Paper 1 - For Want of a Nail - Annotated Bibliography


This article is used to confirm the figure - 82 million Americans - that watched President Bush’s speech to a joint session of Congress a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks.


Abbas writes about how U.S. generals refused to seriously consider Pakistani concerns over the U.S. making the decision to exclude the Taliban after post-invasion invasion, with the Deputy Secretary of State telling the head of the Pakistani ISI that “You are either 100 percent with us or 100 percent against us—there is no gray area”.


This press conference, a few weeks after 9/11, highlighted how President Bush expected military operations in Afghanistan to be brief. President Bush would state “We’re not into nation-building... we’re focused on justice.”


Barfield writes about how policymakers involved in the War in Afghanistan had little nuanced understanding of the country. The paper pulls his quote that “It proved difficult to explain Afghanistan and its politics to those who took an interest in it only after 2001. Tired clichés passed as insights, and few policymakers thought of consulting any Afghans who could not speak English.” Additionally, Barfield writes that in the week after the 9/11 attacks, Mullah Omar convened a loya jirga of several hundred Islamic scholars to advise him on what to do with bin Laden, with many advising him to turn bin Laden over, although Omar ultimately declined to do so.


A day after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush continues to use moralistic language to describe the attacks and the response the U.S. will undertake in response to them.
The paper uses the quote from President Bush: “This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world… The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.”


This speech, given in the morning of the 9/11 attacks, is important because of how then-President Bush describes the attacks. Instead of viewing the act of terrorism as a high-profile crime, the president uses moralistic language: “Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward. And freedom will be defended. Make no mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.”

Bush, George W. Decision Points, Kindle Edition (Crown, 2010), 127-128, 191. This book, written by former President George W. Bush was used to understanding how the president and senior administration officials reacted to the 9/11 attacks. Immediately after the 9/11 attack, Bush wrote about his anger - that “someone had dared attack America” and “they were going to pay.” “My blood was boiling,” he wrote. “We were going to find out who did this, and kick their ass.”


President Bush’s statement to the rescue workers on Ground Zero is cited as another very notable quote in shaping public attitudes towards the eventual GWOT. Bush remarks “I can hear you! The rest of the world hears you! And the people—and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!”


The speech from President Bush to a joint session of Congress in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks lays out how the President would create a narrative that would shape how Americans viewed the attacks and what the U.S. government would do in response. This speech is cited to establish how the attacks were painted as an attack by people who “hated our freedoms”, how Bush puts the world on notice
by stating that “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” and finally what demands the U.S. would put on the Taliban in Afghanistan - “Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.”


This news conference only a month after the 9/11 attacks shows that despite the President being skeptical of nation-building, he would make the statement that “that we should not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved . . . we’ve got to work for a stable Afghanistan so that her neighbors don’t fear terrorist activity again coming out of that country.”


A few days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush continues to make remarks that will shape the understanding of how the American government will respond to the attacks. The paper uses the following quotes from President Bush: that the American people’s “responsibility to history” was clear, “to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” America, Bush said, is “peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger” and pledged that while the conflict was begun by others, “it will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.”


This speech by President Bush in the evening of 9/11/2001 makes the strong statement that the U.S. government would view the terrorists responsible for 9/11
as the same as the countries hosting said terrorists. Bush would state: “We will make no distinction,” he said, “between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”


Chamberlain writes that although Pakistani officials repeatedly warned that removing the Taliban by force was the wrong way to go, as it would empower the nation’s warlords and would “produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men” and make Afghanistan “an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now.” However, Chamberlain would make clear that Pakistani diplomatic efforts “should not impede any of the military planning” that had already begun.


Coll writes about U.S. pressure towards Pakistan in the early days of the war. US Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin asked the Pakistani president point blank, “are you with us or against us?” Pakistan, she said “could now be either a ‘clear enemy’ of the United States or a ‘clear friend.’” Later in the book, Coll writes that Pakistani leaders repeatedly warned US officials about the dangers of ousting the Taliban from power, arguing that the Taliban and al Qaeda were not the same and that America’s new potential ally, the Northern Alliance, was composed of murderers and thugs who could not govern the country.


Dalrymple’s article is useful for highlighting the background of Karzai, who would be selected as the President of the post-Taliban government. Dalrymple writes that Karzai was chosen in part due to his identity as a “Popalzai Pashtun, and a descendant of Shah Shuja ul-Mulk, whom the British had chosen in the late 19th century to lead Afghanistan.”


Dobbins was the senior-most American representative to the 2001 Bonn Talks. Dobbins would write in his book that the U.S. had limited understanding of Afghanistan during that time. However, he would note that “[Khalilzad] was the only participant in the Washington policy process who had firsthand knowledge of that country and its leadership and the only one who could speak to the Afghan leaders in their own language.” Additionally, when military successes accelerated against the
Taliban, government officials were far behind on envisioning a new government as US policymakers had “no clear idea of what group could be put in its place or how to do it.”


Larisa’ article is useful in understanding that the population of Pakistan was never very pro-Western, despite U.S. and Pakistani government cooperation in Afghanistan. Many Pakistanis hold negative views of the U.S. and believe the 9/11 attacks to be an Israeli or American plot as well as Americans wish to rid the world of Muslims.


Gall writes that just before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani military was busily evacuating thousands of troops and advisors that had been assisting the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. Additionally, Pakistani intelligence officials even shared intelligence with the Taliban about U.S. plans to invade.


In the campaign of 2000, Bush had criticized Clinton's efforts to nation-build overseas, stating that “Our military is meant to fight and win wars. That's what it's meant to do. And when it gets overextended, morale drops”. These words from then-candidate Bush would become more prescient over time.


Gopal writes about how there were divisions within the Taliban leadership regarding keeping bin Laden under their protection. However, Omar stubbornly rebuffed US demands, admitting that “Osama is like a chicken bone stuck in my throat. I can neither spit him out nor swallow him.” Gopal also writes that U.S. officials underestimated Pakistani intelligence’s self-interested strategic calculus with respect to the Taliban and consistently ignored Islamabad’s pleadings that the Taliban not be completely excluded from the country's political future.


Grenier sheds light into why Taliban officials were not able to easily change course in either removing Mullah Omar or revoking their hosting of Al-Qaeda and bin Laden. Grenier writes that "for their part, if senior elements in the Taliban were tempted to push Omar aside and to change policy on al Qaeda, they would have to
meet in person and consult with one another” and “to actually reach a consensus” among the Taliban leadership would have required them “to meet together to confer face-to-face, and at length,” something that was impossible once US bombs were raining down around them.


This new article describes in detail the conditions of Ground Zero following the 9/11 attacks. The continued burning of Ground Zero and the ever present acrid, pungent smoke served to harden American resolve against working to reach any form of surrender agreement with the Taliban.


Haass reflects on the thoughts of U.S. policymakers in the early days of the occupation of Afghanistan and how many were skeptical of nation-building. Haass writes that “[T]he consensus was that little could be accomplished in Afghanistan given its history, culture, and composition, and that there would be little payoff beyond Afghanistan even if things there went better than expected.”


This report was used to find the figure for the cost of the war in Afghanistan - $2.3 trillion over the nearly twenty years as well as additional costs in future years to come. The report breaks down the costs of the war into several categories - direct operations, veteran’s care, increases to bases, and interest payments. Additionally, this report breaks down the number of people killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan and which categories of people they belong to (soldiers, civilians, etc.)


This speech is used as a contrast to Bush’s speech in 2001. JFK’s speech also alludes to American promise and morality but envisions alternate pathways of engagement with hostile states.

Jack Fairweather, The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan (London, 2015), 36.
A passage from Fairweather’s book regarding Afghan war customs further serves to bolster the point that the U.S. completely ruled out any consideration to include the Taliban in post-war peace talks. “Out of the question,” a senior U.S. official would say, “They have been defeated.”

Loyn, David. The Long War: The Inside Story of America and Afghanistan since 9/11 (St. Martin’s, 2021), 29.

Loyn writes that in U.S. military military planning circles, many leaders did not wish for U.S. forces to become bogged down in fighting. General Tommy Franks was quoted as saying “there’s nothing to be gained by blundering about those mountains and gorges with armor battalions chasing a lightly armed enemy.”


The book by Malkasian provides crucial insights into the critical moments leading into the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The book relies upon Malkasian’s insight that Mullah Omar refused to hand over bin Laden because he placed significant weight on the attitudes of the Muslim world and feared that handing bin Laden over to non-Muslims would tarnish the Taliban’s Islamic image. Additionally, while Grenier, the CIA’s station chief in Islamabad, sought to avert war; few others in the US government appeared to share the same goal. When U.S. forces first engaged the Taliban using airstrikes, Malkasian noted the frustration in airpower achieving fewer successes than Bush administration policy makers anticipated. However, Malkasian later writes about the success of the U.S. Special Forces assisting the Northern Alliance and how their coordination with bombers utterly devastated the Taliban, sending them into full retreat within a few weeks. Passages from this book describing the failed surrender talks between the Taliban and Northern Alliance are also quoted, especially that then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld played a large role in shutting down any discussion of surrender.

Murphy, John M. “Our Mission and Our Moment.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Winter 2003), 607-632, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41939868#metadata_info_tab_contents. Murphy analyzes the language used in Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress and notes that the black and white terms would become “the prism through which the American people viewed the war on terrorism, and in turn the war in Afghanistan” but by doing so, would make it very difficult for Americans to envision an end to the war.

In response to U.S. pressure urging Pakistani support in Afghanistan, President Musharraf would give a speech trying to paint the partnership as deterring India while also saying that Pakistan’s alignment with America was a “lesser evil” and a temporary decision that would protect Pakistan.


The Commission’s report is used to highlight some important facts as to what U.S. intelligence knew about the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. While the Taliban were unaware of the 9/11 plot before it occurred (they initially joined the international community in publicly condemning the attacks). The Taliban and al Qaeda had struck a mutually beneficial alliance. The Taliban provided refuge to bin Laden and his followers after they were expelled from Sudan in 1996. In return, al Qaeda provided upwards of $10-20 million a year to the Taliban, and its fighters served as shock troops in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance.


This primary source, a memo from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith shows that U.S. policymakers were not that interested in state building in Afghanistan from the start as to avoid getting tied down. The note has the following statement: “The USG [US government] should not agonize over post-Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over al Qaeda and the Taliban.” However, Rumsfeld did envision “a highly capable peacekeeping force drawn from allies in Europe, the Muslim world and elsewhere to help to secure Kabul until stability is achieved.”

Omicinski, John. “General: Capturing bin Laden is not part of mission,” USA Today, November 8, 2001

This article captures a shocking quote from the US military commander in Afghanistan telling reporters in mid-November that US officials did not consider Osama bin Laden a “target of this effort” in Afghanistan. Instead, “What we are about,” he said, “is the destruction of the alQa’eda network, as well as the . . . Taliban that provide harbor to bin Laden and al-Qaeda.” This quote serves to highlight the contradiction that despite wishing to eliminate Al-Qaeda safe havens, ironically,
there was little discussion of destroying al Qaeda training camps or identifying and eliminating key al Qaeda lieutenants.


This speech from Colin Powell to the UNSC highlights that early into the war, although U.S. policymakers had wanted to stay away from long-term nation building, officials still understood that nation-building tasks would be required. Powell would announce that “the war would “be fought with increased support for democracy programs, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform and health and education programs. All of these together deny the reason for terrorists to exist or to find safe havens within those borders.”


Rashid writes about how in the desire to get Pakistan on the U.S.’ side, the Bush administration removed all sanctions on Pakistan and asked Congress to allow Karachi to reschedule repayment of outstanding loans and to provide more than $500 million in fresh loans. Additionally, Rashid writes that although Pakistan would initially agree to U.S. demands, this did not deter Pakistan from meddling directly in Afghanistan’s affairs in ways counter to U.S. interests, a “First say yes and later say but” approach.


Robert Grenier, the CIA bureau chief in Pakistan and a key actor in the US war against the Taliban, notes that officials at the National Counterterrorism Center would regularly send out documents, before September 11, that hyphenated the Taliban and al Qaeda, conflating the two groups.


This interview confirms from Richard Haass, the then director of Policy Planning at the State Department that “People have more prejudices than knowledge” when it came to the early planning heading into the Afghanistan War. Additionally, he notes why the efforts to reach a diplomatic solution failed as “there was a disinclination to compromise with the Taliban.”

This book from then National Security Advisor Rice admits that despite overtures from the U.S. to the Taliban government asking for harsh terms, most expected negotiations to fail and that invasion was the primary objective. Rice admits that “We all knew that the outcome would be a declaration of war against the Taliban and an invasion of Afghanistan.”


This oral history of Douglas Feith would note that early into the war, the U.S. was skeptical of a large nation-building presence. “We wanted to avoid the big footprint the Soviets had had” Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith would say. “The Soviets put 300,000 guys there and failed. We didn't want to re-create that error.

Roy, Olivier. “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

Roy writes about how disputed Kashmir has a historic part to pay in radicalizing Islamists in Pakistan.

Rubin, Barnett R. *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, (Oxford University Press, 2013) 150.

Rubin writes that the U.N.-led effort to create a new government in Afghanistan as the Taliban was in retreat had expectations that were disconnected from reality. “Afghanistan had been through twenty-three years of many-sided civil strife marked by the overt and covert involvement of regional and global powers, yet only nine days elapsed between the UN's opening of talks in the former West German capital and the affixing of signatures on December 5, 2001”


Rubin's book contains an in-depth look at how the U.S. and U.N. conducted the 2001 Bonn conference with non-Taliban Afghan leaders to create a post-Taliban government. Rubin writes that the decision to involve the U.N. was to give the U.S. government a quick fix to the issue of setting up a new nation while also deferring responsibility to the U.N.

This primary document from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to President Bush showcases the thinking in the administration that War in Afghanistan also needed to serve as an example to advance U.S. primacy generally - “If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the United States will not achieve its aim. There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change” and “Making an example of the Taliban increases US leverage on other state supporters of terrorism”.


This article was useful to understand the mindset of Americans during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This statement from the editors that “we can never be quite sure again that any bad intention can be thwarted, no matter how irrational or loathsome” and that “Everything [had] changed” are directly quoted in the paper.


Tilly’s thesis on state formation creates an understanding of how the U.S. and Afghan government’s decision making were fundamentally very different from each other and contributed to the inability of the two sides to reach any agreement post 9-11. Afghan politics had evolved over hundreds of years to achieve consensus by means of collective consultation—leadership was not determined by elections, but by tradition, and it was limited to males of certain prominent families within each loosely bounded geographic space. In contrast, Western states, like the United States, operate in a top-down and hierarchical manner. Thus, Bush and the US national security bureaucracy could move quickly while Omar needed time and space for consultation.


Dr. Toft’s paper cites the difficulty in negotiations to stop war given short timescales. While U.S. and Taliban officials made some efforts to negotiate, failure in talks was also tied to how the nature of Afghan culture and politics did not necessarily allow for a quick resolution to the crisis.

U.S. Senate Committee Hearing, Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Crisis, October 10 and November 15, 2001.
These hearings from the U.S. Senate into Afghanistan showcase the remarks that Senators would make cautioning that the U.S. would need to consider efforts to rebuild Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. Then-Senator Joe Biden observed at a Senate hearing in mid-October, “I know we are not going to use words like ‘nation-building’ … but once we drain the swamp, we had better plan something in that swamp.” In Biden’s view at the time, the long-term solution for Afghanistan included “such important items as secular education for both boys and girls.”

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc06.pdf

This document notes how the State Department crafted policy in line with the Bush administration’s view on the links between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. An internal document consisting of demands included: “The turn over UBL [Osama bin Laden] and all his associates responsible for terrorist attacks against the US, tell us everything they know about UBL and his Al Qaida associates, including their whereabouts, resources, plans for future terrorist acts, and access to WMD [weapons of mass destruction] materials,” and “close immediately all terrorist training camps and expel all terrorists.” Additionally, the document planned that in the case of Taliban refusal, “an international effort aimed at capturing UBL and destroying his infrastructure.” and the United States would “begin to work with our friends and allies to remove the Taliban leadership from power.


These two researchers extensively interviewed senior Taliban officials and concluded that the reason why the Taliban also did not seriously negotiate with the U.S. is because Omar was already convinced that America’s true aim was to topple the Islamic Republic in Afghanistan. Additionally, even if the Taliban were to hand over bin Laden, it would have been difficult to do so within the U.S. timetable as Taliban leadership did not know the whereabouts of bin Laden—and even before the attack, they did not keep close tabs on his location.

Weaver, Mary Anne. “Lost At Tora Bora” New York Times, September 11, 2005  

Weaver’s article in 2005 provided a look into how U.S. policymakers did not have a plan to put US troops on the ground to ensure the capture or killing of bin Laden when he and his lieutenants retreated to the group’s holdout at the cave complex at
Tora Bora. As reported by Weaver, the US presence was just limited to three dozen Special Forces troops.


Whitlock’s Afghanistan Papers captures the admission from a senior U.S. military official that “America goes to war without knowing why it does. We went in reflexively after 9/11 without knowing what we were trying to achieve.” According to some war planners, it was never clear whether regime change was the actual US objective in Afghanistan. Additionally, Whitlock writes about how the exclusion of the Taliban completely from the Afghan government was a mistake. As an U.S. soldier would reflect, “In our eagerness to get revenge we violated the Afghan way of war. That is when one side wins, the other side puts down their arms and reconciles with the side that won.” Another passage of the book used in the paper was in how by pursuing vengeance against the Taliban instead of creating a pathway of amnesty for Taliban fighters and leaders, the eventual imprisonment of hundreds at Guantanamo Bay would provoke the Taliban’s supporters and spur the insurgency that would take hold only a few years later.


This book provides a behind the scenes look into how decision-making was conducted in the Bush Administration in the timeline leading up to the invasion. Woodward notes how the policymakers cobbled together a hastily military plan and many of the bureaucrats had no in-depth knowledge of Afghanistan. Additionally policymakers quickly began to conflate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Woodward also tells how Bush admits that he “had the responsibility to show resolve. I had to show the American people the resolve of a commander-in-chief that was going to do whatever it took to win” and to deal with other world leaders, he would “look them in the eye and say, ‘You’re either with us or you’re against us.’” Military operations were also used in the early days of the GWOT as more of a show of resolve, rather then as a tactical and discrete tool to lessen the threat of terrorism.


Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef was the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan and his bibliography notes that Omar’s reluctance to turn over bin Laden stemmed, in part, from his refusal to believe that the United States would actually attack. “[Omar] reasoned,” writes Zaeef, “that America couldn’t launch an offensive without a valid reason, and that since he had demanded that Washington conduct an official
investigation, and deliver incontrovertible proof” of bin Laden’s involvement in 9/11, he “would take no further steps” until “presented with such evidence”.