
This news article is used to confirm that Gul Agha Sherzai’s spokesman accused him of making a “very, very wrong decision in Kandahar” and striking a deal with Omar.


Barfield is an Afghanistan Expert and Professor of Anthropology at Boston University. In this chapter, he details that “the time to win the peace is at the end of a war” and outlines missed opportunities for an official surrender from the Taliban for peace during the Bonn Agreement.


This source is a transcript of an interview with Secretary of State Colin Powell in February 2002. In the interview, Powell notes that “al-Qaida was completely integrated with the Taliban” and the United States had destroyed the two groups “as functioning organizations”, demonstrating US sentiment that treated the Taliban and al Qaeda as one and the same and of equal importance.


This book provides a deeper level of insight into the frontier regions between the Pakistan and Afghanistan border, shedding insight to the fractures between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, as well as between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This source is used for a quote that the resurgence of the Taliban was not preordained but rather the result of the political sidelining of Taliban leaders in the years following 2001.


This book is an extensive account of U.S. Army Special Operations soldiers and their actions in Afghanistan. This source was used to confirm the reconnaissance mission by Pashta Sherzai into Kandahar on December 7, 2001 and the U.S. being the first foreign troops to enter Kandahar.

This source is a memoir by former President George W. Bush. It was used to understand how the president and senior administration officials believed a significant international presence would upset the Afghans and how the Bush administration was slow and reluctant to build an indigenous Afghan army.


This radio address from former President George W. Bush is used to demonstrate that U.S. officials lumped the Taliban and al Qaeda into the same rhetorical bucket, including a quote from Bush that “the United States and its partners [were] pressing forward with a military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban.”


This speech from former President George W. Bush is used to demonstrate that U.S. officials lumped the Taliban and al Qaeda into the same rhetorical bucket, including a quote from Bush regarding US troops “hunting down the al Qaeda and Taliban forces.”


This news article was used to confirm that when the Taliban's leaders surrendered in late 2001, they initially expected to have their fates decided by their Afghan peers, with promises of safety. Although many Taliban leaders wanted to “live the rest of their lives in quiet dignity”, this was also rejected by the U.S.


This book, written by an NPR reporter that relocated to Afghanistan and headed up an NGO in Kandahar, has a section on the situation in that province immediately after 2001. Chayes reports that even where the Taliban movement originally began, there initially was no hostility to the U.S. presence.


This news article, written in Foreign Affairs, describes how many Taliban leaders and fighters have switched sides to support the new government. Thus, the article seeks to dispel the narrative that all Taliban fighters are fanatics and pushes for the Western-led counterinsurgency efforts to also create pathways to “flip the Taliban”. This article is used for the reporting that Haqqani’s brother even engaged in talks to reach a possible rapprochement with the Karzai government.

Clark, Kate. “How the Guests Became an Enemy: Afghan Attitudes towards Westerners Since
Clark’s publication tracks Afghan attitudes towards Westerners for well over a decade since the start of the Afghanistan War. Clark’s article is used to emphasize that initially, Afghans were actually welcoming of foreigners in 2001-2002.


This book, written by Steve Coll about the role of U.S. intel agencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the efforts of Pakistan’s ISI to secretly fund the Taliban. The paper cites how Mullah Omar reportedly communicated to Karzai that he wished for the Taliban to play a peaceful role in Afghanistan’s future post 2001, but this was rejected by the Bush administration.


Bette Dam, is a Dutch journalist who is an analyst on Afghanistan. In this biography on Hamid Karzai, highlights that losing control of Kandahar convinced Karzai to rely more heavily on his network of loyal allies, no matter their competence or effectiveness.


Bette Dam, a Dutch journalist and analyst on Afghanistan, writes in this book that post-invasion in 2001, Mullah Omar initially wanted to fight on, but even his close lieutenants were done fighting. Thus, this goes to illustrate how the will to launch the insurgency was not predestined.


These volumes, prepared by the Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group, present an operational-level narrative of how the U.S. Army formed, trained, deployed, and employed its forces in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2014. The study group conducted oral history interviews with dozens of key military and civilian leaders. These reports are used for causality figures in the paper, as well as for the reports that Taliban insurgency was driven by abusive governance so many Taliban fighters joined the insurgency out of “self-defense”.


This news briefing from the DoD is used for Rumsfeld’s quotes pertaining to a potential peaceful Taliban surrender. In this November press conference, Rumsfeld
notes that the U.S. does not support surrender talks interfering with U.S. objectives but the future of Afghanistan is for the Afghans to decide.


This news briefing from the DoD is used for Rumsfeld's quote pertaining to his meeting with President Karzai. Rumsfeld states that the Afghans would cooperate with the U.S. to strongly go after all Taliban and AQ forces, with intentions “to find as many of those people” as we can.


This DoD news briefing is used to demonstrate that in a month, Rumsfeld's tone and position on Taliban surrender efforts had hardened. In December, Rumseld stated that the peaceful surrender of senior Taliban officials would not be in the U.S.’ interests and rejected any deal.


This news article details the proposed surrender of Mullah Omar of Kandahar. It highlights the details of the surrender deal and that Karzai stressed his independence when it came to Omar’s fate and that he had not consulted with the United States on the question of whether Omar would face justice.


This interview of Hamid Karzai with BBC journalist Lyse Doucet highlights how Karzai denied in 2021 that the U.S. pressured him to withdraw from the surrender deal.


This news article from the BBC is used to describe why the Taliban leaders were resistant to give Osama bin Laden up. The article notes that a pledge of allegiance - or "bay'ah" - was offered in the 1990s by Osama Bin Laden to his Taliban counterpart Mullah Omar and there were serious religious consequences for reneging on such a pledge.


This book, written by British journalist Jack Fairweather, uses hundreds of
interviews with sources working in Afghanistan to demonstrate how and why the American-led war in Afghanistan failed. The reporting from this source was used to demonstrate how U.S. officials, particularly Col. David Fox, was “directed” to tell Hamid Karzai that the surrender arrangement between Karzai and the Taliban was not in American interests.


This book, written by author Mark Fallon about the story of CIA torture in the War on Terror, is used to describe how many innocent Afghans got caught up in US detention. This book describes how people were rounded up so others could collect bounties or for wearing the wrong watch.


The authors Theo Farrell and Antonio Guistozzi write about the resurgence of the insurgency in Helmand Province. This source is used to report that many former Taliban fighters returned to the insurgency due to mistreatment by government forces.


This news article by reporter Dexter Filkins reports how the US air campaign often resulted in many civilian casualties. This article is useful for describing how too much reliance on local warlords led to civilian casualties and how a notable error led to the U.S. bombing a wedding party.


This source is a report from Afghanistan experts Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder at Tufts University. The report is based on research conducted in five provinces in Afghanistan through interviews and focus group discussions to examine the relationship between aid projects and security. The report was used to highlight that U.S. reliance on warlords in Afghanistan encouraged and incentivized Afghans to maintain insecurity.


This book, written by British journalist Carlotta Gall, describes the war in Afghanistan as a conflict where the Taliban were supported by Pakistan and how the U.S. has created lots of damage to the Afghan people without fully addressing the
root causes of the insurgency. This source is used to describe how US cruise missile attacks in the later 1990s drove the Taliban and Al Qaeda closer together and lays out how Mullah Omar began to make statements for Afghans to join the insurgency in 2003.


This article in 2001 is used to drive the point that Afghans were told by the U.S. coalition that a surrender deal that would allow senior Taliban officials to go free would result in the loss of Western support, particularly for President Karzai and the Northern Alliance.


This DoD press report contains quotes from the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld describing the Taliban and Al Qaeda as essentially the same actors. The paper uses the quotes to support the argument that US officials spoke of and treated the two groups as largely the same.


Scholar and renowned Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi’s book looks at how the Taliban waged war between 2001 to 2021 and how that war changed over time. His work is based on extensive field research, including interviews with Taliban members and community elders. His work details the beginning of the Taliban insurgency, including challenges with finding supporters. He also details attacks and threats by the Taliban in 2003 as well as the emergency of Taliban sanctuaries and safe havens in Afghanistan.


This 2005 article from Tim Golden is used for describing the story of how an innocent Afghan man was brutally mistreated and tortured by his US captors, until his death a week later. This article fits into the broader point in the paper that many innocent Afghan people were rounded up and subject to brutal and unjust detention so that the warlords could justify their existence in the face of an apparent ongoing insecurity.


Anand Gopal is a journalist who has written extensively on Afghanistan. In this work, he highlights how the US got the war in Afghanistan wrong and benefitted the Taliban. His work is cited throughout to detail the sentiment by Taliban officials
regarding the surrender deal in December 2001, including how a military commander told him that it was time for Omar to surrender and the intent of Taliban officials to participate in future elections.


In this academic article, Gopal outlines the Taliban’s resurgence in Kandahar, which serves as a key strategic province for foreign forces, the Afghanistan government, and the Taliban insurgency. He looks at the structure, tactics, causes, and motivations that led to the Taliban's resurgence in Kandahar post-2001, noting the lack of comprehensive reconciliation process that would have enabled the Taliban to surrender. Gopal notes the motivations that drove Taliban members to join the insurgency, including the killing of Hajji Burget Khan in 2003, the humiliation of Malim Feda Muhammad, and the frustration over mistreatment and corruption by US forces and American allies.


This source is a news article regarding the surrender deal between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. This news piece was used to highlight that Karzai had pivoted from earlier comments that Omar would be safe as long as he renounced terrorism and said that Omar and top Taliban leaders must face trial.


This article is an op-ed from former State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass. This source is used to confirm that Haass had requested a U.S. military presence of 25,000 to 30,000 troops in early 2002, which was rejected, demonstrating the administration’s skepticism to an expansion of ISAF.


This book, written by a former senior mujahidin figure and an ex-counter-terrorism analyst, highlights the legacy of Arab fighters in Afghanistan. This book is used to shed light into the cracks of mistrust between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, with the Afghan Taliban seeing the Arabs as a liability and the Arabs seeing the Taliban as backwards and poor fighters.


This article, written by American journalist Fred Hiatt, reports how there is a gap between the promises of the Bush administration to rebuild Afghanistan into a safe
and prosperous nation with the reality of violence faced by Afghans. This source is used for Wolfowitz’s quotes where he both cautions against getting bogged down in Afghanistan like the British and Soviets but also advocates for the US to ensure the nation does not become a safe haven for terrorists.


This autobiography from Ambassador Khalilzad, describes his career working in Afghanistan for over a decade. The source is used for Khalilzad’s quote that immediately after the invasion, he observed that there was no hostility to foreign forces. Additionally, Khalilzad reflects that after President Bush gave his speech at VMI about nation building, he did not see this as a shift in US policy.


This news source is used to confirm that Karzai reneged on previous statements that Mullah Omar would be granted amnesty as part of the surrender deal and instead later said that he wanted to arrest him.


This news article, from December 2001, is used for the quote from Paul Wolfowitz where he describes any surrender agreement between Karzai and Omar as “totally unacceptable”.


This source is an oral history from the U.S. Army in Afghanistan from 2003 – 2005. In this source, Lt. Gen. David Barno is quoted as saying that when it came to Army leadership in Afghanistan, “there was no interest whatsoever in providing us with anything but the absolute minimum level of support.”


This is an interview with Major General David Kratzer, commanding general of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force. This source is used to confirm direct quotes from Kratzer regarding a lack of hostility towards US presence in 2002 as well as the US position not to focus on nation-building in Afghanistan.


This is a news source that reports on Hamid Karzai’s offer of amnesty to Taliban

This news source highlights new US intelligence assessments that indicate that it is unlikely al Qaeda will revive in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2023. This source was used to further demonstrate US policymaking that considered the Taliban and Afghanistan together.


This source documents the history of US marines in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2002. It highlighted a key quote from Hamid Karzai regarding the Taliban’s decision to surrender Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul in exchange for amnesty.


This book by Carter Malkasin, historian and former advisor to the American military commanders in Afghanistan, is a comprehensive history of the American war in Afghanistan. It provides crucial insights into the critical moments leading into the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Malkasin’s analysis is cited throughout the paper to demonstrate US strategy in the aftermath of September 11 as well as to describe the motivations of high-ranking Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar.


This news source represents reporting from December 2001 and the paper cites a quote regarding the sentiment that people across Afghanistan felt pride for the end of an era of terrorism and for the future of peace in the country.


This news article details the surrender deal between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. It confirms that US officials were aware of the negotiations and had made it clear that they would not support any deal.

Pannier, Bruce. “Afghanistan: As Kandahar Surrenders, Is Political Accord Unraveling?”
“This news source highlights the challenges for the political accord on a future Afghanistan government. This reporting was used to directly quote statements by Karzai regarding the terms and conditions of the Taliban’s surrender of Kandahar.

This news source is used to confirm that Karzai reneged on previous statements that Mullah Omar would be granted amnesty as part of the surrender deal and instead later said that he wanted to arrest him.

This source is a transcript of remarks from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on the one-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks at the United Nations. In his speech, Powell said that “Coalition forces led by the United States have liberated the Afghan people from the dual tyranny of al-Qaida terrorists and the Taliban.” This quote is highlighted in the paper to further demonstrate US sentiment that treated the Taliban and al Qaeda as one and the same and of equal importance.

This source is a transcript of President George Bush’s speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. It was used to demonstrate public statements by Bush that “terrorists cannot be appeased”, which aligned with his administration’s lack of support for a Taliban surrender deal with Hamid Karzai.

This book, written by Ahemd Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and expert on the Taliban even prior to 9-11, covers a lot of ground - explaining the issues in governance and nation-building in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Central Asian states. Rashid’s work is cited in the paper to demonstrate US aversion to nation-building in Afghanistan.

This news source reports on the Taliban’s agreement to surrender Kandahar in December 2001. It includes a direct quote from Abdel Salam Zaeef, the Taliban’s...
ambassador to Pakistan, to reporters that "Karzai and the tribal leaders have promised him (Omar) protection"

Researcher Interview with Anand Gopal, June 06, 2023

An interview with journalist Anand Gopal further supports denials by Hamid Karzai that the US pressured him to renege from the surrender deal with the Taliban.

Researcher Interview with Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, October 25, 2023

Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who worked in the Office of Policy Planning at the State Department and later became Colin Powell’s Chief of Staff, notes that he is not able to recall a debate within the Bush administration regarding a potential Taliban surrender.

Researcher Interview with Lt. General David Barno, October 14, 2023

Lt. General David Barno, who took over command of US forces in Afghanistan in 2003, notes that Rumsfeld was primarily focusing on limiting US costs in Afghanistan.

Researcher Interview with Douglas Feith, September 19, 2023

Douglas Feith, who served as under secretary of Defense for Policy under the Bush administration, notes that one of the strategic goals of the US in Afghanistan was to “remove the Taliban government as a way of communicating to state sponsors of terrorism that there are very heavy penalties to be paid for being associated with groups that attack the United States.”

Researcher Interview with Ed Giambastiani, September 8, 2023

Ed Giambastiani, who served as Rumsfeld’s military assistant and later served as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes that Rumsfeld never spoke to Karzai in the fall of 2001 and met him for the first time in mid-December, supporting claims from Karzai that the US never pressured him to renege the surrender deal with the Taliban.

Researcher Interview with Lt. General Franklin Hagenbeck, June 27, 2023

Lt. General Franklin Hagenbeck, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division, notes that The Pentagon provided little guidance in 2002 and that political leadership believed there was not much to do in Afghanistan. He also notes that after Operation Anaconda, al Qaeda and the Taliban had been largely wiped out.

Researcher Interview with Graeme Smith, June 12, 2023

Journalist Graeme Smith notes that US military officials determined the presence of insurgency fighters based on simply assuming anyone firing at their aircraft was the Taliban or Al Qaeda.
Researcher Interview with Jason Amerine, July 17, 2023

Jason Amerine, US Special Forces soldier embedded with Afghan statesman Hamid Karzai, notes that Karzai and Rumsfeld spoke multiple times between November 17 and December 5, 2001 during the same timeframe that the issue of the surrender deal with the Taliban was a pressing issue.

Researcher Interview with Karl Eikenberry, June 13, 2023

Karl Eikenberry, former ISAF commander, notes that the US brought in misbehaving actors that led to the success of the Taliban and thereby making a strategic mistake.

Researcher Interview with Richard Haass, April 26, 2023

Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State, notes that in late 2001, Taliban forces didn't resist US victory in Afghanistan. He also notes that in early 2002 there was deep pessimism regarding increasing US military presence in Afghanistan and what could be accomplished.

Researcher Interview with Robert Grenier, March 24, 2023

Robert Grenier, the CIA bureau chief in Pakistan and a key actor in the US war against the Taliban, notes that the Taliban knew better than the US did that they were defeated in 2003 and early 2003.


This news article reports on the surrender of Kandahar by the Taliban in early December 2002. It includes direct quotes from members of the Northern Alliance and allies of Karzai regarding Karzai’s plans and approach to negotiating with the Taliban.


Barnett Rubin served in the Obama Administration as Senior Advisor to Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His book provides an overview of the history of Afghanistan over the last four decades. Rubin writes about how Omar called on Afghans to wage jihad against the US in 2003, forming what would become the Quetta Shura and developing plans for the ensuing insurgency.


This source is a memoir from former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
details his perspectives and observations while in office. This source was used to provide quotes from Rumsfeld demonstrating his position that the US should not involve itself in intra-Afghan politics.


This memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld recounts a conversation where Rumsfeld asked President Bush if he wanted to meet with Gen. Dan McNeill, the US military commander in Afghanistan to which Bush replied, “Who is General McNeill?” Bush then said that he did not want to meet with him, demonstrating his disengagement from Afghanistan in October 2002.


This source is a memo from Donald Rumsfeld to Dick Cheney, which is the closest documentary record outlining US position towards the Taliban post-2001. The memo outlines that the US is not there to stay in Afghanistan and that US presence in Afghanistan was intended “to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future, assist with humanitarian assistance, and help establish the conditions to ensure the new Afghan government has the opportunity to succeed.” Rumsfeld also noted in the memo that, “Success required recognizing that defeating the Taliban regime had to be a goal, rather than preserving it to avoid chaos in Afghanistan or separating “good” Taliban from bad ones. Afghan reconstruction (and rehabilitation of ‘good’ Taliban) could only come after the defeat of the Taliban regime.”


This is a transcript of an interview that Donald Rumsfeld gave Connie Brod from C-SPAN regarding the war on terrorism. This source was used to confirm a quote from Rumsfeld that US goals in Afghanistan were “to have the Taliban no longer be the government influencing Afghanistan, and that’s been achieved. . . . Second to capture or kill the senior leadership of the Taliban . . . . And, third, to capture or kill [the] al Qaeda at all levels.”

This source is a report from RAND Corporation that details the evolution of US goals in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016. It is based on interviews with senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations on Afghanistan. This source was used to detail the Bush administration’s focus shifting to the war with Iraq.


This source is an insider’s account by Gary Schroen, then the CIA field officer who led the first mission into Afghanistan in late September 2001. Schroen’s book was used to note that the simultaneous focus on both the Taliban and al Qaeda was an operational necessity for the US.


This is a transcript of a press briefing from Donald Rumsfeld in December 2001. It is used to confirm a direct quote from Rumsfeld that if, “we find people who aspire to high office . . . have been involved in preventing us from getting our hands on people who are responsible for what is going on in Afghanistan, [they] will find the United States not terribly friendly to their aspirations” in regards to the new Afghanistan government.


This news source reports on the release of some Guantanamo prisoners in October 2002 and highlights the shortcomings of Guantanamo to hold the “worst of the worst” anti-American terrorists, including innocent Afghans.


This news source from December 2001 reports on the US position in light of the surrender deal between the incoming Karzai administration and the Taliban. It details that the US would reject a surrender deal that would bestow amnesty on Mullah Omar or where former Taliban swore allegiance to the new Afghan government.

This news source details Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Afghanistan in December 2001. The article highlights direct statements from Rumsfeld to Karzai that the Pentagon’s aims were not yet met, including that there are still al Qaeda and Taliban people that needed to be addressed.


This source is written by John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. This article looks at lessons learned from Afghanistan reconstruction. It is used to confirm the proposals for US spending in Afghanistan in 2003.


Linschoten and Kuehn are researchers and writers who have worked in Afghanistan since 2006. Drawing on fieldwork in Afghanistan, their book details the split between the Taliban and al Qaeda from the mid-1990s onward. Their work is cited throughout the paper to detail the complexity of the relationship between Taliban and al Qaeda leaders.


This book, written by Norwegian political scientist Astri Suhrke, makes the case that the failure of Afghan nation-building should be put on the international project itself rather than external or local circumstances. Suhrke’s work is used to characterize perception of American troops in Afghanistan in 2002.


This news source from a Pakistan-based news paper reports on the surrender deal between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. It details that Karzai offered the Taliban a
general amnesty for Taliban fighters but not for foreign fighters.


This is a transcript of then-presidential candidate Barack Obama’s speech on Iraq and Afghanistan. In the speech, he references that the US “could have deployed the full force of American power to hunt down and destroy Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and all of the terrorists responsible for 9/11, while supporting real security in Afghanistan” but instead focused on Iraq.


This source is a New York Times investigation of 780 detainees at Guantánamo. It was reviewed and referenced to note the large contingent of Afghan citizens who were detainees as well as provide a status update on Afghan detainees.


This news source notes that the estimated toll of 812 Afghan civilians who have died in US airstrikes between 2001 and 2002.


This transcript of a US House of Representatives hearing on lessons learned in Afghanistan highlights that the US decision to invade Iraq shifted focus away from Afghanistan. The transcript notes Rep. Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who declared, “We got distracted by the war in Iraq under an administration whose priority was defeating Saddam Hussein, not an end game in Afghanistan.”


This is a transcript of a US Senate hearing on al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Peter Bergen, then Director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation provides a prepared statement with information on the background and motivations of the Taliban and al Qaeda that is cited in this paper.

Reconstruction

Zakheim, 25, Yousafzai,


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Operation Chandler


This is a transcript from a CNN broadcast where Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz discusses military operations. The transcript confirms that in the interview, Wolfowitz was asked about Karzai’s offer of amnesty for Omar and Wolfowitz said the following regarding the US position that, “We made it clear it was totally unacceptable. And I think he has fallen off that position if he ever held it for very long.”


This book by journalist Bob Woodward is an account of President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. It confirms a quote from Central Intelligence Director George Tenet who declared at a meeting of Bush’s foreign policy principals, “The Taliban and al-Qaeda [are] really the same.”


This source is a comprehensive study of the US Army’s experience in Afghanistan between October 2001 and September 2005. This work is cited in the paper to illustrate how the US military effort ensured that American forces played an outsized role, despite efforts to play a limited role otherwise.


This source is an oral history of Taliban and it is used to highlight the motivations, fears, and ambitions of Taliban fighters. It is used to confirm a quote from former Taliban deputy minister Maulvi Mohammad Haqqani that foreign fighters provided the Taliban with the latest IED and suicide bombing technologies.


This book, written by one of then-candidate Bush’s foreign policy advisors and the DoD’s comptroller and CFO, as well as the coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction, provides an inside look at how policymakers failed to actually
implement the broad goals the administration was setting. His book is praised for the insights into how the Bush administration struggled in its dealing with other Middle Eastern nations to solicit funds for Afghanistan but is criticized for overlooking the role of Pakistan. Zakheim’s work is used to explain internal conversations and debates on resource allocation for Afghanistan reconstruction within the Bush administration.