chinese Nationalist regiment that went rogue and initiated the assault. Kai-Shek formally apologized to the Western powers for the incident and laid blame on communist factions within the army that held anti-Western views. The U.S. maintained a presence in the region for several years until the NRA successfully overthrew the Beiyang government and established the Second Republic of China.

SOURCES:

Buhite, R. (1966). Nelson Johnson and American Policy toward China, 1925-1928. *Pacific Historical Review*, 35(4), 451-465. doi:10.2307/3636978

Ellsworth, Harry Alanson. *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934*. United States Marine Corps: History Museums Division. 1974.

Fuller, Joseph V., Dennett, Tyler. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, Volume II: Measures taken by the United States for the protection of American lives and property in China. (Documents 16-127). U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. 1941. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1927v02/ch2>

Konstam, Angus., Bryan, Tony. Yangtze River Gunboats 1900-1949. Osprey Publishing. June 21, 2011. 19-20.

Wilbur, C. Martin. The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-8. Cambridge University Press, 1984. 49-143.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protecting Economic Interests, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 40 (Chinese rioters and NRA soldiers)

TOTAL DEATHS: 50 (civilians)

Per capita total deaths:

40 Chinese rioters and soldiers

10 European Civilians

COSTS: 5 U.S. Navy warships deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case study comes from the Congressional Research Services (CRS) dataset.

1929 Honduras

NAME: Las Limas Bombing

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1170

DATES: March 31, 1929

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

In 1929 the Nicaraguan government, in partnership with U.S. marines, was attempting to dislodge Augusto Sandino and his communist rebels from the Segovia mountains along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. Sandino was well-liked among the locals, who detested the presence of government troops in an area that had rarely before been under direct governmental control. The Honduran military was also cooperating with Nicaragua to dislodge the rebels from their side of the border. Complicating the situation was the fact that the border between Honduras and Nicaragua was ill-defined during this period, with neither country agreeing on an exact line of demarcation.

On March 31st, U.S. marines aviators were flying a reconnaissance mission along the border when they came under fire near the town of Las Limas. In response, the marines bombed a nearby house they believed to belong to the rebels. Both Honduras and Nicaragua claimed that Las Limas was on their side of the border. This event followed several allegations by the Honduran government that marines had crossed the border with Nicaraguan troops.

In mid-April, there was a meeting between a U.S. marine representative and Honduran government officials to review the incident. In January 1931, Honduras and Nicaragua finally agreed to a U.S.-mediated treaty that delineated the exact boundary between the two countries and settled the issue of border disputes.

SOURCES:

By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1929. "MARINES EXPLAIN BOMBING.: BOTH NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS CLAIM REGION WHERE IT OCCURRED." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Apr 10, 5.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/104987135?accountid=14434>

"HONDURAS PROTESTS TO US ON BOMBING: SAYS MARINES CROSSED BORDER RECENTLY THREE TIMES WITHIN A FEW DAYS. NICARAGUA BLAMED ALSO TROOPS ACCUSED OF KILLING CITIZENS --CONFERENCE HELD--MINISTER

EXPLAINS BOMBING." 1929.*New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Apr 11, 2.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/104986409?accountid=14434>.

McPherson, Alan. *A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2016.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, Volume III, Nicaragua, ed. Tyler Dennet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), Document 634.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1929v03/d634>

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1931. "SIGN TREATY TO END BOUNDARY DISPUTE: NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS WILL ARBITRATE OLD CONTROVERSY THROUGH AMERICAN. WOULD AID WAR ON BANDITS SETTLEMENT WOULD PREVENT HIDING IN AREAS INVOLVED--NICARAGUA MAKES BIG DEBT CUT." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Jan 22, 9.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/99520371?accountid=14434>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Honduran: unknown

COSTS: Several marine airplanes flying over Honduran territory and dropping explosive munitions. Potential small groups of marines that briefly crossed into Honduras on multiple occasions.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the MID database, and not in any other datasets on US military intervention. The intervention takes place outside the ACD and IMI timeframe, and does not meet the troop threshold of MIPS. It is unclear why it is not included in the CRS "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad." Additionally, since the incident takes place along the disputed border the case could potentially be considered as either NIC or HON.

1932 China

NAME: The Shanghai Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 248

DATES: January 30, 1932 – May 5, 1932

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY: By January 1932, Japan had gained control of Manchuria and tensions were rising between Japanese and Chinese forces. In Shanghai, anti-Japanese sentiment was stoked by the attacks on Chinese and Korean populations in Manchuria, while violent boycotts of Japanese goods in the city angered the Japanese delegation.

Clashes in the city brought anti-foreign feelings in Shanghai to a fever pitch, making inhabitants of the international settlement and French concession concerned for their safety. Tensions came to a head on January 18 when a mob assault, provoked by anti-Chinese protests, resulted in the death of a radical Japanese monk.

The Japanese delegation made demands for reparations, threatening military action if all demands, including suppression of the boycotts, were not met by January 28. On the 28th, the Shanghai Mayor and Municipal Council declared a state of emergency and accepted the Japanese demands. Despite the capitulation, Japanese forces moved into the area under the auspices of protecting Japanese citizens and interests. Japanese forces clashed with Chinese forces, escalating instability in and around Shanghai and further alarming foreign legations.

American marines and British forces moved to protect the foreign settlement from escalating Sino-Japanese conflict, and American forces stayed in place until May 5 to protect lives and property. Removal of the marines coincided with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Agreement and lifting of the state of emergency in Shanghai.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. MN: Rowman & Littlefield.

Treat, Payson J. "Shanghai, January 28, 1932." *Pacific Historical Review* 9, no. 3 (1940): 337-43.

Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III, eds. Gustave A. Nuernberger, Victor J. Farrar, John G. Reid, William R. Willoughby and E. R. Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), Documents 1-799.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1932v03/comp1>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS:

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Militarized Interstate Dispute report (Gibler, 2018).

1932 El Salvador

NAME: Communist Uprising & Massacre “La Matanza”

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 23, 1932—February 6, 1932.

TARGET STATE(S): El Salvador, 92

SUMMARY:

In 1932, a combination of rural dissatisfaction, poor economic conditions resulting from the Great Depression, widespread inequality, and political repression sparked an uprising in western El Salvador against the military junta led by Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez and supported by the country’s oligarchy, “The Fourteen Families”.¹ The uprising consisted of roughly 60,000 peasants and Native Americans and was led by a group of revolutionaries from the Communist Party of El Salvador.² The insurgents took several towns and police outposts, primarily directing violence and destruction against symbols of state oppression (affluent citizens, government officials, and local authorities).³ However, the insurgency lacking resources, effective leadership, and coordination, was swiftly crushed by the state security forces. Once the threat was neutralized, state security forces initiated a campaign of mass killings and executions throughout the rural west, eradicating entire indigenous and peasant communities, as retaliation for the uprising and to spread fear among the lower-class. Estimates of total number killed range from 8,000-30,000.⁴

In response to the perceived threat posed by the communist uprising and uncertainty surrounding the Martinez government’s capability to respond to the insurgents, the United States, along with the United Kingdom and Canada, deployed several naval war vessels to Salvadorian waters as a form of gunboat diplomacy to support the Martinez government, and defend American foreign

¹ TAYLOR RW, VANDEN HE. Defining Terrorism in El Salvador: “La Matanza.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 1982;463(1):110.

² *Ibid* 110.

³ Stanley, William. "ANTECEDENTS: THE MATANZA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY RULE." In *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador*, 41-68. Temple University Press, 1996. Accessed October 8, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt14bswgc.6>.

⁴ *Ibid*, 42

interests in the country, should the threat arise.⁵ ⁶ Following the government's fast and effective termination of the rebellion, The war vessels were ordered out of El Salvadorian waters.⁷

SOURCES:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, The American Republics, Volume V, Communist Uprising in El Salvador, eds. E.R. Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 685

Stanley, William. "ANTECEDENTS: THE MATANZA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY RULE." In *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador*, 41-68. Temple University

Taylor RW, Vanden HE. Defining Terrorism in El Salvador: "La Matanza." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 1982;463(1):110.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests, and Build/Maintain Foreign Regime

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- None between US and El-Salvadorian security forces or insurgents.
- 32 El-Salvadorian security forces killed from clashes with insurgency
- 8,000-35,000 Civilian and insurgents killed. Unable to distinguish due to mass killings that immediately followed uprising.

Per capita battle deaths:

TOTAL DEATHS:

Per capita total deaths: El Salvador: 8,000-35,000 civilians & insurgents killed

COSTS: 2 Naval Warships

⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, The American Republics, Volume V, Communist Uprising in El Salvador, eds. E.R. Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 685

⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, The American Republics, Volume V, Communist Uprising in El Salvador, eds. E.R. Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 692.

⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, The American Republics, Volume V, Communist Uprising in El Salvador, eds. E.R. Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 703.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case study comes from the Zoltan Grossman list.

1933 Cuba

NAME: Cuban Revolution of 1933

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1677

DATES: August 13, 1933 – January 24, 1934

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

General Gerardo Machado was re-elected as Cuba's president on November 1st, 1928, with firm support from the United States and broad domestic approval. At the time, the political opposition comprised students, communists party members, and the political "old guard," but none of these groups had much power. However, when the Great Depression found its way to Cuba in 1929 in the form of heavily reduced world sugar and tobacco prices, unemployment and poverty inevitably led to social unrest. In response to coordinated efforts and growing strength among the political opposition, the Machado government began a brutal crackdown on dissidents. By October of 1930, Machado had suspended constitutional guarantees, censorship of the press was firmly established, and Machado's vocal opponents were being arrested or killed.

Tensions continued to build until April 1933 when the U.S. sent Sumner Welles to Cuba to help negotiate a truce between Machado and the opposition, which had by then established a revolutionary junta based in the United States. By the end of July, these negotiations had all but failed. However, in early August, a nationwide strike over taxes led to civilian massacres by government troops, and the military finally turned on Machado. Without any internal support remaining, Machado resigned on August 11th, and Carlos Manuel de Cespedes took over as provisional president. In the wake of the change of power, there was widespread violence in Havana directed mainly at members of the old regime. In response to the violence, the *USS Claxton* and *USS Taylor* occupied the Havana harbor, and the *USS Hamilton* anchored off the coast near Manzanillo, all between August 13th and August 18th.

The provisional government only lasted until September 4th, when low-level military officers launched a coup known as the "Sergeants' Revolt." The U.S. again sent navy ships to Cuba between September 5th–September 9th while the revolution took place. The U.S. Navy deployed the *USS Indianapolis* along with at least the *USS Richmond*, *USS Sturtevant*, *USS McFarland*, and *USS Bainbridge* to Cuba in the name of protecting U.S. lives and property. Two battleships and 1200 marines were also placed on alert in Quantico, Virginia, in case they were needed down in Cuba. The rebellion installed Ramon Grau San Martin, a former physician, as president of Cuba. Apart from brief unrest in early October that again drew four U.S. ships to Cuban ports for several days, the Presidency of Grau San Martin lasted until January of 1934.

On January 15th, 1934, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista and Colonel Carlos Mendieta, leaders in the earlier Sergeants' Revolt, launched yet another coup against the government. This time the U.S. sent 16 ships to various Cuban ports as a show of force discouraging any action against U.S. citizens or their property. By January 28th, the dust had settled, and Mendieta was named the new President of Cuba. The U.S. quickly extended diplomatic recognition to Colonel Mendieta, who they strongly preferred over Grau San Martin. By January 24th, 10 of the 16 U.S. warships had already left Cuba, and it was reported that the rest would return soon. The inauguration of President Mendieta marked the end of the revolution. Mendieta would remain in power until December of 1935 before resigning in the face of violent domestic opposition.

SOURCES:

AGUILAR, LUIS ENRIQUE. 1968. "CUBA 1933: THE FRUSTRATED REVOLUTION." Order No. 6813598, American University.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/302287052?accountid=14434>.

By The Associated Press. 1933. "CUBA RELEASES 300 OF CIVILIAN REBELS: ACTS AFTER THREAT OF HUNGER STRIKE -- 32 OF THE FORMER ARMY OFFICERS FREED. AMERICAN OFFICERS DINED COL. BATISTA IS HOST TO NAVY MEN -- STUDENT LEADER SEES ROOSEVELT'S ENVOY." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Dec 26, 1. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/100808050?accountid=14434>.

By The Associated Press. 1933. "Ships Carry 50 Men each.: ROOSEVELT SENDS WARSHIPS TO CUBA." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Aug 14, 1.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/100885628?accountid=14434>

"Cuba (1902-Present)." University of Central Arkansas: Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed November 28, 2020.
<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/cuba-1902-present/>

Special from, Monitor Bureau. 1933. "Chief of Navy Sails for Cuba in Revolt Crisis: Sails for Closer View of Cuban Developments Chief of Navy Sails for Cuba in Revolt Crisis Cuba's Day-Old Junta Attacks the Problem of Setting Up New State Machados to be Reunited." *The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current File)*, Sep 06, 1.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/513391963?accountid=14434>

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1933. "CUBA AGAIN TESTS ROOSEVELT POLICY: WASHINGTON SEES ENTIRE LATIN-AMERICAN 'HANDS OFF' PROGRAM INVOLVED IN HAVANA. INTERVENTION DISCLAIMED STATE DEPARTMENT ASSERTS THE NAVY WILL 'PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY.' CUBA AGAIN TESTS

ROOSEVELT POLICY." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Sep 06, 1.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/100871029?accountid=14434>.

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1933. "DESTROYER RETIRES AS CUBA IS CALMER: WASHINGTON WITHDRAWS THE CLAXTON, LEAVING ONLY THE TAYLOR IN HAVANA HARBOR. SHIPS' PRESENCE USEFUL LINKED TO END OF VIOLENCE -- WELLES INDICATES NEW PRESIDENT IS POPULAR. WARSHIP RETIRES AS CUBA IS CALMER." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Aug 15, 1.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/100792191?accountid=14434>

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1933. "SHIFT IN WARSHIPS EXPLAINED BY HULL: HE SAYS DEPARTURE OF 4 FROM CUBAN PORTS IS NOT LINKED TO THE GENERAL SITUATION. PLAN TO AID CUBA HALTS AGENTS WORKING ON NEW PACT ARE SURPRISED BY REJECTION OF SUGAR AGREEMENT." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Oct 14, 3. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/100866575?accountid=14434>

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1934. "ROOSEVELT GRANTS CUBAN RECOGNITION: HAVANA FIRES GUNS AND CHEERS FOR OUR PRESIDENT IN WILD CELEBRATION. NAVY WITHDRAWING SHIPS TEN OF SIXTEEN ALREADY HAVE LEFT -- ECONOMIC AID IS NOW BEING STUDIED. ROOSEVELT GRANTS CUBAN RECOGNITION." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Jan 24, 1.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/101087389?accountid=14434>

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Cuban: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0; Cuban: 0

COSTS: Three U.S. ships anchored in Cuban water for six days in August of 1933. Five U.S. ships were deployed to Cuba for five days in September of 1933. Two ships and 1200 marines were also mobilized in the U.S. in preparation for potential conflict in Cuba during those five days in September. Four U.S. ships spent two days in Cuban water in October of 1933. The U.S. deployed 16 ships to Cuba in January of 1934 for roughly ten days, although the exact date of arrival and departure is unknown.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is listed in the CRS document of U.S. usage of force abroad and the MID dataset.

1934 China

NAME: Foochow Protective Mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: n/a

DATES: January 15, 1934 - January 16, 1934

TARGET STATE(S): China CHN 710

SUMMARY:

In 1933 in China, the Nineteenth Route Army stationed in Fukian (Fujian) broke rank with their Nationalist government and partnered with the communists to form a front against the Nanking government. The Nationalist Government was ultimately able to regain the area.

During the upheaval, US marines came to the city of Foochow (Fuzhou), the capital of Fujian region to protect the American Consulate. On January 15th, 20 armed marines from the *USS Tulsa* arrived in Foochow, there were also 50 armed members of British military in the area who had landed the previous day. The US Marines returned to the *USS Tulsa* the afternoon of January 16th, with no reported incident.

SOURCES:

“Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III.” Department of State. Accessed October 7, 2020. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/d362>.

HSI, ANGELA N. S. “SOCIALIST REFORM AND THE FUKIEN REBELLION 1932—34.” *Journal of Asian History* 11, no. 1 (1977): 1–25. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41930224>

“Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020.” Congressional Research Service, July 20, 2020. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect Own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 20 U.S. Marines from one U.S. naval ship, *USS Tulsa*.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only mentioned in the CRS dataset. We confirm the intervention using three separate resources all stating the deployment of U.S. marines to protect American diplomatic interests. For this reason, we have included the case in MIP.

1937 Japan

NAME: Panay Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1825

DATES: December 12, 1937

TARGET STATE(S): Japan (JPN), 740

SUMMARY: As the second Sino-Japanese War escalated, Japan made further incursion into China. The American embassy in Nanjing became concerned for the safety of the embassy and Americans in the city. By December 1937, the embassy had encouraged all Americans to leave and shuttered the embassy compound. The Chinese government had withdrawn to Hankow due to the nearing Japanese army and air raids.

The *USS Panay* was the last American ship in Nanjing and became a temporary American legation. The American ambassador notified the Japanese ambassador that the diplomatic mission would withdraw to Hankow on the *USS Panay* and requested that the embassy in Nanjing, all Americans still in the city, and the sailing ship be protected from attack.

On December 12, the *USS Panay* had moved 20 miles up the Yangtze River from Nanjing when it, along with several British ships, was attacked and sunk by Japanese naval planes. One passenger and two sailors died due to injuries received during the attack, but there is confusion around the number missing, making it possible that as many as 25 were killed.

On December 13, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs apologized and committed to dealing with the responsible parties appropriately. Admiral Hasegawa took responsibility for the accident and claimed that it was difficult to discern the provenance of the ships, though later accounts challenged that assertion. Compensation was also paid by the Japanese government to the survivors.

SOURCES:

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1938. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938): 9, 17.

<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/y/yangtze-river-patrol-and-other-us-navy-asiatic-fleet-activities-in-china.html>

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. MN: Rowman & Littlefield.

Press. (1942). Japanese Is Decorated For 1937 Panay Sinking. New York Times (1923-Current File), 29.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume IV, The Far East, Sinking by Japanese attack of the U. S. S. Panay, December 12, 1937, in the Yangtze above Nanking, eds. Matilda F. Axton, Rogers P. Churchill, N. O. Sappington, John G. Reid, Francis C. Prescott, Louis E. Gates, and Shirley L. Phillips (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), Documents 616-674. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1937v04/ch5>

Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I, eds. Joseph Fuller and Tyler Dennet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), Documents 369-407. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1931-41v01/ch9>

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 2

Japan: 0

United States: 2

TOTAL DEATHS: 3

Japan: 0

United States: 3

COSTS: Loss of Panay and the 3-25 dead and missing.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the Militarized Interstate Dispute report (Gibler, 2018).

Japan 1940

NAME: Deterrence Campaign Against Japan

DISPUTE NUMBER: 339

DATES: May 1940 - December 6, 1941

TARGET STATE(S): Japan, 740

SUMMARY:

In the 1900's, Japan sought to imitate Western colonial powers as it expanded its empire through Asia. The US already had a strong military presence in China to maintain trade interests in the region and to build an alliance with China. Japanese expansion in China, namely the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the invasion on Nanking in 1937, escalated tensions between the US and Japan creating competition over dominance in the Pacific region. After the outbreak of WWII, despite its initial efforts to stay neutral, the US became concerned with Japan's activities in the Pacific.

The Roosevelt administration took several actions to deter Japanese expansion in the Pacific. In May 1940, the US disbanded the Battle Fleet and created the Pacific Fleet and Atlantic Fleet. Navy ships were transferred from San Diego, California to the long underdeveloped Pearl Harbor base in Hawaii. Between 1940 and 1941, construction of new facilities began to meet the fleet's needs. At Pearl Harbor, the fleet was instructed to take an "advanced" position in an attempt to deter the Japanese. The commander, Admiral James O. Richardson, opposed a long-term post at Pearl Harbor; as a result, he was replaced by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.

In July 1940, Congress passed the Two Oceans Navy Bill (Second Naval Expansion Act) which included an increase by 70 percent or 1.325 million tons of the Navy, an expansion that cost \$4 billion. Eight battleships and three aircraft carriers were added the next year. In another attempt to force a withdrawal from Japan, Roosevelt cut shipments of iron, steel, and aviation fuel to Japan. This only further aggravated Japan who responded by entering French Indochina. In September 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, which allied it with Germany and Italy as part of the "Axis" in the war. Meanwhile, the Asiatic Fleet was stationed in Manila, Philippines to defend the Philippines and Guam and protect US interests in the region. Originally, the fleet's mission was to counter Japanese aggression. However, with increased tensions, Admiral Hart withdrew forces from mainland China. By January 1941, the Asiatic fleet began preparing for war in the Philippines. By February 1941, the Pacific Fleet was recreated and was to be permanently stationed at Pearl Harbor. In July 1941, Japan moved further into Southern Indochina. In retaliation, Roosevelt seized Japanese assets in the US on July 26th. This effectively cut off Japan from US oil. As a last minute deterrence attempt, Roosevelt built up

military power in Southeast Asia. A squadron of Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighter planes replaced P-26s, two squadrons B-18s replaced B-10s within the 28th Bombardment Squadron, and two squadrons of Seversky P-35s, 19 new B-17 long range bombers, and B-24 Liberators were deployed to the Philippines. It was believed that this large force would secure the islands and deter the Japanese.

These combined efforts, relocating the Pacific Fleet, imposing sanctions, and military buildup in the Pacific, were all attempts to deter Japanese expansion. The decision to move the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor was originally intended as a show of force to Japan. However, showing Japan that the US was in reach of Japan did just that, and eventually led to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. The attack on Pearl Harbor dragged the US into WWII with Roosevelt declaring war on Japan on December 8th.

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OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Passing the Two Oceans Act (\$4 billion) in which additional military support was deployed to the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines in summer 1941 (91 Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighter planes, two squadrons B-18s, two squadrons of Seversky P-35s, 19 new B-17 long range bombers, and B-24 Liberators were deployed). Relocation of the Pacific Fleet (at the time of Pearl Harbor, the Pacific Fleet consisted of 9 battleships, 21 cruisers, 54 destroyers, 22 submarines, 1 gunboat, 9 minelayers, 26 minesweepers, 60 auxiliary ships, and 3 aircraft carriers).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case concerns U.S.-Japanese tensions up until the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The following day, December 8 1941, the U.S. formally declared war on Japan. We code December 7, 1941 as the beginning of World War II, which forms a separate intervention.

1941 World War II

NAME: World War II

DISPUTE NUMBER: 258

DATES: December 7th, 1941 – September 2nd, 1945

TARGET STATE(S):

Japan (740); Germany (255); Italy (325); Bulgaria (355); Hungary (310); Romania (360)

SUMMARY:

Although World War II was global in scope, this brief summary focuses on American action in the European and Pacific theaters, particularly against the five target states with which the United States declared war: Japan (declared December 8th, 1941), Germany and Italy (declared December 11th, 1941), Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (declared June 5th, 1942).

Pacific Theater

On July 7th, 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began. Japanese forces rapidly captured several major Chinese cities, including Peking (Beijing), Shanghai, and Nanking (Nanjing), planning a broader imperial expansion throughout Asia. In July 1941, the United States banned the export of iron and fuel to Japan, and in September, Japan formally joined the Axis powers. On December 7th, 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The United States declared war on Japan the following day, and declared war on Germany and Italy on December 11th.

In the following months, Japanese forces invaded Burma (Myanmar), the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), the Philippines, Singapore, and other parts of Southeast Asia. The United States fought naval battles with Japan in the Pacific throughout the war, beginning with the Battle of Balikpapan on January 24th, 1942. In May and June 1942, the United States defeated Japan in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, respectively. These battles, and particularly the American victory at Midway, marked a turning point in the Pacific theater. The Japanese military position in the Pacific weakened progressively afterward.

The US and its allies won several subsequent naval battles, “island-hopping” across the Pacific toward the main Japanese islands. Between February and March 1945, American forces prevailed in the intense battle for Iwo Jima, and subsequently captured Okinawa and Luzon.

During this period, the US Air Force also firebombed Japanese cities. On August 6th and 9th, respectively, the United States used atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 15th, Japan announced an unconditional surrender. Japan formally surrendered aboard the *USS Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2nd, 1945.

European Theater

On September 1st, 1939, German forces invaded Poland, prompting France and the United Kingdom to declare war with Germany on September 3rd. From April through June of 1940, Germany invaded Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and France. The Battle of Britain began in July, encompassing aerial battles between the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the German Luftwaffe, the latter conducting *blitz* attacks against British cities. The RAF eventually defeated the Luftwaffe, marking Germany's first major defeat in the war. Fighting expanded to North Africa and Eastern and Southern Europe, and Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. In 1943, the Soviet army defeated Germany at the Battle of Stalingrad, and Germany's position on the Eastern Front weakened.

In March 1941, the United States Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, enabling the US to provide supplies to allied countries during the war. In August 1941, US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter, outlining a vision of the post-war world after Germany's defeat. In January 1942, following the US declarations of war with the Axis powers, US troops began deploying to Europe. In December 1942, 11 Allied countries jointly condemned the Nazis' mass detention and murder of Jewish people.

After declaring war on Romania in June 1942, the US Air Force bombed oil fields in Ploesti, bombing them again in the summer of 1943. The US also bombed Romanian railway targets between April and August 1944. Between November 1943 through April 1944, American and allied air forces bombed Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria. Starting in April 1944, American forces also bombed industrial targets in Budapest, Hungary.

In November 1942, Allied forces moved into North Africa, landing in Morocco and Algeria. In May, the Allies defeated Germany in Tunisia, weakening the Axis position in the region and ending the North African campaign. The Allies then captured Sicily and moved north through Italy, encountering intense German resistance throughout the rest of 1943 and into the next year. Finally, on June 4th, 1944, Allied troops captured Rome.

On June 6th, 1944, the Allies landed at Normandy, France. Allied advances against occupying German forces were slow until late July, when German defenses weakened and Allied advances accelerated. In August 1944, American and French troops liberated Paris. By the fall of 1944, Allied troops pressed into Germany, encountering considerable resistance culminating in the

Battle of the Bulge from December 16th, 1944 to early January, 1945. In the following months, the Allies drove further into Germany, which surrendered unconditionally on May 8th, 1945.

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OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Defend Territory; Policy Change; Social Protection & Order; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for US & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- US Battle Deaths: 291,557 (Congressional Research Service 2020, p. 2)
- Japan Battle Deaths (1937-1945):
 - 1,740,955 (Dower 1993, p. 297)
 - Japan Battle Deaths Against US: 485,717 (Dower 1993, p. 297)
 - 1,555,308 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Germany Battle Deaths: 2,850,000 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Italy Battle Deaths: 110,823 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Bulgaria Battle Deaths: 6,671 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Hungary Battle Deaths: 147,435 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Romania Battle Deaths: 169,882 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)

Per capita battle deaths:

- Approximately 1.8% of US's 16.35 million troops
- Approximately 30% of Germany's 9.2 million troops
- Approximately 25% of Japan's 6.095 million troops

- Approximately 2.7% of Italy's 4 million troops
- Approximately 28.3% of Romania's 600,000 troops
- Approximately 42.1% of Hungary's 350,000 troops
- Approximately 1.5% of Bulgaria's 450,000 troops

TOTAL DEATHS:

- United States: 405,399 (Congressional Research Service 2020, p. 2)
- Japan: 2.1 million (Dower 1993, p. 298)
- Germany: 4 million (Weinberg 2005, p. 894)
- Hungary Total Deaths: 470,000
 - Hungary Civilian Deaths: 270,000 (Judt 2006, p. 18)
 - Hungary Military Deaths: 200,000 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Romania Total Deaths: 500,000 (Judt 2006, p. 18)
 - Civilian Deaths: 200,000
 - Military Deaths: 300,000 (Judt 2006, p. 18; Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Bulgaria Total Deaths: 28,500
 - 10,000 Civilian Deaths (Clodfelter 1992, p. 528)
 - 18,500 Total Military Deaths (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Italy Total Deaths: 552,941
 - Italy Military Deaths: 400,000 (Judt 2006, p. 18)
 - Italy Civilian Deaths: 152,941 (Clodfelter 1992, p. 527)
- Total civilian dead in Europe: 19 million (Judt 2006, p. 18)
- Total deaths globally (including in the Holocaust): 60 million (Weinberg 2005, p. 894)

Per capita total deaths:

- Bulgaria: Approximately 0.4% of population
- United States: Approximately 0.3% of population
- Japan: Approximately 2.89% of population
- Germany: Approximately 5.7% of population
- Italy: Approximately 1.2% of population
- Romania: Approximately 3.2% of population
- Hungary: Approximately 5.1% of population

COSTS:

The Congressional Research Service estimates that World War II cost the US \$4.1 trillion in FY 2011 dollars. At its highest point, the US mobilized over 16 million troops, and produced 300,000 aircraft. By August 14, 1945, the US Navy had 6,768 active ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

Virtually all sources remark on the difficulty of arriving at precise death totals for World War II. We include per capita total death estimates using 1939 population estimates from *Our World in Data*. To calculate per capita battle deaths, we use Clodfelter's count of the peak number of troops mobilized by each country.

Although battles involving the American military overwhelmingly occurred abroad, we include "defend territory" among the objectives of the American intervention. This is because Japan's attack on American territory motivated US entry into the war, and because Japan invaded and occupied two pieces of American territory on the westernmost edge of the Aleutian Island chain in June 1942.

1945 China

NAME: Operation Beleaguer

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 30, 1945 - May 16, 1949

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY: This intervention describes Operation Beleaguer, a complex four year deployment of U.S. military forces into China after the end of WWII. Over the course of the deployment, the goals and nature of the mission changed and were often confusing and opaque. On August 20, 1945, the objectives of the operation were laid out as follows: (1) assist the Chinese nationalist government in the occupation of key areas, (2) repatriate Japanese combatants and civilians living in China, and (3) liberate allied prisoners of wars and internees. 50,000 American troops were initially moved to China for Operation Beleaguer.

While the goals were relatively clear upfront, the mission gradually became more complicated as goalposts shifted. President Truman initially sought a united, democratic China, so American troops were ordered to appear as neutral in the Chinese civil war. In practice, this proved challenging and demoralizing for American troops, who had difficulty defining their objectives and rules of enemy engagement.

In 1946, U.S. troops were ordered to assist the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in providing humanitarian relief to the Chinese. This continued until March of 1947, when the UNRRA mission was deemed complete. In June 1947, the size of the American forces was reduced to 5,000. These troops guarded American property and citizens until communist forces took over the mainland in 1949.

All U.S. forces left China by May 1949. While Operation Beleaguer was marred by confusion and opaque goals, the force did accomplish several important tasks. Over 500,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were repatriated. Furthermore, American troops ensured the safe, consistent flow of coal on Chinese railways, which became part of their mission in the later years of the intervention. Troops also protected American citizens and property and helped Chinese nationalists control key infrastructure in Northern China.

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Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*.

OBJECTIVE: Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- United States: 34 American troops killed throughout the Operation
- China: Unknown number of Chinese communist soldiers killed

TOTAL DEATHS:

- United States: 34 American troops. No civilian casualties.
- China: Unknown

COSTS: Costs associated with keeping 50,000 American troops in China for multiple years.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad. It is surprisingly missing in all other key datasets of US military intervention. We are unsure as to what accounts for this missing dataset, as the case represents a direct usage of force abroad for many years. We do make some alterations to the CRS listing by combining this intervention (Operation Beleaguer) with the 1948 Chinese intervention in the CRS report. The 1948 Chinese intervention describes the final missions of the American troops remaining in China, which are also encompassed here. These missions were limited in scope and generally entailed duties such as evacuation and protection of Americans. At its outset and conclusion the mission was a unilateral U.S. intervention, but most of the peak troop deployment occurred in accordance with a U.N.-sanctioned mission. We therefore code the case as UN-sanctioned (InterType = 3).

1946 Russia

NAME: Turkish Strait Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 252

DATES: August 4, 1946 to October 4, 1946

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

On December 4, 1945, anti-communist demonstrations took place in Turkey that the Soviet Union strongly denounced. The Turkish government deemed it an issue of internal politics, which the Soviet Union did not find acceptable.

On December 20, the Soviet Union then demanded that the Turks cede 180 miles of coastline along the Black sea which connected two key Russian oil ports. The Russians claimed that historically this was Georgian land and as a result it belonged to the Soviet Union.

The Turkish government responded by mobilizing its military forces and threatened to go to war if the Russians violated their borders. The Soviets responded by mobilizing their troops and placing them at the Bulgarian border. Both sides remained mobilized until August of 1946.

That August, President Truman made the decision to threaten the Soviets with war if they encroached on the Turkish border. The United States feared losing the eastern mediterranean to the Soviet Union if it led them move any farther west. The Soviets backed down to the threat of war and the United States allowed the Soviets to move through the strait.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Knight, Jonathan. 1975. "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy." *Political Science Quarterly* 90, no. 3: 451-75. doi:10.2307/2148296.

"7 August 1946: Turkish Straits Crisis Reaches Its Climax." 2015. *MoneyWeek*, August 10. <https://moneyweek.com/332694/7-august-1946-turkish-straits-crisis-reaches-its-climax/>.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change;

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of battleship USS Missouri in Eastern Mediterranean.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) sources, but the conflict is deemed to begin on December 20th, 1945. This is when the Soviet Union and Turkey begin their incident, but the US did not involve itself until August of 1946. Therefore, we have changed the MID start date to August 1946.

Gibler (2018) considers the outcome of this intervention a stalemate, presumably because there was no formal settlement. However, our sources show that the United States achieved its stated outcome, which was to halt the advancing Soviets and protect the integrity of the Turkish border. Thus, we code this one as a US Victory.

It's not confirmed whether the US aircraft carriers actually moved into the Eastern Mediterranean or just threatened to do so.

1946 Yugoslavia

NAME: Airspace violation over Yugoslav territory

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3193

DATES: August 9, 1946 – August 19, 1946

TARGET STATE(S): Yugoslavia 345

SUMMARY: Yugoslavia fell under German occupation during World War II. However, its indigenous Communist resistance movement – the Yugoslav Partisans under leadership of Jozep Tito – staged the most powerful military challenge to occupation anywhere in World War II Europe. With only minimal assistance from the Red Army, they liberated Yugoslavia from German rule essentially by their own effort. This military achievement allowed a political achievement of similar magnitude after the war ended as Yugoslavia managed to remain neutral between the East and West blocs in the unfolding Cold War. Yet the transition towards peace and political neutrality was not entirely smooth; among other things, the Great Powers forced Yugoslavia to cede the city of Trieste back to Italy in 1945. It took several years after the end of World War II before local borders fully congealed.

This context of territorial conflict set the stage for a couple of militarized interstate disputes involving American forces. During two incidents in August of 1946, Yugoslav forces fired on American military transport aircraft transgressing what Yugoslav political and military leaders considered their national airspace. In the first incident the aircraft was forced down, and in the second incident anti-aircraft weaponry shot down the aircraft killing at least five servicemen.

In response to these developments, President Truman ordered reinforcements to the US air forces in Northern Italy and for naval units in the Mediterranean to deploy to nearby sites.

American leaders had worried that Yugoslavia under Communist rule would become a Soviet proxy, but political differences lead Tito to break with Stalin in 1948 and chart his own course during the Cold War including as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

SOURCES:

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War*. Harvard University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 5 – 25

Per capita battle deaths: Negligible

TOTAL DEATHS: 5 - 25

Per capita total deaths: Negligible

COSTS: Two American C-47 transport aircraft were shot down.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the MID dataset, not other key sources, most likely due to time frame limitations and the fact that the instance was a display of force, at best. We, however, choose to add this case to our dataset as it represents a large proportion of US military involvements during the Cold War.

1947 Uruguay

NAME: U.S. Nuclear Bombers in Uruguay

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 1947

TARGET STATE(S): Oriental Republic of Uruguay, URU 165

SUMMARY:

In March 1947, Uruguay was inaugurating president-elect Tomás Berreta Gandolfo for his first and only term in office. Uruguay was among the most prosperous countries in Latin America at the time, primarily due to their export of crucial wartime materials like beef and other foodstuffs. Uruguay was also home to assets belonging to mostly German (and some Japanese) companies that the United States was attempting to liquidate upon the conclusion of World War II, and it appears that the Uruguayan government was dragging its feet in passing legislation to allow for the liquidation.¹ Furthermore, neighboring Paraguay descended into civil war in March 1947 (the “Barefoot Revolution”), as leftist and communist parties united against President Higinio Morínigo’s repressive government.²

This context, as well as (unverified) rumors of Axis submarine activity in the region immediately postwar serve as the backdrop for a strange show of force by the United States. President Harry Truman sent a deployment of Strategic Air Command (SAC) nuclear capable B-29’s to Uruguay to celebrate President Berreta’s inauguration.³ No details could be found to explain the strategy behind the deployment, though academics such as Evergreen State’s Zoltan Grossman categorize the deployment as a “show of force”.⁴

OBJECTIVE: Ultimately unclear, but possibilities include:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; support the authority of president-elect Berreta (considering ongoing civil war in Paraguay-avoid spillover into Uruguay)

Maintain Empire; deployment is a show of force meant to remind Latin American states of the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary

¹ "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947, THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, VOLUME VIII." U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 14, 2019.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v08/d902>.

² Sapienza, Antonio Luis. *Aerial Operations in the Revolutions of 1922 & 1947 in Paraguay: The First Dogfights in South America*. Warwick, England: Helion & Company Limited, 2018.

³Lackey, Douglas P. *Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.

⁴ Grossman, Zoltan. "From Wounded Knee to Afghanistan a Century of US Military Interventions." US Global Military. October 8, 2001. Accessed March 14, 2019. <https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~dludden/USwars.htm>.

Policy Change; pressure Uruguayan government to support U.S. efforts to liquidate German and Japanese assets in the country

OUTCOME:

Unclear/missing; the U.S bombers returned home after the deployment, with no further actions or aftermath recorded

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Information not available

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

1948 Russia

NAME: The Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949 (Operation Vittles)

DISPUTE NUMBER: 26

DATES: June 24, 1948 – May 12, 1949

TARGET STATE(S): The Soviet Union, 365, Germany, 255

SUMMARY: Prior to the conclusion of World War Two, the Allies negotiated a zonal program within occupied Germany, splitting the territory and Berlin, into zones controlled by The United Kingdom, the United States, France, and The Soviet Union. The only signed access agreement was an air corridor agreement giving the Allies access to three airstrips within Berlin to their respective German zones. In 1947, the US, France and Britain merged their three contiguous zones into one, that eventually was to develop into the independent Federal Republic of Germany (“West Germany”). Russia controlled the eastern parts of Germany that its forces had captured during World War II.

The one territorial outlier was the capital city of Berlin, split into Western-controlled West Berlin and Soviet-controlled East Berlin but located deep in the heart of the Soviet zone of occupation. West Berlin thus formed an island of Western control deep in a sea of Soviet-controlled territory. As the Cold War began shortly after World War II, Soviet leaders were intent to force its Western competitors to relinquish control over West Berlin. To this effect, on June 24, 1948 Soviet forces abruptly blockaded all road, rail, and canal entrances to West Berlin with the intention of forcing Western powers to abandon the city or force its inhabitants to starve.

When assessing their options the US determined that air routes were the only feasible options to deliver aid to the blockaded city. They predicted that the Soviets would not use force to stop the lift to avoid the perception of being an aggressor against an unarmed humanitarian operation.

The airlift, officially named Operation Vittles, began on June 26, 1949 and was accompanied by a contemporaneous UK operation. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) delivered supplies to the US Air Base in West Berlin. The operation amped up efficiency as it progressed. It started with just thirty C-47s delivering 80 tons of cargo and at its height had expanded to the use of a third of the DoD total C-54s flying 5,000 to 6,000 tons of goods, daily. The USSR ended the blockade of West Berlin and May 12, 1949, just weeks after the establishment of NATO. This ended the need for the airlifts as roads into the city opened. Over the next month the States of West and East Germany were formally established.

SOURCES:

Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War*. Harvard University Press.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harrington, Daniel F. 2012. *Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War*. University Press of Kentucky.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

"The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949." 2019. Government. Office of the Historian. Accessed October 1. <https://www.history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/berlin-airlift>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention; Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 31 Americans; 40 Britons; at least 9 German fatalities

COSTS: ~\$224 million. 2,323,738 tons of supplies were delivered in over 200,000 flights, totaling over 600,000 flying hours. 17 US aircraft crashed during the operation and 8 British. 92 million miles flown.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Only MID and the CRS document of interventions, with their more historical timeframes and broader definitions, list this case of US usage of force abroad. Other datasets, such as MIPS, IMI, and ACD/PRIO does not include this case due to time limitations or more narrow definitions of US military intervention (limited to ground troops or non-humanitarian missions). We choose to include this case in our dataset as it represents the US usage of military force abroad, albeit for humanitarian purposes. But we change the MID start and end dates from May 21, 1948 - July 25, 1949 to June 24, 1948 - May 12, 1949 so as to more accurately reflect the trajectory on the ground (as per case summary).

The Military Intervention Project (MIP) Case Study

NAME: Greek Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 28, 1948 - October 16, 1949

TARGET STATE(S): Greece (GRC), 350

SUMMARY:

British forces liberated Greece from Nazi forces in 1944 and subsequently took responsibility for maintaining a fragile peace between the National Unity government and the Greek Community Party's military wing, the Greek National Liberation Army (ELAS). Fighting broke out between the British, Communists and Nationalists between 1944 and 1945 as the Communist forces refused to disarm after the Nazis were removed. The Communists and Nationalists returned to fighting in March 1946, with the ELAS receiving support from Communists in neighboring Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. The British forces (nearly 40,000 strong) alerted the United States in early 1947 that, due to an internal economic crisis, Great Britain would no longer be able to supply economic and military aid to the Greek state, and that British military forces (except advisers) would be leaving by March 31, 1947.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked a joint session of Congress for \$400 million in military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, with the majority of funds directed to Greece. Truman's address to Congress laid out the Truman Doctrine, in which American foreign policy would support anti-Communist movements and governments wherever they were threatened. The next month, Secretary of State George Marshall announced further economic aid to Greece under the auspices of the European Recovery Program, known colloquially as the "Marshall Plan".

By 1949, roughly 500 American military advisers were assisting the Greek government in beating back Communist guerillas in the north. One American Lieutenant Colonel was killed when his air support aircraft was shot down during a battle with ELAS forces. The significantly larger Greek government forces struggled against the ELAS guerillas until 1948, when the Soviet Union broke off relations with Tito's Yugoslavia over their continued support of the Greek rebels. The Soviets and British had agreed after World War II to a "percentages agreement," which delineated which Balkan states would remain under their respective sphere of influence; the U.S.S.R. had agreed to leave Greece to the British. Tito, Yugoslavia's Communist dictator, continued to supply the ELAS and was rebuked by Stalin. This led to serious divisions inside the Greek Communist party and ELAS, and by 1949 Tito had ceased supporting the rebels. A final offensive by the Greek military in August 1949 pushed the remaining rebel forces into Albania, effectively ending the war.

Greece would remain a divided country for the following decades, with multiple political murders culminating in a coup in 1967 and counter-coup in 1973. American military advisers, especially Lt General James Van Fleet, would exercise considerable influence in Greek politics throughout the 50s and 60s, successfully pushing the government to take a harder line against left wing movements in favor of reactionary right wing politics.

SOURCES:

Calbos, Paul T. 1993. *Cold War Conflict: American Intervention in Greece*. PhD diss., Indiana University.

Harris, William D. 2012. *Instilling Aggressiveness: U.S. Advisors and Greek Combat Leadership in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949*. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth: United States Army.

Nachmani, Amikam. 1990. "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4: 489-522. doi:10.1177/002200949002500406.

Van Schaick, F. 1949. "American Aid to Greece." *Editorial Research Reports 19491*.
<https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1949020900>.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; defend Greek state from Communist rebels

Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; ensure Greece remains within Western sphere of influence and can act as bulwark against Soviets and Tito in Yugoslavia

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies; Communist rebels defeated in 1949 and Western-backed government remains in power

BATTLE DEATHS:

Guerillas: 29,000 killed, 13,000 captured, 28,000 surrendered¹

Government: 11,000 killed, 23,000 wounded, 8,000 missing²

¹ Nachmani, Amikam. "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4 (October 1990): 489-522. Accessed January 15, 2019. doi:10.1177/002200949002500406.

² *ibid*

Guerillas and government: ~50,000 killed³

United States: 1 killed⁴

Per capita battle deaths:

533.3-666.7 per 100,000 Greeks

TOTAL DEATHS:

100,000 killed (civilians, soldiers and guerillas)⁵

~140,000 killed (civilians, soldiers and guerrillas)⁶

4,000 civilians killed by guerillas alone ⁷

Per capita total deaths:

1,333.3-1,866.6 per 100,000 Greeks

COSTS:

700,000 Greeks displaced by the violence⁸

\$350 million in combined military and economic aid for 1947-48⁹

\$200 million in combined military and economic aid for 1948-49¹⁰

~\$550 million in total American aid to Greece during the Civil War (does not include funds disbursed under Marshall Plan)

³ "Greek Civil War." Encyclopædia Britannica. November 26, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019.

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Greek-Civil-War>.

⁴ Calbos, Paul T. *COLD WAR CONFLICT: AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN GREECE*. PhD diss., Indiana University, 1993.

⁵ Smith, Helena. "Bittersweet Return for Greek Civil War's Lost Victims." *The Guardian*. October 17, 2003. Accessed January 15, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/17/greece>.

⁶ Nachmani, Amikam. "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4 (October 1990): 489-522. Accessed January 15, 2019. doi:10.1177/002200949002500406.

⁷ *ibid*

⁸ Pike, John. "Greek Civil War." *Greek Civil War*. July 27, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019.

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/greek.htm>.

⁹ Van Schaick, F. "American Aid to Greece." *Editorial Research Reports 19491* (1949).

<https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1949020900>.

¹⁰ Harris, William D. *Instilling Aggressiveness: U.S. Advisors and Greek Combat Leadership in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949*. Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012. Fort Leavenworth: United States Army, 2012.

American aid financed 67% of Greek imports and accounted for 25% of Greek GDP during the Civil War (1947-49)¹¹

\$700 million in economic aid disbursed to Greece under the Marshall Plan¹²

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears in the MIPS and CRS datasets on US military involvements abroad, with the same start and end dates. It does not appear in MID, IMI, or other leading datasets. This is potentially due to the advisorship role of the US in this case. Nonetheless, while no US combat troops were involved in this incident, US advisors did go into combat, something that MIPS labels as "aggressive assistance." Thus, we include this case as a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad.

¹¹ Havers, Rob. "Greece and the Marshall Plan." Greece and the Marshall Plan. June 08, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. <https://www.marshallfoundation.org/blog/greece-and-the-marshall-plan/>.

¹² *ibid*

1948 Israel

NAME: Arab-Israeli Conflict

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 18, 1948

TARGET STATE(S): Mandate Palestine (present-day Israel 666).

SUMMARY:

The British Empire had ruled Mandate Palestine ever since Britain and France split Arab lands into mutually agreed-upon zones of control after conquering the Arab domains of the Ottoman Empire in 1917. However, Mandate Palestine contained both Jewish and Arab populations with radically different ideas for how this administrative unit ought to be governed. Most Jewish residents adhered to the Zionist belief that (at least substantial parts of) Mandate Palestine should form a national home for the Jewish people. Arab inhabitants almost universally opposed this vision. Conflicts between the two groups intensified along with increasing Jewish immigration to the area in the 1930s; unable to find a political solution, the British government after World War II referred the conflict to the newly inaugurated United Nations.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended partitioning Mandate Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. Zionist leaders agreed to the plan, while Arab leaders rejected it, causing diplomatic deadlock. Britain, however, announced in September 1947 that it would simply end its mandate on May 15, 1948 regardless of whether the diplomatic process had concluded by then. As a result, Mandate Palestine increasingly fell into lawlessness, chaos, and political violence that effectively grew into a civil war between Jewish and Arab communities.

Throughout this process, international mediators and diplomats continued to work in Mandate Palestine to reach a solution, at great risk to their own lives from hardliners on both sides. For instance, US Consul General Thomas Wason was assassinated by unknown assailants in May 1948 and Swedish UN-appointed mediator Folke Bernadotte was assassinated in September 1948 by members of the paramilitary Zionist group Lehi.

On July 18, 1948, a provisional Marine Consular Guard of 13 was detached from the 21st Marines on board the *USS Kearsage* at Tripoli and sent to Jerusalem to protect the U.S. consulate. Having secured the consulate, tensions in the region remained hostile. On October 12, 1948, the U.S. Navy deployed 42 sailors to assist in securing the U.S. consulate. The Marines have been consistently deployed to Israel since 1948 to protect U.S. diplomatic interest in times of civil unrest. In 2018, DoD marginally increased the number of Marines guarding U.S.

diplomatic posts in the region after the U.S. announced it was moving its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

SOURCES:

Morris, Benny. 1999. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Rogan, Eugene. 2009. *The Arabs: a History*. London: Penguin Books.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Shlaim, Avi. 2000. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Daily Boston Globe. 1948. "President Approves Marine Guard for Duty in Jerusalem." *Daily Boston Globe*. Jul. 17.

Special to the New York Times. 1948. "Marine Guard to Grow." *The New York Times*. Oct. 12.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 1 (U.S. Consul General to Jerusalem, Thomas Wasson).

COSTS: Deployment of a contingent of 13 U.S. Marines and later 42 U.S. Navy sailors. Total forces maxed out at 55 troops. Protection mission is ongoing.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only documented in the CRS listing of U.S. usages of force abroad, not in any other key datasets of U.S. military intervention. This is due to the mild nature of the military mission, limited to protecting U.S. citizens within its diplomatic mission in Jerusalem. Nonetheless, we include this case as a confirmed example of the U.S. usage of force abroad, with a very low level of hostility.

1949 Yugoslavia

NAME: Monitoring Yugoslavia's final split from the East bloc

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1286

DATES: August 9, 1949 – December 14, 1951

TARGET STATE(S): Yugoslavia 345; Russia 365; Bulgaria 355

SUMMARY:

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Yugoslavian Communist regime appeared to side with the Soviet Union in diplomatic orientation, for instance, by initially refusing aid from the United States through the Marshall Plan. However, Yugoslav leader Josip Tito wanted autonomy from the Soviet Union to pursue his conception of Yugoslav national interests in both domestic and (especially) foreign policy. By the late 1940s, these tensions developed into an open diplomatic rift.

In late 1949, Yugoslavia left the Soviet voting bloc in the United Nations, and the Soviet Union officially declared Yugoslavia as an enemy. Soviet forces and their allies from Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria massed on Yugoslavia's border before the end of 1949 and multiple border incidents ensued during the following two years.

During this episode, the United States deployed its "largest peace-time fleet" (Gibler 2018:341) to observe and monitor the situation, and in all likelihood to deter the Soviet bloc from further aggression. With the support of the UN Secretary-General, Norwegian national Trygve Lie, Yugoslavia referred its dispute to the United Nations where the General Assembly ruled in its favor in December, 1951. At this point, the Soviet Union backed down.

SOURCES:

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War*. Harvard University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor; Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 25-100

Per capita total deaths: negligible

COSTS: Deployment of America's "largest peace-time fleet into the Mediterranean" for the duration of about a year.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID, Gibler (2018) narratives, and CRS listing of US military usages of force abroad. This is because the case represents a display and threat of force by the US towards the Soviet Union, not a traditional usage of military force. We include this case in our dataset as it represents quite a large "peacetime fleet." Moreover, we are interested in measuring the variations in US foreign policy as it ranges from display, threat, and usage of force abroad.

NAME: Korean War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 51

DATES: June 27, 1950 – July 27, 1953

TARGET STATE(S): 731 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 710 People's Republic of China

SUMMARY:

In the early part of the 20th century, Japan administered Korea. After the breakup of the Japanese empire in 1945, the United States and Soviet Union divided the peninsula at the 38th parallel, with the USSR occupying the north and the U.S. occupying the south. In the South, an American-backed nationalist government under Syngman Rhee, named the Republic of Korea (ROK), was established. With support from both the Soviet Union and China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), a communist government, was established in the north. Both regimes claimed control of the entire peninsula.

On June 25, 1950, the DPRK crossed the 38th parallel and quickly dominated the South Korean army with significant Soviet support. The United States was able to get a United Nations Security Council resolution passed authorizing military support in Korea. The United Nations Command was formed, and coordinated a military effort that consisted of troops from 16 member states, led by the United States. The United Nations forces quickly pushed North Korea back across the 38th parallel, toward the Chinese border. In October 1950, Chinese troops officially entered the battle and began pushing U.S. troops south. By May 1951, a stalemate began to appear near the 38th parallel. Limited military engagements continued until a ceasefire was signed on July 27, 1953.

The Korean War has not yet been concluded, and the original ceasefire remains in effect. Because the war has not yet officially concluded, the United Nations Command continues to operate. The U.S. has signed a bilateral defense treaty with the ROK, established an extended deterrence agreement, and had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the country from 1953-1991. In the DPRK, Kim Il-Sung and his descendants consolidated control and established a totalitarian regime that has a significantly militarized population and a full-fledged nuclear weapons program.

SOURCES:

America's Wars. U.S. Department of Veteran's Affairs. Accessed Nov. 27, 2018.

"Korean War." Britannica Online Academic Edition, 2018, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Mendoza, Abraham O. 2011. "The Korean War, 1950–1953." In *World History Encyclopedia*, by Alfred J. Andrea. ABC-CLIO.

http://ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?auth=tufts&url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/abccliow/the_korean_war_1950_1953/0?institutionId=991

Pfeiffer, Abigail. 2017. "Korean War." *The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives*: E-L., 953-56.

Se Young Jang. 2016. "The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 39: no. 4, 502-520, DOI: [10.1080/01402390.2016.1168012](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1168012)

Won Gon Park. 2009. "The United Nations Command in Korea: Past, Present, and Future." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 21: no. 4, 485-499, DOI: [10.1080/10163270903298959](https://doi.org/10.1080/10163270903298959)

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire or Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 34,000; ROK: 217,000; DPRK: 406,000; PRC: 600,000

TOTAL DEATHS: ROK: 1,217,000; U.S.: 36,835; DPRK: 1,006,000; PRC: 600,000

COSTS: \$30 Billion (1950s dollars); \$341 billion (2011 dollars)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: All main datasets on intervention (MID, IMI, MIPS) include this case, with the exception of PRIO/ACD, as it focuses on smaller instances of armed violence. But each of the main datasets offers different start and end dates. MID offers the range of June 27, 1950 – July 27, 1953 as it begins the dispute when the US received UN Security Council authorization for a military presence in Korea. MIPS offers the range of Oct, 1, 1950 – July 27, 1953 as it begins the dispute once China entered the battle. IMI offers the most narrow range of June 30, 1950 – July 7, 1950, which only measures the initiation of US military action. We choose to follow MID regarding the start and end dates of the incident as this range represents the most comprehensive timeline of US military actions, including Chinese involvement.

1951 Taiwan

NAME: United States Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2052

DATES: February 16, 1951 – October 16, 1952

TARGET STATE(S): China 710

SUMMARY:

The Chinese Nationalist government fled mainland China for Taiwan in December 1949 with the ascendant Communist forces of Mao Zedong in pursuit. In March 1950, Chiang Kai-shek formally resumed the presidency in exile and declared that the Nationalists would reclaim the mainland by 1955. Clashes were frequent, and the Nationalists implemented a blockade of Communist ports. On June 27, 1950, the United States joined the dispute when President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait.

The United States intended to wait out events, but the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula forced the U.S. intervention in the Taiwan strait to mitigate the threat that the Chinese conflict posed to the United Nations war effort in Korea. The Truman Administration posited that it could bottle up Taiwan and prevent potential spillover, but quickly readjusted policy after the Chinese Communists surged across the Yalu river in October 1950 and became official belligerents in Korea. On January 27, 1951, in a response to Communist China's occupation of surrounding territories, Taiwan raided the mainland, killing more than 300 communists.

The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea fundamentally changed the strategic objective of the United States in Taiwan. On May 1, 1951 the U.S. military mission arrived, bringing with it increased naval and air patrols, military and economic aid, and professionalization of the military establishment in order to deter a Communist invasion and prevent the downfall of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. The commitment soon included large-scale military and economic aid packages; reconstruction of Taiwanese infrastructure; land reform programs; and a visit from General MacArthur—Commander-in-Chief of U.N. Forces in Korea—who personally embraced Chiang Kai-shek. American fighter jets based on Okinawa joined in defensive patrols of the Taiwan strait and conducted reconnaissance sorties of Communist forces along the coast. Hundreds of landing craft would be built on Taiwan equipped with American engines and turned over to Nationalist forces, indicating tacit support for Chiang Kai-shek's pipedream invasion plans for regaining mainland China.

On February 16, the United States began to outline mutual security alliances with Asian nations along Red China's periphery, vowing to consider an armed attack on any one of the signatories as an attack upon itself. By the close of 1951, security and defense treaties had been concluded with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. In May 1952, Communist

China protested what it perceived to be Western encirclement, declaring that Taiwan intended to invade the mainland and the United States would recognize the future holdings of Nationalist China at the expense of the Communist regime. Finally, on October 17, 1952, Secretary of State Acheson proclaimed that the United States would not commit any acts of aggression that would violate the UN charter, allowing cooler heads to prevail.

Despite Communist objections and fears, the nascent alliance system took shape after the creation of SEATO in September 1954. Taiwan became a critical link in the “island defense chain” running north to south from the Aleutians to the Marianas, including Japan and the Philippines. Formal arrangements for American air and naval support would be crystallized on December 2, 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed a mutual security pact.

SOURCES:

Clubb, O. Edmund. 1959. "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955." *Political Science Quarterly* 74, no. 4: 517-31. doi:10.2307/2146421.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. Rowman & Littlefield.

N. D. C. 1951."Formosa and Far Eastern Politics." *The World Today* 7, no. 2: 52-59.

Powaski, Ronald. “The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991.” *Oxford University Press*. 1997.

Min-Hua Chiang. (2014). The U.S. Aid and Taiwan’s Post-War Economic Development, 1951-1965. *African & Asian Studies*, 13(1/2), 100–120.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Policy Change; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 251-500 deaths.

Per capita battle deaths: Negligible

TOTAL DEATHS: 9,000-10,000 KMT and PLA casualties between 1950-1955.

Per capita total deaths: Negligible

COSTS: \$31 Billion dollars for Taiwan’s military assistance. Substantial financial costs were accrued by the United States, but these proved to be affordable in the wake of legislative approval

of a massive increase in the U.S. military's share of the annual budget as per NSC 68 instruction outlining Cold War containment strategy. A substantial amount of political capital, manpower, and money was expended to ensure that Taiwan stood firm in the face of Communist aggression.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID list of US military interventions. It does not appear in IMI, MIPS, or ACD/PRIO, most likely due to temporal limitations in these datasets. As this is a confirmed case of the direct usage of force by the US, it is imperative that we include this case in our dataset. We are not able to further refine the death toll beyond the MID estimates due to inconsistent source information or lacking information. This case is best characterized as part of a wider effort to incorporate Taiwan as part of the defensive chain of islands in the Western Pacific. The June 27, 1950 mobilization of the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan should be viewed as a single event, as should the May 1, 1951 military mission to Taiwan. All other events within the 1950-1953 time frame are without distinction, and the 1953 First Taiwan Strait Crisis should act as the book end to this period, ushering in a new era of intervention and commitment from 1953-1955.

1953 Russia/China

NAME: Aerial Interdiction of Russian Aircraft and Violations of Chinese Airspace

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2035

DATES: July 27, 1953 – September 12, 1953

TARGET STATE(S): Russia 365/ China 710

SUMMARY:

On July 27, 1953, four American fighters shot down a Soviet Ilyushin Il-12 passenger plane en route from Port Arthur to the Soviet Union. The mishap occurred when U.S. Air Force Captain Ralph S. Parr Jr. noticed an unknown airplane in the vicinity of his escort mission. Parr made several passes and misidentified the plane as a North Korean Il-12, shooting it down with a long burst of gunfire to obtain his double-ace status. The Soviet aircraft crashed approximately eight miles from the Yalu River on Chinese soil. On July 31, the Soviets protested and claimed the attack had occurred over Chinese territory and resulted in twenty-one fatalities. The United States acknowledged responsibility for the attack but chastised the Soviets for allowing a passenger plane to veer into a zone of ongoing hostilities in North Korean airspace.

Two days later, on July 29, 1953, two Soviet fighters downed an American RB-50 bomber off the coast of Siberia. The Soviets stated that the American bomber had violated the Soviet frontier in the vicinity of Vladivostok and had fired on Soviet aircraft. One survivor was later picked up in the Sea of Japan and the United States filed a formal international diplomatic claim for damages.

Meanwhile, on the same day, American F-86 Sabre fighters crossed the Yalu into China and reconnoitered. The United States then admitted to approximately six separate violations of the post-Korean conflict armistice line by troops crossing into the North Korean-Chinese side. On September 2, 1953, US Secretary of State Dulles threatened war with China should their forces engage in aggression against Korea or in Indochina. American fighters then committed two additional airspace violations on September 12.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Grier, Peter. 2003. "The Remembered War." *Air Force Magazine* 86, no. 7: 68-75.

Winkler, David F. 2017. *Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945-2016*. Naval Institute Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear; Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 16 American airmen

Per capita battle deaths: Negligible

TOTAL DEATHS:

- 21 Soviet civilians
- 16 American airmen

Per capita total deaths: Negligible

COSTS: 11 instances of U.S. utilizing its air force. The loss of the Boeing RB-50G Superfortress was a substantial stand-alone loss, but minuscule relative to the cost of global containment. A single Boeing RB-50G Superfortress cost \$1,144,296 to manufacture.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and Gibler (2018) narratives. This is due to the other datasets beginning after the 1940s and sometimes after the 1950s. But this case is a clear, confirmed example of the US usage of force abroad during the Cold War era.

1953 China/Taiwan

NAME: First Taiwanese Strait Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 9, 1953 – August 1, 1955

TARGET STATE(S): China, 710

SUMMARY:

The Chinese Civil War ended in 1949 and saw the separation of territory so that the People's Republic of China (PRC) dominated over the mainland and nationalist under the Republic of China (ROC) controlled numerous islands off of China's South Eastern coast, the largest being Formosa, Taiwan.

Despite having to retreat to the islands just a few years prior, ROC leadership was still bent on reconquering the Chinese mainland away from PRC control. Within the context of the Korean War, the Truman administration viewed the Taiwanese strait as a strategic chokepoint that could limit U.S. maneuverability in East Asia if a conflict in the strait were to occur. To ensure the United States maintained its strategic position, President Truman mobilized the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet to blockade any potential Communist China's action toward Formosa. The election of President Eisenhower in 1952 witnessed a tack in U.S. foreign policy toward China that focused on withdrawing forces but maintaining rhetorical pressure. On February 9, 1953, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would withdraw the Seventh Fleet from the strait but threatened China with a blockade and the use of force to defend Formosa if Communist China were to attack. The change in policy was seen as an end of the United State's neutralization policy toward the ROC and signalled U.S. support of Chinese Nationalist (ROC) intentions to invade mainland China.

In August of 1954, ROC mobilized a total of 69,000 troops to the small islands of Kinmen and Matsu, just a few kilometers off China's shores. In response, the PRC shelled the islands. In September 1954, LTC Alfred Mendendrop was killed in shelling on the island. Despite his military role, the LTC Mendendrop had volunteered his services to the ROC and was not deployed by the U.S. military.

The United States was concerned with devolving the security situation over the small coastal islands and was concerned that renewed tensions could spell the end of the ROC and PRC take over of Taiwan. However, the Eisenhower administration faced a dilemma. Having just ended its involvement in Korea, the administration was reluctant to commit resources and troops to

another East Asian conflict especially given its location on small, strategically inconsequential islands.

On September 12, 1954, in a discussion between Senior White House staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford recommended the use of nuclear weapons in preventing PRC advancements onto the islands. On November 13 of that year, China punished 11 U.S. airmen shot down during the Korean war to longer prison sentences. Despite the flurry of tensions. Recommendations of military intervention were disregarded by President Eisenhower.

Tensions between the ROC and PRC remained high as conflict continued between the ROC and PRC continued intermittently. Under the guidance of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower signed a mutual defense treaty with ROC on December 2, 1954. Despite the threat of U.S. force, PRC and ROC remained hostile toward each other for decades to come. In 1955, PRC forces had made gains in its shelling campaign and began deploying troops to conquer the Tanchen islands. In response to the aggression and in concordance with the treaty, the U.S. Navy, on February 10, 1955, deployed 132 boats and 400 aircraft under the Seventh Fleet. It successfully evacuated 14,500 civilians, 10,000 ROC troops and 4,000 guerrillas, along with 40,000 tons of military equipment and supplies. On August, 1 1955 China released the 11 captured US airmen previously sentenced to jail terms.

SOURCES:

Associated Press (1953). [Moscow Denounces new Formosa Policy](#). *The New York Times*. February 9, 1953

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953). "President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message.-Ending of "Neutralization" of Formosa.-U.S. Seventh Fleet not to protect Chinese Mainland from Chinese Nationalist Attacks". *Keesings Record of World Events. Volume IX*, January, 1953

Chang, G. (1988). To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. *International Security*, 12(4), 96-123.

Global Security. First Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands. GlobalSecurity.org. May 7, 2011. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/quemoy_matsu.htm

Kerr, George H. Formosa Betrayed. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966. Print.

BBC. U.S. Evacuates Pacific Islands. BBC. February 10, 1955. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/10/newsid_2538000/2538891.stm

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime, Social Protection.

OUTCOME:

Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS:

U.S.: 0

PRC: 0

TOTAL DEATHS:

U.S. 1

ROC: 519

PRC: 393

COSTS: Deployment of 132 boats and 400 aircraft in the successful evacuation of ROC military and civilians from coastal islands.

DEFINITION ISSUES: This case is only mentioned in the CRS list of U.S. military interventions. Previously, this case was dated to commence in 1953, as tensions between PRC and ROC first escalated. Curiously, the MID Dataset notes a separate intervention occurring in 1953 when President Eisenhower implemented the new “non-neutralization” policy toward Formosa (MID #50). This case has been aggregated into this case 1) provides an explanation into the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward Formosa, and 2) has the same objective of maintaining a the Chinese Nationalist regime. The dates of U.S. intervention during the Crisis have been refined to begin during the first threat of force made by the Chairman of JCOS Adm. Radford in 1954 up until the release of the 11 imprisoned U.S. airmen in August 1955.

1953 Czechoslovakia

NAME: Czechoslovakia-US Aircraft Interception

DISPUTE NUMBER: 208

DATES: March 10, 1953 – March 12, 1953

TARGET STATE(S): Czechoslovakia (315), Russia (365), United States of America (2)

SUMMARY: The US-Czechoslovakian incident occurred at the height of the Cold War when Soviet and Western militaries frequently probed each other's defenses along the "Iron Curtain" separating the Capitalists and Communists countries in Central Europe. Following the end of the Second World War, both militaries held training flights and combat air patrols along the borders separating the Federal Republic of Germany from Czechoslovakia and the Republic of Germany from German Democratic Republic. Both sides often accused the other of violating their airspace.

On March 10, 1953, a pair of United States Air Force (USAF) F-84E Thunderjets were intercepted by a Czech MiG-15. Believing that the USAF planes were violating Czechoslovakian airspace, the pilot engaged the planes and shot down one USAF jet, which fell 25 kilometers inside Czechoslovakian territory. The USAF pilot successfully ejected and survived the crash. Two days after the incident, an unarmed British Avro Lincoln bomber flying a routine training mission suffering from navigational issues intruded into East German airspace and was shot down by a MiG 15 Soviet fighter. All 7 of the British crew were killed in the incident. There was no retaliation attempt by Western militaries following the incidents.

Both the United States and United Kingdom governments entered complaints with their Soviet counterparts and increased combat air patrols in the areas adjacent to the two incidents. The event occurred just days after the official state funeral of Stalin. Western governments hoped that the death of Stalin would decrease the East-West tension, but the two incidents depicted Soviet determination to keep a strong military presence in Eastern and Central Europe.

SOURCES:

2004. "Czech Fighter Pilot Recalls Cold War Dogfight," *Radio Praha*, 10, April.
<https://www.radio.cz/en/section/curaffrs/czech-fighter-pilot-recalls-cold-war-dogfight>

1953. "Epilogue to a Funeral," *Life Magazine*, 23, March.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=IUIEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false>

1953. "Soviet MIG's Down R.A.R. Plane, Kill 5 in Berlin Air Lane," *The Associated Press*, 13, March.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1953/03/13/archives/soviet-migs-down-r-a-f-plane-kill-5-in-berlin-air-lane-craft-shot-a.html>

1953. "UK Parliament Speech on Shooting of British Bomber," 17, March.
<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1953/mar/17/shooting-down-of-british-bomber>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain empire; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: United Kingdom 7

Per capita battle deaths: 7

TOTAL DEATHS: 7

Per capita total deaths: 7

COSTS: One American F-84E Thunderjet and one British Avro Lincoln bomber were shot down.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, mostly because it was a combination of a display of force and defense of territory. These incidents represent a proportion of US military involvement in Central Europe during the Cold War, hence we include them in our dataset of the US usage of force abroad.

1954 China

NAME: Cathay Pacific Douglas DC-4 Shootdown

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2033

DATES: July 23, 1954 - July 26, 1954

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY: This incident describes the accidental shootdown of a British airliner by China. On July 23rd, 1954, a Cathay Pacific DC-4 Skymaster was flying from Bangkok to Hong Kong when it was shot down by Chinese fighter jets off the coast of Hainan Island. The plane was carrying a total of 19 passengers and crew, ten of whom perished in the accident. Three Americans were aboard. The situation became more dire when two PLA fighters engaged in skirmishes with three US Navy planes searching for survivors. The two PLA fighters were shot down and the survivors from the Cathay Pacific plane were recovered.

China initially accepted responsibility for the shootdown of the passenger plane and promised to pay compensation. However, China claimed it was not at fault for the air skirmishes between Chinese and American fighters. President Eisenhower alleged China was taking a hostile stance towards The United States and a conciliatory tone towards the U.K. in an attempt to divide the two countries. The incident further strained relations between the U.S. and China.

SOURCES:

2014. "MH17 crash: History of passenger planes shot down." *BBC News*.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28361223>

Matthews, Dylan. 2014. "7 times militaries have shot down civilian planes." *Vox*.
<https://www.vox.com/2014/7/17/5912699/7-times-militaries-have-shot-down-civilian-planes>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own military/diplomatic interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown if the downed PLA fighter pilots survived.

TOTAL DEATHS: 10 confirmed fatalities

COSTS: 3 U.S. Navy Planes. Cost of searching for and recovering survivors.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives. It also appears under different time frames in other dataset (corresponding MID code in other datasets), but we struggled to confirm the incident in question for the MIPS (09/04/1954-05/01/1955) and IMI (01/30/1955-02/11/1955) listings. We also had difficulties in defining the objective of this intervention. This was a confirmed use of force by The United States, as U.S. fighter jets engaged in hostilities with PLA jets. However, the objective was originally to recover the survivors of the plane crash. We have thus coded the objective as “protecting own military/diplomatic interests,” but we advise caution with this measure.

1954 Guatemala

NAME: Guatemalan Regime Change

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 20, 1954 - June 27, 1954

TARGET STATE(S): Guatemala, 90

SUMMARY:

The 1944 revolution in Guatemala resulted in successive democratically elected leftist governments, culminating in the 1950 election of Jacobo Arbenz. Arbenz's increasingly leftist policies such as his agrarian reform, increased taxes for US corporations, and perceived relations with the Soviet bloc represented an economic and existential threat to American interests.

In 1952, the Truman Administration authorized a CIA collaboration with the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza in an attempt to put Guatemalan general Carlos Castillo Armas in power. This attempt, known as PBFORTUNE, was unsuccessful. For the rest of Truman's presidency, the administration remained hesitant to directly aid Guatemalans on the ground trying to overthrow Arbenz.

The new Eisenhower administration, including John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, deemed Guatemala to have turned "red," and authorized a command operation to directly support Armas in overthrowing Arbenz. This effort was supported by a CIA psychological warfare campaign, PBSUCCESS, which persuaded people that a major invasion was imminent, resulting in the defection of the Guatemalan military. This caused Arbenz to flee into exile, putting Castillo Armas in power.

In the short term, the coup was considered an immediate success because it protected American interests and the US was able to largely deny any involvement. In the long term, the coup has been widely condemned and is considered to be one of the more shameful US interventions due to the extremely repressive regime that followed, leading to the estimated deaths of 100,000 civilians.

SOURCES:

- Aslam, Rabia. 2010. "U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 3: 246-67. doi:10.1080/10576100903555788.
- Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. 2018. "Jacobo Arbenz." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. September 11. Accessed December 07, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jacobo-Arbenz>.

"Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, 1954." 2011. *Central Intelligence Agency*. August 03. Accessed December 07, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a03p.htm>.

Doyle, Kate, and Peter Kornbluh. "CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents." CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents. Accessed December 07, 2018. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/>.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Maintain Empire; Economic Protection;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 2.7 million spent on campaign of psychological warfare, political action and subversion, cost of directly supporting Armas and his men (specifics and amounts unknown), long term costs of the US involvement viewed as illegitimate and shameful.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This intervention is included in the CRS listing of US usage of force abroad, but not in the other top datasets on US military intervention, such as MID, MIPS, IMI, and ACD/PRIO. This is most likely due to the covert nature of the mission. Moreover, Grossman (2018) lists "bombing, nuclear threat" as part of the usage of force for this incident. We did not find any evidence of these in other sources. Instead, we consistently found that the intervention involved supporting Guatemalan nationals on the ground combined with a CIA psychological warfare campaign. Thus, we include this case as an example of the US usage of force, but without any dimensions of nuclear threat or bombing of targets.

For Battle Deaths and Total Deaths, our case lists 0 because the US was not directly involved in the violence that occurred. However, in more indirect measures, this was not a bloodless coup. At least 50 of Armas' men were killed in the process.

1954 North Korea

NAME: Korean Peninsula Armistice Tensions

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2244

DATES: January 3, 1954 – November 11, 1956

TARGET STATE(S): Democratic People's Republic of Korea (PRK) 731

SUMMARY:

The Korean War armistice called for a Korean political conference to occur within 180 days of the signing of the document. However, no talks were held and buildup of arms continued on the North Korean side, along with Communists infiltrating into the South. On January 16, ROK President Syngman Rhee declared that he would consider the ROK free to take whatever action it deemed necessary if there were still no talks by April 23, the end of the time period outlined by the armistice. On July 30, the ROK government issued a statement saying they were preparing to take back control of Communist-occupied territory. The DPRK stated that they would respond to such an action with force.

In January 1955, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited South Korea, touring the front line and meeting with the head of the South Korean army. During the visit, he delivered a statement threatening to use atomic weapons against the Communists if they restarted aggressions in Korea. Communist infiltration into South Korea continued.

SOURCES:

Foster, Hailey. 1956. "South Korea Gets More Red Agents," *New York Times*, June 26.

MacGregor, Greg. 1954. "Rhee Sees Korea 'Free' on April 23 to Strike at Reds," *New York Times*, January 16.

"Reds Warn South Korea." 1955. *New York Times*, August 6.

"Warning on Atom Given by Radford." 1955. *New York Times*, January 3.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority, Policy Change.

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Delegation trip to S. Korea

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears in the MID and Gibler narratives as a US usage of force, but we alter this coding to the US threat of force against North Korea, as we find no evidence of the usage of force in this incident. We also make minor edits to the start and end dates as they appear in MID.

1955 China

NAME: Chinese Air Battle

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2032

DATES: May 5, 1955

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

Shortly after the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, an air battle occurred between China and the U.S. that resulted in two, potentially three, Chinese MIG jets to be shot down. Chinese media reports that one U.S. Sabre jet was also shot down, but the U.S. denies this. According to Chinese media, the U.S. aircraft flew into Chinese territory which was a military provocation. The U.S. denies this, stating that the U.S. was flying over international waters.

After the incident, the U.S. remained committed to the defense of Taiwan (Formosa at the time). The U.S. and China did not resolve any fundamental issues, and both sides continued to build up military forces with sporadic military escalation incidents until the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958.

SOURCES:

Finney, John W. 1955. "Brucker Sees No Sign of Formosa Area War." *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, Dec. 31.

"Nationalist Fight MIG's Anew in Matsu Region." 1955. *The New York Times*, May 17.

"Taipeh Sees Straits Air War Nearing." 1955. *The Washington Post*, April 4.

Trumbull, Robert. 1955. "Peiping says jets of U.S. provoked battle off Korea." *The New York Times*, May 11.

OBJECTIVE: Defend Territory (the U.S. was seeking to defend territory of Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan).

OUTCOME: Stalemate - Sporadic incidents between U.S. and China occurred throughout the next few years.

BATTLE DEATHS: Potential deaths: 2-3 Chinese MIG pilots.

TOTAL DEATHS: Potential 2-3 deaths.

COSTS:

8 U.S. Sabre Jets flown, potentially one shot down.

Cost of maintaining U.S. troop presence in South Korea and U.S. Seventh Fleet in region.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset and Gibler (2018) narratives, but it is not included in other key datasets on US military intervention, most likely due to time frame limitations and to the disputed nature of the US attack. Yet this case represents a confirmed usage of force by the US against China, according to the sources above. Thus, we keep this in our dataset.

1955 Vietnam

NAME: U.S. MAAG in South Vietnam

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 12, 1955 - August 4, 1964

TARGET STATE(S): Vietnam (DRV), 816

SUMMARY:

As the Cold War intensified in the early 1950s, Southeast Asia became an important battleground with multiple proxy conflicts where the two rival superpowers took alternate sides. Vietnam was rapidly becoming the most important such proxy battle. France had been an imperial power in Vietnam for quite some time, but French forces definitively pulled out of the country after suffering a major defeat at Dien Bien Pheu in 1954. At this point the United States became the most important foreign sponsor of West-aligned South Vietnam in its battle against the Communist regime in North Vietnam. On February 12, 1955 the United States sent 327 military advisors under the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) program. Advisors contributed not only tactic and strategic advice and training, but also included personnel actively engaged in logistics such as flying helicopters.

By 1957, tensions between North and South Vietnam had intensified. On July 7 of that year, North Vietnamese forces bombed a military base and killed several U.S. MAAG officers. On May 5, 1960 the United States responded to increased aggression in Vietnam by doubling the number of MAAG officers in the country to 685.

In 1961, President Kennedy increased the number of MAAG officers in Vietnam to over 3,400 and increased the amount of financial assistance to the South Vietnamese army to \$144 million a year by the end of his first year in office. In 1962, the MAAG program was consolidated under the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam program (MACV). MACV expanded the U.S. military presence in Vietnam and to 23,000 troops by 1964.

SOURCES:

Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War*. Harvard University Press.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Herring, John. 1996. *America's Longest War*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Eckhardt, George S. (1974). *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950-1969*. Washington DC: Department of the Army.

“Chronology of Events Relative to Vietnam, 1954-1965.” *Vietnam Perspectives*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1965, pp. 17–28.

U.S. National Archives, “Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics.” Accessed, May 20, 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S. : 406
South Vietnam: Unknown
North Vietnam: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: The maximum U.S. troop deployment prior to President Johnson’s initiation of the War was 23,000 military advisors. Over this period the United States financially assisted South Vietnam with \$50 million dollars a year from 1955 to 1961, and then \$144 million from 1961 - 1964. The total economic cost of this assistance throughout the intervention totaled to \$732 million.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US military interventions, but not in other datasets. This is likely due to the non-traditional nature of the incident, with military advisors being sent abroad instead of the deployment of direct force. Nonetheless, we do confirm this case as at least a US display of force abroad. This case parallels Giblers case number 3361 and 1361 which is in reference to the U.S. MACV program. Because the objective and outcome of MACV are identical to that of the MAAG program the three cases have been aggregated.

1956 China

NAME: Search and Rescue Mission in the East China Sea

DISPUTE NUMBER: 53

DATES: August 22, 1956 – August 23, 1956

TARGET STATE(S): China 710

SUMMARY:

On August 22, 1956, while on a night mission 32 miles off the coast of China, crewmen of a U.S. Navy P4M-1Q Mercator ELINT reconnaissance plane spotted Chinese fighters closing in. Radio operators began sending coded messages back to base reporting a possible confrontation. Partway through the second message, Chinese fighters shot down the US Navy reconnaissance plane 37 miles from the Chinese coast in the East China Sea on August 23, 1956, killing 16 US crewmen. The American search and rescue mission was performed by the USS Dennis J. Buckley (DDR 808) with air cover from fighter planes the next day.

SOURCES:

Bamford, James. 2001. "The Dangers of Spy Planes." *The New York Times*. April 5.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Polmar, Norman. 2001. *Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified*. Zenith Press.

Van Dyke, Jon M. 2004. "Military ships and planes operating in the exclusive economic zone of another country." *Marine Policy* 28, no. 1: 29-39.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: 16 American servicemen

Per capita battle deaths: Negligible

TOTAL DEATHS: 16 American servicemen

Per capita total deaths: Negligible

COSTS: 1 x U.S. Navy P4M-1Q Mercator ELINT reconnaissance plane was lost and the USS Dennis J. Buckley (DDR 808) was utilized, along with an unspecified number of aircraft, in the search and rescue mission.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives due to the timeframe of the other datasets. It also represents an example of the US reacting to an attack by another great power. We keep this case in our dataset as it represents a confirmed case of the US display and threat of force.

1956 Suez Crisis

NAME: The Suez Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 200

DATES: November 6, 1956 - November 10, 1956

TARGET STATE(S): Russia 365, Egypt 651

SUMMARY:

On September 24, 1955 Egypt signed an agreement with the Soviet Union securing military aid and future arms shipments. The Moscow-Cairo arms deal placed Egypt in the Soviet camp and set Egyptian President Gamel Nasser on a collision course with the interests of the former colonial powerhouses in the Middle East—Britain and France. The conditions for conflict were set when in retaliation for the U.S. rescindment of an offer to finance the construction of an Egyptian dam, President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on July 27, 1956 and sparked a conflagration that would subsequently be known as the Suez Crisis.

At the time, U.S. interests were limited to the free flow of Middle Eastern oil reserves, the strength of the nascent NATO alliance, and the continued refinement of the United Nations. The United States was forced to balance its support for its Cold War allies while it worked to avoid alienating postcolonial third world populations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The prime American concern during the Suez Crisis was to maintain international peace, negate Soviet attempts to score diplomatic points against the West, and avoid reactionary backsliding toward colonialism. Toward these efforts, the United States sought to restrain its allies from utilizing military force to reclaim the canal. Despite the risks, the British and French went ahead with military plans for seizing the waterway from Nasser and overthrowing his regime. In collusion with Israel, who invaded the Sinai in late October, Britain and France landed troops in Egypt on November 5, 1956.

Threats to Nasser's regime simultaneously threatened Soviet influence in the Arab East at a time when the strength of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe was being tested by a revolt against communist rule in Hungary. Soviet objectives during the Suez Crisis were to exacerbate tensions between the allies and undermine the West politically, while averting overt war. On November 5, 1956, the Soviet Union declared that it was resolved to use force to defend Egypt from aggression; threatening to annihilate Israel and deploy nuclear weapons if UN resolutions demanding an immediate cease-fire and rapid withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt were met with non-compliance by the West.

On November 6, 1956, the United States firmly rejected Soviet overtures for cooperation and threatened nuclear retaliation in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike on London or Paris. President Eisenhower immediately alerted the air defense command, dispatched American aircraft carriers to Europe, and ordered high-level reconnaissance flights over Israel and Syria.

Additionally, a U.S. Marines battalion was ordered to evacuate the U.S. Consulate in Alexandria. The mission was successful and saw the evacuation of 1,300 Americans that included consulate staff and other U.S. civilians.

The same day, President Eisenhower phoned the British Prime Minister and demanded a cease-fire and offered economic assistance if U.S. demands were met and peace was restored to the Sinai. The Anglo-French cease-fire came into effect later that day and would be administered by a UN peacekeeping force. The tension between all parties had largely abated by November 10 when U.S. marines returned to Cairo to celebrate the birthday of the U.S. Marine Corp. Ultimately, Britain and France were coerced to give up the territory they had acquired during the conflict and vacated all military forces from Egypt on December 22. Soviets threats to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level were met in kind by a resolute United States bent on maintaining its freedom of action and avoid being pulled into nuclear war by reckless allies. Israel finally gave up the Gaza Strip in March 1957.

SOURCES:

Eccles, H.E. 1969. "Suez 1956--Some Military Lessons." *Naval War College Review* 21, no. 7: 28-56.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. MN: Rowman & Littlefield.

McCourt, David M. "The Suez Crisis, 1956." 2014. In *Britain and World Power since 1945: Constructing a Nation's Role in International Politics*, 58-85. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Richardson, Louise. 1992. "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis." *International Journal* 47, no. 2: 370-401. doi:10.2307/40202764.

Smolansky, O. M. 1965. "Moscow and the Suez Crisis, 1956: A Reappraisal." *Political Science Quarterly* 80, no. 4: 581-605.

Warner, Geoffrey. 1991. "The United States and the Suez Crisis." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 67, no. 2: 303-17.

Daughtery, Leo III. 2002. "The Marine Corps and the State Department: Enduring Partners in United States Foreign Policy, 1798-2007." *McFarland*. 107-108.

Coles, Michael. 2006. "Suez, 1956—A Successful Naval Operation Compromised by Inept Political Leadership." *Naval War College Review*. 59: 4, 8.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: > 999

COSTS: A marine battalion of 300 - 800 troops evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez Crisis. Deployment of two U.S. reconnaissance planes over Israel and Syria. Mobilization of Sixth Fleet into the Southern Mediterranean constituting 50 ships given the elevated alert status of all U.S. forces after Soviet threats of nuclear attack on London and Paris.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is characterized in the MID as primarily a conflict between Egypt and Israel, while the CRS listing only reference the extraction of American citizens in Egypt. Originally, the noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) was coded as a separate case but was included into the case with Russia. Surprisingly, given the nuclear threats made by both the U.S. and Soviet Union, there were no other references related to U.S. intervention in any of the key datasets or documents. The outcome is coded as a yield by target actor due Soviet inaction and ultimate nonintervention, while the U.S. also succeeded in securing its objectives in relation to its allies.

1957 China

NAME: 1957 U.S. Skirmish Over Chinese Airspace

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2049

DATES: June 12, 1957 - June 13, 1957

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN) 710

SUMMARY:

This intervention describes a series of skirmishes between U.S.-Taiwanese fighters and Chinese ground forces. The incident began on June 12, 1957 when a U.S. jet was conducting routine training exercises and went slightly off course. Chinese ground forces began firing on the jet, causing minimal damage before the plane returned to the *USS Hornet*. In response to the skirmish, the *USS Hornet* sent four U.S. jets into Chinese airspace, accompanied by several Taiwanese fighters. Chinese ground forces fired on all of the aircraft and two Taiwanese fighter jets were shot down.

After the incident, Taiwan criticized mainland China, arguing that it was provoking tensions in the Far East. The U.S. State Department issued a statement announcing it was not considering any formal action against the Chinese Communist government.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. Rowman & Littlefield.

Cox, Samuel J. "H-029-3: A Brief History of U.S. Navy Cold War Aviation Incidents (Excluding Korea and Vietnam)" *Naval History and Heritage Command*.

<https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-029/h-029-3.html>

"U.S. Admits Red China Flak Hit Navy Plane." *Daily Boston Globe* (1928-1960), Jun 13 1957, p. 1. ProQuest. Web. 14 Jan. 2020 .

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 2

Per capita total deaths: Negligible

COSTS: Operation cost of 4 U.S. jets from one U.S. Aircraft carrier. Relatively low cost to the United States. Minor damage to aircraft that took fire over Chinese airspace. However, Taiwan lost two planes and several pilots in the skirmish.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We include this dispute in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force by the United States, as also confirmed in MID and the Gibler narratives. It is, however, unclear how to code the “outcome” of the show of force. Gibler records it as a victory for the US, but we suggest caution in interpreting this measure.

1958 China

NAME: The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 173

DATES: July 22, 1958 – December 19, 1958

TARGET STATES: Russia (RUS), China (Chin) & Taiwan (TAW)

SUMMARY:

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out in 1955, when The People's Republic of China (PRC) sought to weaken the Nationalist Kuomintang party. The ROC had fled to Taiwan and several smaller islands off the coast of mainland China. The PRC looked to weaken the ROC by targeting the small islands of Jinmen, Dachen, and Yijiangshan with heavy shelling. Operating a foreign policy of containment of communist states, the Eisenhower administration had been working on a mutual defense treaty with the capitalist Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Chairman Mao hoped that the attack on the small islands would dissuade the United States from concluding a binding treaty; it had the opposite effect as the parties rushed and concluded the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, which guaranteed American intervention in case of an attack on Taiwan (notably not the small surrounding islands). The United States helped the ROC troops withdraw but did not engage with the PRC troops who seized the Yijiangshan islands, thereby concluding the First Crisis.

Several years later in 1958, Chairman Mao decided to test the United States' commitment to the ROC, and to catalyze the mainland population behind the Great Leap Forward. The PRC initiated intense shelling of the Quemoy and Matsu islands off the coast, where ROC forces were stationed. An intense exchange of fire resulted in 440 and 460 deaths for the ROC and PRC, respectively. The ROC fighters proved superior in the additional air skirmishes due to American-supplied sidewinder missiles. Eisenhower responded by mobilizing the Navy's potent 7th fleet to the strait. The PRC announced that their territorial waters extended 12 nautical miles off their coast, which included the islands under siege, and that any American vessels in the perimeter would be warned and then shot upon. Secretary of State Dulles immediately rejected the claim and threatened American intervention if the islands were invaded, including the threat of utilizing nuclear weapons. As the escalation loomed, Russian premier Khrushchev sent President Eisenhower notice that "An attack on the PRC is an attack on the Soviet Union." The PRC initiated negotiations with the United States in Warsaw, culminating in an agreement. The United States and the ROC released a joint communiqué stating that aggression towards Mainland China would not be supported, in exchange for a ceasefire.

In the immediate aftermath, the United States focused its efforts on reinforcing Taiwan's air defenses and providing defensive capabilities. As part of the ceasefire agreement, Taiwan reduced troop levels on Quemoy to signal its peaceful intentions. The relationship would remain tense with intermittent shelling occurring until the United States and the PRC normalized relations, tensions would again require intervention during the Third Taiwan strait crisis in 1996.

SOURCES:

Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Halperin, Morton H. 1966. "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History." *RAND*. Santa Monica, CA. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4900.html.

Jacobs, J. Bruce. 2011. Shih-shan Henry Tsai, ed. "Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters with the East and the West." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 16, no. 3: 345-346.

Chen, Jian. 2001. *Mao's China and the Cold War*, The New Cold War History. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Min-Hua, Chiang. 2014. "The U.S. Aid and Taiwan's Post-War Economic Development, 1951-1965." *African & Asian Studies* 13, no. 1/2: 100-120. doi:10.1163/15692108-12341287.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS:

Republic of China: 440 Troops - (Jacobs)

People's Republic of China: 460 Troops - (Jacobs)

Per Capita Battle Deaths:

ROC: .00004 PRC

PRC: Not Reducible (Population estimation by UN in 1958 - 637,853,609)

TOTAL DEATHS:

Republic of China: 440 Troops

People's Republic of China: 460 Troops, 218 Civilians killed; total 678 deaths - (Jacobs)

Total Per Capita Deaths:

ROC: .00004 PRC

PRC: Not Reducible (Population estimation by UN in 1958 - 637,853,609)

COSTS:

Deployment of U.S. 7th Fleet; 60 U.S. Vessels. From 1951-1965, the US gave about \$2.5 Billion (in 1958 dollars) in military aid directly to the ROC military forces.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in all of the major datasets on US military intervention, including MID, MIPS, IMI, ACD/PRIO, and CRS. But the start and end dates differ slightly across sources. MID measures the incident from July 22 - December 19, 1958. MIPS includes the range of August 23 - December 31, 1958; and IMI uses the range of September 7, 1958 - December 31, 1958. We choose to keep the MID range as it is the most encompassing of the related incidents.

Moreover, the name of the island assaulted by the PRC changes depending on the account (Jinmen or Quemoy). Also, MID categorizes the intervention outcome as unclear, but it seems to me there was a compromise reached. Thus, we label the outcome of this incident as a compromise, not as unclear.

1958 Iraq

NAME: Iraq Coup/Communist Party Mobilization

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 14, 1958 - April 17, 1959

TARGET STATE(S): Iraq (IRQ)

SUMMARY:

In January 1958 Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri es-Said told the Baghdad Pact that Kuwait should be returned to Iraq. On July 14, 1958 Brigadier Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim and others overthrew the monarchy and executed King Faisal II and Nuri es-Said. This intelligence failure to predict the coup also followed the Suez Canal crisis.

Anglo-American influence appeared to be diminishing as the Soviet Union's increased. Shortly after Qasim took control, he lifted the ban on the Iraqi Communist Party. This gravely concerned the United States and there was domestic political pressure to act under the Eisenhower Doctrine, which stated the United States would protect the Middle East from Soviet aggression. The CIA prepared a plan to assassinate Qasim. President Eisenhower ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare to use nuclear weapons against Iraq in order to prevent Iraq from annexing Kuwait.

By 1959, the fears of Communism in Iraq subsided. In late June 1961, Qasim moved troops to the border with Kuwait. The Kuwaiti ruling family requested British assistance, and the British deployed marine and air units to Kuwait. In response, the Iraqis backed down and Arab League forces took the British military's place in Kuwait.

SOURCES:

American Friends Service Committee, *Incidents of Nuclear Blackmail*,

<https://www.afsc.org/document/incidents-nuclear-blackmail>.

Barrett, Roby. 2008. "Intervention in Iraq 1958-1959." *Middle East Institute*, Policy Brief, no. 11 (April). <https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/intervention-in-iraq-robby-barrett.pdf>.

Klein, David. 2003. *Mechanisms of Western Domination: A Short History of Iraq and Kuwait* California State University, Northridge. <http://www.csun.edu/~vcmth00m/iraqkuwait.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 0

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad. It is a confirmed example of the threat of nuclear force by the US toward another state actor. Thus we include it in our dataset as a threat of force abroad.

1958 Lebanon

NAME: 1958 Intervention in Lebanon (Eisenhower doctrine), Operation Blue Bat

DISPUTE NUMBER: 125

DATES: July 15, 1958 – October 24, 1958

TARGET STATE(S): Lebanon, 660

SUMMARY:

Lebanon descended into civil war in 1958 when, in clear violation of constitutional rules, Lebanese President Camille Chamoun refused to yield power by holding elections. His main worry was that elections would bring to power political forces that would merge Lebanon with the United Arab Republic, created through the union of Syria and Egypt earlier that year. However, he justified his move by blaming the threat of a Communist takeover. To his mostly Christian supporters, he was the guarantor of national independence and ties to the Western bloc. To his detractors, including most Muslims, he was a budding Arab autocrat.

The Eisenhower administration intervened in accordance with the 1957 Eisenhower doctrine that committed the U.S. to opposing unspecified forces of international Communism in the region. American strategists worried that pan-Arab nationalism was a pro-Soviet, Communist-aligned movement that sought to move Arab countries out of the Western orbit. The American intervention consisted of about 10,000 U.S. Marines deployed in-country for about five months.

Once U.S. Marines landed in Beirut, combat ended and the two sides observed a ceasefire. American forces supposedly never fired a single shot. Negotiations between political leaders in Lebanon quickly yielded a settlement and a compromise candidate, Army Commander Fouad Shihab, ascended to the presidency. The country returned to normalcy.

SOURCES:

Gilmour, David. 1983. *Lebanon: The Fractured Country*. New York: St Martin's Press.

Picard, Elizabeth. 2002. *Lebanon: A Shattered Country*. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Salibi, Kamal. 1976. *Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976*. Delmar: Caravan Books.

Traboulsi, Fawwaz. 2007. *A Modern History of Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain foreign regime

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S. 0

Lebanese Army: ~1,000

Lebanese Opposition: ~5,000

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: Deployment of 10,000-13,000 U.S. Marines for over four months. However, according to the sources U.S. forces never fired a single shot in-country.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case of US intervention is coded in the Military Interventions by Powerful States (MIPS) dataset, the Interstate Military Disputes (MID), and the Congressional Research Service's (CRS) "Instances of Use of US Armed Forces Abroad" datasets. However, it is not listed in the widely used International Military Interventions (IMI) or PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). This is due to the non-existent number of battle-deaths. Moreover, this is a case of display of force, not the usage of force, which would remove this case from traditional datasets on US military intervention.

In addition, there are start date discrepancies between the MIPS and MID datasets, with MIPS setting the start date to July 15 and MIPS to May 14. We keep the MIPS date as it appears more frequently in the multitude of sources above.

Lastly, **Lebanon 1958 (MID 125) & RUS, IRQ, EGY, LEB 1958** cases overlap: the one describes that the US moved the 6th fleet into Eastern Mediterranean, the other one is about how the soldiers disembarked. We merge these two data points into one case of intervention (MID 125).

1958 North Korea

NAME: Airplane Hijacking

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2187

DATES: February 16, 1958 - March 17, 1958

TARGET STATE(S): North Korea 731

SUMMARY:

The Korean War of the 1950s resulted in an armistice between North Korea and South Korea; however, it did not resolve the conflict between the two actors. In addition, the war started a long, complicated, and antagonistic relationship between North Korea and the U.S. Border disputes increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The first major incident occurred on February 16, 1958; North Korean agents hijacked a South Korean DC-3 airliner that was originally heading to Seoul. Among the people on board, there was the American pilot, Willis Hobbs, as well as his American copilot. They were forced to take the plane to Pyongyang. North Korea demanded South Korea enter direct negotiations to reclaim the airplane and passengers (and thereby officially recognize North Korea).

On March 6, North Korea shot down an F-86 Sabre Jet that was piloted by Leon K. Pfeiffer and flying near the demilitarized zone between the two countries. Officially, he was on a low-level ground support training mission. Pfeiffer was held as a prisoner of war until he was released on March 17. The passengers, including the American pilots, were released in early March.

SOURCES:

“U.S. Jet in Korea Flew Over North.” *New York Times*. March 9, 1958.
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2187-1958-03-09-PQ-a-DIR.pdf>.

“This Week in USAF and PACAF History.” Accessed October 30, 2020.
<https://perma.cc/VY6U-VNU3>.

PublicDomainFootage. “South Korean plane hijacked and hostages released.” YouTube Video, 0:36. November 26, 2012. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8DfJwK7HUYM>.

Fischer, Hannah. “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007.” Congressional Research Service. Updated April 20, 2007. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>.

O'Connor, James. "Has It Ever Been This Bad With North Korea? Yes, Actually." Updated August, 10, 2017. <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/has-it-ever-been-bad-north-korea-yes-actually-n790661>.

OBJECTIVE: Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: One U.S. F-86 Sabre Jet shot down.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset. However, it does appear in CRS's "North Korean Provocative Actions." Although the United States did not utilize force, the show of a plane is a show of force that we include as a U.S. Military intervention.

1958 Russia

NAME: Accidental Violations of Soviet Airspace

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2215

DATES: June 27, 1958 – September 24, 1958

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

Although still in the early years of the conflict, the Cold War was well underway by March of 1958 when Nikita Khrushchev assumed the Soviet Premiership. According to a national intelligence assessment issued in July of 1958, at this point in great power tension, Khrushchev and the Soviets were aggressively seeking to consolidate their power in Eastern Europe over the satellite states. Furthermore, the report states that the Soviets were willing to accept increased antagonism of the West to achieve this goal.

In early 1958, the Soviet Union also began taking a hard line against U.S. air missions along their borders. On April 18th, the Soviet Foreign Minister publicly charged that U.S. nuclear-armed bombers were making flights near Soviet territory in the arctic. Several days later, on April 21st, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution at the UN calling on the United States to stop military aircraft flights near the borders of “other states.”

On June 27th, these two trends in Soviet-Western relations collided when a United States C-118 transport aircraft on a flight from West Germany to Iran was shot down by Soviet MiG fighter jets in Armenian airspace. The United States military blamed navigational errors for the mistake, while Moscow alleged that the crew intentionally disobeyed signals to land the airplane. No airmen aboard the C-118 were killed, and the U.S. embassy in Moscow secured the crew’s release from Soviet custody ten days after the crash on July 7th. Shortly after the C-118 incident, in July and August of 1958, CIA reconnaissance balloons from a failed spying operation began coming down in Soviet territory, further exacerbating tensions.

On September 2nd, 1958, the Soviets shot down another U.S. aircraft. The C-130, with 17 crew members aboard, was on a reconnaissance mission along the Turkish-Armenian border when it accidentally navigated into Soviet airspace. Initially, the Soviets denied involvement with the crash but declassified documents released shortly afterward proved otherwise. President Eisenhower also released an audio recording of the Soviet pilots as they attacked the C-130 in February of 1959. All 17 men aboard the aircraft died in the crash. On September 24th, the Soviets returned the remains of six of the crew. Despite U.S. efforts for over a year to recover the other 11 crew members’ remains, the Soviets denied ever finding them.

At this stage in the Cold War neither side appeared ready to change course. In a transcribed conversation between Khrushchev and a private U.S. citizen visiting Moscow in October of 1958, Khrushchev stated that he would continue shooting down U.S. aircraft that approach Soviet borders. For their part, the U.S. continued sending aircraft over Soviet territory, eventually leading to the infamous U-2 spy plane incident in 1960.

SOURCES:

Arthur J. Olsen, Special to The New York Times. 1958. "U. S. SAYS SOVIET SHOT DOWN PLANE WITH NINE ABOARD: JET FIGHTERS ALSO FIRED UPON CRAFT AS IT FELL JUNE 27, AIR FORCE REPORTS ONLY ONE MAN INJURED PRESS INQUIRIES RULED OUT AS RELEASED CREW ARRIVES AT WIESBADEN AIR BASE PLANE SHOT DOWN, U. S. REPORT SAYS." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Jul 09, 1.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/114548857?>

"Dedication and Sacrifice." National Security Agency Central Security Service. The Center for Cryptologic History. Accessed October 31, 2020. <https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/coldwar/dedication-sacrifice/>

Max Frankel, Special to The New York Times. 1958. "U.S. HANDS SOVIET NOTE ON 9 AIRMEN: REQUESTS PROMPT RELEASE OF FLIERS FORCED DOWN BY RUSSIAN FIGHTERS." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Jul 01, 3.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/114565283?>

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, eds. Ronald D. Landa, James E. Miller, David S. Patterson, and Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Documents 39-147. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 17; Russian: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 17; Russian: 0

COSTS: The U.S. lost two aircraft. One unarmed C-118 transport aircraft. One C-130 reconnaissance-configured transport plane.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is mentioned in the MID database.

1958 Russia/Germany

NAME: Berlin Corridor Issue

DISPUTE NUMBER: 608

DATES: November 10, 1958 - September 27, 1959

TARGET STATE(S): Russia, RUS (365)

SUMMARY:

In 1945 with the end of World War Two, Germany was divided into four military occupation zones controlled by the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. These zones morphed into East and West Germany, backed by the Soviet Union and the Allied Powers respectively; within East Germany, Berlin was divided between the powers.

A decade after the Berlin Blockade, in which the Soviet Union blocked Western Allies' access to Berlin, a new quarrel emerged regarding the Berlin air corridors and control zones. These corridors consisted of three regulated airways for Western Allied air traffic passing over East Germany into West Berlin. On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the Allied powers to withdraw their forces from Berlin within six months and make the city free and demilitarized.

The dispute continued when Soviets turned back U.S. and British military convoys on the autobahn as they attempted to leave West Berlin. The U.S. claimed that the Soviets were attempting to arbitrarily control traffic between West Germany and West Berlin, and were testing U.S. determination to support the area. On February 3, 1959, the Soviet Union detained five U.S. Army soldiers when their convoy attempted to cross into East Germany. After negotiations, the men were released. Later in March and April, Soviet fighter jets buzzed U.S. military air transports. The Soviets claimed the U.S. violated the 10,000 ft ceiling over the air corridors.

Khrushchev and Eisenhower did not come to an agreement during a May 1959 conference in Geneva, but a mutual understanding after the 25-27 September Camp David talks did result in a lessening of tension.

Despite negotiation talks between the Soviets and U.S., the Berlin issue remained ongoing. U.S., U.K., and France formed a planning group, LIVE OAK, in order to prepare for any aggression on West Berlin; and in 1961, the U.S. moved forces closer to Berlin. The U.S. rejected a proposal by the Soviets to resolve the Berlin corridor issue; Khrushchev was said to have suggested that the West German government take over West Berlin, if the U.S. and allies withdrew their forces. Ultimately, the crisis continued with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

SOURCES:

Bruce, David K.E., 1958. Confidential Cable. "Summary of Incident in Which Convoy Was Denied Permission into Soviet Zone of Berlin," *United States Embassy, Federal Republic of Germany*. June 25.

New York Times, 1959. "East Germany Releases 5 U.S. Soldiers to Red Cross," *New York Times*, February 6.

Olsen, Arthur J., 1959. "Soviet Fighters Buzz U.S. Plane in Dispute About Berlin Corridor," *New York Times*, April 1.

Olsen, Arthur J., 1959. "Soviet Still Detains U.S. Convoy; Action Believed Test on Berlin," *New York Times*, February 4.

Olsen, Arthur K., 1959. "Soviet Releases 4 Berlin Trucks After U.S. Notes," *New York Times*, February 5.

Office of the Historian. "The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961," *U.S. Department of State*.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/berlin-crisis>.

Special Military Representative of the President, 1961. "Further Information on Troop Movement to Berlin." *Office of the White House*, August 18.

Thurston, Raymond L., 1959. Secret Memorandum. "Tripartite Military Planning Effort for Berlin Contingencies; Directive on LIVE OAK Planning Staff Attached," *United States Embassy, France*, April 20.

Topping, Seymour, 1959. "Soviets Buzz Second Plane Near Berlin," *New York Times*, April 15.

Trimble, William, 1958. Confidential Cable. "British Request a Tripartite Meeting on the Convoy Situation," *United States Embassy, Federal Republic of Germany*. August 4.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Foreign Regime Authority; Defend Territory.

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Political costs: Negotiations failed and the corridor crisis deepened with the building of the Berlin Wall.

Military costs: Building up of Berlin Garrison: unsure of troop numbers, equipment acquired, etc.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The MID narrative noted that NATO forces were deployed into West Germany from France and that both sides threatened military force, but we can not find sources to verify this occurred in the time period given. Later, and up until 1961 and the creation of the Berlin Wall, sources indicate that the U.S. and NATO “built up the Berlin garrison.”

1959 Cuba

NAME: Caribbean intervention during the Cuban Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 6, 1959 - January 1960

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

Historically, the Batista regime in Cuba had close ties to the United States, especially economic ties as many American companies had major investments in Cuba. However, the regime was brutal, despotic, and corrupt, which caused major domestic resentment. Fidel Castro organized a small group of Communist insurgents that staged attacks from mountainous hideouts starting in 1953. Their early attacks were not militarily successful, but they increased pressure on the regime and gradually attracted popular support. When the rebels staged an offensive in 1959, Batista fled the country in panic. The military commander ordered his troops not to fire on the rebels, who entered Havana in triumph and began to set up a new political regime.

During the Cuban Revolution, and in its immediate aftermath, American policymakers worried that American nationals in the region would be targeted in violent attacks as symbols of capitalism and American power. To protect U.S. nationals in the region, the military deployed the 2nd Marine Ground Task Force to various sites across the Caribbean during the peak of the Cuban Revolution in 1959-1960. No major attacks on American citizens ensued.

SOURCES:

Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War*. Harvard University Press.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 2nd Marine Ground Task Force for an extended period of time across multiple locations. Size of such task force ranges from 2,600 to 20,000 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US usage of force abroad. This is due to the objectives of the small mission, which were to protect US civilians and property. Other key datasets, such as IMI, MID, and MIPS only list US military actions in Cuba after 1960, culminating in the Bay of Pigs invasion. But given our expanded definition on US military involvements, we include this case as a confirmed instance of the usage of force abroad as well.

1960 Cuba

NAME: Bay of Pigs Invasion

DISPUTE NUMBER: 246

DATES: April 15, 1961 – April 20, 1961

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

In 1960, the Communists under Fidel Castro consolidated power in Cuba after the Cuban Revolution ousted former dictator Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power, the new Communist government moved quickly to seize and nationalize foreign-owned industries (most of which were American). This move naturally caused conflict with the United States, which aside from economic interests also viewed Fidel Castro as a tool of Soviet power deep in the Western Hemisphere. By late October 1959, President Eisenhower approved a program proposed by the Department of State and the CIA, to support opposition elements in Cuba. In May 1960, Fidel Castro claimed that U.S. forces at the Guantanamo Bay naval base were assembling to overthrow his rule. Later that month, Cuban forces attacked an American submarine that they claimed had violated their territorial waters.

The tensions of 1960-61 culminated in the Bay of Pigs invasion, staged by the CIA and featuring CIA-trained and equipped paramilitary forces of Cuban exiles from the United States in what was named the Brigade 2506. The invasion was launched from nearby military bases, especially in Guatemala. On April 15, U.S. B-26 bombed Cuban airfields in an attempt to weaken the islands defences. The next day, Brigade 2506 landed on Cuba on U.S. The attack was a monumental failure as the invading force of 1,400 attackers, with inadequate naval and air support, were no match for the combined armed forces of the Cuban state. On April, 20 remaining forces of Brigade 2506 surrendered.

The affair was a huge embarrassment to the American government, solidified Castro's position in Cuba by making him a national hero, and caused the Castro regime and Soviet Union to deepen ties in ways that led directly to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

SOURCES:

Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. 2009. *America's Cold War*. Harvard University Press.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs : The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.

Quesada, Alejandro de (2009). The Bay of Pigs: Cuba 1961. Elite series #166. Illustrated by Stephen Walsh. Osprey Publishing.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime; Economic Protection;

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 2,300

U.S. Service Members: 4 (2 B-26 Bombers Shot Down)

Brigade 2506: 118

Cuban Armed Forces: 176

National Militia: 2,000

Per capita battle deaths: Negligible

TOTAL DEATHS: 2,300: All battle deaths.

Per capita total deaths: Negligible

COSTS: Cost of operation of 8 B-26 bombers, 5 U.S. Transport Ships. Cost of training, equipping, and transporting a Brigade 2506; 1,400 men. Loss of 2 B-26 Bombers and 2 U.S. Ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID, IMI, and CRS listing of US military involvements, but with different start and end dates. IMI begins its analysis towards the end of 1959, when the secret plans of the overthrow of Castro's rule were being made and organized via travels and meetings within Cuba and the US. IMI ends its analysis by February 1960, after a series of bombings that were later discovered to be by US-based pilots. MID, instead, begins the dispute in April 1960, as the invasion plans were closer to action, after the US had accumulated military forces within Guantanamo Bay. MID ends the dispute in April 1961, without including post-military mission negotiations and discussions. We agree with MID on the end date of the mission, but we alter the start date to include the smaller military skirmishes leading up the invasion, beginning in February 1960.

1960 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: Congo Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 31, 1960 – January 3, 1964

TARGET STATE(S): Congo (DRC), 490

SUMMARY:

Following Congolese independence from Belgium in June 1960, civil disorder and violence escalated during the transition period. Congolese army troops revolted against their Belgian officers who continued to hold public positions in the new government. Belgium maintained its military bases in the economically strategic region of Katanga, supporting its secession that Moïse Tshombé, the province's leader, declared shortly thereafter. The inability for the central government to quell the violence led Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to seek help from the United Nations.

The UN passed Security Council Resolution 143 to establish the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) whose objectives were to restore stability by providing military and technical assistance to the Congolese government. The US voted in favor of the resolution. Within two days of the vote, UN military forces were deployed to Congo.

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom provided the airlift to transport troops and equipment to the Congo. The United States Air Force (USAF) and the Military Air Transport Service (MATC) began the biggest airlift since the Berlin blockade, known as Operation SAFARI and, subsequently, Operation NEW TAPE. USAF used C-124 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules launches to transport troops from Sweden, Ireland, Ethiopia, India, Morocco and Pakistan to Congo. The airlift also relied upon C-124 aircraft, C-133 Cargomasters, a C-135 Stratolifter, and C-130Es. The Operation included 2,310 missions, airlifting 63,884 personnel and 37,202,000 pounds of cargo from 33 different countries.

On January 3, 1964, a C-135 departed Leopoldville with Indian troops, concluding the United States' role in the mission. At this point, ONUC helped the Congolese government reinstall temporary stability in the country by exiling Tshombé, the leader of the secessionist movement in Katanga. This component of the mission is included in a separate case study.

SOURCES:

Meditz, Sandra W., and Tim Merrill. 1994. *Zaire: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 1994. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/94025092/>.

“The Congo Airlifts.” *Air Mobility Command Museum*. Accessed January 12, 2019. <https://amcmuseum.org/history/the-congo-airlifts/>

Haulman, Daniel. 2006. “Named Operations in which the USAF Participated.” *Air Force Historical Research Agency*. <https://media.defense.gov/2011/Feb/18/2001330062/-1/1/0/NamedOPERATIONS%20TABLE.pdf>

United Nations. “Republic of the Congo – ONUC Background.” *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Accessed January 12, 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onucB.htm>

Kaplan, Lawrence S. 1967. "The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960." *The Review of Politics* 29, no. 2: 239-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405667>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: USAF and MATs used C-124 Globemasters, C-130 Hercules, C-124 aircraft, C-133 Cargomasters, a C-135 Stratolifter, and C-130Es to transport troops from Sweden, Ireland, Ethiopia, India, Morocco and Pakistan to Congo.. The Operation included 2,310 missions, airlifting 63,884 personnel and 37,202,000 pounds of cargo from 33 different countries.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the IMI dataset and CRS listing of US military involvements abroad. Other datasets on intervention may not include this case as it is part of a UN mission, where the US supplied airlift support, instead of traditional military usage of force. US support to the ONUC mission also repeated in 1964, for which we create a separate case study.

1960 Russia

NAME: Soviets down two US reconnaissance planes

DISPUTE NUMBER: 253

DATES: May 1, 1960 – February 10, 1962

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, wanted intelligence on Soviet military and nuclear capabilities. The administration developed a new security strategy, the “New Look,” which expanded the United States’ collection and analysis of intelligence. Beginning in 1954, the US carried out aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. On July 4, 1956, a U-2A completed the first overflight of the Soviet Union. From the beginning, the Soviet Union was aware of and monitored the U-2 flights. On July 10, the Soviet Union sent an official note of protest to the US Government. This caused a pause in the flights, though they resumed in 1957. In 1956, Eisenhower established in the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and the Air Force had developed plans to create reconnaissance satellites with the program WS 117L. After US public concern over the reconnaissance, the government covered up the covert program by concocting a biomedical space research project called the DISCOVERER. In 1958, Eisenhower approved project CORONA, which produced photographs taken from space, recovered from satellites. The President is reported to have continually expressed concern over the programs, weighing the international tensions that the plans had the ability to generate. CORONA had been making progress, while the first 12 DISCOVERER missions had been failures.

Two weeks before the Paris summit conferences, the president sent a U-2 flight over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, flown by Francis Gary Powers. After flying into the engagement zone of a SAM battalion near Sverdlovsk, the battalion’s first missile exploded behind the U-2. This prompted Powers to abandon the aircraft and parachute to the ground, during which the second missile hit the U-2 directly. Powers was captured by the KGB and taken to Moscow. Powers was exchanged in February 10, 1962 for Soviet intelligence officer Rudolph Abel, who had been arrested in the United States.

July 1, 1960, exactly 2 months after the U-2 shooting, USAF RB-47 was brought down over the Barents Sea. Of the six man crew, four men were lost. The two survivors were flown to Moscow, taken into custody, and interrogated severely until January 1961, when they were released with the inauguration of President Kennedy.

SOURCES:

Haight, David. 2009. “Ike and His Spies in the Sky.”

<https://www.archives.gov/files/publications/prologue/2009/winter/ike-spies.pdf>

Leone, Dario. 2019. “History, Explained: How Russia Shot Down a U-2 Spy Plane.” August 5,

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/history-explained-how-russia-shot-down-u-2-spy-plane-71546>

Orlov, Alexander. 1998. "The U-2 Program: A Russian Officer Remembers." September 17, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art02.html

Peterson, Michael. 2009. "Maybe You Had to Be There." Declassified November 23. https://fas.org/irp/nsa/maybe_you.pdf

OBJECTIVE: Protect Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released from seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S. 4
USSR: 0

Per capita battle deaths: n/a

TOTAL DEATHS: 4 deaths of US airmen from the USAF RB-47 flight downed over the Barents Sea.

Per capita total deaths: n/a

COSTS: Loss of U-2 and USAF RB-47 planes.
Soviet Union gained intelligence that the US had been gathering.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is included in the MID dataset, but there is confusion on the end data of the mission. The MID dataset reads July 18, 1960, while all sources state that the last plane was brought down on July 1, 1960 (living US pilots released January 1961). The last U.S. pilot to be released from seizure was not until Feb. 19, 1962 which marks the end of this intervention.

1961 Berlin Crisis

NAME: Berlin Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 27

DATES: July 25, 1961 to October 28, 1961

TARGET STATE(S): 265 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 290 Poland (POL), 315 Czechoslovakia (CZE), 365 Russia (RUS)

SUMMARY:

The root of the conflict was in 1948 at the beginning of the Cold War when the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin. The Western powers responded by airlifting food and resources to West Berlin. This set the status quo for Berlin, with each major power governing a section of the city and the city being divided between east and west.

The conflict reheatated in 1958 when Nikita Khrushchev demanded that the Western nations halt their occupations of Berlin. They refused to do so. Tensions rose and culminated with talks at Camp David in 1959, where no agreement was reached.

When the Kennedy administration came to power in 1961, Khrushchev applied the same pressure and the US and their allies refused once again. The Soviets responded by cutting off East Berlin from West Berlin. This included the building of a wall, surrounding West Berlin with barricades, and bolstering Soviet military presence along the East and West Berlin border. The United States responded with a similar show of force. The United States, Britain, and France initiated a troop buildup in West Germany and West Berlin.

The wall would remain intact for 28 years, until the end of the Cold War. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 is symbolic not only because it brought the Soviet Union and the Western allies to the brink of war but also because it was a physical manifestation of what Winston Churchill referred to as the "Iron Curtain." Tensions along this border would serve as proxy for much of the Cold War.

SOURCES:

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. 2018. "Berlin Crisis of 1961." *Encyclopædia Britannica*. December 10. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Berlin-crisis-of-1961>.

Carmichael, Neil, and Brewer Thompson. "The 1961 Berlin Crisis." *National Archives and Records Administration*. <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2011/fall/berlin>.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection: Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of deployment and stationing of additional troops in West Berlin for 28 years. Kennedy initially deployed 148,000 national guardsmen and reserves in the show of force.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset as it is a threat and display of force, not a direct usage of force abroad. But given the expanded definition of our dataset, we include the case as a confirmed, politically important display of force by the U.S. during the Cold War era.

1961 Dominican Republic

NAME: Regime Change

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1801

DATES: June 3, 1961-November 16, 1961

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic (DOM)

SUMMARY:

From 1960 to 1965, the United States in the Dominican Republic engaged in the largest intervention in the affairs of a Latin American state since the inauguration of the Good Neighbor Policy.

American officials in Santo Domingo identified and encouraged a group of anti-Trujillo Dominicans, assuring them that the United States government would cooperate with them should they gain power. According to some reports, U.S. agents may even have aided the Dominican group that assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961.

The United States feared another Cuba situation and Communism spreading in the Caribbean. Just days after the Bay of Pigs (April 17, 1961), President Kennedy approved a contingency plan for landing troops in the Dominican Republic. After Trujillo's death, on June 2, 1961, a U.S. Navy Task Force patrolled the Dominican coast for several months, ready to implement the contingency plan. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was reinforced by two additional amphibious squadrons, and a three carrier task force was deployed to the region. The alert was cancelled on June 10th as the Dominican Republic's domestic situation stabilized. Remaining Trujillo supporters protested the show of force, but the new Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer expressed gratitude for the presence of the US Navy.

In November 1961, when two of Trujillo's brothers returned to regain control of the Dominican Republic, Secretary Rusk warned on the 18th that the U.S. would not "remain idle." By the next day, U.S. military attaches were encouraging key Dominican Air Force officers to oppose the Trujillos and U.S. Navy jets were seen flying over Santo Domingo. On the day after, both the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the U.S. government was prepared to land the Marines, if necessary. On November 20th, the Trujillo brothers and a planeload of relatives and close associates left the Dominican Republic.

From 1962-63, the U.S. offered massive economic aid and security assistance funds. The U.S. later invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965 as part of Operation Power Pack.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. 1970. The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background to Intervention. *Caribbean Studies*, 10, no. 2: 30-55.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/25612211>.

Siegel, Adam B. 1991. *The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990*. Center for Naval Analysis.

Slater, Jerome. 1970. *Intervention and Negotiation, The United States and the Dominican Republic*. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 14 to nearly 40 naval ships (sources differ), 3 navy carriers, amphibious ships, Marine Corps squadron dedicated to ground attack missions, Marine Corps aviation units, U.S. Air Force strategic or tactical fighters and/or bomber forces, US Army forces, CVA-38 Shangri-La aircraft carrier, Air wing CVG-10, ~3,000 troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: All key datasets on US military intervention include this case, but they differ on timelines. Gibler (2018) changed the dates of this incident from May 2, 1961 - November 25, 1961 (found in the current MID dataset) to June 3, 1961 - November 19, 1961 (found in the 2018 book of narratives). MIPS lists the dates as June 3 - November 16, 1961, while IMI lists the very narrow range from November 11 - December 6, 1961, depicting only the last threat of force by the US. We choose to include the updated Gibler (2018) time frame this case as it more explicitly sources the findings.

1961 Russia

NAME: Checkpoint Charlie Standoff and the Berlin Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2219

DATES: October 27, 1961-October 28, 1961

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

The US occupied West Berlin since 1945, but the election of US President John F. Kennedy sparked increased tensions between East and West Berlin. On June 4, 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Krushchev presented Kennedy with an ultimatum in the form of a peace treaty, which demanded that the Western Allies leave West Berlin. It was said that the Allies' occupation of West Berlin acted as a "lure" to refugees from East Berlin. It was made clear that the Soviet Union would follow through with the peace treaty, regardless of the US's signature, by December. On July 25, Kennedy stated that the US would not be driven out of West Berlin. Since 1945 until 1960, over 3 million people fled from the East to the West. Soviets attempted to stem this flow through a severe decrease in checkpoints between the East and West, a physical wall with barbed wire, and restricting ability to cross the border. American concern over the Soviets potentially closing the only checkpoint at Friedrichstrasse caused the US to establish a permanent post there, called Checkpoint Charlie.

After the US military faced several instances of harassment at the checkpoint going into East Berlin, for which the Soviet Union was responsible, there was a standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. On October 17, 1961, the US moved ten M-48A1 tanks and three M-59 armored personnel carriers to Checkpoint Charlie, and the Soviets moved tanks to the East Berlin side of the checkpoint. Seen as a visual representation of the tensions of the Cold War, the public was fearful that this standoff was the beginning of WWII. After a 17 hour standoff, on October 28 at 10:45 AM, the Soviet forces withdrew and an hour later the US forces did the same. After the confrontation at the border crossing, the US attempted to avoid further challenges to the East German authorities while still refusing to recognize the regime. Negotiations began about the future of Germany.

SOURCES:

Carter, Donald. 2011. "The US Military Response to the 1960-1962 Berlin Crisis." A City Torn Apart- Building of the Berlin Wall. October 27. 24-27.

<https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/1961-berlin-crisis/berlin-publication.pdf>

Hendrix, Thomas. 2010. "Standoff in Berlin, October 1961." October 22.

https://www.army.mil/article/46993/standoff_in_berlin_october_1961

United States Mission, West Berlin. 1961. "Account of Incidents at Freifrichstasse Checkpoint Which Set Off Tank Confrontation." October 27.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/USMilitaryResponse.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests.

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: n/a

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: n/a

COSTS: Both sides, use of tanks for 17 hours.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This dispute is listed within MID, but in this dataset, the start and end dates of the conflict are coded as December 3, 1961- August 14, 1962. However, none of the sources we found cite these specific dates. The start and end of the military standoff at Checkpoint Charlie was October 27, 1961-October 28, 1961. Or, when the US, France, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union signed the Two Plus Four Agreement, which was signed on September 12, 1990 and effective March 15, 1991. Here, the four powers relinquished all rights to Germany and allowed Germany to unite and become sovereign. Thus, we change the start and end dates of this dispute to match our findings.

1962 China

NAME: Chinese/Taiwan Hostilities

DISPUTE NUMBER: 172

DATES: January 5, 1962 - December 16, 1962

TARGET STATE(S): 710 China (CHN) /713 Taiwan

SUMMARY: This incident began on January 5th, when China began an artillery bombardment of Quemoy island, which was controlled by Chinese nationalists. China also began a military buildup in the province of Fujian, directly adjacent to Taiwan. The government of Taiwan feared China would begin an invasion of the islands. In response, The United States government warned it would take appropriate measures to protect Taiwan.

While The United States was intent on deterring China from invading Taiwan, the U.S. worried Taiwan would respond to the bombardment by launching an attack on the Chinese mainland, with the goal of overthrowing the communist government. The United States, fearful of becoming embroiled in such a conflict, strongly discouraged Taiwan from this course of action.

By the end of 1962, hostilities between mainland China and Taiwan had lessened. On December 16th, Chinese communists fired their last shells onto Taiwanese islands.

SOURCES:

“Shelling of Quemoy Resumes.” 1962. *The New York Times*, 19 Dec.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gordon, Leonard. 1985. “United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962.” *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 72, No. 3.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: No known direct costs to The United States.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, not in all other key datasets on military intervention. We include this in our dataset because it is a confirmed threat of force by The United States. This incident is coded as a victory for U.S. & Allies because Chinese communists eventually ceased artillery bombardments, leaving the geopolitical environment in the region unchanged. We alter the MID start-end dates as per other sources by a couple of months.

1962 Cuba/Russia

NAME: Cuban Missile Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 61

DATES: October 22, 1962 - November 20, 1962

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), Russia (RUS), 40, 365

SUMMARY:

After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, in July 1962 Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba on September 4, 1962. President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14 the U.S. discovered sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) in Cuba.

On October 22, President Kennedy ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. Later that day, preparations for the naval blockade began, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to push for an air strike and invasion of Cuba.

On October 27, Kennedy proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba. The next day, the Soviets agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba.

The crisis ended peacefully on October 28 when the Soviets began to dismantle their missile sites. On November 20th, Kennedy called off the blockade. By year’s end, the missiles had left Cuba. Soon afterward, the United States quietly removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in April 1963.

Soon after, Kennedy and Khrushchev signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the first disarmament agreement of the nuclear age. Also in 1963, the first "hotline" between Washington and Moscow was installed.

SOURCES:

Douglas Gibler, *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

“One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War,” by Michael Dobbs (Knopf, 2008)

“The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962,” Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
United States Department of State,

<https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/fall/cuban-missiles.html>

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change

OUTCOME: Yield by Target State(s)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS:

- Four tactical air squadrons were readied
- More than 100,000 troops were sent to Florida for a possible invasion of Cuba
- The navy dispatched 180 vessels into the Caribbean for a planned amphibious exercise involving 40,000 marines
- B-52s loaded with nuclear weapons were in the air at all times

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in most intervention datasets, albeit with different start and end dates. MIP includes the dates of January 28, 1962 - December 12, 1962, while MIPS only lists from October 26 - October 28, 1962. Given our case study analysis, we alter the dates to range from October 22, 1962 (quarantine of Cuba) to November 20, 1962 (ending of blockage).

1962 Laos

NAME: U.S. Involvement in Laos Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1353

DATES: January 6, 1962 - February 20, 1973

TARGET STATE(S): 365 Russia, 816 Vietnam, 812 Laos

SUMMARY: This incident describes the U.S. involvement in the war between Pathet Lao communist rebels and the Laotian royal government. In early 1962, Pathet Lao forces attacked Nam Tha, an area near the Thai border, with support from North Vietnam. Pathet Lao forces eventually seized the area on May 6th, when the Royal Lao soldiers retreated. In response to the advances of the Pathet Lao, The United States moved the Seventh Fleet into the Gulf of Thailand. Furthermore, 1,000 U.S. troops already stationed in Thailand were moved to the border.

Fighting between Pathet Lao and the Laotian government continued into the late 1960's. The United States and The Soviet Union protected their interests during the skirmishes and funded various proxy forces. Throughout the civil war, the American government conducted extensive bombing raids in Laos. Approximately 270 million cluster bombs were dropped on Laos by American bombers. The U.S. dropped more ordinance on Laos than on all countries during World War II. U.S. soldiers were also involved in ground operations. Furthermore, the CIA was involved in training local forces to fight against the Pathet Lao.

Starting in 1969, the Pathet Lao began to achieve sustained victories and controlled approximately two-thirds of the country by 1972. The Laotian royal government entered into negotiations with the Pathet Lao in October 1972. These talks did not produce any settlements until the Laotian government was pressured by The United States, which was seeking to end the conflict before negotiating the Paris Peace talks. In 1973, the Pathet Lao and Laotian government signed the Vientiane Agreement. The agreement provided for power sharing between rebels and the incumbent government. However, in just two years, the agreement collapsed and the Pathet Lao took over Laos in 1975.

SOURCES:

2017. "America's secret war in Laos." *The Economist*, 18 Dec.

<https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2017/01/21/americas-secret-war-in-laos>

Andelman, David. 1975. "Pathet Lao Announce Vientiane Take-Over." *The New York Times*, 18 Dec. <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/24/archives/pathet-lao-announce-vientiane-takeover-pathet-lao-report-takeover.html>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kolinovksy, Sarah. 2016. "The Bombing of Laos: By the Numbers." *ABC News*, 18 Dec. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/bombing-laos-numbers/story?id=41890565>

Peel, Michael. 2017. "Apocalypse then: America's secret war in Laos." *The Financial Times*, 18 Dec. <https://www.ft.com/content/9a8c737c-e3d1-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a>

Shipler, David. 1973. "Pathet Lao, Assailing Revolt, Urges Early Peace Pact." *The New York Times*, 18 Dec. <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/23/archives/pathet-lao-assailing-revolt-urges-early-peace-pact-us-role.html>

"Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics." 2018. The National Archives. <https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics#category>

Conboy, Kenneth & Morrison, James. *Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos*. Boulder CO: Paladin Press, 1995.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS:

- United States: 728 troop deaths reported in Laos
- Laos: Unknown number of Royal Lao Army and Pathet Lao soldiers killed

TOTAL DEATHS:

- Approximately one-tenth of Laos's population was killed. As many as 200,000 Laotians.

Per capita total deaths: 1/10 civilian population killed.

COSTS: Costs of U.S. supporting the incumbent Laos government, through American troop deployment and aerial bombings. Annual cost of this support in 1970 was estimated to be \$3.1 billion in 2017 dollars. Cost of continual U.S. involvement in clearing unexploded ordinance in Laos. Estimated to be \$4.9 million annually from 1993 to 2016. U.S. continues to support the removal of unexploded ordnance, with estimated spending from 2016-2019 at \$30 million. CIA

use of Air America in providing air supremacy. Estimates of 80 aircraft.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID, Gibler (2018) narratives, and Grossman (2018) list of U.S. military interventions. Surprisingly, it does not appear in the IMI, MIPS, or the PRIO/ACD of US military interventions, although it is a direct usage of force abroad. This is most likely due to a temporal element. Much of these key datasets focus on later instances of US military usage in more detail than the 1945-1960 eras. Moreover, IMI includes a Laos case of intervention beginning in 1964, not 1962.

We are unable to accurately determine battle deaths of Royal Lao Army and Pathet Lao soldiers as well as the battle deaths of supporting North Vietnamese soldiers. Civilian death tolls vary, but 200,000 was the most consistent across sources.

1962 Thailand

NAME: Support for the Thai regime

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 12, 1962 – November 30, 1962

TARGET STATE(S): Thailand (THI), 800

SUMMARY:

As the Cold War intensified in the early 1960s, Southeast Asia became an important battleground with multiple proxy conflicts where the two rival superpowers took alternate sides. Vietnam was rapidly becoming the most important of such proxy battles. France had been an imperial power in Vietnam for quite some time, but French forces definitively pulled out of the country after suffering a major defeat at Dien Bien Pheu in 1954. At this point, the United States became the most important foreign sponsor of West-aligned South Vietnam in its battle against the Communist regime in North Vietnam and its allied insurgency movement inside South Vietnam, the Viet Cong. By 1963, the United States had about 15,000 military advisers inside South Vietnam. The Vietnam conflict had regional dimensions and also encompassed military and diplomatic activity in Laos and Cambodia as well.

In this context, during May of 1962, the United States dispatched 5,000 U.S. Marines from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit to Thailand to ward off external threats of a Communist takeover by actors elsewhere in the region. However, the intensity of the threat rapidly diminished and by the end of July, less than three months later, the Marines were withdrawn. Thailand retained its monarchy and remained a Western ally throughout the Cold War.

SOURCES:

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit for about three months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears in the IMI and CRS datasets on U.S. military interventions, but not in MID, MIPS, or other leading datasets. Since MID also includes displays and threats of force by the US abroad (not just uses of force like the other datasets), we are unsure as to why this case was not included within the MID dataset as well. Nonetheless, we have confirmed this incident as a display and threat of force by the US abroad via a variety of other sources.

1963 Haiti/Dominican Republic

NAME: Haiti – Dominican Republic Dispute

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1002

DATES: April, 26, 1963 – June, 3, 1963

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI-41) Dominican Republic (DR-42)

SUMMARY:

Haitian President Francois Duvalier found himself in a politically leverageable situation as a strong man whose nation happened to be near both the United States and Cuba. He used this leverage to pocket US aid money (\$40 million dollars) for his own coffers, without suffering material consequences. Duvalier's presidential term was set to expire in May of 1963- in April of that year a kidnapping attempt was made on two of his children.

On April 28th, the Haitian police attacked a Dominican chancery in Port-au-Prince "looking for the criminals responsible". In response, the newly elected Dominican President Juan Bosch mobilized 3,000 troops and put the rest of his armed forces on alert. Bosch sent an ultimatum to Duvalier, demanding he remove all troops from the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince. An emergency session of the Organization of American States (OAS) convened and created a fact-finding mission consisting of 5 nations representatives who departed for Haiti (The United States recused itself from the mission giving its spot to Bolivia, due to tensions with the Duvalier government over misappropriated aid money). Simultaneously the United States deployed its Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron of the US Atlantic Fleet, with the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Gulf of Gonave ready to act if the dispute escalated, the American ships were joined shortly by British and Canadian vessels.

Tensions subsided (in part due to Dominican officers unwillingness to invade Haiti) following the OAS commission's investigation. It is unclear what role deployment of American forces to the nearby Gulf of Gonave had, if any. President Duvalier would go on to serve as a "bulwark" against Cuba and the Duvalier presidency would go on to purge suspected communist movements within Haiti and rule as an authoritarian strong man till his son took over in 1971.

SOURCES:

"Organization of American States." 1963. *International Organization* 17, no. 4: 991-92.

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/stable/2705120>.

The New York Times. 1963. "Ultimatum Send to Haiti Regime by Dominicans." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Apr 29.

<https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/docview/116332819?accountid=14434>.

Helen Chapin Metz and Library of Congress, eds., *Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies*, 3rd ed, Area Handbook Series 550–36 (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; For sale by the Supt. of Docs. U.S. G.P.O, 2001).

TAD SZULC Special to The New, York Times. 1963. "HAITIAN CONTACTS RESUMED BY U.S.: DUVALIER REGIME REGARDED AS FIRMLY IN POWER EVEN IF NOT CONSTITUTIONAL MARINE LANDING ENVISAGED REGIME STILL HELD ILLEGAL HAITIAN CONTACTS RESUMED BY U.S. ENVOY'S RETURN UNLIKELY DOMINICAN ATTACK HELD OFF." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 04, 1.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Operational costs of 2,500 troops and the Boxer Aircraft carrier from US Navy.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case is listed both in MID and IMI. We, however, added the Dominican Republic as a concurrent target state in this dispute. We also maintained IMI's objectives of strategic interest and humanitarian aims.

1964 Cambodia

NAME: US Attack on Northeast Cambodia

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1213 and (#1216, #1217, and #1806)

DATES: 19 March 1964 – 28 April 1969

TARGET STATE(S): 811 Cambodia

SUMMARY:

Amid the US war against North Vietnam, the U.S. believed that communist reinforcements and supplies were coming through the Cambodian border on a route referred to as the “Ho Chi Minh Trail.” Cambodia denied these allegations. The U.S., already involved in a large-scale conflict against North Vietnam, resorted to economic and political channels in an attempt to address the issue. The U.S. took its grievances to the UN Security Council and called for international supervision of the border area.

South Vietnamese forces continued to attack Cambodian villages, sometimes with the involvement of American advisers. On April 28, 1965, South Vietnam flew Skyraider fighter-bombers over the border region and bombed a Cambodian village, killing one. On May 5, 1966, U.S. eastern Cambodia in self-defense, which was met by Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk threatening to seek foreign assistance to retaliate against South Vietnam. The U.S. continued to rely on diplomatic channels to address this conflict, including after news surfaced that a Cambodian port was being used to supply the Viet Cong.

The United States continued to protest border crossings by North Vietnamese communist forces through diplomatic channels until the U.S. presidential election in 1968 brought a new president into office. U.S. bombings of Cambodia began in 1969, followed by a ground invasion in 1970.

SOURCES:

"Cambodia Charges Bombing" 1965. *New York Times* (1923-Current File). New York, N.Y.

Hamilton, Thomas J. 1964. "U.S. and Cambodia Agree To Support U.N. Border Study." *New York Times* (1923-Current File). New York, N.Y.

R.W. Apple, Jr. 1966. Special to *The New York Times*. "PORT OF CAMBODIA TIED TO VIETCONG." *New York Times* (1923-Current File). New York, N.Y.

Special to *The New York Times*. 1965. "Text of U.S. Statement on Cambodia." *New York Times* (1923-Current File). New York, N.Y.

Stevenson, Adlai. 1964. "U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol to Help Prevent Border Incidents between Cambodia and Viet-Nam." *Department of State Bulletin*, 50: 907-13.

Topping, Seymour. 1964. "U.S. Now Asks Cambodia Parley To Control the Vietnam Border." *New York Times* (1923-Current File). New York, N.Y.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: Unclear

TOTAL DEATHS: 25 – 100

COSTS: The costs of economic statecraft to deter Cambodia; the costs of the direct attack (but figures unknown).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This dispute appears in MID and IMI, but the start and end dates differ drastically. While MID only covers the beginning of the dispute (until 1964), IMI combines the smaller skirmishes and attacks against Cambodia since March 1964 with the more intensive bombing campaigns until March 1969. However, given similar events covered by the MID dataset (#1216, #1217, and #1806), we have chosen to aggregate cases involving the United States and Cambodia that occurred in the late 1960s. All of the U.S. objectives were the same. Lastly, the death counts are inaccurate due to the grouping of several incidents together in MID, with no specific details available per smaller incident.

1964 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: 1964 Congo

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: November 24, 1964 – November 25, 1964

TARGET STATE(S): Congo (DRC), 490

SUMMARY:

Civil unrest in the Congo after independence in 1960 prompted the UN to pass Security Council Resolution 143, which established the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The mission's objectives were to restore stability by providing military and technical assistance to the Congolese government. The United States primarily provided air support to ONUC throughout the mission's duration to transport both equipment and personnel to the Congo.

In 1964, the United States sent four C-130 planes and about 100 U.S. military personnel to aid Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe to repel an attack that was part of a broader communist-supported insurgent campaign known as the Simba Rebellion. These rebels had begun to take foreign hostages around Stanleyville as well as Congolese troops fighting on behalf of the central government. The planes transported Belgian paratroopers who landed in Stanleyville to secure, and eventually evacuate, the hostages.

The U.S. operations, known as Dragon Rouge and Dragon Noir, resulted in the rescue of nearly 1,800 American and European citizens, and about 400 Congolese who were then evacuated from Stanleyville. About 100 foreigners and 1,000 to 2,000 Congolese were killed by the Simba rebels. This confrontation is representative of early Cold War proxy competition in the Congo.

SOURCES:

New York Times. 1964. "U.S. Sends Four Big Planes to Congo to Aid Tshombe." Archives. <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/08/13/archives/us-sends-four-big-planes-to-congo-to-aid-tshombe.html>

Odom, Major Thomas. 1988. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965." Leavenworth Papers no. 14. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211790.pdf>

United Nations. "Republic of the Congo – ONUC Background." *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Accessed January 12, 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onucB.htm>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Belgium (2); U.S. (2); Congo (unknown)

TOTAL DEATHS: Belgium (22); U.S. (4); Canada (1); unknown foreign nationals (30-50); Congo (1,000 – 2,000)

COSTS: The U.S. used four C-130 Hercules transport planes for this mission. 100 United States Army and Air Force personnel, including 40 paratroopers were deployed to guard the planes at a base near Leopoldville. Between 1960 and 1964 the U.S. reportedly spent \$350 million in economic aid to Congo, \$6.6 million of which was military assistance in fiscal year 1964.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the IMI dataset and CRS listing of US military involvements abroad. Other datasets on intervention may not include this case as it is part of a UN mission, where the US supplied airlift support, instead of traditional military usage of force. US support to the ONUC mission began in 1960, for which we create a separate case study.

1964 Vietnam War

NAME: 1964-1975 Vietnam War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 611

DATES: August 10, 1964 - January 27, 1973

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365; China (CHN), 710; Vietnam (DRV), 816

SUMMARY: This intervention describes the Vietnam War. Broadly speaking, this was an armed conflict between Southern and Northern Vietnam, with significant proxy involvement on both sides. China and the Soviet Union supported communist fighters in North Vietnam, while a host of countries, including The United States, supported South Vietnam. Initially, U.S. support for South Vietnam was limited to diplomatic assistance. In 1962, approximately 12,000 U.S. military advisers were serving in South Vietnam. Eventually, The United States committed a sizable portion of its own troops to the conflict, with as many as 500,000 American troops in Vietnam by 1966.

Even before direct American military involvement, the U.S. was heavily involved in the region. Fearful that South Vietnam was becoming unstabilized, the United States supported a military coup and assassination against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Congress granted the Johnson administration the power to go to war against North Vietnam on August 10, 1964.

Throughout the entirety of the conflict, approximately 2,594,000 American troops served in Vietnam. U.S. operations throughout the war were extensive, costly, and destructive. One potent example was the use of aerial bombardment and chemical warfare by the United States. Unexploded ordnance in Vietnam and neighboring countries, as well as the myriad health problems faced by civilians and soldiers exposed to Agent Orange, continue to cause serious difficulties.

By the end of the 1960's, U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam became highly unpopular domestically. President Nixon began gradually decreasing American involvement in Vietnam in 1969. The United States withdrew completely on January 27, 1973. Two years later, communist forces captured the South Vietnamese capital city of Saigon on April 30, 1975.

SOURCES:

1961. "A Comparison of the Economies of North and South Vietnam." *Central Intelligence Agency: Economic Intelligence Report*, 19 Jan.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R01141A002200070001-8.pdf>

1975. "U.S. Spent \$141-Billion In Vietnam in 14 years." *The New York Times*, 19 Jan.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/01/archives/us-spent-141-billion-in-vietnam-in-14-years.html>

2018. "Vietnam War Fast Facts." *CNN*, 19 Jan.

<https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/01/world/vietnam-war-fast-facts/index.html>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Spector, Ronald. 2018. "Vietnam War: 1954-1975." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 19 Jan.

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War>

Stein, Jeff. 2013. "Death of a President." *Newsweek Magazine*, 19 Jan.

<https://www.newsweek.com/2013/10/18/death-president-243702.html>

Stewart, Phil. 2018. "U.S. prepares for biggest-ever Agent Orange cleanup in Vietnam."

Reuters, 19 Jan. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-usa-mattis/u-s-prepares-for-biggest-ever-agent-orange-cleanup-in-vietnam-idUSKCN1MR1U4>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

United States: Approximately 58,000

South Vietnam: Estimated between 200,000 - 250,000

North Vietnam: Approximately 1.1 million

Per capita battle deaths: Approximately 1.4% of South Vietnam's population (using 1960 population count). Approximately 6.8% of North Vietnam's population (using 1960 population count).

TOTAL DEATHS: North and South Vietnam: Approximately 2 million civilians on both sides were killed throughout the conflict.

Per capita total deaths: Approximately 6.7% of the overall civilian population of North and South Vietnam perished.

COSTS: Cost of U.S. deployment of 2,594,000 American troops and civilian personnel to Vietnam and neighboring countries. NYT reported in 1975 that the U.S. spent \$141 billion in Vietnam over 14 years. Ecological and human cost of agent orange and extensive aerial bombing. U.S. continues to support agent orange clean up in Vietnam. Significant diplomatic costs to the United States. American involvement seen as disorganized, ineffective, and inhumane.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: While all main datasets on US military intervention include this case, they differ on the start and end dates of U.S. involvement in the conflict. MID codes the start date as February 23, 1964 and Gibler (2018) codes the start date as May 25, 1964. IMI has a start date of August 4, 1964. The Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred in 1964 and the U.S. Congress authorized military action in the region shortly afterwards. However, the U.S. was involved in the region before this time, thus we keep MID's earlier start date. Furthermore, Gibler (2018) and most other sources have the ending date listed as April 30, 1975 as Saigon officially collapsed on this date (IMI codes it as May 1st, 1975). However, the U.S. withdrew completely on January 27, 1973, which is why we code an earlier end date from the existing datasets.

1965 China

NAME: China/United States Air Skirmishes

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2929

DATES: April 9, 1965 - February 14, 1968

TARGET STATE(S): 710 China

SUMMARY: This incident began on April 9, 1965 when skirmishes broke out between Chinese and American jets near the Chinese island of Hainan. One American jet was destroyed after it was accidentally hit by a missile launched from an American fighter. Several months later, Chinese jets engaged U.S. fighters over the province Kwangsi near North Vietnam. One of the four U.S. fighters was destroyed. Sporadic air skirmishes continued between Chinese and American aircraft until February 1968, as American planes continued to fly near or inside Chinese airspace throughout air campaigns targeting Vietnam.

SOURCES:

1966. "Intrusion Proof Claimed By China; Peking Says it Has Photos of Jettisoned Plane Parts." *The New York Times*, 7 Dec.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Van Staaveren, Jacob. 2002. *Gradual Failure: The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-1966*. Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, United States Air Force

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS:

- United States: At least 2 American fighter pilots killed.

TOTAL DEATHS:

- United States: 2 battle deaths

COSTS: Cost of U.S. fighters destroyed. Loss of American life. Diplomatic cost of skirmishes and airspace violation.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is only listed in the MID and Gibler (2018) lists, not in IMI, MIPS, ACD/PRIO, or the CRS list of US military involvements. We are unsure why this incident is not reported in the other datasets on US military interventions, as this presents a clear instance of the usage of force by the US and Chinese militaries. We include this case in our dataset as a confirmed case on the US usage of force abroad.

1965 Dominican Republic

NAME: Operation Power Pack

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 28, 1965-September 21, 1966

TARGET STATE(S): Dominican Republic (DR), 42

SUMMARY:

Three decades of rule under dictator Rafael Trujillo ended in 1961 when Trujillo was assassinated by his generals. The generals ruled in a junta until 1963, when the Dominican Republic held elections with the support of the United States. Juan Emilio Bosch Gaviño was elected, and immediately made enemies of the conservative establishment by implementing democratic reforms. After seven months in office, Gaviño was overthrown and replaced by another military junta, who in turn selected Donald Reid Cabral as president later in 1963. On April 23, 1965, a rogue military unit supporting exiled President Gaviño detained President Cabral's Chief of Staff and occupied Radio Santo Domingo, issuing subsequent calls for rebellion and a return to the constitutional government that Gaviño had touted before his ouster. The next day, April 24, a group of rebels overran the presidential palace and arrested President Reid. Significant fighting broke out among loyalists to President Reid and defecting military units and civilians supporting Gaviño.

On April 25, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered U.S. naval vessels to the Dominican Republic to stand by for evacuation of American citizens in the country. The next day, a further two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division were notified of their impending deployment to the island. As loyalists advanced on Santo Domingo, 400 Marines were airlifted into the city on April 28 to protect and evacuate Americans. By the next day, more than 1,500 Marines had landed in Santo Domingo, and began ferrying civilians to naval vessels offshore.

The 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne landed at San Isidro Airbase on April 30, and the military operation codename "Power Pack" began. In a televised address two days later, President Lyndon Johnson acknowledged that the military intervention in the Dominican Republic was motivated by anti-Communist objectives, stating, "What began as popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of communist conspirators." President Johnson was reportedly concerned about the rise of a "second Cuba" in the Caribbean Basin. The OAS authorized an inter-American force to restore order on May 6. The U.S. forces reached their zenith of 24,000 troops a few weeks later on May 17, and U.S. forces had cleared rebels from Santo Domingo by May 20. A ceasefire was established the next day, and within a week the Inter-American Peace Force assumed command from the U.S. forces and Marines began returning home. The last American troops left the Dominican Republic on September 21, 1966, almost 18 months after the initial incursion.

Aftermath

Joaquín Balaguer defeated Juan Bosch Gaviño in the 1966 presidential election, and Dominican politics have been relatively stable since. American pressure has de-escalated political tensions on multiple occasions, including in 1978 when President Balaguer refused to step down after losing a bid for reelection. On the American side, the quick mobilization and deployment of U.S. forces validated the ROAD Concept, or Reorganization Objective Army Division. This concept emphasized flexible military forces capable of intervening in varied circumstances and pursuing diverse and fluctuating objectives. Many consider the success of Operation Power Pack to be the basis for future American interventions in Haiti, Grenada, and Panama. However, the unilateral American intervention and subsequent approval from the OAS seriously damaged both the prestige of the United States in Latin America and the regional perception of the OAS as an independent body.

SOURCES:

Ferguson, Yale. 1973. "The Dominican Intervention of 1965: Recent Interpretations." *International Organization* 27, no. 4: 517-48.

Greenberg, Major Lawrence M. 1986. "United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention." *U.S. Army Center of Military History*, November.

"LBJ Regretted Ordering U.S. Troops into Dominican Republic in 1965, White House Tapes Confirm; Yet He Insisted." 2015. April 28. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB513>.

O'Shea, Colonel Brendan. 2010. "'OPERATION POWER PACK - U.S. Military Intervention in the Dominican Republic'." *Army Values*, April 20, 2010.

Pike, John. "Operation Power Pack." Accessed December 22, 2018. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/powerpack.htm>

Yates, Lawrence A. 1989. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Palmer, General Bruce. 2015. *Intervention in the Caribbean The Dominican Crisis of 1965*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection and Order; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies (minimal combat deaths, order restored and free elections held).

BATTLE DEATHS:

American: 44 battle deaths (27 KIA, remainder killed in "terrorist-style action"), 127 wounded
 Dominican: Military; ~500 killed or missing (wounded unknown)
 Dominican national police: 325 killed or missing (wounded unknown)
 Dominican rebels: ~600 killed (wounded unknown)

Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF): 11 wounded (6 Brazilians, 5 Paraguayans)
Total: 1,425

Per capita battle deaths: 21.2 Dominicans killed per 100,000
Per capita battle deaths: .023 Americans killed per 100,000

TOTAL DEATHS: Dominican Red Cross estimate: 2,000 dead; 3,000 wounded*

*Note that this accounts for all civilians, some rebels and no loyalist/regular military or police casualties

Per capita total deaths: 72.6 Dominicans killed per 100,000

COSTS: United States spent \$311 million (in 1965 USD) on both humanitarian and military operations in the Dominican Republic. Deployment of 24,000 U.S. troops.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in MIPS, IMI, CRS, but not in ACD/PRIO or the MID dataset. As this is a clear, direct case of the usage of force abroad by the US, it is surprising that MID does not include this case in its database of US military interventions. Indeed, all other key datasets agree on the characteristics of this intervention, even listing the same start and end dates for this incident. MID's exclusion of this case may be an unintentional error.

1965 North Korea

NAME: North Korean Air Skirmish

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2916

DATES: April 27, 1965 - April 28, 1965

TARGET STATE(S): 731 North Korea

SUMMARY: On April 27, 1965, an American RB-47 was flying over the Sea of Japan, where it was engaged by two North Korean MiGs. The RB-47 returned fire, but was damaged in the fight and returned safely to the Yokota Air Base in Japan. No crewmembers on board the plane were injured. In response, The U.S. State Department issued a statement that “appropriate measures” would be used to protect American aircraft operating in international waters.

SOURCES:

Fischer, Hannah. 2007. “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007.” *Congressional Research Service*, Dec 10. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Raymond, Jack. 1965. “North Korea Jets Attack U.S. Plane; RB-47 Damaged but is Safe at Base After Clash With MIG’s Over Japan Sea.” *The New York Times*, Dec 10. <https://www.nytimes.com/1965/04/29/archives/north-korea-jets-attack-us-plane-rb47-damaged-but-is-safe-at-base.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: None, other than cost to repair damaged plane.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is only included in the MID dataset. At best, this is the threat of force by the US, not the direct usage or showing of force. We include this in our dataset

to capture the variability of US military engagements, ranging from threat of force, display of force, use of force, to war.

1966 Guatemala

NAME: Guatemalan Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 6, 1966 - March 1968

TARGET STATE(S): Guatemala (GUA), 90

SUMMARY:

The 1954 CIA backed coup of the democratically elected president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, led to deep resentment in the population, primarily amongst students, unionists, teachers. A formal resistance movement began to form in the early 1960s against the right wing authoritarian dictatorships propped up by the United States government.

As the resistance movement gained more traction in the mid 1960s, the United States urged the newly elected Guatemalan government to accept help in order to fight a war of counter insurgency. In mid 1966, the United States sent an estimated 1,000 U.S personnel to advise the Guatemalan military. Advisors were primarily from the CIA or Green Berets. The earliest reports of CIA activity in Guatemala regarding military assistance is in March 6, 1966, when the CIA sent a cable stating the agency was aware that the Guatemalan military had tortured and executed three men who were believed to be rebels.

The Green Berets both fought with and trained the Guatemalan military in the areas of interrogation and counter insurgency. The teachings of the Green Berets led to the death camps that would lead to the death of over 20,000 Guatemalans by the mid 1970s.

The physical US presence was largely over by 1968 but the legacy of the trainings would lead to the deaths of nearly 200,000 people by 1996 when the war ended. The US role, despite being instrumental, was largely uncriticized throughout the Cold War but has been viewed as enabling a genocide of indigenous people in more recent history.

SOURCES:

Blum, William. 2004. "Guatemala, 1962 to 1980s: A Less Publicized "final Solution"."
<https://williamblum.org/chapters/killing-hope/guatemala>.

"Guatemala: Civil War." 2011. McGill Trauma and Global Health Program. November 25,
<https://www.mcgill.ca/trauma-globalhealth/countries/guatemala/profile/civilwar>.

Isaacs, Anita. 2013. "We Enabled Guatemalan Genocide, but the Elite Committed It." *The New York Times*. May 19. <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/19/what-guilt-does-the-us-bear-in-guatemala/we-enabled-guatemalan-genocide-but-the-elite-committed-it>.

"Indecent Liasons: The US And Guatemala's Army." 1995. *The Christian Science Monitor*. April 17, 1995. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0417/17191.html>.

Georgie, Anne G. "U.S. Role Grows in Guatemala Rebel Threat." *The Washington Post, Times Herald* (1959-1973), Dec 13 1966, p. 1.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: estimated between 3,000-8,000

COSTS: Cost of deploying and sustaining 1,000 Green Berets for 2 years, long term reputational costs

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case only appears in the CRS listing of US military interventions, but it is confirmed via a range of other sources listed above. The exact dates of the Green Berets Deployment is unknown. The first reporting of the deployment comes from Georgie Ann Greyer at the Chicago Daily News in

1967 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: Mercenaries' Mutiny / Kisangani Mutiny / Stanleyville Mutiny

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 6, 1967 - August 5, 1967

TARGET STATE(S): DRC, 490

SUMMARY:

The DRC experienced a series of civil wars between 1960 and 1965. Congolese nationalists earned independence from Belgium peacefully in the summer of 1960. Societal upheavals concerning ethnic conflict, the colonial socio-economic system, and the role of Belgium caused conflict to erupt. Belgian officials and expatriates fled, and later rebellions broke out against successive Congolese governments. One of the conflicts concerned the breakaway southern province of Katanga, which although suppressed, retained imagery in future rebel groups. In 1966, a group of Katangan gendarmes rebelled in Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) but were quickly suppressed.

A group of mercenaries and Katangan Congolese rebels, led by a Congolese Colonel Leonard Monga and Belgian mercenary Colonel Jean Schramme, started a rebellion in Eastern Congo on July 5, 1967, capturing Kisangani and Bukavu. The Congolese government requested American military assistance on July 6. The Americans provided 3 transport aircraft (C-130) and 150 personnel. The UN and Organization of African Unity (the precursor to the AU) likewise condemned the rebellion, which was defeated by November. American help was purely logistical, mainly in the form of transporting Congolese troops to staging points in the Eastern Congo. American support concluded on August 5.

Although the rebellion was eventually crushed, it was notable for its capture of several major cities and the comparative capacity of the rebels. The rebels fled to Rwanda upon the capture of their last strongholds.

SOURCES:

University of Central Arkansas Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project. "Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (1960-Present)."

<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/congo-kinshasazairedemocratic-republic-of-congo-1960-present/>.

Sheehan, Neil. "3 U.S. TRANSPORTS SENT TO KINSHASA TO AID CONGO ARMY; Craft, in Noncombat Status, Will Assist Government in Ending Rebellion." *The New York Times*, July 10, 1967, sec. Archives. <https://www.nytimes.com/1967/07/10/archives/3-us-transport-sent-to-kinshasa-to-aid-congo-army-craft-in.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 3 U.S. Aircraft and 150 military personnel for logistical support and supply distribution.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Only two detailed sources. Other sources are all repetitions of the phrase “The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt.”

1967 Russia

NAME: Sea of Japan Bumpings

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2930

DATES: May 10 - May 11, 1967

TARGET STATE(S): Russia 365

SUMMARY:

In the summer of 1966, the United States and Japan held joint anti-submarine exercises in the Sea of Japan. The Soviet destroyer, *Besslednyi*, began to tail the exercises, but never got close enough to the other ships to cause any issue. In May 1967, these exercises continued, with the USS *Walker*, *Taylor*, and *Davidson* screening for the aircraft carrier, the USS *Hornet* as part of Task Force 70.4. The *Besslednyi* continued its previous tailing stance, approaching the other ships numerous times, including to within fifty feet of the *Taylor* several times.

On May 10th, the *Walker* took over shouldering duties from the *Taylor* and tried to divert the *Besslednyi* away from the group. The Soviet ship proceeded to get closer and closer until a collision was imminent. The two ships slightly scraped each other before separating, each only receiving minor damage and no human casualties. The *Besslednyi* immediately left the exercises after the collision and was replaced by another Soviet destroyer, the *Krupnyy*. On May 11th, the *Krupnyy* overtook the *Walker* and then immediately slowed down, causing another collision, this time more forceful, but still causing only minor damage to the ships. However, the Americans noted that the *Krupnyy* had secured her hatches, ports, and lifeboats ahead, possibly indicating the collision was purposeful. After both incidents, the U.S. State Department summoned the Soviet Charge D’Affaires, Yuri Chernyakov, to forcefully protest the Soviets’ behavior. After the second incident, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Thompson, to do the same. Despite a debate in Congress over whether the American ships could fire at the Soviet ships in response, nothing direct became of the incidents until several Soviet sailors died following a collision with a British vessel in 1970, where the Soviets finally responded to American calls for “Safety on the Sea” talks.

SOURCES:

Finney, John W. “A U.S. Destroyer in Far East Bumped by Soviet Warship.” *The New York Times*. May 11, 1967, 1, 5.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/05/11/issue.html?auth=login-email>

Finney, John W. “A Soviet Warship Bumps U.S. Vessel 2d Time in 2 Days.” *The New York Times*. May 12, 1967, 1, 4.

<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/05/12/issue.html?auth=login-email>

Naval Historical Foundation. "Shouldering Incident Reminiscent of Sea of Japan Bumpings." June 30, 2016. <https://www.navyhistory.org/2016/06/shouldering-incident-reminiscent-of-sea-of-japan-bumpings/>

Trumbull, Robert. "U.S. Skipper Views Bumpings as Error, But Criticizes Soviet." *The New York Times*. May 18, 1967, 1, 4. <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/05/18/issue.html?auth=login-email>

Winkler, David. *US-Soviet Maritime Confidence Building Measures*. Washington: Stimson Center, 1996. Accessed October 29, 2020. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep10946.6.pdf>

OBJECTIVE:

Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Minor structural damage to the USS *Walker*.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case can be found in the MID/Gibler database (dispute number 2930). The end date was changed to May 11, 1967 to reflect when the second "bumping" occurred.

1967 Six-Day War

NAME: The Six Day War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 345

DATES: June 10, 1967 - June 19, 1967

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack and destroyed Egypt's grounded air force, then turned to troops amassed on the borders of Syria and Jordan. Within six days, the entire fight was over. Israel gained Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. Fighting broke out between Israel and its neighbors in the Six Day War. American and Soviet ships went on alert.

Although U.S. policymakers were concerned that an Arab victory would enable Soviet encroachments in the Middle East, they were confident that Israel would win the war and thus decided to stand on the sidelines of the conflict.

Moscow sent much of its Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean and backed up the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Soviet Union began a buildup of naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean as tensions increased in the Middle East. The United States complained of the buildup on May 17, 1967. The Soviets claimed to be trying to exercise a calming influence in the region, and, by May 28, 15 Russian ships were tracking American ships in the area.

On June 8, Israeli fighters accidentally attacked the *USS Liberty*. President Lyndon Johnson used the "Hot Line" to inform the Soviets that the American aircraft in the area were going to aid the *Liberty*. The main taskforce of the Sixth Fleet had been circling in the central Mediterranean. When the *Liberty* was attacked, Johnson told Kosygin that the USS Saratoga was ordered "to dispatch aircraft to investigate".

On May 10, a cease-fire went into effect, but Soviet leaders feared that Israeli forces were planning to invade Damascus. The Soviet government sent a message to President Johnson warning they would take necessary actions if Israel did not halt its advance. Johnson responded by assuring the Soviets that Israel would abide by the cease-fire.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc allies threatened to intervene militarily on June 9, 1967, when it seemed that Israel was close to overrunning Syrian positions and taking Damascus. Faced with Soviet pressure, Washington forced the Israeli government to comply with the

Security Council resolutions and stop the advance of its armed forces into the heart of Syria. Johnson informed Brezhnev that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had sent to the Israeli government an urgent message demanding that Israel immediately implement all Security Council resolutions. In response, the Israeli government expressed its willingness to comply with UN resolutions and, subsequently, ended its offensive against Syria on the evening of 10 June 1967.

SOURCES:

Bar-Noi, Uri. 2011. "The Soviet Union and the Six Day War: Revelations from the Polish Archives," *The Wilson Center Cold War International History Project*, July 7.

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-soviet-union-and-the-six-day-war-revelations-the-polish-archives>.

Beckley, Michael. 2015. "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts." *Quarterly Journal: International Security*, vol. 39. no. 4: 7-48.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Ginor, Isabella. 2000. "How the Six Day War Almost Led to Armageddon," *The Guardian*, June 9. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/10/israel1>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Compromise

BATTLE DEATHS: 26-100 (Gibler)

TOTAL DEATHS: 26-100 (Gibler)

COSTS:

- USS Liberty attacked
- Sixth Fleet deployed to the Mediterranean

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in most datasets of US military interventions, but the start/end dates and fatalities change considerably based on source. We have chosen to maintain MID's start and end dates on the US role within the Six Day War as more sources support this timeline.

1968 Egypt

NAME: Naval incident off the coast of Egypt

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2924

DATES: February 13, 1968

TARGET STATE(S): Egypt 651

SUMMARY:

Tensions remained high in the late 1960s between the United States and Gamal Abdel Nasser, a Soviet ally and Arab nationalist icon. However, Nasser's credibility and legitimacy were badly tarnished by the disastrous 1967 war with Israel, and he faced challenges from other actors eager to capture the "Arab street," such as the Syrian Baath party and the Palestinian national movement.

In this context, on February 13, 1968 according to Gibler (2018, Volume II, page 508): "There were reports that an Egyptian bomber buzzed a US naval vessel. The Defense Department refused to discuss the reports." Little more appears to be known about the incident.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kerr, Malcolm. 1971. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None, other than continuous naval troop deployment.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset, not in any other datasets

or lists on US military intervention. While very little information can be gathered about this incident, the research does confirm the display of force by the US, as interacting with Egyptian military force. Therefore, we keep this case in our dataset.

1968 North Korea

NAME: Seizure of *USS Pueblo*

DISPUTE NUMBER: 347

DATES: January 23, 1968 - December 23, 1968

TARGET STATE(S): 731 North Korea

SUMMARY: This intervention refers to the North Korean seizure of the *USS Pueblo*. The seizure occurred on January 23, 1968 when the *Pueblo* was conducting intelligence gathering in international waters off the coast of North Korea. After being pursued by North Korea forces, the captain of the *Pueblo* surrendered and the crew were taken hostage. In the skirmishes between the forces, one American soldier was killed. Additionally, the North Koreans seized thousands of pages of classified intelligence and equipment onboard the ship.

In response to the seizure, The United States conducted a massive show of force. Approximately 350 combat aircraft relocated to American bases in South Korea. 25 warships and two additional aircraft carriers joined the USS Enterprise on patrol in the Sea of Japan. Despite the show of force, the North Koreans refused to release the hostages. Eventually, The United States and North Korea entered direct talks and on December 23rd all hostages were returned to The United States. The ship was not returned and remains in captivity.

The seizure was widely seen as a public embarrassment for The United States and the Johnson administration. As the Vietnam War continued, public opinion in The United States was turning against the Johnson administration and many Americans were frustrated with the administration's management of the hostage situation. By contrast, many considered the seizure to be a success for North Korea, as they captured a U.S. Navy ship and sensitive intelligence, without facing any significant costs.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hadjimatheou, Chloe. 2012. "Sailor recalls 1968 North Korean capture of USS Pueblo." *BBC News*, 30 Nov. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16650683>

Rosenwald, Michael. 2018. "North Korea tortured USS Pueblo crew members, gathering damaging intel." *The Washington Post*, 30 Nov. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/01/23/beaten-every-day-north-korea-tortured-uss-pueblo-crew-members-gathering-damaging-intel/?utm_term=.8aad7d1e0a80

Welna, David. 2018. "Remembering North Korea's Audacious Capture of the USS Pueblo." *NPR*, 30 Nov.
<https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/580076540/looking-at-the-saga-of-the-uss-pueblo-50-years-later>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure (U.S. soldiers returned, the *USS Pueblo* was not)

BATTLE DEATHS:

- United States: 1 soldier

TOTAL DEATHS:

- United States: 1 soldier

COSTS: *USS Pueblo*-ship was never returned; military cost of U.S. show of force. Loss of American life. North Koreans captured sensitive intelligence and equipment onboard the *Pueblo*, as well as sensitive information from the interrogation of American hostages. Significant diplomatic and public perception costs for the United States and the Johnson administration.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the MID dataset as it is a show of force instead of the direct usage of force. We, however, include this case in our dataset, given the extended definition of military intervention.

1969 China

NAME: Fishing Boat Provocation

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2936

DATES: September 19, 1969- October 4, 1969

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

Chinese media reported that U.S. warships and aircraft attacked Chinese fishing boats in the Gulf of Tonkin between September 19 and 24, and again on October 4. No diplomatic interaction took place as U.S. and Communist China had no diplomatic relations at the time; although, there were signals from Beijing that they might be softening their hostility towards the U.S.

SOURCES:

“China Says U.S. Attacked Fishing Boats.” 1969. *The New York Times*, October 11.

“Red China Says U.S. Attacked Fishing Boats.” 1969. *Colorado Springs Gazette*, October 10.

OBJECTIVE: Unclear

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: Unclear if civilians deaths occurred.

COSTS: Unknown U.S. military aircraft and warships
Unclear effect on U.S. and Chinese diplomatic relations. Incident occurred just prior to U.S. rapprochement of China and as the Sino-Soviet relations were tense.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Due to limited information and the contested nature of the dispute, this case only appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives. We, however, confirm the usage of force by the US across our three sources, thus including this case as a US military involvement in China.

1969 North Korea

NAME: North Korean Shootdown of U.S. Spy Plane

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A (1379 includes this incident along with many others)

DATES: April 18, 1969 - April 21, 1969

TARGET STATE(S): North Korea (PRK), 731

SUMMARY:

This incident describes the shootdown of a U.S. plane by North Korea and the subsequent U.S. response. Relations between the U.S. and North Korea were already tense following the seizure of the *USS Pueblo* one year earlier and the subsequent detainment of the Pueblo crew for 11 months.

The shootdown occurred on April 18, 1969, when a US Lockheed EC-121 spy plane took off from Japan and began to fly towards North Korea. The plane's flight path kept it outside of North Korea, where it would conduct several flights up and down the North Korean coastline before landing in South Korea. U.S. spy planes had conducted approximately 200 flights along the North Korean coastline in 1969 without incident. As the spy plane was preparing to begin its first flight down the North Korean coast, it was approached by two North Korean MiG jets roughly 80 miles off the coast of North Korea. One of the MiGs opened fire on the plane and then returned to North Korean airspace. U.S. radars in South Korea detected the MiGs and attempted to warn the spy plane but there is no indication the spy plane received the warning. All crewman aboard the plane perished in the incident, bringing the death toll to 31.

President Nixon was reportedly furious about the shootdown. His administration considered several retaliatory options, including using nuclear weapons against North Korea. After several days of deliberation, President Nixon ultimately opted for a show of naval force by moving more ships into the region to provide extra security for U.S. spy planes, which continued operations along the North Korean coast. No further incidents or shootdowns occurred.

SOURCES:

Brook, Benedict. 2017. "The EC-121 shootdown: North Korea's killing of 31 US sailors that has almost been forgotten." *News.com.au*. <https://www.news.com.au/world/asia/the-ec121-shootdown-north-koreas-killing-of-31-us-sailors-that-has-almost-been-forgotten/news-story/f31ac9893795646a044d874fbd62386c>

Fischer, Hannah. 2007. "North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950 - 2007." *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Martinez, Luis. 2017. "North Korea shot down a US plane in 1969, killing 31 Americans." *ABC News*. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/north-korea-shot-us-plane-1969-killing-31/story?id=50108838>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor (no further attacks on U.S. spy planes by North Korea)

BATTLE DEATHS: 31 U.S. troops killed

TOTAL DEATHS: 31 U.S.

COSTS: None, other than costs associated with moving greater naval forces into the area.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: There is a question whether this is a show of force. It's not clear if President Nixon ordered more naval forces into the area exclusively to protect U.S. spy planes from further attacks, or if the forces were moved to intimidate the North Koreans. Moreover, this incident is currently aggregated under the PRK, RUS 1964-1969 case, given previous MID measurements. We will further disaggregate these cases.

1970 Cambodia

NAME: Cambodia intervention (Vietnam War)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 30 – June 30, 1970

TARGET STATE(S): Cambodia (CAM), 811

SUMMARY:

American involvement in Vietnam grew in intensity from a presence of 15,000 military advisers, when President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, to over half a million American combat troops by the late 1960s. American forces were fighting both North Vietnamese regular ground troops as well as Viet Cong insurgents operating within South Vietnam. The conflict acquired a regional dimension and encompassed military action inside Laos and Cambodia as well.

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops ferried recruits and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam along the so-called “Ho Chi Minh Trail” that ran along the South Vietnamese border but inside the sovereign states of Laos and Cambodia. The American air force kept up a relentless bombing campaign inside Laos and Cambodia that according to some sources constitutes the most intense bombing campaign in military history. During one specific military operation 1970, the United States deployed significant military ground forces inside Cambodia in a concerted attempt to break down the Ho Chi Minh Trail once and for all. However, much like the bombing campaign, the ground operation proved unable to disrupt the logistics channel more than perhaps temporarily.

SOURCES:

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: Unclear

TOTAL DEATHS: Unclear

COSTS: Part of the cost of the wider Vietnam War.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in IMI and CRS listings of military interventions. IMI, however, includes this incident as part of a larger military intervention between Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge from 1970 until 1973. We include only the direct US involvement during 1970.

1970 Russia

NAME: U.S. Officers Detained in Soviet Armenia

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2221

DATES: October 21, 1970 - November 10, 1970

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

By the 1970's, the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States had caused major distrust and rivalry. On October 21, 1970, a U.S. Army plane violated Soviet airspace and landed 12 miles within the borders of Soviet Armenia. Two U.S. Army Generals, a U.S. pilot, and a Turkish Colonel were detained by the Soviets.

According to the U.S., the plane had intended to land in Kars, Turkey when high winds forced the pilot to miscalculate their location. The plane's mission was to inspect military installations near the Soviet border. In response, the U.S. prepared strategies to apply pressure on the Soviets, including a protest at the strategic-arms limitation talks in Helsinki.

After deliberation, the Soviets agreed not to institute judicial proceedings against the U.S. and Turkish officials. The U.S. apologized and stated its intention to avoid future such incidents. On November 10, 1970, the Americans and Turkish official were returned to Ankara.

SOURCES:

Gwertzman, Bernard. 1970. "2 U.S. Generals in Soviet After Their Plane Strays," *New York Times*, October 23.

New York Times. 1970. "2 U.S. Generals in Ankara After Detention in Soviet," *New York Times*, November, 11.

Smith, Terence. 1970. "U.S. Is Preparing Pressure on Soviet to Free Generals," *New York Times*, November 5.

OBJECTIVE: Protect Own Military Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear: Soviet Union returned the U.S. Servicemen, but the Cold War tension and animosity between the superpowers continued.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of continued mistrust and strained diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives as the US usage of force abroad. But it is unclear whether the US intended to engage with Russia by violating its airspace during this incident, or whether it was truly an accident. We are considering removing this case from the dataset.

1970 Russia/Syria

NAME: Black September/Jordanian Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1039

DATES: September 6, 1970 - September 22, 1970

TARGET STATE(S): Syria, 652; Russia, 365

SUMMARY:

Following Israel's occupation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1969, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters moved their operations into neighboring Jordan. The PLO achieved tactical victories against Israeli forces throughout the year which increased the groups popularity throughout Arab nations. As the PLO's prestige increased it came at odds with Jordanian government. Tensions between the two sides escalated throughout 1970 with frequent armed clashes and the PLO's twice attempted assassination of King Hussein.

On September 6, 1970 a subsidiary of the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four passenger aircrafts and held all passengers hostage at the Dawson's Airfield in rural Jordan. During the crisis, President Nixon placed the U.S Army's 82nd Airborne Division on alert. After a week of negotiations the incident was resolved on September 13. All passengers were successfully freed.

The incident was an embarrassment for Jordanian authorities and affirmed the PLO's autonomy within the country. Just four days later, on September 17, the Jordanian army mobilized and began shelling neighborhoods in cities throughout the country with a significant PLO presence, namely Amman and Irbid. As casualties quickly started to mount, the PLO asked the Syrian government to assist in its protection against Jordanian authorities. The next day, the Syrian army entered Jordan with PLO markings. With the conflict quickly escalating into a regional crisis, King Hussein called on U.S. President Richard Nixon for support. In a show of force intended to prevent further foreign intervention from Syria and the Soviet Union in Jordan, the U.S. mobilized its Sixth Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean and put troops stationed in Europe on alert.

Syrian and PLO fighters surrendered on September 22 following an intense airstrike campaign on behalf of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The conflict was resolved later in the month after a ceasefire agreement was brokered between the belligerents by Egyptian President Gamal Abdal Nasser. The U.S. did not utilize force during the crisis.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Raab, David. 2007. "Terror in Black September: The First Eyewitness Account of the Infamous 1970 Hijackings." *St Martin's Press*.

Kassay, Ali. 2018. "The Exclusion of Amman from Jordanian National Identity". *Presses de l'Ifpo*. pp. 256–271.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS:

U.S.: 0

PLO & Syrian Army: 4000

Jordanian Military: 530

COSTS:

Mobilization of U.S. Navy; three U.S. Aircraft carriers, 12 destroyers, and one cruiser.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both MID and MIPS datasets of US military involvements abroad. Other datasets on intervention may not include this case as the US military did not utilize force.

1971 Cuba

NAME: Fishing boats incidents

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2946

DATES: February 24, 1971 to December 27, 1971

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

Amongst the tensions of the Cold War, the United States and Cuba exchanged instances of seizing each others ships in the Caribbean. The first instance occurred on February 24, 1971 when the United States seized four Cuban boats that it accused on violating its 12 mile fishing limit. These boats were later released in July of that same year.

Later that year, in December of 1971, Cuban gun boats detained two American ships close to the Bahamas. Castro's government claimed that they were involved in a counterrevolutionary activities. The crew was released a couple of weeks later.

After this December incident, the US sent a strong but ambiguous warning to Cuba about detaining further American ships in the Caribbean. This was the last incident that occurred.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Szulc, Tad. 1971. "US Warns Cuba on Ships Attacks." *The New York Times*. December 18. <https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/18/archives/us-warns-cuba-on-ship-attacks-denounces-latest-seizure-vows-to-take.html>.

"U.S Coast Guard Seizes 4 Cuban Fishing Vessels." 1971. *The New York Times*. May 27. <https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/27/archives/us-coast-guard-seizes-4-cuban-fishing-vessels.html>.

"4 Seized Cuban Boats Held at Key West." 1971. *The New York Times*. February 26. <https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/26/archives/4-seized-cuban-boats-held-at-key-west.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change;

OUTCOME: Seizures (Released)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the MID dataset as it is a fishing dispute, leading to the seizure and release of ships by US military authorities. We, however, include this case as a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad.

1972 China

NAME: Bombing of Chinese Lifeboat, Vietnam War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2948

DATES: August 22, 1972

TARGET STATE(S): China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

In summer 1972, reports emerged that Chinese ships had fired at U.S. planes flying off the coast of Vietnam. On August 22, 1972, The U.S. responded to these assaults and utilized two aircraft to sink what was believed to be a Chinese logistical craft off the coast of Honggu Island in North Vietnam's Nghean Province. The boat in question turned out to be a Chinese lifeboat that was simply passing between two merchant ships and carrying a few passengers. The destruction of the lifeboat killed all members on board. Several Vietnamese and Chinese passengers on the merchant ships were wounded or killed in the attack. The U.S. maintained that the lifeboat was firing on U.S. planes following the attack.

The Chinese government demanded compensation for the losses and asked for an end to attacks on all such vessels in the future. The incident was one of many clashes and raids that occurred between the U.S. and China during the War in Vietnam.

SOURCES:

“Peking Charges U.S. Planes Attacked Chinese Lifeboat off Vietnam.” 1972. *The New York Times*, August 25. <https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/25/archives/peking-charges-us-planes-attacked-chinese-lifeboat-off-vietnam.html>

Central Intelligence Agency. 1972. “Memorandum of Conversation to the White House,” September 6.. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-461-5-1-3.pdf>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 1-25

TOTAL DEATHS: 1-25

COSTS: Two U.S. military planes briefly bombed two Chinese merchant ships and a lifeboat and were not attacked or damaged.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and the corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, most likely due to the disputed nature of the act. Moreover, the US accidentally hit a lifeboat, when it claims to have aimed for a logistical craft. Thus, the intention of US military actors remains unclear. Still, we keep this case in our dataset as a confirmed case of the US usage of force abroad. We do change the coding of the incident in MID so that the number of casualties reflects the 1-25 range, not 0.

1973 Yom Kippur War

NAME: Yom Kippur War/The October War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 353

DATES: October 7, 1973 - October 31, 1973

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched surprise attacks on Israel in the Sinai peninsula and the Golan Heights in what became known as the Yom Kippur War. This war immediately increased tension between the Soviet Union, who backed Egypt and Syria, and the United States, who provided support to Israel.

Over the first few days of the conflict, the US and the Soviet Union avoided direct confrontation with each other but increased their direct support for their respective allies in the war. Throughout October 1973, both sides threatened greater involvement, bringing the two superpowers to the brink of war. The US and Soviet navies, both stationed in the mediterranean but outside the conflict zone, remained on high alert as they anticipated a preemptive strike by the other.

Neither the US nor the Soviets wanted to go to war with each other over Israel or Egypt, making both side amenable to a peace agreement. Soviet Premier Breshnev threatened unilateral action if Israel did not respect a ceasefire. A ceasefire was signed by all parties in the conflict on October 25, 1973 and the United States ended its high alert on October 31st.

Over the next few years, the United States would try to broker an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" ended in two disengagement agreements, which did not bring an end to the greater conflict but de-escalated tensions in the region.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rabinovich, Abraham. 2012. "The Little-known US-Soviet Confrontation during Yom Kippur War." *Public Radio International*. October 26. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-26/little-known-us-soviet-confrontation-during-yom-kippur-war>.

"The Yom Kippur War Brings United States and USSR to Brink of Conflict." *History.com*. November 13. <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-yom-kippur-war-brings-united-states-and-ussr-to-brink-of-conflict>.

"The Yom Kippur War: U.S. State Department Summary of the War." *Jewish Virtual Library*. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/u-s-state-department-summary-of-the-yom-kippur-war>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority and/or Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs of military aid to the Israel during the conflict

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, but not in other key datasets of US intervention. This is because the case represents the threat and show of force by the US against the Soviet Union, not a direct usage of force abroad. But this case is characteristic of US foreign policy during the Cold War.

The ceasefire agreement was signed on October 25th and the US reduced its alert on October 31, 1973. Gibler (2018) had October 31st as the original end date but changed it to November 11th in the narratives. As we did not find specific evidence for this change, we have kept the original Gibler (2018) date of October 31 as the end of the dispute.

1975 Cambodia

NAME: Mayaguez crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 356

DATES: May 12, 1975 – May 15, 1975

TARGET STATE(S): Cambodia (CAM), 811

SUMMARY:

On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge took over Phnom Penh. On May 12, they seized an American merchant vessel, the *Mayaguez*. The crew were taken hostage and the ship redirected toward the Cambodian mainland. The news of the ship's capture immediately raised great alarm among U.S. president's Ford's cabinet. The U.S. sent protests notes to the Chinese emissary in the U.S. and the Cambodian representative in Beijing. Both notes were returned. It also sent a letter to the UN Secretary General claiming itself justified in any recovery efforts and requesting help.

Based on intelligence reports, the U.S. believed the crew to be located on Koh Tang island and on board the ship. President Ford authorized an operation to retake the ship, an assault on Koh Tang, and airstrikes on the mainland port. Despite an early-morning radio address announcing the release of the hostages, the planned attacks went forward. The ship was empty and the hostages were released from the mainland at nearly the same time the U.S. forces were landing at Koh Tang. No crew were located on Koh Tang, but the Marines encountered entrenched Cambodian forces on a heavily fortified island. The assault was called off after the crew was recovered by the U.S., but the forces were already engaged in a pitched battle that lasted 12 more hours before the Marines could be evacuated.

The day before the raid launched, a helicopter carrying Air Force police crashed, killing 23, in addition to the 15 Marines killed during the assault on Koh Tang. Because the U.S. had used its bases in Thailand to stage the assault against the direct wishes of the Thai, Thailand recalled its ambassador to the United States in response. A previously scheduled withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand was completed over the course of the next year. The U.S. declared the operation a successful demonstration of U.S. military power remaining in the region after the end of the Vietnam War.

SOURCES:

Browne, Malcolm M. 1975. "Thais, Angry with U.S., Call their Envoy Home." *The New York Times*, May 17. <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/17/archives/thais-angry-with-us-call-their-envoy-home-thailand-angry-with-the.html>

Gwertzman, Bernard. 1975. "Kissinger Calls Ship Action Proof US Stands Firm." *The New York Times*, May 17. <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/17/archives/kissinger-calls-ship-action-proof-us-stands-firm-says-it-shows.html>

“Threat to Relations.” 1975. *The New York Times*, May 15.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/15/archives/threat-to-relations-thailand-reports-withdrawal-of-us-marines-after.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 18

TOTAL DEATHS: 41

COSTS:

Personnel: 1st Battalion 4th Marines (Subic Bay), 1st Battalion 9th Marine regiment (Okinawa), reinforced Marine Company (NAS Cubi Point) airlifted in via C-141.

Aircraft: 5 CH-53 used, 3 crashed. Three days of reconnaissance by P-3 Orion aircraft. Two F-111s (unarmed) performing low passes. 2 F-4 Phantoms fired 20mm cannons in front of *Mayaguez*. A-7Ds (# unknown) also fired in front of the ship. AC-130H Spectre gunship. Airstrikes carried out by A6-A and A-7E aircraft.

Ships: *USS Coral Sea*, an aircraft carrier. Guided missile destroyer *USS Henry B. Wilson* and escort *USS Harold E. Holt*.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MID and IMI datasets with relative consistency. We do, however, alter the MID outcome coding from a seizure to U.S. victory, as MID coded it this way from the perspective of Cambodia, not the U.S.

1975 North Korea

NAME: North/South Korean Hostilities

DISPUTE NUMBER: 1472

DATES: February 15, 1975 - September 1, 1975

TARGET STATE(S): North Korea (PRK), 731

SUMMARY: This incident began on February 15, 1975 after South Korea attacked a North Korean vessel. As hostilities increased, American fighter planes joined South Korean forces south of the demarcation line. The President of North Korea, Kim Il-Sung, issued a warning to the U.S. to withdraw. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger responded by warning North Korea not to test the U.S. military commitment to defend South Korea.

Throughout the dispute, North Korea was conducting diplomatic talks to gain more recognition in The United Nations. On June 29th, the U.N. ended its military operations along the DMZ. While no further military action broke out, South Korea could no longer rely on U.N. military support and was forced to change their security policies.

SOURCES:

1975. "Pyongyang seems to fear a miscalculation by Washington just as much as Washington fears a miscalculation by Pyongyang." *The Guardian*.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/14/north-korea-kim-il-sung-latest-threats-1975>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Halloran, Richard. 1975. "All Eyes Are on North Korea." *The New York Times*.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/15/archives/all-eyes-are-on-north-korea-kim-ii-sungs-travels-have-seoul-on-edge.html>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: Costs associated with moving U.S. fighters to assist South Korea forces.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We include this intervention in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force by the US. We do, however, slightly alter the start and end dates from the original MID/Gibler (2008), from the original May to February, 1975 and from November to September, respectively.

1976 Cuba

NAME: Illegal Cuban Lobster Fishing

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2958

DATES: January 7 - January 10, 1976

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Cuba, CUB 40

SUMMARY:

The United States has disputed fishing rights with neighbors as diverse as Canada and The Bahamas, and there has been particularly fierce competition over the fertile seas of the Caribbean. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf delineated nations' rights to offshore resources, specifically fish and minerals, and would become a source of conflict between American and Caribbean fishermen.¹ In January 1976, the U.S. Coast Guard seized Cuban lobster boat *Gulfo de Tonkin* when it was caught fishing in American territorial waters southeast of Boston.² The Cuban boat and crew were returned a few days later, and in a significant diplomatic coup, the United States would recognize Cuba's historic right to fish in the Gulf of Mexico later that same year.³ Crucially, this incident occurred during a period of heightened tensions between Cuba and the United States due to their support for opposing sides of the Angolan Civil War.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; maintain privileged American access to resources within territorial waters

OUTCOME:

¹ Boodhoo, Ken I., and Ivan C. Harnanan. "The U.S.—Bahamian Lobster Dispute: International Legal Perspectives." *Caribbean Studies* 20, no. 1 (1980): 57-67.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/stable/25612886>.

² "Coast Guard Announces Seizure of a Cuban Vessel." *The New York Times*. January 08, 1976. Accessed March 19, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/01/08/archives/coast-guard-announces-seizure-of-a-cuban-vessel.html>.

³ Boodhoo, Ken I., and Ivan C. Harnanan. "The U.S.—Bahamian Lobster Dispute: International Legal Perspectives." *Caribbean Studies* 20, no. 1 (1980): 57-67.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/stable/25612886>.

Compromise: U.S. returns Cuban vessel and crew, later recognized right of Cuban vessels to fish in the Gulf of Mexico

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Information not available

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset, but we find several additional sources of confirmation.

1976 Lebanon

NAME: Evacuation of Beirut

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 18 - 21, 1976

TARGET STATE(S): Lebanon (LEB), 660

SUMMARY: Lebanon descended into civil war in 1976 because of various domestic conflicts, to a large part along ethno-sectarian lines, which interacted with the regional Arab-Israeli conflict. Ever since independence in the 1940s, political power was concentrated in the office of the Presidency in Lebanon, perpetually reserved for a Maronite Catholic; Christians also held a 6-5 ratio of seats in Parliament. Muslim and left-wing groups demanded change, especially as the Muslim share of the population was growing. Armed Palestinian groups, effectively allies of the Muslim and left-wing coalition, relocated to Lebanon in 1970-71 after the civil war in Jordan. Christian leaders began to arm their supporters in response, and in 1975 these tensions escalated into a conventional civil war.

As chaos and warfare engulfed Lebanon, President Ford ordered the evacuation of the U.S. embassy personnel. The U.S. navy carried out the evacuation of 263 American citizens in an undramatic fashion. The U.S. had negotiated safe passage with a number of left-wing and Palestinian armed groups prior to the evacuation.

SOURCES:

El-Khazen, Farid. 2000. *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

“Ford Orders Evacuation of Americans in Lebanon.” 1976. *The New York Times*, June 18.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1976/06/18/archives/ford-orders-evacuation-of-americans-in-lebanon-embassy-to-set-up.html>

Salibi, Kamal. 1976. *Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976*. Delmar: Caravan Books.

“U.S. Evacuates 263 from Beirut on Naval Vessel.” 1976. *The New York Times*, June 21.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1976/06/21/archives/us-evacuates-263-from-beirut-on-naval-vessel-operation-goes.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Negligible, as the U.S. already maintained a naval presence in the Mediterranean.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears in the CRS listing of U.S. military usages of force abroad, but not in any other key sources. This omission is due to the limited nature of the mission, focusing only on the evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel. We correct CRS start and end dates from July 1974 to June 1976. We believe that such CRS listings were entry errors, given previous listings of the case as occurring in 1976 within the same document. We do, confirm this case occurring in June 1976 via at least other 3 sources.

1976 North Korea

NAME: Panmunjom Tree Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: 362

DATES: August 19, 1976 - August 21, 1976

TARGET STATE(S): North Korea (PRK), 731

SUMMARY: This incident began on August 19, when North Korean soldiers attacked a group of South Korean and American troops that were trimming a tree in the Panmunjom truce area. Two American soldiers were killed in the attack. Three days later, The United States, in conjunction with South Korea, conducted a massive show of force known as Operation Paul Bunyan. Additionally, President Ford moved the U.S. to DEFCON 3.

There was significant deliberation within the Ford administration over how to respond to the killings. Some believed more forceful action was necessary, such as bombing the military barracks that housed the North Korean troops suspected of carrying out the attack. Eventually, the administration decided to initiate Operation Paul Bunyan. It was widely considered decisive and successful, as North Korea issued a statement of regret for the incident. The U.S. and North Korea also negotiated to divide the Panmunjom area, so as to avoid another incident.

SOURCES:

Friedman, Uri. 2018. "The 'God Damn' Three That Nearly Brought America and North Korea to War." *The Atlantic*.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/axe-murder-north-korea-1976/562028/>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Sander, Gordon. 2017. "When the U.S. Almost Went to War With North Korea." *Politico*.

<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/14/north-korea-1976-axe-murder-incident-215605>

OBJECTIVE: Protect Own Military Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- 2 U.S. soldiers killed

TOTAL DEATHS:

- 2 U.S. deaths

COSTS: Operation Paul Bunyan entailed the mobilization of 813 U.S. troops, 23 U.S. Helicopters, and 1 U.S. armored personnel carrier.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives. We change the start and end dates slightly (days difference only) and re-code the outcome as a US victory, not a stalemate (as per MID). We include this in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force.

1977 North Korea

NAME: Korean Peninsula Hostilities

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2192

DATES: April 7, 1977 - May 19, 1978

TARGET STATE(S): North Korea (PRK), 731

SUMMARY: This dispute involves various skirmishes between North Korea and South Korea between 1977 and 1978. Throughout the skirmishes, the U.S. provided military and diplomatic support to South Korea. The hostilities began escalating on May 3rd when North Korean soldiers killed a South Korean soldier. North Korea denied the attacks.

Another incident occurred on July 14th, 1977, when an American helicopter strayed into North Korean airspace and was shot down. Three members of the crew were killed in the crash and one was wounded and captured by the North Koreans. Similar incidents continued until March 1978, when the U.S. and South Korea conducted large-scale military exercises. Approximately 44,000 U.S. troops were involved in the exercises, as well as 73,000 South Korean troops. 200 aircraft were involved in the exercises, as well as an amphibious force. The North Koreans strongly protested the exercises, calling them a “grave provocative action.” Hostilities between the two countries began cooling in May 1978.

SOURCES:

Chapman, William. 1978. “U.S. Moves to Show Ability to Rush to Seoul’s Aid.” *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/03/16/us-moves-to-show-ability-to-rush-to-seouls-aid/77b26c70-c07e-4395-9a43-f1fc0c66a237/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2401537f3628

Foreman, Laura. 1977. “U.S. Copier Strayed on North Korea Line.” *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/07/15/archives/us-copter-strayed-on-north-korea-line-carter-acts-to-avert.html>

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies (hostilities mostly seized once U.S. conducted show of force).

BATTLE DEATHS:

- United States: Three soldiers killed in helicopter crash

TOTAL DEATHS:

- United States: Three

COSTS: Cost associated with military exercises.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is included in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives. We include this incident in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force by The United States, but we alter the dates to better reflect the events. MID listed a start date of July 13, 1977 and end date of March 17, 1978. We extend this timeline of events as per confirmed sources above.

1978 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: Battle of Kolwezi

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 11, 1978 - June 5, 1978

TARGET STATE(S): Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 490

SUMMARY:

After officially gaining independence in 1960, 10,000 Belgian troops remained in the DRC to protect the interests of the Europeans still living there. The UN and Ghana stepped in to ensure the removal of the foreign troops. As the government of the DRC struggled to establish itself, infighting amongst different factions began and continued off and on until the mid 1970s.

In 1977, a group of FNLC rebels, accused of being aided by Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Angola, invaded the Shaba province. The United States, Belgium, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, France, Uganda, Iran and China all gave their financial support to the government over the ensuing months. The rebels were suppressed and legislative elections were held.

In May of 1978, FNLC rebels once again attacked the Shaba province. The support of the United States, Belgium, France and China was requested. The French and Belgians sent paratroopers, while the United States sent 100 personnel as well as air transport support for almost 2,000 European soldiers. On June 5 of 1978, the European forces were replaced with over 2,000 Inter-African forces until the end of the conflict.

After two months of fighting, the rebels were pushed out. About 900-1000 total deaths are estimated. On July 28, 1978, the Brazzaville Agreement was signed between the president of the DRC and the president of Angola to end hostilities.

SOURCES:

"A Dramatic French Rescue in DRC 40 Years Ago." 2018. *News24*. May 13.
<http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/a-dramatic-french-rescue-in-drc-40-years-ago-20180513>.

"Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (1960-present)." *Political Science*. University of Central Arkansas. <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/congo-kinshasazairedemocratic-republic-of-congo-1960-present/>.

Ottaway, David B. 1978. "French, Belgians Get All Whites Out of Zaire City." *The Washington Post*, May 22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/05/22/french-belgians-get-all-whites-out-of-zaire-city/a3ef4193-fed8-41eb-b6aa-3e80b132cc09/?utm_term=.6f0c91793175.

Kaufman, Michael T. 1978. "Desolation at Kolwezi." *The New York Times*, May 25. <https://www.nytimes.com/1978/05/25/archives/desolation-at-kolwezi-welcome-to-kolwezi-after-the-battle-carnage.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection & Order;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 220 government soldiers, 200 rebels, 150 Europeans, and four French soldiers

TOTAL DEATHS: 900

COSTS: 100 U.S. military personnel and US C141s transport aircrafts

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, but not in other key datasets of intervention. This is most likely due to the indirect nature of the event, with the US sending military personnel and equipment to support European soldiers as part of a proxy war. Nonetheless, this is an example of the usage of military force abroad and is included in our dataset.

As a matter of greater context, the US began providing military assistance on March 8, 1977 in the form of \$15 million in non-lethal military equipment and spare parts for C-130 transport aircraft. But since this is not a threat, display, or usage of force abroad, we do not begin the case at this time frame. After this preliminary financial assistance, there was a peace of one year before the conflict re-emerged.

1978 Russia

NAME: US/Soviet Tensions During Iranian Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2223

DATES: November 19, 1978 - January 4, 1979

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

This dispute involves tension between the USSR and the US over potential military action throughout the Iranian Revolution. By November 1978, internal order within Iran was crumbling, as riots, strikes, and mass demonstrations weakened the shah's power. As the revolution gathered momentum, Soviet Premier Brezhnev worried that American forces would move into Iran in response to the revolution. He issued a warning to The United States that any intervention in Iran's internal affairs would violate Soviet national interest and may result in military action.

Initially, President Carter denied The United States had any interest in moving troops into or near Iran. However, over the next several months, The United States grew increasingly worried about the anti-American rhetoric in the revolution. On January 4th, 1979, President Carter ordered American warships to move into the Persian Gulf. While the Soviet Union protested the show of force, they did not respond militarily.

SOURCES:

2018. "Iran profile - timeline." *BBC News*, 11 Jan. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542438>

Akbarm, Mansoor. 1988. "USSR-Iran Relations (1979-86)." *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 41, No 1. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Klose, Kevin. 1979. "Soviets Spurn U.S. Protest, Again Attack Iran Policy." *The Washington Post*, 11 Jan.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/01/05/soviets-spurn-us-protest-again-attack-iran-policy/c84deadd-44e2-4a97-bac3-4215fb9a1bb7/?utm_term=.053e50b3c20b

Halloran, Richard. 1979. "Carter Sending 6 More Navy Ships, Including Carrier, to Arabian Sea." The New York Times. Nov. 21. <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/21/archives/carter-sending-6-more-navy-ships-including-carrier-to-arabian-sea.html>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Protect own Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor (US troops moved into the region without USSR retaliation).

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Deployment of one U.S. Navy Task Force to Persian Gulf, totaling 8 ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: While this case does not appear in other key datasets of US military intervention due to a narrow definition of intervention, we include this in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force by The United States.

1979 North Korea

NAME: Skirmishes During North/South Korea Reunification Talks

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2193

DATES: March 1, 1979 - December 6, 1980

TARGET STATE(S): 732 South Korea, 731 North Korea

SUMMARY: This incident describes several military skirmishes and threats during Korean reunification talks in 1979 and 1980. In the years preceding 1979, relations between South Korea and The United States waned, as President Carter sought to gradually remove U.S. forces from South Korea. However, as U.S. intelligence services became increasingly concerned over North Korean military capabilities, President Carter eventually reversed his position and suspended the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

On March 1st, 1979, The United States began conducting a series of military aircraft exercises in South Korea. The North Koreans strongly protested these exercises during a meeting between North and South Korea on March 7th. Furthermore, on October 26, The United States issued a warning to North Korea not to take any military action against South Korea in the wake of instability within the country after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee. As a show of force, American naval ships moved into South Korean seas. The North Koreans issued no response.

Hostilities between the North and South Korea continued into 1980. In several instances, North Korean troops were killed in border and naval skirmishes. On September 25th, 1980, North Korea formally cancelled reunification talks.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Lee, Chong-Sik. 1980. "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition." *Asian Survey* 20, no. 1: 63-76.

"On This Day, 1979: South Korean President killed." *BBC News*, Dec. 10.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthistday/hi/dates/stories/october/26/newsid_2478000/2478353.stm

Smith, Terence. 1979. "U.S. and Seoul Seek 3-Way Conference with North Korea." *The New York Times*, Dec. 10.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/01/archives/us-and-seoul-seek-3way-conference-with-north-korea-new-york-is-a.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS:

- North Korea: 11 soldiers killed during various skirmishes.

TOTAL DEATHS:

- North Korea: 11 soldiers

COSTS: Cost of U.S. military exercises in South Korea. Cost of moving naval ships into South Korea seas. Cost of sustained diplomatic efforts by The United States to deescalate hostilities.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident only appears in the MID dataset as a display of force, which is why it is excluded from other datasets on direct US military intervention. We include this in our dataset because our sources confirm it as a show of force by The United States.

1979 Russia

NAME: Russian Torpedo Seizure

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2224

DATES: August 10, 1979 – August 11, 1979

TARGET STATE(S): Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russia) (RUS) (365)

SUMMARY:

Throughout the 1970's, Soviet spying upon American naval bases in the Pacific was relatively commonplace. In the case of the American naval base on Guam, Soviet spy ships disguised as fishing trawlers regularly parked themselves just outside the US territorial limit, using sophisticated surveillance equipment to monitor missile traffic and traffic coming and going from the American base.

In August of 1979, an American ballistic missile submarine on training exercises fired a practice version of a Mark 37 torpedo, which passed beyond American territorial waters. The Soviet trawler quickly grabbed the dummy torpedo, and began traveling towards the USSR. In response, the US Navy commander in Guam order a ballistic missile submarine, a torpedo retrieval ship loaded with Marines, two US Coast Guard cutters, and several navy patrol planes deployed from Guam to pursue the trawler. In concert with these efforts, the US Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviets that a US Navy Carrier Battle Group had been deployed in pursuit of the trawler as well. The next day, the Soviet trawler dropped the captured torpedo overboard for the Americans to retrieve, along with a note attached to a bottle of vodka expressing contrition. No long-term negative effects resulted from this incident. Many American observers noted that the captured torpedo was relatively unsophisticated and would not have provided a large intelligence boost to the Soviets.

SOURCES:

Elyria Chronicle-Telegram. 1979. "Squabbles at Sea: A Torpedo and a Bottle of Vodka." August 11, 1979. Accessed March 8. <https://newspaperarchive.com/elyria-chronicle-telegram-aug-11-1979-p-2/>.

Mahony, Edmund. 2017. "Russian Spies Off The Coast Are Nothing New For An Old Sub Hand." *Hartford Courant* (Hartford, CT), February 15. Accessed March 8, 2019. <https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-thunman-submarine-standoff-0216-20170215-story.html>.

Sontag, Sherry, and Christopher Drew. 2008. *Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story Of American Submarine Espionage*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs Books.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Running time for one ballistic missile submarine, one naval retrieval vessel, two coast guard cutters, and several naval surveillance craft for one day while pursuing the trawler.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: As this is a non-traditional case of the US usage of force abroad, it only appears in the MID and Gibler narratives. But we do confirm through several sources that the US did rely on force in response to the Russian seizure of the torpedo. Hence, we include this case in our dataset.

1979 Russia/Cuba

NAME: Russia/Cuba Latin American Concerns

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2225

DATES: August 30, 1979 to November 20, 1979

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365 / Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

The US had long been suspicious of Soviet military activity in Cuba and monitored it closely throughout the Cold War. In November of 1978, President Carter halted flyovers of Cuba as a gesture to Castro; however, by 1979, the United States was becoming increasingly concerned with Cubans and Soviets military action in Latin America.

In August of 1979, photographs taken by satellite camera showed the presence of a Russian military brigade of roughly 3,000 soldiers stationed outside Havana. Castro claimed that this was the same training facility that the United States had been aware of since 1962.

The Soviet military presence was of particular concern to Carter because it threatened the ratification of the SALT II treaty, which had recently been signed the previous June by Carter and Brezhnev. In reaction, Carter expanded the US military presence in Caribbean with a joint task force, military demonstrations and an enhanced presence in Guantanamo. The SALT II Treaty was signed by the US Congress on November 19, 1979

SOURCES:

Binder, David. 1979. "Soviet Brigade: How the U.S. Traced It." *The New York Times*, September 13. <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/13/archives/soviet-brigade-how-the-us-traced-it-how-dispute-developed.html>.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Halloran, Richard. 1979. "U.S. Spy Plane Takes Pictures Over Cuba." *The New York Times*, October 07. <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/07/archives/us-spy-plane-takes-pictures-over-cuba-sr71-photographs-soviet.html>.

"In 1979, Soviet Troops Were in Cuba ... And Americans Were Terrified." *War Is Boring*, January 2. <https://warisboring.com/in-1979-soviet-troops-were-in-cuba-and-americans-were-terrified/>.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COST: Increased military presence in the Caribbean (amount unknown)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset, and we confirm it as a US display of force via at least three additional sources.

1980 Iran

NAME: Iran Hostages Rescue Mission; Operation Eagle Claw

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3020

DATES: April 24, 1980 – April 25, 1980

TARGET STATE(S): Iran, 630

SUMMARY: The Iranian Revolution of 1979 swept away the Shah regime in a major popular uprising. As the uprising began in earnest, the Shah traveled to New York for medical treatment in October, 1979. A couple of weeks later, Iranian students stormed the American embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans as hostages. Only a few days later, Ayatollah Khomeini became the de facto leader of a new Iranian regime, and he sought to negotiate the release of the hostages in exchange for the United States extraditing the Shah to Iran to stand trial. The United States refused.

On April 24, 1980, an American military rescue mission launched several helicopters into Iranian airspace in a complex two-night operation. The first stage of the mission saw eight RH-53D Sea Stallion Helicopters and three EC-130 Aircraft flying from regional U.S. bases and aircraft carriers to a desert in the Khorasan province of Iran. In route to the first staging area, several helicopters ran into mechanical problems caused by a sand storm which decreased the number of operational helicopters for the second stage of the mission to five. Given. On receiving the information, President Carter ordered that the mission be aborted.

As U.S. forces aborted the mission and returned to their initial staging areas, one helicopter collided with an EC-130 and exploded during a refueling operation, killing 8 U.S. service members. The news of the incident quickly became public and an international embarrassment for the U.S. and President Carter. In response to the attempted rescue mission, Iran scattered the 52 hostages throughout the country to prevent any such further attempts from the U.S.

The lessons learned from the failed operation led the U.S. Army to create the 160th Special Operation Aviation Regiment that focuses on low altitude night time helicopter flying.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Trita Parsi. 2007. *Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 8 American servicemen

Per capita total deaths: negligible

COSTS: 8 RH-53D Sea Stallion
3 EC-130s

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MID and IMI datasets of US military intervention. IMI, however, shortens the duration of this involvement to just the day of the Hostage Crisis, April 25th, 1980, while MID aggregates the smaller threats, displays, and skirmishes into a longer duration, from 1979 until 1981. We maintain MID's timeline of this dispute in the interest of increased nuance and real-world variation.

1980 Russia

NAME: NATO Anorack Express Exercise

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2226

DATES: March 13, 1980 – March 19, 1980

TARGET STATE(S): Russia, 365

SUMMARY:

In an effort to train NATO forces to the most demanding environments, The United States military participated in the Joint Allied Command Europe Mobile training exercise in Northern Norway in March of 1980. The Exercise was code named Anorack Express and was used to signal to the Soviet Union that NATO was capable of operating in the harsh conditions of the arctic circle.

Seven NATO countries participated in the exercise including, Canada, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. In all, 18,200 allied troops took part in the field training. The U.S. deployed 1,900 Marines from the 36th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), an air-ground-logistics combat team. In addition, the U.S. deployed three ships, 25 helicopters, and amphibious flat-bottomed military vehicles and LCUs (Landing Craft Utility).

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Associated Press. 2015. "US Marine Corps NATO Anorack Express Exercise." *AP Archive*. Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3S9iKs_I0R0

United States Navy. 1981. "USS SAIPAN (LHA-2) FPO New York 09549." *U.S. Navy, History and Heritage*. U.S. Navy.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Unlear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Aircraft Used: 9 CH-53, 5 CH- 46, 7 UN-1N, 4 AH-1T
Deployment of 1,900 U.S. Marines from the 36th MAU.
Deployment of the USS Saipan, USS Ponce, and USS Newport.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance of military intervention is present in the MID and CRS datasets. While the Anorack express was a military exercise it is included in the MIP dataset as it is a clear signal of border fortification against Soviet aggression.

1981 Cuba

NAME: Arms transfers to El Salvador

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2972

DATES: July 17, 1981 - July 30, 1981

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

Salvadoran military officers overthrew the authoritarian government of General Carlos Romero in October 1979. The country then attempted to build a democratic regime. The political chaos made the country ripe for foreign intervention. In the context of the Cold War, El Salvador became another competition space between U.S. liberalism and Soviet communism.

U.S. policy for Central America was to provide security assistance to enable countries to defend themselves against Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan supported insurgents intent on establishing Marxist-Leninist dictatorships. Fidel Castro's government gave logistical and financial support to various insurgent groups throughout Latin America. Castro helped to coordinate guerrilla forces in El Salvador and into the creation of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).

In early 1981, President Reagan and his advisors repeatedly warned that the United States would take all measures necessary to stop Cuban arms transfers to El Salvador, not excluding actions against Cuba. U.S. representatives twice threatened Cuba with military intervention following Cuba's shipment of Soviet arms to and general support for Salvadoran rebels.

SOURCES:

Central Intelligence Agency. 1985. *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, March 11. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87M00539R001602440011-0.pdf>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Jiri, Valenta. 1981. *The USSR, Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America*, Naval Postgraduate School.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wp98_the_ussr_cuba_and_the_crisis_in_central_america.pdf.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 0

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) sources as a threat of force by the US. We do confirm via at least three other sources.

1981 El Salvador

Name: Salvadoran Civil War

Dispute Number: n/a

Dates: March 13, 1981 - January 16, 1992

Target State(s): El Salvador, 92

Summary:

Throughout the 1960's and 70's, El Salvador experienced destabilization efforts between left-wing guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitary "death squads," seeking to take control of the political establishment. On February 20, 1977, General Carlos Humberto Romero was elected as president, in an election overshadowed by voter intimidation and fraud. After two years of political suppression, civil unrest, and human rights violations, officers from the newly formed Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) staged a coup and overthrew Romero on October 15, 1979. Encouraged by the JRG's anti-communist stance, the United States strongly supported the Junta financially and with military aid and intelligence. Right-wing paramilitary groups began forming closer ties with the national military and political suppression rose throughout the country.

On March 24, 1980, Archbishop Óscar Romero, a critic of the political repression and U.S. support for the regime, was assassinated. This incident and the ensuing government-sponsored massacre at his funeral, is considered a tipping point for the escalation of the conflict into full-fledged civil war. By September of the same year, five of the major left-wing guerrilla groups had unified to form the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) to openly oppose the U.S.-backed regime.

On March 13, 1981, the United States sent 13 Green Berets to assist the military junta in combating the FMLN. The role of the Berets was to advise in the junta's military strategy and educate combatants at the tactical and operation level. By 1983, the United States upped and froze the number of military advisors to 55. Although the Department of Defense never listed the U.S. role in El Salvador as a combat mission, in May 1983, the first U.S. military advisor was killed.

Lasting for more than a decade, the United States maintained and, at times, increased its support for the military junta despite significant violations of human rights and multiple massacres of unarmed civilians. It is recorded that by 1983, American officers had been incorporated into top positions in the Salvadoran armed forces and were largely influencing the direction, policies, and conduct of the war. As the decade progressed, the civil war was becoming increasingly violent. The fighting had killed and displaced thousands and destroyed the country's infrastructure. By the early 1990's the JRG army had taken to committing gross human rights violations to weaken the FMLN.

On January 16, 1992, the Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. Within the settlement was the formation of a UN-supported Truth

Commission which would later find that 85% of complaints regarding political violence were attributed to the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

Sources:

Aslam, Rabia. 5 Feb 2010. *U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict*. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:3, 246-267, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903555788

Bonner, Raymond. 20 Jan 2018. *America's Role in El Salvador's Deterioration*. *The Atlantic*. 19 Nov. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-and-el-salvador/550955/>.

McKinney, Cara E. January 2015. *Twelve Years a Terror: U.S. Impacts in the 12-Year Civil War in El Salvador*. *International ResearchScape Journal*. 16 Nov. <https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=irj>

Norland, Rod. 29 May 1983. *How U.S. Advisers Run the War in El Salvador*. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*. 16 Nov. http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_multi=PI%7C&p_product=PHNP&p_theme=phnp&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&s_dispstring=Title%28HOW%20U.S.%20ADVISERS%20RUN%20THE%20WAR%20IN%20EL%20SALVADOR%29%20AND%20date%28all%29&p_field_advanced-0=title&p_text_advanced-0=%28%22HOW%20U.S.%20ADVISERS%20RUN%20THE%20WAR%20IN%20EL%20SALVADOR%22%29&xcal_numdocs=20&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D&xcal_useweight_s=no.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 16 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

The Center for Justice & Accountability. *El Salvador*. CJA. 15 Nov. <https://cja.org/where-we-work/el-salvador/>

Chavez, Lydia. U.S. Advisors in Salvador: A Delicate Mission. *The New York Times*. May 26, 1983. <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/26/world/us-advisers-in-salvador-a-delicate-mission.html>

Briscoe, Charles. San Miguel, the attack on El Bosque. *Special Forces Newsletter*. May, 2008. http://www.specialforces.com/newsletter/2008_05/SanMiguel08-24fixed.pdf

Irvine, Reed & Joseph C. Goulden. U.S. left's 'big lie' about El Salvador deaths. *Human Events* September 15, 1990.

Objective: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

Outcome: Unclear

Battle Deaths: U.S.: 3

JRG: 7,000
FMLN: 20,000

Total Deaths: +75,000 Salvadorans

Costs: Between 1980 and 1989, \$3.72 billion was given by the U.S. government to the government of El Salvador in aid, specifically in direct aid, indirect aid, aid for reforms and development, commercial and food aid, earthquake damage aid. Throughout the entirety of the Salvadoran civil war period, it is estimated that more than \$4 billion was awarded in aid. The extent in which these funds were used directly or indirectly to support the government's counter-insurgent efforts are unclear.

Deployment of 55 U.S. military advisers in El Salvador providing counterinsurgency training and assistance to government forces. The U.S. Air Force also deployed one AC-130 for logistical support. There are also reports that the U.S. ran reconnaissance missions to support Salvadoran military intelligence, although these reports are unquantified.

Definitional Issues: This case only appears briefly in the CRS list of armed conflict and in Zoltan Grossman's (2018) list of US military interventions. Given the covert and indirect nature of the US's military involvement, few details are known regarding the numbers of U.S. members directly involved or the usage of military aid in the conflict. In addition, our start and end dates of 1981-1992 are unclear, as the peak of the involvement occurred in 1981, according to Grossman (2018), while a separate IMI case documents the peak of this involvement from 1983 to 1988. We can not find additional details on when US military advisors entered or exited El Salvador. For our dataset, we maintain the narrow timeline reported by Grossman (2018) of 1981, and we include a follow-up case from IMI from 1983-1988.

1981 Libya

NAME: US Naval Exercise, Gulf of Sidra

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3098 & 3099

DATES: Aug 13, 1981 – Aug 21, 1981

TARGET STATE(S): LIB, 620

SUMMARY:

In 1981, American and Libyan fighter jets engaged in a brief skirmish over disputed maritime territorial rights. Libya historically made maritime claims over water up to 12 miles from its coastline, while the United States only recognized claims up to 3 miles from the coast. In August, 1979 the Carter Administration changed naval posture and doctrine by authorizing commanders to sail up to 3 miles from the Libyan coast, thus actively violating Libyan territorial claims. The move caused political and military tensions between the two countries.

In August 1981, the US navy held planned naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra in a move that deeply provoked Libyan leaders. At one point Libyan fighter jets challenged US airplanes in a very brief skirmish that ended as the US shot down both Libyan jets. However, the pilots of both jets safely ejected and the skirmish thus had no fatalities.

Both Libya and the United States issued formal protests and blamed the other party for the incident, but it precipitated no further action.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rogan, Eugene. 2009. *The Arabs: a History*. London: Penguin Books.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: The skirmish took place during a preplanned American naval exercise; it did not involve material costs except those already assigned to perform the exercise.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Only the MID dataset includes this case, as it represents the threat and display of force, not the direct usage of force by the US military. We include this case since our scope also includes the threat and display of force abroad.

1982 Egypt

NAME: Sinai Peace-Keeping Forces

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 25 - August 31, 1982

TARGET STATE(S): Egypt (EGY), 651

SUMMARY:

On March 26, 1979, the United States, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty that ended the hostilities between the Egyptians and Israelis that had taken place over the last 15 years. This included the 1967 War and the 1973 Yom Kippur/October War. As part of the treaty, a US-led multinational peacekeeping force (the MFO) was established in the Sinai peninsula to ensure the security arrangements of the treaty were upheld.

The United States contributes the largest amount of troops, around 1,000 out of 2,600, since its founding in 1982. The force is also made up of soldiers from Fiji, Norway, Colombia and eight other nations. Its role includes monitoring the border between Israel and Egypt, setting up checkpoints throughout the Sinai, patrolling the Strait of Tiran and facilitating positive relations between the two nations.

This multinational peacekeeping force is still operational today and largely exists in the same capacity as when it was established in 1982. In its first year, the mission included construction of permanent military bases and facilities to host the MFO. We define the intervention as lasting until August 31, 1982: this date marks the completion of all construction work, and after this point we consider the U.S. forces present as regular rotations of a permanent base, not a temporary military intervention.

SOURCES:

Homan, Richard. 1985. "U.S. Troops Form Nearly Half of Sinai Force." *The Washington Post*. December 13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/12/13/us-troops-form-nearly-half-of-sinai-force/6acbf255-81a7-4b05-ad71-adcd761c5e5c/?utm_term=.8ed2f810ebcb.

Luft, Gal. 2002. "The Future of the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai." *Russia's Energy Goals in Syria - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. January 22. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-future-of-the-multinational-force-and-observers-in-sinai>.

"Mission Begins." *MFO - the Multinational Force & Observers*. Accessed January 16, 2019.
<http://mfo.org/en/mission-begins>.

Multinational Force. "Construction in the Sinai."
<https://mfo.org/construction-in-the-sinai>

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 248 (American soldiers killed in plane crash in 1985, transporting US soldiers out of Sinai)

COSTS: 15 million contributed each year to the upkeep on the force.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident only appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, not in other leading datasets of military intervention. This is most likely due to the multilateral and long-standing nature of the mission described above. Nonetheless, we confirm this case as the usage of force by the US abroad. While some sources from the 1980s suggest that the mission budget was closer to 30 million for the United States, more recent sources suggest that it was around 15 million. We chose to go with 15 million, as it is likely closer to the average cost over the 37 years of the mission's existence.

1982 Greece

NAME: Greco-Turkish tensions

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2176

DATES: November 23, 1982 - March 9, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Greece (GRC), 350/ Turkey (TUR), 640

SUMMARY:

This dispute is one event in a long history of tension between Greece and Turkey over the airspace above the Aegean sea. A year long conflict over this issue had taken place from March 1981 to March 1982, ending with the Greeks assuring the Turks that they had no intention of extending their territory into international waters.

Over the course of a little over a year, beginning in November of 1982, Greece made claims that Turkey and American forces violated their airspace. Many of these events were NATO exercises, an alliance that Greece is a part of; however, they did not participate in these particular exercises.

These incidents continued the dispute between Turkey and Greece over airspace boundary claims. Greece asserted a 10 mile airspace boundary while Turkey only respected a 6 mile boundary. This chain of events culminated in claims that the Turks shelled a Greek naval vessel and fishing boats in the Aegean. The Turks again claimed that these were NATO exercises and that the Greeks had mistaken them for attacks. Greece accepted this explanation.

SOURCES:

"Akropolis on Turkish Violations, NATO Maneuvers." 1983. *Athens Akropolis*, February 2
https://infoweb-newsbank-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/iw-search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=S4AH48YGMTU0NjUzMjAyMS45Njg4Njk6MToxMzoxMzAuNjQuMTEuMTUz&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-1272E291E16E9418@2445369-1272E297DE36D148@24-1272E2980AD82750@AKROPOLIS ON TURKISH VIOLATIONS, NATO MANEUVERS&p_docnum=3.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

"Greece Accuses Turkey." 1983. *The New York Times*, June 23.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/23/world/greece-accuses-turkey.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order;

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 0

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives. Other key datasets do not include this incident as it is not a direct usage of force by the U.S. abroad. It represents an airspace violation by the U.S. through NATO aerial exercises in Greece. We include this as a show of force by the U.S. abroad. We, however, change the MID start date from 1983 to November 1982, according to the sources above.

1982 Lebanon/Syria

NAME: U.S. Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3062

DATES: August 29, 1983 – April 1, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Lebanon 660 and Syria 652

SUMMARY: The Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990 went through several distinct phases of military combat operations interspersed by periods of relative calm. One such period of intense combat – arguably the most intense of the entire conflict – flared up when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. The goal of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was to expel the PLO from Lebanon, install key ally and Maronite Catholic warlord Bashir Gemayel as president of Lebanon, and sign a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon (technically at war since 1948).

The invasion was a military success, but a political failure as Gemayel was assassinated in September of 1982 and Israel failed to groom a pliant alternative. At that point, the United States had dispatched a contingent of marines to Beirut as part of the Multinational Force in Lebanon peacekeeping mission. The MNF was composed of French, Italian and American troops, specifically 800 soldiers from the 2nd Battalion 8th Marines and 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit. Its goal was to evacuate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanese soil, which was successfully negotiated in August 1982, and to restore the sovereignty of Lebanon and its state institutions. However, after Gemayel's assassination the political and military situation gradually deteriorated. Two American marines died from Syrian mortar fire, and the U.S. navy bombarded Syrian and allied positions in response. Ultimately 1,800 Marines were deployed primarily in Beirut, and they carried out small humanitarian missions to resupply isolated Lebanese villages and assist poor civilians.

Two major attacks would end the American role in Lebanon; first, a car bomb at the American embassy in Beirut killed 17 foreign service officers and soldiers on April 18, 1983; second, 241 Marines and 58 French paratroopers were killed by a truck bomb attack on barracks at the Beirut International Airport on October 1983.

On February 6th, 1984 Syrian allies – in particular Shia Muslim Harakat Amal and the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party – gained control over West Beirut. On February 7th President Reagan announced plans to withdraw all U.S. ground forces, which was complete by April 1st, with the exception of a small contingent at the U.S. embassy.

SOURCES:

Cimbala, Stephen J., and Peter Kent Forster. 2016. *Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing*. London: Routledge.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kelly, John H. "Chapter 6: Lebanon: 1982-1984." *RAND Corporation*. Accessed January 02, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129-chapter6.html.

Randal, Jonathan. 1983. *Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon*. New York: Viking Press.

Schiff, Zeev and Ehud Yaari. 1984. *Israel's Lebanon War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

United States General Accounting Office. 1985. *U.S. Security and Military Assistance: Programs and Related Activities--an Update: Report to the Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Social Protection; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS:

American: 265 killed, 159 wounded

French: 89 killed

Italian: 2 killed

Israel: 657 - 1,217 killed, 3,887 wounded

Syria: 370 killed, 1,000 wounded

PLO: 1,000 killed, 6,000 captured

Israel: 675 killed

Syrian & PLO: 9,797 killed

Per capita battle deaths

Israel: 15.6 - 29 deaths per 100,000

Syria: 3.5 ~ 47 deaths per 100,000

United States: .11 deaths per 100,000

TOTAL DEATHS:

Civilians: 19,000 killed, 30,000 wounded (Lebanese and Palestinians)

Lebanese Civilians: 17,825 killed

Per capita total deaths

Lebanon: ~ 616.8 deaths per 100,000

COSTS: Deployment of 4 Marine Amphibious Units for almost 20 months with support from the navy and air power as well. Deployment of USS New Jersey Battleship to Lebanese Waters.

\$12-20 billion in World Bank funds for Lebanese reconstruction

\$50 million emergency relief funds from the United States to Lebanon

\$121.5 million given to Lebanon by United States in 1982-85 in economic support

Cost of deploying troops with the Multinational Force in Lebanon was borne individually by respective countries, but no overall mission cost or specific cost to the United States could be identified.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is documented in MID, MIPS, IMI, and CRS list of US military involvements. But the time frame across these datasets differs. MID lists September 3, 1983-April 1, 1984; MIPS lists September 29, 1982-February 26, 1984; and IMI lists August 29, 1982-March 30, 1984. We include the range of August 29, 1982 to February 7th, 1984, as this fully covers the start and end of the U.S. military mission in Lebanon, but does not include non-US-led components.

1982 Nicaragua

NAME: Incident at Sea, Contra War in the Nicaraguan Revolution

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2977

DATES: March 9, 1982 – June 8, 1982

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua, 93

SUMMARY:

Inspired by the communist revolution in Cuba, in 1961, young Nicaraguans founded the National Liberation Front (FLN – later FSLN or “Sandinistas”), a guerilla organization that sought to overthrow the dictatorship of President Somoza. For two decades, the Sandinistas worked in the countryside, gaining the support of the poor, and then the middle class, while carrying out anti-government and terrorist activities. By the mid-1970s, the fighting escalated and the government and the Sandinistas were locked in battles throughout the country. Then, in 1979, the Sandinistas declared victory over the Somoza government and set about rebuilding the country after decades of rule by the Somoza family.

In the U.S., the administration of President Jimmy Carter had been more sympathetic to the Sandinistas, especially given the Somoza government’s human rights violations against the Nicaraguan people during its fight against the Sandinistas. However, when Ronald Reagan began his term as president in early 1981, his administration took a hard anti-communist stance and strongly opposed the Sandinistas and their support of rebels in nearby El Salvador. Taking advantage of resentment of the Sandinista government by certain regions in Nicaragua and the general countrywide instability, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began a program of secretly backing anti-Sandinista guerilla units called Contras.

In March 1982, a CIA flyover was done over Nicaraguan airspace to gain photo evidence of the country’s military buildup and aid to Salvadoran rebels. Later, in June of that year, a U.S. helicopter from the frigate *USS Trippe* was in international waters, over twelve miles from the coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador in the Gulf of Fonseca, when it was targeted by heavy machine gun fire from a Nicaraguan patrol boat. The SH2F Navy helicopter was unarmed and not damaged, and the *USS Trippe* did not return fire with the Nicaraguan patrol. The U.S. frigate was on routine patrol in an area Nicaragua considered its territorial waters (which it claimed as extending up to 200 miles from its coastline), and was carrying out routine activities possibly to monitor arms flows across the channel to Salvadoran rebels.

As a result of the attack, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the U.S. Francisco Fiallos was called to the State Department in order to receive official protest from the Reagan Administration. Later, in

1986, the truth of the U.S.'s role in aiding the Contras would be revealed. Known as the Iran-Contra Affair, it became a national embarrassment for the Reagan Administration and a major point of the Cold War.

SOURCES:

Close, David, Salvador Martí i Puig, and Shelley A. McConnell, eds. 2011. *The Sandinistas and Nicaragua since 1979*. Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Oberdorfer, Don. 2 June 1982. "U.S. Copter Fired on by Nicaraguan Vessel." *The Washington Post*. Accessed December 6, 2018.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/06/08/us-copter-fired-on-by-nicaraguan-vessel/7a827b26-9505-4eb6-81e6-b7623b025806/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5541c07b9851.

Office of African and Latin American Analysis. 1983. *Memorandum: Cuban Presence in Nicaragua*. Central Intelligence Agency. March 10.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00135R000500800053-2.pdf>

OBJECTIVE: Policy change; Remove Foreign Regime; Social Protection and Order;

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None. The American SH2F helicopter and frigate were fired upon, but were not hit and did not return fire with the Nicaraguan patrol boat.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance of US military involvement does not appear in most key datasets on US military intervention, including MIPS, IMI, ACD/PRIO, or the CRS listings, due to its covert components. It does, however, appear in MID. We change the MID end date, which had been listed the same as the start date (March 17, 1982) to June 8, 1982 according to additional sources.

1982 Russia

NAME: American involvement in the Kuril Islands Border Dispute

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2229

DATES: 1982-1986

TARGET STATE(S): Russia 365

SUMMARY:

The Kuril Islands have been disputed by Japan and Russia since the 1800s. After WWII, most of the islands were awarded to Russia, and an additional few were to be temporarily occupied by Russia in the same manner as Germany and the Japanese mainland. However, the Russians claimed the additional islands as part of the peace negotiations. Japan disputes this, but Russia maintains de facto control over the disputed islands (the main ones being Iturup/Etorofu and Kushenari/Kushenir).

Since the end of WWII, America has maintained the Misawa Air Base on the northern tip of Honshu, the largest Japanese home island. Periodically, tactical fighter units have been stationed there. There was no such unit present during 1982. During the 1980s, the Kuril Island dispute heated up generally, due to Soviet fears that the Americans would station nuclear weapons in Japan. By 1986, two F-16 fighter wings had been stationed once again at Misawa. During 1982 specifically, American submarines started navigating the straits of the Kuril archipelago. By 1988, the dispute had de-escalated once more.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bernstein, Lisbeth Tarlow. 1997. *On the Rocks: Gorbachev and the Kurile Islands*. Doctorate of Philosophy, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. [Link](#)

George, David A. 2012. *The Southern Kurile Islands: Shrouded in Eternal Fog*. United States Army War College. [Link](#)

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Stationing of two F-16 fighter wings to Japan; movement of unknown number of submarines to Japan.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The permanent stationing of air units to a pre-existing American base (where units had been historically based) may not fit the definition of intervention, however, the patrolling of submarines in response to a dispute does fit the definition of intervention.

1983 Cuba

NAME: Violation of Cuban Airspace

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2981

DATES: April 19, 1983

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba (CUB), 40

SUMMARY:

Ever since the Cuban Revolution ended in 1959, replacing U.S.-friendly dictator Fulgencio Batista with the communist regime of Fidel Castro, the U.S. has been on unfriendly terms with Cuba. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy's failed Bay of Pigs Invasion by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was an American attempt to overthrow Castro's government, but it only ended up drawing the Soviets and Cubans closer together. This came to a head during the midst of the Cold War in 1962, when what became known as the "Cuban Missile Crisis" occurred. During this time, the U.S. had intelligence that suggested that the Soviets had ballistic missiles in Cuba, and the situation nearly triggered the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. This was the closest the Cold War ever came to the use of nuclear weapons.

On April 19, 1983, in what the Cubans would claim was done by the U.S. to mark the twenty-second anniversary of the Bay of Pigs incident, an American SR-17 reconnaissance plane violated Cuban airspace twice in one day. The Cuban government was furious and called it a "deliberate and cold provocation" that they said coincided with other threatening maneuvers by the U.S. in the Caribbean. These actions were the Solid Shield 83 maneuvers that the U.S. military was carrying out around the Caribbean at this time as a way of flexing its might in the region in the face of a declining Soviet presence there. As a result of the airspace violation, the Cuban government sent protest to Washington to show its displeasure.

U.S.-Cuban relations remained bad even after the fall of the Soviet Union nearly a decade after the incident. In 2014, during the second term of President Barack Obama's presidency, he lifted much of the trade embargo that the U.S. had had in place with Cuba for decades. However, since the inauguration of Donald Trump in 2017, U.S.-Cuba relations have again taken a step back with a reversal of some of the rapprochement made during President Obama's term.

SOURCES:

Associated Press. 1983. "Cuba Accuses U.S. of Violating Airspace." *The New York Times*, April 27. <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/27/world/around-the-world-cuba-accuses-us-of-violating-airspace.html>

Franklin, Jane. 2016. *Cuba and the U.S. Empire: A Chronological History*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hirschfeld Davis, Julie and Michael R. Gordon. 2014. "Obama Intends to Lift Several Restrictions against Cuba on His Own." *The New York Times*, Dec. 18. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/obama-intends-to-lift-several-restrictions-against-cuba-on-his-own.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Unclear/Missing

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: U.S. SR-71 reconnaissance plane flew over Cuba, but sustained no damage or was fired at.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives as a display of force by the US abroad. We have confirmed this via at least three other sources and include it in our dataset of US military interventions.

1983 Grenada

Name: Invasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury)

Dispute Number: 3058

Dates: October 21, 1983 – December 15, 1983

Target State(s): Grenada (GRN), 55

Summary:

After Maurice Bishop of the Marxist New JEWEL Movement staged a coup against Prime Minister Eric Gairy in 1979, the island nation of Grenada formed closer relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Concerned about the growing instability in the Caribbean, and with more than 650 medical students in the country, the United States began taking interest in the destabilizing political situation. In 1983, a coup against Bishop by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard further threatened the security situation, and after reports were received that a new airfield was being built that could handle large Soviet military transport aircraft, the U.S. determined intervention was necessary.

With the objective of rescuing American citizens, restoring a popular native government sympathetic to US interests, and eliminating a perceived threat to regional stability and interests, the U.S. armed forces invaded Grenada on October 25th, 1983 under the name Operation Urgent Fury. Largely uncoordinated between military branches and resulting in a number of failed missions due to poor intelligence, the military eventually took control of the island, removing Coard from power and installing Commonwealth Governor General Sir Paul Scoon as leader of the interim Government of Grenada. With a significant military presence and few casualties, the American contingent captured a sizeable opposition force, consisting of 638 Cubans, 10 East Germans, 3 Bulgarians, 49 Russians, and 24 North Koreans. By October 29th, U.S. forces began transitioning responsibilities to a Caribbean peacekeeping force and by December 15, all American troops had been withdrawn from the island.

Sources:

Aslam, Rabia. 2010. "U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:3, 246-267, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903555788

Cole, Ronald H. 1997. "Operation Urgent Fury – Grenada." Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Urgent_Fury.pdf

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Lacey, Sharon Tosi. 2018. "How the invasion of Grenada was planned with a tourist map and a copy of The Economist." *Military Times*, 25 October.

<https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/military-history/2018/10/25/how-the-invasion-of-grenada-was-planned-with-a-tourist-map-and-a-copy-of-the-economist/>

Rivard, Major David T. 1985. "An Analysis of Operation Urgent Fury – Student Report, "Insight Into Tomorrow." Air Command and Staff College. April 1985.
<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a156556.pdf>

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 7 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Objective: Remove Foreign Regime; Social Protection; Protect Own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

Outcome: Victory for U.S. & Allies

Battle Deaths: 101-250 deaths (Gibler); 19 Americans, 24 Cubans, 21 Grenadians

Total Deaths: 101-250 deaths (Gibler); 19 Americans, 24 Cubans, 45 Grenadians

Costs: 5,000-7,300 Troops (5,000 paratroopers, 500 marines, 500 rangers); 4 Tanks; 1 Aircraft Carrier; 3 Destroyers; 2 Frigates; 1 Ammunition Ship; 27 F-14A Tomcats

Definitional Issues: This dispute appears in most existing datasets on US military interventions, albeit with different start/end dates and casualty numbers. We change the mission end month to December, instead of November, as listed in MID. We also provide a set of different measurements on battle deaths, aside from Gibler's 101-250 deaths measure.

1983 Iran

NAME: Strait of Hormuz naval conflict

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3071

DATES: July 26, 1983 – May 20, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Iran 630

SUMMARY: During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Iran at various points threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. At the time, this narrow bottleneck of the Persian Gulf saw about one-sixth of the world's oil exports pass through its waters and thus held enormous economic significance to Western countries and especially the United States. The United States therefore issued unambiguous threats to Iran that it would use military force to keep the shipping lanes open if Iran tried to close them.

For a period of about one year, the United States significantly increased its naval presence in the Persian Gulf and in particular around the Strait. Iran labeled this presence as an act of aggression and undertook various threatening moves, such as air force exercises directly above American warships. Yet after May 20, 1984 the presence had effectively become normalized and no longer elicited verbose rhetoric or military posturing from either side.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Trita Parsi. 2007. *Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; ~~Acquire/Defend Territory~~; Policy Change; Economic Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor; Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Maintaining a considerable number of warships in a hostile environment for an extended period of time.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Given that this case is an example of threat and display of force, it only appears in the MID and CRS listings of US use of force abroad. It does not appear in MIPS, IMI, ACD/PRIO or other key sources of intervention. We include this in our dataset as it is a confirmed instance of an enduring threat of force by the US.

1983 Libya (2) Chadian Civil War

NAME: Chadian Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3634

DATES: August 2, 1983 – August 24, 1983

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY:

In 1983, Libya intervened in the civil war in its southern neighbor, Chad, to support tribal Arabic-speaking and other Muslim groups from northern Chad. After Chad gained independence from France in 1960, its government had been dominated by Christian and animist tribes from the southern parts of the country. Muslim tribes from the north launched a low-intensity insurgency in 1965 as they felt shut out of power in the central government. Fighting intensified over time and in 1979 Muslim militias captured the capital city, N'Djamena.

France, the former colonial power, viewed the post-independence Chadian regime as its legitimate sovereign government and had supplied some resources to prop it up against foreign attacks. After 1979, it retained some peacekeeping forces in the country. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, on the other hand, viewed northern Muslim tribes as natural allies and supported them to gain influence in a neighboring state. This support grew over time, and in the summer of 1983 evolved into an outright military intervention by regular Libyan forces to help allied militias capture territory.

Libyan support for northern tribes, let alone outright military intervention, went directly against French and American efforts. The United States therefore responded to Libyan intervention by sending an aircraft carrier battle group towards the Libyan coast and by deploying Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) planes to Sudan to assist French peacekeeping forces on the ground. On August 3rd, two American fighter jets chased two Libyan MiGs over sea and pursued them to the Libyan coast.

However, little change materialized as a result of this intervention and Western powers found it very difficult to significantly alter dynamics on the ground in Chad. One reason for this lack of results was that Western powers were not willing to make decisive commitments of ground troops.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Nolutshungu, Sam. 1996. *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Reno, William. 2011. *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ross, Jay. 1981. *Sudanese Credit AWACS With Averting War*. The Washington Post.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of an aircraft carrier group, generally 4-6 ships, 2 U.S. Navy Jets, and to the Libyan coast and an AWACS system to Sudan. Only one AWACS flight was recorded (cross-listed as dispute 3065).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The dispute is listed across two separate MID cases: 3634 and 3065, Aug 1983. Both involve how the US deploys carrier groups and AWACS to Libya. MID 3634 also mentions that US fighters shot down two Libyan fighters. Otherwise the two MIDs describe the very same incident(s). We merge these two cases. This incident is also recorded in the CRS listing of interventions, but not in MIPS, IMI, or ACD.

1983 Libya (1) AWACS Deployment

NAME: AWACS deployment to Egypt, 1983

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3072

DATES: February 16, 1983 – February 20, 1983

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY: In February, 1983 Libya moved a number of Soviet-manufactured fighter planes to its southeastern border with Sudan. This move worried the Sudanese government, which feared that Libya desired regime change in Sudan. Libya and Sudan had a regional rivalry partly linked to backing different militias in the civil war in Chad, a state that shares long and easily penetrated borders with both countries. Consequently, the move also worried Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, who was a close ally of both Sudan and the United States.

Mubarak appealed to the United States for support and specifically asked for the AWACS reconnaissance system. The Reagan administration agreed and deployed AWACS planes to Egypt on February 16, 1983. As a result, Libya removed their fighter jets from the border area. On February 20th the US Secretary of State announced that the threat from Libya was no longer sufficient to warrant AWACS deployment and that the planes would be removed from Egypt.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Nolutshungu, Sam. 1996. *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Reno, William. 2011. *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of one AWACS system to Egypt for at least five consecutive days

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

The case is also listed in the CRS document on the US usage of force and in MID, but not in other datasets such as MIPS, IMI, and ACD. We hypothesize that this is because it does not represent a direct US military intervention, but a case in which the US supplies allies with military equipment that goes unused. We include this case in our dataset as it is an example of the US display of force.

1983 Nicaragua

NAME: U.S. Intervention in Honduras' Conflict with Nicaragua

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2347

DATES: July 26, 1983 - March 30, 1988

TARGET STATE(S): Nicaragua, 93

SUMMARY:

Following the 1979 Sandinista overthrow of Nicaraguan leader Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Somoza went into exile in neighboring Honduras, with many of his followers fleeing to the border region between the two countries. By 1981, the Reagan administration began supporting anti-Sandinista forces known as the "Contras," and operations against the Sandinista government. With the Contras based on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, disputes between the Contras and Sandinistas led to a number of cross-border conflicts, intensifying tensions between the two nations.

In July 1983, the Reagan administration ordered the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops to assist Honduran soldiers in training and logistics. In this capacity, it facilitated the mobilization of Honduran troops to contested border regions and facilitated the support of Contra rebels in Nicaragua. As the years progressed, the number of U.S. troops in Honduras had declined to around 1,100.

In March of 1988, The Honduran government accused Nicaragua of initiating a major campaign involving more than 1,500 Sandinista soldiers that planned to cripple Contra rebel capabilities within Honduran territory. In a show of support for Honduran sovereignty and its government, the United States nearly doubled its efforts in the region by sending more than 3,000 combat troops to Palmerola Air Base. Under Operation Golden Pheasant, the U.S. sent in 82nd Airborne to signal the U.S.' capacity to militarily support the Honduran military. While the U.S. never fired a shot during the dyad, the show of force was successful in pushing Sandinista troops back into Nicaragua. U.S. troops were kept on high alert throughout the heightened tensions during the incursion. By the end of March, 1988, most of the U.S. troops sent to Honduras were ordered to return home as the retreating Sandinista forces posed little threat to the newly trained Honduran army. There is no evidence to suggest that American troops engaged in direct combat throughout the dispute.

SOURCES:

Aslam, Rabia. 5 Feb 2010. *U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict*. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:3, 246-267, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903555788.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 16 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Treaster, Joseph B. 18 March 1988. *U.S. Troops Arrive at Honduras Base to Show Support*. The New York Times. 20 Nov. <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/18/world/us-troops-arrive-at-honduras-base-to-show-support.html>.

Kagan, Robert. 1998. "Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990." *Free Press*.

U.S. Department of Justice, *Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras*, U.S. Department of Justice. 20 Nov. <http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/appa.htm>.

Objective: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

Outcome: Yield by Target Actor

Battle Deaths: American forces were never directly involved in the fighting between Honduras and Nicaragua.

Total Deaths:

U.S.: 0

Nicaragua: 29

Honduras: 21

Costs: In 1983, 4,000 troops were deployed. In 1988, 3,200-3,500 troops from the 82nd Airborne and the 7th Infantry Division were deployed to Honduras. Prior to this deployment, roughly 1,100 activity duty American military members were serving rotational 4-month tours while 1,000 American National Guardsmen and Army Reservists were serving rotational 2-week tours (largely for development and infrastructure project assistance). Maximum number of U.S. troops deployed approximately 4,500 in 1988.

Definitional Issues: This case only appears in the CRS list of US usage of armed force abroad. This case was initially separated into two instances of U.S. deployment overseas, the first deployment in 1983, and the second in 1988. However, as the objective of either deployment were the same, the two cases have been aggregated. The dates used to evidence U.S. deployment come from publications. Therefore, the exact timeline of deployment is not official. However, these dates were used to represent an approximate timeline of U.S. involvement abroad. While we do not know exactly when US forces began serving their aforementioned rotations in Honduras, we have confirmed the US display of force in this dispute and thus include it in our dataset.

1983 North Korea

NAME: Korean Border Tensions

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2195

DATES: January 31, 1983 to August 12, 1983

TARGET STATE(S): North Korea (PRK), 731

SUMMARY:

North and South Korea held unsuccessful reunification and reconciliation talks in the middle of 1980. Over the next few years, both sides would make efforts to reopen these discussions. The last of these efforts came on January 18, 1983, when North Korea requested talks with South Korea over the removal of US troops from the Korean peninsula. South Korea rejected this proposal.

Over the next 7 months, a series of border violations, displays of force, and small skirmishes took place between North Korea forces and South Korea and American forces. The American role was largely displays of force with the intention of deterring North Korea and leading to further deescalation.

After these border clashes and displays of force on each side subsided in August of 1983, the conflict would re-escalate after Rangoon bombing in October 1983. This greatly increased tensions along the DMZ.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Keesing's Record of World Events. Vol. 30. 1984.

<http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2195-1984-03-KS-a-EYJ.pdf>.

"KPA Command Orders Alert." 1983. *Pyongyang KCNA* (Pyongyang), February 1.

https://infoweb-newsbank-com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/iw-search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=S4AH48YGMTU0NjUzMjAyMS45Njg4Njk6MToxMzoxMzAuNjQuMTEuMTUz&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-1226DCB5E84DCB78@2445367-1226DCB838085088@9-1226DCB864F1B3E0@KPA Command Orders Alert&p_docnum=62.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire;

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: Unclear

TOTAL DEATHS: Under 50

COSTS: Amount Unknown, Material costs of displays of force and small skirmishes.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, as it represents a display of force, not a direct usage of force abroad by the US. The precise means or costs of the displays of force and small skirmishes along the border are not given in any detail. They are, however, discussed and confirmed generally amongst the sources. Thus, we include this case in our dataset as a display of force abroad by the U.S.

1983 Russia

NAME: Able Archer

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2231

DATES: November 23, 1983 - May 20, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

The first Reagan administration brought an increase in tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the early fall of 1983, the Russians shot down a South Korean civilian airliner and the US deployed intermediate range and ground-launched cruise missiles to Europe. Both of these events further increased rising tensions.

In November of 1983, the United States and NATO took part in a war exercise called Able Archer that involved forces from Turkey to Britain. The exercise included highly realistic elements, including real-looking dummy warheads, that differed from previous annual exercises.

This led to the Russians thinking that the exercise was a cover for a preemptive nuclear strike. As a result, the Russians moved many of their forces into positions as though there was an impending strike. In the end, an immediate crisis was averted but both the United States and Russia would commit airspace violations and various shows of force over the next 6 months.

SOURCES:

Doward, Jamie. 2013. "How a Nato War Game Took the World to Brink of Nuclear Disaster." *The Guardian*. November 02. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/02/nato-war-game-nuclear-disaster>.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hoffman, David E. 2015. "In 1983 'war Scare,' Soviet Leadership Feared Nuclear Surprise Attack by U.S." *The Washington Post*. October 24. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-1983-war-scare-soviet-leadership-feared-nuclear-surprise-attack-by-us/2015/10/24/15a289b4-7904-11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html?utm_term=.6f6398129ca5.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Minimal; Unknown costs of displays of force around the world until May 1984; No major immediate domestic costs as the true nature of the threat was only realized years later with the declassification of secret documents.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, due to it being a display of force, not a direct usage of force abroad. Given the broad scope of our definition of intervention, we include this case as a U.S. display of force abroad.

1984 Egypt

NAME: Red Sea Mines (minesweeping)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 17 – December 31, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Egypt (EGY), 651

SUMMARY:

In the 1980s, Egypt and Libya found themselves locked into a regional rivalry in North Africa. The rivalry played out mostly in how the two countries backed different sides in civil wars with regional reverberations, especially in Chad but also in Ethiopia. Egypt also found itself in conflict with Iran, if much less intensely so, as it supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.

In the summer of 1984, underwater mines struck and damaged a series of ships passing through important international shipping lanes in the Red Sea that fall under Egyptian sovereignty and control. No ships sunk, and there are no reports of anyone killed by the mines, but the presence of mines in these busy waterways proved highly disruptive to international trade and damaged Egypt's image as the custodian of the Suez Canal, which generates significant export revenues for the country.

Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak blamed Iran and Libya for the mines, citing unspecified Egyptian intelligence reports that supposedly showed unusual movements by Libyan and Iranian ships in these waters shortly before the mines struck ships for the first time. Egypt had only 12 Soviet-manufactured minesweeper ships and struggled to clear the waterways for shipping. On Egypt's request, the United States – and shortly thereafter also France and the United Kingdom – supplied air and naval forces to assist in clearing the waters of mines. This mission was successful and U.S. units withdrew by the end of the year.

SOURCES:

“Egypt Says Libyan Role in Blasts in Red Sea Is ‘Almost Confirmed’.” 1984. *New York Times*, Aug 22. <https://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/22/world/egypt-says-libyan-role-in-blasts-in-red-sea-is-almost-confirmed.html>.

“Egypt Links Libya and Iran to Mines.” 1984. *New York Times*, Aug. 11. <https://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/11/world/egypt-links-libya-and-iran-to-mines.html>

Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2008. "International Military Intervention, 1989-2005." Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282. Ann Arbor, MI. <http://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/index.html>

"Red Sea Mine Hunt Called Long Term." 1984. *New York Times*, Aug 21.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/21/world/red-sea-mine-hunt-called-long-term.html>

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Social Protection; Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of minor naval and air power units, otherwise stationed in the Mediterranean, for a period of about five months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears in the IMI and CRS listing of US interventions as a consensual usage of force by the US in Egypt.

1984 Iran

NAME: Assistance to Saudi Defence

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 5, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Iran (IRN), 630

SUMMARY:

During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. One-sixth of the world's oil exports pass through the strait and is an economically vital area for oil importing countries, as the United States at that time. The United States retained a heightened military presence in the area with naval and air power forces for most of the 1980s, partly to maintain certain protected international zones for commercial shipping.

At times during the Iran-Iraq War, both sides targeted oil tankers and other economic installations to undermine the economic position of the other. Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi installations, as those countries served as de facto allies of Iraq during this period. The United States, keen on preventing such attacks, engaged to prevent Iranian aggression against oil assets.

On June 5th, 1984 the United States assisted two Saudi Arabian fighter jets in shooting down two Iranian fighter jets over the protected international shipping zone. The U.S. assisted the Saudis by deploying its AWACS system for intelligence and lending the support of a KC-10 aerial refueling tanker aircraft so that the Saudi jets could fulfill their mission. It is unclear whether the Iranian pilots survived the attack or not.

The incident formed part of what was essentially a stalemate; despite the efforts of the United States, the "tanker war" was quite disruptive to regional oil exports.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Trita, Parsi. 2007. *Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: Deployment of two U.S. aircraft. One AWACS and one KC-10 Refueling jet to assist the Saudi military.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, but not in other databases or sources, most likely because the US aided another state using its military power indirectly. We do, however, confirm this case as a US usage of force abroad.

1984 Libya

NAME: Libyan attack on Omdurman, Sudan

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3051

DATES: March 3, 1984 – April 9, 1984

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY: Sudan and Libya backed different sides in the ongoing civil war in their mutual neighbor state of Chad, and Libya also provided sanctuary space for militia groups on its soil. In 1984, Sudan threatened both Libya and Ethiopia to declare war unless those countries worked harder to control armed groups within their borders and ensure those armed groups did not enter Sudanese territory. Libya responded to this threat by attacking the city of Omdurman in Sudan and by making threatening statements toward Egypt, a key Sudanese ally. Egypt responded by increasing its troop presence on the border as well.

In response to these developments, the Reagan administration moved AWACS systems to both Egypt and Sudan to better monitor Libyan troop movements and other activities. However, Libyan forces backed down and the AWACS systems were mostly withdrawn by April 9, 1984.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Nolutshungu, Sam. 1996. *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Reno, William. 2011. *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of AWACS systems to both Egypt and Sudan for about five weeks.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only reported in MID, but none of the other major datasets or lists on US usage of force abroad or interventions. This is because the case depicts the display of force, not the direct usage of force. We choose to include this case in our dataset as our definitional scope includes the threat, display, and usage of force abroad.

1985 Iran

NAME: Iran-Iraq War: Integrity of Kuwait

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3625

DATES: November 24, 1985 – March 16, 1986

TARGET STATE(S): Iran (630)

SUMMARY: During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Kuwait sided with Iraq. In 1985, the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began to coordinate militarily in the event one of the member countries was attacked by Iran. In response, Iran threatened to invade Kuwait unless it ceased its support for Iraq, and moved its military assets towards the Kuwaiti border as if to prepare a possible military assault through Iraqi territory.

The United States, which maintained a heightened naval presence in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, warned Iran that any extension of the war to include other Gulf Arab states would be seen as “a major threat to U.S. interests”. Iran backed down.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Trita Parsi. 2007. *Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Acquire/Defend Territory; Policy Change; Economic Protection;

OUTCOME: Yield by target state.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None, other than the continued maintenance of a heightened naval force.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Given that this case is an example of threat and display of force, it only appears in the MID and CRS listings of US use of force abroad. It does not appear in MIPS,

IMI, ACD/PRIO or other key sources of intervention. We include this in our dataset as it is a confirmed instance of an enduring threat of force by the US.

1985 Italy

NAME: Catching the *Achille Lauro* hijackers

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 10, 1985

TARGET STATE(S): Italy 325

SUMMARY:

On October 7th, 1985 members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* off the coast of Egypt. The terrorists took all of its 748 passengers as hostages, except one elderly Jewish-American man who they killed and threw overboard. They subsequently threatened to slowly execute more hostages unless the Israeli government released a number of Palestinian prisoners from jail. American, Italian, and Egyptian officials differed on the best course of action. As the ship was in their territorial waters, Egyptian officials took charge of negotiations with the hijackers, using Palestinian political leaders as mediators. By putting pressure on Palestinian leaders, Egyptian officials managed to negotiate for the hijackers to surrender control of the ship on the condition that they were transferred to PLO control rather than extradited to the West.

On October 10, 1985 the hijackers boarded a civilian Egypt Air flight bound for Tunis, where the PLO was headquartered at the time. American Tomcat fighter jets intercepted the civilian aircraft, in an operation personally approved by President Reagan, and diverted it to the American Navy Air Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy. However, Italian authorities claimed jurisdiction as the hijackers, now on Italian soil, had targeted an Italian ship. As the planes stopped on the tarmac, American Delta Force and SEAL Team members surrounded the planes but found themselves in an armed standoff with Italian military police with neither side ceding ground. After a phone call between President Reagan and Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, the American forces were instructed to stand down. The hijackers were arrested by Italian police and subsequently flown to Rome.

American fighter jets shadowed the airplane flying to Rome, concerned that it might turn around to Tunis to release the captives; in this process they violated Italian airspace, ignored air traffic controller requests, and landed in a Rome airport without permission. As a result of this messy episode, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Italy were negatively impacted for some period of time.

SOURCES:

Bohn, Michael. 2004. *The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.

Halberstam, Malvina. 1988. "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety". *The American Journal of International Law* 82 (2): 269–310.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Negligible, as the U.S. Navy already had forces stationed in the Mediterranean and on Sicily.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Refer to TIP Database for discrepancies in case study listing across different sources. These alternative data sources are coded as dummy variables in the master dataset. Referring to each dataset's definition of intervention, note any reasons for the discrepancies in bullet format.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. ‘Peacekeeping’ operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, ‘humanitarian’ operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1985 Libya

NAME: Libyan-Egyptian border tensions

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3620

DATES: November 23, 1985 – December 3, 1985

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY: Tensions had escalated between Egypt and Libya for some years linked to regional and intra-Arab rivalries; membership of opposing Cold War alliances; and the civil war in Chad and the resulting Libyan conflict with Sudan, a key Egyptian ally. In August 1985, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi made threatening remarks against Egypt and vowed to punish the country for its alliance with the United States. In November, 1985 an Egyptian airliner was hijacked in an incident that Egypt blamed on Libya. After this point, both countries began substantial troop build ups along their shared border.

In response, the United States increased AWACS surveillance of the region and especially of Libya. On November 26, the United States went one step further and put its forces in the region on high alert as commanders feared that a full-scale conventional war may break out between Egypt and Libya. However on December 3rd, after conducting major military exercises by the border, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak ruled out war with Libya and tensions subsided.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Reno, William. 2011. *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory;

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Increased surveillance by regional AWACS systems; regional forces put

on high alert.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is included in MID and the CRS listing of the usage of force, but not in IMI, MIPS, ACP or other key dataset on US military intervention. This is due to the case reflecting the display of force, not the direct usage of force, which defines traditional datasets on intervention. We include this case as we expand the definition to incorporate the threat and display of force.

1986 Bolivia

Name: 1986 Intervention in Bolivia

Dispute Number: n/a

Dates: July 16, 1986

Target State(s): Bolivia, 145

Summary:

Under the Reagan administration, drug trafficking and all elements of the drug trade were highlighted as a threat to national security. In doing so, the administration expanded the potential for use of force in suppressing the illicit market and supporting counter-narcotics operations within and beyond the Americas.

Throughout the 1980's, Bolivia and the surrounding regions experienced an influx of cocaine production and the encroachment of trafficker influence within its territory. As the second largest global producer of the coca plant, with an estimated 90,000 acres of cultivation, the United States began applying pressure on the Bolivian government to take action, in the form of foreign aid reductions. A number of collaborative raids on production and processing laboratories ensued as the country attempted to quell the industry and appease American politicians.

On July 16, 1986, a large-scale raid was executed on facilities in the north-central Beni region of Bolivia, involving U.S. and Bolivian military forces. Americans were largely tasked with the transportation of Bolivian soldiers by means of Black Hawk helicopters armed with M-60 machine guns. With US Drug Enforcement Administration officers present as well, it was made clear that any direct combat between traffickers would be carried out by Bolivian nationals alone. As had been seen in previous raids, while the structures were deactivated, no fighting ensued as the traffickers had been made aware of the incoming incursion and fled. An unknown number of tons of chemicals for cocaine production were seized and a Cessna aircraft was confiscated by local authorities. With the intention of reducing capacity and capabilities of narcotics traffickers, the operation was deemed a success by enforcement officials.

Sources:

Aslam, Rabia. 5 Feb 2010. *U.S. Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:3, 246-267, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903555788

Brinkley, Joel. 16 July 1986. *U.S. Sends Troops to Aid Bolivians in Cocaine Raids*. The New York Times. 28 Nov. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/16/world/us-sends-troops-to-aid-bolivians-in-cocaine-raids.html>

Graham, Bradley. 19 July 1986. *Cocaine Factory Raided in Bolivia*. The Washington Post. 27 Nov. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/07/19/cocaine-factory-raided-in-bolivia/e8f0fc57-1a82-4ff1-9126-5953264e8d4d/?utm_term=.8843b3913ab0

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 16 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Objective: Social Protection & Order

Outcome: Victory for Target & Allies

Battle Deaths: 0

Total Deaths: 0

Costs: 1 C-5A military transport; 6 Black Hawk transport helicopters; roughly 100 United States Army pilots, officers, and personnel; and at least 6 DEA officers

Definitional Issues: This case represents the usage of military power to undertake a drug raid, with the permission of the target state. It is thus not included in standard datasets on military intervention, such as ACD/PRIO, MID, MIPS, IMI, and others. We find mention of this raid in the CRS list on the US usage of force abroad. We include this case in our dataset as it is a confirmed usage of the US military abroad, and it relates to many other drug-oriented raids and US missions in Latin America.

1986 Cuba

NAME: Sonic Boom event

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2742

DATES: December 8th, 1986

TARGET STATE(S): Cuba 40

SUMMARY:

In December of 1986, Cuba initiated a massive military exercise with over 1.5 million civilians participating as militia members. On December 8th, the US sent a SR-71 reconnaissance jet to fly over Cuba. Because it broke the sound barrier it created loud booms as the military exercises were taking place.

Cuban leaders interpreted the flight as a display of force and sent a diplomatic note in protest. Cuban citizens protested for three days outside of the US Interests Section in Havana. Some totals estimate that 800,000 Cubans took part in these protests.

SOURCES:

“Cuba Reports Millions Join Five-Day Defense Exercises.” *The New York Times*, December 9, 1986, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/09/world/cuba-reports-millions-join-five-day-defense-exercises.html>.

FRANKLIN, JANE. "The Year 1986." In *Cuba and the U.S. Empire: A Chronological History*, 219-28. NYU Press, 2016. Accessed October 30, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1b3h9jn.34>.

Treaster, Joseph B., and Special To the New York Times. “DOWNWARD SPIRAL FOR U.S.-CUBA TIES.” *The New York Times*, May 2, 1987, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/02/world/downward-spiral-for-us-cuba-ties.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Flight of one SR-71 reconnaissance jet

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

Dates (including year) were adjusted to reflect the sonic boom event. Gibler (MID) lists this event as lasting almost a year because it includes Cuba arresting a US citizen months later, but does not provide evidence that they are connected. This incident is better categorized as a single day incident.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often

individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

1986 Iran

NAME: Iran-Iraq War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2578

DATES: January 13, 1986 - January 14, 1986

TARGET STATE(S): Iran 630

SUMMARY: Iran and the United States had numerous militarized incidents at sea in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. On January 12, 1986 Iranian warships stopped and searched an American merchant ship that they suspected of shipping war materials to Iraq. In response, American diplomats lodged formal complaints and the navy dispatched three of its Naval ships stationed in the Gulf to intervene; however the incident had resolved by the time they arrived.

SOURCES:

Cleveland, William. 2004. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Trita Parsi. 2007. *Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. Yale University Press.

OBJECTIVE: Economic Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released (from Seizure)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of three U.S. naval ships.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: As this case represents a brief display of force, it is not included in most datasets on military intervention, such as IMI, MIPS, ACD/PRIO, or the CRS list. MID does include this instance as a show of force, and so do we. It represents the full variation of US military involvements.

1986 Libya (1) Attain Document

NAME: Gulf of Sidra Incident/ Operation Attain Document

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 23, 1986 - March 24, 1986

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY: In December 1985, two terror attacks at the airports in Rome and Vienna were linked to Libyan authorities. European and American aggression toward Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had mounted. In response to the attacks, the United States commanded its Sixth Fleet to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations in the Gulf Sidra. In 1973, Gaddafi had stated that any foreign presence within 62 nautical miles of Libya's coast was equivalent to a border violation, opposed to the normal 12 nautical miles as stipulated by international maritime law. Gaddafi stated that this 62 nautical mile limit was the "line of death".

Operating well outside the "line of the death" the Sixth Fleet and its three aircraft carriers deployed U.S. naval jets in and around the immediate airspace. On March 23, three U.S. fighter jets crossed the 62 nautical mile line. In response, The Libyan military launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and deployed two MiG-23 fighter jets to intercept and shoot down American aircraft.

Both Libyan missiles and fighter jets were unable to match the technical experience and capabilities of U.S. Navy pilots and failed in shooting the three jets. American jets were ready to engage the MiG-23s but by the time the shoot order had been given the Libyan aircraft had returned to sovereign airspace. The U.S. launches missiles to destroy SAM sites inside Libya.

A few hours later, Libyan forces deployed various armed naval vessels to intercept and sink U.S. ships. Again, the U.S. proved better experienced and quickly countered Libyan ships. The Sixth Fleet fired upon the encroaching Libyan Navy and sank three of its ships while severely damaging a fourth. Libyan forces retreated.

SOURCES:

Fisk, Robert. 2005. *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*. London: Vintage.

Davis, Brian Lee. *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya. Chapter 4 "Operation Prairie Fire."* pp. 101–110. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Stanik, Joseph. *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi. Ch. 4 "Operation Prairie Fire"*. Naval Institute Press, 2017

Global Security. 2013. Operation Attain Document. *GlobalSecurity.Org*.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/attain_document.htm

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS:

U.S.: 0

Libya: 72

TOTAL DEATHS:

U.S.: 0

Libya: 72

COSTS: Deployment of 30 U.S. Naval ships into the Gulf of Sidra to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operation exercises and the deployment capability of over 225 U.S. Naval aircraft on board the three U.S. aircraft carriers.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case is not noted in any of the datasets used to cross reference MIP. However, both MIPS and IMI note U.S. intervention against Libya occurring within this time range. This suggests that these datasets aggregate Operation Attain Document with Operation El Dorado Canyon. While these two cases are similar and occur within the same year, MIP has decided to disaggregate the two cases. First, either mission responds to different acts of Libyan sponsored terrorism within Europe. Second, the objective of either mission is different. In this case the U.S. wanted to protect its freedom of navigation rather than inducing a policy change. Either case also had different outcomes.

1986 Libya (2) El Dorado Canyon

NAME: Operation El Dorado Canyon

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3636

DATES: March 24, 1986 - April 15, 1986

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY: Tensions had grown between Libya and the United States for several years, including multiple militarized interstate disputes and minor American interventions in the North Africa region. Among other things, the two countries disputed the exact extent of Libyan territorial waters and their air forces had clashed on multiple occasions. On January 13, 1986, two Libyan fighter jets behaved aggressively around an American surveillance plane over the sea north of the Libyan coast. On January 25, President Reagan ordered US fighter jets to operate closer to the Libyan coast.

On April 5, 1986 terrorists linked to the Libyan regime blew up a nightclub in West Berlin, killing 3 civilians and injuring over 200. In response, President Reagan authorized air strikes on Libya. On April 15, a total of 45 U.S. aircraft were deployed to target government and terrorist sites in Libya. U.S. planes launched approximately 300 missiles over airfields, training facilities and weapon depots. After having successfully executed the targets, one American fighter jet was shot down en route to its aircraft carrier. Two American fighter pilots died. 10-100 Libyans died also, including a mix of civilians and military personnel.

The incident was a serious escalation in the American aggression against Mummar Gadaffi's regime in Libya that supported terrorist cells throughout the Middle East and in Europe. While the U.S. and its European allies were in agreement over the threat Gadaffi posed, there was little agreement over how to best handle the situation. France, under President Francois Mitterand, was adamant that any intervention in Libya necessitated the removal of Gadaffi from power. The Italian government on the other hand, maintained a closer relationship to the Libyan government. It is speculated that the Italian government under PM Benitto Craxi tipped Gadaffi of the U.S. attack just minutes before its execution.

SOURCES:

Fisk, Robert. 2005. *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*. London: Vintage.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pollack, Kenneth M. 2002. *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991*. University of Nebraska Press.

Europe News. 2008. *Italy helped "save" Gaddafi by warning of US air raid*. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. October 30.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 2 American pilots, 10-100 Libyan soldiers
Per capita battle deaths: negligible

TOTAL DEATHS: 10-100, including some Libyan civilians

Per capita total deaths: 0.0000025 - 0.000025

COSTS: Deployment of 45 U.S. fighter aircraft and use of 300 ordinances on Libyan soil.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

While all key datasets list this case, they differ in their records on start and end dates. MIPS has a start date of March 17 and end of March 23, while IMI has a start date of March 24 and end of April 15. We choose to use the start date of March 24 and end dates that coincide with the execution of Operation El Dorado Canyon, on April 15, as they are more encompassing of the dispute trajectory seen in the source documents. Furthermore, March 24 saw the United States involved in another dispute with Libya that is coded separately.

1987 Iraq

NAME: USS *Stark* Incident, Iran-Iraq War

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2739

DATES: May 17, 1987 - May 18, 1987

TARGET STATE(S): Iraq (IRQ), 645

SUMMARY:

The U.S. and Iraq re-established diplomatic relations in 1984 after a 17-year break dating to the 1967 Middle East war against Israel. By the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in 1984, Iraq was already several years into a war with neighboring Iran, newly emerged from its revolution and overthrow of the ruling Shah. Officially on no side (but certainly anti-Iran), the U.S. patrolled the Persian Gulf throughout the war and Iraqi planes and ships had kept their distance. This was the case even as the U.S. and the Soviet Union controversially developed separate plans to provide protection for Kuwaiti vessels traveling in the Persian Gulf during this time of hostility.

However, on May 17, 1987, the American frigate USS *Stark* was traveling through the Persian Gulf about 85 miles north of Bahrain when it was struck by an Iraqi aircraft. The USS *Stark* and two other American ships were on routine patrol in international waters in the Persian Gulf when the attack happened. Leading up to the attack, the USS *Stark* had radioed the Iraqi plane, but received no response. The attack by the Iraqis was unintentional, but the missile still caused extensive damage to the American ship and killed 37 sailors, while injuring at least 21 others. Though the ship did not return fire at the aircraft, the Iraqi plane launched a second missile at the ship.

American diplomats issued harsh threats to Iraq that the U.S. would not hesitate to return fire for such actions in the future. Saddam Hussein accepted responsibility for the attack and agreed to pay compensation to the U.S. for the damage and loss of life. Iraq claimed it had thought the American ship was an Iranian tanker, and the Reagan Administration spun the story to ultimately lay blame at Iran's feet for the incident. With newly revolutionary Iran still very hostile to the U.S., President Reagan chose to downplay Iraq's fault in the incident rather than undermine their shared struggle against their common enemy. However, only a few years later, the U.S. would invade Iraq in Operation Desert Storm after Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait.

SOURCES:

Brummer, Alex, and David Hirst. 1987. "US Navy Ordered to Hit Back After Exonet Kills 28." *The Guardian*, May 19. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1987/may/19/iraq.davidhirst>.

Cooper, Tom. 2016. "In 1987, a Secret Iraqi Warplane Struck an American Frigate and Killed 37 Sailors." *War is Boring*, July 27. <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/in-1987-a-secret-iraqi-warplane-struck-an-american-frigate-and-killed-37-sailors-b341a948fa21>.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wilson, George C., and Lou Cannon. 1987. "Iraqi Missile Hits U.S. Frigate." *The Washington Post*, May 18. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/05/18/iraqi-missile-hits-us-frigate/ecf92eac-bd7e-43cd-9a2c-3a2025e112a2/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.65fefef685d0.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S. 37

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S. 37

COSTS: Heavy damage sustained by American frigate USS *Stark* and loss of life of at least 37 sailors

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, as it represents a threat of force by the U.S. after an unintentional attack against its military. We include this case as a confirmed threat of force by the US abroad.

1987 Panama

Name: Political Unrest

Dispute Number: 2741

Dates: September 23, 1987 – April 8, 1988

Target State(s): Panama, 95

Summary:

In light of growing political unrest within Panama, the United States decided to move an unknown number of troops stationed around the Panama Canal, to the capital and areas around the U.S. Embassy. In response, the central Panamanian government protested, declaring it an invasion of their sovereign territory and a violation of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty.

By February 1988, Manuel Solis Palma and General Manuel Noriega had taken control of the government and begun removing political opponents. In March, forces loyal to Palma and Noriega entered a hotel in the capital, arresting opposition leaders and journalists, some of whom were American citizens. Under the auspices of “safeguarding the canal, U.S. lives, property and interests in the area,” the United States deployed an additional 1,300 troops between April 5th-7th and another 800 troops on April 8th. Sanctions were also imposed on the regime in solidarity with ousted President Eric Arturo Delvalle.

Before the expansion of ground forces in April, there were already roughly 10,000 military personnel stationed throughout the country.

Sources:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gordon, Michael R. 2 April 1988. “U.S. Will Increase Its Panama Force By 1,300 Soldiers.” *The New York Times*. 5 Dec. <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/02/world/us-will-increase-its-panama-force-by-1300-soldiers.html>

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 7 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Objective: Social Protection & Order; Policy Change

Outcome: Unclear

Battle Deaths: 0

Total Deaths: 0

Costs: 1,300 U.S. forces (500 Army military police, 300 marines, 1 Army aviation unit with 350 troops, 150 soldiers in 3 Air Force ground defense units, 2 canine squads); an Army aviation unit (7 AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, 15 UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopters, and 4 OH-58 Kiowa observation helicopters); plus an unspecified additional 800 troops

Definitional Issues: This case appears in MID, IMI, and the CRS list of US usage of force abroad, but not in MIPS or ACD/PRIO, most likely due to the smaller degree of the usage of force. CRS and MID, however, offer slightly different descriptions of the event: CRS states that the event entailed an increase of 1,000 troops, while the IMI dataset (using the NYT source) doesn't include the additional 800 troops. We choose to record the information from Gibler (2018) and the MID dataset, as these offer more detailed accounts of troop numbers and activities.

We are also unsure of the outcome of the involvement so we have coded it as "unclear". Lastly, we include a short-term objective of social protection as well as a longer-term US objective of policy change.

1988 Libya

NAME: US-Libyan Air Skirmish

DISPUTE NUMBER: 2775

DATES: January 4, 1989 - January 5, 1989

TARGET STATE(S): Libya 620

SUMMARY: Tensions had grown between Libya and the United States for several years, including multiple militarized interstate disputes and minor American interventions in the North Africa region. Among other things the two countries disputed the exact extent of Libyan territorial waters and their air forces had clashed on multiple occasions. Against this backdrop, ongoing tensions grew even worse in late 1988 as Western analysts began to comprehend the full extent of Libyan capabilities for producing chemical weapons.

On January 4, 1989 two U.S. Navy F-14 jets dispatched from the *USS John F. Kennedy* aircraft carrier for a routine exercise and encountered two Libyan MiG-23 fighter jets approaching their position. A dogfight between the jets ensued which saw the downing of the two Libyan aircraft. The two Libyan pilots died in the engagement.

Quickly following the incident, Libyan leader Maummar Gaddafi filed an official protest with the United Nations and charged the United States with acts of terrorism against what Libya claimed were two unarmed aircraft. The U.S. Pentagon defended its position by releasing video footage of aggressive maneuvers on behalf of the Libyan jets that they claimed warranted forceful engagement.

The event became a point of discussion within the United States and an investigation into the incident was taken up by the United States House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Committee Chairman Les Aspin criticized the U.S. military for its actions but understood their position given a history of the Libyan firing upon U.S. military assets in years past.

SOURCES:

Pear, Robert. 1989. *U.S. Downs 2 Libyan Fighters, Citing Their 'hostile Intent'; Chemical Plant Link Denied*. The New York Times. Jan. 5. <https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/05/world/us-downs-2-libyan-fighters-citing-their-hostile-intent-chemical-plant-link.html?pagewanted=all>
Wilson, George. 1989. *Secretly Acquired Migs Aided Navy Pilots In Libya Combat*. The Washington Post. Jan. 13.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/01/13/secretly-acquired-migs-aided-navy-pilots-in-libya-combat/f6850bce-097d-4264-bfc4-03729e30e118/>

Fisk, Robert. 2005. *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*. London: Vintage.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

St John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 0
Libya: 2

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 0
Libya: 2

COSTS: Deployment of *USS John F. Kennedy* and two F-14 fighter jets.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance of force is only listed in the MID datasets due to the short, limited nature of the engagement. Other datasets of military intervention, such as IMI, MIPS, ACD, and the CRS listing do not consider this usage of force as a case of traditional military intervention due to this temporal threshold. We include this case in our dataset as it meets the definition of the display, threat, or usage of force by the US. The dates of the intervention have been narrowed to include the instance of usage of force on January 4, 1989.

1989 Andean Initiative

Name: Andean Initiative in the War on Drugs

Dispute Number: N/A

Dates: September 15, 1989 - 1994

Target State(s): Colombia, 100; Bolivia, 145; Peru, 153

Summary:

Deemed a threat to national security, the U.S. “war on drugs” was an effort to curtail the growing production and use of illicit substances in the Americas. The campaign sought a multi-level, domestic and international approach in addressing interdiction, eradication, and demand reduction.

In 1989, under the Bush administration, the “Andean Initiative” was established to expand law enforcement, economic, and military assistance to the countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru - largely seen as sources of production in the growing cocaine market. The “Initiative” increased the role of the U.S. military in the Latin American anti-drug war and reshaped the “rules of engagement” to better allow for the intervention of force. While the Bush administration did not foresee the use of combat forces, the Initiative left in place measures in which they may be called in if requested by South American counterparts.

In addition, the classified National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) was signed, allowing for the deployment of U.S. military personnel in the Peruvian Upper Huallaga Valley, a large coca-producing region under the control of the Shining Path guerrillas.

Following the establishment of the Andean Initiative, a contingent of 50-100 U.S. military advisors was sent to Colombia, alongside seven Special Forces teams of 2-12 individuals, assigned to the training of local troops in the three countries.

Immediate military and law enforcement aid in the amount of \$261 million was offered to the three countries (\$90.2 million to Colombia, \$97.5 million to Bolivia, and \$73.4 million to Peru) with a projected \$2 billion over the next five years, conditional to the level of success of local operations. In addition to expanded use of U.S. spy satellites and electronic intercept technology, \$141 million of the initial aid package was allocated for military equipment, including helicopters, patrol boats and ammunition with another \$13.5 million allocated for “intelligence” aid, such as radars, electronic sensors, secure communications equipment, and computers.

Sources:

Bergeron, Noel B. 1991. “The Andean Initiative: A Faulty Campaign in the War on Drugs.” *U.S. Naval War College*. Feb. 11. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a236512.pdf>

Isikoff, Michael. 1989. "Drug Plan Allows Use of Military." *The Washington Post*. Sept.10.. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/09/10/drug-plan-allows-use-of-military/e5093198-7d79-4301-a1ea-529d393672cc/?utm_term=.c3e0c50b9eb6

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, Nov 7. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Objective: Social Protection & Order

Outcome: Unclear/Missing

Battle Deaths: 0

Total Deaths: 0

Costs: 50-100 U.S. military advisors; 7 Special Forces teams (2-12 persons); \$261 million in military and law enforcement aid with projected \$2 billion over 5 years

Definitional Issues:

This case represents the usage of military influence and aid against "the war on drugs," with the permission of the target state. It is thus not included in standard datasets on military intervention, such as ACD/PRI, MID, MIPS, IMI, and others. We find mention of this initiative in the CRS list on the US usage of force abroad, but only for the year 1989, not the broad 5-year period. We include the narrow timeline of the case in our dataset as it is a confirmed usage of the US military abroad, and it relates to many other drug-oriented raids and US missions in Latin America. Moreover, not all of the intervention elements were freely allowed by the target state, as some were coerced as part of traditional diplomacy and others were covert in nature. We do not include the longer 5-year timeline as we can not confirm the nature on the usage of force during this time. In terms of costs, we remain unclear on how much of the \$2 billion was received and do not find accurate data on the number of deaths, as the initiative primarily included military advisors, not soldiers.

1989 Panama

Name: Operation Just Cause

Dispute Number: 3901

Dates: December 21, 1989 – February 13, 1990

Target State(s): Panama, 95

Summary:

Following the death of military leader Omar Torrijos in 1981, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, a key ally to the United States Central Intelligence Agency's war on drugs, consolidated his control over Panama. General Noriega had previously provided the United States significant intelligence support as well as a counterbalance to regional socialist and communist influences while also profiting himself from the drugs and arms trade passing through Central America.

General Noriega began to fall out of favor with the U.S. as he strengthened his political power through violent suppression and election rigging. After being indicted for drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering by the U.S. Department of Justice, and growing tensions between General Noriega and American nationals in Panama, the United States began to seek direct intervention.

In May of 1989, Noriega's government disregarded the presidential election and annulled the results, leaving Noriega in power. Following the failed U.S.-backed Giroldi coup, the Bush administration determined alternative measures were necessary to invoke a regime change. After the U.S. began conducting numerous illegal military exercises within Panamanian territory, on December 15, the Panamanian National Assembly appointed Noriega head of government and declared a "state of war" with the United States.

On December 21, 1989, with the justification of protecting American nationals, the defense of human rights, countering the War on Drugs, and preserving the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty, President Bush authorized the use of military force to remove General Noriega from the presidency and bring him to justice. Through the use of a sweeping ground and air campaign, the U.S. military invaded the sovereign nation of Panama, largely overwhelming the Panamanian Defense Forces and causing significant damage to the nation's infrastructure. By February 13th of the next year, all invasion forces had been withdrawn and a new Panamanian government, friendly to U.S. interests, had been installed.

Sources:

D'Haeseleer, Brian. June 2018. *Paving the Way for Baghdad: The US Invasion of Panama, 1989*. The Taylor and Francis Group. 6 Nov.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2018.1480512>

Franklin, Jane. 2001. *Panama: Background and Buildup to Invasion of 1989*. Rutgers. 7 Nov. <http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/panama.htm>

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Phillips, R. Cody. September 2017. *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama*. U.S. Army Center of Military History. 5 Nov. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-85-1/cmhPub_70-85-1.pdf

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 7 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Yates, Lawrence A. *Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama City, December 1989*. GlobalSecurity.org. 5 Nov. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/MOUTYates.htm>

General Accounting Office. 1990. *Fact Sheet for the Honorable Andrew Jacobs, Jr. House of Representatives, Panama: Cost of the US Invasion*. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/90/88923.pdf>

Objective: Remove Foreign Regime; Social Protection

Outcome: Victory for U.S. & Allies

Battle Deaths: 23 U.S. soldiers killed in action; 314 Panamanian soldiers killed in action

Total Deaths: U.S. figures estimate 200-300 civilians killed during the operation; the UN estimates 500 civilian casualties while the Central American Human Rights Defense Commission (CODEHUCA) and the Peace and Justice Service in Panama estimate 2,000-3,000 civilian casualties; Panamanian National Human Rights commission estimated over 4,000 civilian casualties (numbers inaccurate because many bodies were immediately cremated).

Costs: \$163.6 million. Deployment of 26,000-28,000 ground troops and more than 300 aircraft over roughly two months.

Definitional Issues:

All key databases on military intervention include this case as part of their universe, but start and end dates are not consistent across datasets and neither are casualties lists since all existing datasets offer a range of casualties, not raw numbers. We average the casualty numbers from the sources above for our dataset.

MID has a start date of December 1, 1989 and end date of December 22, 1989, while MIPS has a start date of December 20 to January 31, 1990. Lastly, IMI has the start date of December 20, 1989 and end date of February 28, 1990. We use the average of these ranges for our dataset, as confirmed by the sources above.

1989 Philippines

NAME: U.S. Intervention in Philippines Coup Attempt

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 1st, 1989 - December 7th, 1989

TARGET STATE(S): Philippines 840

SUMMARY: On December 1st, a coup attempt began against Philippine President Corazon Aquino, who had come to power several years earlier. The attempted coup was carried out by approximately 3000 soldiers, many of whom were loyal to the former president, Ferdinand Marcos. There had been a series of previous coup attempts against Aquino, including two in 1986 and three in 1987. This was the first coup attempt where the U.S. intervened directly with military force.

In response to the rebel capture of several military bases and government facilities, the Philippine government appealed directly to The United States for military assistance. President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. fighter jets to shoot down rebel aircraft targeting government forces. Furthermore, 100 marines were moved into the Philippines to protect the U.S. embassy in Manila. The USS Midway and USS Enterprise were also deployed to the region.

The coup attempt was successfully defeated after one week of hostilities between the parties. Many leaders of the coup remained at large, including renegade colonel Gregorio Honasan. While the country had seen previous coup attempts, this was the bloodiest and best organized. It had a number of lasting impacts, such as the tarnished image of Aquino, the polarization of the armed forces, and diminished economic prospects for the country.

SOURCES:

1989. "Philippine Coup Attempts." *The New York Times*, 6 Dec.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/01/world/philippine-coup-attempts.html>

Murdoch, Gill. 2007. "TIMELINE: Recent coups and attempted coups in the Philippines."

Reuters, 6 Dec. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-unrest/timeline-recent-coups-and-attempted-coups-in-the-philippines-idUSSP31116220071129>

Richburg, Keith. 1989. "Crushed Coup Try Seen Wounding Aquino Politically." *The Washington Post*, 6 Dec.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/12/08/crushed-coup-try-seen-wounding->

[aquino-politically/2dea272f-a3fa-4632-ae3b-e83c19f3a6fc/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4c2c451660f3](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/12/02/manila-turns-back-coup-bid-with-help-of-us-air-power/62895eef-23e2-4311-bf1b-4da4a63267f0/?utm_term=.ccc36493b119)

Timberman, David G. 1990. "The Philippines in 1989: A Good Year Turns Sour." *Asian Survey* 30, no. 2: 167-77.

Yabes, Criselda. 1989. "Manila Turns Back Coup Bid With Help of U.S. Air Power." *The Washington Post*, 6 Dec. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/12/02/manila-turns-back-coup-bid-with-help-of-us-air-power/62895eef-23e2-4311-bf1b-4da4a63267f0/?utm_term=.ccc36493b119

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority ; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies (rebel forces were defeated.) However, the coup attempt created serious, long-term problems for the Aquino government.

BATTLE DEATHS:

- Philippines: 40 rebel soldiers and government combatants killed in the hostilities.

TOTAL DEATHS:

- Philippines: 83 total deaths, including 43 civilians.

COSTS: Costs associated with deployment of U.S. fighter jets, as well as aircraft carriers. Additionally, cost of deploying 100 troops to protect the U.S. embassy.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is recorded in the IMI dataset and the CRS list of US armed forces abroad. MID, MIPS, or ACD/PRIO do not include this usage of force by the US, most likely because it was permitted by the Philippine government. We, however, include this case in our dataset as it is an example of the US usage of force to support a government over a rebel group for its own interests in the region. The US may have received permission from the official government to intervene in the Philippines, but the rebel factions of the country were still targets of coercion and force.

1990 Liberia

NAME: Embassy and Non-Combatant Evacuations

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 6, 1990 – January 31, 1991

TARGET STATE(S): Liberia (LBR) (450)

SUMMARY:

In December of 1989, fighting had broken between various domestic factions seeking to oust Liberian President Samuel K. Doe. These included the forces of rebel leader Charles Taylor, who had invaded from the Ivory Coast, and the forces of another rebel leader Prince Johnson. By August of 1990, the forces of President Doe controlled only a small portion of the capital of Monrovia, and fighting had reached a bloody stalemate. In an attempt to force an intervention by foreign forces, rebel leader Prince Johnson had threatened to begin arresting American and other foreign citizens, and hold them hostage until an international peacekeeping force was deployed.

In response to this, on August 6, 1990, a force of 225 US Marines was deployed from an amphibious battle group off the coast of Liberia to the US Embassy in Monrovia in an attempt to forestall this occurrence. The initial troop deployment evacuated 74 civilians from the embassy to ships off the Liberian coast, with an additional 21 civilians evacuated on August 8th. The Marines maintained their presence and evacuation mission (officially known as “Operation Sharp Edge”) through January of 1991, ultimately evacuating over 2,400 individuals from 59 countries, with only 10 percent of the evacuees themselves being American.

SOURCES:

Department of the Navy US Marine Corps. 2004. On Mamba Station: US Marines in West Africa 1990-2003. By James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe. *U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division. <https://www.marines.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=e9HfyMg3qe0%3D&portalid=59>.

Gordon, Michael. 1990. "U.S. Forces Evacuate 74 After Threats in Liberia." *The New York Times*, August 6. <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/06/world/us-forces-evacuate-74-after-threats-in-liberia.html>.

Schmitt, Eric. 1990. "Marines Evacuate 21 More in Liberia." *New York Times*, August 8. <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/08/world/marines-evacuate-21-more-in-liberia.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs for deploying and maintaining a 250 strong rifle company at the US embassy in Monrovia for 5-6 months.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US military interventions, due to the limited scope of civilian evacuations. There is no clear end date for this formal operation, only references to the marines being re-tasked in "January 1991".

1990 Saudi Arabia

NAME: Operation Desert Shield

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3957

DATES: August 8th, 1990 - March 3, 1991

TARGET STATE(S): Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (SAU), 670

SUMMARY:

On August 2nd 1990 the Iraqi military invaded Kuwait, rapidly taking control of the country while facing minimal resistance. Soon afterwards, Iraqi troops began massing on their border with Saudi Arabia. In response to this attack, President George H.W. Bush announced on August 8th the deployment of US Air Force Assets and the US Army's 82nd Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia to defend against a potential Iraqi invasion. Soon afterwards, additional US military forces began to surge into Saudi Arabia to support the defense of Saudi Arabia and serve as an initial troop presence in the event that the United States chose to retaliate against Iraq. The initial deployment consisted of approximately 15,000 ground troops in total, as well as numerous Air Force squadrons and a second aircraft carrier battle group off the Saudi coast. This operation was termed by the United States Government as "Operation Desert Shield".

The troop deployment to Saudi Arabia eventually served as a key base of operations for the eventual Persian Gulf War and invasion of Kuwait. Ultimate troop numbers fluctuated, but approximately US 500,000 troops were reported to have been based in Saudi Arabia during the course of the Gulf War.

SOURCES:

Bush, George H.W. 1990. "Address on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait." Speech, Washington, DC, August 8. University of Virginia's Miller Center. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-8-1990-address-iraqs-invasion-kuwait>

Gordon, Michael. 1990. "Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to Confront Iraq; Bush's Aims: Deter Attack, Send a Signal." *New York Times* (New York, NY), August 8. Accessed March 21, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/08/world/bush-sends-us-force-saudi-arabia-kingdom-agrees-confront-iraq-bush-s-aim-s-deter.html>.

"Persian Gulf War Timeline." 2019. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Online ed. Chicago, IL: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., n.d. Accessed March 21, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/list/persian-gulf-war-timeline>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: One year troop deployment of a maximum 50,000 US Army Soldiers, squadron of Air Force F-15s (12-24 jets).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in all main datasets on US military interventions. We list battle deaths as “Zero” for this entry. All actual fighting occurred under the auspices of a later operation, Operation Desert Storm. This entry for Desert Shield represents the initial reinforcements by the US government, with subsequent offensive operations occurring under the auspices of the desert storm mission.

1991 Canada

NAME: Seizure of Canadian Fishing Boat

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3972

DATES: July 29, 1991

TARGET STATE: Canada (CAN), 20

SUMMARY:

An international boundary dispute came to head when the U.S. Coast Guard seized a Canadian fishing boat, the Eliza Joye, in the Dixon Entrance, a channel of disputed waters between British Columbia and Alaska. Canadian External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall sent a diplomatic message of protest to the U.S. regarding the incident. The fishing boat was released, but the boundary line dispute remains.

The dispute originates with different interpretations of the 1903 Alaska Boundary Award. Canada maintains that the A-B line claims is a land and maritime boundary. The U.S. claims the purpose was to designate which islands belong to which country; therefore, the Dixon Entrance would be divided equally between the parties. The territorial waters remain disputed; however, are administered by the Canadian Government.

SOURCES:

Keating, Joshua. 2012. "An island dispute of our own," *Foreign Policy*, November 28.
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/28/an-island-dispute-of-our-own/>.

The Toronto Star. 1991. "Canada to clamp down on U.S. fishing boats," *The Toronto Star*, August 3.

Morrisey, Mary Kathleen. 1990. "The Canadian-American Dispute Over Dixon Entrance," *University of Rhode Island*.

OBJECTIVE: Defend Territory

OUTCOME: The Eliza Joye was released from seizure. However a stalemate over the disputed territory continues: The Dixon Entrance remains disputed with both parties unwilling to concede territory. Canada and the U.S. maintain fishing operations in the region. The U.S. also maintains security interests as U.S Navy submarines regularly pass through the territory.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Diplomatic costs between U.S. and Canada due to longstanding dispute of territory.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives as a usage of force by the US abroad, but not in any other leading datasets of military intervention. This is due to the low-level nature of the dispute, involving a fishing vessel seizure by the US Coast Guard. In this case, however, the US had clear strategic, political motives for the ship seizure. In other words, this incident was not simply a routine inspection. Due to our expanded definition of intervention, we include this case as a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad.

1991 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: DRC Troops Airlift

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 25-27, 1991.

TARGET STATE(S): Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 430

SUMMARY:

In fall of 1991, unpaid troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, former Zaire) began demonstrating publicly in protest of unpaid wages. These protests quickly devolved into rioting, with at least 30 Congolese civilians and one French soldier killed by mutinous Congolese troops enraged that they had not been paid.

In response to this, the United States and European military partners initiated an airlift to evacuate American and European citizens from the country. In partnership with the governments of France and Belgium, the United States deployed several C-141 transport planes to transport 100 Belgian soldiers to Kinshasa and 300 French soldiers to the region to secure vital infrastructure during the evacuation of each countries' citizens. The United States government was able to evacuate all citizens in the region without incident. Opposition leaders decried the deployment of European troops to the capital as an attempt to support the government of incumbent President Mobuto, but these allegations were strongly denied by the governments of France and Belgium.

SOURCES:

Massamba, Bernard. 1991. "Death Toll Rises Above 30 in Zaire; U.S. Aids Airlift of Troops." *Associated Press*, September 25.

<https://www.apnews.com/717a02bf1fcfba6164ff6ceaacea9a7d>.

Plock, Lauren. 2015. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. Illustrated Reprint ed. Wolcott, NY: Scholar's Choice.

"U.S., French, Italian planes being sent to Zaire region." 1991. *United Press International*, September 25. <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/09/25/US-French-Italian-planes-being-sent-to-Zaire-region/8584685771200>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Flights costs for a TBD amount of C-141 transport planes, as well as any costs related to troops evacuating American citizens.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears only in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad. This is due to the indirect nature of the usage of force, with the US using its military resources to transport other countries' troops and to evacuate its own citizens. Yet this case is a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad, thus, we include it in our dataset.

1991 Iran

NAME: USS La Salle Exchanges Fire with Two Boats in the Persian Gulf

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3973

DATES: May 21, 1991

TARGET STATE: Iran (IRN), 630

SUMMARY: The *USS La Salle* served as the command ship for U.S. Naval Forces during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in January of 1991. As *La Salle* was operating in the Persian Gulf on May 21st, 1991, two small vessels fired at it using machine guns. *La Salle* returned fire using its 0.50 caliber machine guns. *La Salle*'s firing forced the two vessels to quickly head north toward the Iranian territorial waters. Later on, the Pentagon reported that the ship experienced no damages nor had its crew members suffered from any injuries. The following day, Iran stated that a U.S. military ship fired at an Iranian vessel patrol.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010, Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*, Vol.II. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"U.S.S. LaSalle Exchanges Fire with Two Boats in the Persian Gulf," 1991. *Associated Press*, May 21st. Accessed March 15, 2019.

<https://www.apnews.com/7bfb8ad1e6c4197f533a83e53059de0a>.

AP. "U.S. Ship Attacked In the Persian Gulf." *The New York Times*. May 22, 1991.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/22/world/us-ship-attacked-in-the-persian-gulf-there-s-no-damage.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Diplomatic/Military interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of *USS La Salle*.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and CRS listings, but we are unsure whether it represents a case of U.S. intervention. The United States Navy acted in self-defense in an international water. Moreover, the Pentagon did not claim that those two vessels belonged to Iran's Navy or accused Iran of standing behind the attack. Claims exist that those two vessels belonged to Iran's Navy because during the 1980s, the United States exchanged fire frequently

with Iranian vessels during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the two sources did not confirm that those two vessels belonged to Iran. Finally, we did not find a third source to confirm the case narrative. Thus, we are considering removing this case from the dataset.

1991 Iraq - (1) Desert Storm

NAME: Operation Desert Storm

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3974

DATES: January 17th, 1991 - February 28th, 1991

TARGET STATES: Iraq, 645

SUMMARY:

On August 2nd, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. In the months before the invasion, tensions between Iraq and its Arab Gulf neighbors Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had escalated over Iraq's demands for debt forgiveness and extra \$30 billion loan. Saddam Hussein had accused those three neighboring countries of waging an economic war against his regime by increasing their daily supply of oil, thus decreasing international oil prices. Iraq had expressed an interest in increasing oil prices from \$14bbl to \$25bbl. After that it started accusing Kuwait of stealing oil from its Rumalia oil field. By July 22nd, the CIA had confirmed that Iraq deployed 30,000 of its armed forces on the borders with Kuwait.

The United States instructed its Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie to verify Saddam Hussein's intentions regarding the invasion of Kuwait. The State Department followed that by announcing that while the U.S. has no formal defense treaties with the Arab Gulf states, it "remains committed to supporting [their] the individual and collective self-defense." Saudi Arabia and Egypt tried to deescalate the crisis before the invasion, but their efforts failed to diffuse the growing tensions.

After the invasion, the United States froze Iraq's and Kuwait's assets in America. The United Nations Security Council met on August 2nd, 1990, condemned Iraq and issued security council resolution 660 that demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. The Security Council continued to meet following the invasion and issued resolutions 661, 665, 669, 670. The resolutions established trade, financial, and air traffic embargo against Iraq and created a UN sanctions committee. Concurrently, reports began to emerge alleging that the United States CIA and Green Berets were covertly encouraging and supporting Kuwaiti resistance movements against Iraqi forces. During that time, the United States built up an international coalition to defend Saudi Arabia from another possible aggression from Iraq (see table one.) The League of Arab States met in Cairo on August 10th, 1990 and voted to send troops to Saudi Arabia. Japan offered \$13 billion to support countries in the region and offset the negative effect of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia announced that it would cover the operating costs of American and Arab forces defending the Kingdom. On November 29th, 1990, the Security Council issued resolution 678 that authorized member states to use "all means necessary" against Iraq, if it continues to occupy Kuwait after January 15th, 1991.

All diplomatic efforts failed to convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, including Secretary of State James Baker meeting with Tarek Azziz, Iraq's Foreign Minister, in

Geneva on January 9th, 1991. On January 17th, the U.S. began operation Desert Storm with the support of its allies. The U.S. led a campaign of airstrikes against Iraq's command and control centers in Kuwait and Iraq in addition to its nuclear and chemical weapons facilities. Iraq retaliated by firing SCUD missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel. The U.S. and its allies had flown an average of 2,000 sorties per day on Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq dumped significant amounts of Kuwait's oil in the Gulf. On January 30th, 1990, Iraq tried to attack Saudi Arabia using its tank battalions, but the allies pushed them back. U.S. bombers targeted thousands of Iraqi troops in Kuwait. On February 24, (day 39 of the war,) the U.S. began its ground offensive against Iraq and two days later Saddam Hussein ordered Iraq's army to withdraw from Kuwait. On February 27th, the U.S. led coalition forces entered Kuwait City. On March 6, 1991, from Congress, President Bush declared that war to liberate Kuwait was over.

Table of Military Deployments

Country	Number of Troops	Military assets and equipment	Comments
United States	532,000	2,000 tanks, 1800 fixed wing aircraft, 120 ships	
Afghanistan	300 Mujahidin		
Argentina	450	2 frigates	
Australia		1 guided missile frigate, 1 destroyer, 1 supply ship	
Bahrain	3500		
Bangladesh	2,000		
Belgium		2 minesweepers 1 squadron of fighters based in Turkey	
Canada	1700	2 destroyers, CF-18 Squadron	
Czechoslovakia	200 chemical defense unit, 150 medical personnel		
Denmark		1 corvette	
Egypt	40,000	4,000 tanks	An estimate of # of tanks
France	20,000	14 ships, 75 aircraft, 350 tanks,	
Germany		1 squadron of fighters	
Greece		1 frigate	
Hungary	40 medical team		
Honduras	150		
Italy		4 ships, 8 Tornado fighters, 1 squadron of fighters	
Kuwait	7,000 Kuwait armed forces and 4,500	35 combat aircraft	
Morocco	2,000		
Netherlands		Two frigates, 18 F-16s	
Niger	480		
Norway		1 Coast Guard Cutter and military supply ship	
New Zealand		2 C-130	

Oman	25,000	75 tanks, 12 patrol ships, 50 combat aircrafts	
Pakistan	10,000		
Poland	Medical team	2 ships	
Qatar	7,000	24 tanks, 9 coastal vessels, and 19 combat aircraft	
Saudi Arabia	Army: 38,000 National Guard: 56,000 Air Force: 1600	550 tanks, 180 combat aircrafts, 8 frigates	
Spain		2 corvettes, and 1 destroyer.	
Syria	21,000+2,000 in UAE	300 armored vehicles	Mobilized 50,000 on its borders with Iraq
Turkey		2 frigates	120,000 on its borders with Iraq
United Arab Emirates	40,000+1500 in Air Force	200 tanks, 80 combat aircraft, and 15 ships	
United Kingdom	42,000	16 ships and 58 aircraft.	
Iraq	545,000	4550, armored vehicles 2880, artillery 3257	Estimates of Iraq forces in Kuwait

SOURCES:

Daggett, Stephen. 2010. “Costs of Major U.S. Wars,” *Congressional Research Service*, June 29.

Englehardt, Joseph. 1991. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis,” *Strategic Studies Institute Special Report*, March, 25.

Heidenrich, John G. 1993. “The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?” *Foreign Policy*, 90,117-124.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017,” *Congressional Research Service*, October 12.

Anne Leland, “American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,” Congressional Research Service, November 15th, 2012, p.13.

Wines, Michael. 1990. “U.S. Is Said to Quietly Encourage A Kuwaiti Resistance Movement,” *The New York Times*. Sep. 1.
<https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1990/09/01/067890.html?pageNumber=4>

OBJECTIVES: Remove Foreign Regime, maintain foreign regime, defend territory, and economic protection

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S and its allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

United States: Theater deaths: 383; Non-theater deaths: 1565

Total deaths from all services: 1,948

Battle Deaths of U.S. Allies:

Egypt: 2

France: 2

Senegal: 92 (accident)

Syria: 2

Kuwait: 1

United Arab Emirates: 6

Saudi Arabia: 18

United Kingdom: 47

Battle Deaths of Iraq:

Estimates of Iraqi forces deaths range from 50,000 to 100,000

TOTAL CIVILIAN DEATHS: Total civilian deaths from the Gulf War are estimated to be between 100,000 and 200,000.

COSTS: Current Year: \$61 billion (out of this amount the U.S. paid \$ 4.2 billion from taxpayers' money and the rest came from contributions by the United States' allies.)
Deployment of 532,000 troops, 1800 aircraft, and 120 ships.

Constant Year 2011: \$102 billion. War cost % of GDP: 0.3%

ADDITIONAL COSTS: Oil prices: It was 14\$ when Iraq invaded Kuwait and it skyrocketed to \$40.40 bbl. (The highest price during crisis period; oil producers managed to bring the price down by the end of the war to 19\$.) Iraq blew up 535 oil wells in Kuwait.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: All key datasets on US intervention include this case, with the exception of ACD. But each dataset varies on start and end dates, given the way it measures dyadic pairs, the role of different state participants, and how it divides military actions into unified missions. MID has the start date of July 24, 1990 to end date March 3, 1991. MIPS has the start date of August 14 to February 28, 1991. Lastly, IMI has the start date of August 8 to January 15. We choose the range of August 7th, 1990- February 28th, 1991 for our dataset, as median estimate from the other datasets and combined sources above.

1991 Iraq (2)

Name: Operation Southern Watch, Operation Vigilant Warrior, Operation Provide Comfort/ Provide Comfort II/ Operation Northern Watch

Dispute Number: #3552, #3568, #3974, #4299, #4271, #4269, #4273,, #4271, #4273

Date: April 7th, 1991 - April 15th, 2003.

Target State: Iraq (IRQ), 645

Summary:

The United States with its allies Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait created a no-fly zone over Iraq south of the 32nd parallel. This decision came in response to Iraq's orchestrated targeting of its civilian Shia population in southern Iraq and building on the United Nations' Security Council resolution 688 of April 1991 demanding an end to Iraq's repression of its civilian population. The operational objective of the no-fly zone was to prevent Iraq's regime from using its fixed wing and rotary wing aircrafts in the area south of the 32 parallel. Furthermore, the operation intended to force Iraq to comply with the United Nations' inspection regime, regarding Iraq's program of weapons of mass destruction. The operation included patrolling and sweeping Iraq's airspace south of the 32nd parallel, targeting Iraq's air defense systems, reconnaissance, and airborne warning.

On December 27, 1992, (#3568) a United States' F16 targeted two Iraqi aircrafts that entered the no-fly zone. An American F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-25 "Foxbat" aircraft. Later on in the period between January 13-18th of 1993, the United States and its allies targeted Iraq's missile centers in southern Iraq. In addition, four American warships shot forty-five tomahawk missiles against an Iraqi nuclear facility, in addition to command and control sites in the same area of operation.

After President William J. Clinton took office on January 20th of 1993, he indicated that his administration would continue former President Bush's policy on Iraq and informed Congress that American aircrafts had struck targets in Iraq in response to Iraqi anti-aircraft fires against them. On April 18th, 1993, the United States air forces' F-4G targeted an Iraqi radar that potentially threatened an American aircraft. On June 19th, 1993 the Clinton Administration reported to Congress that a U.S. aircraft had fired a missile against an Iraqi anti-aircraft base.

On June 27th, 1993 (#4299) the United States used its Operation Southern Watch forces to attack Iraq's Intelligence Service Headquarters in Baghdad after confirming that Iraq plotted the assassination attempt against former President George H. W. Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993. On July 24th, another American F-4G fired at an Iraqi radar during a routine patrol over southern Iraq. In October 1994, President Clinton expanded the objectives of Operation Southern Watch to include a no-drive zone south of the 32nd parallel (#4269.) President Clinton made this decision after Iraq moved its Republican Guard and army through southern Iraq to the borders with Kuwait. Furthermore, the United States mobilized 25,000 military personnel from

different services to this area of operation and deployed more aircrafts reaching a total number of 270 aircrafts; all of this to deter Iraq from crossing again into Kuwait. This mobilization was named Operation Vigilant Warrior. On September 3-4, 1996 (#4271) the United States, alongside the British Royal Air Force, targeted Iraq's government sites in southern Iraq in response to Iraqi military activities against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

In February 1998, (#4273) President Clinton ordered U.S. forces in Southern Watch to coerce the Iraqi regime into allowing the United Nations' inspectors access to areas of "possible nuclear, biological and chemical production sites located in or near presidential palaces." During December 1998 and throughout 1999, the United States with the coalition forces targeted Iraqi air defense systems to enforce the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel.

By early 2001 US and coalition pilots had entered the southern no-fly zone in Iraq 153,000 times since 1992. Not one pilot had been lost. Between February 2000 and February 2001 allied pilots entered the zone 10,000 times. On 500 occasions, the Iraqis fixed radar on the jets or engaged them with anti-aircraft weapons. The same pattern continued throughout the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and up until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.

Sources:

Gertler, Jeremiah, Christopher M. Blanchard, Catherine Dale, and Jennifer K. Elsea. 2013. "No Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Consideration for Congress," May 3. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41701.pdf>

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017," *Congressional Research Service*, October 12.

France ended its participation in this coalition on December 15th, 1998. See "Operation Southern Watch," https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/southern_watch.htm

Objective: Defend Territory, Policy Change, Social Protection

Outcome: Victory for U.S. and Allies

Battle deaths: (#4299: 1-25)

Total Deaths: 175

Costs of Operation Southern Watch:

Year	Cost (amounts in millions of current year dollars)
FY1995	715.9
FY1996	333.0
FY1997	468.4

FY1998	576.3
FY1999	597.3
FY2000	1497.2
FY2001	933.2
FY2002	755.4
FY2003	678.0
Total	6554.7

Overseas Bases Used: Saudi Arabia: Riyadh Air Base, Dhahran Air Base, Al Kharj Air Base; Bahrain: Shaikh Isa Air Base

Aircrafts used in operations: C-21, C-130, E-3, EC-135, EF-111, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-117, HC-130, HH-60, KC-10, KC-135, MC-130, MH-53, RC-135, U-2

U.S. Navy used in operations: Carriers, Nimitz (CVN 68), George Washington (CVN 73), Carl Vinson (CVN 70), Enterprise (CVN 65), Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and amphibious assault ship Peleliu (LHA 4).

Maximum number of troops deployed: 25,000

Definitional Issues: These incidents appear in all major datasets on US military intervention, but they are separated into different instances depending on the dataset's chosen timeframes. Gibler's (2018) book cites different starting dates of those disputes than what exists in Torreon's "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017" and other secondary literature. For the purposes of consistency of narrative, we choose to combine all these incidents (#3552, #3568, #3974, #4299, #4271, #4269, #4273, #4271, #4273) into one major incident to minimize redundancies and maximize continuity. They were all part of Operation Southern Watch and other similar operations intended to limit the weapon expansion of Iraq. We do, however, list them separately by MID number in the dataset as both IMI and Gibler (2018) agree on these divisions. Finally, incidents #4271 and #4273 include also acts of usage of force/intervention that happened through Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Watch). See, Iraq case #3974 for more details.

1991 Somalia

NAME: Operation Eastern Exit

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 2, 1991 – January 11, 1991

TARGET STATE(S): Somalia, 520

SUMMARY:

In late 1990, the Somalian military regime under General Siad Barre fell into turmoil. Militants entered the capital city of Mogadishu and vied for power with government forces. The situation led a general state of lawlessness and intense violence. U.S. and other Foreign nationals sought refuge in the U.S. embassy. On January 1, 1991, U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, James K. Bishop, formally requested an evacuation of diplomatic staff from the embassy.

On January 2, The U.S. government used its regional military assets, the majority of which were stationed in Saudi Arabia from the onset of the First Gulf War, to initiate Operation Eastern Exit. Participating units included *USS Guam*, *USS Trenton*, 4th Marine Expeditionary Bde, Air Force AC-130 (intelligence gathering and fire support, and 9-man Navy SEAL team), and other elements.

Despite being engaged by Somali militants U.S. forces held their fire and no casualties were reported. The U.S. military successfully evacuated 281 people from over 30 nations, including 12 heads of diplomatic missions and 39 Soviet citizens and deposited them on the *USS Guam* and *USS Trenton*. The 282 evacuees (one born on board) were safely offloaded in Muscat, Oman on January 11, 1991.

SOURCES:

Jane Perlez special to The New York Times. "U.S. and Italy Evacuating Foreigners in Somalia." *New York Times (1923-Current File)* (New York, N.Y.), 1991.

Pike, John. "Operation Eastern Exit." *GlobalSecurity.Org*, 7 May 2011, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/eastern_exit.htm.

Siegel, A., and Center FOR Naval Analyses Alexandria VA. *Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991*, 1991.

OBJECTIVE:

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Military resources used for evacuation. Helicopters, planes, and ships were all made available from the ongoing Gulf War. Operation Eastern Exit temporarily deviated resources away from the war to Somalia.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case study is not mentioned in any of the datasets. It was inputted by MIP staff.

1992 Peru

NAME: Air Skirmish

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3550

DATES: April 24, 1992

TARGET STATE(S): Peru (PER), 135

SUMMARY: The Bush administration was keen on pursuing a War on Drugs that focused on countering the production of cocaine in Andean countries. U.S. counternarcotics missions in Peru had been authorized by Peruvian authorities.

On April 28, 1992, a U.S. C-130 was conducting an anti-drug surveillance mission 12 nautical miles off the coast of Peru. A miscommunication with the Peruvian military, saw the Peruvian Air Force scrambling two fighter jets to intercept the U.S. and divert course to the perceived air space violation. Peru is an outlier in the international community when it comes to maritime borders. While Peru claims sovereignty over territorial sea and airspace out to 200 nautical miles from its coast, international law does not recognize claims beyond a 12-nautical-mile limit.

After the AC-130 did not comply with demands made by the Peruvian jets, the fighter pilots began strafing the U.S. plane in “non-vital” areas. The engagement injured four U.S. air men and killed one. After the incident, Peruvian fighters insisted that they could not see any U.S. markings on the flight. Despite the incident both countries governments maintained a strong relationship in their joint efforts to combat drug production.

SOURCES:

Robinson, Eugene. “[Peru Defends Firing On U.S. C-130](#)”. *The Washington Post*. April 28, 1992.

Matthews, Mark. “[U.S. grounds aerial drug watch over Peru.](#)” *The Baltimore Sun*. April 28, 1992.

Nash, C. Nathaniel. “[Peru Jets Attack U.S. Air Transport.](#)” *The New York Times*. April 26, 1992.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: 1

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

COSTS: Deployment of one C-130.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MID and CRS datasets. While the U.S. did not intend to display a threat to Peruvian authorities, the mobilization of a C-130 into perceived airspace certainly had that effect. For this reason we have included it into MIP and noted the incident as a clash between Peruvian and American forces.

1992 Sierra Leone

NAME: U.S. Embassy Evacuation

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 3, 1992

TARGET STATE(S): Sierra Leone (SIE), 451

SUMMARY:

On April 29, 1992, a military coup overthrew President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone. The nation had been fighting a civil war beginning in 1991, and the military was poorly supplied and underfed which in part prompted the coup d'état by military leaders.

The U.S. military evacuated more than 300 Americans, including diplomatic personnel, their families, and Peace Corps volunteers, to Rhein-Main Air Base in Frankfurt, Germany due to security concerns. The U.S. further advised all Americans to leave Sierra Leone as soon as possible.

The Sierra Leone Civil War continued for ten years with the U.S providing humanitarian and emergency assistance, promoting reintegration and reconciliation, and supporting the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999.

SOURCES:

Associated Press, 1992. "300 Americans Evacuated After Coup in Sierra Leone," *The New York Times*, May 4.

Associated Press, 1992. "More Than 300 Americans Airlifted From Sierra Leone," *LA Times*, May 4.

Associated Press, 1992. "New Junta in Sierra Leone Replaces Leader," *The New York Times*, May 3.

USAID, 2018. "Sierra Leone History," *United States Agency for International Development*, February 20. <https://www.usaid.gov/sierra-leone/history>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect Diplomatic Interests.

OUTCOME: Victory for the U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of two U.S. military flights to evacuate American personnel.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS documents of US military interventions abroad, due to its limited objectives of evacuating US nationals and diplomats. We do, however, confirm this as a usage of force abroad.

1992 Somalia (1)

NAME: Operation Provide Relief

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 14 1992 – December 2, 1992

TARGET STATE(S): Somalia, 520

SUMMARY:

Operation Provide Relief was a United Nations' mission to provide humanitarian aid to Somalis affected by the acute famine caused by high intensity civil war in 1992. The operation was spearheaded by the United States which contributed most of the equipment and personnel.

The United States contributed AC-130s and 440 personnel which airlifted aid into Somalia from an operating base in Northern Kenya. The operation lasted four months and saw 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies delivered. Despite this effort, Operation Provide Relief was a failure as it did not adequately secure distribution networks on the ground. This allowed armed groups to use the aid as a means of power. The operation's failure and lessons learned led to Operation Restored Hope later that year.

SOURCES:

Poole, Walter S., and United States. *The Effort to save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994*. Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff., U.S. G.P.O., 2005.

Gordon, R. Michael. "With U.N.'S Help, U.S. Will Airlift Food to Somalia: Transit Points In Kenya Announcement By White House Surprises Pentagon, Which Knew Little Of The Plan U.S. Will Airlift Food to Somalia." *New York Times (1923-Current file)*, Aug 15, 1992.

Pike, John. "Operation Provide Relief." GlobalSecurity.Org, May 7, 2011.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_relief.htm.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order; Humanitarian Intervention:

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS:

The U.S. cost were estimated to be \$36 million; \$24 million from Department of Defense, \$12 million from the U.S. Department of State and USAID. Defense costs come from the deployment of AC130 and personnel. Costs from state come from food and medical supplies.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case was not mentioned in any of the datasets. It was inputted by MIP Staff. The failure of Operation Provide Relief led to the adoption of Operation Restored Hope, a case that is mentioned by most datasets used.

1992 Somalia (2)

NAME: Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 3, 1992 - May 9, 1993

TARGET STATE(S): Somalia (SOM), 520

SUMMARY:

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 further increased conflict between various armed groups and provisional governments. In July 1992, 50 unarmed U.N. military observers were deployed to Mogadishu to oversee the ceasefire that had been reached. On August 15, 1992, UNOSOM I, the U.N.'s humanitarian relief mission, Operation Provide Relief began.

UNOSOM I failed to stop violence and famine. 500,000 Somalis had already died from hunger by the fall of 2012. On December 3rd, U.N. Security Resolution 794 authorized the U.S.-led intervention "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible." The United States sent troops to protect relief workers and establish security to promote an environment for eventual political reconciliation. Operation Restore Hope included air assault operations, patrols, cordons and searches, and other combat operations to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid.

President George W. Bush ordered 25,000 troops to Somalia to provide additional security. The first forces arrived in Mogadishu on December 9, 1992. CENTCOM directed a joint and combined task force under UN auspices. The United States initially resisted the expansion of the original mission, but eventually attempted to disarm some of the local militias.

By March 1993, mass starvation had been overcome, and the security situation improved. The U.S. turned over operations to the U.N. on May 9, 1993. By June 1993 1,200 American troops remained in Somalia.

SOURCES:

Davis, Lois M., Susan D. Hosek, Michael G. Tate, Mark Perry, Gerard Hepler, and Paul S. Steinberg. 1996. *Army Medical Support for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance*, Chapter 4. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR773/MR773.chap4.html

DeBruyne, Nese F. 2018. *American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics*, September 14. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf>

Harned, Glenn M. 2016. *Stability Operations in Somalia 1992-1993: A Case Study*. United States Army War College Press.

<http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/Stability%20Ops%20in%20Somalia.pdf>.

“Operation Restore Hope,” *Global Security*,

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm

Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia. 1994. (Chapter Report, 03/04/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-88), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-88/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-88.htm>

Schmitt, Eric. 1993. “Somali War Casualties May Be 10,000,” *New York Times*, December 8.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/world/somali-war-casualties-may-be-10000.html>.

Snyder, R. 2001. “Operation Restore Hope, Battle of Mogadishu,” August.

<https://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/somalia93.html>

“United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994.” 2003. *Center of Military History*, United States Army.

<https://history.army.mil/html/documents/somalia/SomaliaAAR.pdf>.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 1/17/19) *UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia*. Upsala University. www.ucdp.uu.se.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- 43 U.S. troops, FAS
 - Army: 31, Marine Corps: 4, Air Force: 8

TOTAL DEATHS:

- From June-Oct 1992
 - 6,000-10,000 Somali casualties, Somali sources
 - Several thousands, U.N. and Red Cross

- June 5th, 24 Pakistanis

COSTS:

- Marines, Air Force, Army, Special Operations Forces
- At its height, 30,000 American troops
- When President Bill Clinton took office on January 20, 1993, UNITAF consisted of 37,000 troops (24,000 U.S. and 13,000 coalition)
- Deployed engineer force
- \$1.7 billion dollars (1992-1994), New York Times
- Dec 1992-April 1993: 692.2 million, GAO
- Of the almost \$885 million in incremental costs incurred through fiscal year 1993, DOD was reimbursed by the United Nations for at least \$123.6 million for UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MIPS, IMI, and CRS datasets of US military involvements, but not in the MID dataset (perhaps due to the multilateral nature of the mission). But the timeframes of the incident vary across sources. MIPS has a start date of December 3, 1992 and an end date of May 4, 1993. IMI has a start date of December 9, 1992 and end date of March 25, 1994. We use the start date of December 3rd, 1992 as this is when UN authorization for the US mission began, and we use the end date of May 9, 1993 - when the US handed the mission to UN authorities. We code a new incident for the post-1993 mission that is portrayed in the IMI coding (Operation Continue Hope).

Lastly, due to a high degree of overlap between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, especially during the transition period, it was difficult to confirm figures for each individual intervention.

1992 Yugoslavia

NAME: NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia

Operations Maritime Monitor, Sky Monitor, Maritime Guard, Deny Flight, and Sharp Guard

DISPUTE NUMBER: 3551

DATES: July 16, 1992-October 2, 1996

TARGET STATE(S): Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, YUG 345

SUMMARY:

The former state of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Croatian and Slovenian nationalists began the process, replacing Yugoslav security forces with their own domestic police. Macedonia declared independence in 1991, with Bosnia and Herzegovina following their lead in 1992. Croatia and Yugoslavia both supported anti-independence factions within Bosnia, causing significant violence in the region. On July 10, 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers met and agreed to contribute NATO forces to enforce sanctions against Yugoslavia.¹ The sanctions in question were passed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 757 on May 30, 1992.² NATO forces engaged in two blockade operations in support of UN Security Council sanctions, first Operation Maritime Monitor from July 16-November 22, 1992, then Operation Maritime Guard, which operated November 1992-June 1993 and would be followed by Operation Sharp Guard from 1993-1996.³ Sharp Guard unified disparate aspects of the naval blockade of Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.⁴ Operation Sky Monitor applied the same principles of naval blockade to Yugoslavia's airspace, with eleven NATO states providing aircraft and support to deny military aircraft access to Yugoslavia.⁵

Operations Maritime Guard and Deny Flight (April 1993-December 1995) elevated the rules of engagement, allowing NATO forces to directly intercept uncooperative or suspicious aircraft and vessels.⁶ Deny Flight resulted in the first combat operations for NATO forces since its founding in 1949; NATO aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers in the No-Fly Zone in

¹ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 757." NATO/IFOR: UN Resolution. Accessed March 10, 2019. <https://www.nato.int/IFOR/un/u920530a.htm>.

² "Resolution 757 Bosnia and Herzegovina (30 May)." Security Council Resolution 757. Accessed March 10, 2019. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/757>.

³ "NATO's Operations: 1949-Present." NATO's First Operations. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://shape.nato.int/resources/21/nato_operations,1949-present.pdf.

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ Pike, John. "Operations Maritime Monitor." Operation Maritime Monitor. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/sky_monitor.htm.

⁶ "NATO's Operations: 1949-Present." NATO's First Operations. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://shape.nato.int/resources/21/nato_operations,1949-present.pdf.

1994.⁷ Ultimately, increasing NATO pressure on Serbia and Croatia and Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia led to the Dayton Accords, briefly pausing the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies; no NATO losses during operations, mostly successful implementation of blockade and no-fly zone

Yield by Target Actor; warring parties (specifically Croats and Serbs) accede to negotiations, and eventually sign Dayton Accords

Ongoing; conflict continues until NATO puts peacekeepers on the ground in Kosovo and targets Yugoslavia in air campaign. War ends with 1999 Kumanovo Agreement

BATTLE DEATHS: No deaths reported during NATO missions from 1992-1993

TOTAL DEATHS: Between 100,000-200,000 people killed in “Bosnian War” between 1992-95⁸

Per Capita: ~3,030-6,060 killed per 100,000 Bosnians

COSTS:

Department of Defense spends \$144.6 million in 1992-93⁹

Department of Defense spends \$13.9 billion from 1992-2003 for “Bosnia-related operations”¹⁰

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: MID dataset ends this instance of intervention in 1993 (six months after implementation of blockade) instead of with the Dayton Accords in December 1995

⁷ ibid

⁸ Lampe, John R. "Bosnian Conflict." Encyclopædia Britannica. March 08, 2018. Accessed March 10, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict>.

⁹ Bowman, Steven R. "Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations." Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations. July 8, 2003. Accessed March 10, 2019. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib93056.pdf>.

¹⁰ ibid

1993 Bosnia

NAME: NATO Intervention in Bosnia

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 28, 1993 - December 2, 2004

TARGET STATE(S): Bosnia (BOS)

SUMMARY:

Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia in June 1991. Bosnian Serb nationalists demanded that Bosnia remain part of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Bosnian Croat nationalists threatened to secede if Bosnia remained in Yugoslavia.

In April 1992, Serbian paramilitary forces and the Yugoslav Army launched attacks throughout the republic. They quickly seized more than two-thirds of the republic's territory and the capital of Sarajevo. Approximately 2.3 million people were driven from their homes, creating the greatest flow of refugees in Europe since World War II. During the subsequent civil war that lasted from 1992 to 1995, an estimated 100,000 people were killed. In July 1995, Srebrenica became the largest massacre in Europe since the Holocaust.

On February 28, 1993, the United States began an airdrop of relief supplies aimed at Muslims surrounded by Serbian forces in Bosnia. Ongoing peacekeeping and anti-terrorism activities in Bosnia continued through 2006.

On 28 August 1995, when a Serb mortar fell upon a market place in Sarajevo, killing 38 civilians and injuring 85 others, NATO responded with Operation Deliberate Force. Early in the morning of 30 August 1995, NATO aircraft launched a series of precision strikes against targets in Serb-held Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation Deliberate Force lasted for two-and-a-half weeks. NATO also helped police a UN arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia and economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

The NATO bombing campaign forced Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, and a peace agreement, the Dayton Accords, was signed in 1995. The final agreement was signed by the parties at a peace conference in Paris on December 14, 1995.

NATO first deployed an Implementation Force (IFOR) of nearly 60,000 troops to Bosnia to enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton accords. Although IFOR successfully carried out the military tasks outlined in the Dayton agreement, the continued need for an external

military presence to provide a secure environment in Bosnia led NATO to replace IFOR with a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996.

On December 2, 2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over peace stabilization duties to a European Union force (EUFOR) of about 7,000 troops. There have been no U.S. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia since 2004. Fewer than 200 U.S. military personnel remain in Bosnia as part of a small NATO contingent to assist Bosnian defense reform, search for indicted war criminals, and fight terrorism.

SOURCES:

Hendrickson, Ryan C. 2005. Crossing the Rubicon. *NATO Review*.
<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/history.html>.

Kim, Julie. 2006. *Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping*. Congressional Research Service, December.
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21774.pdf>.

Owen, Robert C. 2000. *Deliberate Force*. Air University Press.
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/owen.pdf>.

Ripley, Tim. 1999. Operation Deliberate Force. *Centre for Defense and International Security Studies*, August.

Serafino, Nina M. 2006. *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*. Congressional Research Service. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IB94040.pdf>.

Woehrel, Steven. 2013. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*. Congressional Research Service, January. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40479.pdf>.

Woehrel, Steven. 2005. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issues for U.S. Policy*. Congressional Research Service, February. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32392.pdf>.

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Bosnia-Herzegovina,"
<https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/bosnia-herzegovina>.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Social Protection; Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- U.S.: 12
- 167 UNPROFOR soldiers
- 25 Serbs in Deliberate Force

TOTAL DEATHS:

- 1995: 8,000 (Srebrenica)
- 1992 to 1995: ~100,000 people total

COSTS:

- NATO Implementation Force: 60,000 military personnel, one-third of them American
- ~20,000 troops for initial U.S. IFOR force
- 32,000 troops SFOR initially
- 400 NATO Aircraft conducting 3,515 sorties.
- The U.S. contribution was about 1,000 out of a total of 7,000-8,000 troops in SFOR in late 2004
- ~\$2 billion in aid to Bosnia between FY1993 and FY2010, USAID “Greenbook”
- ~\$13.6 billion in incremental military costs in Bosnia, mainly for the U.S. peacekeeping contingent from FY1991 to FY2004
- Fewer than 200 U.S. military personnel remain in Bosnia as part of a small NATO contingent to assist Bosnian defense reform, search for indicted war criminals, and fight terrorism.
- ~\$10 million toward a war crimes chamber in the state court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 and 2004.
- \$44.7 million in aid under the SEED program in FY2004
- \$41 million in FY2005
- 4,200 U.S. troops in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000 in 2004
- April 2006 220 U.S. troops supported the European Union operation there as part of NATO’s supporting headquarters unit
- FY1991-FY1995 \$784 million
- FY1996 2.5 billion
- FY1997 2 billion
- FY1998 1.9 billion
- FY1999 1.5 billion
- FY2000 1.4 billion
- FY2001 1.2 billion
- FY2002 932 million
- FY2003 742 million

- FY2004 667 million
- FY2005 150 million
- Total (1991-2005) 14 billion

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears as a separate mission only within the CRS listing of US military interventions. It is aggregated with other former-Yugoslav conflicts within MID and IMI. We are considering disaggregating this case into two separate interventions, one from 1993 to 1995 and another from 1995 onwards.

1993 Macedonia

NAME: War in former Yugoslavia

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4046

DATES: June 18, 1993 – February 28, 1999

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Macedonia (MAC) (343)

SUMMARY:

In June of 1993, the UN Nations Security Council adopted Resolution #842, which expanded the existing UN Protection Force in the region of the Balkans and former Yugoslavia to include Macedonia. This authorization occurred following concerns that Macedonia would be the next target for Serbian expansion, with numerous analysts citing statements by Serbian leadership referring to Macedonia as “Southern Serbia”. In response to this, the United States deployed an initial 300 troops, followed by an additional 200, to support the existing protection force in Macedonia, composed primarily of peacekeepers from the Nordic countries.

Out of what had been Yugoslavia would emerge Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia FYROM (Macedonia), and Kosovo (still contested). By 1992, the United Nations had declared a Protection Zone to end large-scale fighting in Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, the two states remaining in Yugoslavia, declared the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In part of the vast arms buildup in the region, beginning on April 21, 1994, UN inspectors counted over 160 50-ton oil tankers heading into Yugoslavia, carrying ammonium nitrate and oil likely for explosive-making. Because of this, by May 1994, the border of the new Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was under the protection of both UN and American troops, there to protect the new state against Yugoslavia. Several incidents occurred at the border during this time, but there were no casualties.

Later in May 1994, it was discovered that Greece (which had placed a trade blockade on the new Macedonian state over displeasure at the state’s name being in reference to a northern Greek province), along with Macedonia (FYROM) were found to be skirting UN sanctions on Yugoslavia by being main suppliers of those ammonium nitrate shipments. Despite being at odds with Greece, authorities believed some in Macedonia allowed this as a means of earning desperately needed foreign currency and out of fear of offending the Serbian Yugoslavians. As a result, the UN continued to maintain more than 1,000 troops in Macedonia, while the U.S. continued to maintain about 300. NATO and the Western European Union would continue their naval blockade of the Adriatic Sea in Operation *Sharp Guard*, and several deadly battles and civilian massacres would occur across the Balkans through the 1990s before war’s end.

The mission in Macedonia, which eventually came to be known as UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, sought to patrol the border between Macedonia and Serbia to monitor and report on any potential actions by either party that could destabilize the fragile peace in the region and prevent a spillover of any ongoing conflict. The UNPREDEP mission was extended until February of 1999, when the People's Republic of China utilized their veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent the renewal of the mission. At its conclusion in 1999, the UNPREDEP mission consisted of over 1,000 international troops, and had successfully enforced its mandate of deterring armed conflict, monitoring the border region, and reporting on any illicit arms trade across the two borders.

SOURCES:

Clinton, William J. 1993. "Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." News release, July 9. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/html/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg1045.htm>.

Clinton, William J. 1994. "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Peacekeeping Operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." News release, April 19. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1994-04-25/pdf/WCPD-1994-04-25-Pg851.pdf>.

Landay, Jonathan. 1993. "US Troops Arrive in Macedonia To Keep Watch on Serbian Border." *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0707/07011.html>.

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Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Vol. 2. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Randal, Jonathan C. 1994. "Greece, Macedonia Said to Skirt Sanctions." *The Washington Post*, May 16. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/16/greece-macedonia-said-to-skirt-sanctions/fb464256-91a5-485c-a916-5352696a07b6/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7f55175cb223.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to the maintenance of an intermittently fluctuating troop presence of 200-500 US Soldiers through 1999.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad. MID also lists a fragment of this case as an individual skirmish via MID dispute number 4046 during in 1994. We have aggregated the MID 4046 case to the longer instance of U.S. force in Macedonia from 1993 to 1999.

1993 North Korea (1) NPT

NAME: North Korea Threat to Withdraw from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4021

DATES: March 3, 1993 – March 24, 1993

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Korea (732), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (731).

SUMMARY:

North Korea's development of a nuclear weapons program continues to threaten South Korea and the United States. In January 1993, after failed negotiations to allow international nuclear facility inspectors into North Korea, the U.S. and South Korea announced that Team Spirit 93, a joint military exercise used as a show of force, would take place that year. Additionally, in March 1993, the U.S. sought allied support to encourage the U.N. Security Council to compel Pyongyang to honor its obligation, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of nuclear facilities inspections. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gave North Korea a deadline to accept inspection of two buildings suspect of containing nuclear evidence. In response on March 12, 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from NPT, citing that it needed to defend its supreme interest.

In response, South Korea indicated the possible permanent cancellation of Team Spirit exercises if North Korea reversed its decision to withdraw from the NPT. On June 11, 1993 after diplomatic negotiations, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT, the U.S. granted assurances against the threat and use of force. Second round negotiations between U.S. and North Korea resulted in a joint statement stating their readiness to negotiate IAEA inspections.

SOURCES:

Farrell, Dr. John F. 2009. "Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations." *Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Force Research Institute*. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a595992.pdf>.

Gordon, Michael R. 1994. "South Korea Offers Terms for Ending War Games." *New York Times*, March 3.

Jehl, Douglas. 1993. "U.S. and North Koreans Discuss Nuclear Dispute." *New York Times*, June 3.

Jehl, Douglas. 1993. "U.S. Seeking U.N. Pressure to Compel North Korea to Honor Treaty." *New York Times*, March 13.

Jehl, Douglas. 1993. "North Korea Says It Won't Pull Out of Arms Pact Now." *New York Times*, June 12.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain regime; Protect own Military and Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate (North Korea suspended its announcement to withdraw from NPT and allowed international monitoring of some of its nuclear sites. North Korea gave no indication that it would agree to inspection of its most sensitive sites).

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 200,000 Troops used during Operation Team Spirit 1993.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance appears in the MID and CRS list of US usage of force abroad, but not in other datasets on military intervention. This is because the case is a display and threat of force, not a direct usage of force. We do, however, find inconsistencies in the MID coding of this case. The MID description indicates that the military exercise happened after NK threatened to withdraw from NPT, but our sources indicate that the military exercises happened before the threat to withdraw, and that the move to withdraw was a NK response to the military exercises. We adjust the case study to reflect this. Lastly, we alter the MID start date from March 3, 1993 to March 12, 1993 - the date that NK announces its intention to withdraw from NPT. We could not find the significance of March 3, 1993, as listed by MID.

1993 North Korea (2) DMZ violations

NAME: DMZ violations

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4022

DATES: November 5, 1993 – September 3, 1999

TARGET STATE(S): Democratic People's Republic of Korea (PRK), 731

SUMMARY:

Amid increasing tensions due to North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections into its nuclear facilities and the buildup of military forces along the North Korean side of the DMZ, President Clinton stated that an attack on South Korea would be an attack on the United States.

Accordingly, the Clinton administration drew up a plan of action in the event of a North Korean attack on South Korea, announced on March 24, 1994. They also upgraded U.S. military equipment stationed in South Korea, including sending a set of Patriot missiles, which were stationed near the DMZ. On December 17, an American OH-58 Kiowa helicopter strayed over the DMZ into North Korean territory, where it was shot down. One pilot was killed while another was taken into captivity for a short period of time.

Over the next five years, North and South Korea engaged in a series of armed confrontations along the DMZ, including several exchanges of fire resulting in several casualties in the DMZ. The two countries also entered into a series of naval clashes in 1998-99, culminating in the First Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign in June 1999.

In August 1999, the U.S. conducted a 12-day military exercise with South Korea. The next year, thawing relations between North and South Korea allowed for the 2000 Inter-Korean Summit, ushering in a new period of cooperation between the two Koreas.

SOURCES:

Gordon, Michael R. 1994. "Freed Pilot Tells How He Was Downed By North Koreans," *New York Times*, December 31.

Gordon, Michael R. 1994. "U.S. is Bolstering Forces in Korea," *New York Times*, March 27.

"Historic deal at North-South Korean summit," 2000. *The Guardian*, June 14.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/14/northkorea3>.

Holmes, Stephen A. 1993. "Clinton Warns North Korea Against Building Atom Bomb." *New York Times* (1923-Current file), Nov 08.

Moore, Jeanne. 1999. "World Briefing," *New York Times*, August 17.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/17/world/world-briefing.html>

Sanger, David E. 1994. "North Korea's Motives Baffle U.S. and the South," *New York Times*, June 6, A8.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 1 US

TOTAL DEATHS: 1 US

COSTS: 1 OH-58 Kiowa (\$4.9 million in 1990)

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident, pulled from the CRS listing, groups together several incidents over six years so a full casualty count and cost estimate is difficult to obtain. We tried to limit the casualties to only ones sustained while in direct conflict with the Americans, and it seems that the helicopter crash was the only incident that met this criterion. Since it was between the two Koreas, we did not include the Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign, which killed 17-30 North Koreans.

1993 Somalia

NAME: Operation Continue Hope (part of UNOSOM II)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 4, 1993 - March 25, 1994

TARGET STATE(S): Somalia (SOM), 520

SUMMARY:

By March 1993, thanks to Operation Restore Hope, mass starvation had been overcome, and the security situation improved in Somalia. The U.S. turned over operations to the U.N. on May 9, 1993. Operation Continue Hope was the U.S. component of UNOSOM II.

U.N. Resolution 814 differentiated UNOSOM II from UNITAF. No member state served as the lead in UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II covered the entirety of Somalia. The ultimate aim of UNOSOM II was to achieve total disarmament within 90 days and establish peace through nation-building operations.

October 3rd was the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident, known as the Battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. President Clinton responded by declaring U.S. troops to be withdrawn by March 31, 1994. The U.S. withdrew on March 25, 1994.

General Aidid, no longer deterred by the U.S., attacked Pakistani troops who had relieved the U.S. Marines in Mogadishu. This attack forced UNOSOM II to take sides in the civil war, undermining its neutrality. On November 4, 1994 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 954, ending UNOSOM II on March 31, 1995.

SOURCES:

Davis, Lois M., Susan D. Hosek, Michael G. Tate, Mark Perry, Gerard Hepler, and Paul S. Steinberg. 1996. *Army Medical Support for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance*, Chapter 4. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR773/MR773.chap4.html

DeBruyne, Nese F. 2018. *American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics*, September 14. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf>

Harned, Glenn M. 2016. *Stability Operations in Somalia 1992-1993: A Case Study*. United States Army War College Press.

<http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/Stability%20Ops%20in%20Somalia.pdf>.

“Operation Restore Hope,” *Global Security*,

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm

Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia. 1994. (Chapter Report, 03/04/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-88), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-88/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-88.htm>

Schmitt, Eric. 1993. “Somali War Casualties May Be 10,000,” *New York Times*, December 8.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/world/somali-war-casualties-may-be-10000.html>.

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<https://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/somalia93.html>

“United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994.” 2003. *Center of Military History*, United States Army.

<https://history.army.mil/html/documents/somalia/SomaliaAAR.pdf>.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 1/17/19) *UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia*.

Uppsala University. www.ucdp.uu.se.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection & Order; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME:

Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS:

- 26 U.S.
 - 18 in “Black Hawk Down”
- ~400 Somali deaths
 - ~300 Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu
 -

TOTAL DEATHS:

- 83 U.N.
- 26 U.S.

COSTS:

- DOD estimated \$4.4 million for troop reimbursements for UNOSOM II from the U.N.
- \$1.7 billion dollars (1992-1994), New York Times
- 94.7 million, GAO
 - ~ 48 million reimbursed by U.N.
- 3,000-5,000 U.S. troops
- Communications, engineers, logistics, air traffic control, civil affairs personnel
- ~ 18,000 non-U.S. troops
- ~4,000 U.S. support troops
 - Reduced to 1,400 by January 1994
- Of the almost \$885 million in incremental costs incurred through fiscal year 1993, DOD was reimbursed by the United Nations for at least \$123.6 million for UNITAF and UNOSOM II.
- At the time of the transfer of responsibility on May 4, UNOSOM II comprised about 16,000 personnel from 21 nations, 57 percent of its authorized strength of 28,000

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MIPS, IMI, and CRS datasets of US military involvements, but not in the MID dataset (perhaps due to the multilateral nature of the mission). But the timeframes of the incident vary across sources. MIPS has a start date of May 4, 1993 and end date of December 31, 1993. IMI has a start date of December 9, 1992 and end date of March 25, 1994.

We use the start date of May 4, 1993 as this is when the US transitioned to contributing to the new mission (Operation Restore Hope becomes Operation Continue Hope), and we use the end date of March 25, 1994 - when the US withdrew its troops from Somalia. We code a new incident for the pre-1993 mission that is portrayed in the IMI coding (Operation Restore Hope).

1994 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: Operation Support Hope

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 22, 1994 – September 30, 1994

TARGET STATE(S): Zaire (DRC), 490

SUMMARY:

The Rwandan genocide began on April 7, 1994 and lasted through mid-July. As a result of the genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by Hutu extremists who had supported former Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, and his political allies. The genocide concluded when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Paul Kagame, invaded Rwanda from Uganda, leading a force of formerly exiled Rwandans to halt the killing. The RPF pushed out most of the perpetrators (*génocidaires*) into neighboring Zaire, sparking a mass movement and humanitarian crisis.

During the genocide, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMID) did not receive significant support from the United States. The lack of political will by the United States was a result of the 18 Americans who had recently been killed in the UN mission in Somalia.

Immediately following the end of the genocide, however, President Bill Clinton ordered an emergency humanitarian airlift to Eastern Zaire where hundreds of thousands of refugees had fled. The humanitarian response included 1,600 American troops with no combat capabilities as part of Operation Support Hope, a Joint Task Force. Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) were set up in Entebbe, Uganda and Goma and Kigali, Rwanda. The mission's primary task was to facilitate the airlift of relief supplies to Zaire and Rwanda.

Hutu extremists seized control of most of the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire by September, prompting the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel. The United States continued to provide covert support to Rwanda's military, but this did not mitigate the long-term pattern of conflict escalation and military intervention by regional and foreign states in the Great Lakes region.

SOURCES:

Borton, John, Emery Brusset, Alistair Hallam, et al. 1996. "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience." Study 3, Humanitarian Aid and

Effects, Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

“Operation Support Hope,” Global Security, accessed November 27, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/support_hope.htm.

Seybolt, Taylor. 1997. “Coordination in Rwanda: The Humanitarian Response to Genocide and Civil War.” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Conflict Management Group Working Paper Series.

The United Nations. 1996. "Chronology" in *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996*. United Nations Bluebook Series, Vol. X. New York: Department of Public Information.

United States. European Command. Operation Support Hope, 1994 after Action Review. Place of Publication Not Identified]: Headquarters, United States, European Command, 1995.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian

OUTCOME: Victory for US/Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: N/A

COSTS: C-5, C-141, and C-130 planes were involved in the humanitarian airlift. The highest recorded number of U.S. troops deployed in the region for Operation Support Hope was 3,600.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the IMI dataset. The case in the CRS list of interventions describes President Clinton’s disclosure to Congress in 1996 about the intervention in 1994.

1994 Haiti

NAME: Operation Uphold Democracy

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4016

DATES: September 19, 1994 - March 31, 1995

TARGET STATE(S): Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

On September 30, 1991, a military coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras removed Haiti's first popularly elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. President George H.W. Bush called for democracy to be restored, and worked with the Organization of American States to impose a trade embargo. In 1992, Bill Clinton campaigned on promises to increase pressure on the military regime by tightening economic sanctions. Once in office, the new Clinton administration faced multiple challenges in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and North Korea, which complicated options to respond in Haiti.

In June 1993, at the insistence of the U.S., the United Nations imposed a ban on petroleum sales to Haiti. This prompted Cédras to participate in negotiation talks resulting in the Governors Island Accord, agreeing to Aristide's return to Haiti. On October 11, 1993, despite indications the Haitian military was backing out of the agreement, the U.S.S. Harlan County, carrying Canadian and American military trainers, traveled to Port-au-Prince, but was turned away because of demonstrators. In response, the U.N. Security Council imposed a naval blockade.

In May and June of 1994, the U.S. and U.N. Security Council adopted tougher sanctions. The U.S. lobbied for a resolution supporting an invasion to restore President Aristide, resulting in U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 authorizing the use of force to restore democracy for a member nation. Preparation for invasion involved a multinational contingent including nearly 25,000 military personnel, two aircraft carriers, and extensive air support.

With military action imminent, a delegation comprised of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell negotiated with General Cédras and military leaders in Haiti. General Cédras did not capitulate until he was shown a video of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft loading its troops, and then informed that the video was nearly two hours old. Then, General Cédras capitulated and allowed President Aristide to return, avoiding bloodshed.

SOURCES:

Holmes, Steven A. 1993. "U.S. May Tighten Embargo on Haiti." *New York Times*, 28 Oct.

Jehl, Douglas. 1994. "Showdown with Haiti: The President; Behind the Scenes at the White House: Clinton Takes 'Last Best Chance' to Avoid Invasion." *New York Times*, 18 Sept.

Office of the Historian. "Intervention in Haiti, 1994-1995." *Department of State*.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.

Schmitt, Eric. 1994. "U.S. Makes Moves for Haiti Action." *New York Times*, 15 July.

Schmitt, Eric. 1994. "U.S. officials see few alternatives to Haiti invasion." *New York Times*, 4 Sept.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime. U.S. sought to remove the military junta led by General Cédras and restore former Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power.

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies. General Cédras and the Haitian military capitulated and agreed to step down. Jean Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti in October 1994. U.S. Operation Uphold Democracy officially ended on March 31, 1994 when it was replaced by the U.N. Mission in Haiti.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Approximately 22,000 troops
 82nd Airborne, 10th Mountain Division
 Two aircraft carriers; USS Harlan County
 Cost of military exercises including a mock invasion in the Bahamas
 Cost of naval blockade

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: There are different start dates and end dates by nearly a year according to IMI, MIPS, and IMI. IMI focuses on the timeline between October 18, 1993 – September 29, 1994, while IMI and MIPS focus on September 19, 1994 - March 31, 1995. We have chosen to focus on the latter of these two periods as it conveys the use of military force against Haiti.

1994 Rwanda

NAME: Rwandan Genocide

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 30, 1994 – September 30, 1994

TARGET STATE(S): Rwanda (RWA), 517

SUMMARY:

The Rwandan genocide began on April 7, 1994 and lasted through mid-July. As a result of the genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by Hutu extremists who had supported former Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, and his political allies. The genocide concluded when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Paul Kagame, invaded Rwanda from Uganda, leading a force of formerly exiled Rwandans to halt the killing. The RPF pushed out most of the perpetrators (*génocidaires*) into neighboring Zaire, sparking a mass movement and humanitarian crisis.

During the genocide, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMID) did not receive significant support from the United States. The lack of political will by the United States was a result of the 18 Americans who had recently been killed in the UN mission in Somalia.

Immediately following the end of the genocide, however, President Bill Clinton ordered an emergency humanitarian airlift to the region where hundreds of thousands of refugees had fled. The humanitarian response included 1,600 American troops with no combat capabilities as part of Operation Support Hope, a Joint Task Force. Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) were set up in Entebbe, Uganda and Goma and Kigali, Rwanda, with Joint Task Force B stationed in Kigali. The mission's primary task was to facilitate the airlift of relief supplies to Zaire and Rwanda. Assistance amounted to about \$370 million during 1994.

Hutu extremists seized control of most of the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire by September, prompting the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the region. The United States continued to provide covert support to Rwanda's military over the following years.

SOURCES:

Borton, John, Emery Brusset, Alistair Hallam, et al. 1996. "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience." Study 3, Humanitarian Aid and

Effects, Copenhagen: *Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*.

Seybolt, Taylor. 1997. "Coordination in Rwanda: The Humanitarian Response to Genocide and Civil War." *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Conflict Management Group Working Paper Series.

The United Nations. 1996. "Chronology" in *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996*. United Nations Bluebook Series, Vol. X. New York: Department of Public Information.

"Lifesaving Aid for Rwanda." 1994. *The New York Times*, July 30.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/30/opinion/lifesaving-aid-for-rwanda.html>

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: N/A

COSTS: C-5, C-141 and AC-130U planes were involved in the humanitarian airlift. Combined, U.S. aircraft flew 1,200 sorties to deliver equipment. The highest recorded number of U.S. troops deployed in the region for Operation Support Hope was 3,000. U.S. assistance was estimated around \$370 million during 1994.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the IMI dataset, but not in other datasets related to intervention, most likely due to its limited scope of evacuation, not combat mandate. This case overlaps with part of the operation listed for Zaire 1994. We are considering aggregating these cases into one.

1995 China

NAME: Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4064

DATES: December 19, 1995- March 28, 1996

TARGET STATE(S): People's Republic of China (CHN), 710

SUMMARY:

Commercial and cultural communication between China and Taiwan had improved since the Opening of China in 1979. However, China stated that they reserved the right to use force in Taiwanese affairs if deemed necessary. In March 1996, Taiwan was scheduled to host its first direct election for president, prompting a series of diplomatic incidents and military displays of force to influence Taiwan.

Despite an unofficial diplomatic status between the U.S. and Taiwan, U.S. Congress voted in favor of granting Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa to speak at Cornell University in June 1995. Beijing perceived this visit as a signal that Taiwan would seek formal independence and responded with threats and intimidation. In November 1995, Beijing held a military exercise as a display of force that was promptly followed by a Taiwanese military exercise. On December 19, 1995, a group of U.S. warships, led by the U.S.S. Nimitz, passed through the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 1978 as a show of force to Beijing. The Chinese responded in March 1996, with a live-fire ballistic missile exercises that landed less than 20 miles from Taiwan. The U.S. responded by moving the U.S.S. Independence closer to Taiwan, and again dispatching the U.S.S. Nimitz and aircraft carrier battle group to the region.

China's threats did not prevail, and Lee Teng-hui was elected in mid-March. China continued its war game exercises until March 25, 1996, two days after the election, then withdrew without further incident.

SOURCES:

Butterton, Glenn R. 1997. *Signals, Threats, and Deterrence: Alive and Well in the Taiwan Strait*. Catholic University Law Review, 47, no. 51.

Tyler, Patrick E. 1995. "China-U.S. Ties Warm a Bit as China-Taiwan Relations Chill." *The New York Times*, Nov. 18.

"U.S. Warship Cruises China-Taiwan Passage." 1996. *The New York Times*, Jan. 27.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Foreign Regime Authority: Deter Chinese and protect Taiwanese interests.

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies: U.S. successfully deterred China from further aggressive actions.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Maintaining and moving U.S. Seventh Fleet.
Worsening diplomatic relations between U.S. and People's Republic of China.
Maintaining diplomatic relations between U.S. and Republic of China (Taiwan) to include military aid.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID, CRS, and MIPS listing of interventions, but not in other datasets as it represents a display and threat of force abroad, not a direct usage of force abroad. MID and MIPS disagree on the start and end dates of this incident. MIPS only documents the last, more severe showing of force by the US, from March 8, 1996 to March 25, 1996. MID's more extensive timeframe of U.S. threats and displaying of force against China is more accurate as per the case summary above. Thus, we include MID's start and end dates for our dataset.

1996 Central African Republic

NAME: Embassy Evacuations

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 20, 1996 – May 30, 1996

TARGET STATE(S): Central African Republic (CEN), (482)

SUMMARY:

In May of 1996, mutinous soldiers from the Central African Republic began rioting in the capital of Bangui in protest of unpaid wages. The mutinous soldiers engaged in widespread looting, attacked public institutions such as prisons and radio stations, and attacking French military forces based in Bangui who had been attempting to maintain public order.

In response to the rapidly deteriorating security situation, on May 20, 1996, President Clinton ordered the deployment of Marines from the 22nd Expeditionary Unit to the capital of Bangui in order to provide additional embassy security and assist French Forces in securing the international airport in Bangui. The deployed forces immediately began the process of evacuating American and other foreign citizens from the capital via both helicopters and two KC-130 cargo aircraft located at the Bangui airport. While evacuations were initially delayed to heavy fighting impeding some Americans from reaching the airport and many expatriates being located outside the capital, the Marines eventually evacuated 190 Americans and 258 foreign nationals by the time the evacuation mission ended on March 28. The final members of the 22nd MEU departed Bangui on May 30th, after French forces had restored a modicum of order to capital and the remaining American citizens requesting assistance (primarily Peace Corps and missionaries located outside the capital) had been evacuated from the country.

SOURCES:

Department of the Navy US Marine Corps. 2004. On Mamba Station: US Marines in West Africa 1996-2003 (Part II). By James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe. *U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division.
<https://www.marines.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=iTZFq-9911w%3D&portalid=59>

Kempster, Norman. 1996. "Americans Evacuated From Central African Republic." *Los Angeles Times*, May 22. http://articles.latimes.com/1996-05-22/news/mn-7063_1_central-african-republic.

Office of the President of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary. 1996. *Text of a Letter From the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro*

Tempore of the Senate, May 23. <https://www.ibiblio.org/pub/archives/whitehouse-papers/1996/May/1996-05-23-Report-on-US-Marines-in-Central-African-Republic>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to the deployment of a total of 61 Marines to Bangui for 8 days, regular daily flights for KC-130 transport aircraft from Bangui to Yaoundé, Cameroon during evacuations.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US military interventions and is confirmed via our three additional sources.

1996 Liberia

NAME: Operation Assured Response

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 9, 1996 – June 20, 1996

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Liberia (LBR) (450)

SUMMARY:

In April of 1996, escalating tensions in Liberia between Charles Taylor's NPFL and Roosevelt Johnson's ULIMO-J erupted into violence following Taylor's calls for Roosevelt's arrest and detainment. The clashes between the ULIMO-J and NPFL/ULIMO-K resulted in escalating violence in the capital that forced a number of American civilians to flee to the Monrovia embassy compound, with an additional 15,000 displaced Liberians seeking refuge at a separate American controlled compound. The situation continued to deteriorate, with fighting occurring near the American embassy, stray mortar rounds impacting the neighboring UN compound, and members of the international peacekeeping force from regional countries abandoning their posts.

In response to this escalating violence, embassy personnel requested and received presidential approval for military assistance in the evacuation of American citizens from the capital, referred to by the US military as Operation Assured Response. Swiftly thereafter, Navy SEAL elements based in Europe deployed via helicopter to the embassy, working to secure the compound and evacuate many of the US and expatriate nationals located on the embassy. Noncombatants were evacuated to a base in Sierra Leone then onward to Dakar, Senegal. US forces staged recurring rescue missions into the capital to rescue stranded or trapped expatriate citizens, and by April 18 more than 2,200 noncombatants, representing 73 countries and 540 American, had been evacuated from Monrovia via helicopter. This represented the vast majority of the American citizens in the capital in need of evacuation. On April 18th, the special operations forces were replaced by more than 275 US Marines from the 22nd MEU who would provide security for the embassy for the remaining of Operation Assured Response. Constant fighting occurred in the immediate vicinity of the embassy, with occasional attempts at intimidation by disorganized local forces towards the embassy security force. At one point, NPFL forces advanced and fired upon the embassy, resulting in the Marine forces returning fire and killing three NPFL soldiers. Further clashes occurred, although an ultimate reduction in conflict resulted in the Marine guards no longer being necessary and departing by June 20, 1996.

SOURCES:

Atlas, Terry. 1996. "Evacuation of Americans Begins." *Chicago Tribune*, April 10.
<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1996-04-10-9604100028-story.html>.

Department of the Navy US Marine Corps. 2004. "On Mamba Station: US Marines in West Africa 1990-2003." By James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe. *U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations*. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division. <https://www.marines.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=e9HfyMg3qe0%3D&portalid=59>.

Shiner, Cindy. 1996. "US Marines Kill 3 Rebels in Monrovia." *Washington Post*, May 1. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/05/01/us-marines-kill-3-rebels-in-monrovia/eb74d1d3-b804-48e7-994c-cbb67c5affc5/?utm_term=.e2baed27162c.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 5 NPFL Soldiers

TOTAL DEATHS: 5 NPFL Soldiers

COSTS: 11 Aircraft and 600 support personnel deployed to FOB in Sierra Leone. 275 Marines deployed for the duration of the operation to the embassy in Monrovia. Two additional Air Force AC-130 gunships deployed on standby.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, due to its limited scope of evacuating American citizens. But we confirm this case as a usage of force by the US abroad.

1997 Albania

NAME: Albania Evacuation

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 13, 1997 – March 26, 1997

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Albania (ALB), 339

SUMMARY:

In early 1997, violent unrest and fighting broke out in Albania as protests demanding the resignation of Albanian president Sali Berisha following a series of high profile pyramid schemes and financial scandals that had come to light. Escalating violence and looting of government armories had resulted in spiraling violence in the capital of Tirana.

In response to this violence, President Clinton deployed a contingent of US Marines to the capital of Tirana on March 13, 1997. This force, referred to as “Operation Silver Wake”, worked to evacuate non-essential embassy staff and their dependents, as well American citizens in country who wished to be evacuated. The missions were briefly interrupted after the helicopters being utilized in the evacuation came under fire from disorganized elements in the capital, but resumed through March 26. By the end of the operation, over 400 American and 489 Third Country Nationals had been evacuated. Following this, approximately 100 US Marines stayed in Tirana to provide continued security to the US Embassy and residential compound.

SOURCES:

US Department of Defense. 1997. "U.S. Forces Evacuate Americans from Albania." *News release*. March 31. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43332>.

Perlez, Jane. 1997. "Albania Chief's Associates Flee; Gunfire Halts Evacuation by U.S." *New York Times*, March 15. <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/15/world/albania-chief-s-associates-flee-gunfire-halts-evacuation-by-us.html>.

Turner Broadcasting System. 1997. "U.S., Western embassies begin evacuation from Albania." *CNN*, March 13. <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/13/albania/>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to recurring helicopter flights, deployment of approximately 200 US Marines to Tirana for evacuation, embassy protection.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in CRS's record of US military interventions abroad. It may be absent in other sources due to the very limited scope of the military mission, focused on evacuating American nationals.

1997 Cambodia

Name: Citizen Protection Operation

Dispute Number: N/A

Dates: July 11, 1997

Target State(s): Cambodia, 811

Summary:

On July 5th, 1997, relations between the two Co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen, had devolved into armed clashes between loyalist forces of the two leaders. While not being directly targeted, violence throughout Phnom Penh risked the security of the 1,200 to 1,400 Americans believed to be in the country.

On July 9th, a drawdown of non-essential embassy staff to a minimum staff of 20 personnel was imposed. The following day, a Joint Task Force, approximating 550 U.S. military personnel, began deploying from U.S. Pacific Command to establish a staging area at Utapao Air Base. The forces were specifically designated for potential non-combatant evacuation operations and would be redeployed as soon as this operation was deemed unnecessary or complete. On July 11th The Joint Task Force assisted in the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cambodia.

Sources:

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 7 Nov. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

United States, President (1993-2001: Clinton). "Letter to Congressional leaders on the Situation in Cambodia." *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, Book 2*. 11 July 1997. Pg. 950.

Lane S. Jeremy. 2004. "Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad." *Nova Publications*.

Associated Press Archives. "Cambodia - Evacuation of Foreigners." Youtube.com. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Pf0vAAiBi4>

Objective: Social Protection

Outcome: Victory for U.S & Allies

Battle Deaths: None

Total Deaths: None

Costs: 550 military personnel from U.S. Pacific Command

Definitional Issues: This case is only present in the CRS dataset. In conducting research we consider this a use of U.S. military intervention abroad as a non-combatant evacuation operation.

1997 Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAME: Evacuation of Americans

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 21, 1997 - June 20, 1997

TARGET STATE(S): Democratic Republic of the Congo 490

SUMMARY:

During the First Congo War (1996-1997), Rwandan/Ugandan supported rebels took over the entirety of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), starting with the far east and moving west. As the rebels approached the capital, Kinshasa, countries began preparations to evacuate their citizens residing there.

On March 21, 1997, between 150 and 300 American Soldiers were forward deployed to Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo in order to prepare to evacuate the approximately 320 American citizens residing in Kinshasa. Another couple of hundred American civilians were scattered across Zaire and were being moved to Kinshasa. The Soldiers were paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Infantry Brigade, an independent unit stationed in Vicenza, Italy as part of the Southern European Task Force, the unit that responds to crises in Africa. 500 additional troops from Belgium and France were part of the joint task force. Brazzaville is just across the river from Zaire.

By April 3rd, there were just under 2000 American troops in Brazzaville as well as the U.S.S. *Nassau* and U.S.S. *Pensacola*, two amphibious assault ships stationed offshore. 1500 of these were marines who came aboard the ships, having redeployed from the Balkans. The rest were the paratroopers mentioned above, and the preliminary planning team (estimated 30 individuals) that deployed in advance of the joint task force. Additionally, Belgium and France increased the size of their contingents.

The Belgians and French had strong colonial and now diplomatic ties to the area, and has experience intervening in central Africa before. The French had a permanent base in Libreville, Gabon, which is where they sent their contingent from. American media suggested that Libreville may be a staging area for any evacuation in central Africa, however Brazzaville remained the staging area. Evidence suggests an American presence never materialized in Gabon at this time.

By June 17, 1997, the Republic of Congo was in a civil war as well. However, most American troops had withdrawn by this time. A small number of marines were involved (as well as the French) in evacuating U.S. embassy personnel. It is unclear whether these marines were part of the traditional embassy security detachment, or if they were from the joint task force from March. These marines announced they would be leaving as soon as the evacuation was complete.

SOURCES:

Congo: Belgian, French & US Troops Establish Bases in Brazzaville. 1997. *AP*, 25 March.
Video and transcript of initial American movement to Republic of Congo.
<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/234052feba63906b2ef939925f7e2b6e>.

Congo: Troops on Stand by for Possible Civilian Evacuation from Zaire. 1997. *AP*, 3 April.
Video and transcript of American withdrawal from Republic of Congo after a civil war begins.
<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/94f18a9476186f10bbbfa4c5ceb9f218>.

Bond, Catherine. 1997. Escalation of Congo Civil War Forecast: U.S. Embassy Closing as Peace Eludes Mediators. *CNN*, 17 June.
Further description of the Congolese Civil War
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9706/17/congo/>.

McIntyre, Jamie. 1997. U.S. Troops Head for Africa to Await Possible Zairian Evacuation. *CNN*, 21 March.
Explanation of initial movement of American forces to Congo in preparation for the evacuation of civilians from Zaire.
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/21/zaire.us/index.html>.

Shenon, Philip. 1997. G.I.'s set for Zaire Evacuation. *The New York Times*, 22 March.
Explanation of initial movement of American forces to Congo in preparation for the evacuation of civilians from Zaire. <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/22/world/gi-s-set-for-zaire-evacuation.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Intervention to Protect own Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S./Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of ~300 troops from Italy to Congo; redeployment of 2 warships and 1500 marines from Yugoslavia to Congo.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident only appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad, not in any other leading datasets on US military intervention. This could be due to the limited scope of the mission, as its main goal was to evacuate American nationals from the Congo region. Nonetheless, we include this case as a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad.

1997 Iran

Name: Operation Southern Watch - Show of Force in Persian Gulf

Dispute Number: 4216

Dates: October 3, 1997 - December 13, 1997

Target State(s): Iran (IRN), 630

Summary:

Following the end of the Gulf War in 1991, two major no-fly zones were established by the United States, Britain, and France, to protect the Kurdish minority in the north and Shi'ite Muslims in the south. In 1997, the U.S.S. *Nimitz* and six warships were brought into the Persian Gulf to expand its capabilities of daily air patrols typically flown from air force bases in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf state allies, collectively known as Operation Southern Watch.

Although the move was previously scheduled, the *Nimitz* arrived in the Gulf earlier than planned so as to apply pressure on Iran as well. This was in response to Iranian planes having conducted two bombings of insurgent bases within southern Iraqi territory on September 29th, a violation of the imposed no-fly zone. The move also coincided with the Iranian Navy's 10-day war games as a show of force in the Persian Gulf.

One month later, following Iran's expulsion of six American members of the United Nations' weapons inspection team, President Clinton dispatched the carrier U.S.S. *George Washington* and four other ships to the Persian Gulf to join the U.S.S. *Nimitz*. The move signaled heightened tensions between the United States and added pressure on Iraq's President Saddam Hussein to allow the U.N. inspectors continued access to the country's weapons facilities. The U.S.S. *George Washington* remained in the Gulf until early December after Iran halted its aggression over the gulf and in Iraq. Despite the drawdown in deployed U.S. military assets, tensions with both Iraq and Iran remained high for years to come.

Sources:

CNN. 12 October 1997. *USS Nimitz Arrives in Persian Gulf*. CNN.com
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9710/12/nimitz/>

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

May, Barry. 13, October 1997. *Aircraft Carrier Nimitz Arrives in Persian Gulf*. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/10/13/aircraft-carrier-nimitz-arrives-in-persian-gulf/044143b6-4948-4edd-bebc-1c00e94f7947/>

Myers, Steven Lee. 15 November 1997. *Clinton is Sending 2D Carrier to Gulf*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/15/world/clinton-is-sending-2d-carrier-to-gulf.html>

Objective: Policy Change; Social Protection & Order

Outcome: Yield by Target Actor

Battle Deaths: None

Total Deaths: None

Costs: Deployment of USS Nimitz and 6 ship accompaniment; later deployment of USS George Washington and 4 ship accompaniment

Definitional Issues:

This dispute is listed in the CRS report and MID datasets as a US show of force. We do, however, find that the sending of the carriers was meant to signal both Iraq and Iran, not just Iran as listed in MID, so we change the target state coding to reflect this.

The second carrier group was not included in the MID dispute description, but we include it here as the continuation of the same dispute.

While the immediate outcome is unclear, greater conflict was avoided via this show of force. We maintain MID's coding as "yield by side B" at this time, but recommend caution with this measure.

1997 Sierra Leone

NAME: Operation Nobel Obelisk

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 29, 1997 – May 30, 1997

TARGET STATE(S): Sierra Leone, 451

SUMMARY:

In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group led by Foday Sankoh, operated a brutal campaign in Sierra Leone in which its thousands of members murdered, raped, and forcibly amputated civilians. The campaign was fueled by other regional conflicts in West Africa, and, in particular, was well-resourced by Charles Taylor, the Liberian president. In addition to seeking control of Sierra Leone's diamond resources, the RUF eventually colluded with the Sierra Leonean army to overthrow President Ahmad Kabbah in 1997. The military coup sparked the United States to evacuate its citizens from the country.

On May 30, 1997, President Clinton deployed military personnel to Freetown, Sierra Leone, to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens. Two stray rounds of rocket-propelled grenade had hit the American Embassy in Freetown, but American citizens were not being targeted. Nevertheless, U.S. Special Forces and Marines led a joint noncombatant evacuation operation called Operation NOBEL OBELISK. U.S. European Command deployed the USS Kearsarge with about 1,305 sailors and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, with about 1,200 Marines to the area for the operation.

The operation led to the successful evacuation of about 2,500 civilians.

SOURCES:

Beaudette, Francis. 2001. "The Role of United States Army Special Forces in Operation Nobel Obelisk." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Kozaryn, Linda. 1997. "U.S. Evacuates Americans from Sierra Leone." U.S. Department of Defense News. Accessed March 10, 2019.

<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40988>

World Peace Foundation. 2017. "United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Brief." In *African Politics, African Peace*.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies (Successful operation, even though the conflict was ongoing)

BATTLE DEATHS: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: N/A

COSTS: US used the USS Kearsarge, which carried four CH-53 Sea Stallions and eight CH-46 Sea Knight transport helicopters. The Navy-Marine task force was equipped with four AH-1 Cobra and six Harrier aircraft. About 1,200 marines and an 11-man U.S. Special Forces team from Fort Bragg's 3rd Special Forces Group were deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The end date for the operation is unclear. There was evidence that the operation lasted two days, but it could have been longer. This was not listed in the given datasets, but found in other articles.

1998 Afghanistan

NAME: Operation Infinite Reach

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4227

DATES: August 20, 1998

TARGET STATE(S): Afghanistan (AFG), 700

SUMMARY:

Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998, killing 224, including 12 Americans. That same day, the CIA determined that al Qaeda was the probable suspect. Two days later that information was confirmed. President Clinton directed the intelligence community to make a list of targets for a Tomahawk missile strike. He wanted to select two sites because two embassies were hit.

On August 20th, he was presented with options and selected a series of al Qaeda training camps in Khost, Afghanistan as well as a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. Pakistani officials were notified that cruise missiles would be passing through their air space. Al Qaeda's leadership, including Osama bin Laden, was known to be at the training camp.

The U.S. fired between 66 and 75 missiles at the Zhawar Kili, Jihad Wal, and Farouk training camps. A first wave hit the complex in order to lure people outside, and then a second wave hit with cluster munitions deployed above the target. Some missiles did not reach in Afghanistan, with power failing in Pakistan. It is suspected that between 20 and 60 individuals were killed, including several ISI officers training militants to fight in Kashmir. However, no al Qaeda leadership was present because they had recently vacated the area. They are suspected to have been tipped off by members of the Pakistani security forces. No further strikes were carried out.

SOURCES:

Hoffman, Tod. 2014. *Al Qaeda Declares War: The African Embassies Bombings and America's Search for Justice*. Lebanon, New Hampshire: University Press of New England

Lewis, Jeffrey W. 2018. *The 1998 East African Embassy Bombings*. Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University and Miami University Departments of History.

OSU blog with casualty figure of 6: <http://origins.osu.edu/milestones/august-2018-1998-east-african-embassy-bombings>.

Morell, Michael, and Bill Harlow. 2015. *The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight against Terrorism - from al Qa'ida to ISIS*. New York, NY: Hachette Book Group.

'Our Target was Terror'. 1998. *Newsweek*, August 30, 1998. <https://www.newsweek.com/our-target-was-terror-169580>.

(Newsweek article with casualty figure of 21 from the Taliban government).

Zenko, Micah. 2012. *Armed Drones and the Hunt for bin Laden*. Center for Preventive Action. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

CFR blog post explaining that Operation Infinite Reach was the blueprint for future drone strikes in the War on Terror: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/armed-drones-and-hunt-bin-laden>.

OBJECTIVE: a) Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests
b) remove foreign regime [eliminate AQ leadership]

OUTCOME: STALEMATE

- a) Victory for U.S. [destroyed the camps]
- b) yield by U.S. [did not kill bin Laden and did not pursue further]

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 20-60 civilians in most sources, others cite 6, 30, and 21 [Taliban government]. The civilians were militants of a variety of unspecified nationalities. No specific numbers of ISI officers are available.

COSTS: Costs associated with deployment of destroyers to Persian Gulf. 66-75 Tomahawk missiles.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This incident is listed in both the MID, CRS, and IMI datasets of US military intervention, but the casualty figures differ across all sources (6-60 people). Thus, we average the casualty numbers for our dataset.

In terms of US objectives, this case is one of retaliation, a category we may add to the dataset in the near future.

This incident is associated with the 1998 Sudan and 1998 Kenya/Tanzania incidents.

1998 Guinea-Bissau

NAME: Guinea-Bissau Evacuation

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 10, 1998 – June 15, 1998

TARGET STATE(S): Guinea-Bissau (GNB), 404

SUMMARY:

In early June 1998, there was a widespread army mutiny following the arrest of Army Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mané, in Guinea-Bissau. The outbreak of war and dispatch of Senegalese and Guinean forces to the nation's capital in support of (then) President Joao Bernardo Vieira led to the internal displacement of over 300,000 civilians.

In response to widespread violence and destruction in Bissau, President Clinton deployed a standby evacuation force of about 130 U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal. This force, including forces from Army Special Forces 10th group, evacuated the U.S. embassy and other American citizens in Guinea-Bissau. The deployment continued until the necessary evacuations were completed about five days later.

SOURCES:

Freedom House. 1998. "Freedom in the World Report." Accessed April 15, 2019.

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/guinea-bissau>

Norwegian Refugee Council. 2002. "Profile of Internal Displacement: Guinea-Bissau." Global IDP Database: Geneva, Switzerland.

U.S. Department of State. 1999. "Guinea-Bissau Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998." ReliefWeb Report. Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea-bissau/us-department-state-guinea-bissau-country-report-human-rights-practices-1998>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: N/A

COSTS: No information about financial or non-financial costs besides the estimated 130 personnel who were deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force as an example of the US protecting its own personnel in a target country. Nonetheless, this incident is confirmed and thus remains in our dataset.

1998 Kenya/Tanzania

NAME: Operation Resolute Response

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: August 7, 1998 - August 31, 1998

TARGET STATE(S): Kenya (KEN) 501, Tanzania (TAZ) 510

SUMMARY:

Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998, killing 224 including 12 Americans.

CENTCOM sent one Marine Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) unit to Kenya and another to Tanzania. These units contained 50 Marines each and were augmenting security personnel at the embassy sites. A SEABEE unit of 30 personnel was also sent specifically to assist in the recovery efforts. CENTCOM and EUCOM provided personnel to set up a Joint Task Force to direct recovery operations. A C-141 airplane flew the security personnel and some medical personnel to Africa from the United States. Two days after the bombing, a second C-141 evacuated some patients to an American medical facility in Germany. Air Mobility Command flights flew 61 missions, 1035 passengers, and 293 tons of cargo during the course of the operation.

The goals of the additional personnel were to increase security of the sites, search and rescue any survivors, body recovery, and medical treatment.

SOURCES:

Brunkow, Robert, and Kathryn Wilcoxson. 2001. *Poised for the New Millennium: The Global Reach of the Air Mobility Command: A Chronology*. Scott Air Force Base, IL: Office of History, Air Mobility Command.

US Air Force history of Air Mobility Command, which did much of the transportation for the mission. <https://www.amc.af.mil/Portals/12/documents/AFD-131018-041.pdf>.

Clinton, William J. 1998. "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Forces in Response to the Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania," August 10. U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Letter from President Clinton to Congress about the military support to the recovery efforts. Identical letters were sent to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Pro Tempore. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1998-book2/html/PPP-1998-book2-doc-pg1429.htm>.

Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers. 1999. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service | The Library of Congress.

Congressional Research Service report on the funding allocation for contingency operations during the 1990s. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19990329_98-823_2a86f48a5f59506a4e8b27a506d5ce564bff6fb8.pdf.

Pike, John. Operation resolute response. in Global Security [database online]. Washington, DC. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/resolute_response.htm.

OBJECTIVE: Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S./Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs associated with deployment of several hundred U.S. personnel to East Africa. According to the Congressional Research Service, a total of 1.2 million dollars.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US military usage of force abroad, not in MID, MIPS, or other key datasets of military intervention. This is because the case represents a non-traditional recovery mission, not a direct usage of military force abroad. We choose to keep this case in our dataset because it represents a US display of force abroad related to the War on Terror.

1998 Liberia

NAME: Defense of U.S. Embassy/Clashes Between First and Second Liberian Civil Wars

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4254

DATES: September 27, 1998 – November 1998

TARGET STATE(S): Liberia 450

SUMMARY:

Towards the end of the seven-year long First Liberian Civil War, faction leader Charles Taylor in 1996 attempted to have opposition leader Roosevelt Johnson arrested. However, Taylor failed and instead sparked fighting across Monrovia that left thousands dead and the city burned and looted. After that, Johnson fled to Ghana and only returned later that year, once the civil war looked to be ending and Taylor became the new president. Peace was brokered between the factions, and Johnson became the new Rural Development Minister. Despite this, Taylor's government forces and Johnson's faction continued to clash.

In mid-September 1998, things changed for the worse. Taylor tried to arrest Johnson again in a nighttime gun battle that killed 47 Liberians. The next morning, September 19, Johnson sought asylum in the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. Johnson and his followers were speaking with U.S. embassy staff outside the compound when Taylor's secret police rushed in and began opening fire. During the incident, Liberian forces killed four of Johnson's men and wounded a U.S. embassy staff member and a government contractor. Johnson, his son, and the rest of his followers rushed in and sought asylum as government forces surrounded the compound. Fearful for the safety of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Monrovia, President Clinton ordered the Navy patrol craft *USS Chinook* to the waters just off the coast of Monrovia and Sierra Leone's capital Freetown, preparing to protect American interests and evacuate the embassy staff if necessary. Further, given the dire situation, 30 U.S. military personnel deployed from the U.S. European Command with the *USS Chinook* to ensure the protection of the embassy staff.

Responding to President Clinton's request for enhanced security, troops of the Economic Community of West Africa Observer Group (ECOMOG) formed a defensive perimeter around the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. refused to hand Johnson over to the Liberian forces, but admitted to having Johnson and his supporters hiding in the embassy. After negotiations, Liberia then granted permission for Johnson and his party to be airlifted to Freetown, Sierra Leone. However, in 1999, fighting resumed in what would be known as the Second Liberian Civil War.

SOURCES:

Associated Press. 22 September 1998. "U.S. Embassy in Liberia is Fired On." *The New York Times*. Accessed December 9, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/22/world/us-embassy-in-liberia-is-fired-on.html>.

Authenticated U.S. Government Information. 1998. "The Administration of William J. Clinton, 1998." Government Publishing Office. Accessed December 9, 2018. <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1998-10-05/pdf/WCPD-1998-10-05-Pg1934.pdf>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Tribune News Service. 30 September 1998. "U.S. Sends Ship for Possible Evacuation." *Chicago Tribune*. Accessed December 9, 2018. <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-09-30-9809300132-story.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order, Protect Own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of Navy patrol craft *USS Chinook* with 30 military personnel from Spain to the coasts of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The incident appears in both the MID and IMI datasets with slightly differing timelines. MID offers the wider range (September to November 1998), encompassing the negotiations with the Liberian government after the acute embassy violence and military protections. IMI, on the other hand, only lists the timeline of the incident as September 25, 1998, when the US evacuated the opposition militia member from Liberia. We choose to keep the broader timeline that MID offers. Moreover, the incident in question is simply the deployment of U.S. troops to Liberia, but it is easily confused with the standoff of the Economic Community of West Africa Observer Group (ECOMOG) troops and Liberian forces circling the US Embassy in Monrovia.

1998 Sudan

NAME: Operation Infinite Reach

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4217

DATES: August 20, 1998 – August 20, 1998

TARGET STATE(S): Sudan (SUD), 625

SUMMARY:

On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda operatives bombed the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. Thousands of others were injured in the attacks that had been planned for several years by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. These attacks prompted an economic, diplomatic, and military retaliation by the U.S. government.

On August 20, 1998 the United States launched a cruise missile attack against a suspected chemical weapons plant in Khartoum, Sudan as part of “Operation Infinite Reach.” Two U.S. warships in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea fired 20 tomahawk cruise missiles at the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant, resulting in one death and 10 injuries. The missiles destroyed three, one-story production facilities and hit a nearby candy factory called Sweets and Sesame.

The Sudanese protested the attack, and subsequent investigation cast doubt on the assertion that Al Shifa was a chemical weapons plant. Prior to the attack, President Clinton sought necessary Congressional approval and justified the attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, days prior to the attack on the Al Shifa facility, an intelligence official claimed that there was no evidence of commercial products being sold out of the facility. Further investigations demonstrated that there was no connection between the plant and the Sudan Military Industrial Complex (SMIC), which had produced weapons for the Sudanese Army. Given this lack of connection, the alleged ‘direct’ financial connection between bin Laden and the plant did not exist, reducing the legitimacy of the Sudanese target.

SOURCES:

Africa News. 1998. “US. Planes Bomb Sudan”. *Africa News*, August 21. LexisNexis.

Astill, James. “Strike One.” October 2, 2001, *The Guardian*. Accessed April 18, 2019.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/02/afghanistan.terrorism3>

Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies. 2005. "Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation Into the 1998 Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania." University of Pittsburgh.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies; Unclear/missing (unclear due to subsequent controversy)

BATTLE DEATHS: 1

TOTAL DEATHS: 1

COSTS: 2 U.S. warships; 20 cruise missiles; diplomatic fallout

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID, IMI, CRS listings of US usage of force abroad.

1999 East Timor

NAME: East Timor Independence Struggle

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 8, 1999 – December 17, 2002

TARGET STATE(S): East Timor, (ETM) (860)

SUMMARY:

An August 1999 independence referendum in East Timor sparked violent unrest and fighting between Indonesian aligned paramilitaries and Timorese forces. Following increased international pressure, the government of Indonesia announced in September of 1999 that it would accept peacekeepers from a UN-backed mission. The subsequent UN Mission the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), was led primarily by Australia, but did include significant support from the United States.

In October of 1999, US President Bill Clinton announced that he had deployed a limited force to East Timor to support the INTERFET mission and its purpose of restoring order to East Timor. Most notably, the amphibious helicopter carrier the USS Belleau Wood was deployed to the Timorese capital of Dili to support logistics and search and rescue operations. Additionally, 150 additional American soldiers were deployed to Dili to provide sophisticated communication support, with another 300 soldiers deployed to Darwin, Australia to provide additional logistics and intelligence support. Notably, the helicopter complement of the Belleau Wood allowed for the transportation of supplies, fuel, and equipment to multinational forces unable to supply themselves in the mountainous Indonesian border region.

The initial INTERFET ended in early 2000, giving way to a larger, longer term UN mission. While the United States did not join the revised UN mission, the United States did establish a longer term humanitarian relief and support mission known as US Support Group East Timor. This command was responsible for a number of humanitarian projects supported by the Belleau Wood, including the provision of medical care, rehabilitation of schools and clinics, and other engineering support. During its operations, USGET constructed 80 schoolhouses and clinics, conducted 50 separate engineering projects, and provided medical treatment to tens of thousands of individuals. At the conclusion of the mission in December of 2002, a number of observers noted the increased stability and reconstructions that had occurred since independence in 1999.

SOURCES:

Batson, Carrie. 2002. "Marines, Sailors Complete Humanitarian Assistance in East Timor." *US Marine Expeditionary Unit Public Affairs*, December 1. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=4837.

Oliva, Mark. 2002. "U.S. military wraps up its mission in East Timor." *Stars and Stripes* (Washington, DC), December 18. <https://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-military-wraps-up-its-mission-in-east-timor-1.230>.

Lekic, Slobodan. 2002. "Small, But Key U.S. Role in Timor." *The Washington Post*, October 11. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/19991011/aponline151829_000.htm.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to the operations of regular airlifts from the Belleau Wood, three years deployment for amphibious ship and other forces supporting the USGET.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS listing of US military missions abroad. The official INTERFET mission continued until 2000. However, the United States then established a separate mission (USGET) parallel to the follow-on UN mission to continue humanitarian assistance through 2002. While these command were separate statutorily, they continued exceedingly similar scopes. These could either continue to be combined, or separated into two separate entries for INTERFET and USGET.

1999 North Korea

NAME: Hostilities Between North Korea and South Korea/United States

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4125

DATES: June 16, 1999 - July 18, 1999

TARGET STATE(S): 731 North Korea

SUMMARY: Tensions between North and South Korea were increasing in 1999. Skirmishes between the two countries resulted in South Korea destroying a North Korean torpedo boat, killing at least 20 North Korean soldiers. At the same time, the United States was suspicious that North Korea was seeking to develop and test long-range missiles. In May, a presidential envoy traveled to Pyongyang to discuss US security concerns. A US inspection team also visited a suspected nuclear site and found no evidence of nuclear activity. As tensions increased, the United States and South Korea conducted landing exercises and increased naval patrols in the Yellow Sea. The United States also sent additional patrols to the region, including a guided missile cruiser, planes, and a destroyer.

In September, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on testing long-range missiles during talks with the United States. Both countries agreed to continue high-level talks and the United States agreed to lift some economic sanctions.

SOURCES:

2018. "Chronology of U.S.-North Korea Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." Arms Control Association, 16 Nov. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. *"The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description."* Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II.* New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rosenthal, Elisabeth. 1999. "U.S. and North Korea Meet on Suspected A-Site." The New York Times, 15 Nov. <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/24/world/us-and-north-korea-meet-on-suspected-a-site.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: 20 North Korean soldiers died in navy skirmish.

TOTAL DEATHS: 20

COSTS: Deployment of extra ships and military personnel to the Yellow Sea.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID datasets. We include this in our dataset because our sources confirm it as a show of force by the United States. Other datasets, however, such as ACD, IMI, CRS, and MIPS do not include this case since it is not a direct military intervention or the direct usage of force.

1999 Taiwan Strait Skirmishes

NAME: Taiwan Strait Skirmishes

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4088

DATES: February 10, 1999 - April 26, 2000.

TARGET STATE(S): 710 China, 713 Taiwan

SUMMARY: In 1999, tensions increased between China and Taiwan as Taiwan was seeking more independence from the mainland. In response, China conducted a series of threats, military exercises, and shows of force aimed at intimidating Taiwan. The dispute officially began on February 10, 1999, when Taiwan announced that China had deployed ballistic missiles within firing range of the island. Chinese shows of force continued into July, when Chinese jets twice crossed the dividing line between China and Taiwan, further exacerbating tensions. In response, the United States sent two aircraft carriers into the region, which remained in the area through July and August 1999.

Tensions continued into 2000. Attempting to intimidate Taiwan, a Chinese guided missile defense destroyer passed through the Taiwan Strait in February. In response, the United States sent the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier to patrol the region. China further increased military bombers and warplanes exercises in April 2000.

SOURCES:

Bunnag, Sanya. 1999. "Understanding Taiwan's Tactics." BBC News, 15 Nov.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/399381.stm>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. *"The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description."* Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II.* New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Military and navy deployment costs in the region.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the MID datasets as it is not an example of direct usage of force by the US. We include this instance in our dataset, however, because it qualifies as a show of force.

1999 Venezuela

NAME: Vargas Tragedy

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4261

DATES: December 14, 1999-January 2, 2000

TARGET STATE(S): Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (VEN), 101

SUMMARY:

Vargas State, a coastal region in northern Venezuela, has been prone to landslides and flooding dating back to the 18th century. In December 1999, Vargas received a historic amount of rainfall across two storms, one early in the month and a second, more powerful storm that lasted from December 14-16. The heavy rainfall and local geology and topography resulted in significant flooding, and later landslides. The event is now known as the “Vargas Tragedy”, cost between \$1.8b and \$3.5b (USD) in damages and claimed between 10,000-30,000 lives.¹ The flooding and landslides also displaced roughly 400,000 Venezuelans.²

The U.S. embassy in Caracas declared a flood emergency on December 16, thereby allowing U.S. government assistance to assist Venezuelan authorities with disaster response.³ Operation Fundamental Response was formed, and by the next day soldiers from 7th Special Forces Group and 160th Special Operations Aviation were on the ground with a total of 111 troops and seven military helicopters.⁴ U.S. personnel were tasked with search and rescue as well as transporting Venezuelan soldiers to and from the disaster area, and evacuated roughly 5,500 Venezuelans.⁶ The U.S. government also provided six water purification units, a four-person hazmat team, 150,000 pounds of food and water, and was set to assist in rebuilding a crucial coastal highway. Venezuelan Defense Minister Raúl Salazar accepted the U.S. Government offer of 450 marines and engineers as well as heavy equipment, however, after the USS Tortuga set sail from Norfolk to Venezuela President Chávez, concerned with potential American interference, overruled Minister Salazar and the Tortuga returned to Norfolk.⁷

¹ United States. U.S. Geological Survey. *Debris-flow and Flooding Hazards Associated with the December 1999 Storm in Coastal Venezuela and Strategies for Mitigation*. By Gerald F. Wiczorek. Reston, VA: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2001.

² United States. USAID. *Venezuela Floods Fact Sheet #9*. 2000.

³ *ibid*

⁴ *Special Operations Association*. Paducah, KY: Turner Pub., 2005.

⁵ United States. USAID. *Venezuela Floods Fact Sheet #9*. 2000.

⁶ *Special Operations Association*. Paducah, KY: Turner Pub., 2005.

⁷ Carroll, Rory. *Comandante: Hugo Chavez Venezuela*. New York City, NY: Penguin Books, 2014.

OBJECTIVE:

Humanitarian Intervention; United States soldiers and officials assist the Venezuelan government in search and rescue missions in Vargas state. United States also offers to help rebuild critical infrastructure, but are rebuffed by President Chávez.

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies; U.S. soldiers and other officials assist with search and rescue missions
Victory for Target & Allies; Venezuela mostly rebuilds in the Vargas state after landslides
Ongoing; some Venezuelans in Vargas still homeless after flooding and landslides, and many critically damaged buildings are still in use by displaced peoples⁸

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: Estimates range from 10,000-30,000 Venezuelans killed during ten days of rain, flooding and landslides.⁹ Unfortunately, poor census data and the fact that most of the neighborhoods affected were informal shantytowns makes more precise estimates difficult.

Per capita total deaths: 42-125 Venezuelans killed per 100,000 citizens

COSTS: ~\$24 million

\$3,756,865 total USG funding to January 2000¹⁰

\$20m authorized by President Clinton on December 24, 1999 to fund DoD response to Vargas tragedy¹¹

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in MID and Gibler (2018) as a very narrow US Coast Guard incident, with Venezuelan authorities accusing the US of violating its waters. But we expand this incident to include the humanitarian military mission of the US to Venezuela as a whole. The isolated Coast Guard incident does not appear to have a confirmed threat, display, or usage of force by the US in response. Thus, we change the start and end dates in line with the US humanitarian mission, beginning in December 1999 and ending in January 2000. The prior MID incident listed both dates as December 21st, 2000. We also change the outcome to denote a US victory, not a stalemate.

⁸ Grant, Will. "Venezuela Flood Victims Still Live in Ruins 10 Years on." BBC News. December 15, 2009. Accessed February 06, 2019. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8412249.stm>

⁹ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Venezuela Mud Slides of 1999." Encyclopædia Britannica. May 24, 2016. Accessed February 06, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Venezuela-mud-slides-of-1999>.

¹⁰ United States. USAID. *Venezuela Floods Fact Sheet #9*. 2000.

¹¹ *ibid*

1999 Yugoslavia

NAME: The Kosovo Intervention

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4137

DATES: March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999

TARGET STATE(S): Yugoslavia (YUG), 345

SUMMARY:

The conflict between the Yugoslav government and the ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo escalated greatly in 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its political autonomy completely. Throughout the 1990s, the Kosovo region was policed heavily, with many Kosovar Albanians being displaced from their homes, fired from public employment, and arrested under dubious charges.

Throughout the 1990s, the Kosovar Albanians had largely resisted nonviolently, but after 1995, as repression continued to increase, violent protests started along with the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a violent resistance group for Kosovar independence. Threats began between Yugoslavia and Albania over the fate and well-being of the ethnic Albanian population within Kosovo.

When United States-initiated peace talks between the Serbian government and the KLA failed, the violence between the two increased. This continued throughout the fall and winter of 1998, despite displays of force and threats by NATO of intervention.

In March of 1999, without UN authorization, NATO began a bombing campaign in order to coerce Milosevic and the Yugoslav government to broker peace with the KLA, prevent further ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians by Serbian military and paramilitaries. The bombing campaign continued until June 10, 1999 after more than 2,000 missiles and nearly 14,000 bombs were dropped on the region. Throughout this campaign, the Serbian state retaliated by shooting at NATO planes, using troops to further displace ethnic Albanian populations, and other direct usages of force. On June 3, 1999 Yugoslavia agreed to leave Kosovo and await a final decision regarding the region. Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia, with US and EU support, in 2008.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.

Zunes, Stephen. 2011. "The US War on Yugoslavia: Ten Years Later." *The Huffington Post*. May 25. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-zunes/the-us-war-on-yugoslavia_b_211172.html.

"15 Years On: Looking Back at NATO's 'humanitarian' Bombing of Yugoslavia." *RT International*. <https://www.rt.com/news/yugoslavia-kosovo-nato-bombing-705/>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order: Social Protection & Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Between 500-1,000. No US fatalities

TOTAL DEATHS: estimates range from 1,000 to 2,000. No US fatalities

COSTS: Alleged 13 billion dollars of increased US military spending over the campaign, reputational costs as a result of many feeling the bombing was excessive and ineffective as a result of killing many Kosovar Albanians as well as the illegality of NATO's actions. At least 11 naval vessels.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in most intervention dataset, albeit with different start and end dates. We choose to use the initial date of NATO airstrikes and the last day of airstrikes as our start/end dates.

2000 Eritrea

NAME: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 30, 2000 - July 31, 2008

TARGET STATE(S): Eritrea (ERI), 531

SUMMARY:

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a protracted independence struggle. The war portion of the independence struggle lasted from 1961 to 1991.

Eritrea and Ethiopia had a border war starting in 1998 in which 70,000 people died. In order to stop the conflict the United Nations initiated a series of negotiations in Algiers. The United States took a significant role in these negotiations. An agreement was signed in December 2000. The Algiers agreement created a 25 km zone to be patrolled by United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The Algiers agreement also created the Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Commission to demarcate a border, which was published in April 2002.

UN Security Council resolution 1312 authorized UNMEE on June 30, 2000. Resolution 1320 authorized 4200 military including 230 observers. Resolution 1681 downgraded this number to 2300 military including 230 observers. Resolution 1827 terminated the mission effective on July 31, 2008. Although the name of the mission includes Ethiopia, the forces were all in Eritrea.

The dispute had cooled significantly by the time UN troops were withdrawn. However, Ethiopia and Eritrea would not have true relations until 2018. Death tolls during UNMEE were significantly decreased from their high point in the late 1990s and from the civil war in the 1980s. The major reason UNMEE was withdrawn was because of declining logistical support, with particular issues concerning Eritrea withdrawing UNMEE helicopter access.

SOURCES:

“Annual Report on United States Contributions to the United Nations” (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, June 7, 2010). [Link](#)

Lyons, Terrence. “Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea,” CSR NO. 21 (The Center for Protective Action; the Council on Foreign Relations, December 2006). [Link](#)

“United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, March 20, 2017. [Link](#)

“UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea - Facts and Figures,” United Nations, November 28, 2006. [Link](#)

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order

OUTCOME: Victory for US/Allies (no continuation of violence)

BATTLE DEATHS: unknown USA; 13 UN military; 4 international civilian; 4 local civilians

TOTAL DEATHS: 21

COSTS: \$26 million in FY2009 from USA

Yearly budget 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 \$182.24 million

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We cannot find the exact number of US troops commitments to this mission, but we can confirm it through several sources as the US usage of force abroad. CRS listed the start date as 2005, but we alter it to 2000 as per more detailed sources.

2000 Russia - Bering Strait

NAME: Stationing of Aircraft to Counter Russian Probes in the Bering Strait

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4197

DATES: November 30, 2000 - January 2001

TARGET STATE(S): Russia 365

SUMMARY:

On November 30, 2000, Russia deployed an unknown number of Tu-95 “Bear” strategic bombers to locations on the Eastern tip of Siberia, to include across the Bering Strait from Alaska. These bombers have a range of 9400 miles without needing to refuel and can launch ballistic missiles. This action was labeled as an exercise.

The US and Canada viewed this as staging for probing of the North American air defense. Alaska has its own air defense zone in the US strategic system, and a significant portion of the anti-Russian identification and defense systems are located in North and Northwest Canada.

To counter any tests, the US and Canada moved fighter jets to bases in Alaska and Canada. The training missions lasted until an unknown time in January 2001.

SOURCES:

Demerly, Tom. 2017. “Russian Tu-95 ‘Bear’ bombers hit daesh terrorist camps with KH-101 cruise missiles in long range strike.” *The Aviationist*.
<https://theaviationist.com/2017/09/27/russian-tu-95-bear-bombers-hit-daesh-terrorist-camps-with-kh-101-cruise-missile-in-long-range-strike/>.
(This page contextualizes capabilities of Tu-95 strategic bombers).

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Roblin, Sebastien. 2017. “The Tu-95 bear: The 60-year-old Russian bomber America still chases all over the world.” *The National Interest*. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-tu-95-bear-the-60-year-old-russian-bomber-america-still-21109>.
(This page also contextualizes Russian use of strategic bombers).

Wetzel, Gary. 2017. “Inside the Russian bomber That’s been flying America’s coastline.” *Foxtrot Alpha*. <https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/inside-the-russian-bomber-that-s-been-flying-america-s-1795375146>.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Unclear/missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Movement of fighter aircraft (most likely F-15 and F-16 varieties) to bases in Alaska and Canada

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and in Gibler's (2018) associated case narratives, as the case represents a showing of force, not a direct usage of force. The action is a movement (not a true deployment) to counter a Russian exercise, which occurred partially within US territory. Gibler (2018) originally did not offer an end date to this dispute, but this was changed in later versions to January 2001. We keep this case in our dataset, but we are unable to directly confirm via non-MID sources.

2000 Russia - Oil Tankers

NAME: Alleged Iran Sanctions Violations by Russia

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4213

DATES: February 2, 2000 - April 9, 2000

TARGET STATE(S): Russia (RUS), 365

SUMMARY:

The U.N. Security Council enacted resolutions in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War that placed sanctions on Iraq. The embargo was meant to pressure Baghdad into accepting restrictions on its military growth, including a prohibition on possessing weapons of mass destruction, and acceptance of international observers. Iraq managed to slip 100,000 barrels of oil a day past the international flotilla patrolling the Persian Gulf, according to the U.S. State Department. In response, the United States added ships to the inspection force.

The U.S. Navy stopped and detained a Volgoneft tanker, flying the Russian flag, bound for the United Arab Emirates that was suspected of carrying sanctioned Iraq oil. The United States claimed that this was not the first Russian ship that had been illegally transporting Iraqi oil and that they gave Russia notice that they would be boarding the ship a week in advance. The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the tanker had Iranian oil and demanded its immediate release. On February 5, 2000 the tanker was moved to Oman for further inspection of the oil. On February 7, 2000, chemical tests confirmed that the vessel was smuggling oil products out of Iraq in violation of U.N. sanctions. Russia commissioned a Swiss organization to conduct an independent test of the oil on February 8. The test results came back a few days later, and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow refused to comment on them.

Russia repeatedly protested the seizure, claiming that the privately owned tanker was carrying legal cargo from Iran; however, there was an Iraqi naval officer aboard the ship.

U.S. officials said there was no reason to believe that the Volgoneft 147 was operating with the knowledge or consent of the Russian government. Russian government officials stated the ship was privately owned.

After initially insisting that the oil it carried could only be from Iran and that the vessel should be immediately released, Russian government officials acknowledged that the cargo could be confiscated if it were shown to have come from Iraq

The offload of oil was completed on February 18, and the crew of 17 Russians and one Iraqi was allowed to leave Omani waters.

SOURCES:

Becker, Elizabeth. 2000. "US Seizes Russia Tanker Said to Carry Oil From Iraq," *New York Times*, February 4. <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/04/world/us-seizes-russia-tanker-said-to-carry-oil-from-iraq.html>

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Suro, Roberto. 2000. "Test Finds Iraqi Oil on Russian Tanker," *Washington Post*, February 7. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-02/07/066r-020700-idx.html>

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change; Economic interests; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by Target Actor

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 0

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and Gibler (2018) as it represented a shipping seizure, not a traditional military intervention. Given the extended nature of this incident and the illegal findings within the ship, we include this case as the US usage of force abroad, but we may consider removing it in the future.

2000 Sierra Leone

NAME: Sierra Leone International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 7, 2000 – September 2001

TARGET STATE(S): Sierra Leone, 451

SUMMARY:

Following the civil war in Sierra Leone throughout the last years of the 1990s, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1289 on 7 February 2000. The resolution called for the Government of Sierra Leone to create a professional and accountable armed forces and national police.

In April and May 2000, UN peacekeepers under the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) came under attack by rebel forces. The United Kingdom responded by sending 1500 troops to evacuate its citizens and to support UNAMSIL. British troops stayed to train the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) so these forces could disarm the rebels themselves. To support the peace effort and centralize the country's security apparatus, the UK organized the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT).

IMATT's mandate is to train the RSLAF into a self-sustaining, democratically accountable and affordable force. Great Britain has provided the vast majority of personnel for IMATT. Canada has provided the next largest contingent, with Bermuda, Ghana, Jamaica, Nigeria, Senegal, the United States among the nations that have also provided personnel. In May of 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver "ammunition, and other supplies and equipment" to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.

SOURCES:

Government of Canada. "[International Military Assistance and Training Team \(IMATT\): International Information](#)." Government of Canada. Accessed Sept. 4, 2020.

Flynn, Daniel. "[UK has foreign policy fans in Sierra Leone](#)." Reuters. August 10, 2007.

Michael J. McNerney et al. "[Defense Institution Building in Africa: an assessment](#)." Rand Corporation. August 2016.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Cost of support operations and deployment of one C-17 Aircraft and 3 U.S. military advisors.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance of military intervention is was not included in the MID. However, it is mentioned in the CRS dataset. While the mission was spearheaded by the United Kingdom, the United States support of the IMATT mission allows for its inclusion into our dataset.

2000 Yemen

NAME: Response to the bombing of *U.S.S. Cole*

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 12-14, 2000

TARGET STATE(S): Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), 678

SUMMARY: The United States has maintained a heightened naval presence in the Persian Gulf dating back to the 1980s when it deployed forces in response to the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the regional fallout of the Iran-Iraq War, such as the “Tanker Wars” that threatened to destabilize international oil markets. The destroyer *U.S.S. Cole* was stationed in the region as part of this force. On October 12, it was refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden when two suicide attackers approached the vessel in a small naval craft and set off a major detonation of C4 explosives. 17 American sailors were killed and 39 were injured.

Al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the attack: ever since the United States sent troops to Saudi soil to counter the threat from Iraq during its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the radical Islamist organization has designated the United States as its main enemy. The attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* was part of a series of Al-Qaida attacks that targeted American interests worldwide, culminating in the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City.

In response to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, President Bill Clinton deployed about 100 military security personnel to Yemeni soil and deployed two additional destroyers to operate in or near Yemeni waters to provide communications. The purpose of the intervention was to safeguard and protect American personnel and materiel in Yemen.

SOURCES:

Gregory Gause. 2009. *International Relations of the Persian Gulf*. Cambridge University Press.

Thomas Hegghammer. 2010. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*. Cambridge University Press

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017.” *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 17 American sailors were killed in the attack on *U.S.S. Cole*

COSTS: Maintaining a heightened naval presence in the Persian Gulf.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad, but we confirm it via several sources.

2000 Yugoslavia (1)

NAME: Kosovo Border Protection

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4186

DATES: February 21, 2000 to April 3, 2000

TARGET STATE(S): Yugoslavia (YUG), 345

SUMMARY:

Violence continued along the UN-protected border area between Yugoslavia and Kosovo in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign. In late 1999 and early 2000, Kosovar rebels infiltrated Serbian territory and attacked various outposts. Both sides accused each other of various attacks throughout the border region during this time.

Amidst the rising tension, the United States walked back on its initial rule to avoid the direct border area between the two sides, sending 30 troops. Kosovar Albanian self-defense units and Serbian forces both reinforced the border area. The United States-led NATO continued to issue threats in order to deter further violence.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

"Europe | Kosovo One Year on." 2000. *BBC News*. March 16.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/676196.stm>.

Smith, Jeffrey R. 2000. "Kosovo Rebels' Serbian Designs Concern NATO." *The Washington Post*. February 28. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/02/28/kosovo-rebels-serbian-designs-concern-nato/4f6cd443-09e0-44de-81db-a5a15b8aa3ce/?utm_term=.938923b7c56a.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection & Order: Social Protection

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset and related Gibler (2018) narratives as a US display of force during a peacekeeping mission. Other datasets do not include this as it is not a direct usage of force abroad. Our expanded definition allows the inclusion of this incident as a confirmed display of force by the US abroad.

2000 Yugoslavia (2)

NAME: PHIBLEX 2000 with Croatian Military

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4298

DATES: September 26, 2000 - September 29, 2000

TARGET STATE(S): Yugoslavia, 345

SUMMARY:

On August 5, 2000 a Croatian freighter was seized by Yugoslav naval forces off the coast of Montenegro. Croatia did not immediately respond to the seizure. A few weeks later, in mid September, Slobodan Milosevic was reelected as president of Yugoslavia. There is speculation that these two incidents raised U.S. concerns over Milosevic's willingness and ability to utilize force in the region.

On September 26, 2000 the United States conducted a joint amphibious exercise (PHIBLEX 2000) with the Croatian military. About 400 U.S. sailors and 200 Marines from the amphibious assault ship *USS Austin* and 400 Croatian soldiers jumped into Zodiac rubber boats and simulated a landing operation on the Croatian island of Zirje in the Adriatic Sea. At the time, the exercise was the largest joint military exercise between the two nations.

Both U.S. and Croatian officials denied that the exercise was intended as a show of force against Yugoslavia. At the time, Croatia was an aspiring NATO member and officials insisted that the exercise was a way of testing their militaries compatibility to fight alongside NATO allies. Croatia's freighter was not released from the Yugoslavian government

SOURCES:

Associated Press. 2015. "Croatia: Us-croatian Military Exercises." *Associated Press Archives*. Published July 21.

<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/a2dcd9148e27186fda133d0bbe8c9dd3>

Gibler, Douglas M. 2018. "International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives." Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Captain Kenneth R. Kassner. 2001. "Croatian Phiblex 2000 Storms New Ground." U.S. Navy Institute. March.

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2001/march/croatian-phiblex-2000-storms-new-ground>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Deployment of USS Austin and 200 U.S. Marines from 26th Regiment.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident only appears in the MID dataset. While there was no usage of force the United States ability to project force in a joint exercise with a current NATO members is a show of force.

2001 Afghanistan

NAME: War in Afghanistan

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 7, 2001 - Ongoing

TARGET STATE(S): Afghanistan (AFG), 700

SUMMARY:

September 11, 2001 was the deadliest terror attack on the United States in its history. 19 members of al-Qaeda (AQ) hijacked four commercial planes. Two jets collided with the World Trade Center towers in New York, one jet crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, VA. The fourth plane downed in rural Pennsylvania after passengers managed to thwart the terrorists' intentions. The attack resulted in the death of 2,977 Americans and more than \$10 Billion dollars of damage.

The attacks vaulted President George W. Bush into a crisis never experienced by the United States. As a candidate, George Bush ran on a platform promising to retrench American power globally and invest in programs at home. 9/11 forced him to change tack. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001 (AUMF). This joint resolution allowed the United States military the green light to fight terrorists that orchestrated 9/11. While the US did not seek a UN resolution granting the use of force. Many saw the US' response as a legitimate self-defense.

Since 1996, the Taliban had ruled over Afghanistan as an Islamic Emirate since the organization's victory in the country's civil war. The Taliban refused U.S. requests to extradite leaders of AQ as up to that point AQ had not claimed responsibility for the attack. This refusal required the removal of the Taliban from power.

On October 7, 2001, The United States with help from the United Kingdom invaded Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power and dismantle al-Qaeda under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United States military effort was coupled with an international diplomatic campaign that established a UN recognized government under the Hamid Karzai. This new government was allied with the US forces and contributed significant troops to the war for years to come. Coordination between the newly created Afghan government and the United States military required significant state capacity building. A costly, timely, and inefficient endeavor.

Despite being heavily outnumbered and outgunned by US coalition forces the Taliban reorganized in early 2002 and launched an insurgency campaign to respond to a streak of US tactical victories. This campaign saw the Taliban using wanton violence against the US military and Afghan citizens to undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government and the presence of foreign forces. The Taliban's campaign of insurgency was successful in regaining areas of

Afghanistan and enforcing its legitimacy. By the end of George W. Bush's presidency, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan reached 36,000.

The US military pivoted strategies to counter Taliban victories to one that focused on state building and political operations. Despite campaigning on reducing the United States' presence in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama increased the number of US troops in Afghanistan and by 2011 there were more than 100,000 troops in the country. The United States achieved a significant tactical victory on May 1, 2011 with the assassination of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.

By this point the United States was conducting a Global War on Terror (GWOT) which saw the deployment of the US military in multiple regions of the world with Afghanistan and Iraq as focal points. OEF has expanded to the Philippines, Sahara, Horn of Africa, Central America, and Central Asia. The United States Government legitimized these interventions through the vagueness of the AUMF.

In 2012, NATO forces announced their withdrawal from Afghanistan and in 2014 the last British military base in the Helmand province was handed over to the Afghan military. NATO maintained some capacity in the country through Operation Resolute Support Mission that provided support to domestic Afghan counterterrorism operations. In 2015, the United States relaunched its military operations in Afghanistan as Operation Freedom's Sentinel that worked in coordination with NATO on counterterrorism initiatives. By the end of his presidency, the number of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan had dwindled down to 9,000.

In 2017, newly inaugurated President, Donald Trump, announced an increase in troops in Afghanistan by 50%. Like his predecessor, President Trump also campaigned on withdrawing the United States from Afghanistan, which at this point was the longest war the US had ever been involved in. US forces focused on destroying sources of Taliban financing and supporting Afghan forces throughout the country. In response to increased US presence, the Taliban expanded their use of terror against civilians.

In February 2019, communication between the United States and the Taliban had begun to gain traction and were on display in the first set of peace talks between the two belligerents. U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and top Taliban official Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar centered the discussion on the United States withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in exchange for the Taliban pledging to block international terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil. After a year of dialogue that wax and waned, either party's representatives signed an agreement on February 29, 2020. Despite the optimism this deal brought, the deal did not include a ceasefire and following its signing the Taliban attacked U.S. positions in Afghanistan. The US responded in kind with aerial strikes on the Taliban.

SOURCES:

Matthew J. Morgan. "The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything?". *Palgrave Macmillan*. July 15, 2009.

Ben Smith and Arabella Thorp. "The legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan". *House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section*. February 26, 2010.

Council on Foreign Relations. "[Timeline of US War in Afghanistan](#)" [Council on Foreign Relations](#)." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Last Updated March, 2020.

Danielle Kurtzleben. "[CHART: How The U.S. Troop Levels In Afghanistan Have Changed Under Obama](#)." *National Public Radio (NPR)*. July 6, 2016.

Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, Gillian S. Oak. "[U.S. Special Operation Forces in the Philippines, 2001- 2014](#)." *RAND Corporation*. 2016.

United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. "[Afghanistan: 10,000 Civilian Casualties For Sixth Straight Year](#)." *United Nations*. Feb. 22, 2020.

Neta Crawford. "[Cost of War: United States Budgetary Costs of the Post-9/11 Wars Through FY2019: \\$5.9 Trillion Spent and Obligated](#)." *Brown University Watson Institute*. Nov. 14, 2018.

U.S. Department of Defense. "[Casualty Status](#)." *U.S. Department of Defense*. Oct. 5, 2020.

Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation "[Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation](#)." *U.S. Department of Labor*. Last Updated Mar. 31, 2020.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime, Maintain/Build Foreign Regime, Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S. Contractors: 1,720
U.S Military: 2,372
Afghan Military: 65,596+ killed
Taliban: 67,000-72,000

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S.: 7,092
Afghanistan: >100,000

COSTS: As of FY 2019, it is estimated that the United Spent a total of \$975 billion. The number of sorties flown throughout the period are well into the thousands. Maximum number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan peaked under President Obama to more than 100,000 battle troops deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is accounted for in every dataset MIP uses, MID (#4283), IMI, and CRS. However, in many previous datasets the War in Afghanistan has been disaggregated into discrete sections. This is likely to account for slightly changing objectives that the United States has had in the country over time. Originally, MIPS intended to section the War into three or four different time sections. However, we have chosen to aggregate all changes in military/political objectives the United States had in Afghanistan to one unique case.

2001 China

NAME: China/United States Hainan Island Incident

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4280

DATES: March 23, 2001 - July 3, 2001

TARGET STATE(S): 710 China

SUMMARY: This string of skirmishes began on March 23, 2001, when Chinese naval forces pursued a U.S. navy ship they contended was operating in Chinese waters. Tensions escalated on April 1, when a U.S. EP-3E Aries II spy plane was conducting surveillance operations approximately 50 miles away from the Chinese island Hainan, where it collided with a Chinese fighter jet. The U.S. claimed the spy plane was operating in international waters. After the collision, the Chinese fighter crashed into the sea, killing the pilot. The U.S. plane successfully made an emergency landing on Hainan, where the 24 crew members and aircraft were captured and held by the Chinese.

This incident sparked a long diplomatic exchange between China and The United States. President Bush on April 3rd demanded the “prompt and safe” return of the American crew and aircraft. Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed regret that the Chinese pilot had been lost in the collision and urged both sides to work together to ensure the incident was resolved. On April 11, the White House issued a statement of regret, however, no formal apology was issued by The United States. The crew were released on the same day.

During the incident, the U.S. moved three destroyers into international waters near China. On April 5th, China scrambled fighters in response to a U.S. spy plane operating near China. The incident officially ended on July 3rd, when the plane was returned to the U.S., although the Chinese could have accessed sensitive materials onboard the plane while it was in captivity. The United States agreed to pay China \$34,567 for the cost of disassembling and shipping the plane, although China initially requested one million dollars to cover these costs.

SOURCES:

2001. “Chinese poker.” *The Economist*, 7 Dec.

<https://www.economist.com/unknown/2001/04/12/chinese-poker>

2001. “U.S. aircraft collides with Chinese fighter, forced to land.” *CNN*, 7 Dec.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20081211063330/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/04/01/us.china.p.lane.03/>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21: 133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rosenthal, Elisabeth. 2001. "China Spurns Spy Plane Offer as Inadequate." *The New York Times*, 7 Dec. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/13/world/china-spurns-spy-plane-offer-as-inadequate.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Compromise. U.S. soldiers released and spy plane returned. White House issued a "statement of regret" to the Chinese.

BATTLE DEATHS:

- China: 1 pilot killed in crash.

TOTAL DEATHS:

- China: 1 death

COSTS: Cost of repairs to damaged plane. U.S. paid China \$34,567 to defray the cost of disassembling and shipping the plane back to The United States. Cost of diverting U.S. destroyers. Diplomatic costs of incident.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and CRS listing of US usage of force, but not in IMI, MIPS, ACD/PRIO, or other key data sources. This is because the case represents a US showing of force, followed by Chinese retaliation. We include this case as a confirmed US display of force.

2001 China/Taiwan

NAME: China/Taiwan Dispute

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4281

DATES: March 27, 2001 - August 2001

TARGET STATE(S): 710 China, 713 Taiwan

SUMMARY: On March 27th, tensions between China and Taiwan increased as China threatened to declare war on Taiwan if it declared independence. China had also been frustrated over American sales of weapons and military equipment to Taiwan. On August 1st, China again threatened force. In response, Taiwan began a series of military helicopter exercises on August 21st. The next day, China conducted a series of extensive military exercises near the Dongshan Island. Approximately 100,000 soldiers were involved in the exercises, with the intention of demonstrating how China would “smash” any potential separatist movements by Taiwan.

In response to Chinese threats and displays of force, the United States threatened force if China attacked Taiwan. On August 17, The United States dispatched two U.S. aircraft carriers to the region and conducted military exercises with other U.S. naval ships and submarines in the region. These exercises lasted only one day.

Despite heated tensions on both sides, Taiwan and Chinese economic integration continued to increase throughout the crisis. In November 2001, Taipei lifted a 50-year ban on investment and direct trade with China.

SOURCES:

2001. “Signs in China and Taiwan of Making Money, Not War.” *The New York Times*, 16 Nov. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/15/world/signs-in-china-and-taiwan-of-making-money-not-war.html>

2001. Lague, David. 2001. "U.S. Holds Tighter to Taiwan's Hand." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 164 (34) (Aug 30): 12-14. <https://login.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/208223098?accountid=14434>.

2001. “U.S. Would Defend Taiwan, Bush Says.” *The New York Times*, 16 Nov. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/us-would-defend-taiwan-bush-says.html>

2018. "Taiwan profile - Timeline." *BBC News*, 16 Nov. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16178545>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "*The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.*" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers and cost of military exercises.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS list of US military involvements and MID datasets, but not in ACD/PRIO, IMI, or MIPS. We include this in our dataset because it is a clear show of force by the United States.

2002 Colombia

NAME: Special Forces Deployment (pipeline protection)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 2002 – September 2005

TARGET STATE(S): Colombia (COL), 100

SUMMARY:

In 2001 and years prior, escalating guerilla warfare between the Government of Colombia and rebel groups such as the FARC and ELN had resulted in increased attacks on oil pipelines and infrastructure. Rebel attacks on oil pipelines had cost the Government of Colombia \$500 million in 2001 alone, and had attacked the Occidental Petroleum Company's Caño Limón-Coveñas (CLC) pipeline alone over 940 times since 1980.

In response to these attacks and threats to oil production, the Bush administration announced the deployment of an initial group of 30 US Special Forces soldiers to provide training assistance to the Colombian military guarding the CLC pipeline in Arauca province. In addition, the US government provided ten helicopters to assist the Government of Colombia with troop transportation under a no-cost lease to the Government of Colombia. The mission lasted until late 2005, where US Special forces provided training and equipment to over 1,600 Colombian Army Soldiers.

The US government broadly regarded the mission as a success. They noted pipeline attacks in the mission's zone of operations had decreased, and that Colombian forces had demonstrated increased competency and better relations with the local populations. However, the GAO did note that attacks on the pipeline had increased in the Norte de Santander department, which was outside the scope of the train and assist mission itself. In addition, it noted that due to delayed delivery of the helicopters themselves, continued assistance would be necessary to integrate them fully into the Colombian military capabilities.

SOURCES:

Forero, Juan. 2002. "New Role for U.S. in Colombia: Protecting a Vital Oil Pipeline." *New York Times*, October 4,. <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/04/world/new-role-for-us-in-colombia-protecting-a-vital-oil-pipeline.html>.

Protecting the Pipeline: The U.S. Military Mission Expands. 2003. Issue brief no. 1. *Colombia Monitor*. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B28580307872CB57C1256D33004000C5-wola-col-27may.pdf>

Security Assistance - Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain. 2005. Report no. GAO-05-971. Report to Congressional Requesters. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: \$99 Million USD - \$71 million for purchase of two UH-60 helicopters, eight UH-11 helicopters. \$28 million remaining for US Special Forces.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only reported in Zoltan Grossman's (2018) list of US military interventions. It is not included in any other key dataset of intervention, as it represents an indirect case of usage of force by the US via a special advisory force, training, and military equipment. Despite such an indirect route of intervention, we consider this a case of the U.S. usage of force abroad as there is clear evidence to show that U.S. military resources altered the frequency of rebel attacks in Colombia. This was also an intentional policy of wielding U.S force abroad to solve transnational issues.

We have battle deaths as zero due to no reported direct combat between US and FARC/ELN forces. But this does not include any results of combat conducted by Colombian military that were advised or trained by US military forces.

We use September 2005 as the final date for the intervention since the GAO report on the project was dated on September 2005, and the report noted that the mission had stretched into "Fiscal Year 2005," which ended on September 31, 2005. Regular reports of US military presence in Arauca and Colombia more broadly persists past this date to the present day, but it is not obvious that the oil pipeline protection mission was extended past 2005.

2002 Cote d'Ivoire

NAME: Evacuation

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 26, 2002

TARGET STATE(S): Cote d'Ivoire (CDI) (437).

SUMMARY:

On September 19, 2002 a failed coup erupted in the Ivorian capital of Abidjan, led by former Army Chief of Staff General Robert Guei. General Guei and many of his allies in the capital were killed in the ensuing fighting, but additional army mutineers announced the formation of a new insurgent group, the Mouvement patriotique de Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI). The MPCI seized control of a number of towns, including the cities of Bouake and Korhogo. At the time, the International Christian Academy in Bouake (a Missionary School), housed almost 200 Western citizens of the United States, France, and Canada, including 148 Americans. In response, the United States deployed approximately 200 Special Forces soldiers to the Bouake airport, in conjunction with a larger French force aiming to evacuate French and other European citizens. Subsequently, the schoolchildren, along with other evacuees, were flown from Bouake to the capital of Yamassoukro, and subsequently to the Ghanaian capital of Accra.

Various rebel groups and subsequent splinter factions subsequently agreed to ceasefires with the government in October of 2001 and January of 2002, restoring a modicum of stability to the country.

SOURCES:

Koinange, Jeff. 2002. "Expats flee Ivory Coast violence." *CNN*, September 27.

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/09/27/africa.icoast/>.

Roberts, Joel. 2002. "American Kids Escape Ivory Coast." *CBS News*, September 27.

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-kids-escape-ivory-coast/>.

Vaisse, Julian. The Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. 2003. U.S. - France Analysis Series. Washington, DC: *Brookings Institution*. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/vaisse20030325.pdf>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to the deployment of 200 American special force soldiers, recurring

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, as the incident is limited to the military evacuation of US nationals.

2002 Djibouti

NAME: Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA) [Djibouti]

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 12, 2002 - July 1, 2006

TARGET STATE(S): Djibouti 522

SUMMARY:

In response to terrorist threats in the Horn of Africa mainly in Somalia and to an extent in Yemen, the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA) in the aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks. Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established in November 2002 in North Carolina, with the first American forces arriving in Djibouti in December 2002. The initial units were U.S. Marines and they leased a small former French base called Camp Lemonnier from the Djiboutian government.

Eventually, the lease was extended and the base expanded to be a permanent presence run by the Navy. On July 1, 2006 a formal ceremony designated the handover of the base from the Marine Corps to the Navy; we code this as the end date of the intervention, as the base - known as Camp Lemonnier - hereafter serves as a de facto overseas U.S. navy base, rather than constituting a distinct military intervention.

The American presence has a variety of purposes and continuously morphs. It was originally formed to combat piracy off the Somali coast, hence the large US Navy presence. Additionally, the Air Force runs drones out of Djibouti to targets in Somalia and Yemen. There is a significant Special Forces presence staged out of Djibouti, as it is the only permanent base in Africa currently. Other operations staged out of Djibouti but range throughout the CJOA include security force assistance (training and equipping partner nations), humanitarian assistance (livestock inoculation, well-digging, road construction, etc.), and disaster relief are organized and executed by Army Civil Affairs and Navy Construction Battalions (Seabees). The force responsible for embassy relief and protection for the continent is also staged out of Djibouti. Djiboutian forces are deployed to portions of western Somalia as part of AMISOM.

Currently, the United States has about 6000 troops in Djibouti. As of this writing, the current Combined Joint Area of Operations (the area that CJTF-HOA is responsible for) is Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Seychelles. However, not all American forces in these countries are from CJTF-HOA, and CJTF-HOA sometimes operates outside of these countries.

SOURCES:

“Afghanistan Fatalities,” iCasualties.org. [Link](#)

Website with casualty figures for post-9/11 military actions.

“Camp Lemonnier History,” Commander, Navy Installations Command. [Link](#)

Cox, Steve. 2002. “Horn of Africa Group Meets with Regional Leaders,” U.S Department of Defense, December 30. [Link](#)

Gardner, Frank. 2014. “US Military Steps up Operations in the Horn of Africa,” *BBC*, February 7. [Link](#)

Schmitt, Eric. 2018. “U.S. Signs New Lease to Keep Strategic Military Installation in the Horn of Africa,” *The New York Times*, January 19. sec. World. [Link](#)

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Economic Protection (missions in neighboring countries fit other definitions, but reason why in Djibouti specifically is economic protection of Bab el Mandeb [the straits] and protection of US interests in Djibouti relative to China)

OUTCOME: Unclear/ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 19 non-hostile American deaths (accidents mainly)

COSTS: Comes from Overseas Contingency Operations budget (OCO), which is like a DOD bottomless pot of money. A new lease for Lemonnier has cost \$350 million since 2015 (\$70 million a year). For a period of time before that it was \$30 million.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad. It was difficult assessing casualties and budgets in this incident because sometimes the numbers are included in the general Operation Enduring Freedom realm which is primarily Afghanistan, but incorporates a handful of other smaller endeavors. We may consider disaggregating this mission further.

2002 Pakistan

NAME: US pursuit of Taliban on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4552

DATES: January 11, 2002 - Ongoing

TARGET STATE(S): Pakistan (770)

SUMMARY:

Since 2002, ending the terrorist threat along the Afghan-Pakistani border has been one of the United States' key national security goals. The US has since financially supported Pakistan authorities and organizations in fighting known terrorist organizations along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) occupies the majority of this frontier and is a region that has certain autonomous functions. Its harsh terrain and rural communities have made the region a safe haven for terror groups, namely Al Qaeda.

In the context of the United States' war in Afghanistan, insurgents based in the FATA region have infiltrated into Afghanistan, carried out attacks against U.S. and coalition troops, and then retreated back into Pakistan. From 2002 to 2008, U.S. military aid to Pakistan totaled \$11.9 billion. However, this support has been fraught with inefficiencies. Alongside the military assistance, the U.S. has also aided Pakistan through development programs. The poor implementation of the two programs, from a variety of U.S. agencies, has seen large amounts of U.S. taxpayer money fueling local corruption.

The inability of Pakistani officials to utilize U.S. funds to achieve American objectives was put on full display following Operation Neptune Spear in 2011 which saw U.S. service members execute Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan. Despite this, the U.S. government continues to provide military aid to Pakistan albeit the amount has reduced significantly since the start of the War in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the U.S has provided more than \$20.3 billion in security assistance to Pakistan.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume I*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Qaiser Janjua, Muhammad. *In the Shadow of the Durand Line: Security, Stability, and the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan*. Naval Postgraduate School. (June 2009).

United States Government Accountability Office. *Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area With Afghanistan, Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, Report to Congressional Requesters*. U.S. GOA (2009) <https://www-hsdl-org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/?view&did=38677>

Ibrahim, Azeem. *U.S. Aid to Pakistan - U.S. Tax Payers have Funded Pakistani Corruption*. Belfer Center Discussion Paper #2009-06. International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School. July 2009.

Farouq, Amal. [*The Rocky U.S.-Pakistan Security Relationship*](#). Security Assistance Monitor. Published May 2019.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: Unknown

COSTS: From FY2003 to FY2020. The United States has provided \$20.3 Billion to Pakistan in security assistance alone.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The dataset says that the start date of the conflict is December 30, 2002. The MID dataset notes the conflict beginning on January 11, 2002 and ending on May 22, 2005. . The only source to cite May 22, 2005 as the end of the conflict has been the Gibler book. Most have ambiguously cited 2009.

OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (adapted from IMI and MIPS):

Remove Foreign Regime. Military force is employed with the intention of removing (i.e., deposing, overthrowing) a foreign regime from power. The intervening state may overthrow and replace a foreign government itself, fight alongside insurgent groups that seek to replace the regime in power, or support foreign invasions by other states attempting to seize power.

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority. Military force is employed in an attempt to preserve the governing authority of an incumbent regime or the existing political institutions in another state. This includes both operations to assist a foreign government with the elimination of a domestic insurgent threat and operations to defend a foreign government against an external threat. This category should also be chosen if the intervening state is attempting to establish and then maintain the political authority of a particular regime or create particular political institutions in a state (i.e., statebuilding). Military operations do not have to seek the preservation of any particular incumbent *leader* to be considered interventions for the maintenance of regime authority. Often individual leaders are appointed and replaced as the intervening state sees fit during the course of an intervention. The key criteria is the goal of defeating some perceived threat (external or internal) to a state's sovereignty or system of government. Foreign regime building and maintenance may follow, but should be distinguished from, the use of force to remove a foreign regime from power. Cases should be coded as defense of territory rather than maintenance of political authority if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute. Cases should be coded as maintenance of empire when the intervening state is attempting to maintain its own political authority, rather than that of an ally.

Maintain Empire. Military force is employed in an attempt to re-assert or maintain the intervening state's own political authority over territory claimed as national homeland by another ethnic group. Cases should be coded as foreign regime maintenance if the conflict location is an independent state.

Acquire or Defend Territory. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed to defend, acquire, or reclaim territory. The state may intervene to defend the territory of an ally from an external threat, help an ally acquire territory or reassert authority over previously held territory, or seize territory for itself. Cases are coded as territorial only if a piece of land, rather than political authority over an entire nation, is in dispute.

Policy Change. Military force, or the threat of force, is employed in an attempt to coerce an incumbent regime, group, or leader into change specific policies (foreign or domestic) or behaviors. While many conflicts stem from policy disputes, the primary political objective of an intervention is only policy change when the intervening state wants the targeted adversary to change an objectionable policy of its own accord.

Economic Protection. Intervener attempts to protect economic or resource interests of self or others.

Social Protection and Order. Military force, or the threat of force, is used to protect civilians from violence and/or other human rights abuses; restore social order in a situation of unrest (e.g. violent protests, rioting, looting); or to suppress violence between armed groups within another state. 'Peacekeeping' operations that are actually intended to prop up an incumbent regime or maintain empire should not be coded as social protection and order operations. Similarly, 'humanitarian' operations in which military force is used in an attempt to coerce the incumbent government into changing the way it is treating a minority group within its borders should be coded as policy change operations.

Subsections of this objective (can select more general umbrella or below subsections, if distinguishable):

Social Protective Intervention: to protect a socio-ethnic faction(s) or minority of the target country.

Humanitarian Intervention: to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation and so forth) apart from protection of a minority group.

Intervention to Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests: This also includes property inside or outside the target: (e.g., military property; diplomats; diplomatic property)

2002 Philippines

NAME: Operation Freedom Eagle (Balikatan)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 15 - December 31, 2002

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of the Philippines (PHI), 840

SUMMARY:

Following the September 11 attacks, the American government began to strengthen ties with governments facing similar threats from Islamic terrorists. The Philippines had been dealing with Muslim rebels in the southern islands since the 1970s, mainly the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The Wahhabist group Abu Sayyaf formed in the early 1990s after extremist Filipinos began returning from fighting with Osama bin Laden and the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and some speculate that the bin Laden family helped fund Abu Sayyaf. In October 2001 President Bush sent American military advisers to the Philippines to appraise the Abu Sayyaf threat and Filipino response. President Bush would promise \$93 million in military aid to the Philippines the next month when President Gloria Arroyo visited Washington, DC.

The Bush administration negotiated a limited visiting forces agreement with the Philippines that allowed 1,300 American troops (including 160 Special Operations soldiers) to act as military advisers to 1,200 Filipino soldiers in addition to engaging in infrastructure projects on the island of Basilan. The rules of engagement prohibited American forces from engaging with targets unless fired upon, and thus they were only occasionally involved in actual fighting. One particular mission of note was the attempted rescue of two American missionaries kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf. The Filipino military raided the hideout where they were being held on June 7, 2002, but were only able to rescue one of the hostages, Gracia Burnham, while the other American and a Filipino hostage were killed in the crossfire. Additionally, Abu Sayyaf leader Abu Sabaya was killed by Filipino troops in June 2002.

The original visiting forces agreement concluded on July 31, 2002, and was renewed for another six months. The agreement was extended for another nine months, and consisted of a larger American force (2,665 troops) that would conduct training exercises and war games with the Filipino military on the islands of Luzon and Mindanao. We thus define this episode as an intervention that lasted until December 31, 2002. However, the Balikatan exercises between the American and Filipino militaries continue intermittently to the present, and began including Australian forces in 2014. A small contingent of American Special Forces soldiers also remains in the Philippines to assist with counter-terrorism operations.

SOURCES:

"Waging Peace in the Philippines." Smithsonian.com. December 01, 2006. Accessed January 29, 2019. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/waging-peace-in-the-philippines-139354699/>.

U.S. Congress. *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-terrorism Cooperation*. By Larry A. Niksch. Cong. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007.

Pike, John. "Operation Freedom Eagle: Balikatan 2002-1." Global Security. Accessed January 28, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan_02-1.htm.

Ressa, Maria. "'No Survivors' in U.S. Chopper Crash." CNN. February 24, 2002. Accessed January 28, 2019. <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/24/phil.us.crash/index.html>.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- 3 Filipino soldiers
- 1 U.S. Army Special Forces

TOTAL DEATHS:

- 10 United States soldiers killed in a helicopter crash on February 21, 2002
- 1 American civilian
- 1 Filipino civilian

COSTS: \$93 Million in military aid to Philippines from January-June 2002; Deployment of 2,665 U.S. troops

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in Grossman's (2017) list of US military interventions. We have confirmed at least 3 other sources verifying this intervention, thus we include it in our case universe.

2003 Ethiopia

NAME: Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 20, 2003 - December 31, 2015

TARGET STATE(S): Ethiopia (ETH), 530

SUMMARY:

The Ogaden Region of Ethiopia has a majority Somali population. Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). They are deployed to the western portion of Somalia, on the Ethiopian border.

The American military has operated in Ethiopia conducting nation assistance and security force assistance (SFA) since approximately 2003 as part of Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, based out of neighboring Djibouti. The main units operating are civil affairs and Navy construction battalions (Seabees), where they do projects like build schools, medical and veterinary missions, and well digging. Other missions are the SFA missions that train Ethiopian soldiers preparing to deploy to Somalia through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA). American operations in Ethiopia are cyclical - some of the local commanders push many missions forward and others scale them back. Ethiopia remains a common trend in CJTF-HOA operations.

The main presence of the civil affairs and Seabees was at Camp Gilbert in the industrial town of Dire Dawa, close to the Djiboutian border. American forces have also been stationed at Contingency Operating Locations (COLs) in the towns of Hurso and Bilate in order to conduct SFA. A third COL in Gode opened in 2005 or 2006 but closed when Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 because of its proximity to the Somali border. These COLs had less than a hundred troops. The COLs and Camp Gilbert appear to be closed at this point, but civil affairs and seabees still have missions in Ethiopia. Drones have been flown out of Arba Minch Airport.

Our sources indicate that Camp Gilbert closed around December 31, 2015 and we code this as the final end date of the intervention.

SOURCES:

“Afghanistan Fatalities,” iCasualties.org. [Link](#)

Website with casualty figures for post-9/11 military actions. Filter for Ethiopia.

“American Military Bases in Africa,” *Global Security*. [Link](#)

Barnett, Thomas P. M. 2007. “The Americans Have Landed,” *Esquire*, June 27. [Link](#)

Besancon, Marie. 2010. "Dire Dawa – Ethiopia Local Views of U.S. Military Operations" (Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, August). [Link](#)

Dean, Darrell. 2008. "School Dedication Celebrates Ethiopian, U.S. Partnership," Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, June 5. [Link](#)

Scavetta, Rick. 2009. "U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Africa Command NCOs Mentor Ethiopian Soldiers," United States Africa Command, July 27. [Link](#)

Turse, Nick. 2015. "Sex, Drugs, and Dead Soldiers: What US Africa Command Doesn't Want You to Know," *Common Dreams*, April 21. [Link](#)

Turse, Nick. "The Startling Size of US Military Operations in Africa," *Universal African Peoples Organization*. [Link](#)

Turse, Nick. 2013. "Tomgram: Nick Turse, AFRICOM's Gigantic 'Small Footprint,'" *TomDispatch*, September 5. [Link](#)

Turse, Nick. 2015. "The US Military's Best-Kept Secret," *The Nation*, November 17. [Link](#)

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime

OUTCOME: Unclear/ongoing (mainly ongoing, could be 'Victory for US/Allies' because projects were completed and reports suggest that the projects were helpful)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 2 non-hostile American deaths in a vehicle accident

COSTS: rents of bases, and the individual mission funding

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case appears as an aggregate with many other countries within CRS in the post-9/11 era. We are disaggregating it across countries and years as much as possible, but limitations persist:

- Cannot find exact date for start of US presence. 2003 was the date that US started hiring interpreters in Ethiopia.
- Sources for the cyclical missions of OEF-HOA are limited to short news articles about civil affairs/seabee missions or non-scholarly sources (not quite conspiracy theorists but definitely considering it).
- Identifying finances is problematic (not published)

2003 Indonesia

NAME: Freedom of Navigation Operation

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4460

DATES: July 3, 2003

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Indonesia (INS), 850

SUMMARY:

In June of 2002, the government of Indonesia published new regulations for naval navigation, stating that any maritime traffic outside of three narrow and specific Archipelagic Sea Lanes would be subject to the much more restrictive international regime of innocent passage. In response to this, the United States lodged a formal diplomatic protest with the Indonesia Government, noting their commitment to complying with UNCLOS strictures embedded in a bilateral tax treaty between the two governments, which these declarations violated.

In an effort to bolster these diplomatic protests, the US Navy sent the USS Carl Nimitz aircraft carrier and a contingent of F-18s through the Java Sea, well outside of three ASLs designated by the Indonesian government. Indonesia deployed its own aircraft to intercept the American contingent, with two Indonesian F-16s shadowing the American fighter jets. These maneuvers in July of 2003 resulted in significant concern from the government of Indonesia, and resulted in public calls for the Government of Indonesia to open additional sea lanes in the Java Sea. The American operations near Bawean Island reinforced an ongoing commitment to preventing archipelagic states from introducing additional navigational restrictions beyond those permitted in the UNCLOS.

SOURCES:

Cay, Vivien J.E. 2010. "Archipelagic sea lanes passage and maritime security in archipelagic Southeast Asia." *World Maritime University*.

Cribb, Robert & Ford, Michele (arg.). 2009. *Indonesia beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State*. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Groves, Steven. 2011. "Accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Is Unnecessary to Secure U.S. Navigational Rights and Freedoms." Issue brief no. 2599. *Heritage Foundation*. https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2599.pdf.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 4 hours of flying time for 5 F-18s, costs related to deploying carrier battle group to Java sea.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives. But we have re-coded the outcome from Stalemate to US Victory due to inability of Indonesia government to enforce its new restrictions, lack of enforcement going forward of news ASLs. We have coded the objective as “policy change” referring to Indonesian designation of restrictive sea lanes.

2003 Iran

NAME: Iranian Seizure of U.S. Service Members

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4512

DATES: June 1, 2003 - June 3, 2003

TARGET STATE(S): Iran (IRN), 630

SUMMARY:

In 2002, Iran denied use of its airspace to the United States to attack Iraq, and Iranian officials stated that Iranian armed forces would defend the country's territory. Iran intensified diplomatic efforts to avert a U.S. military attack on Iraq. Iran's efforts, as that of many other nations, failed and the United States went to war in 2003. That same year, Iran's defense minister stated that its forces would "confront" any U.S. aircraft that used Iranian airspace to conduct air strikes on Iraq.

During the Iraq War in 2003, Iran claimed that the United States had violated its airspace on several occasions. It claimed that not only had U.S. planes entered Iranian airspace but that the U.S. had mistakenly dropped two missiles onto Iranian territory. Iranian officials stated that it would utilize military force to repel any further incursions or transgressions from the United States. On June 1, 4 U.S. soldiers and one U.S. contractor travelled up the Shatt al Arab waterway, the natural boundary separating Iran and Iraq, and were subsequently detained by Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The U.S. service members were detained and interrogated for 26 hours before being released.

SOURCES:

Beckley, Michael. 2015. "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts." *Quarterly Journal: International Security*, vol. 39. no. 4: 7-48.

"Flying Down to Kabul." 2006. *PBS*, August 1.

<https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/map-airspace-politics-iran/2234/>

Schmitt, Eric. 2003. "[AFTER THE WAR: DETENTIONS; 5 Americans Are Held 26 Hours By Iranians.](#)" *The New York Times*.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Seizure of two U.S. Naval ships and four U.S. soldiers.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) narratives as it is a non-traditional drone strike by the US in Iran. However, we have been unable to find three separate sources confirming the United States violation of Iranian air space. We have confirmed the Iranian seizure of U.S. military personnel. For this reason the case is coded as a seizure rather than a clash.

2003 Iraq

NAME: The War in Iraq; Operation Iraqi Freedom

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: 20 March, 2003 – 18 December, 2011

TARGET STATE(S): Iraq, 645

SUMMARY:

The victory of the U.S. led coalition against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, pushed Hussein back into Iraq's borders and placed stringent requirements on the country's military ambitions. The UN placed multiple economic sanctions on the country and required mandatory weapon inspection compliance under the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). The US and UK implemented a strict no-fly zone in the North and South of Iraq to protect populations previously vulnerable to Hussein's aggression (Operation Southern and Northern Watch). The patrol of Iraq's territory led to occasional clashes between Iraqi and U.S. military. Finally, the United Nations imposed strict compliance requirements on Iraq as it related to weapon manufacturing inspection. Tensions between Iraq and the United States remained high and led to frequent clashes throughout the 1990s.

Following the terror attacks of 9/11 President Bush's White House viewed Iraq as more of a security concern. Senior advisors and officials produced information alleging Hussein's regime was producing weapons of mass destruction and that it maintained ties with al-Qaeda. The U.S. seemed increasingly keen on forcefully deposing Saddam Hussein through military intervention. U.S. public opinion was gradually molded to reflect the administration's interest. On October 16, 2002 the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Resolution. This Joint Resolution authorized the use of military force against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This document would allow President Bush to initiate the War in Iraq.

Up to this point, weapon, security, and intelligence experts disagreed with U.S. conclusions regarding Iraq's WMDs and connections to al-Qaeda. In early 2003, the U.S. attempted to gain a UN resolution permitting the use of force in Iraq. Facing a losing resolution via a veto from France and Russia, the U.S. and its coalition members which included Britain, Italy, Poland, Spain, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and Australia withdrew the resolution from a vote.

On March 20, 2003, the United States and coalition members initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom and invaded Iraq to depose of Saddam Hussein. The U.S. deployed more than 100,000 soldiers stationed in Kuwait. A weakened and poorly organized Iraqi military was swiftly defeated by the size and technology of coalition troops. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared that Operation

Iraqi Freedom was successfully accomplished and that the major military operation was over. On December 13, 2003, Saddam Hussein was found by U.S. troops near the city of Tikrit. The United States formed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as a transitional government to allow the creation of democratic institutions. The CPA was dissolved following free elections in Iraq that elected Nuori al-Maliki as Prime Minister in June 2004. It was around this time that U.S. forces in Iraq began engaging with insurgent troops.

The al-Maliki government enacted policies that were widely interpreted as marginalizing Iraq's Sunni majority. Coupled with the remainder of U.S. troops having successfully invaded and occupied Iraqi territory, insurgent groups began emerging throughout the country as a rebellion against the new government and U.S. presence. By 2006, the sectarian division had escalated into a de facto civil war. U.S. troops remained in the country in an attempt to pacify and protect Iraqi government troops. In 2007, President George Bush announced a surge in troops into Iraq of 21,500 and expanded security and reconstruction programs for the country that totaled \$1.2 billion. At around the same time, many coalition members began withdrawing their militaries from the country.

The United States military remained engaged in Iraq for years to come as it combatted insurgent groups throughout the country. In 2009, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. combat missions in Iraq would end in August of 2010 with a remaining force of 50,000 troops to remain until 2011 to train Iraqi soldiers.

The Iraq War proved to be a disastrous foreign policy blunder for the United States. between 2003 and 2011, 4,491 U.S. service members were killed in action and an estimated \$1.2 trillion dollars were spent. The effects of the Iraqi population were devastating. The number of fatalities range from 185,000 to 208,000. The power vacuum created after the U.S. withdrawal allowed extremist groups like the Islamic State to carve out power.

SOURCES:

U.S. Congress. H.J.Res 114 – Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. 107th Congress (2001-2002)

CNN. U.S. has 100,000 troops in Kuwait. CNN, Feb. 18, 2003.

H. Peters & S. Plagakis. Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018. Congressional Research Service. May 10, 2019.

N. Crawford. U.S. Costs of Wars Through 2014: \$4.4 Trillion and Counting Summary of Costs for the U.S. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Boston University. June 24, 2014.

IraqBodyCount. Documented Civilian Deaths from Conflict. Iraq Body Count, Last updated March 31, 2020

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S.: 4,491

Iraq State Soldiers: 5,388–10,800

Insurgent Forces: 26,544

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S. 4,491

Iraq: 185,000 - 208,000

COSTS: Following a troop surge in 2007, the United States sent a maximum of 170,000 troops to Iraq, deployed a total of 67 ships, and flew over 25,000 sorties.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives, not in all other key datasets on military intervention. We include this in our dataset because it is a confirmed threat of force by The United States. This incident is coded as a victory for U.S. & Allies because Chinese communists eventually ceased artillery bombardments, leaving the geopolitical environment in the region unchanged. We alter the MID start-end dates as per other sources by a couple of months.

2003 Liberia

NAME: Joint Task Force Liberia

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 25, 2003-October 1, 2003

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Liberia (LBR), 450

SUMMARY:

Liberia fought a devastating civil war from 1989-1996 as Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) sought to overthrow the despotic and incompetent regime of Samuel Doe. After a series of ceasefire agreements in 1994, '95 and finally '96, Taylor won the 1997 presidential election handily, with 75% of the vote.¹ Rebel groups seeking to unseat Taylor formed with support from the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone as well as the Liberian diaspora in those countries and the United States and United Kingdom. In July 2000, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) invaded Liberia from their base in Guinea, thus beginning the Second Liberian Civil War.² LURD's forces split in early 2003 over internal disagreements into MODEL, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, which was primarily supported by Ivory Coast.³

By April 2003, LURD and MODEL controlled roughly 60% of Liberia, and by June they had begun assaulting the capital of Monrovia.⁴ Peace talks in Accra lead by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) reached a cease-fire agreement between the government and rebel groups on June 17, 2003, however, violence raged on regardless.⁵ While the international community debated the utility of an international peacekeeping force, President George H.W. Bush deployed 4,350 American troops off the coast of Liberia under the auspices of Joint Task Force Liberia.⁶ The UN Security Council passed a U.S.-drafted resolution authorizing a multinational peacekeeping force (later UNMIL or UN Mission in Liberia) on August 1, 2003.⁷

¹ Kieh, George Klay. "Warlords, Politicians and the Post-First Civil War Election in Liberia." *African and Asian Studies* 10, no. 2 (2011): 83-99. doi:10.1163/156921011x586979.

² *Armed Conflicts Report*. Report. January 2005. Accessed January 26, 2019. <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Liberia.pdf>.

³ U.S. Congress. *Liberia, Transition to Peace*. By Nicolas Cook. Cong. Rept. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003.

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ "U.S. Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia." *The American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 1 (2004): 193-95. doi:10.2307/3139280.

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ *ibid*

On August 15, 200 U.S. Marines landed in Monrovia to support humanitarian operations and Nigerian peacekeeping forces, and were not engaged in any fighting.⁸

A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was concluded between Taylor's government and the rebels on August 18, 2003, which provided for a transitional government and free elections in 2005. The last American forces withdrew from Liberia on October 1, 2003 as the UNMIL peacekeeping force took over, though nine American officers were "seconded" the UN mission.⁹

OBJECTIVE:

Remove Foreign Regime; remove Charles Taylor's regime from power

Humanitarian Intervention; protect hundreds of American citizens in Liberia, stop violence between competing government and rebel factions, provide protection for delivery of humanitarian aid

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies; Charles Taylor resigns and transitional government takes power, with free elections held in 2005

BATTLE DEATHS: 1,787 in 2003 violence¹⁰

Per capita battle deaths: 54.2 battle deaths per 100,000 Liberians

TOTAL DEATHS: ~2,000 killed in 2003 violence¹¹

Per capita total deaths: 60.6 deaths per 100,000 Liberians

COSTS: United States pledges \$205.5m in relief and reconstruction at 2004 pledging conference¹², and contributes \$245m to UNMIL, the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia¹³

⁸ Weiner, Tim. "200 U.S. Marines Land in Liberia to Aid African Force." *The New York Times*, August 15, 2003. Accessed January 26, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/15/world/200-us-marines-land-in-liberia-to-aid-african-force.html>.

⁹ "U.S. Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia." *The American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 1 (2004): 193-95. doi:10.2307/3139280.

¹⁰ "UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset." *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*. Accessed January 26, 2019.

¹¹ *Armed Conflicts Report*. Report. January 2005. Accessed January 26, 2019. <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Liberia.pdf>.

¹² U.S. Congress. *Liberia, Transition to Peace*. By Nicolas Cook. Cong. Rept. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003.

¹³ *ibid*

~500,000 Liberians displaced, roughly 300,000 to neighboring countries by September 2003¹⁴

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US military interventions and is a confirmed case of the US usage of force abroad, within the context of a multilateral mission.

¹⁴ *ibid*

2003 North Korea

NAME: North Korea/United States Hostilities Over Nuclear Weapons Development

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4455

DATES: February 21, 2003 - September 23, 2003

TARGET STATE(S): 731 North Korea

SUMMARY: In 2003, tensions were building between North Korea and the United States over the North Korean nuclear weapons program. On January 10th, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Many experts in the United States were worried North Korea was inching closer to developing nuclear weapons. On June 2nd, the G8 met in France and accused North Korea of violating non-proliferation agreements. Among rising rhetoric by the North Koreans, the United States increased its navy presence in the Yellow Sea in a show of force. In response, North Korea conducted shows of force with its own navy. In one instance, North Korea scrambled several fighters in an effort to ward off American planes in North Korean airspace.

In August, the United States announced six-way talks with the goal of ending the nuclear crisis. These meetings took place in Beijing on August 27th and included the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia.

SOURCES:

2004. "Timeline: North Korea's nuclear weapons development." CNN, 16 Nov.
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/20/nkorea.timeline.nuclear/>

2003. "U.S. under fire over N. Korea." CNN, 16 Nov.
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/15/nkorea.nukes/index.html>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. *"The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description."* Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II.* New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire; Policy Change; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of navy and cost of military exercises.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This dispute is listed only the in the CRS document on US usage of force abroad, as it is not a direct case of US military intervention. We include this in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force.

2003 Turkey

NAME: The Hood Event in Iraq

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4516

DATES: July, 4, 2003- July, 6, 2003

TARGET STATE(S): Turkey (640) in Iraq (645)

SUMMARY:

During the 1990's, Turkish troops occasionally operated in Northern Iraq to suppress Kurdish guerrillas waging a separatists struggle in Southeastern Turkey. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq sparked Turkish fears that increased Kurdish authority in Northern Iraq would destabilize Southeastern Turkey and might lead to an independent Kurdistan state. Because of these fears, Turkey withheld permission for U.S. troops to use Turkish military bases staging points during the onset of the invasion and decided not to send troops in support of US operations in Northern Iraq.

Following the election of a Kurdish Governor in the Northern Iraq city of Kirkuk, around 100 troops from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade stormed a compound and detained 11 ununiformed Turkish commandos. The Turkish troops were detained for 40 hours before being released back to Turkish officials. Kurdish officials in Northern Iraq alleged that the commandos were attempting to assassinate the newly elected governor and destabilize the region as a pretext for further Turkish military presence against the Kurds.

The Hood Event was the first time in NATO history that one ally used military force against another, underlying the unreliability of relations between the two nations. A joint U.S.-Kurdish commission determined that the incident was an accident and caused by a lack of communication. Tension between the US and Turkey over the Kurdish regions of Northern Iraq remained high in the preceding years, but after a series of terror attacks in Istanbul, Turkey began increasing cooperating with U.S. forces.

SOURCES:

Bruni, Frank. 2003. A Nation at War: Ankara; Turkey Sends Army Troops into Iraq, Report Says. *New York Times*, March 22. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/22/world/a-nation-at-war-ankara-turkey-sends-army-troops-into-iraq-report-says.html>

Filkins, Dexter. 2003. "Turkey Says U.S. Has Agreed to Free 11 Soldiers Suspected in Plot to Kill Kurdish Aide." *New York Times*, July 7. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/07/world/turkey-says-us-has-agreed-free-11-soldiers-suspected-plot-kill-kurdish-aide.html>

Müftüleri-Bac, Meltem. 2005. "Turkey and the United States: The Impact of the War in Iraq." *International Journal* 61.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Maintain Empire; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests.

OUTCOME: Released from Seizure

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Unknown number of U.S. Army 173rd Airborne Division deployed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID database and is considered a military intervention due to the deployment of US and Turkish troops even though there were no casualties. The case does not appear in any of the other key datasets on U.S. military interventions, most likely due to its more recent timeframe and small scale of attack. We include this case in our dataset as it is a confirmed usage of the US military abroad.

2004 Haiti

NAME: Operation Secure Tomorrow (Multilateral intervention post-2004 Haitian Coup)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 23, 2004-June 1, 2004

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

Jean-Bertrand Aristide completed his original presidential term in 1996 after being returned to power by American and international forces in Operation Uphold Democracy. Aristide won another presidential election in 2000, though opposition figures and some Western states considered the election illegitimate. The ensuing years were marked by increasing violence, especially at the hands of anti-Aristide paramilitary force FRAPH. FRAPH, an organization founded with the support of the CIA and DIA, began wresting Haitian cities from government control in early 2004.¹ FRAPH and their allies threatened Port-au-Prince within weeks of the revolt's inception. President Aristide fled the country on February 29, 2004 for exile in the Central African Republic, then South Africa. Aristide claimed that he had been "kidnapped" and removed from Haiti by Americans under threat of death, going so far as to contact United States Representatives Maxine Waters and Charles Rangel to explain the role of their government in his ouster.

The United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1529 the same day, authorizing a multinational force to restore peace in Haiti. The U.S. had sent 50 Marines to secure the American embassy February 23rd, and they were joined by an additional 300 troops on February 29. The intervention was officially named "Operation Secure Tomorrow" on March 22, and by that April 3,800 troops were stationed in Haiti as part of the Multinational Interim Force, of which roughly 2,000 were American soldiers.² The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004, and the Multinational Interim Force transferred authority to the Brazilian-led MINUSTAH on June 25, 2004. As of 2007, only four U.S. servicemen remained in Haiti as part of the MINUSTAH force.³

¹ Nairn, Allan. "Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries: Our Man in FRAPH." *The Nation*, October 24, 1994.

² Pike, John. "Operation Secure Tomorrow." Global Security. August 5, 2011. Accessed December 8, 2018. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/haiti04.htm>.

³ Fishel, John T., and Andrés Sáenz. *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007.

MINUSTAH handed over authority to the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti on October 15, 2017, formally ending the military component that began in 2004.⁴

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime (according to Aristide & supporters); Social Protection and Order; Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies (no combat deaths, successfully removed Aristide and imposed order);

The United States has remained involved in Haitian politics and development, providing millions of dollars in development and humanitarian relief since 2004. Finally, the United States engaged in Operation Unified Response in the aftermath of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake. United States Southern Command and USAID collaborated to evacuate thousands of American citizens, establish a field hospital, and deliver supplies. Roughly 10,000 sailors and marines participated in the Operation, which concluded by March 24 of the same year.⁵

BATTLE DEATHS: American: 0 battle deaths
MIF: 0 battle deaths
Haitian: 0 battle deaths

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: Haitian civilians killed in rebellion: 80⁶
Haitians civilians killed post-Aristide: 4,000⁷

Per capita total deaths: .87-43.5 deaths per 100,000 Haitians

COSTS: UN Expenditures on Operation Secure Tomorrow (5/1/04-6/30/05): \$428m
U.S. Expenditures Operation Secure Tomorrow (5/1/04-6/30/05): \$116m⁸

⁴ PTI. "Two Indian Police Contingents to Remain in Haiti as UN Ends Peacekeeping Mission." The New Indian Express. April 14, 2017. Accessed December 8, 2018. <http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2017/apr/14/two-indian-police-contingents-to-remain-in-haiti-as-un-ends-peacekeeping-mission-1593673--2.html>.

⁵ Staff Report. "Bataan, 22nd MEU Headed Home from Haiti." March 28, 2010. Accessed December 8, 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20101124231711/http://marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/03/navy_bataan_released_032510w/.

⁶ "Whose Coup in Haiti?" The Economist. March 04, 2004. Accessed December 19, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2004/03/04/whose-coup-in-haiti>.

⁷ Hallward, Peter. *Damming the Flood: Haiti and the Politics of Containment*. London: Verso, 2010.

⁸ United States. GAO. International Affairs & Trade. *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations: Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*. By Joseph A. Christoff. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2007

U.S. Development Aid to Haiti 2004: \$140m
U.S. Development Aid to Haiti 2005: \$150m⁹

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance of usage of force is listed only on the CRS record of US military missions, not in IMI, MID, MIPS, or other main datasets of military intervention. Most likely, this mission isn't included in all other datasets of US intervention due to its UN-based, multilateral dimensions. We, however, make sure to include this case in our dataset as it is a clear usage of force by the US in a multilateral capacity.

⁹ Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. "U.S. Accomplishments in Haiti 2004." U.S. Department of State. January 12, 2005. Accessed December 7, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2005/40841.htm>.

2004 Iran (2) Airspace Violations

NAME: U.S. Violations of Iranian Airspace

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4524

DATES: August 19, 2004-January 1, 2005

TARGET STATE(S): The Islamic Republic of Iran, (IRN) 630

SUMMARY:

The United States invaded Iraq, deposed Saddam Hussein and occupied the nation in 2003. Iraq's neighboring state and regional rival, Iran, took the opportunity to project their influence into the country with Shia militias like the Badr Brigades. Over the course of late 2004, United States aircraft violated Iranian airspace on three separate occasions. No hostilities ensued, as the USAF was apparently testing Iranian air defense systems, attempting to force Iran to turn on its air defense radar so that the U.S. aircraft could "grid the system for use in future targeting data..." This is a crucial bit of intelligence, as in an open conflict with Iran, one of the first targets for the American military would be Iranian air defense systems. While not an explicit act of war, the USAF certainly increased tensions with Tehran by repeatedly violating Iranian airspace. Further, Iran's defense minister said in 2003 that it would "confront any U.S. aircraft that used Iranian airspace" while striking targets in Iraq.

Crucially, the last violation of Iranian airspace was an attempt to gather further information about Iran's nuclear program. Iran had unveiled the existence of several hidden nuclear facilities in 2002, and Iran entered into multilateral negotiations in 2003 to avoid IAEA referral to the UN Security Council. Iran and the EU-3 negotiating group concluded the Paris Agreement in November 2004 to suspend enrichment and related activities, but the CIA received information conflicting with Iran's responsibilities that same month. The CIA was having a difficult time verifying details about Iran's nuclear program, and relied on Israeli and Kurdish sources as well as flyovers to glean intelligence.

SOURCES:

Sale, Richard. "Cat And Mouse Game Over Iran." 24/7 Space News. January 26, 2005. Accessed March 19, 2019. <http://www.spacedaily.com/news/iran-05c.html>.

Flying Down to Kabul." Map: Airspace Politics ~ Iran. October 14, 2008. Accessed March 19, 2019. <https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/map-airspace-politics-iran/2234/>

"Iran." Iran's Nuclear Program. May 2018. Accessed March 19, 2019. <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests.

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Information not available

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in both the MID and CRS listings of US military interventions.

2004 Iran (1) Border with Iraq

NAME: Defending Iran-Iraq border

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4519

DATES: March 13, 2004 - December 18, 2011

TARGET STATE(S): Iran, 630

SUMMARY:

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. armed forces had dismantled Iraq's sovereign military structure. Despite this, U.S. troops began facing a growing insurgency supported by extremist groups like al-Qaeda as well as nations keen on depleting U.S. strength in the region, namely Iran.

In an attempt to prevent an influx of fighters and resources to strengthen Iraqi insurgents, the North Carolina Army National Guard and coalition forces fortified the Iran and Iraq border and decreased the number of border crossings from 19 to just three. Additionally, the United States allocated \$300 million to double Iraqi border security and deployed high flying reconnaissance aircraft to surveil the border area. The National Guard Brigade charged with patrolling the border along Iraq's eastern Diyala Governorate withdrew from their position in 2005. However, U.S. troops remained along the border throughout the war.

SOURCES:

Schmitt, Eric. 2004. "U.S. Commanders Say Increased Border Patrols Are Halting the Influx of Non-Iraqi Guerrillas." *The New York Times*. April 20.

Shanker, Thom. 2004. "U.S. Tightens Security Measures at Iraq's Borders." *The New York Times*. March 13.

Associated Press. 2004. "Iraq Iran Border." *Associated Press Archives*. March 29.

Linwood, Carter. 2005. "Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces." *Congressional Research Services*. November 28.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority, Protect own military/diplomatic interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: \$300 million in funding to double the size and increase the capabilities of Iraqi border security. Deployment of 30th armored brigade combat team to patrol Iran-Iraq border. Roughly 4,500 troops. Deployment of U-2 and E8-C surveillance aircraft.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset and corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives. However it is listed as a clash between U.S. and Iranian forces along the border. Following research, no such instance was discovered and let alone confirmed by more than two sources. The case remains in the dataset as a fortification of the Iraqi border. The increase in troop levels and deployment of aircraft signal a clear show of force.

2004 Kenya

NAME: Operation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA) [Kenya]

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: 2004 - present

TARGET STATE(S): Kenya (KEN), 501

SUMMARY:

The Northeast Province of Kenya has a majority Somali population, and Kenya has suffered at the hands of al Shabaab attacks such as the 2013 Westgate Mall and 2015 Garissa University attacks. The primarily Muslim city of Lamu is particularly prone to conflict. Lamu is on the Manda Bay, an easily accessible port close to the Somali border. The Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). They are deployed to the southern portion of Somalia, on the Kenyan border.

The American military has operated in Kenya conducting nation assistance and security force assistance (SFA) since approximately 2004 as part of Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, based out of nearby Djibouti. The main units operating are civil affairs and Navy construction battalions (Seabees), where they do projects like build schools, medical and veterinary missions, and well digging. Other missions are the SFA missions that train Kenyan soldiers preparing to deploy to Somalia through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA). American operations in Kenya are cyclical - some of the local commanders push many missions forward and others scale them back. Kenya remains a common trend in CJTF-HOA operations.

Some of the SFA missions have been helping the KDF set up a Special Operations Regiment, Ranger school, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) school, and civil affairs school. Some of these actions have been in conjunction with a British-organized staff school in Isiolo. Other SFA training is military intelligence and general staff training. A major American presence (60-200 troops) is at Camp Simba, a Kenyan naval base in Manda Bay. In addition to the permanent presence, it is likely that special operations are staged out of Camp Simba.

SOURCES:

“Afghanistan Fatalities,” iCasualties.org. [Link](#)

“American Military Bases in Africa,” Global Security. [Link](#)

Barnett, Thomas P. M. 2007. “The Americans Have Landed,” *Esquire*, June 27; “The Startling

Size of US Military Operations in Africa,” Universal African Peoples Organization. [Link](#)

“DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force”. 2010. *United States Government Accountability Office*, April. [Link](#)

“Kenya Facilities,” *Global Security*. [Link](#)

Turse, Nick. 2013. “Tomgram: Nick Turse, AFRICOM’s Gigantic ‘Small Footprint,’” *TomDispatch*, September 5. [Link](#)

“UK Training Kenyan Army To Counter IED Threat.” 2018. *Forces Network*. May 25. [Link](#)

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime

OUTCOME: Unclear/ongoing (mainly ongoing, could be ‘Victory for US/Allies’ because projects were completed and reports suggest that the projects were helpful)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 3 non-combat related

COSTS: \$50 million in renovation projects, other unidentified

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears as an aggregation of Operation Enduring Freedom across countries and years within the CRS listing of US military missions abroad. We attempt to disaggregate cases across countries and changing mandates, but encounter several limitations:

- Cannot find exact date for start of US presence. 2004 was the only date given.
- Sources for the cyclical missions of OEF-HOA are limited to short news articles about civil affairs/seabee missions or non-scholarly sources (not quite conspiracy theorists but definitely considering it).
- Identifying finances (not published)

2004 North Korea

NAME: Fortification of Kwangju

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4465

DATES: April 30, 2004 – December 1, 2004

TARGET STATE(S): 731 Democratic People's Republic of Korea

SUMMARY: In May 2003, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to spend \$11 billion to enhance South Korea defenses. As part of this agreement, the United States deployed a Patriot missile battalion (an air defense system) in Kwangju, an area about 50 miles south of the DMZ. By December 1, 2004, the battery of missile defense systems had been erected throughout the area.

The fortification of South Korea's border came amid talks between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States over North Korea's emerging nuclear weapons production program.

SOURCES:

Fisher, Franklin. "Kwangju getting an additional Patriot missile unit." *Stars and Stripes*, October 12, 2004.

Fisher, Franklin. "Deployment of Patriot missile battalion to S. Korea is complete." *Stars and Stripes*, December 1, 2004.

AFP. "US deploys Patriot battery of missiles in South Korea." Reported in Taipei Times. Dec. 1, 2004.

OBJECTIVE: Acquire/Defend Territory

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Patriot missiles, equipment, and accompanying personnel (425 troops). Part of an agreement between ROK and US to spend \$11 billion to bolster ROK's military defenses.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is present in just the MID case book. While this instance is similar to a normal weapon sales which are not accounted for in our dataset. We have chosen to include it as fortification of a U.S. Allies border.

2004 Syria

NAME: Border Clash

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4518

DATES: March 15, 2004

TARGET STATE(S): Syria (SYR), 652

SUMMARY:

In late 2004, increasing insurgent activity along the Iraq-Syria border had resulted in escalating tensions between the United States and Syria. By late 2004, insurgent activity directed at US forces in Iraq had skyrocketed, resulting in an increasingly dire security environment. The United States military had maintained a presence in Camp Husaybah in the Al-Qaim district of Iraq, directly across the border from the Syrian town of Abu Kamal. In addition, US military forces located at Camp Husaybah had begun receiving indirect mortar fire from insurgent groups firing from locations across the border in Syria.

On March 15, 2004, US military forces operating near the Husaybah border outpost came under small arms fire from across the Syrian border from unidentified elements. While returning fire and attempting to withdraw, they were also fired upon by alleged Syrian military forces occupying the Syrian border outposts. During their withdrawal, one US soldier was wounded and three of the Syrian border checkpoints were destroyed with an undetermined number of casualties from the Syrian forces. Subsequently, an investigation by Iraqi authorities determined that neither side had crossed any international borders during the engagement.

SOURCES:

Estes, Kenneth W. 2009. "US Marine Corps Operations in Iraq." Occasional Paper. Quantico, VA: History Division, USMC. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/iraq03-06.pdf>.

Macfarquhar, Neil. 2004. "At Tense Syria-Iraq Border, American Forces Are Battling Insurgents Every Day." *New York Times*, October 26. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/26/world/middleeast/at-tense-syriairaq-border-american-forces-are-battling.html>.

US Marine Corps. 2004. "CROSS BORDER ATTK ON 7RCT IVO HUSAYBAH: 1 CF WIA". Wikileaks Iraq War Log: IRQ20040315n200. <https://wikileaks.org/irq/report/2004/03/IRQ20040315n200.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Medical care for one wounded soldier, ammunition for small arms, and one TOW missile fired upon the Syrian border posts.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID and CRS listing of US military involvements, given that it was a small border skirmish. Yet it remains a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad. We coded this case as a “stalemate” to reflect the fact that the American troops successfully withdrew and both sides received casualties.

2005 Pakistan (1) Drones

NAME: May 2005 Drone Strike

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4568

DATES: May 8, 2005

TARGET STATE(S): Pakistan (PAK), 770

SUMMARY:

Haitham al-Yemeni, an al Qaeda explosives expert, and his car passenger, warlord Samiullah Khan, were killed in a Predator strike in Toorikhel near Mir Ali, North Waziristan. The CIA reportedly targeted al-Yemeni's mobile phone to track him. Yemeni had been under U.S. surveillance for more than a week.

The U.S. team was hoping Haitham al-Yemeni would lead them to al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, said two counterterrorism experts. But after Pakistani authorities early that month captured another al Qaeda leader, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, CIA officials became concerned that al-Yemeni would go into hiding and decided to try to kill him instead.

Sources said the Predator drone, operated from a secret base hundreds of miles from the target, located and fired on al-Yemeni late Saturday night in Toorikhel, Pakistan, a suburb of Mirali in the province of North Waziristan.

The CIA and U.S. military Special Operations forces have been operating inside Pakistan with the knowledge of Pakistani authorities. This strike was carried out with prior approval from the ISI. They were shown the feed from predators circling over the targets by the CIA, according to a former US intelligence officer. The U.S. presence is highly controversial with the public. For that reason, Pakistani officials routinely play down U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan's information minister denied that any such incident even happened. A Pakistani official simultaneously denied the event took place and claimed that it might have happened in Afghanistan.

Al-Yemeni's death is one of only a handful of known incidents in which the CIA has fired the remote-controlled, missile-equipped Predator to kill an al Qaeda member.

SOURCES:

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Priest, Dana. 2005. "Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official," *Washington Post*, May 15. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60743-2005May15.html?noredirect=on>.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, "The Bush Years: Pakistan strikes 2004 – 2009," <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/the-bush-years-pakistan-strikes-2004-2009>.

Zenko, Micah. "Who is Ultimately Responsible for U.S. Drone Strikes?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 5. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/who-ultimately-responsible-us-drone-strikes>.

OBJECTIVE:

Policy Change; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 2

TOTAL DEATHS: 2

COSTS:

- Predator drones typically cost around \$3500 per hour of flight time

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset as it is in reference to a drone strike, not a traditional military intervention. Due to our dataset's expanded definition, we include this confirmed case of US usage of force abroad.

2005 Pakistan (2) Drones

NAME: Drone Strikes in Waziristan, Pakistan.

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4571

DATES: November 11, 2005 - January 14, 2006

TARGET STATE(S): Pakistan (PAK) 770

SUMMARY:

As a result of the 2001 US Coalition invasion in Afghanistan, many Al Qaeda soldiers fled to Pakistan, specifically to North and South Waziristan, a region categorized by the Pakistani government as Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The CIA negotiated terms with Pakistani Intelligence to allow them to use Pakistani airspace to conduct targeted killings with Predator drones. The US granted Pakistan the ability to approve each strike. Three notable drone strikes took place between November 2005 and January 2006.

The first strike took place on December 1st, 2005 and killed the Al Qaeda target Abu Hamza Rabiawas and two other militants who were tied to the for the madrid train bombings, Suleiman al Moghrabi and Amer Azizi. The drone attack was executed with Pakistani Intelligence Services approval.

The second strike, also in North Waziristan, took place on Jan 6, 2006. The primary target was an unnamed Al Qaeda official. The strike left 8 dead, including 3 other suspected radicals and 4 civilians.

The third strike was the deadliest and the least successful. The primary target, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was not killed. The number of killed is debated, but estimates range from 13-22, with 13 - 18 of those being civilians. The Foreign Ministry of Pakistan condemned the strike and Thousands of local Pakistani tribesmen led a protest in the town of Khaar.

SOURCES:

Coll, Steve. 2014. "The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan." *The New Yorker*, November 1. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare>.

Mazzetti, Mark. 2013. "RISE OF THE PREDATORS: Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood." *The New York Times*, April 6, sec. Section A.

“The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004 – 2009.” Drone Warfare. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed October 18, 2019.
<https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/the-bush-years-pakistan-strikes-2004-2009>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS:

- *Strike 1:* 3 militants
- *Strike 2:* 4-5 militants
- *Strike 3:* 3-4 militants

Total: 10 - 12 militants

TOTAL DEATHS:

- *Strike 1:* 6 total - including 3 civilians. The wife of one of the militants and two children
- *Strike 2:* 8 total - including 3-4 civilians of which 1-2 were children
- *Strike 3:* 13-22 total - including 10-18 civilians of which 5-6 were children

Total: 27 - 36 including 16 - 25 civilians

COSTS:

Operation costs for three drones strikes

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This dispute is listed as the US usage of force abroad in both MID and CRS, but the outcome remains unclear, due to the nature of drone warfare.

2005 Pakistan (3) Earthquake Relief

NAME: Earthquake Response

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 10, 2005 - March 31, 2006

TARGET STATE(S): Pakistan (PAK), 770

SUMMARY:

On October 8, 2005 a 7.6 magnitude earthquake hit Pakistan and Kashmir, killing at least 75,000 people. Within days, the DoD responded to a request for assistance including an initial airlift of USAID/OFDA relief cargo from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Nearly 1000 troops were deployed along with 24 helicopters and at least 10 CH-47s to facilitate the transport of evacuees, relief workers, and supplies. The military also established a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital in the city of Muzaffarabad.

US military led the international coordination for airspace management at Chaklala air base. This was particularly salient as there was limited landing area in the mountainous region for the many US, NATO, Pakistan airlifts. Withdrawal of US troops began in February and concluded in March 2006.

SOURCES:

Curtis, Lisa. 2005. "Pakistan Earthquake: International Response and Impact on U.S. Foreign Policies and Programs." Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. One Hundred Ninth Congress, December.
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT25130/html/CPRT-109SPRT25130.htm>.

Kronenfeld, Daniel, and Rhoda Margesson. 2006. "The Earthquake in South Asia: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations." Congressional Research Service Report. Library of Congress, March 24.

US Department of State. 2005. "State Department Update on U.S. Response to Pakistan Earthquake," October 12. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/54860.htm>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: DOD spent \$106.6 million of in-kind support

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the IMI dataset of US military interventions. We confirm the incident via several other sources. This case represents an example of US humanitarian military aid after a natural disaster.

2005 Syria

NAME: Syrian involvement in Lebanon and Iraq

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4527

DATES: April 15, 2005-July 22, 2005

TARGET STATE(S): Syrian Arab Republic (SYR), 652

SUMMARY:

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, diplomatic progress with Syria achieved since the 1990s was quickly eroded.¹ Thousands of Syrian men moved across the porous border into Iraq to oppose the Western presence in Iraq, and the Syrian government likely assisted by coordinating bus convoys to Iraq, subsidizing passport fees for jihadists and allowing local media to antagonize the Syrian population with anti-American content.² Relations further deteriorated after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in Beirut on February 14, 2005. Hariri had become a vocal opponent of Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon since the Lebanese Civil War in 1976, and it was widely assumed that the Syrian government masterminded the assassination in coordination with Hezbollah.³ Although the United Nations investigation did not make a definitive conclusion regarding the perpetrators, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the Netherlands are trying four members of Hezbollah *in absentia* and have been expecting a verdict since September 2018.⁴

The assassination of Hariri and export of jihadi fighters into Iraq prompted President Bush to call for Syria to remove their military and intelligence forces from Lebanon; the Syrian government complied and removed almost all forces from Lebanon by April 2005.⁵ American intelligence received reports of a high-level meeting between Abu Musab Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate, with aides in Syria in April 2005. This led to extensive fighting between American

¹ U.S. Congress. *Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*. By Alfred B. Prados. Cong. Rept. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006.

² Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith. "The Road from Syria, on the Trail of Iraq's Insurgents." *The Guardian*. June 07, 2005. Accessed February 16, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/08/iraq-al-qaida>.

³ U.S. Congress. *Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*. By Alfred B. Prados. Cong. Rept. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006.

⁴ Blanford, Nicholas. "Special Tribunal for Lebanon to Conclude with Whimper Rather than Much-anticipated Bang | Nicholas Blanford." *AW*. September 16, 2018. Accessed February 16, 2019. <https://thearabweekly.com/special-tribunal-lebanon-conclude-whimper-rather-much-anticipated-bang>.

⁵ U.S. Congress. *Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*. By Alfred B. Prados. Cong. Rept. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006.

Marines, Army Rangers, Syrian and Iraqi insurgents and Syrian regular forces along the Iraq-Syria border in May 2005. Nine American Marines were killed in the fighting, along with an unconfirmed number of insurgents (generally reported in excess of 100) and a handful of Syrian government troops.⁶ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called out the Syrian government as the primary conduit for insurgents entering Iraq on May 20, and later that day the Syrian government announced the severance of cooperation and communication with the American military and CIA due to the allegations.⁷ No further violence between Syrian and American forces was reported, though the American embassy in Damascus was attacked on September 12, 2006 by four gunmen. Thankfully, Syrian security forces thwarted the attack, and the car bomb planted by the assailants failed to detonate.⁸

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Policy Change

OUTCOME:

Stalemate; although American forces inflicted more casualties than received in the May 2005 firefight, Syria continued to be a conduit for Sunni insurgents throughout the American occupation.

BATTLE DEATHS: ~100 Syrian soldiers and Iraqi insurgents, nine American deaths reported⁹

Per capita battle deaths

Syria: ~.56 killed per 100,000 Syrians

United States: .003 killed per 100,000 Americans

TOTAL DEATHS: ~100 combatants killed in addition to nine American soldiers

COSTS: N/A

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID, Gibler (2018), and CRS sources. We,

⁶ Risen, James, and David Sanger. "GI's and Syrians in Tense Clashes on Iraqi Border." *The New York Times*, October 15, 2005. Accessed February 16, 2019.

⁷ *ibid*

⁸ Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. "Background Note: Syria." Syria (05-07). May 2007. Accessed February 16, 2019. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm>.

⁹ U.S. Congress. *Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues*. By Alfred B. Prados. Cong. Rept. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006.

however, slightly alter the start and end dates from MID to better reflect the additional sources. We also relabel the outcome from Yield by US to a stalemate, given case study findings.

2005 Yemen

NAME: Counterterrorism campaign in Yemen

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: May 20, 2005 – Present

TARGET STATE(S): Yemen (YAR), 678

SUMMARY: Shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 2001 President George W. Bush declared a “War on Terror” that would target radical Islamic terrorist groups and all states that support them. This declaration provided the rationale for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also for sending U.S. Special Forces and other resources to allied countries to help build up local counterterrorist forces that could serve as allies and proxies in a struggle that quickly came to stretch across many countries across the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

On May 20th, 2005 President George W. Bush sent a report to Congress that for the first time acknowledged that U.S. forces were at that point deployed resources to a series of countries, “in support of the global war on terrorism”. In particular, the President acknowledged that U.S. forces were deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti to help “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” in those countries.

For years, it was known that Yemen was a hotbed for al-Qaeda cells. The United States allocated significant security assistance to the Yemen government to encourage the destruction of terror networks in the country. Since 2005, the United States has dispersed more than \$780 million in military assistance to Yemen. Despite large funding amounts, terrorist networks maintained their position in the country and conducted attacks against western interests as evidenced by attacks on tourists in 2005 and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in 2008. This led President Obama to undertake a series of drone strike against terrorist targets in Yemen during his presidency.

In 2015, Yemen broke into civil war as two factions fought for control over the country’s territory. The conflict saw a significant reduction of U.S. military assistance despite the fact that terror groups maintained their positions amid the country’s chaos. On January 29, 2017, newly inaugurated President Donald Trump authorized an attack on an al-Qaeda cell in Yemen with the goal of targeting regional al-Qaeda leader Qasim al-Rayim and gathering intelligence on the group’s regional operations. The special operations mission was poorly planned and resulted in the death of 10-30 civilians and destruction of local property. One U.S. Navy Seal was killed in the operation.

SOURCES:

Coll, Steve. 2018. *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. London: Allen Lane.

Salazar Torreon, Barbara. 2017. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2017." *Congressional Research Service*, 12 Oct. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf>.

Wright, Lawrence. 2006. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Vintage.

Security Assistance Monitor. 2020. [Yemen Military Assistance 2005 - 2020](#). *Security Assistance Monitor*.

Al Jazeera and News Agencies. 2017. [Yemeni civilians killed in first US raid under Trump](#). *Al Jazeera*. January 30.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection & Order;

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: U.S. 1
al- Qaeda: Unknown

TOTAL DEATHS: U.S. 1
Yemen: 10-30

COSTS: Total of \$780 million in military assistance. Deployment of 40 U.S. special forces and 2 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft during the Raid of Yakla.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad, but it is unclear whether there is an end date. The Raid on Yakla was added to this case study as it shows a continuation of the U.S. War on Terror and evidence of a known raid operation as a result.

2006 Lebanon

NAME: Evacuation during Israel-Lebanon War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 18, 2006 - August 2, 2006

TARGET STATE(S): Lebanon (LEB)

SUMMARY:

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah guerillas kidnapped two Israeli soldiers at Israel's border with Lebanon. Israel responded the next day with a major military assault, bombing Lebanon's airport in Beirut and forcing its closure, blockading Lebanon's ports, and bombing roads and bridges. Shortly after the outbreak of war on July 13, 2006, the U.S. embassy in Beirut was flooded with calls from American citizens seeking to leave. On July 14, State and DOD began developing a plan to move American citizens from Beirut to Cyprus with helicopters, U.S. military ships, and contracted commercial ships.

During July and August 2006 the United States evacuated nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon in one of the largest overseas evacuations of American citizens in recent history. The Department of State has the lead responsibility for evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in times of crisis. However, State needed DOD's ability to secure safe passage for American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD's expertise and resources in providing sea and air transportation for large numbers of people.

Air and land evacuation routes were blocked in Lebanon and safely navigating sea routes required negotiation with Israel. Other nations rented buses and sent their citizens by road into Syria and on to Jordan, but the State Department advised U.S. citizens to avoid individual evacuations using increasingly dangerous Lebanese roads and border crossings with Syria. Israeli bombs targeted the roads leading to Syria. State and DOD were also actively engaged in trying to address military, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues related to the wider conflict. The first large group of Americans departed by boat from Beirut to Cyprus on July 19. State arranged for emergency shelter and asked for DOD's assistance in arranging flights back to the United States. DOD transported about 90 percent of the U.S. evacuees to Cyprus, and took the rest to Incirlik Airbase in Turkey; and, second, flying them from these safe havens to the United States. The last American evacuees departing on U.S. government-arranged flights left Cyprus on August 2, 2006.

SOURCES:

D'Monte, Sunita. 2006. 3741, *An act to provide funding authority to facilitate the evacuation of persons from Lebanon, and for other purposes*. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, August. <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/costestimate/s3741pgo0.pdf>.

Grimmett, Richard F. 2012. *War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance*, Congressional Research Service, September 25. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33532.pdf>

The July. 2007. 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon, State Department Government Accountability Office, June 7. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-893R>.

White, Josh. 2006. U.S. Prepares Huge Lebanon Evacuation, Washington Post, July 18. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/17/AR2006071701421.html>.

OBJECTIVE:

Social Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS:

- Marine CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters
- 2,200 Marines in the 24th MEU
- 2 US Ships (One belonging to DOD the other contracted out)
- ~\$67 million

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS listing of U.S. military interventions abroad, due to its limited scope of Embassy evacuation. We, however, do include this case as the usage of force by the US abroad.

2006 Pakistan

NAME: Drone Strikes

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4575

DATES: October 30, 2006 - December 17, 2010

TARGET STATE(S): PAK 770

SUMMARY:

As a result of the 2001 US Coalition invasion in Afghanistan, many Al Qaeda soldiers fled to Pakistan, specifically to North and South Waziristan, a region categorized by the Pakistani government as Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The strikes taking place between October 2006 and early January of 2009 were authorized under George W Bush administration. The strikes from late January 2009 through December 2010 were authorized under the Barack Obama administration.

Between 2006 and 2010 the number of strikes and death increased each year in Pakistan. 2010 was the peak with a total of 128 total strikes and between 755 - 1,108 total casualties. It was not until 2016 when President Obama signed an executive order requiring US intelligence agencies to report the number of civilians caused by US drone strikes outside of war zones. Therefore the casualties from period are identified from various local and international journalists sources.

SOURCES:

“Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2009.” Drone Warfare. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed November 2, 2019. <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/obama-2009-pakistan-strikes>.

“Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2010.” Drone Warfare. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed November 2, 2019. <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/obama-2010-pakistan-strikes>.

“The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004 – 2009.” Drone Warfare. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed November 2, 2019. <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/the-bush-years-pakistan-strikes-2004-2009>.

“Trump Revokes Obama Rule on Reporting Drone Strike Deaths.” *BBC News*, March 7, 2019, sec. US & Canada. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47480207>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS:

- 2006: 0 - 3 militants
- 2007: 0 - 45 militants
- 2008: 79 - 342 militants
- 2009: 261 - 653 militants
- 2010: 558 - 1019 militants

Total: 898 - 2062

TOTAL DEATHS:

- 2006: 81 - 83 including 80 - 82 civilians
- 2007: 36 - 56 including 11 - 46 civilians
- 2008: 252 - 401 including 59 - 173 civilians
- 2009: 471 - 753 including 100 - 210 civilians
- 2010: 755 - 1,108 including 89 - 197 civilians

Total: 1,595 - 2,401 including 399 - 708 civilians

COSTS:

- Cost of operating 226 stikes

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

Death calculations from drone dataset on the drive.

I calculated battle deaths by subtracting yearly min civilian death from max the total death and max civilian death from the min total death. This may not be the most accurate way to assess battle deaths as strike level data would give more precise results.

I did not put per capita deaths as some of the killed are not citizens of Pakistan.

2006 Somalia

NAME: Support of AMISOM

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 6, 2006 - March 2, 2008

TARGET STATE(S): Somalia (SOM), 520

SUMMARY:

In the summer of 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts took control of most of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. The internationally recognized government controlled a small parcel of territory on the Ethiopian border centered around the town of Baidoa. The UIC (also known as the Islamic Courts Union) government was viewed by neighboring Ethiopia as an unfriendly radical Islamic government, and by the U.S. as a roadblock to eliminating terrorist havens in Somalia.

Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 with U.S. backing. Troop estimates vary between 5000 and 10000, with 8000 being the most consistent number. At first, American officials denied providing support to the Ethiopians, but it was later revealed that there were American special forces advising Ethiopian ground troops, American reconnaissance and intelligence, and a movement of American vessels off the Somali coast. American trainers and special forces were based out of Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, where they had been stationed since 2002 as part of Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa.

In January 2007, the U.S. bombed two targets in Somalia with AC-130 gunships, targeting al Qaeda leadership. Although some terrorists were killed, none of the targeted leadership was. Some civilians were reported killed in the first strike. The planes were forward stationed at Ethiopian air bases. American special forces were reported to have been on the ground in the aftermath of the strike in order to confirm the death, the first American ground incursion into Somalia since the 1994 withdrawal. The recognized government reentered Mogadishu on 28 December, and on 19 January, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed to the country, where it remains today.

In 2008, as part of continued air support to AMISOM missions in southern Somalia, an American AC-130 struck a suspected al-Qaeda training camp in Doblai, Somalia. Four civilians were reported killed. A possibly related incident indicates that an American submarine fired two tomahawk missiles on Doblai on March 3. This strike killed at least 3 women and 3 children and wounded 20 civilians.

SOURCES:

Hull, C. Bryson. 2007. "Somalia strike misses top al Qaeda suspects: U.S." *Thomson Reuters*, January 21.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict/somalia-strike-misses-top-al-qaeda-suspects->

[u-s-idUSHUN14121320070111](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR2007051102114.html).

(Details the second AC-130 strike in Somalia, but cites as taking place the 15th)

Ignatius, David. 2007. "Ethiopia's Iraq." *The Washington Post*, 13 May 13.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR2007051102114.html>.

(Explains U.S. involvement with the Ethiopian invasion)

Jones, Seth G., Andrew M. Liepman, and Nathan Chandler. 2016. *Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against al Shabaab*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1539/RAND_RR1539.pdf.

Rice, Xan. 2007. "'Many dead' in US air strikes on Somalia." *The Guardian*, January 9.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/09/usa>.

(Details unsuccessful first strike and civilian casualties. Uses target date of January 8th)

Rice, Xan, and Suzanne Goldenberg. 2007. "How the US forged an alliance with Ethiopia over invasion." *The Guardian*, January 12.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/13/alqaida.usa>.

(Details U.S.-Ethiopian cooperation)

Dispute Narratives, 2002-2010. 2013. *Correlates of War Project MIDv4.0.* in Pennsylvania State University.

OBJECTIVE: Remove foreign regime

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

- Al-Qaeda - 10+

TOTAL DEATHS:

- UIC - 8000 (8-10 from U.S. strikes)
- Ethiopia - 225
- Civilians - 22-35 from U.S. strikes

COSTS: CJTF-HOA was already in place. Movement of special forces teams with Ethiopian ground forces. Movement of an unknown number of naval vessels off Somali coast. Three AC-130 missions and expended munitions.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only present in Zoltan Grossman's (2018) listing of U.S. military interventions, possibly because it could be listed as a proxy conflict and relies on special forces advisers for much of its progression. If such a scenario arises, an edited case would still fit MIP definitions because of the AC-130 strikes. Ultimately, this case is a confirmed usage of force

by the U.S. in Somalia, and given MIP's inclusion of special operations in its definition of intervention, the case must be included in the dataset.

We have included case number 4397 into this case study as it refers to U.S. military intervention to support AMISOM. Because the cases have the same objective of removing a foreign regime/authority and in the same country, we lumped them together.

2007 Iran (1) Erbil Raid

NAME: Raid on the Iranian Liaison Office in Erbil

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4535

DATES: January 11 – July 9, 2007

TARGET STATE(S): Iran (IRN), 630

SUMMARY:

A month after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil that occurred on September 11, 2001, the U.S.-led NATO coalition invaded Afghanistan and eventually overthrew its Taliban rulers. However, in an expansion of this global war on terrorism, the George W. Bush administration believed that the Saddam Hussein regime which had brutally ruled Iraq was involved in aiding the terrorists who attacked the U.S. and also possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Many of the U.S.'s NATO allies believed there was no evidence to substantiate this claim and did not join the U.S. when it then invaded Iraq in 2003 and eventually toppled Saddam Hussein's regime.

During the war, Iran, which became an enemy of the U.S. after in 1979 revolution brought to power a hard line Islamic government, saw an opportunity to gain leverage amid the instability of U.S.-occupied Iraq. Throughout the Iraq War, Iranian forces backed Iraqi Shia militias against the U.S. and U.S. and Iranian forces even skirmished at times. By 2006, the U.S. suspected that Iran was providing material support for anti-American actions in Iraq and on January 11, 2007, the U.S. military raided the Iranian Liaison Office in Erbil, Iraq. The U.S. soldiers sought to capture two senior Iranian officials, but instead ended up holding five mid-level diplomats hostage. Besides this, the Americans also seized several documents. Then later that spring, U.S. airplanes sent a further message to Iran by violating Iranian airspace in the Persian Gulf and in southwestern Iran.

Since the incident occurred in Erbil (which is in Iraqi Kurdistan), it was strongly condemned by then-president of Kurdistan Massoud Barzani. Though it is unproven, it is widely believed that Iran's capture of fifteen British sailors in the Persian Gulf just two months later in March 2007 was a direct retaliation for the U.S.'s capture of the Iranian diplomats during the raid in Erbil. Since the Iranians had been led to believe that the hostages would be released by March 21, 2007 (but they were not), many have suggested that the capture of the British sailors on March 23 is directly tied. Despite this, the U.S. did not release the Iranians until July 9, 2009 and the U.S. and Iran have remained hostile and continue to clash in Iraq and the Persian Gulf to this day.

SOURCES:

Cockburn, Patrick. 2007. "The Botched US Raid that Led to the Hostage Crisis." *The Independent*, April 3.
https://web.archive.org/web/20070406172103/http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2414760.ece

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

"U.S. Raid Draws Iranian Anger." 2007. *BBC News*, Jan 11.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6251167.stm

Wright, Robin and Nancy Trejos. 2007. "U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People." *The Washington Post*, Jan. 12. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011100427.html>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/build foreign regime authority; acquire or defend territory; intervention to protect own military and/or diplomatic interests

OUTCOME: Released (from seizure)

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: Use of two helicopters to land troops on the roof of the Iranian Liaison Office in Erbil, as well as the use of several fighter jets making incursions into Iranian airspace.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset as an aggregated incident comprising three separate, smaller missions within Iran. We have chosen to aggregate two of the cases #4543 and #4548. We have deleted from #4541 from our dataset as it was not an incident of the U.S. intervening.

2007 Iran (2) Detainment

NAME: Detaining Iranian Nationals in Iraq

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4538

DATES: August 29, 2007 – August 30, 2007

TARGET STATE(S): Islamic Republic of Iran (IRN), 63

SUMMARY:

On the evening of August 29, 2007, American Forces detained eight Iranian citizens in Baghdad, Iraq after unauthorized weapons were found in their car at a checkpoint. The incident came amidst tensions between Washington and Iran regarding alleged Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents fighting US forces and the detention of the other countries' citizens by both the US and Iran. At the Baghdad checkpoint, US forces had found an AK-47 assault rifle and two 9mm pistols belonging to the Iraqis in the group who had been serving as a protective detail. However, the Iraqis did not possess appropriate permits for the weapons, and as such the entire group was detained.

After their hotel quarters had been searched, the members of the Iranian delegation were released the next morning. Both Iraqi and Iranian officials had claimed that the Iranian delegation had been invited to Baghdad by the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity to discuss potentially constructing an electricity plant in the Iraqi city of Najaf. American military forces subsequently referred to the detainments as "regrettable", noting that they had not been linked to ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran. Iranian diplomats vociferously protested the detainments.

SOURCES:

Associated Press. 2007. "Tehran Protests U.S. Detention of Iranians in Baghdad." *Fox News*, August 29. <https://www.foxnews.com/story/tehran-protests-u-s-detention-of-iranians-in-baghdad>.

Associated Press. 2007. "U.S. hands detained Iranians to Iraq authorities." *NBC News*, August 9. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20485199/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-hands-detained-iranians-iraq-authorities/#.XGJb6VVKjDe.

Farrell, Stephen. 2007. "Iranians Seized in Baghdad Freed by U.S. After a Day." *New York Times*, August 30. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/world/middleeast/30iraq.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Released

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Minimal – labor for contingent of US soldiers arresting and processing Iranians for 24 hours.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) sources as a case of US seizures of Iranian nationals in Iraq. We confirm this usage of force abroad via at least three separate sources. This usage of force is, however, minimal and does not directly occur in Iran. We urge caution in interpreting this incident within the dataset.

2008 Pakistan (1) Drones

NAME: War on Terror Drone Strikes in Pakistan

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4581

DATES: January 29, 2008 – March 12, 2009

TARGET STATE(S): Pakistan (PAK), 770

SUMMARY:

After the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil that occurred on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush vowed to find and destroy the perpetrators. The terrorist group Al-Qaeda had sought refuge in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, though the group also held sway across the porous border to Pakistan, where the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) remained out of control of Pakistan's central government. In October 2001, the U.S.-led NATO coalition invaded Afghanistan and eventually overthrew the Taliban rulers. However, the remaining terrorist forces and their sympathizers fled into the mountains and caves, many often crossing into Pakistani territory and taking refuge among the Pashtun people.

In 2008, after years of occupying Afghanistan, President Bush began to draw down the use of troops. Then, when Barack Obama was inaugurated as president in January 2009, he continued the same trend, relying much more heavily on the use of drone strikes to target terrorists in the wilderness without risking American lives. During this time, the U.S. continued its drone attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets not just in Afghanistan, but also in northern Pakistan through January 2008 into March 2009. The attacks were often carried out by helicopter gunships, and Pakistani forces often returned fire upon seeing U.S. craft in Pakistani airspace. Originally, Pakistan's military leaders denied that their troops fired at U.S. aircraft, while President Bush expressly gave permission for U.S. forces to pursue targets into Pakistani territory. As a result of U.S. actions in Pakistan during this period, at least 32 civilians were killed.

Since President Bush declared that U.S. forces could target suspected militants, even in Pakistani territory, U.S.-Pakistani relations were at a low point. However, in many ways the U.S. still relied on Pakistan to help it combat and contain jihadism in the region. When Obama came to office in 2009, he maintained, and in many ways expanded, President Bush's drone policy, but restored relations with Pakistan somewhat. Throughout the War on Terror and its continuing aftermath, drone strikes have been highly controversial, and it continues to be a complicated issue because, while it is not "boots on the ground," it is often still considered an incursion into foreign territory.

SOURCES:

Burke, Jason. 2008. "On the Front Line in War on Pakistan's Taliban." *The Guardian*, November 15. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/16/pakistan-afghanistan-taliban>.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

"Pakistani Troops Fire on U.S. Helicopters." 2008. September 15, 2008. *The New York Times*, September 15. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/asia/15iht-pakistan.1.16157380.html>.

Rondeaux, Candace. 2008. "U.S. Military Releases Footage of Airstrike in Pakistan." *The Washington Post*, June 13. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061200493.html?noredirect=on>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests; Social Protective Intervention

OUTCOME: Unclear (none)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0 soldiers

TOTAL DEATHS: 32+ civilians

COSTS: None. The U.S. aircraft fired upon were undamaged and did not return fire on the Pakistani forces on the ground.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: Only MID and the corresponding Gibler (2018) narratives include this case as it represents a series of US drone strikes in Pakistan, not conventional military missions. Given our expanded definition of military involvement, we include this mission as a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad. No soldiers died as a result of the fighting (as noted in Gibler (2018)), and sources do not agree on how many civilians died. However, they do agree that at least 32 civilians died as a result of U.S. strikes in Pakistani territory.

2008 Pakistan (2) Airspace Violation

NAME: 2008 Pakistan Airspace Violation

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4577

DATES: June 10, 2008

TARGET STATE(S): Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PAK), 770

SUMMARY:

On June 10, 2008, a combined American and Afghan force located on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan came under attack by Taliban forces based in Pakistan. This was part of an increasing pattern of attacks from across the border in Pakistan, which coupled with increased drone and airstrikes by US forces in Pakistan had resulted in escalating tensions between the US and Pakistan.

On the evening of June 10th, Afghan forces had attempted to set up a checkpoint in a disputed region along the Afghan-Pakistan border and come under fire from Taliban forces based in Pakistan. In response, Afghan forces called in support from US forces in the region, who responded with drone and air support for the Afghan forces. After coalition forces returned fire and pushed Taliban forces back into Pakistan, US forces responded with a series of airstrikes on the suspected Taliban position, dropping almost 5,000 lbs of munitions on the position in Pakistan. It is disputed if the American aircraft entered Pakistani airspace during this strike. A Taliban spokesperson stated that eight of their soldiers had been killed in the strikes, with nine wounded. During the engagement, American officials alleged that they had alerted Pakistani military officials of the impending airstrike in an attempt to ensure that friendly troops were not in the region. However, Pakistani troops were in the area and were not able to evacuate the area in time, resulting in the deaths of ten members of the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps, and one Major from the Pakistani regular army.

In response to this, Pakistani authorities expressed initial outrage for the assault, but ultimately softened their response. Pakistan's ambassador to the United States stated that despite the "unacceptable" incident, they would continue to cooperate with US and coalition partners and stressed a commitment to avoiding similar events in the future.

SOURCES:

Turner Broadcasting System. 2008. "Pakistan fury over U.S. 'hot pursuit' attack." *CNN*, June 11.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/11/pakistan.troops.killed/>.

Gall, Carlotta, and Graham Bowley. 2008. "Pakistan condemns airstrike that killed 11 troops in border clash." *New York Times*, June 11.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/asia/11iht-pakistan.4.13645109.html>.

Gall, Carlotta, and Eric Schmidt. 2008. "Pakistan Angry as Strike by U.S. Kills 11 Soldiers." *New York Times*, June 12. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/asia/12pstan.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS:

Pakistani Taliban: 8 dead, 9 wounded

Pakistani Government: 11 dead (10 Frontier Rifles, 1 Regular Army)

TOTAL DEATHS:

Pakistani Taliban: 8 dead, 9 wounded

Pakistani Government: 11 dead (10 Frontier Rifles, 1 Regular Army)

COSTS: Costs related to any forward deployed US troops. Flying time for two F-15E aircraft, one B-1 Bomber. Nine 500 pound bombs, one laser-guided bomb of TBD size.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This event occurred in 2008, but the MID dataset and Gibler (2018) list that the attack occurred in 2007, but no matching events were able to be found for that date range. Similarly, no 2008 entries for an attack of this magnitude were included in the dataset. It is assumed that this may have been an entry error. Thus, we alter the start and end dates of this attack, as well the outcome, from stalemate to US victory, based on additional sources.

2008 Syria

NAME: Abu Kamal Raid

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4540

DATES: October 26, 2008

TARGET STATE(S): Syria (SYR), 652

SUMMARY:

On October 26, 2008, US Special Operations Forces landed 4 helicopters in eastern Syria, close to the Iraqi border, to conduct a raid targeting Abu Ghadiya, a major smuggler of foreign fighters into Iraq. There was suspected CIA involvement. Abu Ghadiya, a former lieutenant of Al Qaeda in Iraq, ran one of the most prolific networks bringing foreign fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq from Syria. The U.S. had condemned Syria's role in stoking the Iraqi insurgency. The outgoing Bush administration blamed Damascus for not doing enough to stem the flow of al Qaeda fighters and other insurgents into Iraq.

Syrian officials denounced the raid and claimed the U.S. troops killed 8 civilians, including 4 children. A U.S. official said U.S. forces targeted only people they considered a threat and that women and children were alive at the site when they left. The Pentagon and the White House originally refused to officially confirm or deny U.S. involvement in the incident.

Syria says 4 helicopters attacked al-Sukkari farm in the Albou Kamal area in eastern Syria. The attack by US special forces occurred just before sunset in an area of farms and brick factories about five miles inside the Syrian border. Eyewitness accounts said 8 US soldiers landed in 2 helicopters and that the dead were building workers. Doctors in nearby al-Sukkariya said another seven people were taken to the hospital with bullet wounds. A senior Syrian source, quoted by the official Sana news agency, said 4 helicopters violated Syrian airspace and described the target as a "civilian building under construction."

Syria summoned the US Charge D'Affaires in Damascus to explain the incident. It also called on the Iraqi government to prevent its airspace being used in this way in future. France called for the respect of sovereignty and lamented the loss of civilian life. In Washington, an unnamed military official told the Associated Press that due to Syrian inaction, the US was "taking matters into our own hands." Syrian officials asked the United States and Iraq for an investigation into the raid, which the Iraqi government said targeted insurgents responsible for attacks inside Iraq.

SOURCES:

Black, Ian and Ewan MacAskill. 2008. "US Forces Kill Eight in Helicopter Raid in Syria," *The Guardian*, October 26. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/27/syria-helicopter-attack>.

Makdessi, Marwan. 2008. "U.S. says raid in Syria targeted smuggler," *Reuters*, October 26. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-syria/u-s-helicopters-attack-syrian-farm-syria-idUSTRE49P2N520081027>.

Schmitt, Eric and Thom Shanker. 2008. "Officials Say U.S. Killed an Iraqi in Raid in Syria," October 26. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html>.

Spillius, Alex. 2008. "Syria: US helicopters attack Syrian farm, leaving 8 dead," *The Telegraph*, October 26. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/3265011/Syria-US-helicopters-attack-Syrian-farm-leaving-8-dead.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: Unclear, at least 1 according to U.S. officials

TOTAL DEATHS: 8-15 dead/wounded civilians -- Syrian officials

COSTS: 2-4 American helicopters; Special Operations Forces

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset as a usage of force by the US abroad, but it does not appear in other key datasets of US military intervention. We are unsure as to why this case is not extensively included in other sources, due to its direct military deployments. Perhaps it is due to the disputed nature of the events or the secretive components of the mission. Moreover, the mission fatalities are inconsistent across sources. While Syrian sources claim that 8 civilians were killed, and 7 others were wounded, Gibler (2018) and MID list no fatalities. We alter the number of civilian deaths to reflect the lower estimates from the Syrian officials, as these accounts are further confirmed in other sources.

2009 China

NAME: China/United States Naval Skirmishes

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4486

DATES: March 9 to March 19, 2009

TARGET STATE(S): 710 China

SUMMARY: Chinese naval forces pursued a U.S. oceanographic survey ship operating in the South China Sea. In response, the U.S. sent the destroyer USS Chung-Hoon to protect the survey ship. China countered by deploying several additional warships to follow the destroyer. Pentagon officials said the destroyer was already on patrol in the region and was not specifically deployed to protect the survey ship.

In response to the incident, Washington lodged a formal complaint with Beijing, contending the survey ship was operating legally in international waters. China rejected the complaint, stating the vessel was operating illegally in China's exclusive economic zones.

SOURCES:

Dawar, Anil. 2009. "Naval standoff threatens US-China military relations." *The Guardian*, 29 Nov. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/13/us-china-naval-standoff>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: None, other than diverting U.S. destroyer to protect survey ship.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the MID datasets, not in ACD/PRIO, IMI,

MIPS, or the CRS lists. This is because the case is an example of the display of force, not the usage of force. We include this in our dataset because it is a confirmed show of force.

2009 Iran

NAME: Iranian Drone Trespassing

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4543

DATES: February 25, 2009

TARGET STATE(S): Islamic Republic of Iran (IRN), 630

SUMMARY:

On February 25, 2009, the American military shot down an Iranian drone operating inside Iraq. The drone was an Iranian model, Ababil 3, with a 10.5-foot wingspan and a range of about 90 miles.¹ American forces claim they tracked the drone inside Iraqi airspace for an hour and ten minutes before two jets brought down the aircraft down without any casualties 60 miles east of Baghdad.²

Two primary theories were given for the drone's incursion to Iraqi airspace. First, Iraqi defense officials claimed that the drone likely wandered across the border and did not intentionally cross into Iraq. Some have speculated that the drone was actually spying on a group of Iranian dissidents called the People's Mujahideen of Iran. Roughly 3,500 dissidents were taking refuge at Camp Ashraf, within a few miles of where the drone was shot down.³

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; U.S. military fighting to protect the nascent Iraqi government from outside influence and insurgents

OUTCOME:

Victory for U.S. & Allies; drone shot down without any casualties

Ongoing; U.S., Iranian forces and proxies of both sides continue to fight for power and influence in the region, especially Iraq

BATTLE DEATHS: None

¹ Norland, Rod, and Alissa Rubin. "U.S. Says It Shot Down an Iranian Drone Over Iraq." *The New York Times*, March 16, 2009. Accessed February 17, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/world/middleeast/17iraq.html>.

² Nasaw, Daniel. "US Forces Shot down Iranian Drone, Official Says." *The Guardian*. March 16, 2009. Accessed February 17, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/16/iran-drone-us-iraq>.

³ Norland, Rod, and Alissa Rubin. "U.S. Says It Shot Down an Iranian Drone Over Iraq." *The New York Times*, March 16, 2009. Accessed February 17, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/world/middleeast/17iraq.html>.

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: N/A

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the MID dataset and Gibler (2018) narratives. We maintain this case as an example of the US usage of force abroad, but we change the outcome from a stalemate to a U.S. victory and ongoing mission, given the above justifications.

2009 North Korea/South Korea

NAME: South Korea/North Korea Yellow Sea Hostilities 2009-2010, Bombardment of Yeonpyeong

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4483

DATES: January 17, 2009 - December 23, 2010

TARGET STATE(S): 732 South Korea, 731 North Korea

SUMMARY: In 2009 and 2010, tensions were increasing over the demarcation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. The hostilities were precipitated by joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, which North Korea strongly condemned. Most of the skirmishes involved shows of force by the three countries. North Korean warships repeatedly crossed the Northern Limit Line. Tensions peaked on November 23, 2010 when North Korea launched an artillery strike at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing several South Korean soldiers and civilians. In response, South Korea returned fire.

After the bombardment of Yeonpyeong, tensions remained high, but eventually subsided. Throughout the fall of 2010, China, the United States, Russia, and Japan engaged in diplomatic efforts to relax the hostilities. North Korea blamed the United States for provoking the crisis, arguing it wanted to increase its military presence in the region.

SOURCES:

2010. "Two South Korean civilians died in attack by North." *BBC News*, 29 Nov.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11827080>

2010. "U.N. Security Council to hold emergency meeting on Korean crisis." *CNN*, 29 Nov.
<http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/12/18/north.korea.richardson/index.html?hpt=T2>

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. *"The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description."* *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:133-154.

Gibler, Douglas. 2018. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives Volume II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Richburg, Keith. 2010. "U.S., South Korea begin military exercises, as China calls for emergency talks on North Korea." *The New York Times*, 29 Nov.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112703600.html?sid=ST2010112804549>

Sang-Hun, Choe. 2010. "As Tensions Rise, U.S. and S. Korea Begin Drills." *The New York Times*, 25 Jul. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26korea.html>

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Unclear

BATTLE DEATHS:

- South Korea: 2 soldiers.

TOTAL DEATHS:

- South Korea: 2 soldiers, 2 civilians. Numerous South Korean soldiers and civilians injured.

COSTS: Financial costs of sustained military exercises and shows of force by United States from 2009-2010. Cost of sustained diplomatic efforts by the United States to deescalate hostilities.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID datasets. We include this in our dataset because our sources confirm it as a show of force by the United States. Other datasets, however, such as ACD, IMI, CRS, and MIPS do not include this case since it is not a direct military intervention or the direct usage of force.

2009 Yemen

NAME: Al-Majalah Cruise Missile Strikes

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 17, 2009

TARGET STATE(S): Yemen (YEM), 679

SUMMARY:

Beginning in 2007, a growing Al-Qaeda presence in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIP) began to concern the United States and threaten American interests. In 2008, suspected AQIP gunmen had attacked the US Embassy in Sanaa, with AQIP also establishing training camps for its militant groups in Yemen. AQIP's assumed leader, Qaaim al-Raymi, had also regularly released recruitment videos encouraging potential militants to travel to Yemen. In response to this, the United States had entered into a counterterrorism agreement with the Government of Yemen. As a part of this, the Government of Yemen agreed to claim and take responsibility for any air strikes or raids conducted by the United States.

On December 17, 2009, the United States launched a series of cruise missile strikes against two suspected AQIP targets in Yemen. One of the targets, the Al-Majalah training camp, was a suspected training camp for Al-Qaeda militants, with a regular presence from AQIP leader Al-Raymi, who the United States hoped to eliminate. However, the attack on Al-Majalah was not successful in eliminating Al-Raymi, and following extensive reporting by Amnesty International revealed that only 14 AQIP militants were killed in the attack, with an additional 41 civilians (including 23 children) killed as well. The Yemeni government had initially taken credit for the attack, but subsequent reporting revealed that the United States government was responsible.

The December strikes, while inflicting damage to AQIP training camps, were ultimately not successful in eliminating suspected AQIP leader Al-Raymi. In addition, subsequent reporting by Yemeni reporter Abdulelah Haider Shaye exposed and drew attention to the civilian death toll. Because of this, the Yemeni government, receiving full support from President Obama, jailed Shaye for a five year prison term.

SOURCES:

Chulov, Martin. 2013. "Jailed Yemeni journalist receives Human Rights Defenders award." *The Guardian*, December 6. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/06/yemen-journalist-shaye-human-rights-defenders-award-drones>.

Filkins, Dexter. 2011. "After the Uprising." *The New Yorker*, April 11. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/11/after-the-uprising>.

Tisdall, Simon. 2009. "Obama takes 'war on terror' to Yemen." *The Guardian*, December 29. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/dec/29/obama-war-on-terror-yemen>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Yemen/AQIP: 14

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: Yemen/AQIP: 14
Yemen/Civilian: 41

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Two cruise missiles launched at two suspected AQIP camps, type unknown.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in Zoltan Grossman's (2018) list of US military interventions, but we have confirmed it via at least 3 other separate sources as a case of the US usage of force abroad. As this usage of force is mainly aerial and often claimed as Yemeni in origin, few other datasets include this case as one of US military intervention.

The objective of this case remains unclear. We have coded it as "Maintain Foreign Regime Authority" as AQIP was a threat to undermine Government of Yemen authority, but the USG also generally sought to eliminate AQIP as a threat to the US homeland.

The outcome is also slightly unclear as well. The US strikes successful destroyed AQIP camp, but they did not eliminate AQIP leader. Thus, we have coded the case as a US victory due to degrading of AQIP capability, but in terms of long-term success, the US did not eliminate Al-Raymi.

2010 Pakistan

NAME: Pakistan-US Border Clash

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4598

DATES: September 30, 2010

TARGET STATE(S): Pakistan (770), Afghanistan (700)

SUMMARY:

Tensions between Pakistan and the United States had been escalating following a series of incursions by American forces located in Afghanistan, targeting suspected insurgent positions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the week before the incident, Pakistani authorities alleged that American helicopters had already twice violated Pakistani sovereignty while pursuing suspected insurgents across the border into Pakistani territory. Despite fraying ties and not permitting international forces on Pakistani soil, the United States and Pakistan maintained a close security arrangement, including intelligence sharing and the use of Pakistani territory for the transit of supplies supporting the NATO war effort.

On the morning of September 30, 2010, at approximately 5:00 AM local time, two American helicopters entered Pakistani airspace into the Upper Khurram agency to engage insurgent forces. Coalition troops in Afghanistan's Paktia province had received intelligence that a cross-border mortar attack by insurgent forces was imminent, resulting in the deployment of the helicopters. However, while pursuing the insurgents into Pakistani airspace, they were fired upon by members of Pakistan's Frontier Corps located at the Mandata Kandaho border post. While the initial shots fired by the Frontier Corps were intended as warning shots, the NATO forces mistook them for insurgent forces and returned fire. Over the course of an approximately 25 minute engagement, the NATO helicopters killed two Pakistani border security officials and seriously wounded four more. It is unclear if the NATO helicopters successfully engaged the insurgents they were initially pursuing.

In response to this, Pakistan responded by immediately closing the Torkham border crossing to NATO resupply efforts. Over the course of the following week, over 100 NATO oil tankers and supply trucks were destroyed by insurgents as their resupply efforts were delayed. On October 7, the United States offered an official apology delivered by US Ambassador Anne Patterson, paving the way for the reopening of the border crossing.

SOURCES:

Brulliard, Karin. 2018. "Pakistan Blocks NATO's Afghan-bound Supply Trucks after Airstrike Kills 3." *Washington Post*, September 30, 2010. Accessed December 5, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/30/AR2010093000145.html>.

Brummitt, Chris, and Deb Riechmann. 2010. "Pakistan Cuts NATO Supply Line after Border Firing." *Washington Post*, September 30, 2010. Accessed December 5, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/30/AR2010093000491.html>.

Crilly, Rob, and Ben Farmer. 2010. "NATO Strike Kills Three Pakistani Soldier." *The Telegraph*, September 30. Accessed December 5, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8033913/Nato-strike-kills-three-Pakistani-soldiers.html>.

Crilly, Rob. 2010. "US Apologises to Pakistan for Helicopter Attack on Soldiers." *The Telegraph*, October 6. Accessed December 6, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8047238/US-apologises-to-Pakistan-for-helicopter-attack-on-soldiers.html>.

Express. 2010. "NATO Investigating Pakistan Cross-border Attack." *The Express Tribune*, September 30. Accessed December 6, 2018. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/56593/nato-helicopters-strike-security-check-post-in-kurram>.

Yousaf, Kamran. 2010. "Sorry..." *The Express Tribune*, October 7. Accessed December 6, 2018. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/59310/us-apologises-over-nato-incursions>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Unclear/Missing

BATTLE DEATHS: Pakistan: 2

TOTAL DEATHS: Pakistan: 2

COSTS: Costs related to flight time for two attack helicopters of undetermined type, Washington Post article mentions "cannon fire and two missiles."

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This instance only appears in the MID and Gibler (2018) datasets and narratives. It does not appear in IMI, MIPS, ACD/PRIO, the CRS list of US military involvements, or other key documents of US military intervention. We believe this is because the incident represents a non-traditional military usage of force against the state of Pakistan. The initial goal of the US usage of force was to apprehend insurgent groups, not clash with Pakistani state authorities. We include this instance of military engagement as it represents variation in how the US now yields force abroad, especially related to the "War on Terror." It is unclear whether the NATO

helicopters successfully engaged the insurgents they were initially pursuing, or if there were additional non-Pakistan military deaths.

2010 Venezuela

NAME: Airspace Violation

DISPUTE NUMBER: 4506

DATES: January 8, 2010

TARGET STATE(S): Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (VEN), 101)

SUMMARY:

On January 8, 2010, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez accused an American P-3 Airborne Reconnaissance plane of having violated Venezuelan airspace and announced that he had deployed Venezuelan Air Force F-16s to intercept the alleged aircraft. This incident occurred during escalating tensions between the United States and Venezuela following the basing of US airborne reconnaissance assets in the Netherlands Antilles. In addition, President Chavez had recently complained vociferously after the United States and Colombia had come to an agreement that allowed the United States to utilize Colombian military bases for anti-drug military operations.

The Government of Venezuela (GOV) alleged that the American aircraft had violated Venezuelan airspace twice during its flight, alleging incursions that lasted 15 minutes and 19 minutes each. In response, the GOV stated that it had deployed two F-16 fighter jets to intercept and escort the American plane away. The United States government denied that any violation had taken place, and subsequent American diplomatic cables leaked to Wikileaks indicated that the GOV had provided conflicting information on the flight of the aircraft and their communication with the plane. Subsequently, the GOV sent a formal letter of protest to the United States.

SOURCES:

“Chavez says Venezuela jets intercepted U.S. plane.” *Reuters*, January 8, 2010.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-usa/chavez-says-venezuela-jets-intercepted-u-s-plane-idUSTRE6080BB20100109>.

Embassy Caracas. 2010. “Venezuela Makes Additional Claims Over Alleged Airspace Violation.” Wikileaks Cable: 10CARACAS33_a. January 12.

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10CARACAS33_a.html.

"Venezuela Protests to US Over Alleged Violation of Airspace." 2010. *Voice of America News*.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/venezuela-protests-to-us-over-alleged-violation-of-airspace-81191922/163732.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain Empire

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Flight time for one P-3 surveillance plane.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the MID dataset of US military involvements, most likely due to its time frame and disputed nature. But our sources confirm the US airspace violation. Thus, we include this case as a US display of force abroad. We include “*Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority*” as the objective since the alleged purpose of the P-3 flight was to support counter-narcotics/counter-insurgency efforts in Colombia.

2011 Libya

NAME: Operation Odyssey Dawn

DISPUTE NUMBER:

DATES: March 19, 2011 – October 31, 2011

TARGET STATE(S): 620 Libya (LIB)

SUMMARY:

In February 2011, the Arab Spring reached Libya. Protestors held anti-government rallies over the arrest of a prominent human rights lawyer. Qadhafi's regime cracked down on the pro-democracy protestors, initially with nonlethal force. However, as the conflict continued, the pro-Qadhafi forces began using live ammunition and fired on the protestors from helicopters and airplanes. The opposition movement against Qadhafi coalesced into a rebellion, and the Qadhafi regime continued to use force against the rebels as they battled over territory.

On February 26, the UN unanimously passed Security Council Resolution 1970, establishing sanctions, a travel ban, and an arms embargo. It also froze the assets of members of the Qadhafi family and referred the issue to the International Criminal Court. The US, EU, and other countries also imposed sanctions. Continuing violence led to humanitarian interventions to address food, fuel, and medical supply shortages.

On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, and the US participated in a multilateral operation maintaining a no-fly zone and started 'protection of civilians' operations. This included launching airstrikes and missiles targeted at missile, radar, and communications centers in major cities. Shortly afterward, on March 30, the US relinquished command of their role in the operation to NATO.

With the combined pressure from the NATO operation and the rebels, the Qadhafi regime crumbled and Qadhafi himself was forced into hiding. On September 15, the UN General Assembly voted to recognize the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya. On October 20, Qadhafi was found and assassinated by rebel groups. The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector ended on October 31, one week after the Libyan rebels had declared victory. After the end of the operation, an airstrike campaign began.

SOURCES:

Kirkpatrick, David, Erlanger, Steven, and Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2011. "Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi's Forces in Libya." *New York Times*, March 19.

"Libya Revolt of 2011." 2019. Encyclopædia Britannica. February 08.

"NATO and Libya (Archived)." 2015. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. November 9.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm

“UN Arms embargo on Libya.” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. September 28, 2018.

OBJECTIVE: Policy Change; Social Protection & Order

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Couldn't find exact #s of rebel or Qadhafi loyalist deaths, 0 NATO

TOTAL DEATHS: 72 civilians (<https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/13/unacknowledged-deaths/civilian-casualties-natos-air-campaign-libya>), 60 civilians (<https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/03/world/africa/united-nations-report-on-libya.html>)

COSTS: 3 US submarines: Scranton, Florida, Province. 2 Destroyers: Stout, Barry. ~110 ship to surface missiles fired. [CRS report](#) estimates the initial operation (March 19 – March 29) cost \$400 million to \$1 billion. The document also includes a historical costs section, which notes the costs of no-fly zones in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: We do not find exact numbers of fatalities for rebel or loyalist battle deaths, but we do conflict that this is a case of the US usage of force abroad with over 60 civilian fatalities.

2011 Operation Observant Compass

NAME: 2011 UGA (OOC)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 12, 2011 – March 29, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Uganda, DRC, CAR, South Sudan, 500, 490, 482, 626

SUMMARY:

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is a non-state armed group that emerged in northern Uganda in 1987. The group, led by Joseph Kony, claimed to challenge the sovereignty of the Ugandan government and state security forces. However, the LRA is known for its brutal tactics that terrorized the civilian population of northern Uganda, including massacres, sexual assault, child abductions, and looting.

The United States provided military and humanitarian aid to its regional partners to counter the LRA beginning in late 2008. This included logistical support to the Ugandan government, even when Ugandan troops pursued counter-LRA operations beyond its borders. In early 2011, President Obama announced the deployment of about 100 U.S. military advisors to Uganda to support the government's military efforts to capture or kill senior LRA leaders, including Kony. These army special forces units (Green Berets) were armed but directed not to engage LRA forces except in self-defense.

Operation Observant Compass contributed U.S. troops to a regional counter-LRA effort involving South Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The mission included training, funding, airlift, logistics, communications and intelligence support for operations in pursuit of LRA leadership. In the first two years of the mission, it was able to reduce LRA forces from about 400 to 200. By the end of the mission, the LRA still had about 100 members, including the elusive LRA leader Joseph Kony. Regional governments and other allies continue to fight the LRA without U.S. direct military support.

SOURCES:

Arieff, Alexis, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Thomas Husted. 2015. "The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response." CRS Report R42094. Congressional Research Service.

Cakaj, Ledio. 2017. "\$800 Million Later, Joseph Kony Is Still a Threat." Foreign Policy Magazine. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/28/800-million-later-joseph-kony-is-still-a-threat/>.

Whitlock, Craig. 2012. "Joseph Kony hunt is proving difficult for U.S. troops." Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/joseph-kony-hunt-is-proving-difficult-for-ustroops/2012/04/29/gIQAasM6pT_story.html?utm_term=.17a1207af3d5.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority, Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: LRA forces: 1-5

TOTAL DEATHS: 1-5 (unknown number of civilians killed by LRA during fight)

COSTS: Over the 6-year mission, total U.S. military support for the operation was around \$800 million. About 100 Green Berets were deployed at any given time.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears on the CRS list of U.S. military involvements abroad. This intervention was a regional one, with U.S. advisors sent primarily to be based in Uganda, though they were given the authorization to help the Ugandan Government to pursue LRA forces in bordering states, including the DRC, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Because of U.S. forces creep into this countries while still executing the same objective, we have chosen to incorporate these countries into the case study.

2012 Philippines

NAME: Typhoon Relief

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 8, 2012 – December 21, 2012

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of the Philippines (PHI), 840

SUMMARY:

On December 3, 2012, the Category 5 rated Typhoon Bopha (also known as Pablo) made landfall in the Southern Philippines on the island of Mindanao causing widespread devastation and damage. Over 1,000 people were killed, with another 1.2 million families displaced. The storm resulted in devastating flash flooding that destroyed vulnerable infrastructure and isolated unprepared communities.

In response to this crisis, a number of international actors pledged assistance, including the United States. In addition to a larger aid package managed by the US Agency for International Development, the US Marine Corps deployed two KC-130-J transport aircraft to assist with logistics and the deployment of relief supplies to affected areas. From December 8th to December 21st the 152nd Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron delivered over 375 tons of critical supplies to victims of Typhoon Bopha. In addition, the Marine Corps provided a water purification unit to assist with relief efforts. Following this, representatives of USAID's OFDA remained on location in the Philippines to support ongoing, longer-term relief efforts.

SOURCES:

Ahmed, Amir. 2012. "Death toll from Typhoon Bopha tops 1,000 in the Philippines." *CNN*, modified December 17. <https://www.cnn.com/2012/12/16/world/asia/philippines-typhoon/index.html>.

Burke, Matthew. 2012. "Okinawa Marines conclude Philippines relief effort." *Stars and Stripes*, December 21. <https://www.stripes.com/news/marine-corps/okinawa-marines-conclude-philippines-relief-effort-1.201461>.

Defense Media Activity. 2012. "Marine Corps continues disaster efforts in Philippines." *Defense Visual Information Distribution Service*, December 12,. <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/99201/marine-corps-continues-disaster-efforts-philippines>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Operating costs related two KC-130J aircraft for 13 days, conducting 22 flights to far-flung region of the Philippines.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US military involvements as it represents a humanitarian relief effort following a natural disaster. But given our expanded definition of the usage of force abroad, we include this case as the usage of force for humanitarian purposes.

2012 Somalia

NAME: Hostage Rescue Mission

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 24, 2012

TARGET STATE(S): Somalia (SOM) 520

SUMMARY:

On October 25, 2011, two humanitarian aid workers in Somalia working for the Danish Refugee Council on a demining project in Somalia were kidnapped by a criminal armed group with the intent of holding them ransom. The captives consisted of Jessica Buchanan, an American citizen, and Paul Hegan Thisted, a Danish national. The captives were kidnapped in the Galkayo region in Somalia, and ransomed for figures in excess of \$1.5 Million USD. At the time, a growing focus by the Obama administration on piracy and militancy in the region had led to an increased American presence in the region, particularly at the large American base in Djibouti.

The hostage takers had recently refused a ransom figure of \$1.5 million, and the United States had received intelligence that Jessica Buchanan, the American citizen, was suffering from a kidney infection and her health was deteriorating. A US Navy SEAL team of an undetermined size was parachuted into the region, and hiked the two miles over land to the hostage site. In the ensuing firefight, the nine hostage takers were killed with no injuries to the SEAL team or the hostages. The SEAL team and hostages were subsequently flown out of the region to the regional US military base in Djibouti where the hostages received medical care.

No long-term negative outcomes specific to this operation were reported, and the hostages were successfully rescued.

SOURCES:

Associated Press. 2012. "Navy SEALs who killed Osama bin Laden rescue of 2 hostages in Somalia: report." *New York Daily News*, January 25.

<https://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/u-s-military-raid-somalia-frees-american-dane-held-hostage-article-1.1011524>.

Sheikh, Abdi. 2012. "U.S. commandos free two hostages in daring Somalia raid." *Reuters*, January 25.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-hostages/u-s-commandos-free-two-hostages-in-daring-somalia-raid-idUSTRE80O0I220120125>.

Gettleman, Jeffrey, Eric Schmidt, and Thom Shanker. 2012. "U.S. Swoops In to Free 2 From Pirates in Somali Raid." *New York Times*, January 25.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/world/africa/us-raid-frees-2-hostages-from-somali-pirates.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Social Protection; Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: Somali – 9

TOTAL DEATHS: Somalia – 9

COSTS: Costs related to air transport for deployment, exfiltration, and costs related to deploying a SEAL team of undetermined size.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident is only listed in the CRS document of US military usages of force abroad, but not in IMI, MID, MIPS, or other datasets of US military intervention. This is because the incident represents an operation to rescue one American citizen from non-state actors. It is not a traditional case of US military intervention against a state actor, yet it is a confirmed, direct usage of force by the US abroad. Thus, we include it in our dataset.

2013 Burundi/Central African Republic

NAME: Airlift Assistance

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 9 - 30, 2013

TARGET STATE(S): Burundi (BUI), 516; Central African Republic (CEN), 482

SUMMARY:

In March of 2013, a rebel group made up of mostly Muslim fighters seized power in the Central African Republic and installed a new government. Sectarian infighting between Christian and Muslim armed groups subsequently escalated, with a rapidly rising death toll. In response, under a UN Security Council resolution, an international mission of French and African Union troops began operations to disarm warring groups, provide humanitarian assistance, and begin a transition back to a democratically elected government.

To support this operation, the French government had requested in December of 2013 American assistance in airlifting Burundian peacekeepers to the CAR in order to support French and African troops in stemming the rising violence in the country. From December 12 to December 30, a small USAF support team and two C-17 transport planes conducted 16 flights from Burundi to the Central African Republic, transporting 857 Burundian soldiers, 73 pallets of equipment, and 18 military vehicles.

Fewer than 10 Americans remained on the ground at the end of 2013 to serve as liaisons with the French military.

SOURCES:

Barnes, Julian. 2013. "U.S. to Fly African Troops Into Conflict Zone; Forces to Be Airlifted to Central African Republic to Put Down Violence." *Wall Street Journal*.

Harper, Jon. 2013. "US airlift of Burundian troops to Central African Republic under way." *Stars and Stripes*, December 11. <https://www.stripes.com/news/us-airlift-of-burundian-troops-to-central-african-republic-under-way-1.257143>.

Roulo, Claudette. 2018. "Airlift Operations Complete in Central African Republic." *American Forces Press Service* (US Department of Defense), December 30. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121417>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection & Order (Humanitarian Intervention)

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies (Both Objectives)

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to 16 flights for two C-17 Globemaster III between Burundi and CAR.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS document of US usage of force abroad, not in any other datasets on US military intervention. This is because the key datasets on US military intervention only collect new cases until 2014. Moreover, this case is unique in its characteristics, given that it was a US airlift to transport another country's troops into a conflict zone. Nonetheless, this represents the usage of the US military abroad, so we include it on our dataset.

2013 Jordan

NAME: Supporting Jordan during the Syrian Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 17, 2013 - Ongoing.

TARGET STATE(S): Jordan (JOR), 663

SUMMARY:

Like many other Arab states, Syria was rocked by protests in the spring of 2011 that gradually took on a revolutionary tone. The regime responded to protests by firing live bullets, and the situation escalated to an open civil war by the summer of 2012. In May, 2013 Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia Islamist movement, confirmed what was by then an open secret: that his armed forces were fighting on the ground in Syria in defense of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. This statement nevertheless highlighted the extent to which Syria was quickly developing into a major regional war. In 2013, the refugee flows started to accelerate with large flows going especially to Syrian neighbors Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. Furthermore, extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and al-Nusra utilized the chaos to expand their operations.

On April 17, 2013 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would send 200 Army soldiers to Jordan to assist local authorities and to prepare for a number of alternative scenarios that might unfold as a result of the deteriorating situation in Syria. In January of 2020, it was reported that 2,795 U.S. Troops were based in Jordan to assist in counter IS campaigns. On November 4, 2016, a Jordanian guard at King Faisal Air Base opened fire on U.S. troops and killed three U.S. Special Forces officers. The incident was a random terror attack and the perpetrator was sent to jail for 20-30 years.

SOURCES:

Ayesh, Rashaan. 2020. [Where U.S. troops and military assets are deployed in the Middle East.](#) *Axios*. Jan. 4.

Abboud, Samer. 2016. *Syria*. Wiley (Global Hotspots series)

Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2008. "International Military Intervention, 1989-2005." Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection No 21282. Ann Arbor, MI. <http://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/index.html>

American Forces Press Service. 2013. "Hagel Places Jordan Among Most Important Middle East Partners." U.S. Department of Defense, April 23.

<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119853>

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Social Protection & Order;
Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 3 U.S.

COSTS: Deployment of 2,795 U.S. troops. Over \$1.4 billion dollars in military aid provided to Jordan.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of the US usage of force abroad, but we have confirmed the US usage of force via other sources. We believe that this mission is still ongoing.

2013 Niger

NAME: U.S. Intervention Against Islamic State in Niger/Tongo Tongo Ambush

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: February 2013 – Present

TARGET STATE(S): Niger (NIR), 436

SUMMARY:

The United States and Niger signed a Status of Force Agreement in 2013 to operate surveillance activities that would aid the French military in its counterterrorism campaign in Northern Mali. By 2016, the United States Government had appropriated funds for the military to build a small airbase to conduct counterterrorism surveillance that focused on the Islamic State in Greater Sahara a splinter group of ISIL. By 2017, more than 800 American soldiers were deployed in Niger to help train the Niger Armed Forces.

Common knowledge about the U.S. presence in Niger came after Tongo Tongo Ambush on October 4, 2017. The attack came after a Nigerien and 8 U.S. soldiers attempted to capture an ISGS sub-commander. After failure to locate the individual the U.S./Nigerien Caravan turned back to base when it was ambushed by ISGS fighters.

The assault left 4 U.S. special force members killed in action and surprised many Americans about its previously unknown footprint in Sahel. Following a number of congressional inquiries into the matter, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley pledged \$60 million dollars in the creation of a new counterterrorism task force composed of five West African nations. By 2018, the United States Government had increased funding to the newly created task force to \$111 million.

SOURCES:

Kelly, Fergus. "US Counter-Terrorism Assistance to G5 Sahel Members Increases to \$111 Million." The Defense Post. The Defense Post, November 5, 2018. <https://thedefensepost.com/2018/11/05/g5-sahel-us-assistance/>.

"Mali Conflict: US Deploys 100 Troops to Neighbour Niger." BBC News. BBC, February 22, 2013. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21550867>.

Schmitt, Eric, and Thomas Gibbons-neff. "Deadly Ambush of Green Berets in Niger Belies a 'Low-Risk' Mission." The New York Times. The New York Times, October 5, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/africa/green-berets-killed-niger.html>.

Turse, Nick. "U.S. Military Is Building a \$100 Million Drone Base in Africa." The Intercept. The Intercept, September 29, 2016. <https://theintercept.com/2016/09/29/u-s-military-is-building-a-100-million-drone-base-in-africa/>.

OBJECTIVE:

Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority; Acquire/Defend Territory; Social Protection & Order;

OUTCOME: Victory for Target & Allies; Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: 5 Nigerians, 4 U.S. Soldiers, 21 Islamic State militants.

Per capita battle deaths:

- 210 per 100,000 Islamic Militants
- 500 per 100,000 U.S. Troops based in Niger

TOTAL DEATHS: Using the number of casualties from the Tongo Tongo Ambush. No numbers provided on the number of deaths caused by drone strikes.

Per capita total deaths:

- Negligible

COSTS:Construction of Drone base with C-17and MQ-9 Drones. Operating and Management cost for 800 deployed troops and upkeep of facility. Total costs are projected to be above \$100 million. Cost in the creation of the G-5 Task force that uses both UN and US funds.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES:

This case study is not mentioned in the key datasets of US military intervention abroad. Nonetheless, we confirm the US usage of force in Niger, especially as defined within the 2017 - present timeline. This intervention is still ongoing. While the United States public has become aware of the U.S. presence in Niger following the Tongo Tongo in 2017 ambush, little information exists on what operations the U.S. is currently conducting in Niger.

2014 Ukraine

NAME: U.S. Involvement in the Ukraine Conflict

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 2014 - Present

TARGET STATE(S): Ukraine - UKR (369)

SUMMARY:

The current conflict in Ukraine has its origins in widespread protests that began in the country in 2013. A violent crackdown in early 2014 led to significant unrest, forcing President Viktor Yanukovich to flee the country. Shortly thereafter, Russian troops invaded the Crimean Peninsula, formally annexing it after a highly controversial referendum. Russian President Vladimir Putin frequently cited the need to protect ethnic Russians living in Crimea as justification for Russia's incursion into the territory.

Since 2014, Ukrainian forces have clashed with Russian-backed separatists forces in Eastern Ukraine. Russia denies involvement in Ukraine, although NATO and Ukraine report the presence of Russian troops and military equipment in eastern Ukraine. In April 2016, NATO announced it would send four battalions to eastern Europe to deter Russian aggression. The U.S. sent two tank battalions to join this force. In 2018, the U.S. joined several other NATO countries in air exercises over western Ukraine.

Throughout the conflict, the U.S. has provided significant economic and military support to Ukraine. Since 2014 the U.S. has given Ukraine approximately \$1.5 billion in direct payments and security assistance. This includes a range of military resources such as patrol boats, counterfire radars, and anti-tank missiles. Several hundred U.S. soldiers have also deployed to Ukraine to assist with training. In 2019 high-level talks began between Russia and Ukraine to de-escalate. As of June 2020, skirmishes between Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces continue in eastern Ukraine.

SOURCES:

BBC News. "Ukraine conflict: Can peace plan in east finally bring peace?" December 10, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49986007>.

"Conflict in Ukraine - Global Conflict Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>.

Curry, Colleen. "Why Is the US Sending \$1 Billion to Ukraine?" *ABC News*, March 4, 2014. <https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/03/why-is-the-u-s-sending-1-billion-to-ukraine>.

DOD Announces \$250M to Ukraine. United States Department of Defense, June 18, 2019. <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/>.

Kim, Lucian. "How U.S. Military Aid Has Helped Ukraine Since 2014." *NPR*, December 18, 2019. <https://www.npr.org/2019/12/18/788874844/how-u-s-military-aid-has-helped-ukraine-since-2014>

Oklahoma Army National Guard Arrive in Ukraine. United States Army, 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/180744/oklahoma_army_national_guard_arrive_in_ukraine.

Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2019 to 15 February 2020. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/29thReportUkraine_EN.pdf.

The New Humanitarian. "COVID-19 turns the clock back on the war in Ukraine, as needs grow." April 20, 2020. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2020/04/20/coronavirus-ukraine-war>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: UKR: Approximately 10,500 Ukrainian government forces and separatist forces

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS:

UKR: Approximately 10,500 Ukrainian government forces and separatist forces

UKR: Approximately 3,350 civilians killed

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: The U.S. sent \$1.5 billion in financial and military support to Ukraine. Approximately 250 U.S. troops deployed in Ukraine for training purposes.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: What should we use as the official start date of this intervention?

Hostilities between Russia and Ukraine started in 2014, and the U.S. has been supporting Ukraine with foreign aid since at least March 2014; so I have coded the start date as March 2014.

2014 Iraq/Syria

NAME: Operation Inherent Resolve

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 17, 2014 – Present

TARGET STATE(S): Iraq (IRQ), 645 & Syria (SYR), 652

SUMMARY:

On 17 October 2014, the Department of Defense formally established Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) in order to formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Alongside the defeat of ISIS, Operation Inherent Resolve is focused with supporting and defending Syrian Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces.

OIR is a multilateral initiative with support from other militaries including that of France, Turkey, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. The United States has largely spearheaded the operation that has mainly used aerial firepower to target and destroy ISIS cells and wipe out the organization's leadership. The operation's main goal has been to As of Aug. 9, 2017, the Coalition has conducted a total of 24,566 air strikes total. Around 75% of which came from the United States military.

In October 2017, CJTF-OIR had announced the liberation of Iraqi territory from ISIS' hands and On 23 March 2019, the Pentagon announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria. Stating that CJTF-OIR and partner forces had liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers of land and 7.7 million people from ISIS. This composed the vast majority of the caliphate's territory and subjects. The Operation achieved a major tactical victory On 27 October, 2019 by killing ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria.

While Operation Inherent Resolve is still active, the presence of U.S. and Coalition military engagements in the area significantly decreased. On January 5, 2020, the Operation had seized training or Iraqi Security Forces following the United States' assassination of Qasem Soleimani. By March of 2020, U.S. ground forces had begun to withdraw from the region.

SOURCES:

Operation Inherent Resolve. "[About CJTF-OIR.](#)" *United States Military*. Published July 2017.

Office of Public Affairs.. “[Press Release: Strike Summary March 10-23, 2019.](#)” *Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve*. March 26, 2019.

Airwars. “[U.S. Led Coalition in Iraq and Syria.](#)” *Airwars.com*. Last Updated, September 2020.

Browne, Ryan & Mattingly, Phillip. “[ISIS leader al-Baghdadi believed to have been killed in a US military raid, sources say.](#)” *CNN Online*. October 27, 2019.

OBJECTIVE: Remove Foreign Regime, Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: United States: 74
ISIS: 80,000

TOTAL DEATHS: : United States: 89
ISIS: 80,000
Civilians: 8,214 - 13,125

COSTS: As of June 30, 2017, the total cost of operations related to ISIS since kinetic operations started on Aug. 8, 2014, is \$14.3 billion and the average daily cost is \$13.6 million for 1,058 days of operations.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS document of US usage of force abroad, not in any other datasets on US military intervention. This is because the key datasets on US military intervention only collect new cases until 2014. Nonetheless, this represents the usage of the US military abroad so we include it on our dataset as a case of US humanitarian intervention.

2014 Liberia

NAME: Operation United Assistance (Ebola Humanitarian Aid)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: 09/16/2014 – 06/30/2015

TARGET STATE(S): Liberia (LBR), 450

SUMMARY:

In December, 2013 an initial case of the Ebola virus was identified in Guinea. The outbreak spread within Guinea and throughout surrounding West African countries. By August of 2014, the WHO declared the virus as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

Operation United Assistance marked the U.S. military participation in a whole-of-government response to assist local institutions in containing the spread of the Ebola virus. Major General Darryl Williams led the Joint Forces Command United Assistance in Monrovia, Liberia. Throughout the mission nearly 3,000 troops were deployed, including National Guard and Reserve troops with relevant expertise.

JFC-UA built six laboratories, a 25 bed Medical Unit, specifically to treat health care workers, and 50-bed Ebola Treatment Units for all other patients. Rotary Wing Aircrafts delivered personnel and cargo to remote or inaccessible locations. The military also worked with civilian agencies to create a training program for local healthcare workers with the goal of containing the spread of the outbreak. On May 19th, 2015 WHO announced that there were no remaining cases of Ebola in Liberia. On June 30th Operation United Assistance concluded.

SOURCES:

“Operation United Assistance: The DOD Response to Ebola in West Africa. 2016.” Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, January 6.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/ebola/OUA_report_jan2016.pdf.

Pellerin, Cheryl. 2014. “Obama to Announce Africom Joint Force Command HQ in Liberia.” U.S. Department of Defense, September 16.

<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/603259/obama-to-announce-africom-joint-force-command-hq-in-liberia/>.

Simeone, Nick. 2014. “Obama Activates National Guard, Reserves for Operation United Assistance.” *National Guard*, October.

<https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/576635/obama-activates-national-guard-reserves-for-operation-united-assistance/>.

United States Africa Command. 2015. "Operation United Assistance: Logistics Partnership Success," January 12. <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/25102/operation-united-assistance-logistics-partnership-success>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: n/a

TOTAL DEATHS:

Guinea: 2,544

Liberia: 4,810

Sierra Leone: 3,956

Per capita total deaths:

Guinea: 0.0002

Liberia: 0.0011

Sierra Leone: 0.0007

COSTS:

3,000 troops deployed

Use of USMC MV-22s

Use of US Army CH-47 helicopters

Use of UH-60 helicopters

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS listing as a case of US usage of force abroad. In our dataset, the ebola related deaths are included within total deaths.

2014 Syria

NAME: U.S. Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 10, 2014 - October 21, 2019

TARGET STATE(S): Syria (SYR), 652

SUMMARY:

The Syrian civil war began with protests in March 2011 against security forces in the city of Daraa. As demonstrations spread throughout the country, President Bashar Assad's forces moved to quickly repress them. Civil war raged throughout the country for years, with U.S. involvement in the war often sporadic and highly controversial.

In August 2011, President Obama said that Assad must "step aside" and froze Syrian government assets. The following year, President Obama announced that if Assad's forces used chemical weapons it would constitute a "red line," prompting intervention by the United States. In 2013, U.S. intelligence concluded Assad had used chemical weapons, but President Obama did not intervene, a decision which was widely criticized. President Obama announced in September 2014 that the U.S. had begun an air campaign against ISIS in Syria. Over the next five years, the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS conducted airstrikes on approximately 17,000 targets in Syria. U.S. ground troops first moved into Syria in 2015. Only 50 troops were initially sent, but as U.S. involvement in the war increased, the troop count swelled to roughly 2,000. The soldiers were tasked with organizing and recruiting Syrian Kurdish and Arab soldiers to push ISIS out of Syria.

In April 2017, shortly after assuming office, President Trump announced that Assad had "crossed a lot of lines" after a suspected attack with chemical weapons in Syria. In the first direct U.S. attack on the Syrian government, the U.S. launched 59 cruise missiles into Syria as retaliation for the suspected use of chemical weapons. In 2018, the U.S., Britain, and France again launched cruise missiles for a suspected use of chemical weapons in the Syrian city of Douma on April 7, 2018. Finally, in December 2018 President Trump announced he intended to pull U.S. troops out of Syria, a highly controversial decision that led to the resignation of U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and U.S. special envoy to the global anti-IS coalition, Brett McGurk. U.S. forces gradually withdrew from Syria in 2019, although the country remains beset with violence and armed conflict.

SOURCES:

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Loveluck, Louisa, and Missy Ryan. "Suicide blast kills four Americans in Syria, a sign of remaining extremist danger." *Washington Post*, January 19, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/blast-rocks-us-patrolled-city-in-syria-monitoring-group-local-media-report-casualties/2019/01/16/ae0e78-1986-11e9-a804-c35766b9f234_story.html.

Radia, Kirit. "Obama Calls on Syria's Assad to Step Down, Freezes Assets." *ABC News*, August 18, 2011. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/obama-calls-syrias-assad-step-freezes-assets/story?id=14330428>.

Hubbard, Ben. "[U.S. Withdrawal From Syria Gathers Speed, Amid Accusations of Betrayal.](#)" *The New York Times*. October 21, 2019.

Specia, Megan. "How Syria's Death Toll Is Lost in the Fog of War." *The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia*. Last modified April 13, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html>.

Syrian Revolution NINE years on: 586,100 persons killed and millions of Syrians displaced and injured. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2020. <https://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=157193>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian intervention; social protection

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS:

United States: Approximately 5 soldiers and intelligence officers

Syria: Approximately 200,000, including government forces and non-state actors operating in the country

Per capita battle deaths: Roughly 1% of Syria's pre-war population.

TOTAL DEATHS:

United States: Approximately 5 total

Syria: Approximately 500,000 total, including combatant deaths (this is the generally accepted number)

Per capita total deaths: Roughly 2.33% of Syria's pre-war population killed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case does not appear in the MID dataset but does in the CRS one. We include it since its a contemporary example of U.S. military intervention abroad. While the U.S. has maintained a very limited presence in Syria following President Trumps announcement of a troop withdrawal, we have chosen to denote the end of U.S. presence in October, 2019.

2015 Afghanistan

NAME: Operation Freedom's Sentinel

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: Jan. 1 2015 - Present

TARGET STATE(S): Afghanistan (AFG) 700

SUMMARY:

Operation Freedom's Sentinel is the continuation of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. It followed the previous U.S. mission in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom. The U.S. had been militarily engaged in Afghanistan since 2001, maintaining a significant troop presence in the country. However, Operation Freedom's Sentinel reduced U.S. troop levels significantly. Approximately 10,000 U.S. troops remained in the country, with another 3,000 troops from 41 countries joining the NATO-led effort.

The mission's objectives were twofold. First, U.S. troops sought to "train, advise, and assist" the Afghan National Defense & Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Afghan Security Institution (ASI). The second objective was to continue counter-terrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda.

In addition to troop deployments, the U.S. military has relied heavily on drones to conduct aerial warfare in Afghanistan. Although the military decreased the number of troops in Afghanistan significantly from 2014-15, the number of drone strikes increased steadily throughout 2015.

The U.S. continues to be involved militarily in Afghanistan. Throughout 2020, the U.S. and the Taliban have been involved in diplomatic talks to end hostilities in the country and negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. forces. As of June 2020, these talks were ongoing. In the U.S., the war in Afghanistan has become deeply unpopular. President Trump has expressed that he wants to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan before November 2020.

SOURCES:

Campbell, John F. "Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Our Continued Security Investment in Afghanistan." U.S. Army. October 5, 2015.

https://www.army.mil/article/156517/operation_freedoms_sentinel_and_our_continued_security_investment_in_afghanistan.

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UN News. "Afghanistan: Civilian casualties exceed 10,000 for sixth straight year." February 22, 2020. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/02/1057921>.

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Kube, Courtney, and Carol E. Lee. "Trump wants to pull all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan by 2020 election, officials say." *NBC News*, August 2, 2019. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/trump-wants-pull-all-troops-out-afghanistan-2020-election-n1038651>.

Shalizi, Hamid, and Charlotte Greenfield. "Afghan peace talks seen this month after U.S. shuttle diplomacy." *Reuters*, June 8, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-taliban-idUSKBN23F1JI>.

Smith, Josh. "Exclusive: Afghan drone war - data show unmanned flights dominate air campaign." *Reuters*, April 20, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-drones-exclusive-idUSKCN0XH2UZ>.

OBJECTIVE: Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: United States: 91
Afghanistan: Unclear; insufficient data on Afghanistan combatant deaths

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: United States: 91 military personnel; 2 DoD civilians
Afghanistan: 17,740 (civilian deaths in Afghanistan from beginning 2015 through end of 2019)

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: U.S. spent approximately \$270 billion in Afghanistan from 2015-2019. 93 U.S. soldiers and civilians killed.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The case is not present in the MID dataset but is in CRS. It is included in the MIP dataset as a contemporary example of military intervention. While this case is still

technically a subset of the War in Afghanistan, it is coded as separate given the change in operation.

2015 Cameroon

NAME: Counter-Boko Haram Deployment

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 12, 2015 – Present

TARGET STATE(S): Cameroon, CAO, 471

SUMMARY:

In 2015, Cameroon had faced a large increase in attacks from Boko Haram extremists operating in the far north of the country. This took the form of suicide bombings, cross border raids, and attacks on government forces. Boko Haram militants had recently increased in strength and their ability to project power from their redoubts in Nigeria and increased attacks on neighbors in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. This occurred in spite of the efforts of a Benin-based regional task force and the deployment of approximately 3,000 French soldiers to the Sahel region, primarily based in Niger.

Subsequently, the president of Cameroon, Paul Biya, invited US assistance in the counter Boko-Haram struggle. This assistance was publicly stated to take the form of drone-based airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, as well as providing training and capacity building assistance to the Cameroonian military. In October of 2015, President Obama notified the US Congress that he had deployed 90 US soldiers to Cameroon, with the consent of the Government of Cameroon, in advance of an anticipated total deployment of 300 soldiers to support the counter-Boko Haram effort.

Public reporting indicated that the US military conducted UAV-centric intelligence collection operations from a base in Garoua, Cameroon, and continued to provide training assistance to the Cameroonian military. Furthermore, while not publicly acknowledged by the United States, reporting indicates that troops in the region had also conducted an undetermined amount of “direct action” raids by US Special Forces. The scope and scale of these operations are unavailable, but received coverage in a variety of American press outlets.

While this assistance continued to be active as December 2018, in August of 2018, US military commanders announced an intention to begin a drawdown of US forces from Cameroon and the broader region. While occurring in the broader context of a reassessment of American strategic priorities in the region, it was specifically noted that Cameroon was a target for a drawdown as American war planners believed the train and assist mission had been successful. US military officials noted that the Cameroonian military was now capable of continuing the Boko-Haram mission on their own.

SOURCES:

Cooper, Helene, and Eric Schmitt. 2018. "U.S. Prepares to Reduce Troops and Shed Missions in Africa." *New York Times*, August 1. Accessed December 14, 2018.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/africa/us-withdraw-troops-africa.html>.

Morgan, Wesley. 2018. "Behind the secret U.S. war in Africa." *Politico*. Last modified July 2. Accessed December 14, 2018. <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005>.

O'Grady, Siobhan. 2015. "U.S. Sends Troops and Drones to Cameroon as Boko Haram Fight Intensifies." *Foreign Policy*, October 15. Accessed December 14, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/14/u-s-sends-troops-and-drones-to-cameroon-as-boko-haram-fight-intensifies>.

Starr, Barbara. 2016. "U.S. special forces wage secretive 'small wars' against terrorists." CNN. Last modified May 12. Accessed December 14, 2018.

<https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/special-ops-small-wars-isis-al-qaeda>.

OBJECTIVE: Maintain/Build Foreign Regime Authority

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0 US, TBD Cameroon, TBD Boko Haram

Per capita battle deaths: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: See Above

Per capita total deaths: N/A

COSTS: Costs related to the maintenance of approximately 300 US soldiers in Cameroon, operations of a drone surveillance base in Garoua, Cameroon for the life of the intervention.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US military involvements abroad. It is not included in MID, IMI, MIPS, ACD/PRIO, or other key datasets on US military involvements as most of these datasets stop updating their listings starting in 2010, 2014 at the latest. While we include this case as a confirmed usage of force abroad by the US, albeit with the permission of the target state, we remain unclear about certain components of this anti-terrorism mission. We are unclear as to exact end date/planned withdrawal of US forces. Similarly, battle deaths are unclear: no US troops were killed in operations, and US forces allege that American soldiers were not engaged in direct combat operations despite reporting to the

contrary. No data exists on US-led raids. lastly, it is difficult to disaggregate between US-assisted and non-US assisted operations within this case.

2016 Haiti

NAME: Hurricane Matthew Humanitarian Assistance

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 4, 2016 – October 21, 2016

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Haiti (HAI), 41

SUMMARY:

In October of 2016, Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti and the broader Caribbean region inflicting widespread devastation. At the time, the most powerful hurricane to have struck Haiti in more than 50 years, Matthew left hundreds dead, with severe damage to infrastructure and leaving thousands more without access to food, water, and other essential services.

As a result of this, the US Navy authorized the deployment of three naval ships to provide assistance as part of a larger relief effort by the US government. The USS George Washington, an aircraft carrier, the USS Mesa Verde, an amphibious transport ship, and the USS Comfort, a hospital ship, were deployed to provide logistical and medical assistance to relief efforts. In addition to the Comfort's medical assistance, the Mesa Verde and the George Washington were able to provide logistical assistance to airlift and transport supplies to previously inaccessible areas in Southwest Haiti. Following improvements to infrastructure and rejuvenated Government of Haiti logistical capacity, the military assistance missions were completed on October 21. This assistance was a component of a larger US government humanitarian assistance package to Haiti and other governments in the region in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew.

SOURCES:

Ahmed, Azam. 2016. "Hurricane Matthew Makes Old Problems Worse for Haitians." *The New York Times*, October 6. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/07/world/americas/hurricane-matthew-haiti.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region@ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>.

Chappell, Bill. 2016. "U.S. Rushes Aid To Haiti, Where Hurricane Matthew Killed Hundreds." *National Public Radio (NPR)*. October 8. <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/08/497194028/u-s-rushes-aid-to-haiti-where-hurricane-matthew-killed-hundreds>.

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Horton, Alex. "US Southern Command Stages 100 Troops in Caribbean for Hurricane Relief." Stars and Stripes. Accessed December 20, 2019. <https://www.stripes.com/news/us-southern-command-stages-100-troops-in-caribbean-for-hurricane-relief-1.432344>.

Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 – Caribbean – Hurricane Matthew. 2016. Report no. 3. Washington, DC: *US Agency for International Development*.

Fact Sheet #7, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 – Caribbean – Hurricane Matthew. Report no. 7. 2016. Washington, DC: *US Agency for International Development*.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: N/A

TOTAL DEATHS: N/A

COSTS: Deployment, regular airlifts, medical costs for three US Navy ships for approximately two weeks. 100 US troops under US Southern Command, 9 Helicopters from both the military and army.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case is only listed in the CRS document of US usage of force abroad, not in any other datasets on US military intervention. This is because the key datasets on US military intervention only collect new cases until 2014. Nonetheless, this represents the usage of the US military abroad for humanitarian purposes, so we include it on our dataset as a case of US humanitarian intervention.

2016 Yemen

NAME: Cruise Missile Strikes

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 13, 2016

TARGET STATE(S): Yemen (YEM), 679

SUMMARY:

During the morning of October 13, Houthi forces launched two anti-ship missiles at the *USS Mason* off the coast of Yemen, failing to strike the ships or inflict any damage. In response, the *USS Nitze* launched three tomahawk cruise missiles at three separate Houthi controlled radar installations along Yemen's Red Sea coast. The radar installations had been suspected of being involved in the recent missile launches that had threatened the *USS Mason* and other vessels traveling in international waters of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb. As a result of these strikes, the ability of Houthi forces to utilize radar installations for targeting data and mid-course updates to anti-ship missiles was significantly disrupted.

In 2015, the United States began taking a more concerted role in the unfolding civil war in Yemen by providing armament and intelligence to the Saudi led coalition against Houthi forces. While support for the Saudi led coalition has continued into the Trump administration, the relationship between the United States has frayed.

SOURCES:

Al Jazeera Media Network. 2016. "US launches strikes against Houthi radar sites in Yemen." *Al Jazeera*, October 13.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/launches-strikes-houthi-radar-sites-yemen-161013041922132.html>.

Lamothe, Dan. 2016. "Navy launches Tomahawk missiles at rebel sites in Yemen after attacks on U.S. ships." *The Washington Post*, October 12. <https://www.washingtonpost.com>.

Rogoway, Tyler. 2016. "Tomahawk Cruise Missiles Pummel Houthi Controlled Radar Sites In Yemen." *The Drive*, October 13. <http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/5545/tomahawk-cruise-missiles-pummel-houthi-controlled-radar-sites-in-yemen>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: United States – 0
Yemen/Houthi Forces – No Figures available (Three radar installations destroyed)

TOTAL DEATHS: United States – 0
Yemen/Houthi Forces – No Figures available

COSTS: Three RGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US military involvements abroad. It is not included in MID, IMI, MIPS, ACD/PRIO, or other key datasets on US military involvements as most of these datasets stop updating their listings starting in 2010, 2014 at the latest. We include this case as a confirmed usage of force by the US abroad. We are, however, unclear as to the number of battle deaths of Houthi forces. While the United States has continued its support for the Saudi led coalition, we are choosing to code this event separately as this case provides the only example of the United States using force in Yemen.

2017 Operation Continuing Promise

NAME: Operation Continuing Promise (Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: January 26, 2017 – March 29, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Guatemala, Republic of Honduras, Republic of Colombia (GUA,90) (HON,91) (COL, 100)

SUMMARY:

Operation Continuing Promise is a recurring US Military mission to provide humanitarian aid and training to partners in the Caribbean region. The 2017 iteration included stops in Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia, where the USNS Spearhead and its assigned personnel conducted a number of humanitarian and civic assistance activities. This included medical, dental, and veterinary assistance, as well as disaster response training to personnel from the three countries.

The Spearhead made its first two stops in Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, and Trujillo, Honduras, where it conducted over 12,000 patient medical visits including dental, pediatric, and adult medical assistance. In addition, personnel conducted 15 separate community support projects and improvements. During their final stop in Colombia, the personnel from the Spearhead worked with the host country government to provide medical care to local citizens in Popoya Playa, conduct light infrastructure upgrades, and conducted training with nutrition professionals in the country.

SOURCES:

Cannady, Brittney. 2017. "Continuing Promise 2017 Completes Humanitarian Mission in Honduras, Tops 12,900 Patient Encounters." U.S. Southern Command Media. Last modified February 24. Accessed March 30, 2019.

<https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/1107872/continuing-promise-2017-completes-humanitarian-mission-in-honduras-tops-12900-p/>.

Daraskevich, Joe. 2017. "Humanitarian mission about building relationships for staff from Jacksonville Naval Hospital." Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville, FL), March 13. Accessed March 30, 2019.

<https://www.jacksonville.com/news/military/2017-03-13/humanitarian-mission-about-building-relationships-staff-jacksonville-naval>.

Zaycek, Amy. 2017. "Continuing Promise 2017 Mission Concludes Final Mission Stop in Popoya Playa." U.S. Southern Command Media. Last modified April 12. Accessed March 30, 2019.

<https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/1153475/continuing-promise-2017-mission-concludes-final-mission-stop-in-popoya-playa/>.

U.S. Navy. "Continuing Promise 2017 Special Report." Navy Live. Navy Live, March 14, 2017. <https://navylive.dodlive.mil/2017/03/09/continuing-promise-2017-special-report/>.

"Continuing Promise 2017 Mission Concludes Final Mission Stop in Popoya." U.S. Southern Command, April 12, 2017. <https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/1153475/continuing-promise-2017-mission-concludes-final-mission-stop-in-popoya-playa/>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Operating costs for USNS Spearhead from January – April 2017, including medical supplies, travel from Jacksonville to Colombia, other stops. 169 troops from various military branches.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This incident appears in the CRS listing of US usage of force abroad. This case refers specifically to the 2017 iteration of Operation Continuing Promise. However, other missions have occurred, are anticipated to continue occurring in different countries in the region, and may not be currently captured in the MIP dataset. We are also considering disaggregating the target countries into individual entries in the dataset, but information is limited.

2017 Dominica

NAME: Hurricane Maria Relief

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: July 24, 2017 – October 8, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Dominica (DMA), 54

SUMMARY:

Hurricane Maria, a Category 5 hurricane, struck Dominica on September 18. The storm devastated Dominica, damaging nearly every building on the island and destroying a quarter of them. Additionally, Dominica faced an island-wide power outage, air and sea ports were closed, there was no running water, and communications off-island were severely compromised. A military joint task force evacuated American citizens and other nationals from Dominica to nearby islands. In an operation led by USAID, it also expanded its existing humanitarian relief operations after Hurricane Irma to include Dominica and other islands hit by Hurricane Maria. After the immediate emergency ended and other humanitarian organizations began operating in the area, the military wound down its activities. The U.S. concluded this operation on October 5, 2017.

SOURCES:

“Getting over Hurricane Maria.” 2018. *The Economist*, August 30.

“Hurricane Maria: Dominica ‘in daze’ after storm leaves island cut off from world.” 2017. *The Guardian*, September 21.

Holmes, Michael, and van Heerden, Dominique. 2017. “Dominica knocked to its knees by Hurricane Maria’s might.” *CNN*, September 21.

U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command. 2017. *RELEASE: Joint Task Force completes support to relief mission in Caribbean*. Miami.

<https://www.southcom.mil/News/PressReleases/Article/1335971/release-joint-task-force-completes-support-to-relief-mission-in-caribbean/>

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: 300 U.S. servicemembers, 10 Army and Marine helicopters, 4 C-130s, the USS Wasp, USNS Spearhead, P8 Poseidon and P3 Orion (aerial reconnaissance aircraft). USAID provided 340,000 pounds of relief supplies (plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, and water containers). Quote from a SOUTHCOM press release: “As of October 3, the U.S. Government has provided more than \$12.6 million in humanitarian assistance to Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint-Martin, and Sint Maarten.”

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears in the CRS listing of US usage of force abroad, and we have confirmed it via several other sources.

2017 JTF Hurricane Relief

NAME: Joint Task Force Hurricane Relief Leeward Islands

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 9, 2017 – October 8, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Saint Martin/Sint Maarten [France (220) and Netherlands (210)],
Dominica, DMA (54).

SUMMARY:

In September of 2017, Hurricane Irma and Maria caused extensive damage throughout the Caribbean and the Leeward Island chain. The island of Saint Martin was particularly hard hit, with the government of France and the Netherlands requesting disaster assistance, including water purification to alleviate the stressed public water system.

In response to this, Joint Task Force Leeward Islands (JTF LI) was established to support USAID's ongoing disaster relief efforts in the region. While USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was the lead coordinating partner, the response included elements from the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. JTF LI provided extensive logistical support to the USAID-led relief effort, including the transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies. The JTF established two water purification sites on the French and Dutch portions of the island, supplying essential drinking supplies to people of the island. Around 300 troops were mobilized for the operation. In addition, JTF LI flew 55 separate missions to the region to deliver aid and response staff, including over 155 tons of humanitarian supplies and 61 tons of heavy equipment. The JTF completed operations on October 5th, after the logistical needs of USAID's disaster relief effort were completed.

SOURCES:

Martens, Melissa. 2017. "Joint Task Force - Leeward Islands Distributes Water to the People of Saint Martin." US Marine Corps Public Site, September 19. Accessed April 12, 2019. <https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/1315669/joint-task-force-leeward-islands-distributes-water-to-the-people-of-saint-martin/>.

Martens, Melissa. 2017. "Joint Task Force - Leeward Islands wraps up humanitarian aid mission." October 9. Accessed April 12, 2019. <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/251587/joint-task-force-leeward-islands-wraps-up-humanitarian-aid-mission>.

"Joint Task Force-Leeward Islands Successfully Completes Humanitarian Assistance Mission." 2017. *Dialogo - Forum of the Americas*. Accessed April 12, 2019.

<https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/joint-task-force-leeward-islands-successfully-completes-humanitarian-assistance-mission>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 300 troops in assistance operations. One USS Wasp (LHD 1), the support of 10 helicopters (two from USS Wasp), and four C-130 Hercules aircraft.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: The CRS lists “Puerto Rico” in addition to Saint Martin for this dispute. However, this task force was focused on the Leeward Islands, and we have not previously included entries where the US military was deployed domestically in support of relief efforts. Also, Saint Martin and Sint Maarten are not included the country codebook. This may be due to the fact that they are dependencies of the France and the Netherlands, and should be coded as such, but their status as nominally separate countries makes the determination difficult.

2017 Peru

NAME: Flooding Relief

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: March 30, 2017 - April 18, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Republic of Peru (PER), 135

SUMMARY:

Beginning in January of 2017, warming water temperatures resulted in a coastal El Nino event with massive flooding, mudslides, damages and loss of life along the Pacific coast. Peru was particularly hard hit by this flooding. In response, the armed forces of the United States and regional allies such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia, among others, were deployed to assist the Government of Peru in humanitarian relief and rescue efforts.

As a component of this response, the United States announced in late March of 2017 the provision of \$750,000 in funding, as well as the deployment of four civilian disaster relief teams to assist the Government of Peru in providing water, sanitation, and improved hygiene efforts. On April 4, the US sent two AC-130s to Lima where U.S. troops distributed aid for 14 days. In addition, the Government of Peru utilized ten helicopters given by the US, initially intended for counter-narcotics operations, to support search and rescue missions and distribute supplies in isolated areas of Peru. Members of the Peruvian military piloted the helicopters. Additionally, The US Department of Defense financed 13 Regional Emergency Operations Centers, as part of US Southern Command's Humanitarian Assistance program. Peru suffered lasting damage as a result of these floods, with over 1.2 million people impacted, and 106 fatalities through late April of 2017

SOURCES:

US Embassy Lima. 2017. "The U.S. supports humanitarian assistance and disaster response in Peru." News release. April 18. <https://pe.usembassy.gov/u-s-supports-humanitarian-assistance-disaster-response-peru>.

Cánepa, Pedro Francisco. 2017. "Partner Nation Armed Forces Assist Peru after Flooding." *Dialogo Digital Military Medicine*, April 28. <https://dialogo-americas.com/partner-nation-armed-forces-assist-peru-after-flooding/>

Department of State Acting Spokesman, Mark Toner. 2017. *Flood Relief Support to Peru*. March 30. <https://www.state.gov/flood-relief-support-to-peru/>

United States Agency for International Development. 2017. *Peru - Flood Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017*. July 13. https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/peru_fl_fs03_07-13-2017.pdf

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Costs related to the provision of 10 helicopters and 2 AC-130s. \$8,320,221 from various US departments to support Peruvian government's flood relief efforts. Costs related to flying two AC-130s. Department of Defense costs finalized at \$1,620,162.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, due to its humanitarian nature and timeframe (other key datasets do not update after 2014). While this mission relates to humanitarian relief after a natural disaster, it does involve the deployment of U.S. military elements and the U.S. usage of force for humanitarian purposes. Thus, we currently maintain this case as part of our dataset.

2017 Sri Lanka

NAME: Humanitarian Assistance (flooding and landslides)

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 11, 2017 – June 17, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (LKA) (280).

SUMMARY:

Heavy rainfall in mid-2017 resulted in widespread flooding and landslides throughout Sri Lanka, causing significant damage to homes and buildings in the country, displacing significant portions of the population. In response to this flooding, US Pacific Command deployed the USS Lake Erie Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser to Colombo to support relief efforts, as well as military aircraft and specialists already located in the region.

During the week the Erie spent in country supporting relief efforts, US Navy personnel worked closely with the Red Cross and local government officials to support cleanup and humanitarian relief efforts. In addition to traditional food distribution and logistical support, US Navy Sailors repaired and rehabilitated over 120 groundwater wells in the region, as well as repaired a large-scale irrigation system in Matara province. The USS Lake Erie departed Colombo on June 17th, with a small group of military specialists remaining in country to support the US embassy with the termination of relief operations.

SOURCES:

Jennewein, Chris. 2017. "San Diego-Based USS Lake Erie Assists Flood Victims in Sri Lanka." *Times of San Diego* (San Diego, CA), June 11. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://timesofsandiego.com/military/2017/06/11/san-diego-based-uss-lake-erie-assists-flood-victims-sri-lanka/>.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command United States Armed Forces. 2017. USS Lake Erie Sailors, Personnel Complete Relief Mission in Sri Lanka. Alea, HI: Destroyer Squadron 7 Public Affairs.

Allison, George. 2017. "American cruiser USS Lake Erie renders assistance in Sri Lanka after devastating floods." *UK Defence Journal* (UK), June 12. Accessed March 15, 2019. <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/american-cruiser-uss-lake-erie-renders-assistance-sri-lanka-devastating-floods/>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Operations of one guided missile cruiser for one week.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case appears only in the CRS listing as a case of US military usage for humanitarian assistance after a natural disaster. We currently include these cases within our dataset.

2017 Uruguay

NAME: Search and Rescue Assistance.

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: April 8, 2017 – April 13, 2017

TARGET STATE(S): Oriental Republic of Uruguay (URY), 165

SUMMARY: In March of 2017, the Korean flagged shipping freighter the Stellar Daisy sank 2,500 miles off the coast of Uruguay. The Stellar Daisy had been carrying large quantities of ore from Brazil to China, and had released a distress signal stating that it had begun to take on large quantities of water and was listing heavily. Two crewmembers were initially rescued from a lifeboat, with the other 22 crew members missing.

In response to this, a number of nations contributed resources to the search and rescue mission, including Brazil, South Korea, and Uruguay. As part of this, South Korea had requested US assistance in the search and rescue mission, and in response the United States had deployed a P-8 maritime patrol aircraft from its base in South Florida to assist in the mission. The crew conducted a series of 5 surveillance flights in an attempt to locate any remnants or traces of the Stellar Daisy, but after a week of searching returned to their base in South Florida, citing the time passed since the disappearance of the ship and other demands on the force. The Stellar Daisy was ultimately not found until nearly two years later in February of 2019, with the wreckage discovered on the ocean floor of the South Atlantic.

SOURCES:

Aaro, David. 2019. "South Korean tanker Stellar Daisy found on ocean floor 2 years after it sank, explorers say." *FOX News*, February 19, 2019. https://www.foxnews.com/science/south-korea-stellar-daisy-found-ocean-floor?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20foxnews%2Fmost-popular%20%28Internal%20-%20Most%20Popular%20Content%29.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2017. "Progress in Search Operations for Missing Crew Members of Stellar Daisy." News release, April 14. [http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=318360&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=R
OK-
New&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=](http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=318360&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=R
OK-
New&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=)

"Stellar Daisy: search for crew of huge cargo ship feared sunk in Atlantic Ocean." 2017. *The Guardian*, April 2. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/03/stellar-daisy-search-crew-huge-cargo-ship-feared-sunk-in-atlantic-ocean>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention;

OUTCOME: Stalemate

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

COSTS: Deployment of one P-8 surveillance craft, five flights across the South Atlantic.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case only appears in the CRS listing of US usages of force abroad, given it's consensual humanitarian mission. We have coded the mission as a "Stalemate", as while the humanitarian operation occurred, they were not able to find the wreck until two years later.

2018 Ecuador

NAME: Operation Enduring Promise

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: October 11, 2018 - December 18, 2018.

TARGET STATE(S): Ecuador (ECU), 130

SUMMARY:

On October 11th, 2018, the United States deployed a U.S. Navy hospital ship, the USNS Comfort to Latin America as part of an 11-week medical assistance mission titled “Operation Enduring Promise”. The ship deployed to several Latin American countries (Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras) in an effort to relieve pressure on medical systems in nations experiencing an influx of migrants and refugees due to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela beginning in 2015, under President Nicolás Maduro.

The crisis in Venezuela emerged from widespread poverty and chronic shortages of food, medicine, and other necessities, in combination with years of economic mismanagement, official corruption, increasing political repression and gross human rights violations, as well as a sharp decline in oil prices between 2013 and 2016. As a result, 3.6 million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015. Many of those fleeing Venezuela have sought refuge in neighboring countries, putting these host-states under enormous economic and political stress.

The deployment of the USNS Comfort is part of the Trump Administration’s aggressive foreign policy strategy towards Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela in response to the country’s man-made human rights and humanitarian crisis. The Trump Administration has increased political and economic pressure on Maduro’s government to oust him from power.

The USNS Comfort’s crew included more than 200 U.S. and partner nation military doctors, nurses, and technicians. In addition, about 60 medical and dental professional volunteers from nongovernmental organizations were on board to support the medical assistance mission. The mission concluded and returned to the U.S. on December 18th, 2018.

SOURCES:

The Economist Intelligence Unit. "The return of the Monroe doctrine? Bello." *The Economist*, February 23, 2019, pg. 33. *Gale Academic OneFile* (accessed January 14, 2021). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A575067766/AONE?u=mlin_m_tufts&sid=AONE&xid=f5d8eb26.

Keith Wilson, Seaman J. “USNS Comfort Begins Medical Site Set-up in Ecuador” U.S. Navy. October, 20th, 2018. <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/297149/usns-comfort-begins-medical-site-set-up-ecuador>

U.S. Embassy and Consulate Ecuador. “Hospital ship to depart Norfolk Oct. 11 for Enduring Promise mission in Latin America” *U.S. Department of State: U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Ecuador*. October 2nd, 2018. <https://ec.usembassy.gov/hospital-ship-to-depart-norfolk-oct-11-for-enduring-promise-mission-in-latin-america/>

Van Praag, Oriana. “Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis.” *The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*. September, 13th, 2019. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-venezuelan-refugee-crisis>

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies.

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: 1 U.S. Navy hospital ship.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) data set, page 45.

2018 Honduras

NAME: Operation Enduring Promise - Honduras

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: December 10, 2018 - December 18, 2018.

TARGET STATE(S): Honduras (HON), 91

SUMMARY:

On October 11th, 2018, the United States deployed a U.S. Navy hospital ship, the USNS Comfort to Latin America as part of an 11-week medical assistance mission titled “Operation Enduring Promise”. The ship deployed to several Latin American countries (Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras) in an effort to relieve pressure on medical systems in nations experiencing an influx of migrants and refugees due to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela beginning in 2015, under President Nicolás Maduro.

On December 10, 2018, DOD reported that the USNS Comfort provided humanitarian assistance in several Central and South American countries by treating more than 20,000 civilians and performing over 600 surgeries.⁸⁶ Included were a number of refugees from Venezuela.

The crisis in Venezuela emerged from widespread poverty and chronic shortages of food, medicine, and other necessities, in combination with years of economic mismanagement, official corruption, increasing political repression and gross human rights violations, as well as a sharp decline in oil prices between 2013 and 2016. As a result, 3.6 million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015. Many of those fleeing Venezuela have sought refuge in neighboring countries, putting these host-states under enormous economic and political stress.

The deployment of the USNS Comfort is part of the Trump Administration’s aggressive foreign policy strategy towards Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela in response to the country’s man-made human rights and humanitarian crisis. The Trump Administration has increased political and economic pressure on Maduro’s government to oust him from power.

The USNS Comfort’s crew included more than 200 U.S. and partner nation military doctors, nurses, and technicians. In addition, about 60 medical and dental professional volunteers from nongovernmental organizations were on board to support the medical assistance mission. The mission concluded and returned to the U.S. on December 18th, 2018.

SOURCES:

David Vergun, "DOD Spokesman: As U.S. Provides Aid to Central, South America, Russia Sends Bombers," DOD News, December 10, 2018, at <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1709295/dod-spokesman-as-us-provides-aid-to-central-south-america-russia-sends-bombers/>.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. "The return of the Monroe doctrine? Bello." *The Economist*, February 23, 2019, pg. 33. *Gale Academic OneFile* (accessed January 14, 2021). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A575067766/AONE?u=mlin_m_tufts&sid=AONE&xid=f5d8eb26.

Keith Wilson, Seaman J. "USNS Comfort Begins Medical Site Set-up in Ecuador" U.S. Navy. October, 20th, 2018. <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/297149/usns-comfort-begins-medical-site-set-up-ecuador>

U.S. Embassy and Consulate Ecuador. "Hospital ship to depart Norfolk Oct. 11 for Enduring Promise mission in Latin America" *U.S. Department of State: U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Ecuador*. October 2nd, 2018. <https://ec.usembassy.gov/hospital-ship-to-depart-norfolk-oct-11-for-enduring-promise-mission-in-latin-america/>

Van Praag, Oriana. "Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis." *The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*. September, 13th, 2019. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-venezuelan-refugee-crisis>

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. and Allies.

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: None

COSTS: 1 U.S. Navy hospital ship.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) data set, page 46.

2018 Thailand

NAME: Thai Cave Rescue

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: June 28, 2018 - July 10, 2020

TARGET STATE(S): Thailand (THI) 800

SUMMARY:

On July 23, 2018, twelve members of a youth soccer team aged between 11 and 17, along with their assistant coach, entered the Tham Luang Cave system in North Thailand for a post practice hike. While in the cave system, monsoon rains rapidly flooded the path leading back to the entrance of the cave leaving the team trapped more than two and half miles from the cave's entrance. The boys were reported missing that evening when a teammate who was not exploring with the rest of the team shared the boys' plans and the story was confirmed when their bicycles were found near the entrance of the cave. Almost immediately, the Thai government began to organize an international rescue operation composed of experienced cave divers, search and rescue personnel, local civilians, and military service members from across the globe, as well as diplomatic support from allies and partners.

On June 26th, the Thai government officially asked the United States for assistance in the rescue operations of the boys and the US military immediately responded. However, after surveying the area, the local military assets did not possess the correct gear to assist in the operation. Two days later on June 28th, 36 U.S. Airmen from the 353rd Special Operations Group and the 31st Rescue Squadron arrived from the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan to provide support for the rescue mission. Throughout the rescue efforts, the US military was quick to stress that the operation was Thai led, with US support. Such support included the provisioning of survival supplies (including caving equipment and oxygen) at various intervals within the cave, with a particular focus on the main internal staging area in Chamber 3, construction of helipads to accommodate large drilling equipment, and conducting search and rescue dives. U.S. Military personnel also helped with geological surveys of the area to assess the possibility for alternative entries into the cave, if the main entrance provided to be an impossible point of entry. Once the boys and their coach had been found safely by British divers, American strategic advisors were also critical in helping to devise various evacuation plans.

During the extraction of the team members between July 8-10, 2019, members of the 353rd Special Operations Group and the 31st Rescue Squadron provided transportation of the sedated boys through the final chambers at the end of the journey, in addition to providing medical aid

and other technical assistance as needed. With the successful conclusion of the rescue operation on July 10th, the U.S. team withdrew from the area.

SOURCES:

- Beech, Hannah; Richard C. Paddock; and Muktitia Suhartono. “‘Still Can’t Believe It Worked’: The Story of the Thailand Cave Rescue.” *The New York Times*. July 12, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/world/asia/thailand-cave-rescue-seals.html>.
- Burke, Matthew M. "One Year After Thai Cave Rescue, US Airman Recalls Harrowing Effort to Save Youth Soccer Team." *Stars and Stripes*. August 8, 2019. <https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/one-year-after-thai-cave-rescue-us-airman-recalls-harrowing-effort-to-save-youth-soccer-team-1.593762>.
- Douglas, Renee (1st Lt.). “Thai Cave Rescue: Two Years Later.” *U.S Air Force Expeditionary Center*. July 8, 2020. <https://www.expeditionarycenter.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2278840/thai-cave-rescue-two-years-later/>.
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- Paddock, Richard C. “How Rescuers in a Thai Cave Pulled Off the Impossible.” *The New York Times*. July 11, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/world/asia/thailand-cave-rescue-how.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article®ion=Footer>.
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- “Thailand Cave Rescue: Ex-Navy Diver Dies on Oxygen Supply Mission.” *The British Broadcasting Corporation*. July 6, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44734385>
- “Thai Navy SEAL Dies of Infections From Cave Rescue.” *The Guardian*. December 27, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/dec/28/thai-navy-seal-dies-of-infection-from-cave-rescue>.

OBJECTIVE: Humanitarian Intervention

OUTCOME: Victory for U.S. & Allies

BATTLE DEATHS: None

TOTAL DEATHS: Two

- Petty Officer Saman Gunan (ret.), a retired Thai Navy SEAL died on July 6th after losing consciousness while delivering oxygen to a staging area within the cave. Despite efforts at CPR, Saman was pronounced dead that evening
- Petty Officer Beirut Pakbara died more than a year after the cave rescue in December of 2019 following lengthy treatment for a blood infection he received while working in the cave

COSTS: 36 U.S. Military personnel from the US Pacific Command were dispatched from Okinawa, Japan along with an unknown amount of search and rescue equipment, and at least two MC-130s. They were joined by approximately seven military personnel already stationed within Thailand.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report on US military intervention.

2019 Iraq

NAME: Baghdad Embassy Protection

DISPUTE NUMBER: NA

DATES: December 31, 2019 - January 1, 2020

TARGET STATE(S): Iraq - 645

SUMMARY:

On Friday December 27th, 2019, a rocket attack killed an American contractor and injured several troops in Kirkuk, Iraq. The attack was executed by Kataib Hezbollah, a Shia militia group under the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) with close ties to Iran's Quds Force. In retaliation, on Sunday the 29th at 11am ET, U.S. forces conducted airstrikes with F-15 Strike Eagle fighter planes targeting five facilities, containing weapon storage and command centers in Syria and Iraq (one of which was in Al-Qaim). The attack left 25 dead and 51 wounded. The Pentagon says these facilities were linked to the Iranian-backed militia. Mark Esper, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, notified Adel Abdul Mahdi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, of the attack half an hour before. Mahdi strongly objected and expressed concerns that this would escalate and threaten the security of the region.

These airstrikes prompted a response in the form of violent protests at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad the following Tuesday, December 31st. Mahdi had called for three days of mourning starting that Tuesday and a funeral was held to pay respects to those killed in the airstrikes. After the funeral, protesters stormed through the Green Zone. They managed to break through the main gate of the compound and burn a reception building and guard posts. The Iraqi security forces made little effort to prevent protestors from entering the Green Zone. Some Iraqi security forces were even seen attacking the compound. Meanwhile, U.S marines used tear gas and soldiers were seen guarding the roof. Two American Apache AH-64 helicopters from Taji, Iraq hovered over and dropped flares. The U.S. immediately deployed 100 marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces Crisis Response in Kuwait. They also deployed 750 men from the 82nd Airborne Division of the Army at Fort Bragg. These troops are in addition to the 14,000 troops that were deployed to the Gulf region in May in light of Iranian aggression. The U.S. called upon the Iraqi government to assist in protecting U.S. personnel. Mahdi urged militiamen and supporters to stop the violence and leave the embassy.

While protesters did enter the compound, the Department of State said that there was no breach of the embassy, that personnel were safe, and there was no evacuation plan. By Tuesday evening, flags of the Iran-backed Shiite militia were left in the reception area and along the embassy wall with anti-US graffiti. The protesters had withdrawn from the compound and set up tents outside for a sit-in. This nearly two day standoff ended with protesters withdrawing after an agreement was made between militia leaders and Mahdi - protesters would leave on the condition that Mahdi get U.S. troops out of Iraq.

Tensions had already been rising between the U.S. and Iran since the summer of 2019. Washington had been putting economic pressure on Iran while they responded with “maximum resistance” in the form of reducing its compliance with the nuclear deal. In May, four oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia were attacked. In June, Iran shot down a U.S. drone and two oil tankers were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. This itself had already brought President Trump to the verge of ordering a strike on Iran. In the weeks leading up to the events of late December, the militias executed 11 attacks on Iraqi bases where U.S. personnel were present. The events of December 29th and the 31st ultimately led to an escalation in a proxy conflict between the U.S. and Iran in Iraq. It also displayed Iran’s power over Iraq and the Iraqi government’s difficult position. The agreements made between the militia leaders at the protest and the Iraqi prime minister, led to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq.

SOURCES:

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Athey, Philip. “100 U.S. Marines, Two Apache Helicopters Reinforcing Embassy in Baghdad after Attack.” Marine Corps Times. Marine Corps Times, December 31, 2019.

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Bacon, John. “After Protesters Storm US Embassy in Iraq, Shouting 'Death to America,' Donald Trump Says Iran Will 'Pay a Very Big Price'.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, January 1, 2020. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/12/31/us-embassy-attacked-iraqi-militia-supporters-break-into-compound/2781811001/>.

Hassan, Falih, and Alissa J. Rubin. “Pro-Iranian Protesters End Siege of U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.” The New York Times. The New York Times, January 1, 2020.

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Starr, Barbara, Kevin Bohn, and Ross Levitt. “US Strikes 5 Facilities in Iraq and Syria Linked to Iranian-Backed Militia.” CNN. Cable News Network, December 30, 2019.

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/29/politics/us-strikes-iran-backed-militia-facilities-in-iraq-syria/index.html>.

OBJECTIVE: Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests

OUTCOME: Yield by U.S.

BATTLE DEATHS: 0

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: Deployment of 750 troops from 82nd Airborne Division, 2 Apache helicopters (AH-64), and 100 marines from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces Crisis Response

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case features in the CRS report.

2019 Saudi Arabia

NAME: Expanded force deployment to counter Iran

DISPUTE NUMBER: N/A

DATES: September 26, 2019

TARGET STATE(S): Saudi Arabia (SAU), 670

SUMMARY:

On September 16th, 2019, a series of explosions rocked an oil processing plant in Saudi Arabia. This attack was attributed by both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States to Iran. The attack followed a pattern of escalating tensions and hostility within the region between the Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the de-facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The United States, under President Donald Trump, has also taken an assertive approach to countering Iran's geopolitical influence in the Middle East through a combination of increased military posturing in the region, implementation of strong economic sanctions against the Iranian regime, and the increased provision of military and economic support to Saudi Arabia, a close regional ally and partner.

In response to the September 16th attack, the United States, which maintains a substantial military force within Saudi Arabia, deployed an additional 3,000 troops, two fighter squadrons, and a number of air-defense and artillery units to the country between September and October 2019 to invest in regional security against Iran. As of 2021, these forces have not been scaled back.

SOURCES:

DOD, "DOD Statement on Deployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," *Department of Defense*, September 2019.

<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1972415/dodstatement-on-deployment-of-us-forces-and-equipment-to-the-kingdom-of-saudi/>.

DOD, "DOD Statement on Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces and Equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, News Release, October 11, 2019," *Department of Defense*, October 11, 2019 <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1987575/dodstatement-on-deployment-of-additional-us-forces-and-equipment-to-the-kingdo/>.

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OBJECTIVE: Social Protection and Order, Protect own Military and/or Diplomatic Interests, Protecting Economic Interests,

OUTCOME: Ongoing

BATTLE DEATHS: None

Per capita battle deaths: 0

TOTAL DEATHS: 0

Per capita total deaths: 0

COSTS: 3,000 Troops, 2 air squadrons (48 planes), and several air-defense and artillery units.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: This case comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) data set, page 45.