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THE FORTY YEAR CRISIS

BERLIN (1948-1989)

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INTRODUCTION

“When I go to sleep, I try not to think about Berlin”. For Dean Rusk, in the early sixties, the outbreak of World War III was a recurring nightmare, not just a rhetorical assumption. “For four years the second Berlin crisis kept Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States in a state of extreme tension”. Certain armchair specialists developed a different perception in their ivory towers and if “the rolling Berlin crisis of the period 1958-1961 severely stretched the normal usage of the term”, it is mainly for those who lose sight of events on the ground. The vagueness and complexity of the crisis concept may thus be used to suit methodological choices or a specific focus. Richard N. Lebow, for instance, published a study of twenty-six international crises in which, after including Stalin’s 1948-49 Blockade, he excluded the events of the next decade in Berlin, for reasons which will be disqualified below. Berlin was a constant irritation for Moscow, and caused nightmares in the major Western capitals, it was essential to the balance of powers and guaranteed the post WWII status quo. Based on commonly accepted definition criteria of crises, this half-MALD paper will argue that the capital city of Germany also holds a valid claim to be regarded as the seat of a forty year long crisis, by far the longest of the Cold War. They both ended on November 9, 1989.

The US/Soviet rivalry was a “bipolar brinkmanship [that] begun amid the blooming linden trees of Berlin in 1948 and ended in 1962 in the blue waters of the Caribbean”. Most studies of Cold War crises focus on the political decision-makers, as principal actors and, along with John Lewis Gaddis, identify the Cold War as a “long peace” because leaders succeeded in preventing crises from escalating to war. For decades however, Berliners, found themselves much closer to war than to peace and acquired, on a daily basis, a hands-on war-like experience. They had become seasoned veterans of crisis management, albeit unwittingly, by the time Robert McNamara identified it as “the Cold War substitute of wartime strategy”.

Berlin was the only point where East met West. Its peculiar status and the resistance spirit of its population accelerated the cementing of German/US relations and Germany’s re-integration into the concert of Western nations. This paper covers Berlin’s post-war history, but not as a succession of snapshots. In a more holistic approach, it follows the Ariadné thread of the Cold War in Moscow’s fundamental fear of Germany. Catalyzing this fear, Berlin identified itself with the Cold War paradigm as the seat of one single continuous crisis.

In 1945, Berlin was no longer the cultural and geographical center of *Mittel Europa* but it suddenly acquired a geo-strategic prominence when Stalin’s blockade showed to the free world that the Iron Curtain was for real. Stalin turned Berlin into a concentrate of Cold War issues, a natural theater for both Soviet harassment and Western resolve, a “test tube” of strategy. This laboratory of crisis management did not cease to operate when the wall came up, in August 1961. Describing an on-going phenomenon, Mac George Bundy writes to Ted Soresen, a year later, August 82, “The Berlin Crisis has warmed up a lot in recent weeks and looks as if it is getting worse”. The date shows the link between Berlin and the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962, providing additional strength to the argument developed in this paper. Until the quadripartite occupation was settled in 1971 and, more generally, until the “Wall of Shame” came down in 1989, the city remained for all the parties involved, the ultimate instrument of the Cold war East West rivalry and the locus, *par excellence*, of crisis management.

Tourists came to get cheap thrills on the S-Bahn, the above ground metro that took them through the squalid Eastern side and back again to the safety of well-lit arteries in the West. Berlin was a surrealist reservation of wealthy Indians, prone to self-derision, and surrounded by tripwires. Eventually, this Achilles heel became a Trojan horse, because the city also brewed the necessary ingredients to end the Cold war, and set in motion the ineluctable process that eventually brings down dictatorships.
In their book, *Conflict Among Nations*, Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing devised a model of crisis curve on which this paper will rely to support its demonstration. It will contribute to a clearer picture of how Berlin went through a latent situation of crisis, punctuated by acute peaks, with sudden escalation and de-escalation phases, during most of the Cold War.

The genesis of Berlin’s unique situation lies in its symbolic value and in a postwar administrative status that turned the city into a strategic tool for the successive political leaders of the era. (Chapters 1 and 2). Events that occurred in or about Berlin will then be tested against a number of definition criteria common to most crises (Chapter 3)

In the last decade, a wealth of archives from the Eastern bloc has allowed historians to confirm or infirm previous hypotheses, tracing a more revealing light on the key players’ decision-making process, on their respective motivations and strategies and on the reality of the potential risks involved. They also outline the importance of emotional factors and above all the constant fear that Germany’s economic recovery and subsequent rearmament aroused in the Kremlin leadership. New information however will not alter the extent to which Berliners’ daily lives were affected by the long and looming crisis, with periods of relative calm and peaks of dramatic tension. Secret Service agents and counter-espionage operatives were the foot soldiers of an unconventional conflict, in which West Berliners were held hostages. Intelligence outweighed the role of force, weapons remained practically silent, and diplomacy was mostly frozen in a stalemate, when it was not conducted through unorthodox channels, with the media’s intermediary. The civil population stood literally on the frontline of the Cold War and participated decisively in the unraveling of the Berlin Crisis. Its role will be addressed in Chapter 4, together with the role played respectively by the other more traditionally considered tools of crisis management, such as military force, diplomacy and intelligence.
1. THE ORIGINS OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

The divided city had a predisposition to become the test tube of Cold War crises, a distinctive feature of the harsh reality of post World War II Europe. There, the superpower discord on the German question, and more generally on world politics, reached a point of crystallization. It was both the locus and the tool of a resistance test that went far beyond the fate of the city itself, for two main reasons. Firstly, it retained a historically strong symbolic value and managed to extend it, beyond Germany, to the confines of the free world. Its capacity of resistance to Communism was not only grossly underestimated by the Soviets, it even surprised the Western Allies, in the immediate post-war years, and was instrumental in convincing them early on that Germany shared the values of the Western bloc. Secondly, the sophisticated machinery and the access routes put in place as a result of wartime agreements - and disagreements - between Germany’s occupying forces, were instrumental in the eruption and subsequent resolution of the successive and acute tension peaks in the Berlin Crisis.

1.1. BERLIN’S SYMBOLIC VALUE,

Berliners have always prided themselves for their wit and political incorrectness, advocating freedom of speech and nonconformist ideas. Long before Stalin’s blockade put them again to the test, in the spring of 1948, they had already demonstrated their fortitude and endured hardships in defense of freedom. The capital city of the Hohenzollern, built on the swampy marshes drained by French Hugenot exiles, in the late 1680s, remained little more than a village until the 19th century. It was nevertheless associated with the major events that contributed to shape the German nation over five centuries. After Bismark put Germany on the map of European powers, Berlin acquired a fast growing prominence to become the country’s only cosmopolitan city, attracting the intelligentsia and business crowds of Central Europe.
Berlin however was never culturally tied to any of its components, it was neither specifically Prussian, nor typically German, and had the largest Jewish population in Europe. The rest of the country, from Hamburg to Munich, was somewhat hostile to its title of Germany’s “cultural hub”. When the Soviets kidnapped its historical center, it was for many Germans, such as Chancellor Conrad Adenauer, a sort of punishment for the arrogance the city had deployed at the time of its splendor. Such resentment explains their reluctance to reinstate Berlin as their capital in 1990. Yet, a desire to heal, in their collective memory, the scars of the Soviet occupancy, systematically leveled to the ground in the East zone, and reaffirm Berlin’s symbolic value, outweighed the few shreds of jealousy for a brilliant past.

Germans have been able to cope with territorial fluctuations because they do not constitute a nation-state, based on a fixed territory. They form a ‘nation-people’, in which the only mooring point was their capital. When its historical heart was severed from the rest of the city in 1945, Berlin symbolized even more than ever the cradle of the German nation. Russians neglected to integrate the full extent of the city's emotional value, not only for Germans, but also for the rest of the free world, into their geo-political evaluation of Berlin and in their decision to use it as a tool of their anti-Western strategy. In spite of consistent intelligence reports on the Allies’ determination never to abandon it, Stalin did not anticipate that the population would meet his assaults on Berlin's freedom with such resistance. He based his decision on what he wanted to hear, such as reports from Pankow that grossly overstated the support for Communism in the Western part of the city. Lenin’s dictum “who holds Berlin, holds Europe” discounted the psychological underpinnings and potential threat of holding the city captive. 9

The division of Germany and the partition of Berlin actually enhanced the emotional hold the capital city retained on the vast majority of Germans. Western allies, convinced of Berlin’s symbolic significance, would not have established the Allied Control Council anywhere else.
With the deterioration of their relationship with Moscow, this choice became even more significant strategically. As long as part of Berlin would remain out of the grip of the Soviets, hope for a reunification of Germany was sustained and the city would continue to represent the very essence of German nationhood, inside and outside the country. The atrocities committed by the Red Army in 1945, and the treatment imposed by the Soviets to their occupation zone, were far more destructive for Moscow than the Allied bombings, because they only reinforced an already fierce opposition to Communism.

Miscalculations on the extent of the Allies’ determination to stay in Berlin and misjudgments on Berliner’s determination against Communism, lead Stalin to blockade the city in the spring of 1948. It immediately focused the world’s attention on this new symbol of resistance to Soviet oppression. For fifteen more years, after the blockade was lifted, the western sectors of Berlin would provide the landing base for several million Eastern Europeans who, contrary to the Russians, were still given the opportunity to vote with their feet.

“From the standpoint of the security of Europe and of the Soviet Union,” Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko still noted in October 1963, the German problem “was problem number one.” Secretary of State Dean Rusk, told Gromyko that the German question, including the complex problems relating to Berlin, was the most fundamental issue in east-west relations. “There was certainly no question about that”. Germany was the point of confrontation, and the German problem (including Berlin) was thus obviously the number one problem in relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. The German question -and that meant, above all, the question of how much power would be given back to Germany - did indeed lie at the heart of Great Power politics during the entire Cold War period. This issue will be developed further, as it represents the underlying clash of interests which shapes the crisis curve analyzed in Chapter 2. (Appendix 2)
In addition to the Soviets’ continuous harassment, the permanent danger of being on the frontline of a Superpowers confrontation allowed Berlin to secure the uninterrupted presence of Western Armed Forces, until the end of the Cold War. The strength of its symbolic value increased in 1961, when Khrushchev convinced Kennedy that “a wall was better than a war”. “No other German city was such a beacon of freedom during the Cold War, no other symbolized more vividly the unnatural division of Europe, no other kept the idea of one Germany and one Europe alive, finally to triumph in 1989”. For many Germans, beyond the exasperation caused by its brashness and ‘un-German’ individualism, the plight of their capital city was the launching pad of a much needed sense of national consciousness. It was the only anchor of patriotism that remained after the defeat and the shame of the Nazi era. Throughout the Cold War, the city helped shape Western strategy and inter-allied political cooperation. The solidity of the instruments organizing its postwar administration, have equally contributed to the remarkable resistance spirit of the city. Wartime agreements had devised a machinery that would greatly contribute to allow Germany to rise from its ashes and cement its “Never Again” stance.

1. 2. WARTIME AGREEMENTS AND ACCESS ROUTES

1.2.1. The Allied Occupation control machinery

"We look forward with confidence to the day when all peoples in the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences." Such grandiloquence reflects the “forced “cooperation spirit among the future victorious allies that presided over the extensive wartime negotiations on the status of postwar Germany. Stalin did not believe a word of it, and if President Roosevelt thought “Uncle Joe” shared his vision of democratic freedom for the world, Churchill did not interfere to open Roosevelt’s eyes. Winning the war against “the Hun“ had top priority and all needed to compromise to buy time.
The principle of a divided Germany was a natural consequence of capitulation, based on the necessity to avoid repeating the mistakes of 1918, when Germany was allowed to retain an army and was not systematically occupied. The heads of states agreed on the basic elements of the future occupation and on organizational blue prints. A European Advisory Commission (EAC) which would structure the operation, emerged in November 1943, in Moscow, in a secret protocol between Molotov, Anthony Eden and Cordell Hull. The Lancaster House Protocols, signed in September and November 1944, established three occupation zones and the details of the control machinery. They announced that “Germany, within her frontiers as they were on 31st December 1937, will, for the purpose of occupation, be divided into three zones”. Based on the principle of unanimous decisions, EAC became the most efficient, and least publicized, instrument of decision-making for the wartime allies. It had the difficult task to monitor a cooperation between them, and rally their consensus, when they were pursuing different, and sometimes conflicting, agendas. Considering the strain under which its members had to work, EAC came up with remarkably workable documents. They omitted to specify a time limit, however, opening the door to Moscow’s later attempts to declare them void, pretending that they were only “intended” for immediate postwar purposes. Without a stipulated time frame, this claim held no legal basis and the arrangements lasted far beyond what their drafters could have anticipated. The London Agreements were confirmed at Yalta, with the inclusion of a fourth sector carved out of the British and American zones for France, who was reluctantly included. This document would later provide strong legal grounds for the adamant refusal by the Allies to accept any unilateral action by the Soviet Union. After the capitulation, all these arrangements were formalized in Postdam, on 5 June 1945 by a common statement of the four governments.

Supreme authority over Germany was conferred to the Allied Control Council and its Zonal Commandants. “Greater Berlin” would be administered by an Inter-Allied Council, or
Kommandatura, under the joint commandment of the Allied Sector Commanders, with a rotating presidency, and controlled by the Allied Council. The division of Germany in occupation zones harbored the implicit partition of the country, along an East-West line leaving the Soviets free to act as they pleased, as long as they did not interfere with Western occupation rights. Principles were laid down in a plan proposed by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who assumed that a partition of Germany along east-west lines was unavoidable. “Let each side do what it wanted in its own part of Germany. This was the simplest formula for a settlement. The Soviets would almost certainly go on acting unilaterally in the eastern zone in any case. But if they ran eastern Germany as they pleased, they should not expect to have much influence in the western zones. The allies would thus go their separate ways, and on this basis they could get along with each other. The Byrnes plan provided the basis for the Potsdam agreement, but it was not as though the plan was simply imposed on an unwilling Soviet Union that was left feeling cheated”. The Potsdam Protocol however called for treating the country as a unit. “Even foreign trade, according to the text, was supposed to be managed on an all-German basis. But the all-German language of the final agreement was essentially a fig leaf. […] It is scarcely to be expected that a written accord would provide directly for an overt partition of Germany. And indeed what was the point of being too explicit about these matters? As long as the real issues had been settled with the agreement on the Byrnes plan, what harm was there in paying a little lip service to Wilsonian platitudes?” The details of the control machinery were in the wartime documents, they were never incorporated in the Postdam Agreement, contrary to what the Soviet leaders would pretend later, as they looked for arguments to wiggle themselves out of the increasing constraints of these arrangements.

Berlin’s partition influenced the entire Cold War: Stalin had refused an earlier British/American proposal, championed by General Eisenhower, to exercise a common
occupation of the whole city. Officially, a division in sectors would allow each ally to provide more easily for its own troops. In reality, Russian soldiers has to be protected from the worst of all ills, capitalist contamination. In the watertight Nomenklatura class system, high-ranking Soviet officers were less susceptible to such pollution and their limited number was controllable. Stalin unwittingly gave Berlin the strongest protection against a Communist take-over by imposing partition. It was one of many ill-inspired decisions that eventually contributed to the downfall of communism and the materialization of his worst fear, the reunification of Germany.

1.2.2. Access to the city.

During wartime negotiations, legally securing access routes to Berlin was not a priority issue. “Surprisingly, given Berlin’s position deep inside the Soviet occupation zone, until 1972, there was no formal agreement guaranteeing the Western Allies continuous ground access to the city.” The victorious armies neglected to condition their withdrawal into their respective zones upon the granting of free access to Berlin, after the capitulation. Cooperation with the Soviets was still the order of the day and no one could fully anticipate the potential risk of not securing written commitments from Stalin on the access question. Logically, since the right of access was not officially denied, its physical implementation was considered a military technicality, and was implicitly guaranteed by the occupation rights. Access rights were in fact never legally challenged as such. Besides, formal documents would probably not have deterred Stalin or Krushchev from leaning on Berlin to achieve their political goals anyway.

Another factor must be taken into consideration. Open squabbling between British and Americans over the right of access of Americans troops and supply trains through the British zone irritated the Soviet delegation, who had raised no argument regarding access to Berlin over their own occupation zone. To drive a wedge between Allies, whose cohesion seemed shaky,
would be easy, when the time came. Marxist doctrine teaches that confrontation between capitalist powers is a natural consequence of their imperialism. Stalin never dissociated ideology from political action. In his election speech in 1946, he rooted the causes of WWII in the contradictions and conflicting interests inherent to capitalism, the tensions of which had irresistibly weakened western nations. Stalinist historical revisionism was prompt to attribute the victory over the Nazis to the sole intervention of the Soviets and their invincible Red Army.

It might not have been wise, at the time, to antagonize the Russians who had just recognized the right for the Western powers to be in Berlin on a footing parity. The official Soviet position, however, was that access was a privilege to be granted and not a right to which the occupying forces could be entitled and President Truman never obtained a formal guarantee of free access to Berlin. Stalin’s hard-line position on this issue relied on information from his agents within the British Embassy in Washington and the top levels of US administration. Knowing that Churchill and Roosevelt disagreed on the delimitation of zones or the modalities of the French participation in the occupation of Germany, with the aggravating factor of the inter-agency rivalries in Washington, he had rightly concluded that under these circumstances no one would push the access question. Although the Soviets never officially confirmed a global right of access, they never denied it either. Land access relied on verbal promises from Marshal Zukhov to General Clay. With the exception of air traffic, because of its specific nature, requests to formalize other accesses were ignored. (See Appendix 1 for air corridors and airlift bases)

Signed on 30 November 1945, the unanimous agreement on Air Safety created six air corridors fanning out of Berlin, that could be used without advanced notice to the Soviets. “Three led to the east or Communist areas. Of the other three, one led to the north-west to Hamburg, one west toward Hanover, both in the British Zone, and the third led southwest to Frankfurt and Wiesbaden in the American Zone”. No other paper was signed on the subject
but “lines of agreement” were gradually implemented. Inter-zonal traffic operated without interference from the Soviets, until 30 March 1948, when the issue of access started the longest crisis of the Cold War. Stalin established at first a mini blockade, to force the West to repel their plan for the economic recovery of Germany. The weakness of the Western Allies’ isolated position in an increasingly hostile territory came then into focus as the Soviets intensified the disruption of surface access to Berlin, until its complete cessation on June 24, 1948.

The air corridors saved Berlin, not because they were secured in writing, but primarily because they were going to allow the Allies to counter Moscow’s show of force, when Stalin blockaded the city. In a circumventing move, a feature common to wartime strategy but also to its Cold War substitute, crisis management, Western powers avoided the first escalation to World War III since 1945. The magnitude and success of the Allies’ airlift could not have been anticipated by the Soviets in their wildest nightmares. The air corridors were used in a way the Soviets could not foresee and Moscow would not be prevented from starving West Berlin. This was accomplished without the use of force, putting the blame for initiating the crisis on the Soviets. If the Allies, as General Clay had first suggested, had forced the rail/road blockade militarily, it might have had the opposite effect. Truman’s decision to go ahead with the airlift had considerable repercussions and was probably the single most important decision that defused the risk of war. The US kept the strategic upper hand and made Stalin back down. West Germany was now definitely in the camp of democracy.

2. THE POLITICAL ACTORS OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

110 miles within hostile territory, Berlin was the designated victim for a totalitarian regime rooted in terror and crime. From the start, Moscow’s goal had been to “keep Germany down” by uniting it under Soviet rule, absorbing Berlin in the process. Washington needed also
to keep Germany in check while preventing any power from ruling over Eurasia, in order to preserve world stability. This policy started in Europe, and Europe’s stability rested on Berlin, which became a kingpin of strategies for the two super-powers. Characteristic moves of crisis management, such as signaling specific commitments, escalating or circumventing moves, took place naturally in Berlin, the actual frontline of the Cold War, where, for the purpose of their common administration, Western Allies were in daily contact with their Soviet counterparts. This gave the latter both motive and opportunity to test western resolve, and allowed the West to express its commitment for Germany, particularly during the most acute periods of crisis.

Stalin’s progressive disruption of land traffic, culminating in a complete blockade, was a daring escalating move based on miscalculations. Ten years later, Khrushchev’s successive ultimatums, threats and vociferation, were escalation attempts that mirrored growing tensions and rivalry between superpowers and occupation forces. By the end of 1948, Berlin had become the Achilles heel of both camps. This strategic vulnerability, however, was counterbalanced for the West by the fact that Berlin was also a Trojan horse in Soviet territory, featuring a permanent showcase of Western technology, an oasis of democracy. It opened the road to freedom for millions of East European citizens, until the “Exit” sign was removed in August 1961. The main policy makers examined below, would nevertheless, in spite of periods of extremely high tension, successfully manage the Berlin crisis and preserve for decades the four Power settlement of 1945. Only those involved during these peaks of crisis will be addressed here.

2. 1. EASTERN BLOC LEADERS.

Stalin and Krushchev turned Berlin into an essential tool of Soviet strategy not only to force the West to alter its own policy regarding Germany, and to eventually defuse the entire Western defense system in Europe, but also to help managing crises within the Communist bloc. East Germany’s Walter Ulbricht had a decisive influence, albeit long underrated, in the strategic
chess game between the US and the USSR. Declassified documents shed a new light on Ulbricht’s decisive role in using Berlin as a means to assert his position within the Warsaw Pact.

2.1.1. Joseph Stalin.

Obsessed with paranoia, Stalin was convinced that Germany would only be prevented from ever attacking Russia again if it remained destroyed beyond repair. His European strategy was based on the principle that “Only a Germany under Soviet control could ensure, with any reliability, the Soviet’s Union’s safety” 24. On the eve of the Potsdam declaration, June 4th 1945, Stalin informed Grotewohl and Pieks, leaders of the German Communist Party (KPD), of his plan to incorporate a reunified Germany into the Soviet bloc. Minutes of this meeting detail his strategy, based on the presence of the Red Army in the Soviet Zone and on a closely monitored action by the KPD, which would merge with the Socialist Party (SPD) to form a unified front (SED). These combined efforts would bring gradually all of Germany into the Soviet bloc. 25 During wartime negotiations, Stalin had not opposed the division of Germany because he was convinced it would be temporary. Merging the zones was only conceivable under Soviet control and the reunification of Germany under Communist rule was only a matter of time, since Marxist analysis predicted that capitalist powers around the world were embarked on a self-destructive course. In the case of Germany, fate needed a little push, starving a city for example, to ensure complete eradication of any possible threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

Stalin’s secure sphere of influence rested on a neutral buffer zone in Switzerland, Austria, and Italy. 26 For this purpose, the totality of Germany had to be kept in a desperate state of destruction and misery. 27 Massive raping, arrests, deportations and executions, coupled with a systematic dismantling of more than a third of its industrial capacity, were the instruments of this strategy that revealed counterproductive, exacerbating the resistance spirit of West Berlin.
Following Winston Churchill’s advice “In war, resolution, in victory, magnanimity”, Western Allies agreed on the swift economic recovery and return to self-government of Germany. Since the principle of unanimous decisions within the Allied Control Council allowed the Soviets to oppose their objectives, they met secretly in London to negotiate their new policy. Soviet agents, infiltrated in the London, Washington and Paris embassies, informed Stalin of the measures discussed in these not so “secret” London meetings. The Soviet clasp tightened on Eastern Europe, and in Czechoslovakia, a leading opposing figure, Jan Masaryk was conveniently “suicided by defenestration”, for wanting to participate in the Marshall Plan. The next step was to lean on Berlin, and blackmail the West into abandoning its recovery plans.

The Allies reacted to a “Baby Blockade”, imposed on April 1, 1948 by merging the Western Zones, and introducing a new currency. Stalin escalated the crisis with what he believed was his trump card. He closed-off all land access to Berlin, based on the correct assumption that he was not risking a war with the West.\(^{28}\) This does not disqualify the Blockade as a major crisis. He miscalculated the effect of his preventive move which consolidated the Western camp around the US. Avoiding further escalation, the Allies used the air corridors over which Stalin had no control and circumvented his move. Their airlift was of such magnitude that it would make all other airlifts history.\(^{29}\) The blockade accelerated what it had precisely aimed at preventing: the foundation of a separate West German state, and the creation of a Western military Alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO owe much to their common architect.

2.1. 2. Nikita Khrushchev

Stalin’s obsession with Germany’s remilitarization left his successors a legacy of diplomatic failures that had backfired and weakened the Soviet Union’s position within the entire Socialist camp.\(^{30}\) In notes sent to Bonn, Paris, London and Washington (10-27 November
Khrushchev attempted to pick up where Stalin had left off, and tilt the balance of powers again in favor of the Soviet Union. He denounced the Potsdam Agreements, alleging their violation by the West, and demanded then to end their “illegal” occupation of West Berlin. The latter was to be demilitarized into a “free city” to become the capital of the GDR. All ties between West Germany and Berlin were to be severed within six months, failing which Moscow would sign a separate “peace treaty” to settle the German question once and for all. The Soviet rights of occupation would be transferred unilaterally to the GDR who would control all transit routes to Berlin. In January 1959, Moscow’s settlement for Berlin, was a peace treaty between the four occupying powers and the two Germany. “The aim of Khrushchev’s demands[…] was to deprive the city of its military protection and directly destroy the foundations of its security.”

Khrushchev had a whole catalogue of attributes for Berlin. It was a bone in his throat, a cancer to be carved out or a rotten tooth that had to be extracted. Such graphic translations of his growing exasperation did not hide the fact that Berlin was for Moscow an effective weapon of political blackmail. Khrushchev played on the divided city’s unenviable position as the Achilles heel of the West and justly said that he only had to squeeze it to make the West squeal, as Berliners and Western leaders experienced. He also used it to strengthen his position in the Communist bloc and to destabilize the alliance between the free world and West Germany.

The Berlin crisis reflected all along, and until the early seventies, a classic attempt to achieve political gain by exploiting the fear of nuclear war. Krushchev used it profusely to achieve political gain, by shifting the onus of leading to a perilous confrontation onto the allies, since they refused his compromise offer of a “peace treaty”.

His ultimatums were dictated by several factors. Foreign policy imperatives were at play with Bonn’s refusal to recognize East Germany as an independent state. Potential West German nuclear capabilities posed a serious security problem, regarded as threatening the survival of the
USSR, as West Berlin advanced the frontline of American defense by 100 miles. Declassified
documents allow us to sharpen this analysis. Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok base
Krushchev’s ultimatums on a need to differentiate himself from the domestic opponents he had
managed to eliminate within the Politburo. ³³ He needed to ascertain his position at home by
gaining international recognition, and had to find a way to counter the increasing power and
military posturing West Germany was acquiring within NATO. Washington’s plan to nuclearize
Germany aroused fears behind the Oder-Neisse line that the FRG would force reunification and
reclaim the territories annexed by Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1945 ³⁴. It prompted Krushchev
to use Berlin as a lever to bring the West to cooperate by keeping Germany in check. ³⁵ The wall
was a compromise. It had no direct impact on the potential threat of Germany’s access to
nuclear power. It answered however immediate domestic concerns. Krutshchev abandoned
hopes of capturing Berlin. He opted for the lesser of two evils and sealed off the Communist
bloc to prevent capitalist contamination from further precipitating the GDR’s collapse.

Krushchev avoided the potentially dangerous option to alienate his rights in Berlin into
the hands of an unreliable underling, far more risk prone than himself. Walter Ulbricht’s heavy
handed policies were a liability, creating a serious risk of war. Russia’s weak eastern flank was
also a pressing issue, in the rivalry with China. The Soviet “ruble diplomacy” attracted a new
clientèle in Africa and Asia, eager for Moscow’s financial help and support against colonialism.
All these strains on its budget, added to the already hefty East-German burden.

2. 1. 3. Walter Ulbricht.

We understand better today, thanks to East German sources, the timing of Walter
Ulbricht’s success with Krushchev. The move in his favor was dictated by reasons primarily
based on internal policy issues. He had to be stopped from upsetting Communist Party strategy,
undermining Krushchev’s authority, both in the Soviet Union and within in the Warsaw Pact.
Minutes of a meeting between Polish president Gomulka and Khrushchev on 10 November 1958, reveal that Poland had offered a plan to establish a nuclear free zone in central Europe, covering East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Gomulka was most disappointed that recognition of the GDR by the West had a higher priority in Soviet foreign and domestic policy than the regional disarmament Poland was counting on, to increase its own maneuvering room, at a time when it was developing substantial ties with the West.  

During his long presidency, Walter Ulbricht pursued no more distinctive a strategy than his eastern bloc counterparts, but Berlin’s situation gave him a specific leverage on Moscow, making him “Primus inter pares”. Although Stalin profoundly despised Ulbricht, he used him and led him to believe that he was ready to sacrifice two and a half million people, to assist him in a Communist take-over of Berlin. In reality, Stalin was after a much bigger pray, entire Germany, and although he was blackmailing the Allies, he was not going to kill his precious hostages just to satisfy Ulbricht’s ambitions. In the end however, Stalin had to give in and allow the formation of a separate East German State. Much to his dismay, Ulbricht never got what he wanted under Stalin. “Newly accessible documents from the former Communist bloc indicate specifically that Walter Ulbricht’s influence on Soviet Deutschlandpolitik grew significantly in the time between Stalin’s death and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and in fact was absolutely crucial in leading up to the building of the wall. […] The tail wagged the dog far more than the west realized”.  

East Germans did not see Berlin as a leverage instrument, ready to be pressured to serve higher purposes, they saw it as a permanent reminder - and principal cause - of their inability to succeed economically and as the escape gate for the country’s most valuable labor force. Western analysts mostly viewed Pankow as Moscow’s puppet, they never fully encompassed the
extent of Ulbricht’s hold on Stalin’s successor and his decisive influence over what John Gaddis called “the longest and one of the most dangerous of all Cold War crises” 38.

Ulbricht succeeded in persuading Krushchev to solve the problem of the East German economy that was bleeding to death from Berlin’s open gates, before, and independently from, the broader German peace settlement thereby unwittingly assisting the West in defeating precisely what Khrushchev was aiming to achieve. “The Wall, although proposed by Ulbricht, ended up being Moscow’s compromise solution for preserving East Germany without provoking the West, […] Previous understanding of the Berlin crisis as a US-Soviet crisis, guided mainly by Khrushchev on the Soviet side is very incomplete. Without understanding Ulbricht’s behavior during the crisis and the role of East German-Soviet relations, previous analyses of the crisis have missed the key dynamic operating on the Soviet side. […] Many scholars of international relations have assumed that to understand great power crisis in the Cold War, one need only examine the great powers themselves.” 39

2.2. THE WESTERN ACTORS

Three successive US Presidents managed the most acute moments of the Berlin Crisis, where European leaders also played a non negligible part. Konrad Adenauer and Charles De Gaulle bear a substantial share of responsibility in the continuation of the Berlin crisis, after the construction of the wall, and even beyond the Caribbean confrontation, the 1972 Agreements.

2.2.1. Harry Truman

American foreign policy was based on two main commitments, to prevent further spreading of communism and to avoid the breaking-out of World War III. All successive US administrations have pursued these objectives, albeit not always with equal means. Roosevelt’s
complacency with Stalin, would probably have allowed the Blockade to succeed. Fortunately for Western Europe, Stalin grossly underestimated Truman’s leadership qualities because, back in Potsdam, he had easily extracted from him concessions on Poland, and on the reparation scheme from Germany. After less than a year in office, however, Truman had translated the basic divide between the two blocs in his “Containment Doctrine”, reflecting the famous Long Telegram, sent by George Kennan from Moscow, on 22 February 1946, and published ‘under X’ in *Foreign Affairs*, that year. “The main element of any United States Policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies, [...] designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world”. Incompatible “ways of life” opposed East and West, freedom and democracy against tyranny and dictatorship and Berlin represented the point of encroachment par excellence.

Much of the US public was still considering the Russians as wartime allies who had resisted and defeated the Nazis. Truman had great difficulties convincing Congress, and most of the country, that he was not betraying Roosevelt’s legacy by advocating a much stiffer attitude. In his memoirs, Dean Acheson recognized that he had to over-denigrate the Soviets intentionally, to force approval for the president’s policies. “The Truman administration was, indeed, so hard-pressed to find congressional and public support for its major containment policies that it found it necessary to exaggerate the Soviet threat.”\(^{40}\) This confession minimizes neither the seriousness of the crisis over Berlin, nor the acute danger of the Soviet threat.

Although Truman is today recognized, on both sides of the Atlantic, as the great president of the cold War for the fortitude and foresight of his “hidden hand presidency”, he was also accused of having triggered the wave of anti-Communist hysteria that tarnished the history of post WWII America. For his European allies, however, he had sped up the recovery process
of Germany, endorsed the Marshall plan and saved Berlin from a take over by the Kremlin. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, it is interesting to reflect on the prophetic element contained in George Kennan’s telegram. “The possibility remains that Soviet power bears within it the seed of its own decay.” 41 Hope, or the abandonment of it, has always been a most powerful driving force behind historical events. It may have then significantly impacted the Truman Containment doctrine and its resistance spirit.

2. 2. 2. General Dwight Eisenhower

Berlin “had been constantly monitored as a crisis since the early fifties. As Ike put it in retrospect, ‘I had lived with this problem intermittently for the past thirteen years’”. 42 The risk of a thermonuclear war increased as Soviet nuclear capacity developed. American policy-makers were no more willing to go to war over Berlin but tensions did not decrease in this hotbed of crises. American ground forces stationed in Europe were a sign of commitment, a trip wire, but they were locked in a hostage situation. They could not be evacuated without engaging the US in the defense of Europe, and “the Eisenhower administration never intended to use these forces to fight a conventional war”. 43 Commenting on the 1958-1959 crisis, Eisenhower justified his strategic choice: “If resort to arms should become necessary, our troops in Berlin would be quickly overrun, and the conflict would almost inevitably be global war. For this type of war our nuclear forces were more than inadequate”. 44 His decision to station intermediate range missiles and deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Germany, triggered Krushchev’s successive “ultimata”.

The division of Europe had not yet become a fait accompli and each side used the threat of resorting to the ultimate weapon in order to maneuver the opponent. Eisenhower was not convinced that partition had “saved western values from Communist destruction” and he often dwelled on this regret that EAC had not opted for a joint and unified command of Berlin. 45
Nevertheless, “Soon after taking office, [his] administration adopted two key decisions on Berlin and the German question that were to have far-reaching consequences in the 1950s and 1960s. First, Eisenhower reaffirmed the U.S. security commitment to West Berlin, a commitment that entailed at least some risk of general war. Second, the administration prepared to use West Berlin in a broader political strategy aimed at weakening and eventually undermining Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The implications of these early decisions did not become fully evident until 1958, when the administration was confronted by a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin”

Despite calls for the liberalization of Eastern Europe, and for “Massive Retaliation’, of questionable relevance, non-intervention was applied in issues considered domestic, or intra Warsaw Pact, such as the 1953 uprising in East Berlin or the 1956 Hungarian revolution. After each event, the exodus hit record numbers in Berlin and to strengthen the solidarity between Warsaw Pact countries, Krushchev boasted that he was well on the path of military supremacy, with intercontinental missiles. The falsity of this claim would be made public by US intelligence a few weeks before the Wall came up. Although Eisenhower carried on Truman’s main objectives, the commitment and efforts deployed to safeguard Berlin’s freedom were not repeated when Moscow tested Western resolve again. On 27 November 1958, Soviet notes accused the three Occupying Powers of having violated the occupation agreements consequently making them void. They had six months to recognize East Germany, and abandon the claim that only the FRG represented the German people in international affairs. If not, Moscow would unilaterally transfer all its occupation rights to Pankow.

Washington called on its Allies to support a tough stand but no one was inclined to push for military action. “The British were unwilling to take that sort of commitment, the French were also quite cautious.” Eisenhower viewed the transfer to Germany of limited nuclear power as
a logical consequence of a progressive US disengagement from Europe, and a correlative strengthening of European Allies. Contrary to Foster Dulles, who considered Soviet fears of German nuclear capability as legitimate, Eisenhower saw no cause for alarm. In December 1958, nuclear warheads were introduced into Germany, as a signal of resolve but no real military build up translated a strengthening of the Allies’ posturing.

During the Eisenhower period, Soviet threats were answered by a willingness to negotiate, but with the understanding that the West refused to discuss under the threat of a deadline. The May 27 deadline was not officially lifted but not enforced either, it was rather conveniently pushed to the back burner, pending summit meetings and diplomatic exchanges. The US were not ready to push for a settlement, neither was Krushchev, in spite of much feather ruffling. The harassment in the Berlin air corridors was kept at its usual -hence bearable- level and response to tightening controls was low-key. Each side wanted the other to bear the onus of escalation and exercised restraint to avoid a serious incident.

Washington and the other western capitals maintained a course of negotiations that resulted in a stalemate but they managed to defuse Krushchev’s successive blackmails, and deadlines kept being postponed. A marathon conference in Geneva (May-August 1959) and talks at Camp David in September achieved no progress. In May 1960, a Paris meeting collapsed and for the rest of his mandate, President Eisenhower held his ground. The U2 incident froze the negotiation process, and Krushchev decided to take his chances with the next US president, to finally “resolve” the Berlin issue. Did the KGB’s feelers indicate he would be a Democrat?

2. 2. 3. John F. Kennedy

If the principle of territorial division had saved West Berlin and favored the West during the two previous administrations, it would now allow Krushchev to close off the Soviet sector
hermetically, during the office of America’s youngest president. John Kennedy set himself apart from his predecessor, in his inaugural address. “A torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace”. Freshly arrived from their ivy-league campuses, the youngest members of Kennedy’s entourage did not analyze the Cold War in terms of defense strategy, but rather as an ideological debate, where the capacity to strike is left to words, and actual responsibility rarely transcends the level of rhetoric. Kennedy’s aphorism, “Never negotiate out of fear but never fear to negotiate” showed at first more bravado than substance. The new administration seemed no match for the Soviets’ strong arm policy and Krushchev intended to play on it. Talks of easing tensions and stabilizing the status quo in Eastern Europe had the underlying assumption that if the US would retreat on the German nuclear question, - a sign of weakness the Soviets would be quick to exploit – they would commit to remain in Europe indefinitely. On the whole, however, Kennedy based his policy on the same central theme as his predecessors, “to support the independence of nations, so that one bloc cannot gain sufficient power to finally overcome us”.

Kennedy’s policy on Berlin sustained an evolution that can be chronologically divided in three phases. During the first one, from his inauguration to the immediate pre-wall period, (20 January - 25 July 1961), Kennedy could not give in to Krushchev’s demands without shattering his world credibility, but within five months he modified his position. Both sides held mutually incompatible stances which brought them closer than ever before to the brink of nuclear war. Krushchev had made the first overtures for a fresh start, as soon as the elections results were known and he offered to discuss preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Formal recognition of East Germany was no longer a priority issue, and a flexible approach to the free city status was even considered. In February 1961, however, Krushchev sent
a memorandum to Adenauer, renewing his threat of signing a separate peace treaty with Pankow. President Kennedy reassured the German Foreign minister Heinrich von Bretano, that the West would not tolerate any infringement of Western rights in Berlin. Three points were not negotiable: the right to self determination of the citizens of West Berlin, the presence of Allied troops there and free access. Other rights, such as the modalities of access to the Soviet sector, which was so crucial to East Germany’s survival, were open for discussion.

From its moles at various levels of government, the Kremlin knew that the US and their British allies were not ready to risk world security over Berlin. Fears had arisen in France and Germany that the new administration would choose not to act, if Khrushchev decided to move on Berlin. Procrastination on Berlin, added to a number of unrelated but unfortunate incidents, such as the U2 spying mission or the handling of the Laos crisis, reinforced this conviction. Coupled with other signals from within the Soviet zone, the flow of refugees in Berlin increased to numbers never attained since the 1953 and 1956 uprisings (See table 1). Kennedy had gone to the first US/USSR summit in Vienna on 3/4 June 1961, via Paris where De Gaulle urged him to reaffirm a strong joint determination to defend Berlin. However, once he faced the Soviet leader’s explicit threats of war over the issue of Germany, the US president decided to settle for a “standstill in the Cold war”. The fist Bay of Pigs fiasco contributed to undermine a more staunch resistance to Soviet demands. Kennedy showed then a strong sign of willingness to compromise. In a televised interview, on 21 July 1961, he forewarned that a frontier would run through Berlin, and that the US commitment would be limited to the Western side of the city. Three weeks later the wall came up, and the issue of a peace treaty, no longer a pressing matter, never surfaced again.

A second phase started with the wall, and lasted until the resolution of the Cuban missile Crisis (August 61-October 62). It was punctuated by two crisis peaks in October 1961 with the
US/Soviet tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie, and in February and March 1962, when Soviet harassment in the air corridors rose high above the usual level. The West’s passive reaction provoked a confidence crisis in West Berlin, which Kennedy tried to defuse by going to Berlin and sending Lyndon Johnson and Lucius Clay, in a show of support to Berliners. Krushchev had not withdrawn his ultimatum, he still wanted to weaken Washington’s position to negotiate on Berlin and the German issue, even when the West had backed down after the tank incident and no longer tried to enforce its legal right to enter East Berlin unrestricted. (See Appendix 5 for details of the Checkpoint Charlie showdown). Negotiations between Dean Rusk and Gromyko seemed for a while to be nearing a settlement of the Berlin question and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, but De Gaulle and Adenauer chose this moment to make an unsuccessful attempt at free-riding, entering into an alliance that cooled US-Soviet relations. It undermined the negotiations between Bonn and Washington, a process that would culminate in the Cuban crisis a few months later and is addressed in the next section.

The third phase begun in the Caribbean and the two opponents became convinced that they had to reach some agreement over Berlin. The issue might not have been solved peacefully, had it occurred in Central Europe instead of close to US territory. The Cuban Crisis provoked a salutary fear that brought Bonn to soften its negative view of détente. Realizing that no agreement could be reached on Berlin, as it touched upon the three vital interests that were not negotiable, Kennedy focused instead on a field where less vital interests were at stake. The result of this policy change was the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed in August 63. “Strikingly, the LTBT also served as a hidden Berlin agreement because all Soviet demands concerning Berlin and Germany were met at least partly. The recognition of the GDR was enhanced because East Germany was admitted to sign the treaty, and the FRG was prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons because the Americans were able to convince Adenauer to join the treaty as well. In
return, Krushchev assured that Moscow would both recognize the three vital American interests and no longer put pressure on West Berlin. In conclusion, Kennedy’s Berlin policy resulted in a general stabilization of the political situation in Central Europe. Consequently the risk of war drastically decreased.”

Krushchev finally decided against delegating to Ulbricht the control over the access to West Berlin. It would have been too risky, as it would have allowed East-Germany “to exercise inordinate influence over the course of events”. The wall was an acceptable solution for the two major leaders, and in this bipolar structure, their respective allies had to accommodate themselves, albeit most reluctantly, to the situation thus imposed

2. 2. 4. Charles De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer

As East Germany was moving closer to collapse, Ulbricht’s strength had grown out of his very weaknesses, a paradox that also characterized the position of Western powers in Berlin. As already seen in the previous sections, the role of Moscow’s East European allies and their influence on strategic choices was often underestimated. The language barrier, and the additional hurdle of obtaining information from within the closed system of the Communist bloc, are however arguments that no longer hold to analyze the contribution of the United States’ allies in US policy-making on Berlin and cannot justify why they too attracted little attention in American political science literature. The Cold War International History Project brings to light how international relations analysts, such as Kenneth Waltz, have wrongly assumed that to understand great power crises the latter themselves need only be analyzed, and how they neglected to study the impact their respective allies had on US-Soviet relations.

West Germany’s leaders, or Berlin mayors, Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt were key players during the Berlin Crisis. Germany’s push for nuclear capability constituted the major
threat that triggered Moscow’s strategy on Berlin but it should not be ‘decoupled’ from the more general nuclear issue between NATO members.

A common language contributes to a natural inclination for English speaking Cold War analysts to cover more readily Great-Britain’s role in the quadripartite occupation of Germany. Emblematic figures such as K. Adenauer, H. von Brentano, J. Strauss or General De Gaulle should not be discounted, however. Their action, when analyzed merely within the Alliance structure, limits the study to a military focus, when much wider domestic and international political goals were at stake, that directly impacted the Berlin Crisis. Adenauer and De Gaulle shared a strong commitment to Berlin, based on the legality of its post-war status, but also as a major pillar in their own reconciliation efforts. They sent to Moscow unequivocal signals that were key factors in the unraveling of events.

Between 1958 and 1962, if Washington or London felt that Berlin was not worth the blood of their boys, German and French leaders not only reaffirmed repeatedly that they would never allow Russians to advance any further in their direction, they also acted upon their declarations. Khrushchev had to find another solution when he realized that, in spite of decades of hefty financial support by the Kremlin, the Parti Communiste Français had consistently failed to come to power. De Gaulle sided with Adenauer in an inflexible refusal to recognize Pankow and reaffirmed support of Bonn over the Berlin issue, ready to back it up with its “force de frappe”. The West guaranteed Berlin's status, and failure to honor this guarantee would result in a major decisive victory for the Soviet Union. The credibility of Western powers in the world was linked to their position on Berlin and a Soviet victory would dramatically alter the balance of power and destroy the world’s political and strategic equilibrium.

Washington called the shots, but its European allies were part of, and substantially contributed to, the definition of a US strategy on Berlin. After the construction of the Berlin
Wall, however, France and West Germany interpreted Washington’s lack of response as a sign of possible abandonment and, at the instigation of France, the Adenauer administration tried to torpedo the ongoing US/SU negotiations on the German question. They pushed the issue of reunification by signing a separate agreement with De Gaulle on nuclear strategic assistance.\textsuperscript{56}

At a Bermuda summit in December 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan summarized for President Kennedy the absurdity of West Germany’s position: “East Germany exists. It is nonsense for the West Germans to talk as though it doesn’t exist when they are conducting trade with East Germany to the tune of 300 million pounds a year.”\textsuperscript{57} Because of the ease with which Kennedy had accepted the wall, Adenauer had feared that, in his desire for détente with the USSR, he would not hesitate to sacrifice West Germany’s interests. A generation conflict worsened the looming confidence crisis between the two leaders. It really broke out in the spring of 1962, when the US wanted to advance further discussions on Berlin with the Kremlin in the midst of a much aggravated Soviet harassment in the air corridors and at the checkpoints. De Gaulle played on the growing estrangement between the two administrations to get Germany to loosen its ties within NATO. Indiscretions about a Franco-German treaty on strategic matters were wrongly presented as making Germany the direct beneficiary of France’s nuclear force de frappe. George Ball recalls in his memoirs the shock felt in Washington but explains how it turned out to be “merely the final act in a love affair between two old men, de Gaulle and Adenauer”.\textsuperscript{58} Within this rather volatile context, the Cuban missile crisis broke out at a time when dissention with Germany weakened Washington’s bargaining position with Moscow on the Berlin issue. It provides added confirmation, if need be, of the link between the Berlin Crisis and Moscow’s installation of launching pads in Cuba.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{3. BERLIN AND THE THEORY OF CRISIS}
According to Carl von Clausevitz, wars are characterized by “fog and friction”, and by the necessity for political oversight, elements that are present also in Cold War crises. They represent the closest both superpowers ever came to actual war. This chapter will base its analysis on the Snyder-Diesing model to analyze what these authors have called the “anatomy” of a crisis. If linearity is the clue to predictability, the non-linearity of crisis curves confirms at first glance Thomas Schelling’s affirmation that “the essence of crisis is unpredictability”. “The doctrine of crisis management exemplifies George and Smoke’s dictum that policy oriented theories in international relations tend to consist of ‘free floating generalizations and isolated insights’ ”. Some authors will prefer to talk about crisis diplomacy, instead of management, historians emphasize individual decision-makers or the detail of contextual events, social scientists dissect the decision-making process and debate on the relative merits of rational choice, cognitive distortion or game theory. However, considering the diversity of contending approaches which characterizes the field of International Relations, the academic literature has developed a fairly homogeneous doctrine of the complex crisis phenomenon.

In crisis management, the fundamental requirement for key players in response to political and psychological pressures, is a high degree of adaptability. Theoretical issues should reflect the same flexibility. The perception of both the actors involved in a crisis, and the analysts, who decide which events constitute or not a crisis, is at the heart of any attempt to define the concept. If a crisis is in the eye of the beholder, even within a rather consensual doctrine, a study of the concept is bound to leave some room for discussion and controversy.

Various definitions identify the most commonly accepted constitutive elements and contribute to a better understanding of all the parameters included in a crisis situation. The concept is however too multi-dimensional to be easily covered by a check-list. Definitions and criteria will help us to test and identify the events that punctuated the city’s history during the
decades of “The Berlin Crisis”. During the Cold War, however, “the delicate balance of terror” identified by Schelling has blurred the contours of the criteria applicable to crises. If traditional rules of statecraft applied, prescriptions are “as useful as general advice to Emergency Room personnel: keep calm, have equipment ready, make no premature diagnoses.” 63

3. 1. THE “ANATOMY” OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

3. 1. 1. Definition of the concept

Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing provide the following definition, generally accepted by students of Cold War crises. “An international crisis is a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war”. 64 Several other criteria, as the element of surprise and the finite aspect of the time factor have been added to refine the analysis. “A new study defines crisis as a perception by the highest level decision-makers ‘of a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities ‘. 65 According to this view, surprise is not a necessary component of crisis, and the time span involved is limited only very loosely (months or even years). All that is required for a potentially explosive situation to be regarded as a crisis, is a ‘heightened’ perception of the possibility of an armed clash which may itself fall well short of war in any sense of the term”. 66

Crises are eminently context-dependent and their psychological and behavioral content makes it all the more delicate to measure the potential risk of war during the escalation phase. “While it would be too far to say that crises exist only in the eyes of the beholder, crisis are constituted by the perception of political leaders.” 67 Snyder and Diesing have stressed the difficulty to find a one-size-fits-all definition. “A crisis is a sort of hybrid condition, neither
peace nor war, but containing elements of both and comprising the potential for transformation from peace to war, [...] a blend of coercion and accommodation”.68 This “foggy” zone has a strong emotional and psychological content, where behaviors reflect the constant need to navigate through unexpected events, and fortitude matters more than military strength.

To be comprehensive, a study of the crisis concept must encompass a behavioral and psychological approach and evaluate the highly subjective perceptions of all the key-players involved. Individual constraints and external factors exacerbate the level of leaders’ tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. These elements are considered here as a given and, if they are complementary, they go beyond the scope of this study, which will limit itself to the operational criteria, identifying the various constitutive elements of the “anatomy” of the Berlin crisis.

3. 1. 2. The Berlin Crisis Curve.

The Snyder and Diesing model of crisis curve depicts how crises occur, the intensity and acuity of a crisis situation. Transposed on such a curve, the reality of the Cold War history of Berlin appears more clearly than in words. The solid horizontal line represents the Ariadné thread and explains the underlying clash of interest represented a continuum from 1948 to 1989. The degree of intensity of the inherent tensions in the conflict situation, is translated in various peaks. Vertical lines identify a precise challenge (C1, C2, C3) as the immediate cause of a crisis, an act of severe coercion, attempted by one political entity against another. The resistance (R1, R2, R4) to these challenges precipitates the sub crises.

The challenge reacts to a precipitant which can be either external or internal, and is most frequently -and not surprisingly in view of the complex nature of crises- a blend of both. Precipitants come in two kinds. The general precipitant (P) is the underlying situation that has become intolerable but can have been lingering for some time, and the specific precipitant is a
more instantaneous event, akin to the “last straw”. For Snyder and Diesing, the precipitant acts as a chemical agent and the reaction it causes induces a crisis. “In short, our “precipitant” does not mean “cause” in any complete sense, but only in a partial proximate sense: those developments that finally caused a developing conflict to boil over into crisis”. The terms chosen voluntarily “skirt the subjective and emotion-laden issue of who is the “aggressor” or who is “to blame” for starting a crisis. They simply denote the sequence of acts that create the actor’s perception that the likelihood of war has risen dangerously high.”

Stalin and Krushchev’s challenges were motivated by internal and external precipitants. Ulbricht’s demand was the internal precipitant of the Blockade and the Western decision to walk Germany through a speedy economic recovery was the external one. Ten years later if the challenge took a different form, the precipitants had not really changed, and continuity in the nature of the precipitant links all the successive peaks on the crisis curve. “Krushchev’s challenge was motivated by factors internal to the Communist bloc: the weakness of the East German government and the perception by the Soviet leadership that getting the Western powers out of West Berlin and/or gaining the formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic would both strengthen East Germany and give the Soviet Union a great diplomatic triumph. However, there was also a degree of external precipitation in the anti-Communist propaganda, espionage, and subversive activity that the Soviets perceived to be emanating from West Berlin, and perhaps also in the rearmament of West Germany and the US deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on West German territory”.

If the victim of a challenge gives in there is no crisis. A crisis curve must include the resistance met by the challenge, or at the very least the expected resistance. Resistance contains the concept of deterrence with implies threats to fight if the challenger executes his own threat. The clash between a challenge, and the resistance moves to counter, it pushes the crisis line over
the threshold. When the resistance line intersects with the crisis curve, the tension rises pushing it over the threshold. The confrontation phase begins, it is the eye of the cyclone, the duration of which is immaterial, usually from a few days to months. The Berlin Crisis represents an extreme case, in this respect, but here the various peaks constitute sub-crises of different durations.

The confrontation phase presents periods of acute tension which correspond to individual events, each centering on a specific precipitant, an issue bringing the crisis on the brink of disaster. “At these peaks, the likelihood of war appears to rise, and the feelings of anxiety associated with tension become more intense.” 72 In Cold War crises, the outcome was never war. The resolution phase either constitutes a capitulation of one side as in the Berlin Blockade or a compromise, as the decision to give in to Ulbricht and let him build the “Concrete Rose”. 73 Or still the quid pro quo which ended the Cuban missile crisis.

From 1963 to 1972, the crisis curve runs above the horizontal threshold because the situation of Berlin remains precarious. It can fall slightly below, with the Nixon-Brezhnev agreements of 1972, after the Berlin Settlement was signed which all but eliminated the sword of Damocles hanging over the city. Since the underlying conflict of interest was not actually resolved by a mere accommodation -or détente- between the superpowers until 1989, and fear of Germany remained a constant issue, the curve runs below the threshold, but at a lower level. Stanley Hoffmann compares the after-effects of crises to “rocks thrown in a pond: the stones disappear, but the reverberations ruffle the waters all around”. 74 Berlin remained on the frontline, and eventually ceased to feel the “ruffles in the pond” after the wall went down.

The institutionalized division of Germany was a guaranty of stability for Moscow in its sphere of influence. The partition of Berlin guaranteed East German stability, itself detrimental to the Soviet regime’s position among its satellites. The consequences of its collapse
demonstrate the strength of this link but also confirm how crucial Berlin was in the balance of powers. The Soviet system could not survive the reunification of Germany, confirming the relevance of the fears that had motivated the strategy of the Kremlin leaders since 1945, and such fears perpetuated the crisis situation in Berlin during the entire Cold War era.

3. 2. OPERATIONAL CRITERIA

Berlin’s claim as the seat of the Cold War’s longest crisis can also be substantiated in analyzing several variables specifically applicable to international crises. A threat to highly regarded values or interests, the turning point between peace and war, the engagement of key decision-makers, and a situation where time is finite, are the factors most commonly identified in crises. The Cold War was a protracted situation, in which Soviet coercive diplomacy used Berlin as a strategic tool, waging a psychological and intelligence war, in a microcosm of international politics. These elements, not necessarily present in every crisis, still contribute to establish the contours of a workable definition to sustain our demonstration.

3. 1. 1. Crises involve a threat to vital interests.

Berlin was at the heart of an ideological conflict where each camp defended mutually incompatible values. This clash of values was only resolved in 1989 when the Communist bloc lost the Cold War without waging a single battle. Until then, the potential of crisis remained high and the threshold of the crisis curve remained constant, during the Cold War. Core interests and the survival of the regimes involved were at stake.

For Stalin and Krushchev, the revival of Germany’s power endangered the survival of the USSR. Berlin, or a part of it, could be sacrificed, to justify this higher end. By December 1947, the usual tactics employed by the Communists to impose their rule, from rigged ballot boxes, propaganda, threats and lies, to arrests, deportations or murders, had failed in the western part of
Berlin. The four power negotiations on the future of Germany were deadlocked, and the Western allies were going to expedite reforms, against Stalin’s will. Fearing that the Marshall Plan would allow Bonn to re-militarize, he wanted to go on plundering East Germany, until it fell into the arms of Communism. West German political autonomy and economic recovery threatened the vital interests of the USSR. “The Kremlin leader wanted to eliminate even the remote possibility of a threat to the Soviet Zone of security in Central Europe”.  

Stalin was ready to starve 2.5 million people. He already demonstrated in Ukraine and Poland that numbers were irrelevant, the plight of entire populations negligible. Except this time, he was not dealing with defenseless victims. Berlin became the seat of the most humiliating defeat of the proletarian revolution, which set out thirty years earlier, to save humanity from capitalist imperialism. In defense of their own highly valued interests, the Allies organized an airlift which went far beyond their expectations, to become a model of peacetime military and civil co-operation and averted the risk of war in a most successful crisis management.

Berlin played a particularly sensitive part in a more general strategy which had been, revealed in 1904, by Sir Halford Mackinder, who underlined the strategic importance, for the security of European countries, to ensure that the vast Eurasian stretch of land he called the “heartland” did not fall prey to a hostile power. Since then, it has been in the national interest of Western nations to prevent such a control of this pivot area. In opposing the take-over of Germany, the Soviets applied Mackinder’s theory, expressed as follows.

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland,

Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island Eurasia,

Who rules Eurasia commands the World. “

Beyond the clash of basic values, Berlin was thus the pivot, not only of Germany’s destiny but of the control over Eurasia. The Soviets applied this geopolitical concept to define
their national interest and strategy. Although Russia is no longer in a position to rule, it is still very much part of its current national strategic concept and forms the basis of its foreign policy.

Chairman Mao also captured the high stake Moscow and Washington had in Berlin. He told Soviet diplomat S. F. Antonov: “Americans fear that their exit from Berlin will lead to a decrease in their international authority, and that as a result from losing West Berlin they can lose everything else […] West Germany and Japan represent the greatest danger for the Communist bloc” 77.

Each further Soviet attempt to exercise pressure on East-West relationships in Berlin has set deeper in stone the war-time partition of Germany, which Stalin had deemed temporary, basing his judgement on US strong pre-war isolationism and protectionism. “The blockade and the airlift catalyzed an American-European military alliance, it was the successful defense of West Berlin that made the security interests of the United States and those of Western Europe effectively inseparable, at least while the Soviet Union remained powerful and hostile. […] Until the end of the Cold War, the US commitment to defend West Berlin would differ in no material way from the commitment to defend New York or Los Angeles” 78. Even if this last remark remains somewhat arguable, such was the wide consensus about Berlin’s strategic value, in the West. It must have had some resonance in the Kremlin, since, after Washington’s show of resolve during the Cuban missile crisis, “squeezes” on Berlin became increasingly weaker and more sporadic.

According to Ned Lebow, a threat to values includes an action that “seriously impairs […] the country’s bargaining reputation, or the [leader’s] ability to remain in power” 79. Both features appeared, after Kennedy failed to hold his ground in Vienna in June 1961. Perceiving a weakening in US resolve, Khrushchev tried with increasingly violent insistence, to force Western Allies to sign his “peace” treaty, that was to guarantee the neutrality of Germany. The
necessity to weaken Germany was not the sole motivation for his decision to push the peace treaty issue. We know now that his own political survival weighed substantially in his strategy. The construction of the wall was an unexpected development. It was forced upon Khrushchev, who operated a quid pro quo with Walter Ulbricht. He gave in to the East German’s plea to stop the hemorrhage that was bringing his country on the verge of bankruptcy, in order to preserve his own bargaining position, his personal leadership and credibility within the Eastern Bloc.

Whether the values at stake where freedom and democracy for the West, the security of the USSR or the political survival of its leader for the Kremlin, their protection was paramount in triggering the Berlin Crisis. Washington and Moscow have pursued until 1961 the same goal, albeit for diametrically opposed reasons, the reunification of Germany. As the crisis unfolded, they finally came to terms with the obligation to recognize the partition as a lesser evil.

All the key-players involved in the Berlin Crisis were, for various reasons, protecting highly valued national interests. The repeated attacks on the city of Berlin were constant reminders of the volatility and fragility of a situation, which in spite of Moscow’s strong arm policy, reflected its inability to impose its rule over the rest of Europe. Berlin was for all the parties involved a lever in the protection of their interests. In the Berlin Crisis, highly valued interests were continuously at stake. Beyond those defended by policy makers and political leaders on both sides, it also involved the survival and freedom of West Berliners and the occupying forces who only left the city in 1990.

3. 1. 2. Crises as turning points between peace and war

Ned Lebow excluded Khruchchev’s successive ultimatums between 1958 and 1961, and the construction of the Berlin Wall, from his study of twentieth century crises. “There is little evidence that war was perceived on either side as a very serious possibility” 80 Even with
extremely scarce information on the intent of the superpowers, such discrimination is puzzling. If this argument were validly applied, it should have ruled out all the Cold War crises and in particular the Berlin Blockade. It seems odd to deliberately overlook the well-known fact that “Stalin’s actions in 1947-1948 were based on the correct assumption that he was not risking a war with the West.” 81 By the 70s, no academic circle could ignore that Truman and Stalin never intended to start World War III, and that David Mac Lean had informed Stalin that the B-29s deployed in Britain were not operational and were merely a strong US signal of resolve. The nuclear monopoly of the US, even if Stalin had called Truman’s bluff about the B-29s, made war then neither closer nor more remote a possibility than ten years later. War always happens inadvertently, however, hence the omnipresent lingering fear.

The inner contradiction of R. Lebow’s crisis classification rests on the most specific feature of Cold War crises: the avoidance of war. With what “we know now”, it seems even more difficult to accept the dismissal of a three year long tension that culminated in a 16 hour US-Soviet tank confrontation in October 1961, and revived its acuity throughout the Cuban missile crisis. The perception of the risk of war was what brought out all the crises situations of the Cold War, underlying the bargaining options of the protagonists. Such a factor does not constitute a valid criterion of Cold War crisis. “In the two Berlin crises, there was extreme reluctance to go to war on both sides, even though the adversaries’ goals were incompatible and highly consequential. Nevertheless both were serious crises: there were major concerns over miscalculation, and some policy makers favored confrontational moves -claimed to be safer on the long run- which might in fact have heighten the dangers. Aversion to war does not in itself ensure that volatile situations will remain under policy maker’s control.” 82

Ned Lebow’s analysis neglects to address another fundamental aspect of the Cold War. The shadow of the nuclear threat, in which crises did not lead to war, and could only be
surrogates thereof. “More functional than dysfunctional, their systemic function is to resolve without violence, or with only minimal violence, those conflicts that are too severe to be settled by ordinary diplomacy and that in earlier times would have been settled by war” 83. Consequently, as decision-makers are in a situation of quasi-war, the knowledge-or ignorance-of bellicose intentions cannot constitute a valid differentiating variable.

The basis of Lebow’s restrictive analysis was already weak in the seventies. It holds even less against the post-Cold War better informed analysis and hindsight, on two accounts. It does not reflect the uncertainty about each side’s intentions, the “fog” surrounding their respective ordering of priorities, and it relies essentially on the potentiality of a risk of war in a situation of nuclear stalemate. Khrushchev knew of the dissentions between allies, the British were more inclined to abandon Berlin and Washington was not prepared either to go to war about it, while the French and the Germans insisted on a firm stand. But if he really knew Washington’s intentions, he would not have proceeded with such caution, and his bite would have been far more ferocious than his bark. He did not know what to expect from the Western powers, this was revealed in a document declassified by the former East German Foreign Affairs Ministry. 84 It indicates that Khrushchev would have been far more assertive and moved earlier on Berlin. He only repeated, for nearly three years, forceful, but idle, threats, waiting until East Germany was practically bankrupt. This document also reveals that he was not expecting such a lack of reaction from the West after the wall came up, which emboldened him to move on Cuba.

Could anyone have expressed the same assurance in Washington about Moscow’s intention not to escalate, when the US administration only found out a few weeks before the wall was built that the Soviet military strength had been grossly exaggerated? The period between 1958 and 1961 was indeed a crisis, a continuum of uncertainty, fog and friction. In this period of acute tension the turning point between war and peace may have come extremely close.
3.1. 3. Key decision-makers are parties to a crisis

The Clausewitzian definition of war definitely holds for Cold War crises, which are the continuation of politics by other means with a civilian lead over the military. It applies readily to the Berlin Crisis, as Marc Trachtenberg observed about Kennedy’s policy-making over Berlin. To avoid a thermonuclear holocaust, he felt it was absolutely necessary to keep in check, at the highest level, command and control over the nuclear apparel. “On basic political issues relating to Berlin, policy was set at the top. […] The president made it clear that he wanted to be deeply involved in war planning, especially on issues relating to the Berlin Crisis and general nuclear war. He and his civilian advisers felt that control of military operations –not at a very detailed level of course, but when major issues were involved- had to rest with the political authorities in Washington. They were thinking above all in terms of the Berlin Crisis, where the key decisions were political at their core, not least because they involved a judgement about how the political authorities on the other side would respond, and so could not be made on the basis of narrow military criteria”. 85

The role of national leaders has been detailed in the previous pages which already indicated that decision-making in crisis does not follow prescriptions, predefined patterns or regular channels. Strategies depend on the expectation of the adversaries’ actions or reactions. In this volatile context, successful leaders must exercise a balanced judgement between the arguments developed by “Doves“ and “Hawks”, to achieve their objectives, without provoking the adversary into unwanted escalation. Leaders will develop crisis bargaining codes to determine which strategy is best applicable to the situation and set-up ad hoc moves and reactions to circumvent a lack of coordination or rivalries between domestic agencies or bureaucracies. The literature on decision making during crisis covers all the facets of human
behavior and goes well beyond the purpose of this paper, which only deals with the concept of crisis itself and does not extend to the actual decision-making process during crises.

In a crisis, key-decisions are not necessarily made by heads of government or statesmen, they can also come from lesser ranking officials, as in the Berlin Airlift, for example. As in wartime, if strategic decision-making was in the hands of Truman, at top government level, daily tactical decisions during the airlift were taken at the theater of operations level, in Berlin and in Germany. According to all the eye-witness accounts, the success of the Airlift was due to the remarkable coordination of a Combined Airlift Task Force under Allied Command.

The decision to intensify the first “Baby- airlift” that responded to the “Baby-blockade” of March 1948, and to prepare for a protracted blockade, came from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Vandenberg. He went over the heads of Generals Le May and Clay and imposed the best specialist of airlift operations, General Tunner, to run the entire enterprise. 86 This single decision turned the tide around and allowed the Allies to eventually break the blockade, against Stalin’s prediction that the winter months would again intervene on Russia’s side as in the campaigns against Hitler and Napoleon. This time General Tunner defeated “General Winter” and the Airlift inflicted to Stalin one of his worst humiliations. (see opposite page, “Ramming the Blockade”, cartoon of 6 December 1948). Another example can be found in the 1961 tank confrontation detailed in Appendix 6 with General Lemay’s refusal to give in to East Germany’s attempts at asserting a new role.

Crises are geared towards the avoidance of escalation into military conflicts, and encompass specific strategies which are very “context-dependent”. Alexander George describes them as a “test of capabilities within very restrictive ground rules”. To illustrate this specific type of strategy, he refers to the Berlin Airlift in those terms: “In time, hard work, skill at improvisation, and use of increasingly larger resources eventually transformed the airlift into an
effective weapon for breaking the ground blockade. The defending power thus succeeded in reversing the expected outcome of the test of capabilities without having to escalate the conflict, thereby transferring back to its opponent the onerous decision whether to engage in a risky escalation or to accept defeat.” 87 The Berlin Airlift is the perfect example of a commitment move, transformed into a circumventing one, by the right strategic decision.

Building the wall was also one of these decisions which stopped a crisis just short of escalation to a higher test of resolve. Khrushchev successfully defused the crisis he had ignited almost three years earlier, without touching a hair of an Allied soldier, or firing a shot, except on Peter Freier, the poor devil who agonized for hours in Berlin’s “no man’s land”, between two rows of barbed wire. This decision avoided having to give in to Ulbricht’s demands to turn over to Pankow the entire administration of the Soviet Zone. Krushchev had been all along reluctant to perpetrate such a blatant violation of wartime rights because of the inherent danger to relinquish such rights into the hands of an unreliable partner. The Tanks bearing a bright red star on their flank, that faced US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, signaled to the world Ulbricht’s defeat. He had been allowed to build the wall, but only to stop the effect of his collapsing economy on all other Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets could not let him further compromise the stability of their sphere of influence. This move by the Soviets clearly amounts to successful crisis management, as it marks the beginning of a de-escalation phase for the 1961 sub-crisis. External events would ignite the crisis again a few months later, to culminate in the Caribbean Sea.

3. 1. 4. A crisis is characterized by an element of surprise.

“Some crises, particularly the rolling Berlin Crisis of the period of 1958-1961, were essentially exercises in public diplomacy or psychological warfare, in which surprise was not a factor, and were protracted to an extent that severely stretches the normal usage of the term”. 88
Cold War crises were of a particular kind. They broke out between actors who had developed a sophisticated system of intelligence gathering and a fair knowledge of each other’s decision-making culture. Elements of surprise resided in the sudden behaviors. If the information supply had been perfect, there would have been little danger involved and not many crises to speak of. Stalin’s Blockade was an abrupt decision, so was the wall, but the West had been in both case expecting some move on Berlin. Numerous signals had announced an impending crisis. The first traffic disturbances experienced by Allied troops in March 1948, a British fighter crashing after being buzzed by a Soviet fighter in April, the Soviets storming out of the Kommandatura on 19 June 1948. They unmistakably announced the eventual closing of access routes to Berlin, the next week, and were all clear signals punctuating an escalation phase

The signals adversaries send to one another are often read with asymmetrical clarity. This observation is closely related to the quality of intelligence gathering and processing that will be addressed more in detail below. Even if, during the Cold War, adversaries had many opportunities, after decades of confrontation and negotiations, conferences and summits, to develop a reasonably fair knowledge of one another, miscalculations and biased judgements still played an important part, even in the early sixties, leaving always room for surprise. Stalin’s miscalculations on the incapacity for Russian General Winter to defeat US General Tunner surprised even the Western allies themselves. When US spy planes discovered the silos being built on Cuba, it was another major surprise in the continuation of the Berlin crisis.

As mentioned also earlier, Khrushchev had been cautious to carry out a gradual policy of threats, to avoid unexpected complications. Surprise was always looming about but never reached startling levels in the city itself, throughout the Berlin Crisis. Some kind of advanced knowledge was generally based on a growing and reciprocal ability to read signals, to use intelligence reports. Elements of surprise however were reflected in the permanent state of crisis
experienced on a daily basis by West Berliners and more generally by all those who traveled
to and from Berlin. On many instances, such as in August 1960, for example, a year before the
wall, traffic restrictions and added travel controls were imposed, as usual without prior notice.
They reduced border crossings in both directions and suddenly the refugee flows greatly
diminished for a few days. This coincided with an expected, a *routine* surprise harassment.

The building of the Berlin Wall did not really come as a surprise either to most observers
who expected he iron curtain to close its unique “cat door”, the only uncertainty was when. The
Soviets were aware that international public opinion expected a move by East Germany, to stop
the fast growing number of refugees, flocking West Berlin’s Marienfeld camp, on a daily basis.
Senator Fulbright gave an ill-inspired interview to *The New York Times*: “I don’t understand why
the East-Germans don’t close their borders because I think that they have a right to do so”. 89 It
is then most *surprising* that eminent students of the Berlin crises, such as Eleanor Lansing Dulles
who lived in Berlin and had privileged access to information, could really claim having been
taken by surprise, on the morning of August 13, 1961. 90

The event did not surprise “BOB”, the CIA’s bureau in Berlin. Months before that
fateful date, “it was evident to BOB that it would have to move faster to prepare its agents in the
East for the inevitable closure of the sector borders”. 91 The refugees who had swarmed the
border crossings by the thousands the last weekend before the wall came up, had also read
unmistakable signals and were not in the least surprised when the Vopos rolled out the barbed
wire they had been stacking up for months. The daily number of refugees had quadrupled in the
last days. In a message relayed by all the Western radios several months before, Mayor Willy
Brandt had sent a vibrant appeal to the Allies warning them of the impending closing of Berlin’s
borders. For Khrushchev, the real element of surprise was the West’s lack of military response.
3. 1. 5. A crisis is a situation where time is finite.

In explaining why they had not factored time into their definition of crises, Snyder and Diesing cited Berlin in the 1958-1961 period and argued that urgency is inherent to the concept of danger but that the actual length of a crisis situation was irrelevant as a definition criterion. Urgency influences the decision-making process and responds to the pressure of events that occur during the unraveling of a crisis, irrespective of its duration. The permanence of the deep conflict of interests between East and West, which triggered conflict behaviors, was always latent in Berlin, making time constraints considerably more limited than in other crises.

Playing for time however is a decisive factor in a crisis situation. Forty-eight hours after Stalin cut all land and water access from the West to Berlin, and contrary to General Lucius Clay’s plan to counterattack on the Autobahn, Truman decided not to break the blockade by armed convoy, and to intensify the “Baby Airlift” instead. General Tunner recalled, “President Truman was convinced that ‘the Airlift would stretch out the stockpile of rations in Berlin and thus gain time for negotiations’. Even so, when pressure was put on him to pull Americans out of Berlin he said ‘we’re going to stay, period’.” Stalin was also playing for time, convinced the winter would discourage the rescue operation. No one could foresee that it would last for 311 days. No one can say that, because it lasted so long, it did not constitute a crisis. The Forty year long Berlin crisis clearly exemplifies the limits of the finite aspect of time in crises.

Khrushchev put a time frame on his ultimatums, but when they expired, he did not execute his threats to turn over the administration of the Soviet Zone to East Germany. He never signed a separate peace treaty with them either. In this crisis, the danger of escalation was omnipresent and imparted a sense of urgency, but it took Khrushchev three years to end it in a stalemate and he only obtained from Washington the acceptance of the wall as the recognition of the division of Germany. The wall allowed Khrushchev to back away and not execute his threats.
without loosing face. All his other demands were frozen in exchange for a status quo. Such immobility takes the measure of the irrelevance of time in this particular crisis.

3. 1. 6. A crisis is a microcosm of international politics.

A crisis distills all the elements that make up the essence of politics in the international system. This specific character is best encompassed when looking at the entire picture of the city’s history during the Cold War. Then only does Berlin really appear as all together the instrument and the accelerator of the most important decisions and events. The collapse of the wartime alliance that had defeated the Nazis, and the formation of a new balance of power, the economic recovery of Germany, the beginning of European construction, the birth of the FRG, and its integration into the Western bloc, German rearmament. No other city in the world was such a unique test-tube of strategies, reflecting the central components of high politics, during the Cold War’s four decades dominated by the superpower rivalry. As the Berlin crisis has demonstrated, it was the thermometer of East-West relations.

The four Occupying Powers only ceased to exercise specific responsibilities in Berlin with the destruction of the wall. Until that time, if to a lesser extent, and in a more symbolic way, Berlin still remained a concentrate of international politics. When it became again the capital of a reunited country, this continuous position on the international scene was actually confirmed.

The microcosmic aspect transcends the periods of acute tension and is reflected throughout the development of détente. It has been already argued that an unwritten “Berlin Settlement” underlined the 1963 LMTB treaty. The progressive normalization of what had been for Khrushchev “an abnormal situation” was formalized in September 1971 by the Four Powers’ Agreement on Berlin. It was achieved after ten years of intense negotiations and discussions, during which Soviet pressures on Berlin never ceased. The US theoretical literature on the
empirical analyses of Berlin crises overlooked the extent of the daily harassment the Soviets and East Germans continued to impose on land and air traffics to people visiting West Berlin or living there, between 1962 and 1969. In the air corridors, incidents were a constant fear for pilots, who were always expecting the unexpected, as GDR aircraft buzzed them, fired at them or made low flights over West Berlin. Visa and passport restrictions took the form of retarded clearance, vexations by constant controls and prolonged and repeated searches. On the Autobahn checkpoints, sudden disturbances and obstructions were frequent occurrences, red lights would stay on for hours, or days as the “tailgate crisis” of 1963. Berliners lived in a permanent fear of an abrupt cutting of the fragile link with the West that was their life-support system. They were constantly reminded of their fragile situation, entirely at the mercy of Moscow.

To avoid any further complication in and about West Berlin was at least as instrumental as the widest goal to promote peace and secure détente, in prompting President Nixon to initiate the Four-Power discussions, that resulted in the Berlin Settlement. “In 1971, the European post war order was eventually formalized when the USA, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain reached the Quadripartite Agreement about Berlin.” 95 Once again the capital city of Germany had become the touchstone of the whole policy of détente. The wording of the Settlement reveals the reality of the daily tensions and complications still punctuating East-West relations in Berlin.

“Art. 1. The four Governments will strive to promote the elimination of tensions and the prevention of complications in the relevant area.

Art. 2. The four Governments, taking into account their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, agree that there shall be no use or threat of force in the area and that disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means. […]

Art. 4. The four Governments agree that the situation […] shall not be changed unilaterally.”
Further provisions guaranteed land access through the GDR but reaffirmed that West Berlin was not part of the Federal Republic of Germany. Visa conditions for visits from West Berliner to their relatives and friends were relaxed. The conjunction of these elements confirms that, during the entire Cold War era, any tension in East-West relations, any disagreement between Moscow and Washington, sent a scare wave through West Berlin. Berliners were living under a live volcano but knew they were also part of a larger project, which would eventually end up with unification.

As a microcosm of international politics for all these years, Berlin represents a strong argument to sustain the claim of this paper. It is further confirmed by the additional argument developed by many students of the Cold war, mostly since the early nineties, that “the great climax of the confrontation over Berlin” is a key to the understanding of the Cuban missile crisis. The Wall was only the first fait accompli and unless the West initiated negotiations to solve the more general question of West Germany’s nuclearization, the worst was still to come. This analysis was criticized by De Gaulle and by hawks in Washington (Dean Acheson and Lucius Clay) as a show of weakness that would exacerbate the boldness of Moscow. Peace would be better served by adopting a firm stand, even at the cost of a showdown on Berlin, making the potential crisis situation always acute..

When U.S.-Soviet talks had dragged on in the first months of 1962, in spite of Kennedy’s appeals to Krushchev to “put the Berlin question on ice”, Soviet intransigence on Berlin had risen in direct proportion to the increasingly accommodating mood of the West on the German nuclear issue. As hard-liners had predicted, after the lack of response in August 1961, Moscow pushed its luck with a coup de force, but not in Berlin, in Cuba. In any case, this developing conflict over Berlin provided the fundamental context for the Cuban crisis.
At a National Security Council Meeting on 22 October 1962, Kennedy stressed the link between Berlin and Cuba. ‘Gromyko had left the impression that the Soviets were going to act in Berlin in the next few months. Therefore, if they acted now in response to our blockade action, we would only have brought on their Berlin squeeze earlier than expected’. 98

The different variables we have examined militate decisively in favor of a monolithic assessment of Berlin’s postwar history as the longest crisis of the Cold War. Berlin can claim this title, it was a privileged locus and instrument of Cold War crisis management. To live on the front-line of the battle of the Titans was a continuous contribution, paving the road leading to 1989. It also conferred to the Berlin crisis the dual aspect in the Chinese ideogram of crisis, which depicts the two concepts of danger and opportunity, as the next section will illustrate.

3. 1. 7. A crisis is a conjunction of danger and opportunity.

The Chinese ideogram for crisis translates both danger and opportunity. Successful crises not only catalyze the immediate danger of escalation to war, they can also induce positive changes in a relationship that was pushed to the brink of a war only a short while ago, and produce benefits for one or both parties involved. We have already examined the dangerous and threatening aspects of in the Berlin Crisis, it also has another aspect. The airlift, for instance, punctured the US treasury, costing 252.5 billion dollars, when its defense budget was 15 billion. 99 It took 80 lives (10 of them German civilians) and cost much suffering to the people of Berlin, but its positive outcome made it worth every penny and effort. 100 (See Appendix 3).

The Berlin crisis was enormously positive in the West. The Airlift tightened the links between the Allies, proved they could cooperate under duress and it accelerated the creation of NATO. The French built the new Tegel airfield in three months, proving the highly impressive efficiency of German workers. Stalin had forced the Berlin population to choose between the two antagonistic sets of values which Harry Truman had already identified, his blockade
highlighted the political and moral difference between the two power blocs and crystallized what historians call a “Cold War consensus”. The Allies of West Germany were convinced of its commitment to Western values. Stalin succeeded in accelerating the implementation of what he aimed at preventing: the swift recovery of Germany. Four months after the end of the blockade, on 21 September 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was created, and was later admitted into NATO, exactly ten year to the day after the capitulation of the Nazis.

Invaluable lessons were also learned at Army level: "The intensity of Operation Vittles telescoped a decade of air transport experience into a one-year period" 101. It marked the transition to the instrument-flying age as it forced air transport units and troop carriers to work together and underlined their lack of standardization. It proved the need for a clear chain of command and the necessity to have only one organization in charge. Air Force and Navy proved they could cooperate efficiently in spite of some problems to solve. The Airlift validated the need for - and future development of- large The airlift also demonstrated that air power capabilities extended far beyond combat carriers.102

The Blockade ended not only because Stalin had not succeeded to drive a wedge into the Allies’s resolve but also because their counter-blockade of the East Zone considerably hurt an already crippled economy. The Berlin Crisis provides a better understanding of its positive outcome when taken as a whole, than when analyzed in successive slices of history. The undeniable opportunity aspect of the crisis is revealed by the status quo into which it forced the two rival powers, after the wall was built, thus averting war. The US under Kennedy had abandoned Eisenhower’s idea of a progressive withdrawal from Western Europe in exchange for the nuclear capability conferred to West Germany. US troops were now permanently stationing of in Western Europe, alleviating fears of a return to isolationism in Washington.
Benefits emerged from the Berlin crisis also for the Kremlin, who managed to avert their greatest fear, Germany’s nuclearization. Moscow, no longer threatened by Germany’s potential destructive capacity as a nuclear power, was appeased, and a stable bipolar structure emerged. It would take the Cuban missile showdown to refine the equilibrium and proceed with détente. “The Berlin crisis functioned as a catalyst speeding up developments that probably would have taken place in any case, and partly as an independent cause, forcing people, for example, to deal with problems they would otherwise have very much preferred to avoid.”

Underestimating at first Krushchev’s fear of Germany getting nuclear capability, Kennedy later came to use it as a bargaining tool in exchange for the division of Germany which had become a lesser evil. The crisis has helped to clarify how far both the US and the USSR could be pushed and “it had revealed something about the way international politics work in the nuclear age”.

More generally, the Berlin crisis played a central role in the historical process establishing a durable peace in Europe. The city’s plight was a decisive accelerator of history. It sped Germany’s mooring onto Western Europe, strengthening NATO in the process. Partition enhanced the reconciliation with France, and the two countries grew into the core of a prosperous European Economic Community. The Berlin wall’s major accomplishment was that behind its safety, the power of attraction of prosperity and security would contribute to bring down the Soviet system from inside.

4. BERLIN AND THE TOOLS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The monolithic aspect of the Berlin crisis becomes equally apparent when it is tested against the set of tools usually identified by the academic literature on crisis management. As Cold War crises never escalated to war, military forces were kept in the background as a secondary deterrent, a weak intermediate option before the use of the ultimate weapon.
Intelligence took over and played a decisive part, while diplomatic channels were overshadowed by a decision-making process originating at the top, in the Kremlin and in the White House. The Cold War history of Berlin illustrates Robert McNamara’s famous post-mortem of the Cuban missile crisis. ‘There is no longer such a thing as strategy, there is only crisis management’.

In a crisis situation, a political decision-making process takes the lead over conventional military strategy. The Berlin Kommandatura constituted the instrument of crisis management par excellence. Daily decisions on the ground were taken by the Allied Commandants, while top level decision-making came from the four capitals, mainly from the White House and the Kremlin. Crisis management consists of substitute strategies, aimed at avoiding escalation to war at all cost, while at the same time successfully protecting the vital interests threatened by the ongoing events that provoked the crisis.

This chapter examines the respective roles of force, diplomacy, and intelligence. In addition to these instruments of policy traditionally accepted, it also analyzes the part played by the civilian population, which was a factor specific to the unraveling of the Berlin Crisis. The resistance spirit of the citizens of West Berlin, the presence of British, French, and US troops, and their civilian counterparts, a large portion of which was formed by the substantial and close-knit intelligence community, the “Widergutmachungsgericht”, the International Court for Restitutions, all contributed to the resilience which allowed them to hold together until 1989.

4. 1. The role of force

One look at a map confirms Kennedy’s statement that Berlin was as indefensible as Bastogne, and could not be protected militarily. The military unbalance between the Soviets and the Western Allies was a direct consequence of this geographical isolation. In 1948, Western troops represented 5 Battalions without heavy weapons and no combat effectiveness. The Red
Army’s four divisions were 25 miles outside Berlin, with extensive combat experience, albeit with major discipline problems and a lame truck fleet. In 1958, 22 Soviet divisions were on alert around Berlin, plus the Warsaw Pact troops. Western Allies totaled 11,000 men. Weighted against the Soviets’ numerical superiority the strategic vulnerability of West Berlin was staggering but it reflects the relative unimportance of the military capabilities of each Superpower, in the context of Cold War crises. Stalin did not resist the temptation to do some intimidating saber rattling in his crisis bargaining. Khrushchev threatened, but he never resorted to a military blockade to impose his demands on the West. He needed only to allude to it, and the threat underlining his “neutralization” of the city was readily incorporated into his bargaining code. Under the shadow of the nuclear threat, however, the “objective balance of military power is much less relevant to assessments of comparative resolve in a crisis” \( ^{105} \). In other terms, a corollary of the relative irrelevance of the use of force is that “the outcomes of competitive or conflictual inter-actions between states are not simply determined or reliably predicted by the relative distribution of powers between them”. \( ^{106} \) Other factors come into play.

The unbalance becomes irrelevant and the numerical superiority pointless when neither opponent can resort to the use of force without escalating to a major conflict and take the responsibility of starting W.W. III. During the Berlin blockade, the US nuclear monopoly did not play a deterring role either. Stalin knew Truman was bluffing but backed down nevertheless.

Western numerical inferiority was counterbalanced by the usually underestimated crisis management tool, the unwavering support of the Berlin population, who accepted to suffer the incredible harshness of the 1948-49 winter. They had no other option but to trust the Allies. They had learned from the start to fear the Russians. The flagrant differences in “occupation-style”, and the reconstruction plan going at full speed, were immediate and powerful signals that West Berlin had been dealt the luckiest hand.
In 1948, to respond to the Blockade by an airlift instead of trying to force it by land, as General Clay had first suggested, was to pursue the avoidance of war, as primary objective. It exercised successful restraint in the use of force, resorting instead to a circumventing strategy that proved most efficient as it transferred onto Stalin the onus of responsibility for escalation into war. “What is clear in the Berlin blockade, […] is that the United States decided not to embark on a policy of limited escalation, backed by threats of additional escalation in order to force the opponent to call-off his Blockade actions. To have done so would have been to choose the strategy of coercive diplomacy.”

The deployment of military capabilities, the B-29s, was only a signal of commitment, of resolve, which both sides knew how to evaluate.

On the other hand, Stalin’s strategy failed for the simple reason that coercive diplomacy can only be successful when the capacity of the opponent to comply has been properly assessed. Alexander George disputes that the Airlift should be considered a “masterpiece of smooth and effective crisis management.” He contends that “although the US strategy proved remarkably capable of deflecting and eventually defeating the Soviet challenge, the success of the strategy was due at least as much to mutual restraint as to the ingenuity of US planning.” This argument neglects to incorporate the fact that war was avoided not because Stalin chose to exercise restraint, not by his goodwill or because he was reasonable. Stalin was more realistically compelled to refrain from attacking the planes supplying Berlin because this would have been a declaration of war. He had no other option. Consequently, the Airlift, behind its technical prowess, does constitute a masterpiece of smooth and effective crisis management as it accomplished its ultimate measure of success: Stalin lifted the blockade.

In the period regarded as a diplomatic stalemate, (1949-1957) several contingency plans were devised in the Pentagon. The second Eisenhower Administration approved on 25 January 1954 a plan detailed in NSC 5404/1, which was to apply in case the Soviets would again cut-off
access to Berlin. A tripartite force of battalion-size, would force the land blockade and an Airlift would proceed. Newly declassified material on contingency planning sheds light on the inception and organization of LIVE OAK, the codename for the secret tripartite military planning group that Gen. Norstad organized in April 1959. The group was only disbanded in November 1989, an additional argument to confirm the length of the Berlin crisis.\textsuperscript{110}

The Kennedy doctrine of flexible response was set according to several principles of crisis management that policy makers follow to avoid escalation to war. The whole doctrine relied on the need to give the president complete control over military operations and the obligation to ensure that no unnecessary “noise” could lead to confusing signals. During the Summer of 1961, Kennedy sent the First Battle Group to Berlin, to reinforce the American garrison. They could not have played a decisive role, however, had Krushchev opted for taking over the city, but they were a definite show of resolve and played a part later, in October, in the Checkpoint Charlie showdown, which put all the allied troops in Berlin on alert.

There was never any direct substantial military intervention, only skirmishes and shows of bravado, sometimes getting dangerously close, as on October 25, 1961. American and Russian tanks came to face each other at the only checkpoint left open in the Berlin wall for the allies, and it was controlled by the Americans on the Western side.

The sixteen hours confrontation did not mark the end of harassment which went on for years.\textsuperscript{111} The military unbalance was impossible to rectify and since it had a limited impact on the resolution of the crisis, it remained unchanged throughout the Cold War. The use of force never constituted a valid option in the context of the Berlin Crisis, because the next step was an escalation to nuclear war. A clear and final illustration of the limited role of force in the Berlin Crisis is the way it ended, in a peaceful “rave party”. A crowd of teenagers made history one
night of November 1989, when the Vopos guarding the Wall did not fire a single shot as they dismantled the symbol of the Cold War with their bare hands, befittingly closing its last chapter.

4. 2. The role of diplomacy

Diplomacy, although very active, did not play a decisive role either during the escalatory phases of the Berlin Crisis, because there was never much room for negotiation. It was more instrumental in the de-escalation phases. During the blockade, the Allies were able to increase the capacity of the airlift until it became capable to sustain the city indefinitely. Their tenacity defeated the purpose of the blockade and reinforced their resistance to Russian demands, thereby suppressing any margin for diplomatic negotiation: Stalin was forced to back down or go to war. UN led negotiations in November-December 1948 ended in a stalemate. However, as soon as Stalin indicated that he was backing down, (in an interview on 31 January, 1949 with an American journalist), secret negotiations between US and Soviet diplomats started to defuse the situation and the blockade was lifted May 12. Until 1962, numerous talks, exchanges of diplomatic notes, conferences and summits never led to a workable solution of the various ultimatums. From the 1959 Geneva Conference to the 1961 Vienna Summit, diplomacy seemed intended more for the benefit of public opinion at home or to make the rest of the world believe that both sides were willing to compromise, when neither one really was.

The arrival of a new administration under President Kennedy had led the way to a progressive acceptance of Soviet demands on Berlin, as the Americans and their allies grew less inclined to go to war over it. Diplomacy accomplished rather little and the construction of the wall ended up by representing no so much a defeat in the ultimate test of Western resolve than the acknowledgement of a status quo, an agreement to disagree, except on the principle of non-interference, recognized tacitly on both sides. The test came later in Cuba.
During crises, diplomacy and regular channels such as the NSC are not best suited as vehicle of communication, and leaders on both sides favored more personal means. President Eisenhower, for example added his son John, then a Major, to General Andrew Goodpaster’s Office of the Staff Secretary, and used him on special missions when Krushchev sent his first ultimatum. The situation in Berlin reached a stage of acute crisis of such importance that it generated a major change in the NSC, with the creation of the National Security Adviser. “Ike felt great apprehension about Berlin, indicated by the proportion of business he transacted outside the NSC”. Later, this time to circumvent the State Department, Nixon would open a “White House” back channel to communicate directly with the Soviet leadership. It led to the series of agreements signed in 1971 and 1972. Since the use of military force was an impossible option, and with the limited record of diplomacy, other tools of crisis management, intelligence and public opinion, abroad and in the city itself, were more successfully employed throughout the Berlin Crisis.

4.3. Intelligence outweighs force and diplomacy.

Public opinion and the competing demands of secrecy and publicity played a major role in Cold War crises, where the need for accurate information was just as crucial to a successful outcome as in any other type of conflict. In conventional warfare, however, it is fairly easy to manipulate public opinion because censure is commonly accepted when the highest interests of a nation are at stake. If the CNN factor was not yet at play during the Cold War, crises increasingly attracted public exposure, creating the need for a delicate balance between the two conflicting requirements of secrecy and transparency. Public opinion was used as a tool to counter Soviets’ attacks and their demands on the West, domestic issues and the of constituencies greatly influenced decision-makers. A note written by J. F. Kennedy to Dean Rusk upon learning about the Wall, on 14 August, 1961, indicates his order of priorities. The
president is primarily concerned by how “to exploit politically propagandawise the Soviet East-German cut-off of the border”. He views Krushchev’s move first as a “very good propaganda stick”. (See Appendix 4) Both superpowers used intelligence and propaganda extensively, albeit with mixed results and the Soviets’ poor ability to process information greatly undermined the efficiency of the Eastern bloc in the sustained brinkmanship of the Cold war.

A permanent politicization of intelligence gathering flawed considerably Moscow’s analysis and gave Western Allies a valuable advantage over their opponent, as the Berlin Crisis unfolded. Later, in 1989, when the situation had deteriorated as a result of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, and when East Germans “tourists” started pouring again through the open gates at the western borders of Poland and Hungary, the impossibility to achieve reforms in the fossilized GDR system precipitated the disaster.

The authors of “Battleground Berlin” conclude their collective work by highlighting that East Germany was the seat of the worst “disparity between information and influence”. “Our analysis of the newly released KGB archival material reveals that the Soviet treasure trove of intelligence never shaped Soviet policy as it could have. […] Forced to accept without question the dictates of their leaders, agents wrote and rewrote their reports to conform to the prevailing Soviet ideology. Further, Soviet leaders were unable, (or unwilling) to exploit their intelligence advantage to urge GDR administrators to change their policies. When Gorbachev finally did this, the end came swiftly for East Germany and the Wall, and it was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union itself”\(^{113}\)

In 1685, Louis XIV repelled the Edict of Nantes, by which Henry IV had granted religious freedom in 1598, ending the wars of religion. Forced into exile, French Huguenot engineers, who had developed a unique expertise in draining the swamps of the Nantes region, were hired by the Hohenzollern Prince, and contributed to builds his capital city in the
marshland around the Spree River. This historical coincidence surfaced again when Stalin and Krushchev denounced Berlin as a “cesspool” of spies and an espionage “swamp” respectively. Berlin was not only a kingpin of Cold War strategy, it was indeed swarming with agents of all creed and breed, the battleground *par excellence* for US, Russian, British, French - and later East-German- intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies, not to mention Warsaw Pact countries, and China.

Intelligence is of paramount importance in any conflict, but was even more so in Cold War crises, where overt military operations were ruled out. Hence the increased importance of a skilful exploitation of information. During the Cold War, no armed forces were engaged in actual combat against one another, but intelligence agents were fighting in the shadows. Sheer numbers had no greater significance than for armed forces, in determining the success of the intelligence wars, which depended more on information processing skills and efficiency. Compared to the KGB, the success of CIA’s Berlin Operations Base (BOB) in managing the Berlin Crisis was in reverse proportion to the relative paucity of its means. In relation to the strategic importance of Berlin for US security, the American intelligence system in Berlin appears astonishingly scarce in personnel and funding. Their British and French counterparts were no better endowed.

Still, Berlin harbored, comparatively to its size, an impressive intelligence community. The unexpected being the essence of crises, its efforts were geared to minimize elements of surprise especially in Berlin, where it was on the actual frontline. The Berlin Crisis exemplifies the importance of information processing: Intelligence reports are only as good as what decision-makers do with them. In spite of superior means, the Soviets could not prevent Western leaders from having the upper hand, because they relied far more on the accuracy of their “feelers” than their Eastern counterparts.
In the summer of 1945, Moscow had reactivated and strongly reorganized its pre-war Residency in Berlin. A Ministry of State Security (MGB) replaced a complicated and fragmented collection and distribution system of foreign intelligence, inherited from the revolutionary period. In 1946, Stalin and Molotov learned, from their moles in the Allied negotiation teams, that the West was going ahead with the economic recovery of Germany, and had increased the frequency of meetings between Allied Council Foreign Ministers. To respond, they sped up the information flux to make it quickly available to their own negotiators.  

They transferred foreign intelligence to a Committee for Information (KI) which reported now directly to the Soviet Council of Ministers. Unlike CIA, which had been created two weeks earlier, KI’s existence was never officially acknowledged, although it operated on a large scale. By 1948, in Berlin, KI had infiltrated the major political parties, the Allied military administrations, various émigré associations, and all the prominent news media.  

The main OSS – and later CIA- operations were conducted from the US Forces, European Theater in Frankfurt and their Berlin “outpost” was run like a cottage industry. BOB had a limited number of agents in the East, which counted more Putzfrauen (cleaning ladies) than Nomenklaturists. In spite of major material problems and strained relationships with the military, BOB’s contribution started to prove invaluable as soon as the blockade began. The same cannot be said of their Soviet counterparts who only fueled Stalin the news he wanted to hear. The Berlin Blockade illustrates the damaging effect of misused intelligence reports through the high degree of politicization which affected the information processing on the Soviet side.

In their book, “Inside the Kremlin Cold War”, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov reveal how the satisfaction of playing major league alongside Churchill and Roosevelt had alleviated Stalin’s anxieties and inferiority complex. The Big Three behaved like an exclusive club, they shared memories, private jokes, and oversized cigars. After Roosevelt died
and Churchill failed to be reelected, cooperation with the West became unrealistic and Stalin could no longer hide the megalomaniac paranoia that prevented him, all his life, from leaving his country. The Conference was held in Yalta, in spite of Roosevelt’s weakness, because Stalin would never have traveled abroad. In his dealings with intelligence reports, he constantly redefined which information he was expecting. His ill-inspired decision to seal-off land routes in and out of Berlin, his miscalculations in threatening two and a half million people with starvation, resulted from the flawed assessments he had himself requested from his agents.

“KI obviously had an impressive array of sources who acquired documentary intelligence from high levels of the British and the French governments. But even though solid information on Allied attitudes toward Berlin was available to Stalin, by September 1948, the information was incomplete and often delayed. In particular, because KI did not report on how successful the airlift was, Stalin felt encouraged to weaken both the airlift and the population’s morale, before deciding to back off […]The reports prolonged the blockade by underestimating both Western resolve and concealing that the apprehension in the West caused by the blockade was leading to increased efforts to enlist West Germany in European defense.”117 118

Stalin also miscalculated the strength of US commitment to the defense of a democratic regime in West Germany. KI reports consistently underestimated Allied resolve to stay in Berlin. They aimed at comforting Stalin in his wishful thinking that the Americans would return to pre-war isolationism and protectionism. The blockade backfired and had dramatic consequences for the Soviet Union and even more so for Walter Ulbricht. Far from preventing the creation of a West German state, it accelerated it. The Allies went ahead with their plan to reconstruct Germany and with the currency reform that had triggered the blockade. The Atlantic Alliance was also established as a result.
Yet, KI had indeed received all the messages sent by British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, to his ambassador in Washington, in particular from Burgess and Mac Lean, in the British Foreign Office, but failed to transmit the unpleasant ones. “After Bevin emphasized that if ‘we do not now take a firm position, then our situation in Europe will be hopeless’, he opined that the Soviet Union was dragging out the negotiations until winter, when supplying West Berlin would be more difficult. He then quoted statistics on the airlift from Secretary of State Marshall’s briefing to the ministers noting that larger aircraft (C-54’S) were to be used, but repeating Marshall’s caution that ‘in the event of a surprise Soviet attack, the loss of a large part of the US airlift capacity would be inevitable.’ It is interesting that this report went only to Molotov and Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin and not to Stalin. Considering the large number of inconsequential reports that KI sent to Stalin, it is notable that it failed to send him this one, which was certain to irritate the irascible leader”.  

Stalin underestimated the Allies’ will to counter the blockade since he only relied on intelligence reports which fueled his expectations and ambitions or confirmed his analyses or his fears. His paranoia made him see enemies everywhere. To avoid the gulag or worse, his immediate entourage carefully filtered messages. Even when messages were true, he refused to believe them, such as reports that Bevin and Truman were not pursuing Roosevelt and Churchill’s quarrels and were adamant in their refusal to abandon Berlin. Stalin also thought the Germans would panic. He hoped that western humiliation in having to abandon Berlin would turn the Germans against them and Berlin into Soviet control. His plan aimed at discrediting the Allies, proving the repeated Soviet allegation according to which Allies would no longer support the Germans who, abandoned by their treacherous new friends, would be only too happy to seek salvation in the Soviet paradise.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, comparatively scarce information was processed with far greater efficiency by the intelligence officers of the three Western occupying powers.
“Information obtained by CIA’s Berlin Operations Base had a significant and immediate effect on US decisions about West Berlin and West Germany. BOB’s reports went straight to the field commander, General Clay, whose attitudes had a direct influence on those decisions. Bob’s reporting on security and military issues went to the heart of Clay’s concerns: was there any evidence that the Soviets or the newly created East German Forces were preparing for an armed confrontation?”

Clay was able to go ahead and then sustain for 10 months a full-scale airlift, the magnitude of which was never equaled, because of the reliability of BOB’s sources in the Soviet sector. Some movements, in the late fall and early winter of 1948, were clearly identified as simple scare tactics. BOB could also confirm that there was no visible preparation for war, and kept General Clay informed of the movements of troops in and around the Soviet zone. Although operatives complained that their work was not properly exploited, reports that the Soviets were not prepared in 1948, to use force against the Allies and news that the airlift stirred-up major unrest in the East proved most accurate and helped define and improve counter-measures.

Miscalculations and bad assessments in spite of extensive intelligence reports reflect the cognitive element which cannot be dissociated from the concept of crisis. The Soviets misjudged the Allies’ capacity for airlift and their determination to help the Germans. It seemed a high gain - low risk strategy. They ignored a US-led operation in Asia, “the Hump”, already managed by Tunnener, and only remembered the disastrous German airlift to Stalingrad. The Nazis had sent planes and pilots in summer clothes directly from North Africa to the Russian winter, and the failure of this airlift was due to flawed organization and not conclusive of the impossibility to sustain a whole city by air. Americans also underestimated the sustaining capacity of the Airlift and thought it was just temporary, a way to buy time for diplomatic negotiations and certainly did not see it at first as a way to eventually break down the blockade.
BOB helped the Allies to call Krushchev’s bluff when he issued his first ultimatum in November 1958. He threatened to hand over military operations in the Soviet Zone to the East Germans, under the pretext that Berlin was swarmed with spies, in violation of the occupation agreements. BOB established that KI had no intention of leaving East Berlin and secondly the “espionage swamp” accusations backfired as they triggered a US counterattack, based on information BOB had received from a high ranking GRU defector. It was made public through a well-orchestrated media campaign, establishing “that East Berlin was a hotbed of Soviet and East German espionage” 121. At a Foreign Minister meeting in Geneva, in June 1959, in front of a “stony faced” Gromyko, Foster Dulles read BOB’s complete report with a detailed description of Soviet, East German and other East European intelligence services operating in East Berlin. It blunted Soviet attacks against West Berlin, and allowed Eisenhower to keep his ground. The Kremlin temporarily removed the issue from its diplomatic agenda.

Prescient reports, as accurate as they may have been, find their limit against political will and could not prevent Walter Ulbricht from winning his case with Krushchev, for his “Concrete Rose”. Advanced knowledge of what Ulbricht had been plotting did not prevent the Eastern bloc from being sealed definitively. Since May 1960, US intelligence knew that closing of the border in Berlin was getting dangerously close. KGB reports had warned Krushchev that Kennedy would not go to war if the border was closed in Berlin. This information influenced their strategy more than the rehashing around conference tables of documents the Soviets were not about to respect. In November 1960, the mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, publicly announced that he expected East Germany to impose a division of his city and had further predicted the inaction of the Allies. This information was accessible to the public and broadcast widely on national and international radios. It confirmed intelligence reports BOB had sent to Washington
in the months and weeks before August 13, 1961. When Eleanor Dulles claims the wall was unforeseeable it is most puzzling that she had not seen or heard it announced, in the local press. “The Berlin Wall represented an important tactical victory for the KGB because it kept BOB at a distance in East Germany, but the struggle for Berlin continued for many years.”  

In the summer of 1989, a prescient East German minister of State Security, Erich Mielke asked a KGB agent to relay to Gorbachev his fear that Perestroïka and Glasnost had released social forces he could no longer contain and that the GDR would be crushed as a result.

4. 4. The role of the civil population

Civilian populations escape academic scrutiny, in most crisis studies, because they are not considered as key-players. In the Berlin Crisis, however, they influenced significantly the course of events. In 1948, West Berliners’ staunch resistance to Communism surprised the Allies who expected to be resented just as much as the Russians, after their massive bombings in the spring of 1945. At the time, an information gap had prevented Western Allies from clearly analyzing the situation. Much like the Serbs of the 1990s, the Soviets had organized for months, even after the capitulation of Germany, a massive “ethnic cleansing” and perpetrated systematic and repeated raping and killings, in addition to the destruction and dismantling of the industry.

The horror stories were still told many years later in West Berlin and in the rest of Germany by the survivors, but they only penetrated the cognizance of the public at large much later. Many Americans had been horrified witnesses but did not denounce them publicly. In the immediate postwar era, the need to preserve a consensus among allies and to avoid antagonizing Russian counterparts in the on-going negotiations within the Allied Council and the Kommandatura was paramount. Because of the shame, the raping did not either make the front page of Western newspapers. Nevertheless, the impact of the Soviet conduct on the
Germans’ resistance to Communism was overwhelming. One of the most decisive factors behind the success of the Airlift was the forceful determination of the Berlin population not to give in to Stalin, it was rooted in the atrocities committed by the Red Army.

In 1948, Mayor Ernst Reuter told General Clay that, if the Allies could supply the population, he would take care of Berliners, who would sustain the effort and endure whatever was expected of them. To evaluate properly the extent to which Berliners would resist the harshness resulting from his blockade, Stalin would have had to assess correctly the devastating impact of his troops’ conduct. This element did not enter into consideration for two reasons. He could never bring himself to blame his soldiers because what we consider as barbaric and criminal, he tolerated as the normal conduct of a victorious army taking its legitimate spoils. Consequently, the Berliners’ strong anti-Soviet feelings should not be underestimated to explain the Berlin crisis. They were decisive in shaping public opinion and in sustaining Berlin’s resistance to the Soviet steamroller throughout the Cold War. John Gaddis observed in “We Know Now” that most American academic circles did not integrate this factor in their analyses before the end of the Cold War. 124

Berlin has now been reinstated into its past grandeur, with the appropriate pump and circumstance, and is healing its scars with astonishing speed. It is also recapturing its former zone of influence at the confluent of two former Empires. This coincides with a sputtering of the Franco-German “engine” because of a realignment of priorities which leaves a reunited Germany looking eastward again, and more concerned with domestic problems than with the deepening of European integration. Berlin however, after surviving decades of acute crisis, builds on the ruins of the GDR, and has started the millennium with a renewed vigor which should not surprise those who have witnessed its resourcefulness while it was held captive. Its geographical location will again contribute to its central role, in bringing back into the Western
culture the formerly estranged Central Europe, ironing out definitively the partition line the Soviets had drawn through it. If the Berlin Crisis lasted as long as the Cold War, it is not only because it came to personify this conflict but also because Berliners successfully resisted the Soviet ‘technostructure’. In becoming the US’s strongest ally in continental Europe, Germany gave the world a lesson in crisis management but also in democracy. This was all made possible because one American President perceived justly Berlin’s symbolic value and the survival ability of his inhabitants. He refused to compromise on their freedom and made Stalin back down. The Western world would look very different today, if President Roosevelt had still been in charge.

To downplay the extent of Soviet harassment in Berlin, by refusing to consider Berlin as the seat of a crisis, allows to raise the question of the relevance of analytical results which are so far removed from the objective reality of widely documented eye witness records. The number of casualties, miraculously low during the Berlin Blockade in particular, and more generally during the entire Cold War, should not lead to underestimate the seriousness of the situation.

There was throughout the Berlin Crisis a high risk of a loss of control over the events, of the unexpected and accidental or unauthorized act that could occur in spite of the decision-maker’s resolute restraint. This is why the leaders in the Kremlin never relinquished their occupying powers to their unreliable underlings in Pankow. Berlin has thus remained on the edge, as its crisis curve demonstrates, staying close to the threshold for most of the Cold War.

West Berliners were spared serving in the Bundeswehr, because they were permanent foot soldiers of the Berlin Crisis. ‘The Communist measures […] have had considerable nuisance value in keeping the Berliners aware of their precarious existence’ The strain of daily life in a permanent state of anxiety was shared by the civil population and their occupying forces, and decades in the fear of the Soviets’ next move on Berlin developed a strong solidarity
between them, convincing the Allies to remain in the city in spite, and may be because, of Soviet threats. The Soviets used scare tactics, gloomy rumors were spread in a well orchestrated propaganda campaign on the treatment the families of allied servicemen garrisoned in Berlin would receive, once the city was “liberated”. Months after the Wall was built, 1700 people were still leaving West Berlin for West Germany, each week.

In 1960, a collection of essays was published in Germany under the title “Berlin, Pivot of German Destiny”. It already then explained that one of the reasons why Krushchev understood that he would never succeed in forcing Communism on Western Europe, “one of the factors that has produced and deepened this kind of sobering realization in the Kremlin [was] the character and behavior of the people of Berlin.” In spite of its might, the Kremlin backed down and abandoned its predatory ambitions on the Western part of Germany because the resistance spirit of the Berliners had made their city a force to be reckoned with, in the balance of power between East and West. Their contribution to peace and stability in Europe deserved recognition.

CONCLUSION

Berlin was a beacon in many aspects, but it was primarily the only successful democracy in 20th century Mittle Europa. The Berlin Crisis resembles no other, not only by its length, but by its inner dynamic. It espoused all the milestones of the “Long March” to stability in continental Europe, and ended with the Cold War, in the victory of Western values. The extreme unwillingness on both sides to resort to war over Berlin made the city a major pawn in the balance of powers in Europe, and a landmark case in the study of crises. The city will remain in the historical consciousness of Cold War contemporaries as the symbol of resistance to Communism and still carries within itself the living memory of the history of Europe.
Surviving dinosaurs of the "Parti Unique" have joined former Communist road companions, reconfigured into the oxymoronic ‘Social(ist) democrats’. Much like the French, who lashed at Germany to erase the “syndrome of the forties”, they conceal their guilty compromising with a corrupted and barbarian regime, by lashing now at America. They find it hard to admit that without Washington’s help, Berlin and the rest of the free world would not have been able to hold the torch of freedom and democracy for half a century. They continued, after the collapse of the Soviet regime, to glorify its contribution to “social progress” and its victory in holding the presently unleashed American imperialism in check. In spite of an even more abundant literature denouncing the atrocities of the Soviet regime, it is not politically incorrect in Social Democrat Europe to acknowledge that during the Cold War, the main artisan of peace was the vigor and steadfastness of the United States, which managed to preserve democratic values in the West, and maintained a stable balance of power. The Cold war remained at the level of a political and ideological confrontation, and crises never escalated to war because US support contributed to counter successfully Moscow’s steamrolling proselytism in all of Western Europe. This support was visible most of all in Berlin.

The resistance spirit of the Berlin population was closely linked to the American citizens. It made them conscious of the freedom and prosperity they enjoyed and of what they would lose if they no longer defended it. Because the destiny of the free world, was so linked to the destiny of Berlin, its Cold War history is best understood when it is not merely exposed in the juxtaposition of two major crises, taken as separated events. A more general overview has allowed us to stress the human element. Most theoretical analyses pigeonhole events and behaviors. Our approach addressed the relative applicability of different criteria most commonly found in international crises, voluntarily leaving out the details of bargaining codes or subjective matrixes, the preference orderings of various key players, their bounded rationality or bidding
sequences. Game theory applied to international relations is an attempt to circumvent a weakness. It reflects a frustration at failing to establish valid predictions. Beyond the limited applicability of a restricted number of criteria, crises are like wars. “Without going into a long dissertation on chaos theory, [W]hat usually happens in history is in the category called ‘none of the above’. If one examines the predictions made in the areas of international relations over the centuries, most of the time, most of the people get it wrong, -even the most learned, experienced and intelligent people.” 128

Theories contribute to a better understanding of events. Crisis theory explains behaviors in international crises, that are used as empirical sources for case study. IR theory centers on issues of conflict and cooperation, which derive from the anarchic structure of the international system of states. In this context, the Berlin crisis was deceptive. It had a low level of casualties and violence, and was entangled in a painstaking management process, within an ideological divide, towered by Moscow’s fear of Germany. Paradoxically, this highly emotional context, has led analysts to discount important aspects of the psychological content associated with the events on the surface of which they trail their aseptic surgical tools.

In his unfinished work On War, Carl von Clausewitz has revolutionized the way to think about war. Before him, military literature was essentially descriptive. Basically utilitarian, and not speculative, it aimed at establishing strategic principles. Clausewitz on the contrary believed that each era tends to produce its own strategic doctrine and culture, and that wars are the reflection of, are constructed by, the societies that wage them. His approach to war could be called in some way pre-constructivist. The ageless relevance of his work owes much to the psychological and emotional dimension of his findings. He considered that the importance of moral forces was paramount. Courage, resolution, audacity, and perseverance were praised over tactical prowess. Fear was accounted for as a major engine of decision making. The concepts of
fog and friction gave war the dimension it lacked when it was fought on paper by the chiefs of staff. War is ugly, violent and bloody. At the age of twelve, Clausewitz had already witnessed the horrors of war. The defeat of the Prussian army by Bonaparte marked him forever, giving his work an unparalleled depth and sharpening the acuity of his judgement. Clausewitz’s genius resided in his way to think about war in terms of uncertainty, as a “state of crisis”. War is unstable, fragmented, it is not an aggregation of techniques, and he did not write a recipe book.

To study Cold War crisis one should follow a Clausevitzian process, diversifying the approach. If the attention of the analysts focuses on how to encapsulate the decision-makers’ behavioral patterns into neatly defined figures, graphs, or theorems, it misses the flesh and blood of all the different actors who impacted the events they try to explain. By proceeding in a sanitized environment they leave out not only the emotional dimension of the human factor, but also the ideas that construct the events, objects of such analysis. Declassified documents from behind the Iron Curtain highlight with a dramatic acuity the visceral fear of Germany that was at the root of all the Soviet leaders’ strategies. In this light, the Berlin Crisis is better presented as a monolithic event, not as a succession of fragmented snapshots.

In spite of all their missiles and numerical military supremacy, even a peaceful Anschluß of East Germany, was unacceptable, because it would push its borders 200 miles closer to Moscow. This fear did not subside when they finally realized, in the early sixties, that they would never impose their rule over the rest of Europe. The West was blinded by its own fear of the Soviets credible power projection, if both superpowers had know how afraid they were of each other and on which grounds, the course of the Cold War could have been quite different, mostly for Eastern Europe.

A stimulating debate is presently at work within the field of International Relations Theory. Authors seek alternative approaches to explain how and why “it all hangs together”.
This paper focused with a wide angle on the entire Cold War history of Berlin, an approach suggested by several authors, among which those of the “Logic of Anarchy”. Barry Buzan and Richard Little criticize IR Theory for failing to view “international systems from a world historical perspective”. Alexander Wendt argues in his “Theory of International Politics”, that social or “constructed” facts have a greater impact in international affairs than tanks and combat troops. Underestimating the power of ideas, and ignoring social or societal factors, most IR theorists, have accepted the image of an anarchical world operating without moral or social restraint, and played lip service to the role of individuals, or groups of individuals in socially constructing this anarchy. The Berlin Crisis exemplifies the importance of shared values and of individuals, neither of which can be discounted in the study of international events.

As many archives of the period are being declassified, the dynamics of the Berlin crisis become increasingly clearer. New documents will help historians and political scientists to refine their understanding of this period, and allow them to substantiate eventually what those of us who have lived in the partitioned city have known all along. “[They] may finally learn just how dangerous the Berlin crisis was.”

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Web sites:
APPENDIX 5

The Checkpoint Charlie Showdown:

Kennedy sent General Lucius Clay back to Berlin in the Summer of 196, to demonstrate America’s resolve not to abandon Berlin. The incident was a crisis within the Berlin crisis, and the only instance in the Cold War when US and Soviet soldiers experienced an actual military face-off. General Clay brought the Soviets to back down after he had reached his goal, to prove that East Germany, for all its shows of bravado, was at their beck and call.

It started as yet another thrust by the East-Germans at the Four Power control over Berlin. A practice in force since 1945 allowed cars with an occupation forces license plate to cross the border into East Berlin unchecked. On October 22, 1961, the Vopos stopped a car driven by a US diplomat. In conformity with occupation regulations Mr. Allen Lightner only accepted to identify himself in the presence of a Russian officer. When the Vopos refused, he drove back to
the American side of the checkpoint and returned escorted by eight service men armed with bayonets. This time the Vopos let them all through and back again. The next day, Pankow announced that “foreigners” were to identify themselves to the Vopos. General Clay convinced Washington that to back down would be considered as a surrender, and in a show of force, on October 25, twelve men escorting two US officials forced their way into East-Germany, without identification. Less than an hour later, ten M-48 medium tanks took position at Checkpoint Charlie, guarding over two additional escorted US cars that were let through the East German border and back, by enraged and humiliated but helpless Vopos.

When ten Russian tanks turned up, a few hours later, General Clay had proof that the Four-Power occupation status of Berlin was still in effect and that the East-German’s harassment was ordered by the Soviets. The next morning, the Russian tanks retreated, and the US tanks withdrew half an hour later. This remarkable management of the crisis by General Clay was perceived in Washington as gross insubordination. What mattered to the Berlin population, however, was that he had single handedly restored in their eyes the honor of the West, that had been somewhat diluted since the night of August 13. A quarter of a million West Berliners assembled on May Day 1962 to bid farewell to General Clay. When they heard him explain; “I leave Berlin because the time has come when I can serve its cause better at home”, it was a clear sign that the Berlin Crisis was not yet over, for any of them.

ENDNOTES

1 Dean Rusk’s words are quoted in “On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents On the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961”, edited by Donald P. Steury, (Washington, DC, CIA History Staff, 1999.)
5 Zubok and Pleshakov, 7
6 This formula was first used by President Roosevelt who predicted that Berlin would become a “test tube of US-Russian cooperation. Only the “test-tube” part of the prediction was correct as soon after his death cooperation turned into confrontation.
9 The resilience of such formulas is quite astonishing. Most of Western Europe felt quite comfortable having Germany’s capital remaining in the sleepy town of Bonn and did not rejoice at its move back to Berlin. The Ariadne thread of the Cold War was not yet broken in the early 90s and if the younger generations have freed themselves from it, it still looms around in many chanceries,
10 Rusk-Gromyko meeting, 2 October, 1963, POL GER, State Department Central Files for 1963, Record Group 59, U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland
12 Joint declaration of the Grand Alliance in Teheran 1943.
13 Lancaster house is the seat of the American Embassy in London
The task of Ambassador Winant, the US chief negotiator, was aggravated by having to work with conflicting instructions from Washington, even in the absence of such instructions, due to department rivalries within the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, which even resulted in vetoing action against him from the Civil Affairs Division. See Daniel J Nelson, “Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma” (Univ. of Alabama Press, 1978) 15-19.

De Gaulle was not at Yalta and was only reluctantly offered a side chair at the end of the Potsdam Conference.

For the claim that the pushing through of the Byrnes plan reflected a new American toughness resulting from the first successful test of a nuclear weapon, see Gar Alperovitz, “Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam” (New York, 1965), 164ff, 173.

For the text, see FRUS Potsdam:2, 1477-98.


Robert Murphy, “Diplomat Among Warriors”, (Garden City, 1964), 226-244.

Nelson, details the wartime negotiations and the position of the allies and gives a clear understanding of the extent of Stalin’s infiltration into allies delegations and administration, 120-139.


Nelson, 139


The transcripts of this meeting have been published by W. Picks himself in his memoirs (“Auszeichnungen zur Deutschland Politik, 1945-1953”, Berlin 1993)

The heavily subsidized European parties, mainly in Italy and in France, through the action of the Komintern, ensured the docility of these countries. See François Furet “Le passé d’une illusion, essai sur l’idée communiste au XXème siècle”, (Paris 1995)

The idea to rase down its industry and turn Germany into pastures has circulated in certain American circles.

Zubok, Pleshakov. 52


He also called Berlin the testicles of the West


Cordon Craig, Alexander George, “Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Out Times” (New York, 1983) 126. “From 1957 to 1952, the Soviet government engaged in a deliberate, systematic and sustained campaign of deception, issuing grossly exaggerated claims regarding ther production and deployment of ICBMs, Krushchev put this claims to use to invigorate his assertive foreign policy; this was[…] no where more evident than in the Berlin crises”. This strategy backfired when Kennedy publicly revealed the bluff and Krushchev played yet another card that would further advance the risk of nuclear war when he deployed missiles in Cuba a few month s later.

Beria andMalenkov had opposed siding with the GDR and advocated a Soviet withdrawal from Berlin. See C. F. Ostermann. “This is not a Politburo but a Madhouse”, CWIHP, #10, March 98, p. 61-72.


CWIHP, issue n#11, Winter 98.

Hope Harrisson, “Ulbricht And The Concrete Rose”, Cold War International History Project #5, p. 3-4

http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihlib

John Gaddis,We know Now, 13

The Concrete Rose,5


John Prados, “Keepers of the Keys: a History of the National Security Council From Truman To Bush” (New-York, 1986) 87

John Lewis Gaddis, “Strategies of Containment”, (Oxford University Press,1982),168


Trachtenberg, 258.

The issue has never been solved and it resurfaced thirty years later, when Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand were convinced that a united Germany would endanger European integration and asked Moscow to intervene.

ibid, 201
53 Christof Münger, “Ich bin ein Berliner: Der Wandel der amerikanischen Berlinpolitik während der Präsidentschaft John F. Kennedys.” (I am a Berliner, the development of the US Berlin policy during the presidency of John F. Kennedy) Heft # 49, (Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, a publication of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, 1999), 5.
56 Münger, 153-157
58 George W. Ball, “The Past Has Another Pattern” (New York, 1982) 274
59 Münger, 172- 178.
60 Snyder and Diesing 15
61 Thomas Schelling, “Arms and Influence”, (New Haven, 1966), 97
64 Snyder and Diesing.6-21
66 Lord, 6
67 Carnes Lord, op cit, 7
68 Snyder, Diesing, 10
69 ibid., 12
70 ibid., 18.
71 ibid., 13
72 ibid., 14
73 Hope Harrisson, “Ulbricht And The Concrete Rose”, Cold War International History Project #5, p. 3-4 http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihlib.
75 Zubok., 51
77 C.W.I.H.P.: *Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War*, May, 151.
78 Lebow, 10
79 Lebow, 9
80 Zubok, Pleshakov, 52
81 James L. Richardson.) 245.,
82 Snyder, Diesing, 455
83 Hope Harrisson, *New Evidence On Khrushchev’s 1958 Ultimatum*, CWHP.
84 Trachtenberg, 298
85 see Tunner, chapt. 1-2
86 George, Development of Doctrine and Strategy, 30.
87 Lord, 5
90 David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, George Bailey, “Battleground Berlin”, *CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War*”(Yale Univ. Press, 1997),343
91 Snyder and Deasing, 18
92 Tunner,159.
93 “Berlin Settlement”, 149.
94 Münger, 5
95 Trachtenberg, 297
98 Max Charles, “Berlin Blockade” (London 1959)147. The secretary of the Air Force reported total expenditures of $252.5 billion, including, fuel, depreciation and lost aircraft. The bill for London was about $40 million.
As an Easter present, general Tunner offered Berliners a “Parade” breaking a record with 10,000 tons of cargo airlifted on Easter Sunday. Figures of the multinational airlift into Sarajevo give a god idea of this accomplishment. Between July 1992 and January 1996, 180,000 tons of cargo were airlifted into Sarajevo. The Berlin airlift delivered more in the month of March 1949 and again during the next four months reaching a grand total of almost 2.5 million tons. Even if the population of Berlin was bigger, the intensity and magnitude of the effort remains unsurpassed. (See Appendix 3)

Start Symington, in *Annual report of the Secretary of the Air Force, FY 1948*, 240

the C-74 and the transport version of the B-29, the YC-97A. General Tunner also convinced Washington to push the C-124.


Snyder, Diesing, 457.

Alexander George, 372

Alexander George, 214

Alexander George, 214

Alexander George, 214.

The LIVE OAK records (which are held by the German archives) are classified for another 20 years. The complexity of LIVE OAK planning highlights the role of inter-Allied politics in the group. The British, never approved this plan, because it would lead to a military disaster, and a major conflict. It was considerably down played, relative to its ambitious scope, the final phase of which was a thermonuclear war. (Digital National Security Archives, The Berlin Crisis 1998).


ibid. Major incidents, in the air corridors, or at the autobahn checkpoints continued, the most publicized of which was the "Tailgate Crisis" in the fall of 1963 which blocked access for days. It would be fastidious to repertory the succession of harassment imposed by the Soviets, as signals of frustration and anger, reactions to many unrelated incidents on the international or domestic scene which were passed on Berlin or as simple posturing. Whatever the cause, they were a reminder of the city’s precarious situation, a sword of Damocles hanging over Berlin, for the duration of the Cold War.

Prados, 88

*Battleground*, 398.

Detailed information on BOB and KI, in “Battleground Berlin”

ibid. chapters 1 and 2.

ibid.

ibid, 77-78.

ibid. 63.

ibid., 67.

ibid. 78.

ibid. 325

ibid. 396


Gaddis, We Know Now. 286-287

Jack Schick, “The Berlin Crisis”, cited by Snyder and Diesing, 239

Jean Edward Smith, “The defense of Berlin” (Baltimore, 1963), 140

Robson, Charles B., "Berlin, Pivot of German History “ (Chapel Hill, 1960), 21


Smith, 341