

**Paper 2 - Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory:
How the United States Lost the Peace in Afghanistan - Annotated Bibliography**

Baker, Mark. "Last City Falls, But No Hint Of Bin Laden." *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 8, 2001.

This news article is used to confirm that Gul Agha Sherzai's spokesman accused him of making a "very, very wrong decision in Kandahar" and striking a deal with Omar.

Barfield, Thomas. "Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism: Complementary or Contradictory Strategies." In *State Strengthening in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001-14*, edited by Scott Smith and Colin Cookman, 9-18. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016.

Barfield is an Afghanistan Expert and Professor of Anthropology at Boston University. In this chapter, he details that "the time to win the peace is at the end of a war" and outlines missed opportunities for an official surrender from the Taliban for peace during the Bonn Agreement.

"Be Heard: An MTV Global Discussion With Colin Powell." Department Of State, February 14, 2002.

<https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/8038.htm>.

This source is a transcript of an interview with Secretary of State Colin Powell in February 2002. In the interview, Powell notes that "al-Qaida was completely integrated with the Taliban" and the United States had destroyed the two groups "as functioning organizations", demonstrating US sentiment that treated the Taliban and al Qaeda as one and the same and of equal importance.

Bergen, Peter L., and Katherine Tiedemann, eds. *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics and Religion*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

This book provides a deeper level of insight into the frontier regions between the Pakistan and Afghanistan border, shedding insight to the fractures between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, as well as between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This source is used for a quote that the resurgence of the Taliban was not preordained but rather the result of the political sidelining of Taliban leaders in the years following 2001.

Briscoe, Charles H., Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp. *Weapon of Choice U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan*. Combat Studies Institute Press, 2019.

This book is an extensive account of U.S. Army Special Operations soldiers and their actions in Afghanistan. This source was used to confirm the reconnaissance mission by Pashta Sherzai into Kandahar on December 7, 2001 and the U.S. being the first foreign troops to enter Kandahar.

Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. 1st ed. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010.

This source is a memoir by former President George W. Bush. It was used to understand how the president and senior administration officials believed a significant international presence would upset the Afghans and how the Bush administration was slow and reluctant to build an indigenous Afghan army.

Bush, George W. "Radio Address by the President to the Nation," April 20, 2002.
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020420.html>.

This radio address from former President George W. Bush is used to demonstrate that U.S. officials lumped the Taliban and al Qaeda into the same rhetorical bucket, including a quote from Bush that "the United States and its partners [were] pressing forward with a military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban."

Bush, George W. "Remarks at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia." The American Presidency Project, April 17, 2002.
<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-virginia-military-institute-lexington-virginia>.

This speech from former President George W. Bush is used to demonstrate that U.S. officials lumped the Taliban and al Qaeda into the same rhetorical bucket, including a quote from Bush regarding US troops "hunting down the al Qaeda and Taliban forces."

Chayes, Sarah. "Taliban Agrees To Surrender Kandahar." *NPR: All Things Considered*, December 6, 2001.

This news article was used to confirm that when the Taliban's leaders surrendered in late 2001, they initially expected to have their fates decided by their Afghan peers, with promises of safety. Although many Taliban leaders wanted to "live the rest of their lives in quiet dignity", this was also rejected by the U.S.

Chayes, Sarah. *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban*. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007.

This book, written by an NPR reporter that relocated to Afghanistan and headed up an NGO in Kandahar, has a section on the situation in that province immediately after 2001. Chayes reports that even where the Taliban movement originally began, there initially was no hostility to the U.S. presence.

Christia, Fotini, and Semple, Michael. "Flipping the Taliban." *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 2009.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2009-07-01/flipping-taliban>.

This news article, written in *Foreign Affairs*, describes how many Taliban leaders and fighters have switched sides to support the new government. Thus, the article seeks to dispel the narrative that all Taliban fighters are fanatics and pushes for the Western-led counterinsurgency efforts to also create pathways to "flip the Taliban". This article is used for the reporting that Haqqani's brother even engaged in talks to reach a possible rapprochement with the Karzai government.

Clark, Kate. "How the Guests Became an Enemy: Afghan Attitudes towards Westerners Since

2001." Middle East Institute, April 18, 2012.

<https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-guests-became-enemy-afghan-attitudes-towards-westerners-2001>.

Clark's publication tracks Afghan attitudes towards Westerners for well over a decade since the start of the Afghanistan War. Clark's article is used to emphasize that initially, Afghans were actually welcoming of foreigners in 2001-2002.

Coll, Steve. *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. New York: Penguin Press, 2018.

This book, written by Steve Coll about the role of U.S. intel agencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the efforts of Pakistan's ISI to secretly fund the Taliban. The paper cites how Mullah Omar reportedly communicated to Karzai that he wished for the Taliban to play a peaceful role in Afghanistan's future post 2001, but this was rejected by the Bush administration.

Dam, Bette. *A Man and a Motorcycle: How Hamid Karzai Became Afghanistan's President*. Utrecht: Ipso Facto Publishers, 2014.

Bette Dam, is a Dutch journalist who is an analyst on Afghanistan. In this biography on Hamid Karzai, highlights that losing control of Kandahar convinced Karzai to rely more heavily on his network of loyal allies, no matter their competence or effectiveness.

Dam, Bette. *Looking for the Enemy: Mullah Omar and the Unknown Taliban*. Harper Collins, 2021.

Bette Dam, a Dutch journalist and analyst on Afghanistan, writes in this book that post-invasion in 2001, Mullah Omar initially wanted to fight on, but even his close lieutenants were done fighting. Thus, this goes to illustrate how the will to launch the insurgency was not predestined.

Degen, Edmund J., and Mark J. Reardon. *Modern War in an Ancient Land: The United States in Afghanistan*. US Army Center of Military History, 2021.

These volumes, prepared by the Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group, present an operational-level narrative of how the U.S. Army formed, trained, deployed, and employed its forces in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2014. The study group conducted oral history interviews with dozens of key military and civilian leaders. These reports are used for causality figures in the paper, as well as for the reports that Taliban insurgency was driven by abusive governance so many Taliban fighters joined the insurgency out of "self-defense".

"DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld." U.S. Department of Defense, November 19, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20121026060743/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2444>.

This news briefing from the DoD is used for Rumsfeld's quotes pertaining to a potential peaceful Taliban surrender. In this November press conference, Rumsfeld

notes that the U.S. does not support surrender talks interfering with U.S. objectives but the future of Afghanistan is for the Afghans to decide.

“DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld.” U.S. Department of Defense, December 19, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20121026041148/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2677>.

This news briefing from the DoD is used for Rumsfeld’s quote pertaining to his meeting with President Karzai. Rumsfeld states that the Afghans would cooperate with the U.S. to strongly go after all Taliban and AQ forces, with intentions “to find as many of those people” as we can.

“DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace.” U.S. Department of Defense, December 6, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20121026041223/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2604>.

This DoD news briefing is used to demonstrate that in a month, Rumsfeld’s tone and position on Taliban surrender efforts had hardened. In December, Rumsfeld stated that the peaceful surrender of senior Taliban officials would not be in the U.S.’ interests and rejected any deal.

Dow Jones Business News. “Taliban Official, New Afghan Leader Says Omar Is Set to Surrender Kandahar.” December 6, 2001.

This news article details the proposed surrender of Mullah Omar of Kandahar. It highlights the details of the surrender deal and that Karzai stressed his independence when it came to Omar’s fate and that he had not consulted with the United States on the question of whether Omar would face justice.

Doucet, Lyse. “A Wish For Afghanistan: The President.” BBC, September 15, 2021. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct2jn9>.

This interview of Hamid Karzai with BBC journalist Lyse Doucet highlights how Karzai denied in 2021 that the U.S. pressured him to withdraw from the surrender deal.

El-Bay, Driss. “Afghanistan: The Pledge Binding al-Qaeda to the Taliban.” *BBC*, September 7, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58473574>.

This news article from the BBC is used to describe why the Taliban leaders were resistant to give Osama bin Laden up. The article notes that a pledge of allegiance - or “bay’ah” - was offered in the 1990s by Osama Bin Laden to his Taliban counterpart Mullah Omar and there were serious religious consequences for reneging on such a pledge.

Fairweather, Jack. *The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan*. New York: Basic Books, 2014.

This book, written by British journalist Jack Fairweather, uses hundreds of

interviews with sources working in Afghanistan to demonstrate how and why the American-led war in Afghanistan failed. The reporting from this source was used to demonstrate how U.S. officials, particularly Col. David Fox, was “directed” to tell Hamid Karzai that the surrender arrangement between Karzai and the Taliban was not in American interests.

Fallon, Mark. *Unjustifiable Means: The inside Story of How the CIA, Pentagon, and US Government Conspired to Torture*. New York: Regan Arts, 2017.

This book, written by author Mark Fallon about the story of CIA torture in the War on Terror, is used to describe how many innocent Afghans got caught up in US detention. This book describes how people were rounded up so others could collect bounties or for wearing the wrong watch.

Farrell, Theo, and Antonio Giustozzi. “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004-2012.” *International Affairs* 89, no. 4 (July 2013): 845–71.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12048>.

The authors Theo Farrell and Antonio Guistozzi write about the resurgence of the insurgency in Helmand Province. This source is used to report that many former Taliban fighters returned to the insurgency due to mistreatment by government forces.

Filkins, Dexter. “Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead.” *The New York Times*, July 21, 2002, sec. World.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/world/flaws-in-us-air-war-left-hundreds-of-civilians-dead.html>.

This news article by reporter Dexter Filkins reports how the US air campaign often resulted in many civilian casualties. This article is useful for describing how too much reliance on local warlords led to civilian casualties and how a notable error led to the U.S. bombing a wedding party.

Fishstein, Paul, and Andrew Wilder. “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan.” Feinstein International Center, January 2012. <https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/WinningHearts-Final.pdf>.

This source is a report from Afghanistan experts Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder at Tufts University. The report is based on research conducted in five provinces in Afghanistan through interviews and focus group discussions to examine the relationship between aid projects and security. The report was used to highlight that U.S. reliance on warlords in Afghanistan encouraged and incentivized Afghans to maintain insecurity.

Gall, Carlotta. *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014.

This book, written by British journalist Carlotta Gall, describes the war in Afghanistan as a conflict where the Taliban were supported by Pakistan and how the U.S. has created lots of damage to the Afghan people without fully addressing the

root causes of the insurgency. This source is used to describe how US cruise missile attacks in the later 1990s drove the Taliban and Al Qaeda closer together and lays out how Mullah Omar began to make statements for Afghans to join the insurgency in 2003.

Gannon, Kathy. "Taliban Surrender Is Conditional." *Associated Press*, December 6, 2001.

This article in 2001 is used to drive the point that Afghans were told by the U.S. coalition that a surrender deal that would allow senior Taliban officials to go free would result in the loss of Western support, particularly for President Karzai and the Northern Alliance.

Garamone, Jim. "U.S. Using Intel to Foil Terror Attacks." American Forces Press Service, January 11, 2002.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20121113170421/http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=43862>.

This DoD press report contains quotes from the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld describing the Taliban and Al Qaeda as essentially the same actors. The paper uses the quotes to support the argument that US officials spoke of and treated the two groups as largely the same.

Giustozzi, Antonio. *The Taliban at War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Scholar and renowned Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi's book looks at how the Taliban waged war between 2001 to 2021 and how that war changed over time. His work is based on extensive field research, including interviews with Taliban members and community elders. His work details the beginning of the Taliban insurgency, including challenges with finding supporters. He also details attacks and threats by the Taliban in 2003 as well as the emergency of Taliban sanctuaries and safe havens in Afghanistan.

Golden, Tim. "In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths." *The New York Times*, May 20, 2005, sec. Archives.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/world/asia/in-us-report-brutal-details-of-2-afghan-inmates-deaths.html>.

This 2005 article from Tim Golden is used for describing the story of how an innocent Afghan man was brutally mistreated and tortured by his US captors, until his death a week later. This article fits into the broader point in the paper that many innocent Afghan people were rounded up and subject to brutal and unjust detention so that the warlords could justify their existence in the face of an apparent ongoing insecurity.

Gopal, Anand. *No Good Men among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes*. First Edition. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2014.

Anand Gopal is a journalist who has written extensively on Afghanistan. In this work, he highlights how the US got the war in Afghanistan wrong and benefitted the Taliban. His work is cited throughout to detail the sentiment by Taliban officials

regarding the surrender deal in December 2001, including how a military commander told him that it was time for Omar to surrender and the intent of Taliban officials to participate in future elections.

Gopal, Anand. "The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar." *New America*, 2010. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10483>.

In this academic article, Gopal outlines the Taliban's resurgence in Kandahar, which serves as a key strategic province for foreign forces, the Afghanistan government, and the Taliban insurgency. He looks at the structure, tactics, causes, and motivations that led to the Taliban's resurgence in Kandahar post-2001, noting the lack of comprehensive reconciliation process that would have enabled the Taliban to surrender. Gopal notes the motivations that drove Taliban members to join the insurgency, including the killing of Hajji Burget Khan in 2003, the humiliation of Malim Feda Muhammad, and the frustration over mistreatment and corruption by US forces and American allies.

Gordon, Michael, and Norimitsu Onishi. "Surrender Deal May Hinge on Amnesty for Mullah Omar." *The New York Times*, December 7, 2001, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/international/asia/surrender-deal-may-hinge-on-amnesty-for-mullah-omar.html>.

This source is a news article regarding the surrender deal between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. This news piece was used to highlight that Karzai had pivoted from earlier comments that Omar would be safe as long as he renounced terrorism and said that Omar and top Taliban leaders must face trial.

Haass, Richard N. "Time to Draw Down in Afghanistan." *Newsweek*, July 18, 2010. <https://www.newsweek.com/haass-time-draw-down-afghanistan-74467>.

This article is an op-ed from former State Department's Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass. This source is used to confirm that Haass had requested a U.S. military presence of 25,000 to 30,000 troops in early 2002, which was rejected, demonstrating the administration's skepticism to an expansion of ISAF.

Hamid, Mustafa, and Farrall, Leah. *The Arabs at War in Afghanistan*. London: Hurst & Company, 2015.

This book, written by a former senior mujahidin figure and an ex-counter-terrorism analyst, highlights the legacy of Arab fighters in Afghanistan. This book is used to shed light into the cracks of mistrust between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, with the Afghan Taliban seeing the Arabs as a liability and the Arabs seeing the Taliban as backwards and poor fighters.

Hiatt, Fred. "Underachieving Afghanistan." *Washington Post*, May 20, 2002. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/05/20/underachieving-afghanistan/7e4a8435-495c-4dac-bc5d-6721e9d22b6c/>.

This article, written by American journalist Fred Hiatt, reports how there is a gap between the promises of the Bush administration to rebuild Afghanistan into a safe

and prosperous nation with the reality of violence faced by Afghans. This source is used for Wolfowitz's quotes where he both cautions against getting bogged down in Afghanistan like the British and Soviets but also advocates for the US to ensure the nation does not become a safe haven for terrorists.

Khalilzad, Zalmay. *The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey through a Turbulent World*. First edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2016.

This autobiography from Ambassador Khalilzad, describes his career working in Afghanistan for over a decade. The source is used for Khalilzad's quote that immediately after the invasion, he observed that there was no hostility to foreign forces. Additionally, Khalilzad reflects that after President Bush gave his speech at VMI about nation building, he did not see this as a shift in US policy.

King, Laura. "Omar: Unwanted By Many, Wanted By New Rulers." *Associated Press*, December 8, 2001.

This news source is used to confirm that Karzai reneged on previous statements that Mullah Omar would be granted amnesty as part of the surrender deal and instead later said that he wanted to arrest him.

Knowlton, Brian. "Rumsfeld Rejects Plan To Allow Mullah Omar 'To Live in Dignity' : Taliban Fighters Agree to Surrender Kandahar." *The New York Times*, December 7, 2001, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/news/rumsfeld-rejects-plan-to-allow-mullah-omar-to-live-in-dignity-taliban.html>.

This news article, from December 2001, is used for the quote from Paul Wolfowitz where he describes any surrender agreement between Karzai and Omar as "totally unacceptable".

Koontz, Christopher N., ed. *Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005*. Washington, DC : Center for Military History, 2008.

This source is an oral history from the U.S. Army in Afghanistan from 2003 – 2005. In this source, Lt. Gen. David Barno is quoted as saying that when it came to Army leadership in Afghanistan, "there was no interest whatsoever in providing us with anything but the absolute minimum level of support."

Kratzer, MG David. Interview with MG David Kratzer, CFLCC Camp Doha, Kuwait, July 16, 2002. Center for Military History.

This is an interview with Major General David Kratzer, commanding general of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force. This source is used to confirm direct quotes from Kratzer regarding a lack of hostility towards US presence in 2002 as well as the US position not to focus on nation-building in Afghanistan.

Kyodo News. "Afghan Chief Karzai Declares Amnesty for All, Daily Says." December 5, 2001.

This is a news source that reports on Hamid Karzai's offer of amnesty to Taliban

fighters.

Lillis, Katie Bo, and Natasha Bertrand. "New US Intelligence Suggests al Qaeda Unlikely to Revive in Afghanistan, but Officials Warn ISIS Threat Remains | CNN Politics." CNN, September 8, 2023.

<https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/08/politics/us-intelligence-al-qaeda-afghanistan/index.html>.

This news source highlights new US intelligence assessments that indicate that it is unlikely al Qaeda will revive in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2023. This source was used to further demonstrate US policymaking that considered the Taliban and Afghanistan together.

Lowrey, Col. Nathan S. *U.S. Marines In Afghanistan, 2001-2002: From The Sea*. Tannenber Publishing, 2011.

This source documents the history of US marines in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2002. It highlighted a key quote from Hamid Karzai regarding the Taliban's decision to surrender Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul in exchange for amnesty.

Malkasian, Carter. *The American War in Afghanistan: A History*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021.

This book by Carter Malkasian, historian and former advisor to the American military commanders in Afghanistan, is a comprehensive history of the American war in Afghanistan. It provides crucial insights into the critical moments leading into the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Malkasian's analysis is cited throughout the paper to demonstrate US strategy in the aftermath of September 11 as well as to describe the motivations of high-ranking Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar.

McFadden, Robert D. "New Leaders in Kabul, Pledges of Support and the Cleanup Operation." *The New York Times*, December 23, 2001, sec. World.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/23/world/overview-dec-22-2001-new-leaders-kabul-pledges-support-cleanup-operation.html>.

This news source represents reporting from December 2001 and the paper cites a quote regarding the sentiment that people across Afghanistan felt pride for the end of an era of terrorism and for the future of peace in the country.

"Mullah Mohammed Omar Said To Be Ready To Surrender Kandahar." NPR: Morning Edition, December 6, 2001.

This news article details the surrender deal between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. It confirms that US officials were aware of the negotiations and had made it clear that they would not support any deal.

Pannier, Bruce. "Afghanistan: As Kandahar Surrenders, Is Political Accord Unraveling?"

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 6, 2001, sec. Archive.
<https://www.rferl.org/a/1098184.html>.

This news source highlights the challenges for the political accord on a future Afghanistan government. This reporting was used to directly quote statements by Karzai regarding the terms and conditions of the Taliban's surrender of Kandahar.

Philadelphia Inquirer. "Troops Abandon Kandahar." December 18, 2001.

This news source is used to confirm that Karzai reneged on previous statements that Mullah Omar would be granted amnesty as part of the surrender deal and instead later said that he wanted to arrest him.

Powell, Colin L. "Remarks to the Security Council of the United Nations." Department Of State, September 11, 2002.

<https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/13407.htm>.

This source is a transcript of remarks from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on the one-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks at the United Nations. In his speech, Powell said that "Coalition forces led by the United States have liberated the Afghan people from the dual tyranny of al-Qaida terrorists and the Taliban." This quote is highlighted in the paper to further demonstrate US sentiment that treated the Taliban and al Qaeda as one and the same and of equal importance.

"President Bush on Pearl Harbor." *Washington Post*, December 7, 2001.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushtext_120701.html.

This source is a transcript of President George Bush's speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. It was used to demonstrate public statements by Bush that "terrorists cannot be appeased", which aligned with his administration's lack of support for a Taliban surrender deal with Hamid Karzai.

Rashid, Ahmed. *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.

This book, written by Ahemd Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and expert on the Taliban even prior to 9-11, covers a lot of ground - explaining the issues in governance and nation-building in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Central Asian states. Rashid's work is cited in the paper to demonstrate US aversion to nation-building in Afghanistan.

Reid, Robert. "Taliban Agrees to Surrender Last Bastion, Southern City of Kandahar." *Associated Press*, December 6, 2001.

This news source reports on the Taliban's agreement to surrender Kandahar in December 2001. It includes a direct quote from Abdel Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's

ambassador to Pakistan, to reporters that “Karzai and the tribal leaders have promised him (Omar) protection”

Researcher Interview with Anand Gopal, June 06, 2023

An interview with journalist Anand Gopal further supports denials by Hamid Karzai that the US pressured him to renege from the surrender deal with the Taliban.

Researcher Interview with Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, October 25, 2023

Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who worked in the Office of Policy Planning at the State Department and later became Colin Powell’s Chief of Staff, notes that he is not able to recall a debate within the Bush administration regarding a potential Taliban surrender.

Researcher Interview with Lt. General David Barno, October 14, 2023

Lt. General David Barno, who took over command of US forces in Afghanistan in 2003, notes that Rumsfeld was primarily focusing on limiting US costs in Afghanistan.

Researcher Interview with Douglas Feith, September 19, 2023

Douglas Feith, who served as under secretary of Defense for Policy under the Bush administration, notes that one of the strategic goals of the US in Afghanistan was to “remove the Taliban government as a way of communicating to state sponsors of terrorism that there are very heavy penalties to be paid for being associated with groups that attack the United States.”

Researcher Interview with Ed Giambastiani, September 8, 2023

Ed Giambastiani, who served as Rumsfeld’s military assistant and later served as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes that Rumsfeld never spoke to Karzai in the fall of 2001 and met him for the first time in mid-December, supporting claims from Karzai that the US never pressured him to renege the surrender deal with the Taliban.

Researcher Interview with Lt. General Franklin Hagenbeck, June 27, 2023

Lt. General Franklin Hagenbeck, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division, notes that The Pentagon provided little guidance in 2002 and that political leadership believed there was not much to do in Afghanistan. He also notes that after Operation Anaconda, al Qaeda and the Taliban had been largely wiped out.

Researcher Interview with Graeme Smith, June 12, 2023

Journalist Graeme Smith notes that US military officials determined the presence of insurgency fighters based on simply assuming anyone firing at their aircraft was the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

Researcher Interview with Jason Amerine, July 17, 2023

Jason Amerine, US Special Forces soldier embedded with Afghan statesman Hamid Karzai, notes that Karzai and Rumsfeld spoke multiple times between November 17 and December 5, 2001 during the same timeframe that the issue of the surrender deal with the Taliban was a pressing issue.

Researcher Interview with Karl Eikenberry, June 13, 2023

Karl Eikenberry, former ISAF commander, notes that the US brought in misbehaving actors that led to the success of the Taliban and thereby making a strategic mistake.

Researcher Interview with Richard Haass, April 26, 2023

Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State, notes that in late 2001, Taliban forces didn't resist US victory in Afghanistan. He also notes that in early 2002 there was deep pessimism regarding increasing US military presence in Afghanistan and what could be accomplished.

Researcher Interview with Robert Grenier, March 24, 2023

Robert Grenier, the CIA bureau chief in Pakistan and a key actor in the US war against the Taliban, notes that the Taliban knew better than the US did that they were defeated in 2003 and early 2003.

Rohde, David, and Morimitsu Onishi. "Taliban Abandon Last Stronghold; Omar Is Not Found." *The New York Times*, December 8, 2001, sec. World.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/world/nation-challenged-last-stronghold-taliban-abandon-last-stronghold-omar-not-found.html>.

This news article reports on the surrender of Kandahar by the Taliban in early December 2002. It includes direct quotes from members of the Northern Alliance and allies of Karzai regarding Karzai's plans and approach to negotiating with the Taliban.

Rubin, Barnett R. *Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know*. What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Barnett Rubin served in the Obama Administration as Senior Advisor to Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His book provides an overview of the history of Afghanistan over the last four decades. Rubin writes about how Omar called on Afghans to wage jihad against the US in 2003, forming what would become the Quetta Shura and developing plans for the ensuing insurgency.

Rumsfeld, Donald. *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*. New York: Sentinel, 2011.

This source is a memoir from former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and

details his perspectives and observations while in office. This source was used to provide quotes from Rumsfeld demonstrating his position that the US should not involve itself in intra-Afghan politics.

Rumsfeld, Donald. "Meetings with President." Memo, October 21, 2002.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/qy3fic-cl4be/07.pdf>.

This memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld recounts a conversation where Rumsfeld asked President Bush if he wanted to meet with Gen. Dan McNeill, the US military commander in Afghanistan to which Bush replied, "Who is General McNeill?" Bush then said that he did not want to meet with him, demonstrating his disengagement from Afghanistan in October 2002.

Rumsfeld, Donald. Memorandum to Dick Cheney. "Major Directional Decisions." Memorandum, September 3, 2002.
<http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/992/2002-09-03%20to%20Vice%20President%20Richard%20B%20Cheney%20re%20Decision-%20Memo%20Attachment.pdf>.

This source is a memo from Donald Rumsfeld to Dick Cheney, which is the closest documentary record outlining US position towards the Taliban post-2001. The memo outlines that the US is not there to stay in Afghanistan and that US presence in Afghanistan was intended "to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future, assist with humanitarian assistance, and help establish the conditions to ensure the new Afghan government has the opportunity to succeed." Rumsfeld also noted in the memo that, "Success required recognizing that defeating the Taliban regime had to be a goal, rather than preserving it to avoid chaos in Afghanistan or separating "good" Taliban from bad ones. Afghan reconstruction (and rehabilitation of 'good' Taliban) could only come after the defeat of the Taliban regime."

Rumsfeld, Donald. Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with C-SPAN. Interview by Connie Brod, January 8, 2002.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20121026054604/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1089>.

This is a transcript of an interview that Donald Rumsfeld gave Connie Brod from C-SPAN regarding the war on terrorism. This source was used to confirm a quote from Rumsfeld that US goals in Afghanistan were "to have the Taliban no longer be the government influencing Afghanistan, and that's been achieved. . . . Second to capture or kill the senior leadership of the Taliban And, third, to capture or kill [the] al Qaeda at all levels."

Sargent, Matthew, Jason H. Campbell, Alexandra T. Evans, Caitlin McCulloch, Jordan R. Reimer, and Richard S. Girven. *Staying the Unfavorable Course: National Security Council Decisionmaking and the Inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001–2016*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.7249/RAA808-1>.

This source is a report from RAND Corporation that details the evolution of US goals in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016. It is based on interviews with senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations on Afghanistan. This source was used to detail the Bush administration's focus shifting to the war with Iraq.

Schroen, Gary C. *First in: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan*. 1st ed. New York: Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2005.

This source is an insider's account by Gary Schroen, then the CIA field officer who led the first mission into Afghanistan in late September 2001. Schroen's book was used to note that the simultaneous focus on both the Taliban and al Qaeda was an operational necessity for the US.

"Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Brussels." U.S. Department of Defense, December 18, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20121026041126/http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2663>.

This is a transcript of a press briefing from Donald Rumsfeld in December 2001. It is used to confirm a direct quote from Rumsfeld that if, "we find people who aspire to high office . . . have been involved in preventing us from getting our hands on people who are responsible for what is going on in Afghanistan, [they] will find the United States not terribly friendly to their aspirations" in regards to the new Afghanistan government.

Seelye, Katharine. "Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says." *The New York Times*, October 23, 2002, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/world/threats-responses-detainees-some-guantanamo-prisoners-will-be-freed-rumsfeld.html>.

This news source reports on the release of some Guantanamo prisoners in October 2002 and highlights the shortcomings of Guantanamo to hold the "worst of the worst" anti-American terrorists, including innocent Afghans.

Shanker, Thom. "A Cornered Enemy." *The New York Times*, December 7, 2001, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/world/a-nation-challenged-news-analysis-a-cornered-enemy.html>.

This news source from December 2001 reports on the US position in light of the surrender deal between the incoming Karzai administration and the Taliban. It details that the US would reject a surrender deal that would bestow amnesty on Mullah Omar or where former Taliban swore allegiance to the new Afghan government.

Shanker, Thom. "Rumsfeld Visits Afghanistan, Calling U.S. Goals Unfulfilled." *The New York Times*, December 16, 2001, sec. World.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/16/international/asia/rumsfeld-visits-afghanistan-calling-us-goals-unfulfilled.html>.

This news source details Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Afghanistan in December 2001. The article highlights direct statements from Rumsfeld to Karzai that the Pentagon's aims were not yet met, including that there are still al Qaeda and Taliban people that needed to be addressed.

Sopko, John F. "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Lessons from the Long War." PRISM Vol. 8, No. 2. National Defense University, October 4, 2019.
<https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1980479/afghanistan-reconstruction-lessons-from-the-long-war/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F1980479%2Fafghanistan-reconstruction-lessons-from-the-long-war%2F>.

This source is written by John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. This article looks at lessons learned from Afghanistan reconstruction. It is used to confirm the proposals for US spending in Afghanistan in 2003.

Strick van Linschoten, Alex, and Felix Kuehn. *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan*. Oxford (GB): Oxford University Press, 2014.

Linschoten and Kuehn are researchers and writers who have worked in Afghanistan since 2006. Drawing on fieldwork in Afghanistan, their book details the split between the Taliban and al Qaeda from the mid-1990s onward. Their work is cited throughout the paper to detail the complexity of the relationship between Taliban and al Qaeda leaders.

Suhrke, Astri. *When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

This book, written by Norwegian political scientist Astri Suhrke, makes the case that the failure of Afghan nation-building should be put on the international project itself rather than external or local circumstances. Suhrke's work is used to characterize perception of American troops in Afghanistan in 2002.

"Taliban Agree to Surrender Kandahar: Power Transfer Begins Today." Dawn, December 7, 2001.
<https://www.dawn.com/news/9630/taliban-agree-to-surrender-kandahar-power-transfer-begins-today>

This news source from a Pakistan-based news paper reports on the surrender deal between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. It details that Karzai offered the Taliban a

general amnesty for Taliban fighters but not for foreign fighters.

The New York Times. "Obama's Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan." July 15, 2008, sec. U.S. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html>.

This is a transcript of then-presidential candidate Barack Obama's speech on Iraq and Afghanistan. In the speech, he references that the US "could have deployed the full force of American power to hunt down and destroy Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and all of the terrorists responsible for 9/11, while supporting real security in Afghanistan" but instead focused on Iraq.

The New York Times. "The Guantánamo Docket." May 18, 2021, sec. U.S. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/guantanamo-bay-detainees.html>.

This source is a New York Times investigation of 780 detainees at Guantanamo. It was reviewed and referenced to note the large contingent of Afghan citizens who were detainees as well as provide a status update on Afghan detainees.

Treanor, Jill. "US Raids 'Killed 800 Afghan Civilians.'" *The Guardian*, July 22, 2002, sec. World News. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/22/afghanistan.jilltreanor>.

This news source notes that the estimated toll of 812 Afghan civilians who have died in US airstrikes between 2001 and 2002.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *U.S Lessons Learned in Afghanistan*. 116th Congress, Cong., 2nd sess., January 15, 2020. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67892/html/CHRG-112shrg67892.htm>

This transcript of a US House of Representatives hearing on lessons learned in Afghanistan highlights that the US decision to invade Iraq shifted focus away from Afghanistan. The transcript notes Rep. Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who declared, "We got distracted by the war in Iraq under an administration whose priority was defeating Saddam Hussein, not an end game in Afghanistan."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Al Qaeda, The Taliban, and Other Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. 112th Congress, Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2011. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67892/html/CHRG-112shrg67892.htm>

This is a transcript of a US Senate hearing on al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Peter Bergen, then Director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation provides a prepared statement with information on the background and motivations of the Taliban and al Qaeda that is cited in this paper.

Waldman, Amy. "Afghan Leader Warily Backs U.S. Bombing." *The New York Times*, January 2,

2002, sec. World.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/world/a-nation-challenged-kabul-afghan-leader-warily-backs-us-bombing.html>.

This news source is used to confirm Hamid Karzai's support of US bombing in Afghanistan in early 2002 in order to root out terrorist activity.

"Wolfowitz Discusses Military Operations; Lott Talks About Anti- Terrorism Measures; Biden, Hagel on Length of U.S.-Taliban War." *CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer*. CNN, December 9, 2001. <https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/le/date/2001-12-09/segment/00>.

This is a transcript from a CNN broadcast where Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz discusses military operations. The transcript confirms that in the interview, Wolfowitz was asked about Karzai's offer of amnesty for Omar and Wolfowitz said the following regarding the US position that, "We made it clear it was totally unacceptable. And I think he has fallen off that position if he ever held it for very long."

Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

This book by journalist Bob Woodward is an account of President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. It confirms a quote from Central Intelligence Director George Tenet who declared at a meeting of Bush's foreign policy principals, "The Taliban and al Qaeda [are] really the same."

Wright, Donald P., James R. Bird, Steven E. Clay, Peter W. Connors, Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia, and Dennis F. Van Wey. "A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) October 2001–September 2005." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, May 2010.

<https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf>.

This source is a comprehensive study of the US Army's experience in Afghanistan between October 2001 and September 2005. This work is cited in the paper to illustrate how the US military effort ensured that American forces played an outsized role, despite efforts to play a limited role otherwise.

Yousafzai, Sami. "The Taliban's Oral History of the Afghanistan War." *Newsweek*, September 25, 2009. <https://www.newsweek.com/talibans-oral-history-afghanistan-war-79553>.

This source is an oral history of Taliban and it is used to highlight the motivations, fears, and ambitions of Taliban fighters. It is used to confirm a quote from former Taliban deputy minister Maulvi Mohammad Haqqani that foreign fighters provided the Taliban with the latest IED and suicide bombing technologies.

Zakheim, Dov S. *A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.

This book, written by one of then-candidate Bush's foreign policy advisors and the DoD's comptroller and CFO, as well as the coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction, provides an inside look at how policymakers failed to actually

implement the broad goals the administration was setting. His book is praised for the insights into how the Bush administration struggled in its dealing with other Middle Eastern nations to solicit funds for Afghanistan but is criticized for overlooking the role of Pakistan. Zakheim's work is used to explain internal conversations and debates on resource allocation for Afghanistan reconstruction within the Bush administration.