POLICY BRIEF

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Religion and Migration in the Mediterranean and Europe:
Human Mobility and Pluralizing Identities

Colloquium Key Findings

1. **Terminology matters.** Imprecise use of terms such as migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees fails to differentiate the mixed features of humans on the move and to specify the legal differences between those categories. The International Organization for Migration and the 1951 Refugee Convention[1] emphasize the factor of voluntariness in distinguishing between migrants and refugees. Binaries such as Muslim and non-Muslim are reductionist and essentialist, and they fail to capture the religious diversity of migration flows. Securitization of religion through equating security and counter-terrorism assumes uni-directional causality between religion and violence, assumes equivalence between religious expression and violence, and fails to differentiate between state security and human security.

2. **Policy, politics, and mediatized public debate matter.** Discussions and decisions about the linkages between religion and the "Euro-Mediterranean Migration crisis" are shaped by a combination of intersecting EU voices and actors. EU policy-making actors, European political party platforms, and European media coverage have shaped a dominant public discourse that constrains innovative policymaking and impact, polarizes voters around identity questions, and corrodes civility in mediatized debates about migration, religion, security, and the meaning of secularity, modernity, and Europeanness.

3. **Causality, visibility, and timeline matter for where religion figures in migration.** Religious identity has not been a primary causal driver in Euro-Med migration flows. Religious identity is frequently activated by structural factors on arrival in transit and destination countries. Visibility of religious difference affects responses to and self-perception of arrivals in Europe. The salience of religion increases over the migration timeline, from the emergency movement and arrival phase to the integration and cohesion phase.

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1   International Organization for Migration, "Key Migration Terms," https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms; UNHCR USA, "The 1951 Refugee Convention," http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html.

4. **"Crisis" versus "phenomenon" leads to demand for multi-stakeholder strategies, elongated and incremental time horizons, and distinctions between emergency and humanitarian relief versus social cohesion and political-economic integration support.** The focus on migration flows from the eastern Mediterranean into Europe shows that mixed migration across the Mediterranean Basin mischaracterizes human mobility as a "crisis" that will end. In fact, migration is an open-ended phenomenon that is part of the new normal of the global landscape.

5. **Migration is a "wicked problem"[2] whose management requires a multi-stakeholder, intersectional approach.** The continuous, open-ended phenomenon of migration requires public-private sector cooperation to respond, educate, and adapt to migration and, especially, to the religion-security linkages of migration. State policies require inter-agency cooperation to optimize emergency and humanitarian action and to develop social cohesion and economic integration strategies to cope with the short- and long-term impacts of migration.

> A wicked problem has innumerable causes, it tough to describe, involves many stakeholders with different values and priorities difficult to come to grips with and changes with every attempt to address it, and doesn't have a right answer.
>
> John C. Camillus[3]

6. **Religious pluralism is the new reality for Europe.** Euro-Med migration flows, in tandem with demographic patterns in EU member-states, have generated religious pluralization across Europe, catalyzing new understandings of secularity as religious pluralism and adjustments to legal-institutional frameworks for regulating religious pluralism in ways that will strengthen democracy. Distinguishing between long-term religious pluralism and episodic religiously expressed violence is a core policy challenge. Migration flows are reshaping both public perceptions and empirical linkages between religion and security.

7. **Religious communities have capacity advantages for migration policy successes.** Religious (faith-based) communities have capacity advantages in identifying and responding to the human security needs of humans on the move. EU member states should consider incorporating religious organizations and institutions in crisis response and incorporation and inclusion strategies for Euro-Med migration populations.

Colloquium on Religion and Migration in the Mediterranean and Europe

The Henry J. Leir Institute convened a colloquium on 26-27 January 2017 that focused on analysis of the complex relationship between religion and migration within the context of the Mediterranean and Europe. Migration studies have largely overlooked the salience of religion in global migration patterns. Instead, migration analyses focused on categories of race, ethnicity, and gender to problematize the migration-identity relationship. Yet, political platforms and media treatments in EU member states have shown a strong tendency to emphasize religion in discussions about how to understand and respond to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers arriving through the eastern Mediterranean routes (and, more broadly, in discussions about the security of Europe's borders vis-à-vis its Eastern and Southern Neighborhoods) into western and northern Europe. Public discourses in many EU member states commonly equate migrants with religious extremism and terrorism. This colloquium problematized the religion-migration nexus in Mediterranean flows with four main goals in mind: first, to introduce the category of religion to academic research on the relationship between identity and migration; second, to consider the religious demographics and religious ecosystem of migration flows through the Mediterranean into Europe; third, to gain purchase on the relevance and contours of religion as a push factor in Mediterranean migration into Europe; fourth, to explore the contours of civili-

2 Horst W.J. Rittel, Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 155–160.
3 John C. Camillus, "Strategy as a Wicked Problem," Harvard Business Review (May 2008).

zational discourses about European identity and European secularity associated with migration through the Mediterranean; and fifth, to consider the value in developing a more robust understanding of the religion-migration nexus in support of innovative, efficacious policy responses by the European states to the migration flows via Mediterranean maritime and land routes.

What follows are core methodological, analytic, and empirical points culled from the colloquium, with supporting insights drawn from meetings and field research conducted in Greece over the period from June through August 2017 and, subsequently, in June and July 2018. The stylized synopsis identifies the major thematic continuities, as well as the unanswered questions, developed at the colloquium.

A Synopsis of Colloquium Discussions

Religion and Migration: An Overview

Does religion matter in terms of the language used to discuss Mediterranean migration flows into Europe?

Language offers a descriptive, interpretive, legal, and normative framework for understanding how governments, policymakers, and the public make sense of migration flows into Europe. In general, policy discussions of the "refugee crisis" in the European Union have failed to clarify for EU citizens the legal distinctions between migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, thereby minimizing the efficacy of legal and normative tools (humanitarian and human rights laws, EU and national laws) for managing migration flows and for demystifying the "crisis."

More specifically, religion as a construct is deployed to organize real and imagined categories and hierarchies of difference—the starkest being the binaries of Muslim (bad/threat/other) and non-Muslim (good/non-threat/self)—which has exacerbated the lack of precision in language used to discuss and to understand the phenomenon. Such descriptive binaries with implicit normative valences occlude the remarkable religious diversity of humans on the move across the Mediterranean into the European Union. Furthermore, the civilizational language of identity categories of Muslim and non-Muslim applied to the religion-migration nexus has led to a hyper-securiti-

zation in the analysis of religion as a factor in migration flows and impacts. Muslim migrants/refugees/asylum seekers have been overwhelmingly reduced to potential Islamist extremists and terrorists in the popular imagination. This perspective is given traction by the empirical reality of the spate of terrorist events in Europe (e.g., London, Paris, Madrid) perpetrated by individuals and groups acting in the name of Islam. Similarly, reductionist religious identity categories are instrumentalized by opponents in civilizational wars, thereby creating multiplier effects and embedding religious identity into policy design and outcomes.

The impact of the aforementioned conceptual frameworks and empirical events is a reinforcement of assumptions undergirding the conventional secularization paradigm, which equated modernity with religious decline and privatization and which associated religion with irrationality, violence, and anti-modernity. Consequently, because religion is seen as incompatible with Europe and modernity—with European modernity—the putative dominance of religion as an identity marker of arrivals into Europe is seen as an existential threat to the European project premised on universal norms, liberal values, and rule of law. Episodic violence in Europe by groups and individuals declaring to act in the name of Islamist groups, as well as visible expressions of religious difference, amplifies discourses and perceptions about migration-religion linkages as a long-term, corrosive factor in the sustainability of the EU and of "an idea of Europe as a political and cultural domain."[4]

How can we disaggregate these assumptions and the argumentation that flows from such assumptions? What policy purchase derives from the unpacking of unexamined assumptions and conceits? What questions remain unanswered?

Is the term "crisis" appropriate to describe the current situation? Is there an alternative way to describe migration flows across the Mediterranean into Europe?

The annual reports of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) detail trends

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4 Anthony Pagden, "Introduction," in Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1.

of growing levels of identity prejudice—including ethnic, racial, and religiously-based prejudice expressed as Islamophobia and anti-Semitism—frequently linked to the arrival of refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants in Europe.[5] Furthermore, as mixed migration flows have "continued to be represented by xenophobic, populist groups and networks as a threat to social cohesion and security," public discourse, political party platforms, and policymaking responses have led to the conceptualization of migration as a "crisis" that can be permanently resolved.

An alternative conception of migration—as a phenomenon whose causal factors are systemic, complex, and intersectional rather than as a crisis with fixed temporal parameters and disaggregated, segmented causes—is necessary for efficacious policy responses. In particular, the phenomenon of human mobility must take into account multiple (both sequential and simultaneous) time horizons that differentiate policy assumptions and approaches (e.g., emergency, short-term versus sustainable, long-term) and that promote intersectionality (e.g., inter-agency collaboration and multi-sectoral cooperation).

Mediatized discussions of the migration "crisis" generate and amplify public panic about the implications of the unprecedented flow of people (one million)[6] who crossed the Mediterranean in the peak year of 2016. By acknowledging that migration is a global, systemic phenomenon, rather than a crisis, European policymakers can normalize the conversation about, and reduce the panic associated with, migration-crisis language.

Furthermore, a perspective on migration as a phenomenon, rather than a crisis, is particularly significant for unpacking the various dimensions of the religion-migration nexus. In particular, questions of religious pluralization and the management of a religiously plural Europe can be differentiated from questions about religiously expressed terrorism. The former question turns the policy discussion to medium- and long-term issues of social cohesion and political-economic integration. The latter question turns the policy discussion to rule of law, policing and security, and economic criminality. In this regard, the reconceptualization of migration as a phenomenon, rather than a crisis, also helps to differentiate the time horizons and associated policy design and management challenges related to the migration phenomenon; likewise, the salience of religion in differentiated points on the time horizon may be teased out and clarified.

> But this is not a crisis of numbers; it is a crisis of solidarity.
>
> Ban Ki-moon[7]

What can demographic data help us understand about the migration-religion nexus? To what extent do statistical realities contradict perceptions about the religious composition of mixed migration into Europe?

Until 50 years ago, most migration flows for Europe were internal—migration occurred within, not from without, Europe's external borders. Today, the vast majority of migrants received by Europe come from outside European borders. Moreover, the demographics of migration to Europe have changed, but misperceptions persist about the composition, in terms of both religious identity and legal category, of those arriving to Europe. Contrary to popular perception, demographic data have shown:

- Not all migrants to Europe are refugees. In fact, most of the 15 million migrants in Europe are regular and legal, not refugees.

- Not all migrants to Europe are Muslim. In fact, 47.4 percent of migrants in Europe are Muslim. Of those entering from Greece or Italy in the past six years, 88.8 percent are Muslim. Still only 6 percent of Europe's population is Muslim.

However, we do not have reliable survey data to respond to the following questions:

5 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance and Council of Europe, "Annual Report on ECRI's Activities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2017," (June 2018), https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-on-ecri-s-activities-covering-the-period-from-1-january-/16808c168b.

6 Emma Batha, "Europe's Refugee and Migrant Crisis in 2016: In Numbers" (World Economic Forum, December 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/europes-refugee-and-migrant-crisis-in-2016-in-numbers.

7 Ban Ki-moon, "Refugees and Migrants: A Crisis of Solidarity?" (United Nations University, May 9, 2016).

- Neither UNHCR nor the EU's Frontex track data on religious affiliation, so how is it possible to capture accurately the salience of religion as either a push factor or a variable for social organization on arrival to Europe?

- Do migrants self-identify in terms of their religious community? Do migrants organize along and within religious community lines once in Europe? Are Muslim migrants more vulnerable than non-Muslim migrants to discrimination and exclusion on arrival and/or settlement in Europe?

The flow of people entering Europe might be managed, but it is neither empirically possible nor legally and ethically desirable to stop migration across the Mediterranean into Europe. Policymakers must consider long-term adaptation strategies for cohesion and integration based on the inevitable influx of non-Europeans to Europe over the next century, in order to reinforce principles, mentalities, and behaviors of inclusive citizenship and rule of law among EU citizens and new arrivals.

The Push-Pull Factors: Religion as a Cause of Mass Migration

The contemporary world order is characterized by mass population movements in the face of violent conflicts. To what extent does religion serve as a push factor for these migratory patterns?

Empirical evidence shows that religion is an important factor for many individuals who emigrate from their countries of origin, but religion is only one among many push factors (e.g., sub-state violence due to fragile and failed states, economic need, ecological disasters, food insecurity, violation of civil and political rights) for mixed migration into Europe. Moreover, individuals emigrate for a number of reasons when it comes to religion: flight from state and societal perpetration of religious discrimination and/or religious persecution, sectarian (intra-religious) and communal (inter-religious) violence, and the pull of social contacts from communities in Europe with shared religious identity. Therefore, the extent to which religion is the determinant, first-order, push-pull factor is difficult to measure, particularly since religion may be either linked to or embedded in other push-pull factors, particularly those

related to economic and human-security imperatives. European policy discussions have failed to identify whether religion is a first-, second-, or even third-order push factor in migration flows through the eastern (and other) Mediterranean routes.

To what extent is violent religious persecution a push factor? To what extent is non-violent, yet systemic, religiously based discrimination a push factor? To what extent does conflict generated by state failure activate violations of religious freedom?

State fragility and failure, as well as processes of nation-building, help to explain the differences in religion as a push factor in migration flows from the eastern Mediterranean into Europe. In the case of humans on the move from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Eritrea (major countries of origin in the eastern Mediterranean route), state failure and fragility generate massive deficits in human security, which are often disproportionately experienced by vulnerable religious communities, usually those who are a minority in numerical terms and in identity terms. Religious discrimination in home countries has been a push factor in migration to Europe, for economic opportunity and human security, while violent religious persecution has been a major factor in the spikes in refugees and asylum seekers arriving to Europe from the Levant. In particular, state security forces and paramilitaries (e.g., in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan), along with Islamist terror groups such as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and al-Qaeda and the Taliban, have targeted both co-religionists and other religious communities in struggles over control of the institutions, resources, and territory of the state. In sum, migration flows through the eastern route in the Mediterranean (from as far afield as Afghanistan in Southwest Asia and closer by, from Syria and Iraq) are connected to security—to failures of state security and deficits in human security—and those security factors are often "religionized," producing a triangulation between religion, migration, and security. Those different types of security deficits and their impact on religious communities in countries of origin help to explain the diverse motives for mixed migration, the different categories of migrant (economic, refugee, asylum seeker), and the relative weight of religion as a push-pull factor. Such comparative nuance, granularity, and precision must be mined and amplified in order to move beyond the generalized tropes of policy, political, and

media conversations about migration and religion in the Mediterranean and Europe.

> Individuals have complex and overlapping motivations for leaving their origin countries that defy simple categorization. Even for those fleeing conflict or oppressive regimes, it is often difficult to pinpoint one precipitating push factor.
>
> Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Susan Fratzke[8]

How do migrants then see each other in terms of identity? Do they identify themselves or others as religious migrants? How do host-country citizens view migrants? Does religion factor into perception and action?

There is a dearth of longitudinal and comparative data to answer this question, which therefore weakens policy assumptions and responses, so much work *is* to be done on the issue of identify perception and, specifically, religion as an identity marker—in terms of how migrants view themselves and how host populations view migrants. Visibility (religious dress, religious practices, and location of worship) is one of the most obvious markers by which arriving migrants express their religious identity and by which they may seek to identify with co-religionists already citizens or residents of the host EU country. Such visibility markers are critical to the host population's initial perceptions of, assumptions about, and (potentially) responses to arriving migrants.

The significance of a visible religious identity as a marker of difference and/or perceived threat increases over time, given the religious pluralization generated by migration inflows and given the incidences of religiously defined violence experienced in EU member states. Therefore, policy priorities must take into account visibility in designing social cohesion

8 Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Susan Fratzke, "Europe's Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now and What Next?" (Migration Policy Institute, September 24, 2015).

and economic integration strategies associated with migration inflows. Policy sectors—including public education, religious affairs, economic equity and labor markets—will be especially important for addressing positive versus negative attitudes, mentalities, and behaviors associated with religious pluralism. Policy sectors associated with external security, internal intelligence and public order, and policing practices, will be especially critical in establishing the legal and normative frameworks, messages, and practices that reject religion as a marker of inequality or discrimination vis-à-vis the state and within civil society.

Religion and European Identity: Welcome to a Secular Europe?

To what extent are contemporary ideas about European identity informed by assumptions about religion? How has the phenomenon of Mediterranean migration shaped debates, legislation, and other polices related to ideas about European identity?

The dominant assumptions that inform contemporary models of European identity are Europe as a Judeo-Christian space and Europe as a secular space. The former gives rise to the latter, as explanations of the secularization and modernization of Europe turn on a reading of history in which the secular state achieved definitive dominance, whether by violence or consent, over the Judeo-Christian institutions and leaders. The popularization of the stylized history of Europe's secularization-modernization has produced a policy-elite-driven consensus that Europe is a secular space defined by religion-state separation, the relocation of religion from the public to the private sphere, and the inexorable decline of religious beliefs, practices, and affinities for action.

The massive mixed migration flows into Europe from the Mediterranean east, marked by the simultaneity of demographic trends inside Europe and the visibility of the religious identity of arrivals, have catalyzed debates about the contours, impacts, and normative underpinnings of European identity as secular.

Migration policy debates in Europe have become a forum for revealing and testing the elasticity and adaptability of secular arrangements for managing

religion-state relations, as well as for challenging the internal contradictions of liberal secularism that rejects religious vitality and public religion. The religious composition of migrants coming into Europe through the eastern route of the Mediterranean has challenged the comfortable conceits of a uniform secularity and an ideology of secularism rife equated with European identity. Those policy debates are likely to intensify as the time horizon of the migration phenomenon lengthens, as policies of emergency and humanitarian relief are outweighed by policies of social cohesion and integration. Furthermore, the likelihood of greater engagement by religious communities in shaping the issues, discourses, and outcomes of policy debates about arrangements of secularity—with different features across different EU member states—is likely to increase over time.

The migration phenomenon has catalyzed intense popular debates, amplified and refracted through the media, about the meaning of religion for European identity, with the ecosystem of participants ranging from atheists and dogmatic secularists to religious pluralists and religious totalitarians of all confessions. At the core of these debates is the reality of religious pluralism that is the "new normal" in Europe, a reality generated by mixed migration flows that show no signs of abating.

What effect has migration had on the religious institutions of Europe? How have different religious groups responded to changing demographics?

Some religious institutions have stepped in to fill the gap in national or regional policy addressing the successful integration of migrants. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) have been active in providing humanitarian and emergency assistance to new arrivals in Europe, as well as in offering medical, socio-economic, legal, and language services designed to help migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers navigate the local environment. Religious institutions are also increasingly active in filling the policy gaps left by failures in state will and capacity.

What role does interfaith dialogue play in responding to both humanitarian and spiritual concerns presented by migration? What role can it play in the larger discussion of the role of religion in European society?

Religious leaders, institutions, and associated non-governmental organizations are taking an increasingly active role in promoting inter-faith dialogue as a platform for ameliorating the challenges of social inclusion associated with migration as a phenomenon that is re-pluralizing Europe's religious ecosystem. Interfaith and ecumenical dialogue is also emerging as a platform for exploring the common existential, humanitarian, and spiritual needs that cut across religious distinctions—Muslim, Christian, Yazidi, animist—among migrant arrivals.

Indeed, religious leaders have taken the lead in urging their respective faith adherents in Europe, as well as in exhorting EU policymakers, to see the principles and capacity of religious communities as sources of ideational, spiritual, and practical support for addressing the humanitarian, inclusion, and cohesion policies of Mediterranean migration into Europe. The discourse of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is evocative of the potential for faith-based communities to engage actively in framing the migration-religion nexus. On a 2016 visit with Pope Francis and Archbishop Ieronymos of Athens and All Greece to the frontline Greek island of Lesvos in 2016, the Ecumenical Patriarch observed, "The Mediterranean Sea should not be a tomb. It is a place of life, a crossroad of cultures and civilizations, a place of exchange and dialogue. In order to rediscover its original vocation, the *Mare Nostrum*, and more specifically the Aegean Sea . . . must become a sea of peace."[9] Toward that goal, he also rejected as "unacceptable that some Europeans, who praise human rights and who wish to appear as defenders of a 'Christian Europe', at the same time employ hard language against migrants and refugees, and defend closed European borders," calling on European policymakers and publics to "transform the "threat of otherness" into the opportunity to foster a culture of solidarity and inclusion."[10] Similarly, Pope Francis has reframed the migration "crisis" as a window of opportunity, noting, "At this moment in human history, marked by great movements of migration those who migrate are forced to change some of their most distinctive characteristics and, whether they like or

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9 Aurelian Iftimiu, "Ecumenical Patriarch Speaks about the Refugee Crisis at the Concordia Europe Summit: 'The World Expects the Common Witness of People of Faith'" (Basilica.Ro, June 2017), http://basilica.ro/en/ecumenical-patriarch-speaks-about-the-refugee-crisis-at-the-concordia-europe-summit-the-world-expects-the-common-witness-of-people-of-faith/.
10 Ibid.

not, even those who welcome them are also forced to change. How can we experience these changes not as obstacles to genuine development, but rather as opportunities for genuine human, social and spiritual growth?"[11]

Policy at the Macro Level: Schengen, Dublin, and the Neighborhood Policy

To what extent have the EU's macro-level immigration policies been informed by religion? Have ideas about the religious composition of Europeanness affected the evolution of these policies, from the arbitrary suspension of Schengen rules to the evolution of the Dublin Agreements to the reconfiguration of the European Neighbourhood policies?

Macro-level immigration policies vary significantly among states, as evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), especially when comparing the EU's agreements with its Eastern Neighbors to those of the EU and its Southern Neighbors. Brussels' negotiation of visa facilitation agreements with the EU's Eastern Neighbors have progressed relatively smoothly and decisively, in contrast to the stalled negotiation processes with its Southern Neighbors. Especially instructive has been the EU's move to tie visa facilitation for North African states to readmission agreements that contain a "third country national" (TCN) readmission clause, since this requirement allows the EU to place the policy burden of migration management onto developing, transit nations that, in most cases, lack the requisite political-bureaucratic capacity and economic prosperity to manage and/or absorb migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

Since the migration "crisis" of 2015, there has been a decided shift in the ENP towards externalization strategies, which amount to "an agenda aimed at controlling migration towards Europe, which was not the original purpose."[12] Externalization for the purposes of stopping the mixed-migration influx into Europe has meant the securitization of devel-

opment and the implicit linkage of security to religion; after all, the new externalization strategies of the newest version of the ENP have been designed to control migration from the Mediterranean routes through which migrants who are disproportionately Muslim enter Europe.

How has the widespread securitization of religion affected macro policies? To what extent have macro discussions of religion and policy been dominated by security concerns?

It is crucial to distinguish between realistic threats and measurable burdens (employment, social benefits, healthcare and education costs, etc.) and symbolic threats (national identity, values, religious and cultural homogeneity) posed by migration flows. The migration "crisis" language emerged in 2015, and more broadly within the context of the Euro-American war on terror since the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the United States. Since then, the securitization of migration has led to the blurring of distinction between immigrants (illegal, legal) and refugees/asylum seekers. In addition, it has brought to the fore religious identity as part of the security calculus that figures into the EU migration management policies. The securitization of religion allows this language to be normalized and manipulated to provoke fear and the politics of fear, deployed frequently by populist parties on the right. But it has also informed the secularist discourse of parties on the left, which use visibility as a means to accentuate religion as a marker of difference between host country citizens and arrival populations. The politics of fear, then, may activate and intensify religious identity among arrivals over the course of their migration journey and as cohesion and integration challenges emerge over the elongated timeline of migration management.

11 "Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2016" (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, January 17, 2016), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/migration/documents/papa-francesco_20150912_world-migrants-day-2016.html.
12 Mari Neuvonen. "Fear of Migration: Is the EU's Southern Neighbourhood Policy Fading Away?" FIAA Briefing Paper 177 (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 8, 2015), https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/fear-of-migration#.