

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH VATAN:
GEOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN POLICY

A thesis Presented to the Faculty
of
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
by
BEHLÜL ÖZKAN

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

SEPTEMBER 2009

Dissertation Committee
Professor Andrew C. Hess, Chair
Professor Alan K. Henrikson
Professor Feroz Ahmad

UMI Number: 3390192

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 3390192

Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table of Contents | II |
| Curriculum Vitae | IV |
| Abstract | VII |
| Acknowledgements | IX |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Chapter I Methodology and Research Questions | 6 |
| I. 1. Realist Hegemony in the Discipline of International Relations | |
| I. 2. Problem Solving Theory of Realism | |
| I. 3. Critical Theory and International Relations | |
| I. 4. A Postmodern Turn in International Relations | |
| I. 5. Turkey’s Foreign Policy as a Discourse | |
| Chapter II Genealogy of <i>Vatan</i> | 49 |
| II. 1. Ottoman Cosmology Facing the West | |
| II. 2. The French Revolution and Remaking the Concept of <i>Vatan</i> | |
| II. 3. Promoting an Imperial <i>Vatan</i> to Encourage Ottoman Patriotism | |
| II. 4. Young Turk Era | |
| Chapter III From Imperial to National <i>Vatan</i> | 98 |
| III. 1. Between Ottomanism, Islamism, and pan-Turkism | |
| III. 2. Imagining Anatolia as a National <i>Vatan</i> | |
| III. 3. Conclusion | |
| Chapter IV From Geography to <i>Vatan</i> | 158 |
| IV. 1. Geography Education During the Late Ottoman Period | |

| | |
|--|------------|
| IV. 2. Turkification of Geography after the Establishment of Republic | |
| IV. 3. Geography Education after the Second World War | |
| IV. 4. Conclusion | |
| Chapter V <i>Vatan</i> and Turkey's Foreign Policy Discourse..... | 207 |
| V. 1. Nonaligned Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1939: Defending <i>Vatan</i> against European Imperialism | |
| V. 2. Turkey's Foreign Policy Discourse during the Cold War: Protecting <i>Vatan</i> from the Enemies | |
| V. 3. Representation of the Soviet Union as a Threat to <i>Vatan</i> | |
| V. 4. Representing the Korean War as a Fight for <i>Vatan</i> against Communism | |
| V. 5. Cyprus: From Baby- <i>Vatan</i> to a Gangrenous Problem | |
| V. 6. Conclusion | |
| Conclusion..... | 289 |
| Bibliography..... | 293 |

Behlül Özkan

behlul.ozkan@tufts.edu

EDUCATION

- 2005- **The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University** **Medford, MA, USA**
Successfully passed the Comprehensive Exams on Geopolitics, Europe and the Middle East, May 2005
PhD Dissertation: “*The Social Construction of Turkish Vatan: Geography and Foreign Policy*”
- 2002 – 2005 **The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University** **Medford, MA, USA**
Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, May 2004
Honors Thesis: “*New Geopolitics of Energy Security of Europe*”
- 1993 – 1998 **Boğaziçi University** **Istanbul, Turkey**
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and Political Science

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

- August 2008 “Who Gains From the ‘No War, No Peace’ Situation? A Critical Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” *Journal of Geopolitics* 13, no.3 (August 2008): 574-601
- October 2006 “New Geopolitics of Energy in the Black Sea Region,” in *The Black Sea Region Countries and Prospective Relationships with European Union* (Tbilisi: International Black Sea University Press, 2006), 43-50

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

- April 2009 “24 Nisan Geride Kalırken,” *Radikal*, April 26th, 2009
- July 2008 “Amerikan Rüyası Kabusa Dönerken,” *Birikim* 230-231 (July*August 2008): 157-161
- November 2007 “Ermenistan’da İktidarı Değiştirmek,” *Referans*, November 16th 2007
- October 2007 “Milliyetçilik Kısırdöngüsünde Bir Ülke: Ermenistan,” *Radikal*, October 7th, 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- Summer 2009 **Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations** **Istanbul, Turkey**
Pols 439 Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Analysis

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

- February 2009 **Ties That Bind and Ties That Divide Conference, University of Pittsburgh** **Pittsburgh, PA, USA**
Speaker at the Seminar of Global Challenges vs. Local Interests
- Presented an article about Transformation of Geopolitical Discourse of Turkey
- January 2008 **Harvard Humanitarian Initiative** **Cambridge, MA, USA**
Speaker and one of the five members of the Turkish Team
- Participated in the Turkish-Armenian workshop as a speaker of the Turkish team composed by academicians and diplomats
- September 2007 **Beyond the Nation Conference 2007, Queens University** **Belfast, United Kingdom**
Speaker at the Seminar of Problematizing Ethnic Conflict in a Globalized World
- Presented an article about the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
- February 2007 **5th International Conference of Eurasian Political Studies Network** **Moscow, Russia**
Speaker at the Seminar of Ethnic Factors and External Challenges
- Presented an article about the Geopolitics of the Caucasus
- October 2006 **3rd International Silk Road Symposium** **Tbilisi, Georgia**
Speaker at the Black Sea Energy Security Seminar
- Presented a published article about the European Energy Security from the Black Sea perspective

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

- 2004- 2006 **BTU Ventures** **Waltham, MA and Dubai, UAE**
Assistant Vice President, Market Intelligence, Technology and Research
- Performed research analysis on various company initiatives and projects, especially in Middle East
 - Prepared and presented market intelligence reports in power and energy sector
 - Produced a comprehensive report on Turkish Energy Sector
- July 2003 **Botaş Petroleum Pipeline Cooperation** **Ankara, Turkey**
Analyst, Foreign Relations and Strategies Department
- Delivered a report on EU natural gas policy and Russia's increasing influence on EU's energy security

1998 - 2002

CNN Türk Broadcasting Company

Istanbul, Turkey

Foreign Affairs Correspondent and Regional Analyst

- Produced political and economic analysis based on visits to Iran, Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria and Azerbaijan, interviews with senior policy makers from those countries
- Conducted research for a television documentary “Azerbaijan, Oil and its Future”

PERSONAL

- Citizen of Turkey
- Languages: Turkish (native), English (fluent), German (fluent), Ottoman Turkish(intermediate)
- Exchange student to Cologne, Germany summer 1989, Moscow, USSR summer 1991
- Member of Eskişehirspor Football Club

Abstract

The traditional geopolitical discourse of Turkey is based on the belief that Turkey is located in a unique geography in the world and therefore Turkish homeland, ‘*vatan*,’ is besieged by internal and external enemies. *Vatan* has acquired an ahistorical and ontological status, considered as a timeless natural symbol of reality of Turkish nation state. Far from being neutral and authentic, *vatan* has been a historically constructed spatial grid, upon which various political forces have battled for the control of the national power structure and for the hegemony in physically controlling and representing the *vatan*. By problematizing the established geographical assumption of Turkey’s foreign policy based upon the nation being engulfed and surrounded by internal and external threats, the dissertation leads to an understanding that defending the *vatan* legitimizes and confers hegemonic status to the holders of political power.

Three noticeable cases in Turkey’s foreign policy are examined: political conflict with the Soviet Union after the Second World War and Turkey’s entry into the anti-Soviet camp, Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, and the Cyprus conflict. Defending the *vatan* was the common denominator in all these three cases: disagreements with the Soviet Union were reflected as an assault on Turkey’s territorial integrity, Turkey’s participation in the Korean war was defended by the ruling Democrat Party as protecting the *vatan* from a ‘communist threat’ in the distant Korean peninsula, and the Cyprus conflict was transformed into a nationalist discourse by depicting the island as ‘baby-*vatan*.’

The dissertation also analyzes how nationalist discourse had become established in educational materials, particularly how state education implanted national ideals into geography textbooks and promoted Turkish national identity and the country’s spatial and cultural features.

It aims to understand the nationalist representation of space in Turkey and the production of geographical knowledge by the Turkish state to justify its own power and authority over its citizens. Instead of considering national essences as commonsense and matters of fact, the dissertation deconstructs them to reveal processes of power and rhetoric. Processes rather than essences invent national homeland and national boundaries and treat them as meaningful.

Acknowledgements

Like any other Ph.D. student, at the end of the seven years long graduate study, I have accumulated many debts. I am firstly indebted to my parents, Nihat and Saime Özkan, who did everything possible to make my dreams happen. Without their support, this dissertation would not have been possible. I dedicate this dissertation to them.

I would like to express my gratitude to the director of this dissertation, Professor Andrew C. Hess. He introduced me to critical and interdisciplinary thinking. I also wish to thank Professor Alan K. Henrikson for taking time to carefully read the manuscript. I wish to acknowledge my enormous debt to Professor Feroz Ahmad, who guided me through my academic studies both in Boston and Istanbul. I am also indebted to Professor Georges Prevelakis. During his three years stay at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, I had mastered geopolitics with his support, advice, and encouragement. In addition, I would like to thank Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy that enabled me to pursue an academic career by providing an excellent education.

Last but not least, I am indebted to my beloved wife, Selin. She is an indispensable part of this dissertation. Without her support and sacrifice, I would not have finished this dissertation.

Introduction

In 2001, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, presumably one of the most democratic prime ministers in Turkey's modern republic, said, "In Turkey, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have a very special role defined by the nation's unique geographical circumstances. In terms of security, Turkey is located in a critically vulnerable region compared to Western European countries. Therefore, its internal and external security is indivisible. From this vantage point, European countries cannot set the example because Turkey is a *sui generis* embedded in a very delicate geopolitical position."¹ Ecevit's statement was not an extraordinary one in Turkish politics. On the contrary, it reflected the well-established rationale of Turkey's 'special' geography requiring a customized type of democracy that had been repeatedly articulated by generals, politicians, and foreign ministry bureaucrats since the end of World War II. As this rationale, which considered Turkey as seeking to maintain its territorial integrity against internal and external threats within the context of a 'dangerous' geography, gained an ontological, if not practically a metaphysical, status in Turkish politics, any argument criticizing this rationale was easily dismissed as marginal and failing to account for Turkey's special geopolitical characteristics. Even Bülent Ecevit, who had strenuously criticized the military coups and interventions in the 1970s and 1980s, internalized this geopolitical rationale in due course and defended it in the 2000s, when Turkey's membership in the European Union (EU) necessitated limiting the military's role in Turkish politics. This dissertation aims to deconstruct the

¹ "Ecevit: Türkiye'de Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin Özel Bir Konumu Var, Bize Bu Bakımdan Avrupa Ülkeleri Örnek Olabilecek Konumda Değil," *Hürriyet*, January 15, 2001.

established assumption that “only strong states can survive in Turkey’s geography” by identifying and analyzing its sources in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse.²

Max Weber’s definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of force* within a given territory” (emphasis in original) became a well-established dictum in the social sciences of the Twentieth Century.³ In line with Weber, who accepted the territorial element as ‘given’ and focused on examining the legitimate use of force, a majority of the political scientists have long been ensnared in the “territorial trap,” because they have neglected problematizing and questioning the territoriality of the nation-state.⁴ As James Anderson noted, “Nations, like states, are not located simply in geographic space, which is the case with all social organizations, rather they explicitly claim particular territories and derive distinctiveness for them.”⁵ The concept of homeland, the essential part of the nation-state paradigm establishing the link between the people and the territory, territorializes the national identity by creating the sense of belonging to the sacred soil and turning the imagined boundaries into physical ones. Moreover, in Turkey, the nation-state accrued enormous power by convincing millions of its citizens of the need for unification, even if that meant sacrificing their lives for the national homeland’s defense. While homeland provides physical space for the nation-state, it also reinforces the national identity by generating symbolic acts about the territory through geographical imagination.

² The quote belongs to Suat İlhan, the retired general who extensively worked on geopolitics since the 1960s and published various books and articles about Turkey’s geopolitics. Suat İlhan, *Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır? Jeopolitik Yaklaşım* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000), 36. For an exceptional study about the “geopolitical truths” see Pınar Bilgin, “‘Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography:’ The Uses of ‘Geopolitical Truths’ in Turkey,” *Political Geography* 26, no. 7 (2007): 740-756.

³ Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 78.

⁴ Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod, eds., *State/Space: a Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 2-3; John A. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 51.

⁵ James Anderson, “Nationalist Ideology and Territory,” in *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, eds. R. J. Johnston, David B. Knight, and Eleanor Kofman (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), 18.

In Turkey, the concept of *vatan* signified the national territory of the nation-state. *Vatan* – which, in Arabic, means the place of one’s birth – can be translated as homeland in English. But this translation is problematic and does not fully reflect the implied meaning of *vatan* in the Turkish language. In English, homeland refers to the territory of the nation-state but, in Turkish, it has occupied a predominating status in politics in general and in the foreign policy in particular. It not only refers to the national territory but also major political and legal concepts derived from the word *vatan* including citizen (*vatan-daş*), patriotism (*vatan-severlik*), heimat (*vatan-sız*), high treason (*vatana ihanet*), and traitor to homeland (*vatan haini*). Per the Turkish constitution, it is illegal to try the President for any charge except for treason to *vatan*.

The concept of *vatan* has also played an essential role in foreign policy discourse. The Kemalists waged the National Liberation War to save the *vatan* from the invasion by European powers based on the National Pact, which identified the geographical borders of the *vatan* in 1920. Since the establishment of the Republic, *vatan* has been the constitutive dimension of Turkey’s foreign policy and has been reconstructed continuously according to changing internal and external political and social conditions. Kemalists fought for *vatan* against imperialist powers and cooperated with the Soviet Union during National Liberation. However, after World War II, the ruling elites argued that the same *vatan* was threatened by Soviet expansionism and, therefore, Turkey’s entry into the Western bloc was the only way to protect the *vatan* from the ‘communist threat.’ While Turkey’s participation in the Korean War was represented as defending *vatan* against communism on the far side of Asia, Cyprus, in the second half of the Twentieth Century, became the baby-*vatan* (*yavru-vatan*) in the foreign policy discourse and unifying it with the mother-*vatan* (*ana-vatan*) constituted the popular national cause.

This dissertation suggests foreign policy is a boundary-making process to distinguish the internal from the external, the domestic from the foreign and ‘us’ from ‘the other.’ The nation-state, national identity and *vatan* in Turkey are not already existing and pre-political entities. Similarly, Turkey’s foreign policy is not an “external orientation of a pre-established state” defending its people and *vatan* against threats and dangers stemming from external enemies.⁶ On the contrary, these entities are constituted through the practices of foreign policy. Boundary-producing activities of foreign policy are never complete and fixed. Competing political groups always contest them, as foreign policy is central to the constitution, production and maintenance of Turkish national identity.

Although *vatan* has shadowed and influenced Turkey’s political discourse, it remains peculiarly unexplored and conspicuously absent from the analytical radar in the state-centric approaches common in social studies. *Vatan* has acquired an ahistorical and ontological status, considered as a timeless natural symbol of the reality of Turkish nation and state. However, far from being neutral and authentic, *vatan* has been a historically constructed spatial grid, upon which various political forces have battled for the control of the national power structure and for the hegemony in physically controlling and representing the *vatan*. The hegemonic political discourse carries an enormous authority in its capacity to define the physical and imagined boundaries of *vatan* and, therefore, the difference between the internal and the external. Correspondingly, such an authority allows the hegemonic political discourse to dictate who can stay inside the *vatan* and to exclude alternative representations of *vatan* by using the process of othering. This study refuses to acknowledge *vatan* as a pre-ordained, static, and unchanging spatial platform, but rather it seeks to explore how it has been historically conceptualized,

⁶ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 47.

reinstated and transformed as a constitutive territorial parameter for the Turkish nation-state. It seeks to politicize the uncontested principle of a natural link between Turkish *vatan* and nation. This dissertation focuses on the processes rather than essences involved in *vatan*'s imaginations and representations.⁷ By problematizing the established geographical assumption of Turkey's foreign policy based upon the nation being engulfed and surrounded by internal and external threats, the study leads to an understanding that defending the *vatan* legitimizes and confers hegemonic status to the holders of political power.

⁷ Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture:' Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (February 1992): 9-11.

Chapter 1

METHODOLOGY

In 1995, Ken Booth asked a fundamental question about the end of the Cold War that questioned the entrenched thinking of International Relations (IR)⁸ in the last five decades: “If academic International Relations theory could not adequately describe, explain or predict such a turning point in history, should it not be discarded as another of the failed projects buried by the Wall?”⁹ Indeed, the end of the Cold War provided an exceptional ground to validate the ‘scientific’ theoretical approaches of IR that have evolved post World War II and have disciplined the discipline. During the second half of the 1980s, when the dramatic events were happening in world politics, the IR’s performance according to the empiric and positivist standards was embarrassing. The prevailing discourse was based on the assumption that the bipolar world order and superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union would continue for the foreseeable future. Hugh Gusterson brilliantly pointed out this pathetic situation of the discipline by examining the subjects covered by one of the leading journals of the IR, *International Security*, in the last three years of the Cold War.¹⁰ None of the articles published by the journal during this time period discussed the possibility that the Cold War and arms race might end. *International Security* in that time period favored articles about

⁸ The term International Relations in capitalized form refers in this dissertation to the discipline, which studies the international politics in universities and policy centers.

⁹ Ken Booth, “Dare Not To Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future,” in *International Relations Theory Today*, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 329.

¹⁰ *International Security*, founded in the mid 1970s, is edited by Harvard University and published by MIT Press. Its editorial board included people from the Cambridge and East Coast establishment such as Joseph Nye and Ashton Carter (both of them served in the first Clinton administration), Thomas Schelling (one of the founders of game theory in security studies), Brent Scowcroft (Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2005), John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Robert Jervis, and Stanley Hoffmann. See Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War,” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 325-6.

modernization of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and reconfiguration of nuclear arsenal. The technocratic discourse of *International Security*, which regarded the arms race as a fact of life, contributed to the production of insecurities. The indications of the end of the Cold War, such as reform in the Soviet Union, were regarded as dubious and invisible.

As the case of *International Security* reveals, positivist Cold War IR lost sight of reality.¹¹ An academic discipline, which had started with a broad disciplinary agenda “to provide a comprehensive account of world politics as the basis for thinking about the creation of a better world,” turned into a “positivist cliché” to examine self evident international facts of the worlds of military establishments and foreign offices.¹² Realist academics totally neglected a fundamental transformation of the antagonistic Cold War system as a result of cooperation and peaceful agreements, since occurrence of such groundbreaking systemic transformation were deemed impossible in the ‘anarchic international sphere.’ There was little debate about the underlying causes of systemic change and the possibility that the Cold War could be peacefully resolved.¹³ Game theorists, security strategists and grand theorists continued their business as usual. For them, the only possible systemic transformation in world politics could have been possible as a result of a nuclear war.

Robert Keohane in his Presidential Address to the International Studies Association in 1988 criticized other research methods from the empiricist perspective. For Keohane, if alternative research programs seek to resist marginalization in the field by “empirical

¹¹ Realism in capitalized form refers to the dominant intellectual tradition and theory in IR with a rationale that the ‘reality’ out there can only be known by Realist methods and perspectives. Therefore, it becomes an ideology by claiming the true source of legitimate knowledge in the discipline of IR and by considering all other methods and theories unrealistic.

¹² Ken Booth, “75 Years on: Rewriting the Subject’s Past – Reinventing its Future,” in *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 330.

¹³ Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 2.

researchers,” they should transform themselves in “testable theories” as it is “impossible to evaluate their research program.”¹⁴ It is important to underline that Keohane delegitimized other theoretical approaches on the epistemological grounds of positivism. He determined, for the sake of science, what can be studied and what can be the subject matter of IR.

It is important to analyze the influential role of the Realist orthodoxy in IR. Due to its commitment to ideological ontology, positivist methodology, and epistemology restricted by these two, Realism has elevated itself to “the implicit ‘gold standard’” of the discipline.¹⁵ However, before examining how Realism became commonsense against other approaches, it is necessary to clarify the distinctions between the key concepts of philosophy of science within the IR, namely ontology, epistemology, positivism, and methodology.¹⁶ Ontology, in philosophy, is the study of the nature of being, or the ultimate reality with particular emphasis on determining what entities exist or can be said to exist. Robert Cox labeled this understanding of ontology as “Universality I,” which applies the universality that is a product of a specific historical period as a universal truth similarly to monotheistic religions. Cox differentiated it with the other meaning of ontology, which he called “Universality II,” a term that aims “to identify the basic constitutive factors that help toward understanding and acting upon a particular historical conjecture.”¹⁷ This approach defines universality as universal in a transitory way, the snapshot of a world in perpetual motion. In the case of IR, the key ontological premise that has governed Realism and

¹⁴ Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 392.

¹⁵ Steve Smith, “Positivism Beyond,” in *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 16.

¹⁶ As Colin Wight argued in detail, these terms were “thrown around like philosophical hand grenades” in IR without considering their specific uses in the philosophy of science. See Colin Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage Publication, 2002), 26.

¹⁷ Robert Cox, “The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order,” in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 45-6.

neo-Realism (Universality I) is that the concept of the state and the anarchy in the interstate relations constitute and account for international relations as opposed to sub- and trans-state political and economic forces. By depicting Realism and neo-Realism as “an ideology of the Cold War,” Critical Theory’s ontology (Universality II) is more suitable to describe the “real world” of the 21st century that takes into account factors like change in the world social structure as a result of economic globalization or transformation of the states system.¹⁸

The term ‘epistemology’ comes from the Greek word ‘episteme,’ which means ‘knowledge.’ According to Jurgen Habermas, science can only be comprehended by philosophy epistemologically, which means as one category of possible knowledge. Since Kant, two main schools of thought, absolute knowledge (Hegelian) and scientific knowledge (Descartes and Comte) blocked the development of an epistemological concept of science comprehended by philosophy, in which “science can be made comprehensible within the horizon of possible knowledge and legitimated.”¹⁹ This brings us to a positivist methodology of “scientism” emptied from philosophical thought that obliges the principle “that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science.”²⁰ Furthermore, positivism immunized sciences from philosophy to accomplish objective knowledge about the world by dictating the separation of fact and value, subject and object. Quite the reverse, Critical Theory underlines the entanglement of facts and values and denies the distinction between subject and object. It stresses the epistemological self-reflection and the “contribution of subjective activity to the preformed objects of possible knowledge.”²¹ Through self reflection, Critical Theory releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers and

¹⁸ Ibid., 46.

¹⁹ Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, translated by J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1971), 4.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 212.

overcomes obstacles for a self-conscious development of life. I shall examine this point thoroughly in the following sections.

Realist Hegemony in the Discipline of International Relations

International Relations emerged as a discipline at the end of the First World War with the establishment of the first academic department in Aberystwyth, Britain, in 1919. The controversy over the nature of world politics—whether it is based on peace and cooperation or the struggle for power and war—and the role of diplomacy in the causes and prevention of war, shaped the discipline in its earliest years. It was called the First Great Debate of International Relations. Scholars, labeled as utopians or idealists, rejected the balance of power politics, secret alliances, and the arms race among states. Instead, they emphasized harmony of interests, international peace based on reason, and creation of a world public opinion. They condemned nationalist reasoning, which had produced pointless violence during the First World War by prioritizing international norms and values: “to disseminate knowledge of the facts of international relations, and to inculcate the international rather than the nationalistic way of regarding them . . . for the world cannot be saved by governments and governing classes. It can be saved only by the creation, among peoples of the world, of such a public opinion as cannot be duped by misrepresentation nor misled by passion.”²²

²² G. Lowes Dickinson, *Causes of International War* (London: Swarthmore Press Ltd., 1920), 6. Other major works of the idealist international theory are Nicholas Murray Butler, *A World In Ferment: Interpretations of the War for a New World Order* (New York: Charles Schreibner’s Sons, 1917), Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage* (London: W. Heinemann, 1910), Murray Butler, *Between the Two Worlds: Interpretations of the Age in Which We Live* (New York: Charles Schreibner’s Sons, 1934), Gilbert Murray, *The Ordeal of This Generation* (New York: Harper&Row, 1929), G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy 1904-1914* (New York: Century Company, 1926).

Idealist reasoning was challenged by scholars, called Realists, who stressed a clash of interests rather than a harmony of interests in international relations.²³ The main assertion of methodologically positivist and philosophically Realist thinking was that international politics should be examined as it is, not as it might be. Three fundamental assumptions dominated the positivist reconstruction of social sciences and IR: 1) Naturalism, which argues that the natural and social worlds can be analyzed by the same scientific methods. 2) Empiricism: Knowledge of the world can be justified by empirical validation or falsification. 3) Objectivism: An observer can get rid of his/her values to discover objective facts without being subjective. Hans J. Morgenthau, “a crusader for realism,”²⁴ reasoned that “[p]olitical realism believes that, politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws.”²⁵ Therefore, the aim of a scholar is to obtain knowledge by observing the world ‘out there.’ By doing so, he/she detaches him/herself from the world of facts and becomes the external sovereign voice, independent from the historical and cultural context of human existence to observe and explain the world ‘out there’ objectively. According to Morgenthau, in this way it becomes possible to distinguish “truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated

²³ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1949), 62.

²⁴ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 599.

²⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), 4. It must be noted that in the first half of the twentieth century, well-known physicists such as Einstein and Heisenberg rejected crude positivism based on the objective factual world separated from the observing subject as the foundation of knowledge and scientific method. In quantum physics at a sub-atomic level, the natural laws of physics are not valid and probability is decisive in the movement of particles: “In atomic physics observations can no longer be objectified in such a simple manner; that is they cannot be referred to something that takes place objectively or in a describable manner in space and time. Here it remains still to be added that the science of nature does not deal with nature itself but in fact with the science of nature as man thinks and describes it.” In a similar way, 150 years before, Hegel criticized Morgenthau’s standpoint: “If physics were based only on perceptions however, and perceptions were nothing but the evidence of the senses, the activity of a natural scientist consist only of seeing, smelling, hearing, etc., so that animals would also be physicists.” See Werner Heisenberg, “Planck’s Discovery and the Philosophical Problems of Atomic Physics,” in *On Modern Physics*, ed. Werner Heisenberg (New York: Clarkson Potter, 1961), 20; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature Volume I* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 197.

by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.”²⁶

At the beginning of the Cold War, when government and foreign policy circles (especially in the United States) increased their demand for knowledge to oppose the globally ‘growing Soviet and communist threat,’ Realism provided a fitting rationale “for not appeasing the presumably unappeasable and therefore for the Cold War.”²⁷ “A new generation of Young Turks” labeled the interwar idealism as amateurish and accused it of ignoring the realities of power. For these intellectuals of statecraft, “struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience.”²⁸ Their agenda was based on the perceived interests of states and therefore elites in power and maximization of the state security. Essentially, what these scholars offered was exactly what the policy makers wanted:

[E]xorcise isolationism, and justify a permanent and global involvement in world affairs; rationalize the accumulation of power, the techniques of intervention, and the methods of containment apparently required by the cold war; explain to a public of idealists why international politics does not leave much leeway for pure good will, and indeed besmirches purity; appease the frustrations of the bellicose by showing why unlimited force or extremism on behalf of liberty was no virtue; and reassure a nation eager for ultimate accommodation, about the possibility of both avoiding war and achieving its ideals.²⁹

²⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4.

²⁷ William T. R. Fox, “E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision,” *Review of International Studies* 11, no. 1 (January 1985): 7. After the Second World War, an influential group of writers, called Realists, dominated the theory and practice of international relations. See for major texts of realism, Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, E. H Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939), Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, a Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense* (New York: Schribner’s Sons, 1944), John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946).

²⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 36, and Miles Kahler, “Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945,” in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 25-30.

²⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” in *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Relations* (London: Westview Press, 1987), 10. This article first appeared in the journal *Daedalus* in 1977.

The balance of power, which determines all key concepts—domination, national interests, state, and anarchy—in the international relations is never completed and always contested by revisionist forces to be formed under different conditions. The supremacy of power struggle among states could not be grasped without analyzing the fundamental characteristics of human nature. Reinhold Niebuhr’s theological views about international relations were very influential on Realism’s emphasis on human nature as the basis of power politics. Niebuhr argued that “the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior, make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end.”³⁰ Following in the footsteps of Niebuhr, Morgenthau pointed out that “the selfishness of man has its limits; his will to power has none . . . his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man became the object of his domination.”³¹ Consequently, man’s lust for power and domination, a drive which man has in common with “chickens and monkeys,”³² is transferred to the nation as states aspire to expand their control over others.³³

The postwar professionalization and government’s need for academic backing established three indispensable notions for Realism: state, strategy, and stability.³⁴ Studies beyond the state level, such as international peace, were ignored and labeled as utopianism or normative speculation. The emerging professional elite in the academia disregarded the research beyond ruling elites, such as general public audiences:

³⁰ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribners’ Sons, 1930), XX.

³¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 193.

³² Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 37n.

³³ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, 198.

³⁴ Ken Booth, “Critical Explorations,” in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 7.

[W]e put ourselves in the position of statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesmen may choose who must meet this problem under the circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the fact of international politics.³⁵

Morgenthau's instrumental rationality, which dominated the discipline for many years to come, had been challenged by a behaviorist approach in the 1960s, regarded as the Second Great Debate in IR.³⁶ However, this was not a paradigmatic crisis in Kuhn's terms as the behaviorist approach sought to renovate the Realist paradigm with scientific and quantified methods to verify the Realist theory instead of displacing its subject matter.³⁷ In the Realist way of thinking, knowledge is not constituted objectively but, on the contrary, according to the subjective interests of statesmen. For Realism "explicans and explicandum are of the same 'language system' . . . If proposed terms, concepts, and knowledge claims are not warranted and meaningful within just this frame—if they are not meaningful to statesmen—then they have no place in practical realism."³⁸ Therefore, knowledge must be dependent on its object of "political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated," namely the community of statesmen.³⁹ This is one of the most crucial handicaps of Realism as a 'scientific' theory of international relations. As Realists build theory "over the shoulder of the statesman," they cannot ask questions against the interests of statesmen. Ultimately, these scholars develop and sustain the institutions, political system, and mental images by acting as an ideological apparatus of the

³⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5.

³⁶ For the second debate in the discipline of International Relations see, Klaus Eugen Knorr and James N. Rosenau, *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

³⁷ John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 23.

³⁸ Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 213.

³⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 9.

statesmen and become the “organic intellectuals” of the ruling elite in Antonio Gramsci’s formulation.⁴⁰ As Richard Ashley argued,

[W]here competent statesmen are prepared to recognize problems, Realism will give voice to problems. But where competent statesmen have an interest in silence, Realism will be silent, too. Among these problems are those that would call into question the tradition within whose context statesmen demonstrate their competence, secure recognition, and orchestrate the empowering states.⁴¹

At the end of the 1970s, Realism entered into a crisis, since it could not comprehend the systemic problems of world economy and increasing trans-nationalist economic and political links and movements that challenge the capabilities of states. A number of American scholars reacted by developing a ‘scientific’ theory of anarchical structure of international politics. Neo-Realists agreed with Realist scholars on theory’s essential points, such as power, state, and anarchy.⁴² However, for neo-Realists, the explanatory power of unobservable laws of human nature is unacceptable along with positivist standards. They sought to systematize the discipline with a scientific endeavor by rejecting the impact of social dynamics of ethics, values, and identities.⁴³

Neo-Realists claimed that the permanent anarchy in the international structure necessitates self-interested states to act rationally for survival. According to Waltz, the unchanging anarchic international political system, “like economic markets, are formed by the

⁴⁰ The concept of “organic intellectual” is formed by Antonio Gramsci that is related to the dominant social class and acts as both an organizer of society and its diverse organisms and as its thinking element leading the ideas of their class. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 2005), 12-16. See also, Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, (1983): 168.

⁴¹ Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (Spring, 1984): 274-275.

⁴² Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 160-3.

⁴³ Keith L. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism and American Liberalism,” *The Review of Politics* 54, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 295-296.

coactions of self-regarding units.”⁴⁴ Therefore, states’ actions in anarchy can be studied ‘scientifically,’ similarly to how economists examine companies in market economies. A neo-Realist’s value-free stance is comparable to Gramsci’s “traditional intellectual,” who seeks Olympian detachment in his scientific search for truth. A neo-realist is interested in theory to give ‘impartial analysis and advice’ contrary to a Realist’s intimate relationship with the ruling elite (“organic intellectual” in a Gramscian sense).⁴⁵

Kenneth Waltz, one of the architects of neo-Realism, rejected Morgenthau’s argument of “the whole political life of a nation” dominated by “continuous struggle for power,” and proposed that “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.”⁴⁶ Neo-Realists criticized the Realist stance that the validity of the universal concepts “must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place”⁴⁷ by focusing on the components and forces in the international systems that “usually continue for long periods.”⁴⁸ Waltz labeled the Realist stance as reductionism since it concentrates the causes “at the individual or national level.”⁴⁹ Instead of examining the interaction between the parts (states) and their subjective perceptions in constituting the world politics, the theory must be holistic and concentrate on the anarchic structure of the modern state system. For Waltz, “similarity of outcomes prevails despite changes in the system.”⁵⁰ Against the concentration on observing

⁴⁴ Waltz used the analogy between theory of balance of power and microeconomics extensively. He compared oligopoly, where several firms dominates the market, with the world politics before the Second World War and duopoly, where just two firms control the whole market, with the bipolar world politics post 1945. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 54-55, 72-74, 89-94.

⁴⁵ Benedetto Fontana, “The Democratic Philosopher: Rhetoric as Hegemony in Gramsci,” *Italian Culture* 23, (2005): 108.

⁴⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* 6th Edition (New York: Knopf, 1985), 40. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 192.

⁴⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* 6th Edition, 10.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 329.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 18.

⁵⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 39.

political reality as a constant flux, neo-Realists preferred stable and structured reality, where they can examine actions of states scientifically. The object of theory is not states and relations between them, but independent and objective anarchical structure, which is regulating and directing its constituting parts, namely states. Instead of examining states that inevitably aspire to dominate others, neo-Realists prioritized survival and fear of domination of unit actors whose rational behaviors are functions of systemic forces. Furthermore, contrary to the Realists' argument of considering states a billiard balls in motion seeking for security in the absence of superior authority, neo-Realists used the metaphor of "cobwebs."⁵¹

Problem Solving Theory Of Realism

Against the reasoning of objective theorizing the world 'out there,' Robert Cox claimed that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose."⁵² Cox distinguished two types of theories based on their ontology, in particular, how they problematize the reality and how they systematize their purposes: 1) Problem solving theory, 2) Critical Theory.

Problem solving theory accepts the world it inherits and therefore legitimizes and reproduces the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions. By not calling into question the hierarchical structures, it contributes to the naturalization and augmentation of the organization of power within a state. The main objective of problem solving theory is to "make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble."⁵³ Realism in international relations perpetuates states and conflict between them by

⁵¹ Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 2.

⁵² Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10 (1981): 128.

⁵³ Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 88.

placing struggle for power in the center of social relations. By accepting the power relations as a given element of the national interest without questioning its social basis and social limits, problem solving Realism itself becomes a problem for IR. As all theories have a perspective derived from a position in social and political time and space, knowledge is socially and historically produced in a context, which is entirely dependent on identities and interests. Therefore, when any theory represents itself divorced from a standpoint in time and space, “it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective.”⁵⁴ From this perspective, Realism claims that it is a value-free non-normative theory as a result of its positivist methodology, which treats variables as objects and rejects moral objectives. However, resembling Cox’s phrase, theory is “for some one for some purpose.” This ‘non-normative’ stance disguises Realism’s value-bond feature of accepting the existing institutions and power relations as its parameters and its ideological bias of securing the perceived interests of states and its elites. Indeed, Realism is a powerful ideology with its enduring realities, such as power, anarchy, self-help considered as commonsense and self-evident truth, with the purpose of “obscur[ing] the real condition of society . . . and thereby stabiliz[ing] it.”⁵⁵

Martin Wight wrote an article in the 1960s with a title “Why Is There No International Theory?” His answer was because there is not much to theorize about in “international politics [which] is the realm of recurrence and repetition.”⁵⁶ Realism with its emphasis on ahistorical and unchanging objective laws—human nature’s lust for power for Morgenthau and survival in systemic violence for Waltz—was the perfect fit for the problems of the Cold War. Its problem solving nature legitimized and sustained the power relations of the bipolar world order. Its

⁵⁴ Ibid., 128.

⁵⁵ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: an Introduction to the Society of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), 36.

⁵⁶ Martin Wight, “Why There Is No International Theory,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen&Unwin, 1966), 17-34.

panoptic discourse interiorized *raison d'état*: “as prescription, it is committed to view of the state as a subject; consequently, as explanation, its energies are directed to the illumination of international history as the half mastered practice and partly staggered outcomes of state policy.”⁵⁷ Realism’s preoccupation with state is not its only major theoretical set-back. By giving ontological priority to the state, it has under-theorized the state and has not examined it seriously as a political unit comprising complex relations with civil society and economic structures embedded in historical conditions. Furthermore, the idea of the state has been treated as a transtemporal and transspatial structural invariable for ahistorical explanations. Realists converted the flux of human experience into an eternal theory of human nature, and neo-Realists turned history into structure where “diachrony is studied synchronistically; process is a matter of ongoing relations constrained by structure.”⁵⁸ Proponents of both schools of thought see international relations as a “timeless present,” centuries old unbroken power struggles and they shake hands with Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.⁵⁹ The Realist theoretical kernel, *raison d'état*, becomes a metaphysical commitment. By channeling rather than challenging thought, it labels any argument as unscientific that challenges and contests the existence of boundaries, legitimations, interests and capacities of the state. Despite its positivist and empiricist commitments for testing and falsifying theories, Realism’s state-centricity is immunized from any form of falsification. As Ashley argued, it excludes “the historically testable hypothesis that

⁵⁷ Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society* (London: Verso, 1994), 11.

⁵⁸ Rob B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” *International Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (March 1987): 74-80.

⁵⁹ It is difficult to find a book about IR theory, written from the Realist perspective and does not have a reference to Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. The Melian Dialogue of Thucydides is an eternal script for diplomats, Machiavelli was named as “the first important political realist,” and Morgenthau was inspired by Hobbes’ classical analysis of the “unlimited desire for power” in the *Leviathan*. These thinkers were anachronistically constructed as Realists to establish a powerful myth of origin and to give an authoritative position for Realism in the discipline. These classic texts were decontextualized and were turned into shadow plays’ puppets. However, since the 1980s, there have been studies to counter-memorize and deconstruct the foundational texts of realism. See Laurie M. Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes and the Interpretation of Realism* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), Rob B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 2.

the state-as-actor construct might be not a first-order given of international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which dominant coalitions legitimize and secure consent for their precarious conditions of rule.”⁶⁰

As Realism considers the dynamics of international relations as endlessly repeated regularities across time in the realm of power politics, it does not comprehend, let alone explain, the change at the unit or systemic level. Instead, it argued that under the same causal dynamics, the future of international relations will repeat the cycles of rise and fall of great powers. Waltz asked the question, “Will the future be like the past?” to which he answered that the same pattern of relationship will likely prevail and that it would be best of all that this should be so. He argued that “political structure produces a similarity in process and performance as long as structure endures.”⁶¹ However, the price paid for concentrating on “timeless features” and objective laws of anarchy and human nature is “the sacrifice of understanding the process of change in world affairs.”⁶² Indeed, the discipline missed the most remarkable change in world politics in the last century, the peaceful end of the Cold War. The intellectual framework, which had dominated the IR since the end of the Second World War, collapsed with the end of the Cold War contrary to the claims that it would endure everlastingly. While some Realists remained silent and insensitive about the systemic transformation, some considered the end of the Cold War to be “a mere data point.”⁶³ Hugh Gusterson’s questioning of Realism is worth quoting:

⁶⁰ Ashley, *The Poverty of Neorealism*, 238-9.

⁶¹ Waltz, 1979, 87. In the same book on page 66, Waltz argued in a similar way that “the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly.”

⁶² K. Thompson, “Toward a Theory of International Relations,” in *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, ed. Stanley Hoffmann (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1960), 35.

⁶³ According to Lebow, a prominent IR scholar, who was dissatisfied with the proceeding of the conference about the end of the Cold War in 1991 at Cornell University, insisted that the participants had not posed a theoretically interesting question. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), IX.

If the unforeseen end of the Cold War does not discredit the theories and assumptions of this variant of Realism, what would have, or what might yet? Would a US-Soviet nuclear war have been seen as discrediting their theories? Would fifty years of stable multilateralism now? Or bandwagoning in the new Europe? Or could ex post facto explanations be found for all these phenomena too?⁶⁴

Realism, with its problem-solving approach, treats all human activity as a raw material to find universally applicable objective laws. This major deficit caused its inability to account for major changes and transformations in the structure. Realism considers its basic parameters, power struggle or anarchy, as static and reproductive regularities outside of and prior to history.⁶⁵ With its scientific claims about transcending history and presenting universal knowledge, Realism plunged “into the trap of unconscious ideology.”⁶⁶

Critical Theory and International Relations

In the early 1980s, the discipline of IR was introduced to critical thinking by Robert Cox in his well known essay, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations.” Cox compared problem-solving theory with critical theory and argued that instead of seeking to define how the world really is, the latter insists on studying how worlds are made by social practices in particular historical and spatial conditions as a result of authoritative discourses which make, create and legitimize what people are saying, doing and being. Although

⁶⁴ Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War,” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 341. In a similar way, one of the iconic figures of realism, E. H. Carr, affirmed Neville Chamberlain’s radical change for appeasement and portrayed it as “a reaction of realism against utopianism” in the first edition of his well-known book *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* in 1939. However, this sentence disappeared in the later editions of the book. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1939), 14n.

⁶⁵ According to John Gerard Ruggie, the major problem of Waltz’s model is that he disregarded the dimension of change in the international system. Waltz did not take into account the shift from the medieval to the modern international system and lumped both of them into anarchy. See for detailed critique of Waltz, John Gerard Ruggie, “Review: Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-285.

⁶⁶ Robert W. Cox, “Realism, Positivism and Historicism,” in *Approaches to World Order*, Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 52-57. This article first appeared in 1985 as the new postscript to the reprinting of “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

Cox did not refer to the studies of the Frankfurt School in his articles, there are significant similarities that reveal the continuity between the two approaches.⁶⁷ More than four decades before Cox's article, Max Horkheimer published his seminal article, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in the journal of *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*.⁶⁸ Horkheimer claimed that traditional theory considered the world as a set of observable facts independent of the social framework and traditional theory claims that it is able to discover these facts to describe the world by using scientific methods.

These schools [positivists and pragmatists] consider the prevision and usefulness of results to be a scientific task. But in reality this sense of practical purpose, this belief in the social value of his calling is a purely private conviction of the scholar. He may just well believe in an independent, 'suprasocial,' detached knowledge as in the social importance of his expertise: such opposed interpretations do not influence his real activity slightest. The scholar and his science are incorporated into the apparatus of society; his achievements are a factor in the conservation and continuous renewal of the existing state of affairs, no matter what fine names he gives to what he does. His knowledge and results, it is expected, will correspond to their proper 'concept,' that is, they must constitute theory in the sense described above.⁶⁹

In contrast to Traditional Theory's orientation to explain the society by separation of subject and object, fact and value, theory and practice, Critical Theory challenged established positivist orthodoxy in social sciences by rejecting the principle of delivering truth scientifically

⁶⁷ Institute für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research), known as the Frankfurt School, was established in 1923 at Frankfurt University during the Weimar Republic. It gathered dissident Marxists, namely Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin and Erich Fromm, who severely criticized capitalism but were disenchanted with Marxism's narrow interpretation in defense of the Soviet Union and orthodox Communist parties in Europe. Instead of focusing on historical materialism, they were interested in ideology, culture, psychoanalysis, and aesthetics. When Hitler came to power, the Frankfurt Institute moved to the United States and returned to Germany after the Second World War. Major works include Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, translated by John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory / Selected Essays*, translated by Matthew J. O'Connell (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, translated by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, edited by Hannah Arendt and translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies* (London: Routledge, 1964), Herbert Marcuse, *Studies in Critical Philosophy*, translated by Joris de Bres (London: NLB, 1972), Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941).

⁶⁸ Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory / Selected Essays*.

⁶⁹ Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory / Selected Essays*, 196.

and objectively about the social world in a similar way to studying earthquakes or winds in the natural sciences. Study should be directed to the totality of society in its historical specificity. For Horkheimer, politics, an arena for emancipation and therefore for potential freedom, is inseparable from ethics. Theory with an emancipatory intent cannot be separated from practice as practice contributes to theory by setting its objective. Therefore, emancipation is an integral part of theorizing and there is no firmer foundation for practice than immanent critique. Critical Theory is a social thought rather than a homogenous school of theory or method that opposes wrongs and ills of modern societies on the one hand, and the ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ theorizing that legitimize those societies on the other hand. Theorists are part of the social processes making the world, and “critical theory makes the reflective self-understanding of the theorist a central moment in theory.”⁷⁰

The distinguishing feature of Critical Theory is its insistence on the inseparability of knowledge and interests. Social reality is founded on the dialectic between knowledge and interests. Therefore, knowledge with a social function is at the heart of social relations. Against Traditional Theory’s claim that facts are independent of the social world, Horkheimer stressed that facts are historically and socially preformed: “The facts which our senses present to us are socially performed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ. Both are not simply natural; they are shaped by human activity.”⁷¹

Jurgen Habermas, a prominent Critical Theorist, focused on the influence of “knowledge-constitutive interests,” which are a priori and shape the cognitive processes, on the construction

⁷⁰ Jay M. Bernstein, *Recovering Ethical Life* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11-12.

⁷¹ Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory / Selected Essays*, 200.

of social reality. Knowledge can become reflectively conscious of its own constitutive conditions, but cannot get rid of interests since they emerge as a result of humans' interaction with other humans in society. Subsequently, Habermas outlined three knowledge-constitutive interests: First, technical cognitive interests: Natural sciences are guided by an interest to extend control over objects in the environment. Second, practical cognitive interests: The historical, cultural and hermeneutic sciences are concentrated on "the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual understanding."⁷² There is a dialectical relationship between these two to define and generate knowledge and how to study it. Technical knowledge (empirical observation) is meaningful as long as it is communicated to others and therefore requires practical interests. Correspondingly, "what is open to inter-subjective understanding and interpretation is defined by what is deemed to fall within the bounds of the observable."⁷³ Only self reflection can change this internally unlimited but categorically bounded dialectical relationship and free ourselves "from entrapment in the causal nexus of nature and from patterns of social life permeated by relations of power."⁷⁴ Habermas called this third category "emancipatory cognitive interests." "In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a moment of emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection."⁷⁵ The natural and hermeneutic sciences are methodically ignorant of what they are doing as they do not critique their guiding interests under the name of objectivist attitude of fact picturing. However, by renouncing objectivism the emancipatory cognitive interests guide

⁷² Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 310.

⁷³ Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16, (1987): 235.

⁷⁴ Peter Dews, ed., *Habermas: a Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 8-9.

⁷⁵ Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 197-198.

critically oriented sciences to facilitate self reflection, self-consciousness and emancipation from hypostatized forces that produce self-evident truths. Critical theory interprets various empirical phenomena with the objective of abolishing the obstacles established by institutions and modes of thought with an interest in emancipation. Its objective is the construction of emancipatory politics, in which the individual is the subject not the object, based on the rational consensus between human beings without any constraints on human autonomy. It encourages all social scientists to reflect their cognitive interests and normative assumptions that motivate their research, without requiring that all research should be in line with the critical criteria.

Critical Theory of IR is not an alternative grand theory, which offers quick-fix solutions for a complex and turbulent world. It considers reality as an eternal flux of transformation, movement, and volatility contrary to the universalist and essentialist terms. By rejecting the reduction of diversity into unity, and heterogeneity into homogeneity, Critical Theory of IR aims to inaugurate new analytical frontiers that are beyond the reach of the disciplinary citadel of Realism. Andrew Linklater argued that Critical Theory has four major achievements in the discipline: First, against the positivist argument that knowledge arises from a subject's neutral engagement with an objective reality, Critical Theory maintains that knowledge always reflects preexisting social purposes and interests. In IR this understanding will recover the project of enlightenment and emancipation. Second, it opposes empirical claims about the immutability of the existing social structures that contain inequalities of power and wealth. With the theoretical assumption of all that is solid eventually melts into air, Critical Theory asserts that "man can change reality, and the necessary conditions for such change already exist."⁷⁶ Third, Critical Theory seeks to overcome the conventional Marxist principle of class power as the essential

⁷⁶ Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," in *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 280.

form of social exclusion and production as the crucial determinant of society and history by being inclusive without denying differences. It emphasizes a more complex account of social learning and discourse ethics in which human beings “can develop the capacity to engage all other in open and potentially universal discourse.”⁷⁷ Fourth, Critical Theory rejects that communities must deal with each other in the currency of military power. It embraces open dialogue and post-sovereign forms of political life to overcome the limitations of the bounded sovereign state. As David Held rightly concludes, “Whose agreement is necessary and whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, for example, the use of non-renewable resources, or the disposal of nuclear waste, or the management of financial flows, or the rules of trade, or AIDS? What is the relevant constituency: national, regional or international? To whom do decision makers justify their decisions? To whom should they be accountable?”⁷⁸

The Realist scholars did not ponder these types of questions and insisted on their loyalty to power politics and legitimated their line of reasoning with the assertion that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of deterrence strategy and the US military superiority. They continued to analyze important events like the Gulf War and Balkan Wars within the context of Cold War reasoning. However, just a couple of months after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Vaclav Havel, a politician and president of Czechoslovakia at that time, announced the end of the modern era “in which there was a cult of depersonalized objectivity, an era in which objective knowledge was amassed and technologically exploited an era of belief in automatic progress brokered by scientific method. It was an era of systems, institutions, mechanisms and statistical averages. It was era of ideologies, doctrines, interpretations of reality, an era in which the goal

⁷⁷ Horkheimer, *Traditional and Critical Theory*, 227.

⁷⁸ David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 292

was to find a universal theory of the world, and thus a universal key to unlock its prosperity.”⁷⁹ In this new era Havel rejected searching for an objective way out of the crisis of objectivism and suggested to see the pluralism of the world: “The world today is a world in which generality, objectivity and universality are in crisis. This world presents a great challenge to the practice of politics, which, it seems to me, still has a technocratic, utilitarian approach to Being, and therefore to political power as well . . . Sooner or later politics will be faced with the task of finding a new, postmodern face.”⁸⁰ In parallel with Havel’s suggestion, I shall examine the postmodern turn in the IR.

A Postmodern Turn in International Relations

Francisco Goya’s painting of *The Third of May 1808*, completed in 1814, is “revolutionary in every sense of the word, in style, in subject, and in intention.”⁸¹ It is considered one of the first paintings of the modern era. The painting is a clear break from tradition, which glorified war. For the first time, Goya portrayed war as a brutal, horrible, and inhuman event. He depicted the mass murder of Spanish rebels by Napoleon’s firing squads in a mechanical way without any aesthetic or spiritual grace. The main message of the painting is man’s inhumanity to man, and Goya’s hatred of it. *The Third of May 1808* inspired Pablo Picasso, and his paintings *Guernica* and *Massacre in Korea*, both of them demonstrated the sufferings that war inflicted upon civilians. In a similar path-breaking way, postmodernism refused to represent reality in an objective and foundational way as a cohesive and systemic whole, and rather argued that the objects and subjects of reality are discursively constructed and that their meanings are made and

⁷⁹ Vaclav Havel gave this historic speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on February 4, 1992. See Vaclav Havel, “The End of the Modern Era,” *New York Times*, March 1, 1992, 15.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Kenneth Clark, *Looking at Pictures* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 130.

remade by people in different times and places.⁸² Kant's famous dictum about the Enlightenment's critical *Weltanschauung* is the departure point for postmodernism: "Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit."⁸³ Under the influence of Kant, Jean Francois Lyotard, a well-known postmodernist who simplified postmodernism as "incredulity towards meta-narratives" and criticized realist art and literature as easily recognizable and understandable for viewers and readers.⁸⁴ Realism in art makes the world appear to be real in a way that people are accustomed to, prevents them from challenging established narratives and discourses about 'reality,' and in so doing "protect[s] consciousness from doubt."⁸⁵ However, critical thinkers such as Habermas accused postmodern thinkers like Lyotard, who wage an ontological "war on totality," of refusing emancipation and emancipatory art, one of the grand narratives of modernity, and rejoicing in the fragmentation of modern life.⁸⁶ Indeed, postmodernism stirs up the crisis of modernity's grand narratives, universalist claims of Enlightenment and all-encompassing theories and philosophies about the world. "Deprived of God's hiddenness of the metaphysical guarantees for the world, man constructs for himself a counterworld of elementary rationality, and manipulability"⁸⁷ based on notions such as the progress of history, the knowability of everything by science, and the possibility of absolute

⁸² Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne, 1994), 156.

⁸³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: St Martin's Press, 1970), 7.

⁸⁴ Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), XXIV.

⁸⁵ Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985*. Translation edited by Julian Pefanis and Morgan Thomas, translated by Don Barry, Bernadette Maher and Virginia Spate (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 5-6.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 12, and Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity: an Unfinished Project," in *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, eds. Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).

⁸⁷ Hans Blumenberg, *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, translated by Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 173.

freedom. Therefore, grand narratives are used by subjects to legitimize knowledge claims as a means of self-assertion, which “became the sovereignty of self-foundation.”⁸⁸

Postmodernism refuses the universal emancipatory ideal of Habermas and other critical thinkers, since full realization of harmony, a final reconciliation or a ‘fully inclusive we’ are not possible.⁸⁹ Instead of a universal grand narrative, which contends to represent reality with a view from nowhere and an all-encompassing perspective, postmodernism celebrated the plurality of perspectives based on Nietzsche’s thought: “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing.”⁹⁰ However, “a perspective of knowing” does not deny the possibility of knowledge by any means. It eliminates the possibility for any single perspective to have God’s view or to be an Archimedean point for reference and thereby to stay outside of the epistemological battle against other perspectives. After skillfully examining Nietzsche’s criticism of the objective and universal knowing subject, Richard Devetak argued that

knowledge is always situated, it always marks and is embedded in a particular position. As Nietzsche so forcefully showed, the subject does not simply denote a perspective, but is constituted by it. A perspective thus always also *posits* a subject. Nietzsche thus suggests that knowledge and subjectivity are fundamentally entwined: knowledge is always embodied in a particular subject, simultaneously positing that subject. Knowledge, qua perspective, always posits or positions a subject; it is thus always linked to ways of being-in-the-world, and indeed is a part of the world, not somehow extraneous or removed.⁹¹

Furthermore, Nietzsche rejects the notion of a priori subject behind human knowing and doing. On the contrary, a subject’s being is constituted by doing, and the knower is constituted

⁸⁸ Quoted in David L. Hall, *Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 27.

⁸⁹ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2001), XVII.

⁹⁰ Richard Devetak, “Theories, Practices and Postmodernism in International Relations 1,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 12, no. 2 (1999): 61-76 and Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 119.

⁹¹ Devetak, 66-7.

by knowing: “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; the ‘doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – deed is everything.”⁹²

By refusing to anchor subject and identity to an alleged deeper reality, postmodernism argues that both of them are outcomes of discursive construction. All objects, identities, statements, and concepts derive their meaning from discursively constructed systems of rules. Therefore, nothing exists outside of discourse. This stance does not reject the existence of external reality or material conditions. But it underlines the fact that we can never know the material world outside of discourses. A one thousand years old Byzantine ruin in the path of a planned subway line in a congested city such as Istanbul might be an object of cultural heritage or an obstacle for the improvement of the transportation network depending on the subject positions of archeologists or developers. In a similar way, an earthquake can be represented as a natural phenomenon or as an expression of God’s wrath: “The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought or with the Realism/Idealism opposition... What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.”⁹³ At the ontological level, a discursive approach shows that social meaning is contextual and relational and constantly renegotiated and reconstructed by particular systems of differences. Therefore, meanings and identities can be fixed only partially. Total closure of a discourse or discursive fixation is impossible. Because of ultimate contingency of meaning and identity, there will be other meanings and identities articulated by forces against and exterior to the order established by the hegemonic discourse.

⁹² Devetak, 76.

⁹³ Laclau and Mouffe, 108.

These exterior forces are indispensable for a discourse, as every discourse needs a discursive outside, which cannot be articulated, to constitute itself.⁹⁴

The main critiques of discourse theory are that its claim of relational identity and meaning and impossibility of the closure of any discourse reveal the conceptual relativism. Against these criticisms, Laclau privileged “the primacy of the political over social.”⁹⁵ Social relations defined as articulated sets of discursive structures are shaped and reshaped by political struggles involving antagonisms, exercise of power and domination. The political, the terrain in which articulations of identity and meaning take place, is the very ontological condition and inherent to every human society. Politics, which refers to the structuring of these articulations, deals with the co-existence of irreducible differences. Hence, “in politics there can be no truth claims to be settled as there can be no recourse to extra-political moral or epistemological foundations such as the free and rational individual, the common good or ‘philosophical experts.’”⁹⁶ The liberal and Marxist visions of the end of history and classless society respectively assume the end of politics and attach the political to systems of truth, order and norms. Instead of abolishing politics, for a radical democracy politics should take place everywhere without being limited by control, hierarchy and domination.⁹⁷

Robert Cox’s statement that “ontology lies at the beginning of any enquiry” underlines the main debate about the foundations of IR since 1980s.⁹⁸ Cox defined ‘ontologies’ as

⁹⁴ David Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 101-104.

⁹⁵ Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1990), 33.

⁹⁶ Torben Berch Dryberg, “The Political and Politics in Discourse Analysis,” in *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, eds. Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart (London: Routledge, 2004), 241-244.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 253.

⁹⁸ Robert W. Cox, “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, eds. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 132.

“arbitrary constructions; they are the specification of the commonsense of an epoch.”⁹⁹ As the emerging local, global, supra and transnational social forces and practices cannot be comprehended with static methods belong to the Cold War era, the postmodern turn in IR started to question the very ontological basis of the discipline: the state.¹⁰⁰ Recognizing state as the foundational ontology makes it the parameter of our existence. Knowing states “to be there means knowing that other people will act as though they are there.”¹⁰¹ Instead of considering the state as a transhistorical referent, postmodern scholars regard it as an intersubjectively constructed unit by acts and discourses of security strategies, domestic and foreign policies, diplomatic representational practices, interventions, and wars.

⁹⁹ Robert W. Cox, “Critical Political Economy,” in *International Political Economy and Understanding Global Disorder*, eds. Robert W. Cox and Bjorn Hettne (Halifax: Fernwood, 1995).

¹⁰⁰ I am aware of the fact that there is not a consensus in the discipline of IR on postmodernism, which is not a homogenous theoretical paradigm. As Seyla Benhabib says, “our lived time, time as imbued with symbolic meaning, is caught in the throes of forces of which we only have a dim understanding at the present. The many ‘postisms,’ like posthumanism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, postfordism, post-Keynesianism, and post-Histoire circulating in our intellectual and cultural lives, are at one level only expressions of a deeply shared sense that certain aspects of our social, symbolic and political universe have been profoundly and most likely irretrievably transformed.” Postmodern and poststructuralist scholars all accept the critical attitude as methodology to challenge the hierarchies of power in international politics and agree on major points such as the flux status of reality and the crisis of metanarratives. According to Lyotard, “postmodernism is not modernism at its end, but in a nascent state, and this state is recurrent.” For postmodernists, the modern is an open ended on-going project in a state of unremitting chaos to innovate, transform and progress. The postmodern is a dynamic force of continuous renewal and openness to create new ways of thinking and acting by challenging modern concepts and ideas. Rob Walker, David Campbell and other scholars in the discipline emphasized that they are more comfortable with the term poststructuralism than postmodernism. Walker claimed that while postmodernism comprises a complex historical/cultural condition, poststructuralism refers “to a more specific response to philosophical dilemmas that have become especially pressing under postmodern conditions.” In a similar way, Campbell argued that “while ‘postmodernity’ is the cultural, economic, social and political formation within modernity that results from changes in time-space relations, poststructuralism is one of the interpretative analytics that critically engages with the production and implication of these transformations.” However, if there is anything obvious about postmodernism and poststructuralism it is that they lack agreement on their own meanings and definitions. In this study I use the term ‘postmodernism’ when I refer to post-theorizing body of thought in the discipline of IR. See Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 1; Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985*, translated by Don Barry, Bernadette Maher, Julian Pefanis, Virginia Spate and Morgan Thomas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 13; Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, 188 and David Campbell, “Poststructuralism,” in *International Relations Theories*, eds. Tim Dunne, Milya Kurki, and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 212.

¹⁰¹ Robert W. Cox, “Critical Political Economy.”

Seeing that “to endeavor to think [about] the state is to take the risk of taking over (or being taken over by) a thought of the state,” these scholars reject equating politics with activities that fall under the sphere of the state.¹⁰² As global transformations force them to reassess the orthodox IR’s premise of locating the political only within the state, they conceive the political as a web of antagonistic relationships for identity constitution and therefore the ontology of the social. One of the necessary implications of this ontology is that reality is never a complete, entirely coherent thing independent of perspectives about identities and meanings. These different and competing perspectives themselves are the ways to construct and comprehend the knowable and identifiable ‘real world.’ For that reason, as Foucault claims, power is essential in the discursively produced knowledge about reality: “There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.”¹⁰³ Therefore, the notion of a transcendental subject which is outside of discourses of power must be denied. Subjects themselves come into existence as a result of political power struggles over control and domination of discourses, which prescribe reality meaningful. Theory is constitutive of practice by organizing, categorizing and knowing the ‘real world.’ According to the postmodern studies in IR, the social world is what we make it with our theories, which are not explanatory tools outside of the social world, as positivists claim. With the collapse of grand narratives that provide a secure foundation for theoretical and political truths, the notion of theory-as-practice overcomes the problem of totalizing epistemology and ontology and technical applications of theory to political practice: “Instead, postmodernism argues that a serious reflection on the relationship between theory and practice must be willing to question self-evident truths about the ‘real world’ and the agents of

¹⁰² Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 35.

¹⁰³ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison*, translated by A. Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 27.

change. Only then will it be possible to introduce modifications to the ways in which we think and act politically in international relations.”¹⁰⁴

At the end of the 1980s, a prominent scholar, Kal J. Holsti, announced that “international theory is in a state of disarray.”¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the foundational entity of mainstream IR, namely the state and its sovereignty, started to be challenged and problematized with the proliferation of theories. For postmodern approaches, the starting point is to question the legitimacy of the state’s sovereignty and its privileged central position to dominate every practice. The questioning of the legitimacy of the state is precisely the point that makes Holsti uncomfortable:

My view is that we have a distinct field of study, one that has its limits. The limits are flexible, but there nevertheless. Our field should be basically concerned with the relations between states, and relations between societies and non-state actors, to the extent that those relations impinge upon and affect the relations between states. When we go far beyond these domains, we get into areas of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology that are best dealt with by people in those disciplines.¹⁰⁶

These words reflect Holsti’s discomfort with the proliferation of possibilities under the absence of a sovereign center and nostalgia for an institutional order that can secure “the limits” and bring the puzzling reality under its hegemony again. “The limits” or as postmodern scholars prefer to use the term ‘boundaries’ must be deconstructed to reveal the impossibility of attempted closure and totalization of state sovereignties and their theoretical frameworks. However, the crisis is beyond IR’s imagined boundaries. It must be understood as a general crisis of endeavors to impose exclusionary boundaries when omnipresent transgressions cannot be held in the institutional spaces. As Ashley and Walker cogently argued, the effects of the general crisis in the discipline became visible as “feminist movements questioning the modes of social and

¹⁰⁴ Devetak, “Theories, Practices and Postmodernism in International Relations 1,” 73.

¹⁰⁵ Kal J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 1.

¹⁰⁶ Adam Jones, “Interview with Kal Holsti,” *Review of International Studies* 28, no.3 (July 2002): 621.

political discipline engendered as ‘masculine,’ ecological movements questioning the disciplines of ‘industrial society,’ peace movements questioning the disciplines of ‘national security’ estates, worker movements questioning the disciplines of ‘managerial order,’ ‘information’—these and countless words must be now written in quotation marks because the modes of disciplining domains of human conduct they would designate are now openly in question, in doubt, in crisis.”¹⁰⁷

Ashley and Walker highlighted eight essential issues to understand the postmodern or what they call “dissident” works of thought in IR. 1) The crisis happening in the discipline and in general is not an unprecedented event. A similar crisis occurred including the breakdown of traditional values in Athens at the time of Socrates, the dawn of Renaissance and the disintegration of the Church as a sovereign center of temporal authority, the end of Eurocentering geopolitical thought as a result of decolonization. 2) Although there is not an exact and definite origin of the crisis, the emergence of it can be attributed “to a proliferation of transgressions of the institutional boundaries that would differentiate, mark off, and fix time, space, and identity within a social order, including identities of subjects as agents of knowing and the objects that they would know.”¹⁰⁸ 3) Amid the transgressions, there is not any stable oppositional theoretical framework that can invoke a privileged interpretation to respond to dynamic and contradictory events. 4) This is a crisis of representation, as the subject’s presence

¹⁰⁷ Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” *International Studies, Special issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies* 34, no.3 (September 1990): 377. The definition of a dissident scholar can be outlined by Julia Kristeva’s question, which was also quoted by Ashley and Walker in the beginning of their article: “how can we avoid sinking into the mire of commonsense, if not by becoming a stranger to one’s own country, language, sex and identity?” In this special issue, a number of dissident IR scholars analyzed the problem of sovereignty and resistance to sovereignty from different perspectives. James Der Derian examined new technological forces of simulation, surveillance, and speed; Michael Shapiro focused on strategy, geopolitics and the formation of security policy; Bradley Klein examined how the politics of NATO was presented in a single master narrative by traditional theoretical approaches, Jim George and David Campbell argued that dissident scholars refused to construct an alternative paradigm with a sovereign center dominating the territorial ground and instead suggested to open up a thinking space.

¹⁰⁸ Ashley and Walker, 377-378.

and identity are disputed by contesting interpretations and correspondingly there is not any fixed and indubitable existence of an external object that might be clearly represented, “assigned a social value, and entered into circulation in a system of communication or exchange.”¹⁰⁹ The very possibility of the truth and meaning is in question. 5) There are two types of attitudes emerging in response to the crisis of representation: a) A celebratory attitude that greets opportunities for creativity to explore new modes of thinking as an alternative to restructuration of boundaries. It celebrates the crisis which opened a space for freedom of thought and political action. b) Despairing, dogmatic and religious attitudes, which fear the impossibility of retreating to an established foundational authority and imposing an ideal of identity or unity over the realities of difference and diversity, and at the same time a desire to construct a center of universal judgment to compensate for the lack and fix a space, a time, and an identity beyond question. 6) The above mentioned desire is the well-known political discourse of sovereignty used ideologically to represent “some source of meaning, some effective organizational principle, some mode of being already in place, some simply and self-evidently given resolution of paradoxes of space, time, and identity.”¹¹⁰ These paradoxes put all origins of truth and meaning in doubt. Sovereignty with its rootless and empty content cannot effectively police the boundaries to impose judgment beyond doubt and becomes the center of the crisis of representation. 7) The great texts of modern political discourse written by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Marx and others are read with different motivations to engage the crisis because they were written at times of crisis as well. 8) However, these texts become part of the crisis and contested by two ways of reading. a) Memorializing reading abstracts the ideal of “sovereign center that supposedly rules a text and might show us how to rule ourselves” and turns the text

¹⁰⁹ Ashley and Walker, 378-379.

¹¹⁰ Ashley and Walker, 383.

into a paradigm to fix the territoriality of the IR.¹¹¹ b) Countermemorializing reading acknowledges the fact that these texts were written in a crisis of representation. Therefore, instead of announcing ‘the end of the discipline’ in the face of contemporary paradoxes of space, time, and identity, countermemorializing reading enriches the discipline by revealing that similar paradoxes were studied by the discipline’s historical texts at their times.¹¹²

In 1979, Kenneth Waltz asked a rhetorical question about the future of states: “Who is likely be around 100 years from now—the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Thailand, and Uganda? Or Ford, IBM, Shell, Unilever, and Massey-Ferguson? I would bet on the states, perhaps even on Uganda?”¹¹³ However, thirty years later there are few scholars left as confident as Waltz about the endurance of sovereign states’ boundaries and at the same time the intellectual boundaries of IR. The right question is not that whether states will be around in 2100, but whether they will be very different from sovereign states of the 20th century. Writing in the middle of a global financial crisis, in which the subprime mortgage crisis in the US sparked a chain of bankruptcies in investments banks, insurance companies, and other large financial institutions all over the world, IR can no longer be considered “as the analysis of the relations between clearly and securely bounded sovereign states responding to the challenges of immutable anarchy.”¹¹⁴ The deconstruction or essentialization of boundaries is the fault line between postmodern and traditional theories of IR. None of the traditional theories of the

¹¹¹ Ashley and Walker, 384.

¹¹² An excellent example of a memorializing reading is Kenneth Waltz’s evaluation of Machiavelli and *The Prince*. According to Waltz, *The Prince* reveals the timeless *raison d’état* and rivalry to survive among territorial states. However Walker argued in a countermemorializing way that Machiavelli is interested in how to form a state and establishing a life of virtue within political communities. According to Walker, Machiavelli is less concerned with realism or power politics than with humanism, republicanism, and civic virtue. Rob B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30-48.

¹¹³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 95.

¹¹⁴ Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan, “Introduction: Boundaries in Question,” in *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations*, eds. Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan (London: Cassell Publishers, 1995), 4.

discipline seriously analyzed the state's determining role in the construction of bounded political communities and isolated them from the outside world. Nevertheless, the dramatic transformation of the nature of the political community as a result of globalization and fragmentation revealed the grave results of the negligence of how "the state privileges and excludes the identities it supports or marginalizes and the moral choices it permits or discourages."¹¹⁵ The constitution and function of boundaries is the core of politics since they play a significant role in inclusion and exclusion to distinguish the inside from the outside that is a never complete and always competed process by different sovereign centers and sovereign claims. Instead of acknowledging the state as an unproblematic and firmly bounded phenomena, postmodernism abandons the idea of the privileging state as an ethically and politically sovereign single subject and legitimating its social and physical boundaries.¹¹⁶ What is questioned and rejected is that the ideological boundary-fixing tendency of state based theories; not that "we can get along without demarcating boundaries."¹¹⁷ As Devetak rightly put it, postmodern studies reveal that "the inscription of boundaries is a political act par excellence. It gives shape to the limits and identity of political units, marking the point of articulation between inside and outside, association and dissociation, attachment and detachment, and the principles of bonding and seperability."¹¹⁸

The state sovereignty is disaggregated as a result of a multiplication of orders inside and outside of the state, such as proliferation of non-state actors and forms of cross-border trade, capital flows and conflict, diasporas, multinational companies, computerized financial markets, transnational terrorist networks, and global cities. However, postmodern studies revealed the fact

¹¹⁵ Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan, "Introduction: Boundaries in Question," 12-13.

¹¹⁶ Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 24 (1995): 41-42.

¹¹⁷ Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 184.

¹¹⁸ Devetak, "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory," 50.

that analyzing the state is crucial for the IR, not because it is ontologically prior to world politics. But it still has powerful resources to obstruct the alternative sites of power to fulfill the needs of people and convince its citizens that the loss of national identity and political sovereignty is the biggest danger to their security. Therefore, rather than accepting the state as a theoretical foundation upon which the political practices are realized, it should be problematized to create new perspectives for today's world challenges.

Turkey's Foreign Policy as a Discourse¹¹⁹

General İlker Başbuğ, in his first speech as the Commander of Turkish Armed Forces during the handover ceremony, underlined the fact that Turkey has been located in the middle of a turbulent region and quoting Napoleon he said that Turkey's geography determined its fate:

If you look at the geography of Anatolia and the history of this geography, you realize that only strong states can survive and weak ones disappear soon from history's stage... In its thorny geography, Turkey faces symmetrical and asymmetrical risks and threats. Therefore it has to possess solid political, economic, technological, socio-cultural and military strengths that support each other... Contrary to the conventional ideas, Turkey's conditions and difficulties due to its geography are not similar to some European countries. Such conventional ideas will cause tremendous delusions and irreparable results.¹²⁰

Explicit references to Turkey's 'dangerous' geographical location have not been made only by military officials, but in day to day politics, school textbooks, and newspaper columns by politicians, academics, and journalists. Democracy, foreign policy, and ethnic problems have all

¹¹⁹ There is definitely a confusion and carelessness whether to use the term Turkey's Foreign Policy or Turkish Foreign Policy. Although most of the non-Turkish scholars switch between them unconsciously, presumably because they are unaware of the fact that there is a crucial difference between the two terms. The adjective of Turkish has nationalist and ethnic connotations and emphasizes that Turkey is formed by a homogenous Turkish nation. However, when the republic was formed in 1923, it was named as "the Republic of Turkey" to signify that the territorial entity of Turkey includes a number of ethnic groups such as Turks, Kurds, Circassians, etc. In line with this founding principle of the country, I will use the term Turkey's Foreign Policy in this study.

¹²⁰ İlker Başbuğ, "General İlker Başbuğ's Speech During the Handover Ceremony of Turkish General Staff," August 28, 2008. Accessed October 30, 2008. Available from http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2008/org_ilkerbasbug_dvrtsl_konusmasi_28082008.html

been depoliticized and interpreted from the perspective of geographical determinism. As Bülent Ecevit said, “Turkey’s special geopolitical conditions require a special type of democracy.”¹²¹ In a similar way, a textbook for National Security classes, which is compulsory for every student in the 10th grade, warns students that “the Republic of Turkey, because of its geographical position, has had to face schemes devised by external powers. The Turkish youth needs to be prepared to deal with such schemes.”¹²²

Contrary to this deterministic discourse, geography is not a product of nature. It is an outcome of a historical struggle over the control of territorial space. As Henri Lefebvre argued, “space has been shaped and moulded from historical elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies. There is an ideology of space. Why? Because space, which seems homogenous, which seems to be completely objective in its pure form... is a social product.”¹²³ Parallel to this position, with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the ruling elites constructed a national territory—based on the Kemalist imagi-nation and ideology—to position the new Turkish state and nation within the world. Kemalist reforms were unprecedented in terms of combining Turkish identity with territoriality. Mustafa Kemal’s notion of modernization was fundamentally different from all previous interpretations during the late Ottoman period. He rejected all forms of ambiguous nationalism and patriotism, such as pan-Turanism, pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism and Ottomanism in favor of making Turkey an independent and territorially based state. However, official historiography and most of the existing studies of the Turkish nation and state claim that the essentials and identity of the nation and homeland paved the way for the state. This study argues

¹²¹ Quoted in Ersel Aydın and Dov Waxman, “A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey’s Entry Into the European Union,” *Current History* 100, no. 649 (2001): 385.

¹²² *Lise Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi* (Istanbul: Devlet Kitapları, 2004), 7, quoted in Pınar Bilgin, “‘Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography:’ The Uses of ‘Geopolitical Truths’ in Turkey,” 746.

¹²³ Henri Lefebvre, “Reflections on the Politics of Space,” *Antipode* 30, no. 2 (8 May 1976): 31.

that the nation should be considered as an “imagined community” without primordial and well-established identities.¹²⁴ Like all imagined communities, Turkey’s identity and Turkish homeland, *vatan*, cannot be understood as an ontological entity but a paradoxical and never finished one with multiple and contradictory identities that should be continuously aligned and integrated into it. Furthermore, Turkey is the imagined community par excellence. As the Kemalist elites sought to initiate a radical break with Ottoman history and geography to legitimize the newly established nation-state, their policy of the transformation of an imperial space into a national *vatan* engendered an aporia in Turkey’s geopolitical discourse.¹²⁵ On the one side there was a huge loss of territories considered as *vatan* and ruled by Ottomans for centuries and millions of people migrated from lost territories; on the other hand, they had to build a national identity and solidarity to unite people from different ethnic backgrounds based on the glorification of the liberated territories based on the National Pact.

The first question that this dissertation seeks to analyze is how had an imperial heterogeneous territory been transformed and constructed as a homogenous Turkified national vatan? Simply put, it is a genealogy or history of the present of Turkish *vatan*. Foucault articulated genealogy or writing the history of the present in an interview: “I set out from a problem expressed in the terms current today and I try to work out its genealogy. Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present.”¹²⁶ It does not aim to endorse uninterrupted causal relations between past and present. A genealogical approach analyzes the formation of the present in terms of its past and explains “how the present became

¹²⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1993), 6.

¹²⁵ Derrida defined ‘aporia’ as irreconcilable paradoxes, “neither monopoly nor dispersion.” Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe*, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 41.

¹²⁶ Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984*, ed. L. D. Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1988), 262.

logically possible.”¹²⁷ Genealogy rejects the search for truth in history. Instead, it problematizes how regimes of transhistorical and unproblematic truth in the present formed out of the past by discursive conditions, or to rephrase it in a Nietzschean way, how did we get here? “From a genealogical point of view, the present is all history, in the sense that everything in it has a history, including that which thought to be timeless, unchanging, given or original, has been elevated into metanarrative. Thus genealogy is not a history of opinions, but a history of knowledges and metastories which furnish other stories with validity and coherence. It does not presuppose objects, subjects, and concepts, but aims to explain their emergence.”¹²⁸ From a Foucauldian point of view, this dissertation’s starting point is the changing perception of space in Turkey in the post Cold War era in which the former narratives based on ethnic and political homogeneity are challenged and new meanings are sought after with respect to national identity and the idea of *vatan*. Since the 1980s, new domestic and global dynamics have challenged the former constructs of conceptual and cartographic boundaries of the Turkish nation. The emerging global temporal-spatial order has compelled Turkey to transform its state-based national identity into one that should include various groups in the society.

The next chapter genealogically analyzes the process of the construction of Turkish *vatan*. The genealogy of the *vatan* deconstructs the essentialization of geography within the constructed national ethos. Its focus is to contextualize geography in the economic, political and historical structures to better understand how the production of knowledge about *vatan* gave power to the ruling elites in Turkey. The third chapter examines the failed attempts to create an imperial patriotism based on Ottoman *vatan* and continuities and ruptures between what belonged to the Empire and what was imagined to belong to the Turkish nationalism based on

¹²⁷ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 7-8.

¹²⁸ Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, 73-74.

national *vatan* after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.¹²⁹ It argues that the traditional geopolitical discourse of Turkey is based on the belief that Turkey is located in a unique geography in the world and therefore that the *vatan* is besieged by internal and external enemies, played and still playing an important role for ruling elites to legitimize their undemocratic political decisions in the eyes of citizens and marginalize their political opponents. There are striking similarities between how ruling elites dealt with the left wing opposition groups during the Cold War and Kurdish opposition after the 1990s. Both were labeled as “traitors to *vatan*” and were seen as tools of external enemies to destroy the Turkish state. However, in the last twenty years, it became obvious that the traditional geopolitical discourse based on dangers and threats is not able to cope with new global challenges and opportunities. In a globalizing world, the traditional geopolitical vision, which advocates isolation and self-reliance, has been challenged by various groups in the society such as business associations and civil society organizations. As constructed mental maps by ruling elites to impose order and identity have become meaningless for people in Turkey to understand the world, the alternative and competing geopolitical discourses connecting Turkey with the global economy have become prevalent.

The fourth chapter analyzes how nationalist discourse had become established in educational materials, and particularly how state education implanted national ideals into geography textbooks and promoted Turkish national identity and the country’s spatial and cultural features. The comparison of the geography textbooks published in Turkey before and after 1923 reveals that the newly established Turkish state effectively used education to construct spatial consciousness about the national homeland and to popularize collective national duties.

¹²⁹ According to Bernard Lewis, “Kemal [Atatürk] sought to adapt and inculcate the new idea of an Anatolian Turkish fatherland. His aim was to destroy what remained of the Islamic and Ottoman feelings of loyalty, to counter distractions of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist appeals, and to forge a new loyalty, of the Turkish nation to its homeland.” Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 358-359.

The spatial representations used in geography textbooks, such as maps and images, changed considerably with the establishment of the Republic. The analysis of this transformation reveals that the nationalist ideology used various forms of exclusion, active forgetting, and images of the ‘Other’ to unite people inhabiting the territories saved from ‘foreign invaders’ and named them as ‘Turks,’ whose national duty was to defend the Turkish *vatan*.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the ‘Soviet danger’ had a major impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. To proclaim the end of the ‘Soviet danger’ for Turkey, however, presumes that there is an unproblematic understanding about what the exact nature of the ‘Soviet danger’ was for Turkey’s security. As David Campbell rightly put it for the Cold War, “in considering the issue of where we go from here, there is a tendency to uncritically accept a particular story of how we got to here.”¹³⁰ ***From this point of view, the second question that this dissertation aims to analyze is the “particular story” of how representations of threats and dangers to the security of vatan occupied an important role in the formation of Turkey’s foreign policy during the Cold War.*** The conventional understanding of most of the existing studies posits that the Soviet proposals and ‘threats’ provided the organizing principle for Turkey’s foreign policy during the Cold War. William Hale, who wrote one of the most comprehensive books about Turkey’s foreign policy, argued that just after the Second World War, “Turkey’s territorial integrity and its future as an independent state was gravely threatened by a resurgent Russia, and that Turkey urgently needed to find allies to fend it off.”¹³¹ According to Hale, Turkey’s joining into the anti-Soviet Western alliance was unavoidable as “Turkey was forced into the Western camp in the Cold War because it was directly threatened by the Soviet

¹³⁰ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, 15.

¹³¹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 109.

Union.”¹³² In the same way, Kemal Karpat claimed that “it was the immensity of Soviet military power and her insatiable ambition for territorial and ideological expansion in 1946, which forced Turkey to seek full affiliation with the West almost at any price, and embark at the same time upon a policy of identification with the West in the economic, social, political and cultural fields. Probably at no time in history was the Westernization of Turkey so intensive and one sided as in the period after WWII, and this thanks to the pressure coming from the Soviet Union.”¹³³ This dissertation refuses to give the ‘Soviet danger’ an ontological status in Turkey’s foreign policy. Instead it argues that terms like ‘danger,’ ‘security,’ and ‘threat’ are not objective entities that exist “independently of those to whom it may become a threat.”¹³⁴ Their meaning is contingent upon the contemporary dynamics of foreign policy discourses. The construction of dangers is central for foreign policy making to control and discipline the political struggle over identity and power. Therefore, Turkey’s foreign policy during the Cold War cannot be understood by considering the prior existence of a ‘Soviet danger’ to the territorial integrity of Turkey as argued by Hale and Karpat.

There are three noticeable cases in Turkey’s foreign policy during the Cold War that are examined in the fifth chapter: political conflict with the Soviet Union after the Second World War and Turkey’s entry into the anti-Soviet camp, Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, and the Cyprus conflict. These three case studies signify a fundamental rupture with Turkey’s “anti-imperialist and pro-collective security stance” in its foreign policy during Mustafa Kemal’s period between 1923 and 1938.¹³⁵ They reveal how foreign policy practices had been used successfully by ruling elites to create external enemies. Ruling elites marginalized any

¹³² William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 110.

¹³³ Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 2.

¹³⁴ David Campbell, *Writing Security*, 1.

¹³⁵ Tefik Rüştü Aras, *Görüşlerim* (Istanbul: Tan Basımevi, 1945), 36.

opposition groups—left wing and socialist parties, anti-war and anti-colonialist groups—that questioned and challenged their policies, as collaborators of the enemies inside of Turkey and delegitimized them in the eyes of people by labeling them as ‘traitors to *vatan*.’ Defending the *vatan* was the common denominator in all these three cases: disagreements with the Soviet Union were reflected as an assault on Turkey’s territorial integrity, Turkey’s participation in the Korean war was defended by the ruling Democrat Party as protecting the *vatan* from a ‘communist threat’ in the distant Korean peninsula, and the Cyprus conflict was transformed into a nationalist discourse by depicting the island as ‘baby-*vatan*.’

During a conference at the Turkish Military Academy in March 2002, General Tuncer Kılınç, Secretary General of the National Security Council, publicly suggested an alliance between Turkey, Iran and Russia against the EU.¹³⁶ General Kılınç’s remarks represented doubts about further integration with the EU, which the majority of the Westernist military-bureaucratic elite of Turkey shares. Eight months after this event, the ‘Islamist’ Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power obtaining almost a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The new JDP government subsequently initiated unprecedented economic and political reforms to include abandoning the traditional anti-EU discourse of Islamist politics. These pro and anti EU foreign policy positions are important examples, as they reveal the confusion and uncertainty of Turkish decision makers about how to position Turkey geopolitically in the post Cold War era. In this context, Turkish decision makers “surrounded by the debris of the old geopolitical order” are challenged by the task of casting a new foreign policy for Turkey.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ General Tuncer Kılınç’s exact words were as follows: “On problems that concern its national interests, Turkey does not get support from the EU. Russia too finds itself alone. Therefore, I think that, without disregarding the United States, there is a need to enter into a new quest, a quest which would encompass Iran as well,” *Turkish Daily News*, March 9, 2002.

¹³⁷ John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space* (London: Routledge, 1995), 227.

With the end of the bipolar system, international politics entered into a geopolitical vertigo. During the last two decades, fixed and state based territorial representations of space have been challenged by global dynamics of transnational economic and cultural networks. To answer the question “Where do we belong?” for citizens of states is more difficult today than when it was thirty years ago. *The third question that this dissertation addresses is how the emerging global temporal-spatial order has compelled Turkey to embrace a new and meaningful geopolitical discourse by transforming its state-based national identity and foreign policy into one that should include various groups in the society.* In a global world where boundaries—including political, cultural and territorial—open and further develop into spaces of transboundary interaction, Turkey is becoming part of the global community. In this rapidly transforming environment, alternative and diverse interpretations of identity and foreign policy are emerging and competing with each other. Turkish society is becoming more heterogeneous where “the legitimation of various forms of inclusion and exclusion” are not as stable and clear as they have been in the past.¹³⁸ As it had been done during the Cold War, danger cannot be constructed as ‘out there,’ and security cannot be provided ‘in here.’ A foreign policy discourse that claims to provide order and security in a sovereign territory has lost its capacity as “it makes little sense to speak of politics occurring in terms of a distinct ‘inside’ or ‘outside.’”¹³⁹ The reconstruction of the meanings of territory and nation in Turkey under the strong currents of the globalization process is both stirring up new discourses on national identity and hindering the consensus of Turkey’s new foreign policy direction.

¹³⁸ Rob B. J. Walker, *International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 21-22.

¹³⁹ David Campbell, *Writing Security*, 18.

The period of change in Turkey beginning in the second half of the 1980s was crystallized in Turkey's relationship with the EU. Accession to the European Union has been the main point of reference for the formation of Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, I use Turkey's integration process into the EU as a case study to examine Turkey's changing geopolitical discourse and foreign policy in the last two decades. Business elites and civil society consider EU membership as Turkey's new foreign policy objective. Their interests lie in integrating Turkey into the global economy. To accomplish this objective, this pro-EU camp seeks to equate Turkish modernity with increased liberalization and democratization. On the other hand, the Euro-skeptics, namely the military-bureaucratic elite, insist on maintaining Turkey's traditional foreign policy by arguing that Turkey's unique geographic location requires a special type of democracy that is more restrictive, elite-based and isolationist. These competing dynamics of "integration and disintegration at both sub- and supra-state levels" reveal the transformation happening in Turkey in the last two decades.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in *Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 10.

Chapter 2

Genealogy of *Vatan*

In the last two centuries, nation-states have become the prevailing form of political and social organization. The success of the nation-state largely depends on its construction of individual and group identities based on bounded territories, in which it legitimized its monopoly of power. To put it briefly, territoriality emerged as a significant form of power. However, to attain uniformity within its territory, nation-state had to abolish the heterogenic organizational structure of the political system it succeeded. In the case of Turkey, the *millet* system, in which people were bound to their autonomous religious institutions—these institutions were the backbone of the political and legal system that played an intermediary role between people and state—was replaced with direct loyalty and identification of citizens to the state. It was a very complicated process, as it required the constructing of borders of the national identity and territory in an imperial space formed by multiple religious groups segmented horizontally and separated by fluid frontier zones. In Turkey and in other Middle Eastern societies, this process also necessitated the transformation of value-based ontological self-perception (*Selbstverständnis*) of Islamic civilization into a completely different mechanism-based self-perception of the Western civilization.¹⁴¹ The difference between these two self-perceptions can be most clearly seen in political concepts such as nation-state and *ummah*. It is difficult to find a corresponding term for the nation-state in Turkish, Persian and Arabic and similarly for *ummah* in Western languages. In the 20th century, as Muslim societies started to be shaped by the newly founded nation-states, the modernizing ruling-elites faced an arduous task of creating national societies and national homelands in place of *ummah* and *Dar al-Islam*. They faced a political

¹⁴¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory* (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 6-7.

legitimacy problem, while creating a new understanding of state: “State began to be visualized as a sovereign element within the international system instead of a political instrument for the ethico-legal ideals of the Islamic belief system. Thus, the imagination of *Dar al-Islam* as an alternative world order was replaced by imagination of being an element of the international system which was established by and based on the interests of the colonial powers.”¹⁴² To better understand the construction of the nation state and national *vatan* in Turkey, firstly, I will examine the perception of space in the Ottoman Empire and how it had changed as a result of military defeats and continuous loss of territory.

Ottoman Cosmology Facing the West

Cosmology is the philosophical and scientific study of the nature and the structure of the universe. Islamic theocentric cosmology is based on the concept of *tawhid* (*La ilaha illa Allah*), the code of declaring God to be one and not composed of parts. The most important consequence of *tawhid* is that it created an ontological hierarchy from God to human being and from human being to nature in which the “transcendence and unity of Allah are the prime and only cause of all that take place.”¹⁴³ The difference between the God-centered Islamic political justification and the nature-centered Western political justification has significant political and social consequences. Western political philosophy put state of nature at its center and developed mechanisms of sovereignty to legitimize the state authority. In the case of Islamic political philosophy, the main objective is to establish a state to fulfill justice on behalf of Allah on earth. Whereas the former prioritized political institutionalization and contractual-consensual methods to rationalize the obedience to the political authority and to law, the latter emphasized the

¹⁴² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Alternative Paradigms*, 193-194.

¹⁴³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Alternative Paradigms*, 48-49.

dependence of political authority on the divinely based eternal value-system. The values of social order and justice constituted the basic political philosophy of the Ottoman Empire summarized in the formula of “Circle of Equity”: “a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice.”¹⁴⁴

The Ottoman worldview (Weltanschauung) organized knowledge about the world in four dimensions.¹⁴⁵ Two dimensions were related to the space. The first one is the Islamic cosmography, which explains the creation, the cosmos, and the physical realities in the world as a manifestation of the omnipotence of God. Ibn al-Arabi’s explanation of the spherical form of the created universe is an example of this tradition:

Know that since the world is spherical, man yearns for his beginning [when he reaches] his end; thus our coming into existence from nonexistence is from God and to him shall we return, since he said, ‘everything will be returned to him’ [11:23], and he said, ‘and fear the day when you shall be brought back to Allah’ [2:281], and he said, ‘he is the place of destination’ [5:18 and others], and ‘the end of all things belongs to him’ [31:22]. Do you not see that when you start drawing a circle . . . you do not stop drawing it until you reach its beginning [point] and [only] then it is a circle? . . . everything and every being is a circle returning to him from whom it originated.¹⁴⁶

The second dimension related to space is geography, which sought to explain physical conditions of regions and laws of nature. However, it was completely different from the modern understanding of geography as political and military approaches were almost disregarded by authors. Esthetic enjoyment played a more important role in maps and miniatures, and geographical books about other parts of the world were mainly interested in exotic creatures,

¹⁴⁴ Halil İnalçık, “Turkey,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 43.

¹⁴⁵ Gottfried Hagen, “Ottoman Understanding of the World in the Seventeenth Century,” in *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Celebi*, ed. Robert Dankoff (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 215-216.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in Ahmet T. Karamustafa, “Cosmographical Diagrams,” in *The History of Cartography: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies*, eds. J. B Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 74.

supernatural forces, and mythical legends. The remarkable work of Piri Reis—a world map with recent discoveries (1513) that included more information than Columbus knew after his last voyage—had not received major interest until it was rediscovered in 1929. In a similar way, *Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi* (A History of the West India), a book about the New World written around 1580, was more interested in illustrating animals and local inhabitants than in the activities of Europeans. In the 16th century when the empire was expanding, the Ottomans did not need to incorporate the extensive information about the geographic discoveries into their political practices. For Ottomans, conquering Egypt with its prosperous resources made much more sense than pondering the unknown New World.¹⁴⁷

The third dimension is time in a historical conception. In the traditional Ottoman history, the empire occupied the central position of the universe based on the Ptolemaic geocentric model. It was regarded as the inheritor of the Muslim dynasty, which started with the Prophet Muhammad and continued with four caliphs, the Umayyads and Abbasids down to the Ottomans. The fourth dimension, the theology, which explains the relation between man and God, is the dominant one in interpreting cosmology, geography and history. Metaphorically, “looking around ([cosmography] and geography) and looking back (history) are inextricably linked to looking up (theology).”¹⁴⁸ In the 17th century, this Ottoman worldview was challenged on all four levels. In the dimension of theology, the emergence of unorthodox religious sects such as Kadızadeli and Sabetai movements destabilized the political-religious structure of the empire. In history and cosmology, most of the Ottoman intellectuals recognized in an Ibn Khaldunian way, that the empire passed its zenith during the rule of Süleyman the Lawgiver

¹⁴⁷ Thomas D. Goodrich, *The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth Century Ottoman Americana* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1990); Svat Soucek, “Piri Res and Ottoman Discovery of the Great Discoveries,” *Studia Islamica* 79 (1994): 121-142; Andrew C. Hess, “Piri Reis and the Ottoman Response to the Voyages of Discovery,” *Terrae Incognitae* 6 (1974): 19-37.

¹⁴⁸ Gottfried Hagen, “Ottoman Understanding of the World in the Seventeenth Century,” 216.

(1520-1566) and that it was not located in the center of the universe anymore. While the stability of the political-religious state structure was shaking and the conquest towards infidel lands was brought to a standstill, some Ottoman polymaths started to question the traditional spatial consciousness.

Katip Çelebi (1609-1657) is one of the most prominent geographers in the empire's seven centuries long history. Contrary to his precursors, Katip Çelebi considered geography as an important tool for statesmen to be employed in political and military strategies. Geography provided them the opportunity to journey to the foreign countries and to acquire information from maps without travelling in these countries:

For those who are in charge of affairs of the state, the science of geography is a matter of which knowledge is necessary. It may be not easy for them to be familiar with what the entire globe is like, but they ought at least to know the map of the Ottoman Empire and of those countries adjoining it. Then, when they have sent forces on campaign, they can proceed on the basis of the knowledge, and so the invasion of the enemy's land and also the protection and defense of the frontiers becomes an easier task. Taking counsel with individuals who are ignorant of that science is no satisfactory substitute, not even when such men are local experts. Most such local experts are entirely unable to sketch the map of their regions. Sufficient and convincing proof of the necessity for learning this science is the fact that the infidels, by their application to and their esteem for those branches of learning, have discovered the New World and have over-run the markets of India. Even the despicable Venetians, a nation the chief of which among the infidel kings is confined to the title of Duke, and is known by the epithet of the fishermen, coming to the straits of the Ottoman Empire, have opposed to the power of our noble state, who rules from east to the west.¹⁴⁹

Katip Çelebi's views reflect a shift in the traditional Ottoman spatial consciousness. The reason for this shift was that the "infidels" were no longer limited to their part of the world and conquered the New World and India. Although Europeans had not invaded the empire's

¹⁴⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibar Fi Esfari'l-Bihar* (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık ve Basım Sanayii, 1980), 5. Katip Çelebi wrote this book in 1656 as a result of the Ottoman defeat in the beginning of the campaign of Crete. His objective was to warn the Ottoman statesmen about their mistakes and unawareness. The book was translated into English and French; see, Haji Khalifeh, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, translated by James Mitchell (London: A. J. Valpy, 1831).

territories yet, their supremacy in sailing—resulting in controlling the trade routes—was threatening the Ottoman Empire’s economic and political interests. For Katip Çelebi, to counter the European advance, rulers cannot continue to be ignorant about affairs of “infidels” and should expand their cartographical and geographical knowledge.

Katip Çelebi wrote his most admired work, *Cihannüma*, between the years 1648-1654 to compile a universal geography book. Even the name of the book—which means literally roof terrace with a wide view and interpreted as the mirror of the world (Cosmorama in Latin)—hints his intention. Because of the importance of the information it included, *Cihannüma* became one of the 17 books printed in the Ottoman’s first printing office in 1732, eight decades after it was written.¹⁵⁰ The foremost characteristic of *Cihannüma*, which was unsurpassed by any Ottoman study until the 19th century, was its systematic methodology. In the science of geography, how to partition the world is a major challenge to describe the differences in the earth’s surface. Islamic geographers before Katip Çelebi divided the known world according to people’s inhabitation into seven *iklîms* (*klima* in Greek), a mathematical and astronomic concept derived from Ptolemy’s system.¹⁵¹ Although Katip Çelebi did not completely reject this understanding, he partitioned the world into six continents: Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Magellenica (Australia), and North and South Poles.¹⁵² Then he divided continents into territorial units called *memleket*. For him, a

¹⁵⁰ Because of Katip Çelebi’s untimely death, *Cihannüma* remained unfinished. When it was printed in 1732, out of 698 pages 325 was added by İbrahim Müteferrika. Also the printed version included 27 maps and 13 charts. In the preface of the book, Müteferrika underlined that the reason for printing *Cihannüma* was that “the permanence of the state and religion, the protection of the country and nation, the recording of history and events, the conservation of agriculture, education and works of art can only be possible by recording knowledge of books.” Bülent Özükan ed., *Kitab-ı Cihannüma* (Istanbul: Boyut, 2008), 124.

¹⁵¹ All seven *iklîms* are located in the northern hemisphere. The first *iklim* is located between 0-15 parallels, the second between 15-20 parallels, the third between 20-28 parallels, the fourth between 28-34 parallels, the fifth between 34-39 parallels, the sixth between 39-44 parallels, and the seventh between 44-48 parallels. It is assumed there are no *iklîms* in the further north of 48 parallel and in the southern hemisphere. See the reprinted version of *Cihannüma* in Turkish and English; Bülent Özükan, *Kitab-ı Cihannüma*, 62-63.

¹⁵² A. Adnan Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), 130. Bernard Lewis argued that “until the nineteenth century, Muslim writers on history and geography knew nothing of the names which Europeans

geographer should inform his readers about the history and politics of the *memleket*. This represents a transition from “the additive structure of older Islamic geography to analytical regional geography which describes a region in its entirety.”¹⁵³ According to Katip Çelebi, if a geographer restricts himself with the physical characteristics of space, “he will turn to a painter who portraits a naked dead body.”¹⁵⁴ He criticizes previous Islamic geographical works for trying to portray the world by words and sentences and therefore ignoring maps. On the first page of *Cihannüma*, he mentioned the importance of cartography for geographical studies. For him, voyagers, who travelled the world in their lifetime, cannot match people, who acquired the geographical knowledge from maps. One of the most important features of *Cihannüma* is that it is the first Ottoman scientific study, which extensively used and synthesized the Western sources with the Islamic ones. Indeed, Katip Çelebi started to write the first *Cihannüma* based on Islamic forces. Nonetheless, he soon realized that the existent Islamic sources were not adequate to complete a universal geography book and stopped writing the first *Cihannüma*. In the second *Cihannüma*, he used *Theatrum orbis terrarium* of Abraham Ortelius, *Introductio geographica tam vetera quam nova* of Cluverius, and Atlas Minor of Gerardus Mercator. Heavily influenced by Mercator’s views, Katip Çelebi underlined geography’s instrumental value for the interests of the state:

Geography is one of the extremely useful sciences in human civilization and society, more important and necessary for notables of the state and the pillars of the kingdom than any other. Some prudent scholars have preferred this science over all other rational sciences, because if you study books uninformed of it you are like a blind and deaf man. If a conflict arises over the borders of states this science solves the problem, and also in

had given to the continents...At no time before the nineteenth century was any sovereignty defined in territorial terms.” However Lewis’s claims are contradictory to the information in *Cihannüma*. Starting with the second half of the 17th century, Ottomans were very well aware of the continents and territorial units, as they called them *memlekets*. See Bernard Lewis, *Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: W. W. Norton&Company, 1982), 60.

¹⁵³ Gottfried Hagen, “Katib Celebi: Cihannuma,” in *Exhibition Catalog 400 Jahre Atlas* (Munchen: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 1995), 48.

¹⁵⁴ Hamit Sadi Selen, “Cihannüma,” in *Katip Çelebi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985), 132.

minor issues this science intervenes in a meaningful way. It is a wondrous science since strange things which would never cross your mind are written down in it, and thus makes man aware of the course of time and informs him about the state of countries and regions, since it presents all the climates and the peculiarities in them in detail. Especially in our times the remote regions of the world are being discovered by ships and described. Countries, rivers, islands, deserts, mountain ridges, plains, and woodlands are all depicted in their respective locations, and longitudes of countries are correctly verified and recorded in degrees and minutes. Moreover strange events [in the history of] peoples of each clime in war and peace have been described accurately. Thus, this science is most useful in the conduction of politics, and whoever indulges in it will be most respected and praised.¹⁵⁵

These original thoughts reflect a clear break from the Islamic understanding of the world. Geography is considered as a science that depicts all shapes on the earth.¹⁵⁶ The fourth dimension of the abovementioned Ottoman worldview, theology, is degraded and used only in the preface of the book for legitimating the author's views. What is ground-breaking in *Cihannüma* is the scholarly attitude of Katip Çelebi towards geographical knowledge and his factual and impassionate style. Contrary to the Ottoman geographers' overwhelming interest in personal narratives of travelers and tales about strange events about foreign countries to entertain the ruling elite of the empire such as well known Evliya Çelebi, he considered geography as a practical science for statecraft and relied on European books, merchants doing business with West and East, and Ottoman officials' accounts. Although Katip Çelebi travelled Anatolia extensively, he did not even use his impressions when he described this region. Katip Çelebi is one of the first Ottoman intellectuals who questioned the roots of the European military successes and attributed them to the superiority of geographical knowledge.¹⁵⁷ From the window opened by Katip Çelebi, other scholars entered into Western geographical knowledge.

¹⁵⁵ Quoted in Gottfried Hagen, *Ottoman Understanding of the World in the Seventeenth Century*, 230.

¹⁵⁶ Katip Çelebi gave a scientific definition of geography in *Cihannüma*. He mentioned that the word geography is formed in Greek by joining two words meaning 'world' and 'writing.' Bülent Özükan, *Kitab-ı Cihannüma*, 130.

¹⁵⁷ Gottfried Hagen, "Ottoman Understanding of the World in the Seventeenth Century," 227-233.

Another notable Ottoman geographer, Ebu Bekr ibn Behram el-Dimaşki, translated *Atlas Maior* of Joan Blaeu with the order of the Ottoman vizier, Fazıl Ahmet Pasha. The translation took ten years and was completed in 1685. This monumental nine-volume book with 252 maps was called *Coğrafya-i Kebir*. It was like a state almanac and has a utilitarian approach to inform the reader about the land, population, and cities of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, during the second siege of Vienna (1683), the information in the *Atlas Maior* about Hungary and Germany was used by the grand vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha. What is noteworthy about *Coğrafya-i Kebir* was that it was the first Ottoman book that mentioned Copernicus's heliocentric scientific theory 142 years after its development.

İbrahim Müteferrika, who used to call himself a geographer and added substantive information to the printed version of *Cihannüma*, made an important contribution to the development of the geographical knowledge with his book *Usul el-Hikem fi Nizam el-Ümem* (Scientific Methods in the Structure of Nations). This book was written during the turbulent years of the Patrona Halil Revolt in 1730 that ended the Tulip Era and its reforms started in 1718. Müteferrika asked a crucial question in his book: "Why do Christians, who were so weak, degenerate, and inferior in the past compared with Muslims, begin to expand into the world and dominate so many lands and even defeat the once victorious Ottoman armies?"¹⁵⁸ His answer was based on two factors. The first factor entailed new methods and techniques developed by European states in warfare and the organization of army. He discussed at length the significance of the army as a class for the order and stability in state and society.¹⁵⁹ Müteferrika attributed the

¹⁵⁸ İbrahim Müteferrika, *Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usüller* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 2000), 23.

¹⁵⁹ Müteferrika mentioned army's leading role as a class compared to three other classes, which are tradesman and artisans, civil servants, and peasants. As his book was written in the turbulent years of Patrona Halil Revolt, Müteferrika emphasized that it is necessary to keep apart the classes from each other for prosperity and order. The principle of four classes (erkan-ı erbaa) was the integral part of the Ottoman political theory and was elaborated in

recent Ottoman defeats against well-organized and disciplined Austrian and Russian armies to the ignorance of new military strategies and techniques. From this perspective he examined the success of reforms in Russia in the last thirty years and how Peter the Great invited experts from England and Netherland to modernize the state organization and military. Obviously, Russia was considered as an example of Westernization for the Ottoman audience. Second, Müteferrika argued that in European countries reason replaced the authority of religion in the state administration and implementation of laws. As it was too risky to advise replacing reason with religion in the empire, instead he discussed the indispensability of the science of geography for the Ottoman statesmen to comprehend the physical and social conditions of their own state and their enemies. Indeed, one out of three chapters of the book discusses the geography as a scientific guide for the statesmen. For Müteferrika, “geography is the mirror of the world. The world nations’ capacities and conditions can be observed through geography. It is a kind of mirror of whether daily news and developments in the world are true or false and which can be verified with geography.”¹⁶⁰ He advised to augment geographical knowledge not only about enemies, but also about other Islamic peoples and countries dispersed all over the world. Sultans should utilize geography to unite all Muslims under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire and defend them against the attacks of infidels.¹⁶¹ These thoughts are the seeds of pan-Islamism, which became an influential ideology after the Tanzimat reforms in 1839.

Beginning in the second half of the 17th century, some Ottoman scholars realized the significance of the scientific geography and the necessity to develop knowledge about their own and neighboring countries for using it in the military organization and state administration. These

depth by prominent scholars such as Kınalızade in the 16th century. See İbrahim Müteferrika, *Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usüller*, 60 and Kınalızade Ali Efendi, *Devlet ve Aile Ahlakı* (Istanbul: Tercüman, n.d.) 217-218.

¹⁶⁰ İbrahim Müteferrika, *Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usüller*, 64.

¹⁶¹ İbrahim Müteferrika, *Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usüller*, 65-66.

scholars argued that with the help of geographical knowledge, statesman can differentiate correct from inaccurate information and base their decisions on facts rather than superstitions and legends. However, their spatial consciousness diverges from the modern one and reflects the zeitgeist of the early modern period. The foundational stones of the Ottoman worldview before 19th century were extraterritoriality, diasporas, and networks. Unlike a territorially defined, clearly bordered homogenous modern society, “Ottoman world consisted of a tapestry of differing cultures.”¹⁶² This does not mean that Ottoman society was essentially open-minded and humanitarian as some contemporary Turkish scholars have idealized it anachronistically as a precursor of liberal society.¹⁶³ The Ottomans tolerated different religions for pragmatic reasons. They utilized commercial and cultural diasporas, such as Jewish, Greek and Armenian and their networks all over Europe for the economic and political interests of the state. These communities were not only valuable in developing exports and imports, but also in gathering economic, political and military intelligence. While in Europe the religious wars between Catholic and Protestant communities engendered the condition of *cuius region eius religio* (whose realm, his religion), in which people were forced to accept the religion of their king, the Ottomans provided extraterritoriality for the Venetian and Genoese merchant communities. The ambassadors and consuls had legal jurisdiction over their communities and they were allowed to have their own church in Ottoman territories.¹⁶⁴ Contrary to claims about the feeling of “timelessness” which is allegedly dominant among Muslim writers’ perception of Europe “that nothing really changes,” Ottomans were keen to update their information about European rivals.¹⁶⁵ Abraham Ortelius’s

¹⁶² Daniel Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance State: the Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy,” in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 64.

¹⁶³ See M. Hakan Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” *Middle East Journal* 53, no.4 (Autumn 1999): 584-605.

¹⁶⁴ Daniel Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance State: the Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy,” 72-73.

¹⁶⁵ Bernard Lewis, *Muslim Discovery of Europe*, 297.

Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, which is the first true modern atlas with maps and supporting text bounded in book format, was brought to Istanbul in 1573, three years after it was published in Vienna.¹⁶⁶

As the works of Piri Reis, Katip Çelebi, Ebu Bekr ibn Behram el-Dimaşki, and İbrahim Müteferrika revealed, these scholars followed Western advances in geography and other sciences. However, the question asked by İbrahim Müteferrika—why Europe surpassed the Ottoman Empire and started to dominate other parts—has a point in terms of comparison between these two civilizations. The answer might be found in replies of these scholars. All these scholars argued that to compete against the West, the Ottoman ruling elites should change their attitude towards science and geography. By restricting themselves with diagnosing the troubles of their state and proposing practical solutions, they missed the crucial point that the Western advance in geography was not due to political motivation. Portuguese and English navigational achievements were economically and commercially motivated by the emerging merchant class in these two countries. Andrew Hess argued convincingly that “while the Portuguese created a commercial and oceanic empire, the Ottomans pushed their frontiers into the water surrounding the eastern Mediterranean to create a seaborne state conditioned by the military and administrative requirements of a land-based Turko-Muslim state. In the course of their voyages rulers and merchants from Portugal and other Christian states participated in overseas commercial and military ventures that, in the East, rarely went beyond the establishment of a fortified trading post. While Portugal rejected the conquering tradition of her warrior aristocracy to lean almost entirely upon maritime commerce as the primary reason for imperial naval

¹⁶⁶ Gabor Agoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry,” in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 87.

expansion in the East, the Ottomans, in contrast sought to conquer territories in order to gain tax revenues from newly acquired agricultural and commercial economies.”¹⁶⁷ In the same way, in the second half of the 16th century when the English Crown was not able to pay for cartographic projects due to the financial crises which influenced all the monarchies in Europe, the merchant class became the patron of mapmakers to obtain scientifically produced charts for much-needed new markets.¹⁶⁸ None of the Ottoman scholars noticed the importance of the emerging various centers of power in the European societies that played an important role in the expansion of knowledge. Indeed, all their proposals were based on how to strengthen the social and political center of the Ottoman state to compete against the West. While decentralization of power led to the development of the economy and commerce in Europe, the extensive road and postal network of the Ottoman Empire enabled the central authority to distribute imperial orders and control even the remote provinces such as Libya and Yemen. In the Ottoman Empire, political power dominated the economic and commercial interests, not vice versa. The empire’s patrimonial agrarian structure—aimed to maximize its revenues from land tax—restrained the accumulation of wealth and development of innovative methods in private sphere.¹⁶⁹

The commercial and technological dominance of European states became more evident in the second half of the 18th century. With the defeat of empire in the war against Russia in 1774, the military situation of the empire changed dramatically. The armies of “infidels” were no longer a distant threat for Ottomans anymore. The loss of the first Muslim inhabited territory to a European power in 1783, namely Russia’s conquest of Crimea, signaled the approaching

¹⁶⁷ Andrew C. Hess, “The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525,” *The American Historical Review* 75, no.7 (Dec. 1970): 1915-1916.

¹⁶⁸ Peter Barber, “England II: Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 1550-1625,” in *Monarchs Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe*, ed. David Buisseret (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 58-59.

¹⁶⁹ Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4, no. 1-2 (1997-1998): 51.

“longest century” of the empire and its terminal decline. However in the 19th century, the threat was not only the economic and military superiority of the West. If the world economy was reshaped as result of the success of commercial Western European states, world politics in the 19th century was formed by the French Revolution and its vocabulary of *patrie*, liberty and equality. The powerful ideology of nationalism sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The emergence of nationalism among Ottoman peoples resulted in the transformation of imperial spaces and multi-ethnic structure into nation-state territories and national identities. When the empire’s borders were in constant flux, maps, territory, and geography would have completely different meanings for its people.

The French Revolution and Remaking the Concept of Vatan

When veteran Chinese politician, Zhou En-Lai, was asked in the early 1970s what he thought of the impact of the French Revolution of 1789, he replied that “it is too early to say.” The *Marseillaise*, the national anthem of the French Revolution, was sung during the 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Revolution in 1917 and constantly played by Radio Baghdad in 1958 after the military coup commanded by General Qasim, who drew explicit parallels between the Iraqi Revolution and French Revolution in his speeches.¹⁷⁰ The French Revolution engendered a new political culture based on a thorough social and political change by means of mass mobilization and voluntary action. It not only influenced Western Europe but had, for example, repercussions on the liberation movements against the colonial powers in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. From the late 18th century onwards, the French Revolution changed the mental mapping of empires and the role of their elites in the center and

¹⁷⁰ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Volume 3 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 46; Rex A. Wade, *The Russian Revolution, 1917* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 289; David Styan, *France and Iraq* (New York: Tauris, 2006), 71.

periphery. In the context of the Ottoman Empire, the impact of the French Revolution was not confined to Serbian, Greek and Romanian independence movements. Contrary to the conventional views which prioritize the role of the peripheral elites in using the ideas of the French Revolution, the bulk of the importing was done by the Ottoman imperial elites for military and bureaucratic reforms: first to consolidate the authority of the sultan and later by the newly emerging bureaucratic class to limit the powers of the sovereign. The central elites faced the difficult task of modernizing the Ottoman Empire and at the same time maintaining a maximum territory by accommodating the forces of nationalism and confronting the Russian Empire, which was the main supporter of the national movements in the Balkans, in numerous wars. However, rather than imitating the practices and concepts of the French Revolution, the imperial elites used them an ad hoc basis. They borrowed and manipulated the ideas and achievements of the Great Revolution for their strategic interests.¹⁷¹

One of the most important ideas of the French Revolution that was adopted by the Ottoman elites was the concept of patriotism and *patrie* or *vatan* in Turkish and *watan* in Arabic. Bernard Lewis argued that the roots of the word *patrie* go back to Greek and Roman times. “The sense of country, as the ultimate identity and loyalty, remained strong and became stronger” in the European political culture since the Roman Empire.¹⁷² For Lewis, contrary to the Western understanding, in the Arabic, Turkish and Persian, the word *vatan/watan* had never had any political meaning or loyalty to a territory. It “simply means one’s place of residence, which may be adopted or temporary” and “had no more political significance than the English word

¹⁷¹ Bertrand Badie, “The Impact of the French Revolution on Muslim Societies: Evidence and Ambiguities,” *International Social Science Journal* 41 (1989): 6-7.

¹⁷² Bernard Lewis, “Watan,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no.3/4 (Sept. 1991): 523; Bernard Lewis, “The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey,” *Journal of World History* 1, (July, 1953): 107.

home.”¹⁷³ However, prominent scholars of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, rejected the primordial understanding of nationalism that considers nations as a social reality dating back at least two thousand years. They both claimed that until the end of 18th century national loyalties were non-existent in Europe.¹⁷⁴ Likewise, the nationalist vocabulary emerged in French in the last quarter of the 18th century. In 1690, the *Dictionnaire Universel* of the Abbè Furetière defined *patrie* as “the country where one is born, and it refers to a particular place as much as to the province and the empire or the state where one was born... the Romans and the Greeks were famous for their love of the *patrie*... It is sometimes figuratively said that Rome is the *patrie* of all Christians. Heaven is our true *patrie*, a philosopher is everywhere in his *patrie*. *Patrie* is the place where one feels good.”¹⁷⁵ Still at the end of the 17th century, patriotism was regarded as a sentiment characteristic of ancients and *patrie* had religious connotations. The word *patrie* acquired nationalistic meaning in the same dictionary published in 1777: “France is our *patrie*. Love of the *patrie*. For the good of the *patrie*. In the service of the *patrie*. To serve one’s *patrie*. To defend one’s *patrie*. To die for the *patrie*. The duty to the *patrie* is one of the primary duties.”¹⁷⁶

Right from the beginning, Ottoman statesman and diplomats were aware of the emergence of nationalism as a powerful idea in France. Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna in 1792, was the first Ottoman diplomat who used the words *vatan* and

¹⁷³ Bernard Lewis, “Watan,” 524-525.

¹⁷⁴ While Gellner argued that nations are by-products of industrialization, for Anderson the printing-press and capitalism are necessary conditions for the construction of nations. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 162.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

millet (nation) in the modern sense in his treatise and travelogues.¹⁷⁷ During his five-month long stay in Vienna, Ratib Efendi came across the turmoil in Europe and particularly in French politics. He warned the Ottoman sultan not to consider France in a process of disintegration due to the civil war. He emphasized that “unlike Habsburg Empire, France was united in a single religion, in a single nation, enjoying a common language.”¹⁷⁸ Ratib Efendi argued that if the Jacobins took power, France would become a republic and export revolutionary ideology to other European monarchies. In his writings, Ratib Efendi used the concept of *kavim* (people) for Hungarians, Bulgarians and Greeks. However, for France and Frenchmen he applied concepts of *vatan* and *millet* and he was fully aware of the fact that a powerful nation state with one nation and one homeland was emerging in Europe.¹⁷⁹ Ratib Efendi also noticed the alliance among the European monarchs against France based on their fears from “the new order” (*nizam-i cedid*) in the republican regime.¹⁸⁰

Another Ottoman diplomat influenced by the developments in Europe at the end of 18th century was Mahmud Raif Efendi. His book, *Tableau des Nouveaux Règlements de l'Empire Ottoman* published in 1798, was the first study written by a Muslim Ottoman bureaucrat in a Western language. Mahmud Raif Efendi wrote this book to inform European states about the reforms initiated by the Sultan Selim III. Although his main focus was the military reforms to elevate the Ottoman Empire into “a respectable status” among European powers, there are

¹⁷⁷ For Bernard Lewis, Ali Esseyid Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris in 1797 and 1798, was the first Ottoman statesman, who used the word *vatan* in a political sense. However, according to Fatih Yeşil, five years before Ali Esseyid Efendi, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi realized that the words ‘patrie’ and ‘nation’ acquired new meanings in the French language. Bernard Lewis, *Watan*, 526; Fatih Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’s Observations,” *Bulletin of SOAS* 70, no.2 (2007): 283-304.

¹⁷⁸ “...bir mezheb ve bir millet ve bir lisan olmalarıyla...” Fatih Yeşil, *Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’s Observations*, 291.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 302.

¹⁸⁰ Fatih Bayram, “Ebubekir Ratib Efendi as Envoy of Knowledge between the East and the West,” (unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, 2000), 114.

important points in the book that reflect the ongoing modernization of the worldview of the Ottoman statesman.¹⁸¹ In the first sentence of the book, Mustafa Raif Efendi emphasized a striking fact: “I desired to be beneficial for my *patrie* since I was admitted into the Sublime Porte as an officer when I was very young.”¹⁸² It must be highlighted that he did not use the word *patrie* without knowing its meaning in French or unconsciously, as in the original version of the book Mahmud Raif Efendi wrote the word with a capital letter as *Patrie*.¹⁸³ Additionally, the comparison of the introduction of Mahmud Raif Efendi’s book with İbrahim Müteferrika’s book *Usul el-Hikem fi Nizam el-Ümem*, which was printed 66 years before Mahmud Raif Efendi’s book, reveals a paradigm shift happening in the Ottoman mentality. Whereas Müteferrika praised God and the Prophet Mohammad in the introductory sentences of his book in a traditional way, Mahmud Raif Efendi admired in an avant-garde style the *patrie*, the Ottoman state and the sultan without mentioning God. Another important point brought up by Mahmud Raif Efendi was the changing geopolitical consciousness of Ottoman statesman by considering Russia one of the most important threats to the empire’s security. Until his time, the Porte considered the Dardanelles significant for the defense of Istanbul and neglected the Bosphorus as the Black Sea was under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. However, Mahmud Raif Efendi mentioned the new military fortifications on the Bosphorus due to increasing Russian power, which would become the most serious threat of the empire’s territorial integrity in the next hundred years.¹⁸⁴

Seyyid Mustafa Efendi’s book *Diatribesur L’état Actuel de L’art Militaire, Du Génie et des Sciences à Constantinople* is another important study that identified European superiority

¹⁸¹ Mahmud Raif Efendi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli*, translated by Arslan Terzioğlu and Hüsrev Hatemi (Istanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1988), 4, 33. This book includes the original French version and also its Turkish translation.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸³ “Admis, dès ma plus tendre jeunesse, au nombre des secrétaires dans les Bureaux de la SUBLIME PORTE, je me suis senti aussitôt animé du désir de me rendre utile à ma Patrie.”

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

with the development of scientific advancement. The book was written in 1803 in French and then rewritten by Seyyid Mustafa Efendi in Ottoman Turkish.¹⁸⁵ In the French version, he mentioned two times the word *patrie*: in the introduction and in the last paragraph. In the introduction, Seyyid Mustafa Efendi mentioned that he was studying modern sciences and he was waiting for an opportunity to be sent by the Ottoman state to Europe. Selim III's project to open a new mathematic school changed Seyyid Mustafa Efendi's mind as "the idea to be able to be useful for *patrie* enchanted me and prevailed; I stayed."¹⁸⁶ In the last section of the book, he states that the Ottoman Empire had been a military state established on the notion of conquest and the Islamic principle of fighting against infidels. According to Seyyid Mustafa Efendi, as a result of the corruption, local military authorities emerged and threatened the power of the sultan. He was very pleased with the reforms in the Ottoman army and reconsolidation of central authority: "I am very delighted of seeing my *patrie* in the state—I desired so ardently—enlightened by the torch of sciences and arts day by day and it was not possible for me to continue to be silent anymore."¹⁸⁷

In the light of the abovementioned examples, at the end of the 18th century the Ottoman bureaucrats and diplomats started to adopt the European concept of *patrie* and use the word *vatan* in a similar way. This change in the meaning of *vatan* from a place where man was born

¹⁸⁵ This book was republished in French, in Ottoman Turkish, and Turkish in 1986. See Seyyid Mustafa, *İstanbul'da Askerlik Sanatı, Yeteneklerin ve Bilimlerin Durumu Üzerine Risale* (Istanbul: Tüyap, 1986).

¹⁸⁶ "Selim III, donc, projeta la fondation d'une grande et nouvelle école de mathématiques près de l'arsenal a Sudlidze : la publication de ce projet ralentit un peu mon ardeur sur le dessein d'un voyage en Europe ; l'idée de pouvoir profiter dans le sein de ma patrie, et peut-être encore lui devenir utile, m'enchanta et prévalut ; je fis halte." In the Ottoman version he used the word *vatan* in place of *patrie*: "Sultan Selim Han Hazretleri, Tersane-i Amire'ye kabil Südlüce nam mahalde bir bab Handesehane müceddeden bina vu inşasına iradesinin havadisiyle, seyahat maddesinde olan hahisim ta'dil olunup, bir eyyam dahi tevakkufu tasvib eyledim ve kendu vatanım dahilinde tahsil u istifade ve belki fa'ide-dade olmağı teviz eyledim." See Seyyid Mustafa, *İstanbul'da Askerlik Sanatı, Yeteneklerin ve Bilimlerin Durumu Üzerine Risale*, 70, 89.

¹⁸⁷ "Moi-même, ivre de joie de voir ma patrie dans l'état que je desirois si ardemment, éclairée tous les jours davantage du flambeau des sciences et des arts, il ne me fut plus possible de me taire." As the Ottoman version of the book was slightly different, he did not use the word *vatan* in this paragraph. *Ibid.*, 118.

and lives to a place which man feels loyalty does not indicate an imagination of national territory. The internalization and adoption of Ottoman patriotism as an ideology would happen after the Tanzimat Edict in 1839. These examples signify a shift from a pre-modern to a modern mode of legitimization of political power. To be more precise, Ottomans statesmen were aware of the fact that it was not sufficient to justify the political power of the sultan by basing it on divine right. During this period, one of the major challenges to the legitimacy of the sultan was Rhigas Pheraios and his revolutionary ideas about changing the Ottoman regime into a pseudo-Jacobin republic.¹⁸⁸ Rhigas called all Ottoman subjects from Bosnia to Arabia to revolt against the sultan. His revolutionary slogans such as “freedom for all faith,” “our hearts for our country,” and “draw the sword for liberty” were condemned by the Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul. In 1798 he was arrested by the Austrian police in Trieste, handed over to Ottoman authorities and executed in Belgrade.¹⁸⁹ Rhigas’s revolutionary ideas were some of the first examples of the national movements that would challenge the imperial elites in the 19th century. In parallel to the Ottoman Empire, other European monarchies had been experiencing similar legitimacy crises:

Such traditional guarantors of loyalty as dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right and continuity of rule, or religious cohesion, were severely weakened. Last but not least, all these traditional legitimations of state authority were, since 1789, under permanent challenge. This is clear in the case of monarchy. The need to provide a new or at least a supplementary, ‘national’ foundation for this institution was felt in states as secure from revolution as George III’s Britain and Nicholas I’s Russia. And monarchies certainly tried to adapt themselves.¹⁹⁰

The Ottoman imperial elites did not only suppress the separatist national movement and demands for modernization, but also used these new ideas to devise policies and “invent

¹⁸⁸ Rhigas Pheraios was born in a wealthy Vlach family in 1757. He became familiar with revolutionary ideas, when he joined the Greek community in Vienna around 1793 and wrote a new constitution for his envisaged republic. Later Rhigas became a national Greek hero and forerunner of the Greek independence movement.

¹⁸⁹ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 148, 278-279; Michael Angold, *Eastern Christianity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 207.

¹⁹⁰ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 84.

traditions” to strengthen the political power of the center and legitimize their positions.¹⁹¹ However, constructing an Ottoman nation and patriotism to unite people from different ethnic and religious origins was a very difficult task. It was best described by Benedict Anderson as “stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”¹⁹²

The reforms of Selim III and the New Order ended as a result of the Janissary revolt in 1807. Selim III and several reformers including Mahmud Raif Efendi were killed by Janissaries. The reactionaries were only able to stop the reform process for a limited time. As Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar rightly put it, the reforms “did not wither as their seeds scattered into the life were nurtured by the exigencies.”¹⁹³ Indeed, 19 years after the revolt the centuries old Ottoman institution of the Janissaries was abolished by the Mahmud II in 1826. The national uprising in Serbia between 1804 and 1817 and the independence of Greece in 1821 challenged the traditional *millet* system of the empire. Furthermore, the *millet* system became a tool for international powers such as Russia, Britain and France to influence and manipulate the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire. Mahmud II and his bureaucrats tried to overcome these problems by constructing a new Ottoman state “composed of peoples of diverse nationalities and religions, based on secular principles of sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval concept of an Islamic empire.”¹⁹⁴ The Tanzimat Edict that was proclaimed in 1839 was the culmination of this politics. The text of Tanzimat, which means literally reorganization, was written by the

¹⁹¹ Selim Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no.1 (January 1993): 3-29.

¹⁹² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 86.

¹⁹³ “...patlayan Kabakçı İsyanı ile bu nisbi aydınlanma ve tereddüt devresi kapandı. Fakat, hayata serpilmiş olan tohumlarını zaruretler beslediği için ölmedi.” Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Istanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006), 69.

¹⁹⁴ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Routledge: New York, 1998), 90.

foreign minister Mustafa Reşid Pasha and read in front of the ambassadors of European powers to influence them. The Porte officially notified the Tanzimat Edict to European states.¹⁹⁵

The Tanzimat stated that Ottoman subjects had inalienable rights and liberties which could not be revoked arbitrarily. The main objective was to acknowledge the legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims and unite them under the umbrella of Ottomanism. During the Mahmud II's reign, symbols and ceremonies had been created to emphasize royal power and to establish a "national monarchy."¹⁹⁶ The creation of the first coat of arms for the dynasty, the composition of the first national anthem (Mahmudiye march by Guiseppe Donezetti who was later made a pasha) and the introduction of medals for service and loyalty to the state were the examples of glorification of dynasty as a response to inflating nationalism. As Kemal Karpat argued, "these activities divested the dynasty of its traditional position as the absolute owner of the territory and all that lived on it and subordinated the dynasty to the state."¹⁹⁷

Mustafa Sami Efendi, a diplomat in the Ottoman Embassy in Paris in 1838-1839, admired "the love of vatan" among French people in his book titled *Avrupa Risalesi* (The European Treatise).¹⁹⁸ In the last section of the book, Mustafa Sami Efendi attributed the development in European countries to the advancement of science. He underlined that by making science prevalent among the whole society, all Ottoman subjects would appreciate the

¹⁹⁵ Cemal Kafadar draw attention to the similarities between Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the Gorbachev's reforms called perestroika, which also means restructuring: "A century and a half earlier than the leaders of the Soviet Union, the ruling class of the Ottoman Empire faced a similar complex of challenges: nationalist stirrings, economic backwardness, and a rapid erosion of both internal and external confidence in the ability of the sociopolitical order to provide state and society with a viable future." Cemal Kafadar, "The Question of Ottoman Decline," 65.

¹⁹⁶ Selim Deringil, *The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908*, 5.

¹⁹⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 227-229.

¹⁹⁸ Mustafa Sami Efendi, *Bir Osmanlı Bürokratının Avrupa İzlenimleri: Mustafa Sami Efendi ve Avrupa Risalesi*, ed. M. Fatih Andı (Istanbul: Bayram Matbaacılık, 1996), 70. This book includes Mustafa Sami Efendi's text *Avrupa Risalesi* in Ottoman Turkish and modern Turkish.

significance of “vatan and millet.”¹⁹⁹ Similarly, the necessity of territorial loyalty to empower the authority of the sultan was very well reflected in the text of the Tanzimat Edict:

If there is an absence of security with regard to property, everyone remains indifferent to his state and community; nobody deals with the progress of the public wealth, absorbed as he is in his own troubles and worries. If, on the contrary, he enjoys perfect security, he will not depart from the ways of loyalty and he feels each day to intensify his love for state and community, devotion to his *vatan*.²⁰⁰

Furthermore, military service was no longer considered as a religious obligation of Muslim subjects to fight against infidels; it was regarded as a duty of all Ottomans to defend the *vatan*: “The defense of the *vatan* is an important issue and it is a duty for all to provide soldiers for this purpose.”²⁰¹

Promoting an Imperial *Vatan* to Encourage Ottoman Patriotism

Promoting *vatan* as a territorial concept to secure the loyalty of subjects served as a modern political foundation for the Ottoman state. Attachment to Ottoman territory had significant value in political discourse involving the ruling elites during the second half of the

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 81.

²⁰⁰ The Tanzimat text was published in Ottoman Turkish and French. However, there are slight differences between the two texts. In the first sentence of the quoted part of the French version the words *prince* and *patrie* were used instead of *devlet* (state) and *millet* (community). In the second sentence, in parallel to the Ottoman version, the word *patrie* was used in place of *vatan*. The French version is as the following: “S'il y a absence de sécurité à l'égard de la fortune, tout le monde reste froid à la voix du prince et de la patrie; personne ne s'occupe du progrès de la fortune publique, absorbé que l'on est par ses propres inquiétudes. Si, au contraire, le citoyen possède avec confiance ses propriétés de toute nature, alors plein d'ardeur pour ses affaires, dont il cherche à élargir le cercle afin d'étendre celui de ses jouissances, il sent chaque jour redoubler en son cœur l'amour du prince et de la patrie, le dévouement à son pays.” The Ottoman Turkish version is as follows: “Emniyeti mal kaziyesinin fıkdanı halinde ise herkes ne devlet ve ne milletine ısınmayıp ve ne imar-ı mülke bakamayıp daima endişe ve ıztırdan hâli olamadığı misullü aksi takdirinde yani emval ve emlakından emniyet-i kâmile olduğu halde dahi kendü işi ile ve tevsi-i daire-i taayyüşüyle uğraşıp ve kendisinde günbegün devlet ve millet gayreti ve vatan muhabbeti artıp ona göre hüsnü harekete çalışacağı şüpheden azadedir.” For the photograph of the original French version of the Tanzimat Edict see *Tanzimat: Yüzcüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetile* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 48-49; for the Ottoman Turkish version in Latin letters see *Tanzimat Dönemi* (accessed November 28, 2008); available from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kultur_sanat/yayinlar/yayin001/001_00_005.pdf.

²⁰¹ Instead of the word *vatan*, the word *pays* was used in the French version: “asker maddesi dahi ber minval-i muharrer mevadd-ı mühimmeden olarak eğerçi muhafaza-i vatan için asker vermek ahalinin farize-i zimmeti ise de...” “Bien que, comme nous l'avons dit, la défense du pays soit une chose importante et que ce soit un devoir pour tous les habitants de fournir des soldats à cette fin...”

19th century. Contrary to the secular role of the *patrie* or fatherland in European political culture, in the context of the Ottoman Empire, loyalty to *vatan* was considered a part of the Muslim faith and culture and was used by both elites and intellectuals to establish a firm foundation for the ideology of Ottomanism. The Islamization of *vatan* only intensified after the second half of the 1860s as a reaction to the privileged status of Christian *millet*s and Balkan nationalism. Although the Tanzimat aimed to establish “an Ottoman nation” based on a common *vatan*, “in which subjects would benefit from identical civil rights,” the author of the Tanzimat Edict, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, did not envisage that the full equality of both Muslims and Christians would soon be realized.²⁰²

The first shift that changed the balance between the Muslim and Christian communities was the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838. It allowed foreign merchants to participate in internal trade and abandoned protectionism and with it the guild system. Non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, who played an intermediary role between European markets and local Muslim producers, benefited from expanded trade and foreign imports. This pattern ultimately eliminated Muslim merchants and improved the status of Christian merchants, who were preferred by European traders as partners in the empire and secured privileged legal status because of the capitulations granted to all European powers. The improved conditions of non-Muslim moneylenders “increased national awareness and exacerbated religious and ethnic tensions with grave consequences in the future.”²⁰³ The Islahat Edict in 1856, a result of European pressure, augmented the economic power of non-Muslim groups and contributed to the solidification of boundaries and identities. By declaring the Tanzimat Edict in 1839, the Porte acknowledged the equality of all Ottoman subjects regardless of religion, but, due to a lack of

²⁰² Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 14.

²⁰³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (Routledge: New York, 1996), 28.

appropriate institutional support, this declaration could not be enforced. The Islahat Edict institutionalized the promise of Tanzimat by abolishing the head tax and by securing equality in the military, as well as in education, justice, and government employment.²⁰⁴ The resentment among the Muslim community after the proclamation of the Islahat Edict was best described by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, a prominent Ottoman historian and statesman: “Many Moslems began to grumble: ‘Today we lost our sacred national rights which our ancestors gained with their blood. While the Islamic nation used to be the ruling nation, it is now bereft of this sacred right. This is a day of tears and mourning for the Moslem brethren.’”²⁰⁵ Nationalist uprisings in the Balkans also increased the resentment in the Muslim community. In 1859, Moldavia and Wallachia united and formed the autonomous Romania, which acted as a de-facto sovereign state until it was awarded full independence in 1877. In 1862, clashes started in Belgrade between the Ottoman army and the local population. Under pressure from European powers and Russia, the last Ottoman soldier left Belgrade in 1867, officially bringing to an end the centuries’ old Ottoman rule in Serbia. In addition to the *de facto* independence of Romania and Serbia, conflicts in Lebanon, Crete, Bosnia, and Montenegro in the 1860s precipitated the formation of a patriotic movement known as the “Young Ottomans,” among the mostly Turkish-speaking, Muslim intelligentsia. The avowed goal of the movement was to ‘save the empire.’ They were significantly influenced by the Carbonari in Italy and by other patriotic movements such as Young Italy, Young France, and Young Germany.

Benedict Anderson considers the emergence of print-capitalism as a crucial factor in the rise of nationalism because the expansion of books and newspapers throughout the country enabled people to see themselves as part of a national community and to better relate to their

²⁰⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 47.

²⁰⁵ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, ed. Cavit Baysun (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953), 68.

fellow citizens.²⁰⁶ In the context of the Ottoman Empire, it is impossible to argue the emergence of print-capitalism in the 1860s, because the very low literacy rate made it difficult for entrepreneurs to start profitable print businesses. However, the establishment of the first private newspapers owned by Muslims played an important role in the emergence of patriotic movements, such as the Young Ottomans, among intellectuals and bureaucrats. Between 1729 and 1829, only 180 books were printed in the Ottoman Empire. This number increased to 6,357 between 1876 and 1892 and to 10,601 between 1893 and 1907. In 1875, the number of journals and newspapers was 87. This total grew to reach 144 in 1883, 226 in 1895, and 548 in 1911.²⁰⁷ With the ever-increasing availability of printed materials, Ottoman intellectuals tried to address the fundamental challenge concerning the empire's survival: how to maintain social order while religious communities were transformed into political communities? In parallel with the official Ottoman patriotism developed after the Tanzimat by bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte, Young Ottomans sought to construct territorial patriotism as a constitutive common identity for all Ottoman subjects. They were challenged not only by nationalist movements in the Balkans, but also by other Muslim intellectuals in Egypt and Lebanon that developed local territorial patriotic movements that questioned the legitimacy of the imperial center.

Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was one of the leading Middle Eastern thinkers who expressed the idea of territorial patriotism based on the Egyptian *vatan*. According to Tahtawi, *hubb ul-vatan*, which means "love of country," was the foundation of a society's solidarity. Duties of members of a society towards their country, such as sacrifice, unity, submission to law,

²⁰⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 43-45.

²⁰⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, 102.

and all rights to freedom originate from *hubb ul-vatan*.²⁰⁸ Tahtawi's Egyptian patriotism, which focused on Egypt's territory, was a clear break from the Islamic political concept of *ummah*. In his book *Manahij*, Tahtawi quoted the Prophet Mohammad's well-known *Hadith*, "the Muslim is brother of the Muslim" and compared religious loyalty with *wataniyyah* (patriotism):

All that is binding on a believer in regard to his fellow believers is binding also on members of the same *watan* in their mutual rights. For there is a national brotherhood between them over and above the brotherhood in religion. There is a moral obligation on those who share the same *watan* to work together to improve it and perfect its organization in all that concern its honor and greatness and wealth.²⁰⁹

Another Arab thinker who referred extensively to *vatan* and territorial patriotism was Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883). During communal violence in Lebanon in 1860, Bustani wrote eleven pamphlets in an effort to unite different religious sects. In these pamphlets, Bustani addressed members of the Syrian society known as "*Ya abna al-watan*" (children of the fatherland) and signed each pamphlet simply as "*muhubb li'l-watan*" (the patriot).²¹⁰ A comparison of the patriotism of Fuad Pasha, who was sent to Lebanon by the Sublime Porte to suppress local violence, with Bustani's patriotism reveals significant differences between the central and peripheral elites of the empire. While both Fuad Pasha and Bustani underlined the importance of the *hubb ul-vatan* in overcoming differences between religious sects, these two individuals adopted completely different perspectives in terms of patriotism. Although Bustani's patriotism envisioned active and equal subjects, who "would have to transform themselves into citizens,"²¹¹ Fuad Pasha's call for patriotism was paternalistic and aimed to strengthen the hierarchical relationship between the rulers and ruled. He called for all Ottoman subjects to uncritically obey the orders of the sultan: "All people should act in accordance with the Sultan's

²⁰⁸ Albert Habib Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 78-79.

²⁰⁹ Quoted in Albert Habib Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939*, 79.

²¹⁰ Ussama Makdisi, "Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of The Middle East* 34, no.4 (November 2002): 604-605.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 608.

benevolent wishes, and each class of the imperial subjects should embrace tightly the principles of unity, patriotism [hubb ul-vatan], and service to the nation by obeying imperial orders and by zealously fulfilling humanitarian obligations.”²¹² Fuad Pasha and the elites in Istanbul were aware of the developing patriotic consciousness among Arab thinkers. For example, Tahtawi’s book *Takhlis al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz* (The Extraction of Gold from a Distillation of Paris) was published in Turkish in 1839. Young Ottomans tried to counterbalance emerging local patriotic ideas and movements with Ottoman patriotism, which was called *Osmanlılık* (Ottomanism).

The intellectual foundations of the Young Ottomans were established by İbrahim Şinasi (1826-1871), who published the Ottoman Empire’s first private newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahval*. Şinasi truly believed in the modernization mission of the Tanzimat. The major difference between his viewpoint and that of his intellectual predecessors was that Şinasi realized the importance of the people’s right to be informed of the workings of government. He considered journalism an important tool in providing such information to the Ottoman people. In the foreword of the first issue of *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, Şinasi explicitly associated the dissemination of ideas through written materials with the interests of *vatan*: “Since people who live in a society have a duty of loyalty to various official obligations, it necessarily follows that a part of their rights consists of the dissemination of verbal and written ideas to promote the interests of the *vatan*.”²¹³ The influence of the ideas of the French Revolution on Şinasi’s writing is obvious in his frequent use of the word “nation” and “the Great Ottoman nation.” Nonetheless, it is not possible to label him an Ottoman nationalist because his line of thinking also reflected the universalist perspective of the French Revolution. In his article in the newspaper *Ceride-i Askeriye* (Newspaper of the Military) published on January 17, 1864, Şinasi defined the duty of

²¹²Ibid., 606.

²¹³ Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, *Şinasi: Makaleler* (Ankara: Dün-Bugün Yayınevi, 1960), 2.

the Ottoman nation “to enlighten and improve humanity.” Şinasi also echoed Victor Hugo’s universalist words “avoir pour patrie le monde et pour nation l’humanité” in one of his verses: “*Milletim nev-i beşerdir vatanm rûy-i zemin,*” which may be translated as “mankind is my nation and the Earth is my *vatan*.”²¹⁴ Well-known Young Ottoman intellectuals, such as Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi, who were mentored by Şinasi, did not take the universalistic tone of Şinasi into consideration and instead employed Ottoman patriotism more vigorously in their writings.

Namık Kemal (1840-1888) is by far the most prominent figure of Ottoman patriotism. As a consequence of Namık Kemal’s writings, the word *vatan* acquired political significance and came to be used extensively in Turkish literature.²¹⁵ Years later, his patriotic poems, plays, and articles became sources of inspiration for Turkish nationalists. After the First Battle of İnönü in 1921, in which national forces stopped the advancing Greek army in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal labeled Namık Kemal “the guardian of our *vatan* overlooking from the heaven” and quoted from his well-known poem *Vatan*:

[Namık] Kemal asked: “In the heart of the *vatan* is the enemy’s dagger; isn’t there anyone to save the ill-fortuned mother[land]?” Here, from this bench as the president of the sublime parliament, I state on behalf of each and every member of the parliament and the entire nation: So be the enemy’s dagger in the heart of the *vatan*; there shall be definitely one to save the ill-fortuned mother[land].²¹⁶

Today, Turkish primary school students still read his poems and perform his well-known play *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (Fatherland, or Silistre). In Turkey, Namık Kemal is known as “*Vatan Şairi*,” which means “the poet of the fatherland.” Without a doubt, the concept of *vatan* acquired significant patriotic meaning through Namık Kemal’s writings. He transformed the meaning of *vatan* from a feeling of belonging to a birthplace into a feeling of loyalty towards a sacred

²¹⁴ Hikmet Dizdaroğlu, *Şinasi: Hayatı, Sanatı, Eserleri* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1954), 55.

²¹⁵ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *İnsani Vatanperverlik* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitaphanesi, 1933), 239-241.

²¹⁶ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık, 2006), 186. Mustafa Kemal gave this speech on 13 January, 1921.

territory.²¹⁷ According to Namık Kemal, *vatan* requires dedication and allegiance; in return, the love of the fatherland (*hubb ul-vatan*) provides “glory and inner contentment.”²¹⁸ He considered the defense of *vatan* as the most sacred duty of the Ottoman people.

Namık Kemal’s patriotism was a response to the inexorable and ongoing disintegration of the empire. At the time, his goal was to prevent further loss of territory and maintain the empire’s borders. His solution to reuniting diverse ethnic groups in the empire and resisting Russian expansion was patriotic appropriation of space.²¹⁹ Namık Kemal employed ideological motivation and passionate discourse to make people conscious of Ottoman territories as sacred constituents of their lives. However, he was aware that drawing the borders of a common Ottoman *vatan*, which would also include peripheral regions such as Tunisia and Yemen, and groups from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, would be very difficult. Consequently, his patriotic discourse on *vatan* was essentially an overly idealistic portrayal of several key themes. Namık Kemal explicitly said that the unity of the Muslim people could not be destroyed “by drawing lines on the map.”²²⁰ The main difference between the Ottoman patriotism of Namık Kemal and nationalist movements in Western Europe, particularly those in Italy and Germany, was the absence of clearly defined efforts to expand the borders of the Ottoman

²¹⁷ The change in the meaning of *vatan* becomes clearer, if Namık Kemal’s usage of *vatan* is compared with Fuzuli’s, a well-known poet who lived in the 16th century. Fuzuli used the word *vatan* in a lyrical sense to describe one’s feeling towards his native village: “Fuzuli, I cannot leave my lover’s village; as it is my homeland (Edemem terk Fuzuli ser-i kuyin yarin; Vatanımdır vatanımdır vatanımdır, vatanım).” Namık Kemal established a patriotic relationship between the people and their territory: “*Vatan*’s soil is the essence of the human body; such a body would not hesitate to sacrifice itself to protect the *vatan* and return to the soil (Vücutun kim hamir-i mâyesi hâk-i vatandandır; ne gam rah-ı vatanda hak olursa cevri ü mihnetten).”

²¹⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, 330-331.

²¹⁹ Namık Kemal criticized his statesmen’s fear of the Russian armies descending from the north: “If a comet rises in the north of the sky, they [Ottoman statesmen] will be afraid of it because they believe that it will definitely fall on our heads.” According to him, European powers would never allow Russia to control the strategic territories of the Ottoman Empire, because trade routes between Europe and Asia were vital for their economies. Namık Kemal, “Bir Mülâhaza,” *İbret*, June 27, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1938), 34-37.

²²⁰ Namık Kemal, “İttihad-ı İslam,” *İbret*, June 27, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 77.

Empire. From this standpoint, there are similarities between Namık Kemal and Ernst Renan. For both, the fatherland was an emotional and sentimental concept, and was not a simple geographical unit with clearly defined borders.²²¹ In his article the “*Vatan*” published on March 22, 1873, Namık Kemal rejected rationalistic conceptions of borders:

[I]magination of *vatan* in the shape of borders or a map . . . A person loves his *vatan*, because it is not composed by the vague lines traced by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea resulting from the coalescence of various emotions such as the nation, liberty, interest, solidarity, sovereignty, respect for one’s ancestors, love of the family, and childhood memories . . . Therefore, in every religion, in every nation, in every culture, in every civilization love of the *vatan* is the most important virtue and the most sacred duty.²²²

Similarly, in another article, he said that “although *vatan* is an imagined concept, everybody is agreed that it is much more effective to protect justice and the general interest than fortifications made from iron and stone.”²²³ For him, the disintegration of the Ottoman *vatan* was incomprehensible, as different nations and religious sects benefited from sharing the same territory that organically constituted the Ottoman nation. Ruling elites and the Ottoman people had to be made aware that justice, liberty, and love of the *vatan* were indispensable factors in protecting 600 years of Ottoman unity: “Nobody has either the right or the power to destroy [Ottoman] unity by reinforcing the Arabian, Tunisian, Egyptian or Yemeni identities.”²²⁴ To overcome differences among various religious and ethnic groups and to unite them under the

²²¹ Like Namık Kemal, Renan’s famous essay, *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* (What is Nation?), identified sacrifices as “the essential condition for being a nation. One loves in proportion to the sacrifices which one has approved and for which one has suffered. One loves the house which he has built and which he has made over. The Spartan chant: ‘We are what you make us; we are what you are’ is simply the abbreviated hymn of the Fatherland.” Ernst Renan, “*Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*” in *Nationalism*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17-18. There were also disagreements between Namık Kemal’s and Renan’s views. Namık Kemal criticized Renan, who regarded Islam as a barrier to scientific development, in his book *Renan Müdafaaamesi* (Defense against Renan). Namık Kemal, *Renan Müdafaaamesi* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988).

²²² Namık Kemal, “*Vatan*,” *İbret*, March 22, 1873, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 263-265.

²²³ Namık Kemal, “İmtizacı Akvam,” *İbret*, July 2, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 82.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 84. In another article, Namık Kemal emphasized that, in the Ottoman Empire, it is impossible to create “Laz, Albanian, Kurdish, Arabic” nationalisms. Namık Kemal, “İstikbal,” *İbret*, July 2, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 33.

umbrella of Ottoman identity, he proposed “to establish schools, which would accept children from different religious and ethnic backgrounds.” If “children of *vatan*” (*evladi vatan*) attended the same school, “it would be impossible [for foreign powers] to sow discord between them.”²²⁵ Until the first half of the 19th century, only the ruling elites belonged to Ottoman society. Namık Kemal believed that a societal Ottoman identity would be essential in bonding together the people of the empire; he finished some of his articles with the motto “long live the Ottomans” (*Yaşasın Osmanlılar*). Namık Kemal’s play *Vatan Yahut Silistre*, which portrayed the sacrifice and heroism of Ottoman soldiers in their defense of the Silistre Castle (in today’s Bulgaria) against the Russian army during the Crimean War, generated patriotic euphoria among the public when it opened on April 1, 1873. The popular sentiment was so strong that in a week the theater was closed, the play was censored, and Namık Kemal and his friends were exiled by the government, which was afraid of a patriotic uprising.

There was a deliberate ambiguity in the thinking of Namık Kemal regarding how to define the Ottoman nation (*Millet-i Osmaniye*) and the Ottoman *vatan*. Sometimes, the Ottoman nation was defined as all individuals living in Ottoman territories regardless of religion and ethnicity. On other occasions, the Unity of Islam, namely Muslims in the empire, was identified as the backbone of the Ottoman nation. In the play *Vatan Yahut Silistre*, the Balkans were labeled as the heartland of the Ottoman *vatan* and the River Danube was the “elixir of the life.” Therefore, “if Danube is lost, the *vatan* cannot survive, and nobody can live on.” In his poem *Vaveyla*, he defined the borders of the *vatan* by employing religious symbols: “*Vatan*, go to Kaaba wrap yourself with black; put your one hand on the thumb of the Prophet in Medina; and your other hand on the thumb of Husayin in Kerbela; look to the universe with all your

²²⁵ Namık Kemal, “İmtizacı Akvam,” *İbret*, July 2, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 85.

magnificence.” It is clear that, although the Balkans were portrayed as the indispensable center of the *vatan* in the play, the poem *Vaveyla* defined *vatan* from a religious perspective and used the holy sites of Islam to give the *vatan* a sacred connotation. The ambiguity and confusion over the concept of *vatan* in the writings of Namık Kemal and other post-Tanzimat intellectuals captures the *zeitgeist* of the second half of the 19th century. Although all were aware of a real Turkish ethnicity, which served as the foundation of the empire, it was impossible for them to advocate the idea of Turkish nationalism. As Hilmi Ziya Ülken correctly argued, “despite the fact that the empire was contracting, it was still surviving.” Young Ottomans realized that the establishment of a national society in the future was inevitable. Nevertheless, because they remained imperial elites, supporting the idea of a national society would have been “self-denial.”²²⁶

Young Ottomans developed two different ideologies to protect the unity of the Ottoman Empire: *İttihad-ı Anasır* (unity of the elements) and *İttihad-ı İslam* (unity of Islam). *İttihad-ı Anasır* was envisaged by Tanzimat bureaucrats and intellectuals as a means of maintaining the loyalty of ethnic religious groups towards the imperial center. *İttihad-ı İslam* emerged as an ideology in the 1860s, when over a million Muslims were forced by Russia to migrate from the Caucasus to the Ottoman territories. *İttihad-ı İslam* became the dominant ideology of the state after the 1877-78 War with Russia, when the Ottoman Empire lost almost one-third of its territory and its Christian population decreased from 40 percent to 20 percent. *İttihad-ı Anasır* and *İttihad-ı İslam* were not considered competing ideologies by the Young Ottomans, who employed these terms interchangeably in their writings.²²⁷ Ali Suavi (1838-1878) was the one of

²²⁶ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Millet ve Tarih Şuurı* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1948), 59.

²²⁷ Namık Kemal’s two articles—*İttihad-ı İslam* and *Avrupa Şarkı Bilmez* (Europe Doesn’t Understand the East)—are excellent examples for comparison. See Namık Kemal, “İttihad-ı İslam,” *İbret*, June 27, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat

the first Ottoman intellectuals who used the concept of Turkishness in his writings. Although he was considered to be the first Turkish nationalist by Falih Rıfki Atay and others, Ali Suavi was not exceptional among Young Ottomans in his efforts to maintain the integrity of the empire by developing the ideologies of *İttihad-ı Anasır* and *İttihad-ı İslam*.²²⁸ His main distinguishing feature was that Ali Suavi was not “unaware of the national consciousness.”²²⁹ Ali Suavi’s article “Türk,” which was published in the *Muhbir* newspaper in London, aimed to erase “the image of the vulgar and uncivilized Turk.”²³⁰ He examined the roots of Turks in Central Asia and sought to elevate the status of Turks by tracing their historical contributions to world civilization. Similar to Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi wrote about the concept of *vatan* extensively:

Retaining the possession of the territories outside of the homeland requires an extensive [military] force, which we cannot afford anymore. Thus, we should grant independence to the autonomous regions and create a strong Islamic state in Africa by helping Tripoli, Benghazi, and Egypt unite. The Ottoman Empire and this newly formed state would support each other. If there is an act aggression against our territories in Africa, as was the case in Algeria, what can we do other than protesting the aggressor? Our mother *vatan* then would consist of Rumelia and Anatolia, which includes Syria, Iraq and Palestine. This would be the homeland, where we would exercise our sovereignty.²³¹

Ali Suavi criticized European intellectuals for their attempts to analyze Eastern civilizations drawing upon Western standards. He asserted that the two worldviews are completely different. According to Ali Suavi, “a Frenchman cannot rise to the rank of minister under the English government. Likewise, an Algerian Arab can never enjoy the rights granted to Frenchman. However, the question of ethnicity does not exist in the East.”²³² In Ali Suavi’s

Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 74-78; and Namık Kemal, “Avrupa Şarkı Bilmez,” *İbret*, June 22, 1872, in Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 54-59.

²²⁸ Falih Rıfki Atay, *Başveren İnkılapçı* (Ankara: Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu, 1954).

²²⁹ Fuat Köprülü, *Edebiyat Araştırmaları I* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1989), 212-213.

²³⁰ Quoted in Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 226.

²³¹ Quoted in Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (İstanbul, Ülken Yayınları, 1966), 82. Ali Suavi responded to the allegations of the British newspaper Saturday Review that there were not enough Turks in Anatolia because they were assimilated by other nations. See Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 620.

²³² Ali Suavi, “Osman,” *The Mukhbir*, June 12, 1868, 2. Quoted in Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi*, 623-624.

thinking, Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism could easily be combined. Instead of ethnic problems, in the Ottoman Empire, all Muslims united under the Islamic ideology of *tawhid*. This unity became apparent in his conceptualization of Ottoman *vatan* and in his comparison with the French *patrie*: “For instance Frenchmen number only 30 million people, who support the case of Frenchness. However, Turks are 200 million people in their case of Islam. Ethnicity can perish. But Islam shall exist forever. Therefore Turks will not ever perish.” Far from a nationalist worldview, Ali Suavi defended the imperial and Islamic *vatan*, in which Turks played a vital role as the key element of the Ottoman Empire. He looked down on Western nationalism and praised Islamic unity:

In Islam, if Islamic lands were attacked, it is the duty of every Muslim to defend it . . . We read in the books that this was not the case in France. Instead, they have ‘amour de la patrie,’ which means *hubb ul-vatan*. If the French patrie is attacked, all Frenchmen will defend the *vatan*. However, Prussian soldiers invaded France. The French newspapers alarmed their people for two months to defend their *vatan* and nobody revolted against the enemy.²³³

Young Ottomans were the ideologues of the Ottoman Empire. Their ideology was to “save the state” and to “awaken the nation.” Because there were no intermediary institutions in the empire between the sultan and the people, Young Ottomans developed the idea of loyalty towards the *vatan* as a means of depersonalizing the authority of the Ottoman state. The young Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II, who came to power because of a political coup d’état, used the devastating Russo-Ottoman war to strengthen his authority. He purged the major figures of the Young Ottoman movement, dissolved Parliament, and suspended the constitution. During his extended rule from 1876 to 1909, Abdulhamid continued the reforms started in the Tanzimat era to modernize imperial institutions, such as education and transportation, with an emphasis on the centralization of power. The main difference between Tanzimat reformers and Abdulhamid was

²³³ Ali Suavi, “İslam Askerliği Fransız Askerliği,” *Muvakkaten* 2, October, 6, 1870, 30. Quoted in Seyit Battal Uğurlu, “Ulum Gazetesi’nin Tematik İncelemesi,” (Master Thesis, Van Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi, 1997), 43-44.

that he considered patriotism to be a major threat to his rule. He firmly declared the impossibility of ever constructing a “national consciousness” among the Ottoman people and instead employed Islam as an ideology to protect the territorial integrity of his empire:²³⁴

In their attempts to denigrate us, Europeans label us with the cliché of ‘the dreadful fanaticism of Muslims.’ With this phrase they refer to the so-called bloody atrocities we committed against people of other religions. But isn’t this love same with the one they name love of the *vatan* in their case, which they refer to as fanaticism to describe our case. What they feel for their *vatan* is similar to what we feel for our religion.²³⁵

Abdulhamid used the office of the caliphate to influence Muslims outside of the Ottoman Empire, especially Muslims in the British and Russian Empire. In so doing, he wished to strengthen his hand against the European powers. In turn, he believed, Britain encouraged national uprisings in the empire to dethrone him:

Certain young people, who received a little intellectual polish in Europe, deliver from time to time speeches concerning the love of the *vatan*. However the love of the *vatan* should not come first in our empire. The love of the faith and the caliph should be the first and then should come love of the *vatan*. Is not that the case among the Catholics of Europe? The Christians first pay respect to the Catholic Church and the Pope, and then they consider their *vatan* in the second place. Britain has been spreading the idea of the *vatan* in the Islamic lands with the aim to undermine my authority. This idea has already made a considerable progress in Egypt. Egyptian patriots are unwittingly deceived by the British and undermine the power of Islam as well as the prestige of the caliphate.²³⁶

To weaken the attraction of nationalist movements among Muslims within the empire, Abdulhamid added a thick Islamic color to his regime, which may be termed Islamic Ottomanism. Abdulhamid reinvented traditions and ceremonies to establish a personality cult around the Caliphate.²³⁷ His greatest monument was the construction of the Hijaz railway from Damascus to Medina. The Hijaz Railway facilitated the transportation of pilgrims to Mecca and was completed in 1908 using contributions from Muslims all over the world. However, he also

²³⁴ Sultan Abdülhamid, *Siyasi Hatıratım* (Istanbul: Hareket Yayınları, 1974), 107.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 161-162.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 166-167.

²³⁷ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 123-129.

established a highly developed censorship mechanism to control opposition groups. Officials even condemned the use of the word *vatan* in printed materials as a potentially dangerous act. The exiled Namık Kemal removed the word *vatan* from the title of his play and named it *Silistre* in order not to arouse suspicion.²³⁸ Most of the leading figures that were opposed to the Hamidian regime escaped to Europe and continued their political activities, mainly in France. They formed secret committees and disseminated their journals and articles throughout the major cities of the empire with the objective of overthrowing the sultan and reinstating the constitution and parliament. Although they shared a common enemy, namely Abdulhamid, and therefore combined under the banner of the Young Turks, these intellectuals did not have a common agenda, because they were from different ethnic and religious origins and pursued various ideological and cultural priorities.²³⁹

Young Turk Era

The formation of the Ottoman Unity Society (*İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti*) in 1889 is considered a foundational moment for the Young Turks. However, none of the founders of the Ottoman Unity Society was ethnically Turkish.²⁴⁰ In the first meeting in 1899, there were debates about membership criteria; some members argued that only Muslims could join the organization. İbrahim Temo, who held membership ID number 1-1 (first member of the first division), rejected these proposals. Temo proposed that “every trustworthy Ottoman with goodwill be admitted to the organization regardless of his religion and ethnicity” and his proposal was accepted.²⁴¹ In

²³⁸ Mustafa Nihat Özön, “Bazı Küçük Notlar,” in *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), 13.

²³⁹ M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 144.

²⁴⁰ İbrahim Temo was a Muslim Albanian, Mehmed Reşid was a Circassian, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sukuti were Kurds. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire Volume II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 256; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 168.

²⁴¹ İbrahim Temo, *İbrahim Temo'nun İttihat ve Terakki Anıları* (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987), 17.

1895, the Ottoman Unity Society was renamed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), an organization that was to leave its mark on the next 25 years of the empire. Its leader Ahmet Rıza (1857-1930) rejected the name *İttihad-ı İslam* (Unity of Islam). Because there were various nations and religions in the empire, for Ahmet Rıza, it was essential that the name of the committee embrace all Ottomans. Ahmet Rıza offered two alternatives, *İttihad-ı Osmani* (Unity of Ottomans) and *İttihat ve Terakki* (Union and Progress), and ultimately *İttihat ve Terakki* was accepted.²⁴² While the word “progress” in the name of the committee referred to the modernization of political and economic frameworks, the word “union” signified the unity of every ethnic and religious group in the empire.

Between 1894 and 1896, there were Armenian rebellions and intercommunal conflicts in the Anatolian provinces and in Istanbul. During this turmoil, the CUP declared that its goal was to protect the unity of the empire through loyalty to a common *vatan*. One of the first pamphlets published by the CUP was entitled *Vatan Tehlikede* (*Vatan is in Danger*). It was written by İbrahim Temo and his associates in response to the Armenian rebellions of October 1895, which took place a couple of months after the formation of the CUP. The authors used one of the slogans of the French Revolution, *La Patrie est en danger*, as the title of the pamphlet.²⁴³ In the first two paragraphs of the pamphlet, the authors explained why they took the French Revolution as their model:

A hundred years ago, during the French Revolution when France was attacked by foreign forces, a well-known individual unfurled the flag of patriotism and shouted “our *vatan* is in danger.” Every Parisian old enough to be drafted into the army accepted this patriotic invitation and chose to serve and to sacrifice themselves for their *vatan*. Soon, the sacrifice that had started in the capital began to spread all over the country. Volunteer armies succeeded in saving their country from danger and in defending it against their

²⁴² Ahmet Rıza, *Anılar* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet, 2001), 16-17, 30.

²⁴³ The pamphlet was republished in Latin letters in 1988 in the journal of *Tarih ve Toplum*. Ali Birinci, “Vatan Tehlikede,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 54 (June 1988): 337-342.

oppressors. Even though this important event happened a hundred years ago in a foreign country, we draw parallels with our situation today. Our precious *vatan* has been in danger for some time. We reiterate the scale of this danger. Our goal is to find a solution together to save our common holy mother, our dear *vatan*.²⁴⁴

According to the CUP, the most important factor, “which put state, nation, and 600 hundred year old honor in danger,” was the Armenian question. Although the CUP supported general reforms in the empire, they were against preferential treatment of the Armenian community in six provinces, because this gave the impression that the empire had surrendered to pressure from European states. The authors rejected seeing the empire as the “sultan’s ranch and the people as his slaves.” According to them, the sultan should consider “the members of the nation as citizens and be just and fair to them.”²⁴⁵ In the last pages of the pamphlet, “all Ottomans” were called to act to “save their *vatan*” and to demonstrate in front of the palace in the hundreds of thousands so that the sultan would fulfill his duty towards the nation and reopen the parliament, in which Muslims and Christians could be represented without ethnic and religious discrimination. The CUP warned all Ottoman people that if they hesitated in acting to save the *vatan*, it would be broken into pieces by foreign countries and all Ottomans would face misery.

The political ideal of “saving the *vatan*” had a remarkable impact on the Young Turks. They adopted this ideal from the Young Ottomans, and particularly from Namık Kemal. Under the repressive regime of Abdulhamid, Namık Kemal and his patriotism especially influenced students in the military and medical schools.²⁴⁶ When İbrahim Temo was a medical student, he was questioned by his professors about why he had hung pictures of Ali Suavi and Namık Kemal on the wall of his dormitory room. İbrahim Temo explained that he had these pictures because

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 339.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 341.

²⁴⁶ İbrahim Temo, *İbrahim Temo'nun İttihat ve Terakki Anıları*, 31-32.

“the members of the nation should appreciate and respect these people.” The professors then asked him “why he did not display pictures of the recent sultans.” His answer was “because we were not taught about the sultans after Sultan Mahmud and we cannot even find their pictures.” He was forced to take down these pictures and his room was inspected regularly after the incident. Resneli Ahmet Niyazi, who was a rebellious figure during the 1908 revolution and became a “hero of freedom,” complained to his friends in military school about the lack of patriotism in their education: “We are raised as military officers to protect our *vatan* and destroy the invading enemy. Then why is there not a single course in our program about the love of *vatan* . . . The answer is ‘for the sake of the Yıldız’ [The name of the palace, where Abdulhamid resided].”²⁴⁷ As one of the first members of the CUP, Kazım Nami Duru mentioned in his memoirs that, in military school in Manastir (Bitola in today’s Macedonia), he grasped the significance of Namık Kemal and his writings: “I was so excited after reading Namık Kemal that I imagined myself as an eagle flying around the summit of the mountain of freedom. I learned the *vatan*, the love of the *vatan*, to defend the *vatan*, and the love of freedom from him.”²⁴⁸

Thirteen years after the publication of the pamphlet *Vatan is in Danger*, the CUP decided to act to save the *vatan* from the despotism of the sultan. The revolution of 1908 resulted in the restoration of the constitutional regime and the first general election since 1876. The composition of the new parliament reflected the multicultural nature of Ottoman society. Out of a total of 288 deputies in the parliament, there were 147 Turks, 60 Arabs, 27 Albanians, 26 Greeks, 14 Armenians, 10 Slavs, and 4 Jews.²⁴⁹ Although the period after 1908 and the political regime of the CUP were considered by some scholars to represent the galvanization of nascent Turkish

²⁴⁷ Ahmet Niyazi, *Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Hatıratı* (Istanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2003), 134-135.

²⁴⁸ Kazım Nami Duru, *İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957), 6.

²⁴⁹ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 145.

nationalism, the leaders of the CUP were well aware that they were ruling a multiethnic empire and not a nation-state. Therefore it is more appropriate to call them Ottoman patriots rather than Turkish nationalists, at least until the second half of World War I. Mehmed Reşid Bey's dispute with local Arabs in the city hall of Tripoli after the Revolution of 1908 revealed how a member of the CUP viewed a distant territory, namely Libya, as part of the Ottoman *vatan*.²⁵⁰ Local Arabs considered Ottoman patriots and Young Turks, who were exiled to Libya, as “nonbelievers,” and they opposed the reforms of the Young Turks:

By declaring freedom [the Young Turks] want to turn us into infidels, make us embrace the customs of the heathen, coerce our women to walk naked in the streets, and force us to be brothers with infidels and Jews . . . They have to go back to their country. This is our country not theirs. We have been inhabiting here for centuries. Our ancestors have been buried here. [The Young Turks] are foreigners.²⁵¹

Reşid Bey's response was striking because it revealed that the dispute was not between Arab and Turkish nationalism, but between conservatism and modern Ottoman patriotism.

First of all, this is not your country; it belongs to all Ottomans. The difference between us is that you consider only Tripoli as *vatan*, whereas we consider Anatolia, Rumelia, Arabia, and here as *vatan*, because all of the latter constitute the Ottoman Empire. You are so careless and irresponsible about the future and welfare of Tripoli, even though you consider it your *vatan*. We believe that it is our duty to sacrifice our lives for our *vatan*. If we had thought that *vatan* is the place where we were born and where we earn our living, we would not have left our family and our independence and we would not have come here. I stand up to you and tell you to your face that there is not even a single person among you that has worked as much as I have worked for this country in the last eleven years . . . You do not even know what the love of *vatan* means. Recently when the Italian navy threatened [Libya] and insulted our nation, you all kept quiet and did not do anything. If you had loved your *vatan*, you would have sent telegrams to Istanbul to obtain ammunition and you would have stated your willingness to be soldiers and defend our country. You would have affirmed that you are Ottomans and that you want to continue to be Ottomans. You would have expressed your readiness to sacrifice

²⁵⁰ There is a saying in today's Turkish culture that is used to describe distant places: “Oh, it is in Fezzan.” Although most Turkish people do not know what Fezzan is, presumably this saying was popularized during Abdulhamid's reign to describe those exiled to Fezzan, which was the most remote part of the empire in the southwest of Libya.

²⁵¹ Ahmet Mehmetefendioğlu, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Kurucu Üyelerinden Dr. Reşid Bey'in Hatıraları: Sürgünden İntihara* (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1993), 40.

yourselves because you cannot tolerate our territory being invaded and our religion being mocked by the enemy.²⁵²

Some scholars portrayed Ottoman rule over peripheral regions, such as Libya, Yemen, or Lebanon, as “Ottoman Turkish” colonialism.²⁵³ Nevertheless, there are striking differences between the patriotic vision of Reşid Bey and his embrace of Tripoli as a part of the Ottoman *vatan*, and British colonial officers’ view of India or French colonizers’ ambitions in respect of Algeria.²⁵⁴ Two major problems can be identified in the context of labeling the Ottoman administration of peripheral regions as “colonialism” in a similar way to European colonial rule in Africa or in other parts of the world. First, the Ottoman Empire did not have economic ambitions for peripheral regions to develop industry and thereby compete with European powers. In the 19th century, the empire itself became a semi-colony of Britain and France.²⁵⁵ Second, the crucial difference between Western colonialism and the Ottoman rule of peripheral regions was that the Ottoman rulers and the ruled shared the same religion.²⁵⁶ Moreover, especially in the late

²⁵² Ibid., 40-41.

²⁵³ See Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 768-796; Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45 (2003): 311-342.

²⁵⁴ Similarly, the article “Gecelerimden” (From My Nights) written by Suyum Bike and published by the journal *Türk Yurdu* bemoaned the loss of Tripoli. According to the article, the author spent her childhood in Libya with her father, who was appointed to Libya presumably as an officer, contracted tuberculosis, and died in Tripoli. The author considered Tripoli as her *vatan* and felt great pain over its loss: “Tripoli, which was the heaven of my memoirs, was lost . . . Oh my dear father! Can you see from your burial place in a sand hill that does not have even a tombstone, the condition of your country, for which your lungs were lost. Can you hear the footsteps of the enemy, who wander around your burial place?” Suyum Bike, “Gecelerimden,” *Türk Yurdu* 64 (April 30, 1914): 253-254.

²⁵⁵ Selim Deringil argued that colonialism was a “survival tactic” for Istanbul and therefore referred to the intermediary status of the Ottoman Empire as “borrowed colonialism.” I think that there are still important problems in using the modified term “borrowed colonialism” to portray the relationship between the center and the periphery of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. See Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate.”

²⁵⁶ Khalil Ghanem, who was a Maronite Arab and member of the Young Turk movement, wholeheartedly supported Ottomanism. His words were a clear example of how some Arabs preferred Ottoman rule over European colonial rule: “We Arabs know that if (the Franks) enter our country, in a couple of years our territories will be in their hands; and they will rule it as they wish. As for Turks, they believe in our religion and are acquainted with our customs. In their four centuries of rule, they did not take an inch of our property into their possession. They left to the inhabitants their land, their property, their industry, and their commerce. The Arabs have benefited from trade with the Turks and from our uninterrupted bond. Would it be right for us to replace them with someone else? . . . It is only those who want to curry favor with the ruler who accuse the Muslims of [desiring] to establish an Arab state and the Christians of conspiring with the foreigners . . . The Arab intellectuals and notables have no wish for their

19th century, the center of the Empire legitimated its rule over these territories by positioning the Ottoman sultan as the Caliph and therefore the leader of all the Muslims in the world. The position of the Ottoman sultan vis-à-vis other Muslim rulers was further strengthened by the fact that in the late 19th century, the Ottoman sultan was the only Muslim sovereign ruler who could still play the custodian role for Muslims who were threatened by European colonial empires. The leaders of Muslim societies in distant places such as Aceh, Kashgar, and the Comore Islands approached the Ottoman sultan “believing rather naively that he possessed enough military and economic power to assure their independence and protect them against England, France, Russia, and so on.”²⁵⁷

Another problem is the usage of the adjectival “Ottoman Turkish” to define the rule over non-Turkish Muslims and non-Muslims. According to Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” which emerged after the loss of the Balkan territories in 1878, “reflected the rise of a specifically *Turkish* sensibility as the dominant element of a westernized Islamic Ottoman nationalism” (emphasis in original).²⁵⁸ Makdisi used the terms “Ottoman Turkish rule,” “Ottoman Turkish nation,” “Ottoman Turkish elite,” “Ottoman Turkish tutelage,” “Ottoman Turkish press,” and “Ottoman Turkish modernity” to underline the increasing Turkish nationalism in the last fifty years of the empire. He differentiated the last fifty years of the empire from its classical age, during which Islamic symbolism was used to legitimize sultans’ rule. Makdisi specified “the facilitation and protection of the annual Hajj” as one of the important examples of Islamic symbolism during the classical age. As mentioned above, long after the classical age, during

umma other than to live within the domain of Ottoman interests.” Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 223.

²⁵⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, 66.

²⁵⁸ Ussama Makdisi, *Ottoman Orientalism*, 787.

Abdulhamid's reign, Islamic symbols were extensively used to legitimize his rule. The grandeur project of the construction of the Hijaz Railway to facilitate pilgrimages was the zenith of this policy. Even though most Ottoman intellectuals, including Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi, were aware of the Turkish consciousness, neither they nor the ruling elite used Turkish nationalism as a political ideology until World War I. Even after 1908, when the CUP came to power, the ruling elite of the empire identified themselves as Ottomans and sought to protect the territorial integrity of the empire by emphasizing the common Ottoman identity and Ottoman *vatan*. Contrary to arguments that Young Turks' main objective was the restructuring of the empire under Turkish hegemony, Young Turks aimed to "save the Ottoman *vatan*" by championing Ottomanism. In the first decade of the 20th century, there were intellectuals, such as Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)²⁵⁹, who openly supported pan-Turkism against Ottomanism. But their ideas were not supported by the CUP and the majority of the Young Turks until the Balkan Wars of 1913.

Yusuf Akçura's path-breaking article *Three Political Ways* (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset) has been called the "Manifesto of Turkish nationalism."²⁶⁰ In his article, pan-Turkism was compared with Ottomanism and Islamism for the first time as one of three viable ideologies for the Ottoman Empire. Akçura questioned the ideology of the Young Turks that was founded on protecting the Ottoman Empire's borders, territories, and multi-ethnic social structure by reforming its political

²⁵⁹ Yusuf Akçura was one of the founders of Turkish nationalism, along with Ziya Gökalp. He was born to a rich merchant Tatar family in Kazan, Russia. At the age of seven, he came to Istanbul and later attended the Military College. He was exiled to Fezzan in Libya by the Hamidian regime because of his revolutionary ideas. However, he escaped from Libya to Paris and became a student at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques. In France, Akçura became an ardent supporter of Turkish nationalism, and during the CUP years, he founded institutions and publications that served as an impetus for the development of Turkish nationalism. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, he became a member of parliament and one of the ideologues of nationalism. See François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, translated by Alev Er (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999).

²⁶⁰ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Lotus, 2005).

system. The majority of the Young Turks shared the political ideal of “saving the state” by creating an Ottoman nation with Ottoman statesmen, but both sides advocated different methods. While the Young Turks advocated for a constitutional monarchy, Ottoman statesmen defended the despotic regime of Abdulhamid, because they considered it the only way to suppress separatist movements. Akçura refused to idealize the notion of supranational Ottoman identity by asking this crucial question in his article: “Is the Ottoman Empire able to protect its present geographical borders with its existent forces?”²⁶¹ For Akçura, preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by creating an Ottoman nation was a “futile mission.”²⁶² While Akçura rejected the ideology of Ottomanism, in the article he implicitly hinted that he favored Turkism, which he defined as a “newborn child,” over Islamism to guard the interests of the empire. According to Akçura, the main handicap of Turkism was that the empire would lose territories inhabited by non-Turkish Muslims.

After the publication of *Three Political Ways* in the journal *Türk*, two articles appeared in the same journal as responses to Akçura. Ali Kemal, a supporter of Ottomanism who later opposed the Kemalist movement and was killed by nationalists in 1922, argued that pan-Turkism was a fantasy for the Ottoman Empire:

Who are we unifying? Let’s leave the history aside and look at the geography and the circumstances of the world. To unify the Turks, the whole world should be turned upside down ... think about how it would be possible to take pieces from the body of the colossal Russia.²⁶³

²⁶¹ “Osmanlı Devletinin hakiki kuvveti, günümüzdeki coğrafi şeklini korumakta mıdır?” Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, 48.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 54.

²⁶³ Ali Kemal, “Cevabımız,” in *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Lotus, 2005), 68.

Ahmet Ferit's response to Akçura revealed that it was still too early for Ottoman intellectuals to accept Turkism as the dominant ideology of the state.²⁶⁴ Ahmet Ferit accepted "the impossibility of protecting the current borders of the empire and the infeasibility of turning all people living within its borders into Ottomans and Turks." According to Ahmet Ferit, instead of abandoning the Ottoman ideal, the objective should be to use the ideology of Ottomanism "to maintain as many territories and people as possible."²⁶⁵ Later, during the Balkan Wars, Ahmet Ferit changed his stance and asserted that a national state should be established in the north from Rize to Edirne and in the south from Kerkuk to the island of Rhodes.²⁶⁶ Similarly, according to the memoirs of Ali Fuat Cebesoy, before the 1908 Revolution, Mustafa Kemal argued that after taking power the CUP should liquidate the Ottoman Empire and establish a nation state:

In Rumelia, we will keep the Western and Eastern Thrace. The border in the north of Edirne will be redrawn to Bulgaria's disadvantage . . . The islands close to the Anatolian coast will remain in the newly established Turkish state, the remaining islands will be transferred to Greece. In the south, we will keep Mosul, Aleppo, and Hatay; the rest will be left to the Arabs. There won't be any changes in the eastern and the northeastern borders. The Greek, the Bulgarian, and the Serbian minorities in the new Turkey will be exchanged with Turkish minorities, who will be left outside of our borders.²⁶⁷

The nationalist ideas of the Turkists were not favored by the majority of the CUP members, who refused to liquidate the empire to create a nation-state. They protested that such a move would lead to a loss of territory in Rumelia and Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem in the Middle East, all of which were considered indispensable parts of the Ottoman *vatan*. Unionist leaders embraced the imperial discourse in opposition to a nationalist discourse. The manifesto, which was distributed by the CUP to European Consulates (except Russia) in Manastir two

²⁶⁴ Ahmet Ferit was Yusuf Akçura's friend during Military College. He was also exiled by the government to Libya and then escaped to Paris. He was a member of parliament between 1908 and 1912. Later, he became the director of the nationalist Turkish Hearths organization (*Türk Yurdu*) during the CUP rule. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, he served as a Member of Parliament and ambassador to London, Warsaw and Tokyo.

²⁶⁵ Ahmet Ferit, "Bir Mektup," in *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Lotus, 2005), 91.

²⁶⁶ "Edirne, Rize, Rodos, Süleymaniye! Bu dört kale Türkün ilk hududunun demir kazıklarıdır." Ahmed Ferid, "Türk Ocakları", in *Nevsal-i Milli* (Istanbul: Artin Asaduryan Matbaası, 1914), 189-191.

²⁶⁷ Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Sınıf Arkadaşım Atatürk*, (Istanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1967), 108-114.

months before the 1908 Revolution, was a clear example of imperial discourse as adapted by Unionists. The manifesto rejected the intervention of European powers into Macedonia and the appointment of a foreign governor to the region. According to the CUP, European intervention in the internal affairs of the empire would be collectively rejected by Muslims and Christians, who would act together to “defend their *vatan* from the foreign invasion and therefore decide to take over power from the current [Abdulhamid] regime.”²⁶⁸ The manifesto repeatedly underlined the solidarity between Muslims and Christians, based on the love of the *vatan*:

In Macedonia and in other regions Muslims and Christians are children of the same soil and they are not so unwise as to fight their brethren, who are also captives of the despotic regime . . . Muslims are aware of the fact that their union with other citizens, who speak different languages and belong to different religions, will be crucial for the future of the *vatan* . . . Regardless of religion and ethnicity, all Ottomans are brothers. For the sake of *vatan*, the differences between Christian and Muslim communities disappear and Ottoman identity prevails.²⁶⁹

The Young Turks and the CUP had various reasons for adopting Ottomanism as their ideology. The primary reason was pragmatism. After taking power in 1908, they had to transform themselves from an intellectual movement into a political organization, which could compete against other parties. As “empire savers,” they had to find ways to maintain the balance between various ethnic and religious groups and to protect the territorial integrity of the empire.²⁷⁰ The positivists and pan-Turkists were marginalized in the CUP in order to avoid offending conservatives and non-Turkish groups. The CUP adopted Ottomanism not only rhetorically, but also idealistically. From the idealistic point of view, to create an Ottoman patriotism based on common *vatan*, history, and language was seen the only viable alternative to pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in order to overcome separatist tendencies in a multiethnic

²⁶⁸ The manifesto was published by Resneli Niyazi in his memoirs. Ahmet Niyazi, *Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Hatıratı*, 187-188.

²⁶⁹ Ahmet Niyazi, *Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Hatıratı*, 192, 197-198.

²⁷⁰ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 313-317.

empire. The best example of this policy was the change of the mission of the Ottoman army from the *gaza* tradition (military campaigns against infidel lands on behalf of Islam) to the patriotic defense of the *vatan*.²⁷¹ It must be underlined that Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and Islamism were not mutually exclusive political ideologies. Ottomanism was considered as an umbrella ideology, which included pan-Turkist and Islamist elements. Given the changing circumstances, the Unionists advanced either pan-Turkism or Islamism without downgrading Ottomanism from its central position. However, the infusion of patriotic elements in education, military, and politics caused negative reactions among non-Turkish communities. Ottomanist policies of the CUP were considered tools of Turkification.

When the CUP took power in 1908, the empire stretched from Libya to Yemen and from Basra to Kosova. According to the population census in 1906-1907, there were 15,508,753 Muslims (mainly Turks and Arabs), 2,823,063 Greeks, 1,031,668 Armenians, 761,530 Bulgarians, and 253,425 Jews in the Ottoman Empire.²⁷² In this chaotic, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious environment, it would have been political suicide for the CUP to apply nationalist policies and a Turkification campaign toward non-Turkish groups. According to Şükrü Hanioglu, “the available CUP documents reveal that only in very late 1917 did the CUP decide to totally abandon Ottomanism and pursue a Turkist policy.”²⁷³ Similarly, François Georgeon argued that “during the 1908 Revolution, the nationalist movement was nonexistent. There were no newspapers or organizations that supported [nationalist] ideas.”²⁷⁴ Ten years after the 1908 Revolution, there was a radically different tableau before the ruling elites of the empire. In the

²⁷¹ The ideal of “defending the *vatan*” has been an important factor in the Turkish military. It became a slogan and has been used by the army in military coups against governments and opposition groups such as Kurds, Islamists, and Leftists.

²⁷² Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

²⁷³ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks*, 299.

²⁷⁴ François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, 60.

war against Italy in 1911-1912, the empire lost its last territory in Africa, namely Libya. In the Balkan Wars, the European heartland of the empire was invaded by the Balkan states. Except for the Edirne region, all of the European territories were surrendered. The dramatic loss of significant territories resulted in the dislocation of the imperial discourse. In the context of discourse theory, “dislocation” refers to “a destabilization of a discourse that results from the emergence of events which cannot be domesticated, symbolized or integrated within the discourse in question.”²⁷⁵ In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the loss of territories in the Balkans and Libya caused Turkish and Arab intellectuals to question the validity of Ottomanism. Arab intellectuals also questioned the ability of the Ottoman state — due to its poor performance against Italy in Libya — to defend territories inhabited by Arabs in the Middle East against European powers. Similarly, Turkish nationalists argued that the Ottoman state and the army were too weak for imperial ambitions.²⁷⁶ During World War I, when the Ottoman sultan’s declaration of jihad to unite all Muslims against the empire’s enemies was disregarded by most non-Turkish Muslims, pan-Turkist voices started to be heard more loudly, arguing that uniting all Turks would serve the empire’s interests better than Islamism. In 1918, the empire was merely controlling territories where Turks and Kurds were the majority. The ideology of Turkish nationalism emerged as the dominant discourse on account of this dislocation. In the next chapter, I will analyze how the nationalist discourse became hegemonic by examining the transformation of the imperial *vatan* into the national *vatan*.

²⁷⁵ Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 301.

²⁷⁶ Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*, 107.

Chapter 3

From Imperial to National *Vatan*

In 1913, when the Ottomans were fighting against the Balkan armies, a series of conferences were organized in Istanbul by Sati Bey (1880-1969), the director of the School of Education, about the defense of *vatan*. During the turmoil due to the loss of the Rumelia and of the historic city of Edirne, Sati Bey undertook a comprehensive analysis of how to imbue Ottoman citizens with Ottoman patriotism. These conferences were published in a book called *Vatan İçin Beş Konferans* (Five Conferences for the *Vatan*).²⁷⁷ The titles of the conferences were as follows: 1) The idea of *vatan*, 2) The education for *vatan*, 3) The duty for *vatan*, 4) Defending the nation, and 5) The emergence of Prussia and the speeches of Fichte. It must be emphasized that Sati Bey was born in Yemen in 1880 as an Arab, and became one of the founders of modern education in the Ottoman Empire.²⁷⁸ The issues dealt with in these conferences and Sati Bey's thoughts revealed that as late as 1913, an Arab intellectual was truly committed to Ottomanism and considered it to be the only viable ideology for all Ottoman people.

In these conferences, Sati Bey complained about “the weakness of the love of *vatan*” among the Ottomans. For Sati Bey, the primary duty of the Ottoman state was to “strengthen the idea of *vatan*” among its people.²⁷⁹ He criticized the supporters of Turkish, Arab, and Armenian nationalisms and their negation of Ottoman patriotism as a feasible ideology. Sati Bey refused to imitate the European countries to construct an Ottoman *vatan* based on language or ethnicity, as

²⁷⁷ Sati Bey, *Vatan İçin Beş Konferans* (Dersaadet: Kader Matbaası, 1913).

²⁷⁸ With the end of the World War I, Sati Bey left Istanbul and lived in Iraq, Syria and the Middle East until the end of his life. He institutionalized modern education in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. In Cairo he became a professor of the Arab nation, and according to Berkes, Sati Bey “taught the Egyptians how to become an Arab.” Niyazi Berkes, *Arap Dünyasında İslamiyet, Milliyetçilik, Sosyalizm* (Istanbul: Köprü, 1969), 96.

²⁷⁹ Sati Bey, *Vatan İçin Beş Konferans*, 3.

there were various ethnic groups and a great number of languages dispersed in the vast territories of the empire. To overcome these differences, Sati Bey claimed that loyalty to the Ottoman *vatan* “has to be established on the basis of the Ottoman state and common history.” According to him, Islam was the most important link among Ottomans and it was “the only Muslim state, which would be able to protect its sovereignty.”²⁸⁰ He emphasized the importance of symbols, such as the national flag, the national anthem and the teaching of the “*vatan*’s geography and history” for the development of Ottoman patriotism.²⁸¹ The Ottoman Empire and Sati Bey were not unique in an era that sought to solve the nationality problem in a multiethnic empire by promoting patriotism and loyalty to a common fatherland. In a comparably chaotic atmosphere, Josef Alexander Helbert (1820-1910), the undersecretary of the ministry of education in the Habsburg Empire, reacted similarly to the national uprisings in 1848.²⁸² For Helbert, as for Sati Bey, the solution for overcoming the national uprisings was to teach the *vaterlandische Geschichte* (history of the fatherland) to the children and to imbue them with imperial patriotic feelings:

²⁸⁰ Ibid, 23-25.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 37, 46-48.

²⁸² The similarities between Josef Alexander Helbert and Sati Bey are striking. Both of them served in the ministry of education and advocated for the construction of a common imperial history to maintain the solidarity between different ethnic groups. Similarly, both Helbert and Sati Bey analyzed the education systems of other European countries to change their imperial and cosmopolitan curriculums to patriotic and practical ones. In his book *Concerning National History and What is Done in Austria to Promote it*, published in 1853, Helbert envisaged a national history for the Habsburg Empire: “It is true that mankind is divided into a great number of tribes that differ as to language and color. But according to our ideas national history is not the history of any such group defined by its racial origin. We think that national history is the history of the population of a territory that is politically united, subordinate to the same authority and living under the protection of the same law. For us, Austrian national history is the history of the Austrian state and people as a whole. This whole is constituted of a variety of tribes that differ as to education and customs. These live together organically in a very complex system on the vast territory of the Empire either separated in closed groups or intermixed.” Josef Alexander Helbert, *Über Nationalgeschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand ihrer Pflege in Österreich* (Prag: Calve’schen Buchhandlung, 1853). See also Walter Leitsch, “East Europeans Studying History in Vienna,” in *Historians as Nation-Builders*, eds. Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), 139-143. 60 years after Helbert, Sati Bey underlined the importance of reforming the teaching of history and geography: “Geography is a crucial science to teach the body and the physical characteristics of *vatan*. History as a science is important to teach the spirit of *vatan*. These two sciences are the most important tools for the education of patriotism . . . Teaching of these two sciences should be restructured to engender the love of *vatan* in the hearts of people.” Sati Bey, *Vatan İçin Beş Konferans*, 36-37.

We saw everywhere nationalist extremists of different kinds among Germans in Vienna, Salzburg and Graz, among the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia and among Hungarians in Hungary and Transylvania. The chance to learn more about our homeland and to love it seemed to have been lost everywhere. As soon as the days of temptation had come, those who lacked sound intuition allowed themselves to be drawn into shortsighted sympathies for narrow-minded tendencies of secession or into a fixation on a distant external attraction.²⁸³

Neither Sati Bey's nor Helbert Joseph Alexander's views about imperial patriotism achieved wide-ranging support among the people in these empires. The Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires were unable to construct durable patriotisms and were therefore unable to maintain their territorial integrities. The people in Ottoman and Habsburg lands lost confidence in the value of belonging to an empire. Rival nationalist ideologies, which aimed to create national territories, were much more powerful than imperial patriotism in creating physical boundaries to unite and divide space and mental boundaries to separate 'us' from 'them.' The nation-state paradigm attributes great importance to the control over territory to legitimize the power of the state. Whereas the political structure of the empire consisted of heterogeneous units in which membership was organized hierarchically, the nation state insisted on abolishing hierarchical belonging and replacing it with popular sovereignty, which belonged to a homogenous group of people.²⁸⁴ Ernest Gellner explained how nationalism changed the political authority by comparing

two ethnographic maps, one drawn up before the age of nationalism, and the other after the principle of nationalism had done much of its work. The first map resembles a painting by Kokoschka. The riot of diverse points of colour is such that no clear pattern can be discerned in any detail, though the picture as a whole does have one. A great diversity and plurality and complexity characterizes all distinct parts of the whole . . . Look now instead at the ethnographic and political map of an area of the modern world. It resembles not Kokoschka, but, say, Modigliani. There is very little shading; neat flat

²⁸³ Josef Alexander Helbert, *Über Nationalgeschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand ihrer Pflege in Österreich*, 31.

²⁸⁴ Jan Penrose, "Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 3 (2002): 283-284.

surfaces are clearly separated from each other, it is generally plain where one begins and another ends, and there is little if any ambiguity or overlap.²⁸⁵

By constructing territories as the basis of identities, the nation state provided an ontological security for its citizens. Boundaries played a crucial role in the process of institutionalizing territories as homelands. Therefore, not only where the boundary is, but also how it is naturalized and against what kind of resistant forces it was manifested reveals the fact that territorial identities are socially constructed and historically contingent. National identity essentialized itself by claiming to be in existence since ancient times. Although nationalism claimed the unchanging presence of the nation in the fullness of time, the nation is not a singular and static process. It has various meanings “for different actors and in different contexts.”²⁸⁶

In the case of Turkey, the analysis of the change from a heterogeneous imperial homeland to a homogenous national homeland illustrates how national discourses and practices nationalized education, politics, and daily life in order to maintain social integration and control. This was a very difficult process because it required not only the acceptance and internalization of significant territorial losses such as Rumelia, in which most of the founders of the Republic of Turkey were born, including Mustafa Kemal, but also the change of identity and belonging.²⁸⁷ In order to establish a nation state, the ruling elites had to transform the existing imperial consciousness to a Turkish national identity in an environment “where the borders lost their

²⁸⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 139-140.

²⁸⁶ Anssi Paasi, “Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World Flows,” in *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*, ed. David Newman (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999), 81.

²⁸⁷ After the 1908 Revolution, the politics of the empire was dominated by the civil and military officers from the Balkans that played an important role in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. According to Zurcher, 48 percent of high-level military and civil officers came from the Balkans after 1908, “with another 26 percent born in the capital. Eleven percent came from the islands and coast of the Aegean, while the vast Asiatic possessions of the empire taken together produced only 13 percent” of the post-1908 leadership. Erik Jan Zurcher, *The Young Turks – Children of the Borderlands?* (accessed December 2, 2008); available from http://www.tulp.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/wap/ejz16.pdf.

essential character and the empire was exposed to the threats of foreign countries.”²⁸⁸ Indeed, the Sevres Treaty and the occupation of Istanbul and other parts of Anatolia by European powers and Greece played a crucial role in the nationalist discourse during the War of Independence. A couple of months after starting ‘the National Movement’ (*Hareket-i Milliye*) in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal defined its main objective as “defending the miserable country and territories against the invading foreign and aggressive forces, who are seeking to destroy it with the policies of imperialism and colonialism.”²⁸⁹

In this chapter, the nation state building process in Turkey will be examined. The in-depth analysis of this process reveals that the imperial elites changed themselves and nationalized the political discourse, which defined sovereignty as ‘national sovereignty,’ the borders ‘as national borders,’ the parliament as a ‘national assembly,’ and education as ‘national education.’ I will analyze how Turkish nationalism successfully adapted a territorial approach based on ‘national borders’ and became the dominant ideology among the ruling elites and intellectuals by eliminating competing ideologies such as Islamism and pan-Turkism.

Between Ottomanism, Islamism, and pan-Turkism²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ “Bir taraftan hudutlar kat’i mahiyetini kaybeder, koca imparatorluk harice karşı adeta emniyetsiz yaşar.” Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar used this sentence to define the period between 1776 and 1826. I believe it is more appropriate for the period between 1876 and 1920, when the empire lost almost all of its territories in Europe and the Middle East. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 163.

²⁸⁹ Mustafa Kemal made this speech to the journalist Ruşen Eşref in Amasya on 24-25th of October 1919. Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 22.

²⁹⁰ The use of the terms Turkism, pan-Turkism, and Turanism is problematic, and their meanings changed according to the circumstances. The difference between pan-Turkism and Turanism is relatively clear compared to Turkism. Pan-Turkism emerged in Russia against the Czarist rule to unite all Turkic groups. Compared to pan-Turkism, Turanism was all-encompassing, and in addition to Turkic groups it included Hungarians, Finns, and Mongols. However most of the Turkish nationalists used these terms interchangeably. For instance, although Ziya Gökalp used the term Turan extensively in his articles and poems, a confederation of Turks with Mongols, Hungarians, and Finns was not realistic for him, because he considered religion an important factor for a political union. The difference between pan-Turkism and Turkism is more ambiguous. Whereas pan-Turkism was used mainly against pan-Slavism by authors in their works, which aimed at Western readers, Turkism as a term was more prominent in publications, which were in Turkish and aimed at Turkish public opinion. Moreover, pan-Turkism had expansionist

With the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established within the borders identified in the National Pact that was announced by the last term of the Ottoman Parliament in 1920, with some major exceptions, such as Western Thrace and the districts of Mosul and İskenderun. In contrast to Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, who lost World War I and accepted the agreements enforced by Entente Powers, the Turkish nationalists waged a war against the implementation of the Sevres Treaty. Furthermore, Turkish nationalists' refusal to accept territorial losses in Anatolia and their signing of a new peace treaty as a result of a military victory in the National Liberation War was the crucial difference between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, which gained their independence without a major military confrontation in the boundaries drawn by colonial powers.²⁹¹ This distinctive feature had a major impact on the politics of Turkey and on its foreign policy.

Turkish nationalism, which was shaped in the political and social context of the period after World War I, envisaged a homeland limited to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. This territorial feature of Turkish nationalism played a major role in the creation of modern Turkey, and it signified a major break from the pan-Turkist ideology, which advocated for the unity of all Turkic people in Eurasia. Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924) were the two major ideologues of Turkish nationalism, and their thinking, which was considered the basis of the nationalist ideology's corpus, evolved from pan-Turkism to Turkish nationalism in the first quarter of the twentieth century.²⁹² Although both Akçura and Gökalp supported the Kemalist

tones compared to Turkism, which limited its objectives with the Turks in the Ottoman Empire. The main difference between pan-Turkism, and Turanism and Turkish nationalism is that the last one clearly rejected irredentism and restricted its objectives with the "national borders." Ziya Gökalp, "Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak," *Türk Yurdu* 35 (March 20, 1913): 186; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 344.

²⁹¹ Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt did not gain their independence as a result of a national liberation wars against colonial powers. Algeria was definitely an exception that gained independence after a long war against France.

²⁹² Although Akçura had a very close relationship with the CUP and from time to time supported its policies, he never became a member. Ziya Gökalp was appointed by the CUP as the inspector of party organizations in the

movement, there was an essential difference between their earlier view of nationalism until the end of World War I and their later view after the beginning of national struggle in 1919. While they considered ethnicity to be the most important feature of Turkish nationalism, which determined the unification of all Turkic groups as a political objective, Kemalist nationalism clearly rejected their expansionist worldview and restricted Turkish nationalism through national borders. As Ali Kazancıgil rightly argued, “while Ziya Gökalp defined the nation as people with the same education, language and religion – but non-territorial, insofar as the Turks were part of Islam; Kemalist nationalism was above all territorial.”²⁹³

The early Turkists’ thoughts were too idealistic and romantic to define the territorial limits of the Turkish *vatan*. Yusuf Akçura’s pioneering article *Three Political Ways* vaguely defined the geographical objective of the “Turkish Union,” which “is not limited to the borders of the Ottoman Empire.” According to Akçura, “the Turkish world” would emerge between the “white and yellow races” and would “unify all the Turks being spread over a great portion of Asia and over the Eastern parts of Europe.” The area between these two races would be lead by the Ottoman Empire, and it “could play a role similar to that which is played by Japan among the yellow races.”²⁹⁴ It is obvious that Akçura was not interested in devising a nationalist ideology for a Turkish nation-state. His vision was clearly expansionist, as he sought to develop pan-Turkism as the main policy of the Ottoman Empire. To put his vision into practice, Akçura came to Istanbul in 1908 and established the first Turkist institution in the Ottoman Empire: Turkish

provinces of Diyarbakır, Bitlis, and Van after 1908 Revolution. In 1910, Gökalp moved to Salonika and became the member of the Central Committee, which was the highest organ of the CUP, and he kept his influential position until 1918. See Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1826-1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 13.

²⁹³ Ali Kazancıgil, “The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: Hurst Company, 1981), 51.

²⁹⁴ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, 59.

Association (*Türk Derneği*).²⁹⁵ The aim of the Turkish Association was to “study and teach history, language, and literature of all the Turks, to explore the geography of the Turkish countries and to develop our language so that it will be suitable for an extensive civilization.”²⁹⁶ In three years, all Turkist intellectuals, such as Ziya Gökalp, Fuat Köprülü (1890-1966), Mehmet Emin (1869-1944), Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869-1939), came together in the journal *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), which was directed by Akçura.²⁹⁷ *Türk Yurdu* would become one of the most influential publications of Turkish nationalism in the 20th century.²⁹⁸

The program of *Türk Yurdu*, which was written by Akçura, was in favor of empowering the Turkism in the Ottoman Empire and increasing the relationship between the various Turkish groups in Eurasia:

The journal [*Türk Yurdu*] will not support any political party when it talks about the internal politics of the Ottoman state. However, it will defend the political and economic interests of the Turks. While it defends the interests of the Turkish society, it will refrain to cause conflict among different societies [in the empire] . . . The main ideal of the journal in international politics is to defend the interests of the Turkish world.²⁹⁹

Until the Balkan Wars, the journal was the major publication in the Ottoman Empire that explicitly supported Turkism against Ottomanism. It identified Turkism as the most suitable ideology for defending the interests of the Turks. In his article “In the Turkish World,” Akçura

²⁹⁵ Muharrem Feyzi Togay, *Yusuf Akçura: Hayatı ve Eserleri* (Istanbul: Hüsnütabiat Basımevi, 1944), 59.

²⁹⁶ Yusuf Akçura, *Yeni Türk Devletinin Öncüleri: 1928 Yılı Yazıları* (Ankara: Aydınlar Matbaacılık, 2001), 229-230.

²⁹⁷ Fuat Köprülü belonged to the well-known Köprülü family, and his great grandfather was a grand vizier from 1655 to 1661. Fuat Köprülü was a leading historian and known for his contributions to Ottoman history. He later became one of the founders of the Democrat Party and served in the governments of Adnan Menderes as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1950 to 1955. Mehmet Emin was one of the first ardent Turkish nationalist poets whose poems are still memorized today by Turkish schoolchildren. Mehmet Emin became a member of the CUP in 1907. After the establishment of the Republic, he took the surname *Yurdakul*, which means ‘slave to the homeland.’ Ahmet Ağaoğlu (known as Agayev in Azerbaijan) was a prominent Turkist. He was the member of the CUP and became a member of parliament in 1914. He studied in Paris at the Sorbonne University and was influenced by the works of Ernst Renan. Upon the establishment of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, he went to Baku and became a member of the parliament. After the Soviet invasion, he came to Turkey and continued his political activities as a journalist. Later he became a member of the parliament from the city of Kars, which has a considerable Azeri population.

²⁹⁸ Yusuf Akçura and other Turkist intellectuals established the organization the *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearths) in 1912. The organization had 3000 members in 1914 and this number had increased to 30000 by 1920.

²⁹⁹ Yusuf Akçura, *Yeni Türk Devletinin Öncüleri*, 235.

held the Ottoman statesmen responsible for not developing the regions inhabited by Turks and for giving preferential treatment to areas inhabited by Arabs, Armenians, and Albanians: “Turks sacrifice everything they own for this country and in return they get nothing . . . Listen, from now on Turks demand their rights and their deserved status in the empire.”³⁰⁰

Between the 1908 Revolution and the Balkan Wars, the Unionists optimistically believed that maintaining the imperial political structure was in the interests of all Ottomans and therefore should be endorsed by them.³⁰¹ The general hatred towards the despotic regime of Abdulhamid disguised fundamental differences between various groups about the outlook of the empire. The Unionists disregarded the political and social developments in Europe during the 19th century and took the French Revolution as their political model. As Tarık Zafer Tunaya rightly put it, they “abolished the established political regime without any future plans by employing an outdated ideology borrowed from France that was forgotten even by her.”³⁰² The CUP reasoned that Ottomanism and loyalty to the Ottoman *vatan* would be the glue to unify all Ottoman people (See Figure 1). In fact, the Young Turk movement, which was formed by different ethnic groups all over the empire, was more Ottoman than its predecessor, Young Ottomans, which was restricted to the Turcophile intellectuals in the imperial center.³⁰³ According to the Young Turks, all ethnic groups had their “special *vatans*” (*vatan-ı hususi*), which were enclosed by the “general *vatan*” (*vatan-ı umumi*).³⁰⁴ The Interior Minister Halil Bey (Menteşe), who was called

³⁰⁰ Yusuf Akçura, “Türk Aleminde,” *Türk Yurdu* 1, no. 17 (July 11, 1912): 288.

³⁰¹ Cemal Pasha wrote his memoirs in 1919 and admitted that the Unionists were unsuccessful in integrating the revolutionary organizations of other ethnic groups to the CUP: “Just as the Ottoman government was formed by the union of all Ottoman nations, we wanted the CUP to be a union of all revolutionary organizations of all the Ottoman nations.” Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar* (Istanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959), 346.


³⁰² Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 47.

³⁰³ According to Hasan Kayalı, it is misleading to argue that “the transition from Young Ottoman to Young Turk implies an ungrounded narrowing of interests toward a more ethnically Turkish emphasis.” Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*, 38-39.

³⁰⁴ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 373-375. The idea of establishing two types of territorial loyalty was first employed in the Ottoman Empire by an Albanian intellectual Şemsettin Sami in 1878. Şemsettin

as the part time member of the triumvirate of Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas, rejected “the Turkification of Ottomans” and regarded such a policy as “destructive” for the empire: “The aim of the government in the internal politics is the union of all Ottomans. The objective of the policy of union is to convince all Ottomans that they will consider every part of the Ottoman *vatan* as their common *vatan* and with the same common love and affection they will see the Ottoman state as their own state.”³⁰⁵ The clear illustration of how the CUP embraced the policy of “The Unity of Elements” or Ottomanism was Sultan Mehmed Reşad’s historic tour of Ottoman cities in the Balkans in 1911. The CUP meticulously organized parades in which Bulgarians, Greeks, and Albanians demonstrated their loyalty to the sultan.³⁰⁶

Figure 1: One of the posters used during 1908 Revolution. On the cow, it was written *vatan*. Ottoman *vatan* was portrayed as an exploited cow.



Sami argued that he had two different loyalties: one to the Ottoman Empire and the other to Albania. He called the former as the “general *vatan*” and the latter as the “special *vatan*.” See Hasan Kaleşi, “Şemsettin Sami Fraşeri’nin Siyasi Görüşleri,” in *VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1973), 647.

³⁰⁵ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 373-374. See for a detailed information about Halil Menteşe, Syed Tanvir Wasti, “Halil Mentese: The Quadrumvir,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 3 (July 1996): 92-105; İsmail Arar, “Giriş,” in *Halil Menteşe’nin Anıları* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), 1-106.

³⁰⁶ Erik Jan Zürcher, “Kosovo Revisited: Sultan Resad’s Macedonian Journey of June 1911,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 1999): 26-39.

Both the CUP politicians and intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, who would be a leading Turkish nationalist after the Balkan Wars, were unable to decide between Turkism and Ottomanism until 1913. Ziya Gökalp defined the Ottoman Empire as “the free and progressivist America of the East.”³⁰⁷ He used the term “Young Ottomans” instead of “Young Turks” to define the patriotic intellectuals: “Who are the Young Ottomans? Regardless of their [ethnic] group, they are the wise men, who adapted to the new life and the new civilization. They seek to save patriotism from the domination of one [ethnic] group and disseminate it to all citizens.”³⁰⁸ Gökalp underlined the fact that Young Ottomans did not restrict themselves with the proclamation of the constitutional regime. Their two other crucial objectives were to realize “Ottoman Unity” and to establish “an advanced civilization” for the Ottoman society. According to Gökalp, members of Young Ottomans referred to themselves first as Ottomans and then as Arabs, Turks, Armenians, or Greeks depending on their ethnicity. In 1909 Gökalp truly believed in the viability of the Ottoman nation, “which would exist forever in constitutionalism and friendship, and will always advance under the guidance of the Young Ottomans.”³⁰⁹ Two years later, in the article “the Resistance of the Old,” Gökalp made a clear distinction between ethnicity (*kavim*) and nation (*millet*). Whereas Armenians, Turks, Greeks, and Kurds are different ethnicities, they together constituted the Ottoman nation, which had a political character: “An Englishman, a Frenchman, a German belong to different political communities. All of them have a specific *vatan*. Like them, we belong to the Ottoman nation and the Ottoman *vatan*.”³¹⁰

³⁰⁷ Ziya Gökalp, “Yeni Osmanlılar,” in *Makaleler I*, ed. Şevket Beysanoğlu (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976), 63. The article was originally published by the newspaper *Peyman* in Diyarbakır on July 12, 1909.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 62-65.

³¹⁰ Ziya Gökalp, “Eskiliğin Mukavemeti,” *Genç Kalemler 2* (May 9, 1911): 26-29.

While Ziya Gökalp still believed in the cosmopolitan ideology of Ottomanism, Akçura, Ağaoğlu and other authors of *Türk Yurdu* advocated for an ethnic Turkish nationalism to change the multiethnic political structure of the Ottoman Empire, and they severely criticized Ottomanism. The journal published an article of İsmail Gasprinski (1851-1914) that denounced the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire after the Tanzimat.³¹¹ According to Gasprinski, the main objective of the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire during this period was to “postpone the trouble” (*def-i gail*) by giving concessions to European powers. As a result of this policy, he continued, the empire lost Crete, Bosnia, Egypt, Tunis, and Eastern Rumelia. He denounced the Ottoman sultans for not having an ideal, as they only aimed to maintain their rule rather than to protect the territorial integrity of the empire. For Gasprinski, Germany and Japan developed and expanded during the same period as a result of a nationalist ideal, whereas the Ottoman Empire weakened because it ignored the Turks and their heartland of Anatolia:

How to calm the conflicts in Albania and how to finish the war against Italy are today’s problems. Their consequences are contingent to present conditions. However, the real problem of yesterday, today, and future for Turkey is the problem of Anatolia that is the matter of life. The Anatolian problem is how to develop Anatolia and to restore the Turks In the last sixty years, while Rumelia had been lost gradually, if the Istanbul government had worked to develop Anatolia, today’s situation would have been quite different.³¹²

Likewise, Akçura analyzed the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire from an ethnic perspective in his article published just after the beginning of the Balkan War. He defined the war as “an offensive of the Slav world against Turkish people.”³¹³ According to Akçura, the major power behind the Slavic alliance was Russia, which aimed to “drive out Turks and Germans from the Balkan peninsula and to subjugate Albanians, Greeks, and Romanians under Slavic control.” The war revealed the ignorance of the Turkish high officials about the

³¹¹ “İmparatorluk Haricindeki Türkler Ne Diyorlar?” *Türk Yurdu* 20 (August 22, 1912): 336-337.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Yusuf Akçura, “Türklük Şuunu,” *Türk Yurdu* 25 (October 31, 1912): 30.

significance of ethnicity in politics, as they sought to “set up a Balkan Alliance under the leadership of the Ottoman Sultan” just before the conflict.³¹⁴

The Balkan territories of the empire had a significant position in the eyes of the Ottoman ruling elite. The grand vizier Sait Pasha (1830-1914) argued in his report submitted to sultan Abdulhamid that “the survival of this state depends on the continuation of our rule in the Rumelia region.”³¹⁵ Indeed, the Balkan Wars were the turning point for the Ottoman Empire and the development of Turkish nationalism. Balkan countries, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria formed an alliance against the Ottoman Empire and declared war in October 1912. Within a couple of months, the Ottoman army lost the battles on all fronts and retreated to its last defense line in Çatalca, which is 60 kilometers from Istanbul. The loss of all of the territories in the Balkans, including the historic capital city of Edirne, and the arrival of thousands of Muslims migrants, who escaped from the advancing Balkan armies, created a feeling of despair within Turkish society. The collapse of imperial discourse was reflected remarkably by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897-1976)³¹⁶:

Eventually the Balkan War started. When the imperial army retreated against the Balkan armies, which were despised by that time, and lost all the Ottoman territories in Europe, everything became clear. This collapse was not just a defeat of a state. It was the end of a

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 130. Kazım Karabekir (1882-1948), who fought against the Bulgarian army in the Balkan Wars and became one of the most powerful generals during the war of independence, mentioned in his memoirs the importance of the Balkans for the survival of Turkey: “Macedonia, are you going to remain in our hands? If you leave, will you drag all Turkey with you?” Kazım Karabekir, *Hayatım* (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995), 365.

³¹⁶ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s book *Suyu Arayan Adam* is an excellent account for analyzing the changing discourse of a Turkish intellectual in the first half of the 20th century. Aydemir was an Ottoman patriot when he was in the military school. After the loss of territories in the Balkans, he became a passionate pan-Turkist to unite all the “enslaved Turks” in the Russian Empire. He joined the Ottoman army during World War I to fight against Russians on the Caucasus front. After the war, he went to Azerbaijan and Russia and became a socialist. After returning to Turkey, he became a Kemalist intellectual and defended the Kemalist reforms until the end of his life. Aydemir defined the end of his intellectual transformation accordingly: “My life story ended with a turn to the soil of the Central Anatolian steppe.” Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976).

groundless dream. It was a complete collapse of a spirit and mentality. An imperial story was dissolving. Apparently, what we considered as grandeur was just a woolgathering.³¹⁷

Indeed, intellectuals and politicians described the situation of the empire after the first Balkan War as a “national disaster.” Newspapers and journals published articles, and conferences were organized to make the Turkish society conscious of the seriousness of the military defeat to an unprecedented degree. On April 12, 1913, Halide Edib (1884-1964)—a feminist political figure who later became very active in the National Liberation War in Anatolia—gave a speech with the title “Nations after Disasters” to women at the conference in *Darulfünun* (House of Multiple Sciences, which later became Istanbul University).³¹⁸ The language of her speech was very nationalistic. She frequently underlined the fact that Turks had never experienced such a disaster in Ottoman history. According to Halide Edib, the main difference between the war against Russia in 1877-1878 and the Balkan Wars was that for the first time “the nation carries the disaster in its heart. Today, *vatan* is not a territory, fortress or country that lies far from us. Today, *vatan* is a country, which is in our heart and spirit.”³¹⁹ As Italian unification showed, provided that a nation kept the love of *vatan* in its heart, it was impossible to destroy it. Therefore, she continued, Turkish mothers had to instill “the hatred against enemies” in their children. Halide Edib considered Bulgaria and the Bulgarian army, which captured Edirne, as the main threat to Turkish people: “Bulgaria should be destroyed.’ You have to keep this fire in your heart so that years or even death cannot extinguish it. You have to pour it [hatred] to your children’s vein with your milk from your breasts.”³²⁰ The reason

³¹⁷ Ibid., 48-49.

³¹⁸ İnci Enginün, *Halide Edib Adivar’ın Eserlerinde Doğu ve Batı Meselesi* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2007), 434. Her speech was published by *Türk Yurdu* on May 29, 1913. Halide Edib, “Felaketlerden Sonra Milletler,” *Türk Yurdu* 40 (May 29, 1913): 287-291.

³¹⁹ Halide Edib, “Felaketlerden Sonra Milletler,” 288.

³²⁰ Ibid., 289.

to carry the hatred and the need for revenge to future generations was to realize the ideal of “establishing a strong and free Turkey and Turks.”³²¹

Fuat Köprülü criticized the prevailing feeling of desperation among Turks after the loss of Edirne. For him, the Turkish youth should leave submissive thoughts aside and get ready for revenge: “If today’s youth instill the principles of nationality and revenge in the common people, there is no need to fear from the Slav army waiting in front of Çatalca.”³²² In the same way, the speaker of the parliament, Halil Bey warned members of the parliament not to forget the loss of Rumelia:

Other nations do not forget the lost parts of their *vatan* and keep them alive for the future generations. Therefore, they protect themselves from the occurrence of similar disasters. From this exalted pulpit, I suggest to my nation: Do not forget! Do not forget the cradle of freedom and constitutionalism of Salonika, green Manastir, Kosova, Iskodra, Yanya, and all of the beautiful Rumelia. I request our teachers, authors, poets, and intellectuals to keep alive the sprit for the future generations with their classes, writings and poems that in the other side of the border there are our brothers and parts of *vatan* to be saved.³²³

After the Greek army conquered Selanik, the leading authors of the journal *Genç Kalemler*, such as Ziya Gökalp and Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920), came to Istanbul and joined the other Turkists in the *Türk Yurdu*.³²⁴ Ziya Gökalp, who truly believed in the viability of Ottomanism before 1912, made a dramatic change in his thought and declared the demise of the Ottoman unity. His article “Turkification, Islamization, Modernization” published by *Türk Yurdu* on March 20, 1913, bore a resemblance to Akçura’s article “Three Political Ways,” with one major difference. Whereas nine years ago Akçura analyzed and compared three different

³²¹ Ibid., 291.

³²² Fuat Köprülü, “Ümit ve Azim,” *Türk Yurdu* 32 (February 6, 1913): 139.

³²³ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 562-563.

³²⁴ Ömer Seyfettin was a prominent modern Turkish nationalist. He is still considered one of the greatest short story writers. He graduated from the military academy and served in the army until the Balkan Wars. During the war, he became a prisoner of war and was kept in a prison camp by the Greek Army. After returning to Istanbul, he resigned from the military and started to write articles in newspapers and journals. Ömer Seyfettin was an ardent supporter of the nationalist policies of the CUP.

ideologies, namely Turkism, Islamism and Ottomanism, Gökalp refused to examine Ottomanism as a feasible ideology. For Gökalp, Turkishness should be the dominant ideology against the “cosmopolitan” ideologies of Islamism and Ottomanism.³²⁵ He claimed that “Tanzimat reformers had faith in making a voluntary nation out of different ethnic and religious groups. With this objective, they attributed a new meaning, which was filtered from national colors, to the historical ‘Ottoman’ concept. The painful past experiences proved that the new meaning of the Ottoman concept was embraced only by Turks.”³²⁶ According to Gökalp, because the 20th century was “the century of nationality,” the goal should be to construct a “modern and Islamic Turkishness.”³²⁷

Before the Balkan Wars there was a disagreement between the authors of *Genç Kalemler*, particularly between Ali Canip (1887-1967) and Fuat Köprülü, who was writing in the journal of *Servet-i Fünun*, over the construction of a national language for Turks in the Ottoman Empire. The authors of *Genç Kalemler* argued that Ottoman Turkish was too complicated for the common Turkish people. For that reason, there was a need to reform the language and to replace Arabic and Persian words with native Turkish words. Ali Canip contended that while young writers in Istanbul such as Köprülü represented the cosmopolite “internationalism,” the young people in Anatolia defended “the patriotism.” According to Ali Canip, Köprülü would soon understand that his “cosmopolitanism is preparing terrible abysses for this poor *vatan*.”³²⁸ Against the demands of Turkification of the language, Fuat Köprülü defended Ottoman Turkish. He refused to accept the ‘new language movement’; since he believed that this new language was stillborn like Esperanto. Köprülü blamed the authors of *Genç Kalemler* for “taking us [Ottoman

³²⁵ Ziya Gökalp, “Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak,” 184-186.

³²⁶ Ibid., 184.

³²⁷ Ibid., 186.

³²⁸ Yekta Bahir, “‘Milli,’ Daha Doğrusu ‘Kavmi’ Edebiyat Ne Demektir?” *Genç Kalemler* 4, no. 2 (June 8, 1911): 162-167. Ali Canip used the nickname Yekta Bahir for this article.

Turks] back to Karakorum,” which is in Central Asia, or would “cause us to live similar to Oğuz Han,” who was the mythical founder of Hun Turks.³²⁹

After the Balkan Wars, like Ziya Gökalp, there was a change in Köprülü’s thoughts on the side of Turkism. In his article “Turkism, Islamism, Ottomanism” published by *Türk Yurdu*, Köprülü argued that “the development of Ottomanism and Islamism is only possible by awakening and advancing Turkism.” Whereas he had objected to the formation of a national Turkish language a couple of years before, after the Balkan Wars, Köprülü considered the “national ideal” the only option for the survival of the Ottoman Turks: “The two important elements, which constitute nationality, are national history and national language. However, language and tradition lost their meaning [among Turks] and they have become the basis for decadence. National history has been forgotten to such a degree that the nation’s name Turk has disappeared and the word Ottoman, which is a diplomatic concept, is used instead of it.”³³⁰ According to Köprülü, “the Ottoman state lost most parts of the *vatan*, because of the weakness of the Turkish core.”³³¹ The military officials also deemed that the lack of national ideal was the major reason for the catastrophic defeat of the Ottoman army. Fevzi Pasha (Çakmak, 1876-1950), who fought in Kosova during the Balkan Wars and later became the field marshal in the Turkish army, analyzed the Balkan Wars in a conference in 1927. According to Fevzi Pasha, “Turkism as an ideal was nonexistent during the Balkan Wars. . . All other nations, which together constituted the Ottoman union, had different and conflicting religions, *vatan*s, and ideals.”³³²

³²⁹ Fuat Köprülü, “Edebiyatı Milliye,” *Servet-i Fünun* 1041 (1911): 3-7.

³³⁰ Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, “Türklük, İslamlık, Osmanlılık,” *Türk Yurdu* 44 (July 24, 1913): 373.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 374.

³³² Fevzi Paşa, *Garbi Rumeli’nin Suret-i Ziyat ve Balkan Harbi’nde Garb Cephesi Harekatı* (Istanbul: Erkan-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1927), 4-5.

As the abovementioned examples revealed, nationalism became the central ideology among the Turkish intellectuals, politicians, and military officials after 1913. On the other hand, there was disagreement and confusion among and within them whether to limit nationalism to the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire or to support pan-Turkist ideals for the unity of all Turkic groups in Eurasia. Whereas Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu had a clear pan-Turkist stance, Fuat Köprülü opted for developing the national consciousness among Ottoman Turks. Others such as Ziya Gökalp were undecided about choosing pan-Turkism or Turkish nationalism. On the one hand, Gökalp was delighted with the idea of pan-Turkism, and he wrote poems about it. On the other hand, his articles admitted the impossibility of the unity of all Turks under one state. Gökalp popularized the “ideal of Turan” among the common people that played a compensatory role for the Turkists in the declining years of the Ottoman Empire.³³³ Gökalp defined the homeland for all Turks in his poem *Turan*, published by the journal *Genç Türkler* in 1911: “The *vatan* of the Turks is neither Turkey, nor Turkistan. Their *vatan* is vast and eternal land: Turan.”³³⁴

It must be emphasized that Gökalp used the concept of Turan as an imaginary ideal for Turks rather than as an immediate political objective for the empire. He later admitted that the unity of all Turkic people in the Eurasian continent would only be possible in the distant future. Turkish intellectuals rapidly appropriated the ideal of Turan due to its imaginary feature. Due to the significant territorial losses in the empire’s heartland of Rumelia in the Balkan Wars, Ottomanism and its ideals lost their appeal for intellectuals. These intellectuals considered the ideal of Turan to be the only panacea to alleviate the territorial losses in the last four decades and to expand the empire towards the east. The psychological condition of Turkish intellectuals was

³³³ The word ‘Turan’ is a Persian word for Central Asia that literally means “the land of the Tur.”

³³⁴ Ziya Gökalp, “Turan,” *Genç Kalemler* 14 (1911): 68.

best reflected by Aydemir, when he defined his own state of mind after the Balkan Wars. According to him, Anatolia was too small to satisfy the ideals of the young people from Rumelia who dreamed of ruling the territories “from Danube to the Caucasus and from Africa to the gates of India.”³³⁵ Pan-Turkism presented a vast region for them to identify as their homeland: “In that chaotic environment, a new way of thinking was emerging in our minds. This was an understanding of a new *vatan* and a new nation. Accordingly, *vatan* was not only constituted by the territories ruled by the state. *Vatan* was not only the territories protected by the army.”³³⁶ For Aydemir,

vatan included all the territories, in which the [Turkish] nation lives. Regardless of the sovereign and the flag, the name of this *vatan* was Turan . . . Only the Ottoman *vatan* was collapsing. The *vatan* of the Turks covers the entire world. Every place inhabited by Turks was the part of the Turkish *vatan*, despite the fact that it was under other flags. The borders of this *vatan* reach from Danube and Meriç to Altay Mountains, to the Great Wall of China and even to the Yellow Sea. It reaches from the deserts of Arabia to Himalayas and to the North Sea.³³⁷

Various authors sought to define the borders of this new *vatan*, which was sometimes referred to as ‘Turkish homeland’ (*Türk Yurdu*) and sometimes as ‘Turan.’ In the first issue of the *Türk Yurdu*, Ahmet Ağaoğlu admitted that “it is very difficult to draw the borders of the Turkish world, which is as large as and at the same time as vague as imagination.”³³⁸ For him, the “Turkish world” could not include regions such as Hungary, Finland, North Africa or remote regions in China, which had only historical links with the Turks. It should instead be composed of the regions that had been dominated by the Turks and Turkish civilization. Nevertheless, his vision of the Turkish world was enormous, reaching from Mongolia to the Balkan Mountains and from Syria to the Caspian Sea.

³³⁵ Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 54.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, 55. Aydemir pointed out how the journal of *Türk Yurdu* and the articles it published changed his worldview from Ottomanism to Turkism.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 57-58.

³³⁸ Ahmet Ağayef (Ağaoğlu), “Türk Alemi,” *Türk Yurdu* 1, no. 1 (November 30, 1911): 15-16.

Halide Edip's utopic novel *Yeni Turan* (The New Turan), published in 1912, became a leading literary work after Gökalp's poem *Turan*, and it had a great impact on Turkish society. Due to the popularity of the novel, many cafes and restaurants named themselves as *Yeni Turan*.³³⁹ The novel is based on a struggle between two political parties. *Yeni Turan* advocates for Turkish nationalism against an Ottomanist party, which suppresses Turkish nationalism for the sake of Ottoman unity. Although the title of the novel has a pan-Turkist connotation, Halide Edib imagined *New Turan* as an advanced Turkish country in Anatolia with modern institutions such as railways and high schools. The main characters of the novel search for the imagined country and repeatedly ask the same question throughout the novel: "O! New Turan, dear country, tell me that how can I reach you?" For Halide Edib, to realize the imagined *New Turan*, the most important step was to develop strong territorial nationalism among Turkish people.³⁴⁰

The territorial losses had also dramatic affects on the political environment in the capital. When the military situation was desperate at the front, the Ottoman government decided to accept the armistice in December 1912. The diplomats convened in London to negotiate the terms of the peace agreement in January 1913, and the Ottoman government was pressured to accept the surrender of Edirne to Bulgaria. When the news reached Istanbul, the CUP leaders used the appeasing approach of the Ottoman government as a justification to depose the government. Powerful Unionist politicians and army officers decided to launch the coup d'état, and an armed group headed by Enver and Talat raided the cabinet and killed the war minister.

³³⁹ Hülya Adak, "New Introduction," in *Memoirs of Halide Edib*, Halide Adivar Edib (New York: Gorgias Press, 2004), IX. *Yeni Turan* was translated into German in 1916 and later into Russian and Serbian.

³⁴⁰ Halide Edib Adivar, *Yeni Turan* (Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2006), 55-56. According to Ahmet Açoğlu, *Yeni Turan* illustrated that Turkish nationalists were not chauvinists as argued by their opponents: "There is not anybody left that does not read the novel *Yeni Turan* written by well-known author Miss Halide. The nationalist author summarized the intention and the ideal of the new movement in her novel. Nobody, even the hardest opponent of the nationalist movement, can question the sincerity of Miss Halide. Is there such a feeling of revenge among the main characters of the novel? Do they want to harm other [ethnic] groups? Do they want to have more for Turks than others?" "Matbuat," *Türk Yurdu* 65 (May 14, 1914): 295.

The CUP's rule, which would last until 1918, was further consolidated after Enver led the Ottoman army into Eastern Thrace and recovered the historic capital city of Edirne from Bulgaria. With the help of the military victory, the Unionists purged the leading members of the opposition. The CUP convened its fifth congress in this chaotic political environment. It transformed itself from an association to a party, and it decided to adopt a nationalist stance towards education and the economy. Yusuf Akçura fully supported this nationalist change in the CUP:

This year, the stance of the Central Committee of the Union and Progress towards the nationality question is coming close to a stage, which is considered ideal for nationalists. *Türk Yurdu* was born nationalist, because it was an outcome of a belief, which considers the national idea the most appropriate one for Turkish awakening and development. We are pleased about seeing the same thinking in the report of the Central Committee.³⁴¹

Nationalism in the late Ottoman period evolved as a de facto ideology in response to wars, territorial losses, and mass scale migrations. Between the 1908 revolution and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the ruling elite oscillated between Ottoman patriotism, pan-Turkism, and Islamism in order to develop the most appropriate ideology to prevent the disintegration of the empire and “to save the *vatan*.” At the end of the Balkan Wars, since the empire lost the territories where Christians were in the majority, the ruling elites and the intellectuals realized that there was no need to employ Ottomanism, whose major objective was to maintain the loyalty of all Ottoman citizens regardless of their religion. Ziya Gökalp's response to an Armenian author, who defended Ottomanism in his article published by *Türk Yurdu*, illustrated that Gökalp favored Turkism and Islamism over Ottomanism. According to Gökalp, “an Ottoman culture” similar “to British culture” was not possible since the representatives of Armenians and Greeks were against the “education of all Ottoman people in

³⁴¹ Yusuf Akçura, “Türklük Şuunu,” *Türk Yurdu* 49 (October 2, 1913): 29.

the same schools.”³⁴² In the same way, for Yusuf Akçura, the appearance of the Bulgarian army in the outskirts of Istanbul in 1912 signified the collapse of Ottomanism, which started with the Tanzimat and aimed to unite all Ottomans around “the Ottoman state and the Ottoman *vatan*.”³⁴³

The period between 1908 and 1918 was identified as “the longest decade” within “the longest century” of the empire.³⁴⁴ During this decade, the CUP was the most important political factor in sealing the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Unionists faced large-scale territorial losses and massive migrations as a result of the wars lost against Italy, the Balkan states and the Entente powers. Preventing the disintegration of the empire required the CUP to balance two clashing dynamics: while it sought to reform the political, economic, and military structures and change the conditions to fight wars on various fronts; it simultaneously had to transform itself and its policies according to the rapidly changing conditions in both domestic and international politics.³⁴⁵ After the Balkan Wars, Turkish nationalism became one of the leading ideological trends among the Unionists. When World War I started, the CUP was aware of the fact that the empire had a considerable non-Turkish Muslim population, and it realized that their loyalty would play a determining role in the Middle Eastern front. Enver Pasha, who designed the military strategy of the Ottoman army as the Minister of War, believed that the empire “would not last without taking the Caucasus and its oil reserves, and Egypt and its cotton.”³⁴⁶

³⁴² Ziya Gökalp, “Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak 6,” *Türk Yurdu* 47 (September 4, 1913): 426.

³⁴³ Yusuf Akçura, “Peyam’a Cevap,” *Türk Yurdu* 66 (May 28, 1914): 312-313.

³⁴⁴ Şükrü Hanioglu coined the term “longest decade” of the empire for the era from 1908 to 1918. The term “the longest century” of the empire was employed by İlber Ortaylı to define the last completed century, namely the 19th century, by the Ottoman Empire. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1983).

³⁴⁵ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 30.

³⁴⁶ Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1976), 132-133. According to Ali Fuad Erden (1883-1957), who served in the Ottoman army in the Middle East during the World War I and later became General Secretary of the National Security Council in 1946, the objective of the offensive to the Suez Canal was to block the linkage between Britain and its colonies in Asia, not to conquer Egypt. He underlined that the offensive also aimed to block the British warships, which transported soldiers from

With the beginning of the First World War, Ottoman statesmen started to put forward Islamism to obtain the support of non-Turkish Muslims. Sultan Mehmed Reşad's speech in 1914 at the inauguration of the parliament warned all Muslims against the hostile policies of Russia, France and Britain: "I invited all Muslims to the Jihad against these states and their allies."³⁴⁷ In the rallies in Istanbul at the beginning of the war, the War Minister Enver Pasha was called as "Enver, who carries the Islamic flag in his hand with courage."³⁴⁸ In February 1916, a couple of months before the Hashemite Revolt, incorrectly become known as Arab Revolt due to British propaganda, Enver Pasha toured the Middle Eastern front starting from Damascus to the Sinai Peninsula, Mecca and Medina. His visit to Medina and the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad was identified as an "agent's account to the master about his duty, which was entrusted by the former from the latter."³⁴⁹ Said Halim Pasha's (1865-1921) appointment to the grand vizierate in 1913 demonstrated that the CUP took the ideology of Islamism seriously into consideration to ensure the loyalty of the Arabs to the center.³⁵⁰ Said Halim Pasha, who was the grandson of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt and had connections with the Arab intellectuals, served between the years 1913 and 1917. He became the longest serving grand vizier in the last decade of the empire.³⁵¹ He believed that the Ottoman Empire was in "the stage of stagnation" (*Devr-i Tevakkuf*), and during the world war its main consideration had to be to "protect the borders." He rejected the

India, Australia, and New Zealand to the Dardanelles. However, both Ali Fuad Erden and Ziya Şakir argued that the Suez offensive was depicted by the ruling elites as a military move to conquer Egypt and used as a propaganda vehicle for the domestic public opinion.

³⁴⁷ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 603.

³⁴⁸ Ali Fuad Erden, *Paris'ten Tih Sahrasına* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1949), 21.

³⁴⁹ During his visit in Medina, Enver Pasha was psychologically in a condition of ecstasy. He constantly cried and prayed in the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad. Ali Fuad Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Suriye Hatıraları* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 220-221.

³⁵⁰ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*, 139-140.

³⁵¹ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 39.

expansionist aspirations of Enver Pasha: “I ask for leaving aside the conquest of Turan and Egypt and ambitions about Tripoli, Tunisia, Algeria etc.”³⁵²

Whereas Islamism and ‘Grand Jihad’ (*Cihad-ı Ekber*) were employed against the British Empire to obtain the support of non-Turkish Muslims, the aim of pan-Turkism was to unite the Turks in the Caucasus and Central Asia to revolt against the Russian Empire. When the war in the Caucasus front started at the end of 1914, the CUP officials constructed road signs in Anatolian cities pointing towards the east and saying “the road towards Turan.”³⁵³ CUP’s two-directional policy was best reflected in Gökâlp’s poem *Kızıl Destan* (Red Epic), which was published in the newspaper *Tanin* just four days after the signing of the Ottoman-German alliance. Gökâlp identified the conquest of Turan as the main military objective for the Ottoman Empire: “The land of the enemy shall be devastated, Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan . . . The Altai homeland shall be the great *vatan*, and the sultan shall be the ruler of Turan.”³⁵⁴ Although scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Jacob Landau extensively used *Kızıl Destan* to portray the pan-Turkist stance of the CUP, they did not notice the unambiguous Islamist perspective of Gökâlp.³⁵⁵ Gökâlp identified the British Empire as the common enemy of all the Muslims and called on them to unite against the enemy in *Kızıl Destan*: “Englishmen captured

³⁵² Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 591-592.

³⁵³ Ziya Şakir, *1914-1918 Cihan Harbini Nasıl İdare Ettik* (Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası. 1944), 112.

³⁵⁴ According to the Ziya Şakir, two “first class” Unionists were talking to each other about the signing of the alliance between Ottoman Empire and Germany on 3rd of August 1914. One of them argued that after the war the empire would regain the lost territories. Furthermore, he underlined that “a Great Turkistan Empire will be established from Adriatic Sea to the border of China.” It is striking that the same term, “from the Adriatic to the Wall of China,” was employed by Turkish statesmen, especially by the President Süleyman Demirel, after the collapse of the Soviet Union to define the “emerging Turkic world in Eurasia.” Ziya Şakir, *1914 Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik* (Istanbul: Muallim Fuat Gücüyener Kitap Deposu, 1943), 68.

³⁵⁵ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 351; Jacob M. Landau, *Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History* (London: Hurst, 2004), 45.

the Sultan Osman [warship], by using it they will control India and Amman! Islam identified its enemy, soon there shall be a happy moment: Koran shall take the revenge from the enemy.”³⁵⁶

During World War I, Ziya Gökalp modified his pan-Turkist stance and put more emphasis on Islam and on the solidarity between Turks and Arabs. For Gökalp, “the Ottoman state can be named as Turk-Arab state.”³⁵⁷ For Gökalp, there were three different *vatan*s in the empire: The Turkish *vatan*, which was referred to as Turan, the Arabic *vatan*, and the Islamic *vatan*, which encompassed all of the Muslims in the world. Gökalp emphasized that “Turks’ devotion to Turan does not imply that they disregarded “the small Islamic *vatan*” (the Ottoman country) and “the big Islamic *vatan*.”³⁵⁸ In the same way, Ömer Seyfeddin identified three types of *vatan* for the Turks: 1) National *vatan*, which was Turan, 2) religious *vatan*, all the territories inhabited by Muslims, and 3) physical *vatan*, which was referred to as Turkey by Ömer Seyfeddin, and which included all of the Ottoman territories. According to him, Turks and Arabs shared the religious *vatan*, and it was their duty to liberate its occupied parts.³⁵⁹

In 1914, the CUP considered the support of the Arabs to be critical in the Middle Eastern front against the British Empire. Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha’s Islamist critical stance against nationalist imaginations about *vatan* signified that Islamism was the only contending ideology

³⁵⁶ Sultan Osman and Reşadiye were the two battleships constructed by Britain for the Ottoman Empire. Winston Churchill, who was the First Lord of Admiralty in August 1914, ordered to requisition these warships. Moreover, Britain refused to refund the payments of 4 million pounds to the Ottoman Empire for these battleships.

³⁵⁷ Ziya Gökalp, “Millet ve Vatan,” *Türk Yurdu* 67 (May 28, 1914): 303

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Although Ömer Seyfeddin gave weight to the unity between Turks and Arabs, he made a clear distinction between the territories inhabited by these two groups. According to him, Arabs were in the majority in the territories south of Kirkuk and Aleppo, and he called them the “Arabian homeland.” According to Ömer Seyfeddin, “Turkish homeland includes Istanbul, Edirne, Konya, Adana, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Ma’muretül-Aziz [Elazığ], and the north of Mosul and Aleppo. There are few Greeks in the coastal areas of the Turkish homeland and they are migrating and leaving. In the eastern provinces of Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis, Armenians are in the minority and their population is less than that of the Turks.” It is important to note that after the World War I; roughly the same territories were claimed by the last Ottoman parliament and the Kemalists as the ‘national territories.’ Ömer Seyfeddin, “Türklük Mefkuresi,” in *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2002), 83-85. This article was originally published in 1914.

against Turkism. Said Halim Pasha truly believed in the internationalism of Islam, and he rejected the import of nationalism from the West and its adaptation in Muslim societies. According to him, a unified Islamic worldview should prevail in every Muslim country as “Islamic realities, did not belong to a specific *vatan*.” Islamic traditions and ideals, which together constituted the “spiritual *vatan*,” were much more important than the physical *vatan*. For Said Halim Pasha “the *vatan* of a Muslim is the place, where the Islamic law reigns.”³⁶⁰ The well-known Islamist intellectual Mehmet Akif (1873-1936), who was a member of the CUP and the poet of the Turkish national anthem, also harshly criticized pan-Turkists. Mehmet Akif claimed that ethnic nationalism did great harm to the cohesive structure of Islam and divided Islamic society into various competing groups. Mehmet Akif accused pan-Turkists such as Ziya Gökalp of running after impractical ideas and therefore damaging the integrity of the traditional Islamic structure of the Ottoman Empire in his poems: “We acquired a myth named the ‘County of Turan;’ we called this myth as the cause and strived for it. But we lost many homelands to realize this cause; the lost ones are enough, feel sorry for the remaining homeland!”³⁶¹ In the same way, Islamist writer Ahmed Naim (1872-1934) accused pan-Turkists of turning from Kaaba to Turan and criticized their partitioning of Ottoman Empire into three different *vatans*: “I plead you for Islam, for mankind, and for Turkism, about whose future I am afraid of: Do not create two ideals for the people. There are some among you that want to have three different *vatans*. According to a Turkish saying, the fork cannot be put into a hole for a pole. How can you

³⁶⁰ Said Halim Paşa, *Buhranlarımız* (Istanbul: Tercüman, no date), 110-111.

³⁶¹ Mehmed Akif Ersoy, “Hala mı Boğuşmak?” in *Safahat* (Istanbul: İnkilap Kitapevi, 1958).

insert this fork type ideal, namely three different *vatans*, into people? Do not deviate from the Islamic ideal.”³⁶²

Both pan-Turkism and Islamism were employed by the CUP as ideological tools “to save the empire” from disintegration. In both ideologies, the purpose was to establish a “general *vatan*” for the unity of various groups living in a diverse geography rather than a national territory. Whereas the imagined *vatan*, namely Turan, reached as far as the Chinese border, the spiritual Islamic *vatan* embraced all Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa. The CUP’s vision was clearly imperial and its recipe to prevent the collapse of the empire was to expand the borders.³⁶³ For Unionists, the only way for the Ottoman Empire to escape its declining position in international politics was to return to Great Power status.³⁶⁴ One month after the signing of the Ottoman-German alliance, the Ottoman government unilaterally abrogated the capitulations on September 11, 1914 that had turned the empire into a colonial status in the 19th century. After the empire officially entered the war in November 1914, its first military objective was to wage an offensive war in the Caucasus front against Russia. In the winter of 1915, the empire initiated another offensive war against Britain to capture the Suez region. As mentioned above, politicians and intellectuals such as Said Halim Pasha and Yahya Kemal (1884-1958) openly criticized the

³⁶² Ahmed Naim, *İslamda Kavmiyetçilik Yoktur* (Istanbul: Bedir Yayınevi, 1991), 40-41. Ahmed Naim wrote a series of articles with the title “There is no nationalism in Islam” published in the newspaper *Sebilürreşad* in 1914. These articles were collected in a book published in 1916.

³⁶³ The theme of expanding the borders of the empire was dominant even among the second rank army officers. Just after the signing of the Ottoman-German alliance, Ali Fuad Erden participated in a discussion with Colonel von Frankenberg and Ottoman officers in the headquarters of the Second Army in Istanbul. Frankenberg and Ottoman officials were talking about the future borders of the Ottoman Empire on a map. Since Ali Fuad Erden was hesitant about this issue, and Frankenberg asked him about a region in Asia: “Why should not this border will be the border of your *vatan*?” Ali Fuad Erden thought about this question and acknowledged that Frankenberg was right: “There was no reason not to desire it [expanding the borders to Asia].” Ali Fuad Erden, *Paris’ten Tih Sahrasma*, 17-19.

³⁶⁴ Similarly, the imperial elites of the Habsburg Empire viewed World War I as an opportunity to become a Great Power in Europe. For imperial elites, to be a Great Power was the only justification for the existence of the Habsburg Empire, since accepting the status of a middling power “would be a sign of weakness and convey the wrong the signal to all of the domains under the Vienna’s control.” See Solomon Wank, “The Habsburg Empire,” in *After Empire*, eds. Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 52.

offensive war objectives of the CUP and instead advocated for a defensive stance in the war. However, these dissident voices were disregarded and silenced by the authoritarian CUP rule during the war.

Contrary to expectations about the rapid breakdown of the Ottoman Empire on the various military fronts, its military performance in the Battle of Dardanelles and in Iraq against the British army was outstanding. However, the rosy picture darkened in 1916. The empire lost almost all of Eastern Anatolia to the Russian Empire. On the Middle Eastern front, two military campaigns to capture the Suez region ended without any success. Moreover, the call of all the Muslims to Jihad against British Empire was futile and did not have a major effect on the Arab people. Due to the Hashemite Revolt and the retreat of the Ottoman army on the Middle Eastern front, Islamism lost its appeal for the Unionists. The CUP perceived a Turkist and secular outlook in its congress of 1916.³⁶⁵ In 1917, the war was called the “Independence War” in the Ottoman parliament.³⁶⁶ The gloomy outlook changed once again after the Russian revolution and the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918. Before the end of World War I, while the Ottoman army retreated to Mosul and Aleppo by losing almost all of its possessions in the Middle East, it captured Tabriz and Baku on the Caucasian front. With the signing of the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, the empire abandoned its territorial gains in the Caucasus and all of the Ottomans garrisons outside of Anatolia were surrendered to the Allies.³⁶⁷ After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the national discourse disregarded the Ottoman territorial gains in the Caucasian front, as the Kemalist regime clearly distanced itself from the

³⁶⁵ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 295.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 605.

³⁶⁷ The clause 11 of the Armistice of Mudros: “Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Northwest Persia to behind the pre-war frontier has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops; the remainder is to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.”

expansionist pan-Turkist ideals. The Ottoman victory in the Battle of Dardanelles was a more suitable memorial for the defensive worldview of the Kemalist regime.

Imagining Anatolia as a National *Vatan*

Before World War I, Ottoman intellectuals such as Ahmet Ferit and Abdullah Cevdet advocated the creation of a national *vatan* in Anatolia and abandoned the imperial vision. During the Balkan Wars, Abdullah Cevdet emphasized the significance of Anatolia and identified it as the heartland of the Turks: “I am not afraid of Bulgarian artillery... Do not ask me about whether it is a right time to think about Anatolia, when there is a fire in Catalca and Edirne and when the life of the state is in danger? We take every second of our life from Anatolia. It is our heart, head, and air.”³⁶⁸ Although these Anatolianist views were in the minority before 1914, their voices were heard more loudly in 1918, when the empire lost all of its territories outside of Anatolia. The debate over Anatolia among the intellectuals was crystallized during the congress of the Turkish Hearths in June 1918. Members such as Halide Edib, Ahmet Ferit, and Nüzhet Sabit proposed to change the second clause of the charter of the Turkish Hearths. According to the proposal, “the objective of the Turkish Hearths is the cultural unity of the Turks and advancement of [Turkish] civilization. The field of activity of the Turkish Hearths is limited particularly with Turkey.”³⁶⁹ The words, “particularly with Turkey,” created a dispute among the members. Hamdullah Suphi (1885-1966), who served as the chairman of the Turkish Hearths for 34 years between 1912 and 1966, suggested eliminating the words “particularly with Turkey,” since “it will offend our Turkish brothers, who are far from us and request our moral assistance.” Nüzhet Sabit defended the proposal by stating that “while we support the great Turan ideal with

³⁶⁸ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Vol. 3, 560.

³⁶⁹ “Türk Ocağı Kongresi,” *Türk Yurdu* 7, no. 160 (July 15, 1918): 250-252.

hopes, we have to restrict our activity in the first instance with Turkey.” Halide Edib addressed the members after Nüzhet Sabit, and she clearly took a pro-Anatolian stance against Turanism. She separated the members into two groups: 1) the romantics, who dreamed to conquer “the Caucasus and Turkistan” and could realize their dreams only in poems; and 2) the realists, who focused on Anatolia and sought to find ways to develop it.³⁷⁰ After heated discussions in the congress, the members decided to eliminate the part “particularly with Turkey.” This decision did not stop the argument between the two camps and did not overcome the differences on whether to limit Turkism with Anatolia.

A couple of days later, Halide Edib wrote an article entitled “Let’s Take Care of Our Own Home: The Field of Activity of Turkism” in the newspaper *Vakit*. Her article was one of the first written works that called for the attention of all Turkish intellectuals in order to face Anatolia’s desperate condition. For Halide Edib, Turkish engineers, doctors, and military officers who went to war with imperial ideals had to face reality and develop a new task for Turkism to save the country and its people. According to her, Turkism should focus on “young Turkey” instead of the “newly established Turkish republics” in Eurasia. She openly advocated for territorial nationalism rather than one based on ethnicity: “Today, races are hypothetical concepts and nations are facts. A nation, which seeks to exist, should first match its field of activity with its countries’ borders . . . At present, young Turkey is desperate to get service and care of its children. Every Turk, who carries his energy and service outside of young Turkey, puts himself in the position of one robbing his own mother and his own home.”³⁷¹

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Halide Edib, “Evimize Bakalım: Türkçülüğün Faaliyet Sahası,” *Vakit*, June 30th, 1918.

Just four days later, after the appearance of Halide Edib's article, Ziya Gökalp responded to her with an article entitled "Turkism and Turkeyism." Gökalp made an unambiguous distinction between these two terms. Whereas Turkism referred to ethnicity and promoted the solidarity among the Turkish societies in Eurasia, Turkeyism was territorial patriotism of all ethnic groups in Anatolia. Gökalp compared these two terms with Germanism and Prussianism. For him, in order to create a unified and advanced country in Eurasia similar to Germany in Europe, Turkism should prevail over other nationalist movements in Azerbaijan, Crimea, Kazan, Uzbekistan, and Kashgar, similar to Germanism's success against Prussian, Saxonian and Bavarian movements in the 19th century: "Our nation's borders is not limited with the borders of state, ummah, and race. A nation is completely different from these categories and it is a cultural category. As culture's characteristics are language and religion, our nation is comprised by Turkish speaking Muslim people."³⁷² According to Gökalp, the definition of the Turkish nation includes Azerbaijani, Crimean, Kazan, Turkmen, Sart, Uzbek, Kirgiz, and Kashgar people in addition to Turkish speaking Muslim people in Anatolia.

Fuat Köprülü, who had held an Ottomanist stance before the Balkan Wars and had accused Turkists in that period of "taking us back to Karakorum," also criticized Halide Edib's Anatolianism in his article "The Aims of Turkism," published by *Vakit* on July 16, 1918. Like Gökalp, Fuat Köprülü argued that a "Turkish nation" was creating a "Turkish world" in Eurasia similar to German union and German nation: "Today the local interests and needs of Istanbul, Bursa, Aydın and Konya together constitute the general and common interests of Turkey. Likewise, the interests of Crimea, Turkistan, Kazakhstan, and north Türkeli [Turkistan] together

³⁷² Ziya Gökalp, "Türkçülük ve Türkiyecilik," *Yeni Mecmua* 2, no 51 (July 4, 1918): 482.

constitute the common interests of the Turkish world.”³⁷³ According to Köprülü, Turkism emerged against the Ottomanist conviction of “restricting our operations within our borders and disregarding our compatriots living outside of our borders.” Both Gökalp’s and Köprülü’s articles were written in a period when Ottoman Empire captured Tabriz, Kars and Tbilisi by taking the advantage of the military power vacuum in the Caucasus that emerged as a result of the Soviet revolution. During the summer of 1918, the “Army of Islam” was established by Nuri Pasha, Enver Pasha’s stepbrother, to take over Baku.³⁷⁴ Fuat Köprülü wholeheartedly supported the Caucasus campaign of the army. He argued that “our negligence of our compatriots in Russia can lead to the devastation of that world by the new Russian force formed in the future. Later then it [the new Russian force] can destroy us easily.”³⁷⁵

While the military situation in the Caucasus was promising, there were less than 8000 soldiers to defend Istanbul against the advancing Allied armies in the Balkans directed by French General Louis Franchet d’Esprey, which defeated the Bulgarian army and forced Bulgaria to sign the armistice agreement on September 29, 1918.³⁷⁶ As the military situation disintegrated on the western and the southern fronts and the railway link between the Ottoman Empire and its allies Germany and Austria-Hungary was blocked in the Balkans by the Allied armies, The Unionist government resigned on October 13, 1918. The new Ottoman government formed by the respected general Ahmet İzzet Pasha asked the Allies for an armistice to save the capital and the

³⁷³ Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Türkçülüğün Gayeleri,” *Vakit*, July 16, 1918.

³⁷⁴ The Army of Islam headed by Nuri Pasha captured Baku on September 15, 1918. The Ottoman forces continued to advance towards north along the Caspian coast and took Petrovsk in Dagestan on October 8, 1918, located 180 miles north of Baku.

³⁷⁵ Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Türkçülüğün Gayeleri.”

³⁷⁶ According to Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, who was the Chief Secretary of the Chancery of the Ottoman Sultan Vahdeddin, there were around 7000 to 8000 Ottoman soldiers in Thrace. For Stanford Shaw, the number of Ottoman defensive force in the Thrace region was “no more than 6000 men.” Ali Türkgeldi, *Moudros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi* (Ankara: Güney Matbaacılık, 1948), 25-26; Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic* Vol. 1 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 66.

sultan from the assault of the Allied army stationed in Eastern Rumelia and Western Thrace.³⁷⁷ Before the Ottoman delegation left Istanbul for the negotiations on the Aegean island of Limnos, the sultan instructed them on two principal points: 1) The Ottoman family would continue to retain the titles of the Caliphate and the Sultanate to rule the Ottoman Empire; 2) the empire would grant administrative autonomy to a number of provinces. However, it would refuse to recognize the status of political autonomy, as it would pave the way for the independence of these provinces. The sultan did not mention the self-determination of the Turkish nation or protecting the national borders. As late as 1918, the Ottoman sultan Vahdettin and his entourage considered Islam and therefore the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty over the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina the only way to ensure the continuation of the Ottoman Empire.

The signing of the Armistice of Mudros on October 30 was welcomed by the ruling elite in Istanbul as an optimistic step taken to protect the territories, where Turks were in the majority. According to Rauf Bey, the head of the Ottoman delegation, places such as Kars, Batum, and Adana would not be occupied: “This was more than we had hoped for the Armistice. The independence of the state, rights of the sultan and national pride have been entirely saved.”³⁷⁸ The speech by Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Britain, in the House of Commons on January 5, 1918 and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, declared on January 18, 1918 were the two important references for the optimistic perceptions of the Ottoman ruling elite about the vague clauses of the Mudros Armistice. They believed that these vague clauses would not be used by the Allies “to annihilate Turkism.”³⁷⁹ Lloyd George underlined in his speech in the British

³⁷⁷ Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım* Vol. 2 (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1993), 19.

³⁷⁸ Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic* Vol. 1, 94.

³⁷⁹ The clauses seven and twenty-four of the Mudros Armistice were particularly written in an ambiguous way, so that it would give right to the Allies to occupy any part of the empire without consulting Istanbul. Clause 7: “The Allies to have right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of

parliament that Britain was not at war “to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.”³⁸⁰ Three days later, United States President Woodrow Wilson declared his Fourteen Points in a joint session of the Congress. Point 12 recognized the right of self-determination for Turkish areas:

The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.³⁸¹

The grand vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha and other statesmen considered Wilson’s principles a last chance not only to preserve Ottoman rule in Anatolia but to get back Western Thrace, since Turks were in majority in this region. They aimed to maintain the Ottoman territories in the Middle East by granting autonomy to Arabs, hoping that Wilson’s Fourteen Points would annul the secret agreements signed between the Allies during the World War I to partition the empire’s Arab territories.³⁸²

In a move that ran counter to Ottoman statesmen’ optimism, immediately after the armistice of Mudros, British and French armies started to occupy places such as Mosul, İskenderun, Antep, Maraş, Mersin, and Adana, which were in the possession of the Ottoman armies before the armistice. Against the Ottoman protests, the Allies argued that these places were parts of Cilicia, Syria and Mesopotamia and therefore, according to clause sixteen of the

the Allies.” Clause 24: “In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve themselves the right to occupy any part of them.” In the Turkish text, “six Armenian vilayets” were called as “six vilayets.”

³⁸⁰“British War Aims,” *The Times*, January, 6, 1918: 7.

³⁸¹ The original document can be reached at <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62>

³⁸² In October 1918, the grand vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha announced in the Ottoman parliament that the empire would grant autonomous status to its Arab regions. After the announcement, he was congratulated by the Arab members of the parliament. Ali Türkğeldi, *Mudros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*, 16, 29.

armistice, they had to be surrendered by Ottoman armies.³⁸³ Britain and France stretched the meanings of geographical and historical terms such as Cilicia, Mesopotamia, and Syria, which did not exist in the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire, and used them to occupy these cities.³⁸⁴

Mustafa Kemal analyzed the emergence of the national struggle against the Allies in his six day-long speech delivered in October 1927. According to the official discourse, which was based on Mustafa Kemal's point of view, the national struggle started with Mustafa Kemal's arrival in Samsun on May 19, 1919 to organize the Turkish people in Anatolia to 'save the *vatan* from the enemies.' The official discourse disregarded the roles of the members of the Istanbul government, other leading figures and intellectuals in the national struggle. Contrary to the official discourse, during the eight months between the signing of the Armistice of Mudros and Paris Peace Conference in June 1919, three important developments occurred that formed the basis of the national liberation movement in Anatolia: 1) The establishment of Defense of Rights organizations in Thrace, the Aegean region, and Eastern Anatolia; 2) The occupation of Izmir by

³⁸³ Clause 16 of the Armistice of Mudros: Surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander, and the withdrawal of all troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause 5.

³⁸⁴ Gotthard Jaeschke, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri*, trans. Cemal Köprülü (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 32-33. Mustafa Kemal became the Commander of the Ottoman army in Syria after the armistice, and his communications with the Ottoman government revealed that he was aware of the fact that Allies were aiming to occupy major cities in the south and east of Anatolia by using the geographical and historical terms mentioned in the armistice. On November 3, 1918, only a day after the armistice was publicly announced, Mustafa Kemal asked for clarification of these terms from the grand vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha: "Which Cilicia territories were included? Where is the boundary of Syria set? Does the boundary of Syria mean the north boundary of our province of Syria. . . While the area of Cilicia is known to be an important part of the province Adana, its boundaries are not known. Please elaborate on what they are." In another telegram he sent to the grand vizier, he insisted on resisting any further Allied demands: "This article was written by the British to fool us, and no doubt remains that they are giving two meanings to every one of the conditions signed by the Turkish representatives. . . My object in asking about the border of the Cilicia is to find out if the Ottoman government is officially accepting the British definition of the boundaries of the historic term, which includes everything north of Maras. Because to my thinking by substituting the word Cilicia for that of Adana, which we use, the British are trying to extend its boundaries to the north, right up to the borders of Iraq. They want to include Siirt. . . If we bend our neck to everything that the British say, we will not be able to escape their greed. . . If they occupy Anatolia, will we give permission?" Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic* Vol. 1, 103-104.

Greece and large-scale protest meetings in Istanbul; and 3) the Ottoman government's memorandum to the Allies in the Paris Peace Conference about the borders of the empire.

When Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun on May 19, 1919, there were a number of Defense of Rights organizations in Anatolia and Thrace that aimed to resist Armenian and Greek territorial demands at the regional level. The most significant ones were in Thrace, Trabzon, Erzurum, Kars and Izmir. The organizations in Erzurum and Kars were formed against the Armenian territorial demands on Eastern Anatolia. The ones in Trabzon, Izmir, and Thrace were organized to fight against the Greek occupation of these regions. As Turks formed a majority in all these regions, the Defense of Rights associations based their claims of self-determination on the twelfth article of Wilson's principles. For the first time in the Ottoman Empire, independent and isolated organizations were established to defend the "national" rights of the Muslim people in Anatolia and to defend the national *vatan* against the occupying forces. Most of these organizations—the Trabzon Defense of National Rights Society, the National Rejection of Annexation Society in the Aegean Region, the National Government of the Southwest Caucasus—had the word 'national' (*'milli'*) in their names or had 'national manifestations' included in their programs. Nevertheless, there was not enough cooperation between these various organizations, which were founded autonomously in different cities, to organize a national movement to defend all of Anatolia.

After the Mudros Armistice, British and French army units landed in coastal towns of Anatolia such as Adana, Mersin, İskenderun, and Çanakkale. As these army units consisted of only a couple hundred soldiers, they were considered as temporary by local people and therefore did not incite large-scale protests. However, the Greek occupation of Izmir on May 15, 1919 was the turning point for the national struggle. Just two days after the Greek occupation of Izmir,

75,000 people attended a protest meeting in Istanbul organized by Turkish Hearths and Karakol Association. During the week, leaflets were distributed to call people to the meeting on Friday, May 23, 1919. Both religious and national notions were used to incite patriotism:

Muslim! This coming Friday is the day of the official prayer. On that day, after the Friday prayer in the Fatih, Beyazıt, and Sultanahmet mosques, special prayers will be recited for the liberation of the Muslim and Turkish homelands. . . Our beloved *vatan* is broken up. Deadly disasters are mounting. . . Open your eyes; think about your enemies and your nation! Learn about the tragedies in Izmir. Anatolia is waiting for your decision. Cry out against the injustices. Run to defend your *vatan*, which is being divided, as well as your rights with a passion that will appeal to the conscience of the world.³⁸⁵

The organizers of the meeting accentuated the partition of the *vatan*, which was identified as Anatolia. The call to defend the *vatan* brought about the largest meeting in the Ottoman history. 200,000 people in Sultanahmet Square were stirred up by the passionate speeches of nationalist poet Mehmet Emin and Halide Edib.

The occupation of Izmir and the gigantic mass protests drove the sultan and the Damat Ferid (1853-1923) government into the corner. The sultan kept the Ottoman parliament closed beginning at the end of the World War I by postponing the elections.³⁸⁶ Sultan Vahdettin and the grand vizier Damat Ferit decided to convene the “Assembly of the Sultanate” during this political turmoil in the capital to spread the responsibility of the strategy, which would be pursued by the Ottoman delegation in the coming peace conference in Paris. On May 26, 1919, over 130 dignitaries attended the meeting at the Yıldız Palace. Besides ministers, ambassadors, journalists; representatives of the National Rights Societies from Trabzon, Izmir, Thrace and the Eastern Anatolia also attended the Assembly of the Sultanate. In the opening speech, the sultan

³⁸⁵ Mehmet Kalan and İnci Enginün, *Devrin Yazarlarının Kalemile Milli Mücadele ve Gazi Mustafa Kemal* Vol. 1 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), 89.

³⁸⁶ Damat Ferid served as the grand vizier of the Ottoman governments between March 4, 1919 and September 30, 1919, and between April 5, 1920 and October 17, 1920. The Sevres Treaty was signed by his government and therefore he was identified by Mustafa Kemal as the “traitor to *vatan*.” His political career ascended during Vahdettin’s reign due to Damat Ferit’s marriage to Vahdettin’s sister Mediha Sultan.

emphasized that the dignitaries were convened to save “the Ottoman state from its difficult situation by urgently determining the necessary actions.”³⁸⁷ Although the subject matter of the meeting was the occupation of Izmir, the delegates deliberated on how to defend the rights and interests of Turks at the Paris Conference. The majority of the dignitaries agreed that the Ottoman delegation would have to base its argument on the right of self-determination of the Turks, who were “in majority from Edirne to the East of Anatolia.”³⁸⁸

Three weeks after this important meeting, the Ottoman delegation headed by Damat Ferit arrived in Paris. Damat Ferit submitted a detailed memorandum on June 23 to the Allies represented by the US President Wilson, British Prime Minister Lloyd George and the French Prime Minister Clemenceau. This memorandum was decisive in terms of demarcating the territories in which Turks were the majority. As Damat Ferit was labeled as a traitor by Mustafa Kemal, the memorandum’s importance in the context of the National Liberation War was completely ignored by the official national discourse. For the first time, an official Ottoman delegation defined the boundaries of the Turkish *vatan* in an international conference:

To ensure the Ottoman Empire’s legal sovereignty over its Turkish population, the regions populated by Turks should be politically independent and nationally united. Therefore, establishing the full independence of the Turkish *vatan* is imperative. Its boundary in the west is the Turkish-Bulgarian border before the Balkan War and it includes the district Gümülcine [Komotini]. The northern border is the Black Sea. In the east it starts from the south of Poti and includes the Three Provinces [Kars, Ardahan, Batum]. The border with Armenia will be determined according to the explanation below and it [the border of Turkish *vatan*] will be limited with the Iranian border. In the south, it will start from the district of Kirkuk and passes Mosul, Resul Ayn, Aleppo and ends in the north of Lattakia at the point of İbn-i Hani. The territories inside this border with the

³⁸⁷ According to Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, sultan Vahdettin immediately left the room after his opening speech with Abdülmecid, the heir to the throne. He told to Abdülmecid that “I am crying like women” when he was in tears. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, *Görüp İştiklerim* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1949), 234.

³⁸⁸ Mithat Sertoğlu, “Mütareke Devrinde Saltanat Şurası ve Milli Şura Hazırlıkları,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 22 (July 1969): 34-35.

capital Istanbul will be the *vatan* of Turkish national sovereignty according to the Wilson principles.³⁸⁹

In the memorandum, Damat Ferit proposed an exchange of the Muslim population in Greece and the Caucasus with the Greek and Armenian population in Anatolia. Four years later, at the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish delegation insisted on a population exchange with Greece in parallel with the Ottoman delegation's memorandum at the Paris Peace Conference. Moreover, the Ottoman memorandum underlined the new political situation in the Middle East and proposed maximum autonomy for Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Hejaz, and Yemen. The islands adjacent to Anatolia were also claimed by the Ottoman delegation due to their strategic importance. The Ottoman delegation also protested the occupation of Izmir, Mersin, Antalya, Konya, Adana, and Karesi and insisted on an immediate withdrawal of the Allied armies. Furthermore, the termination of the capitulations was considered indispensable for "the financial and economic independence of Turkey." The last section of the memorandum argued that "the [Ottoman] government believes that if these conditions are realized, a new independent Turkey, which will be open to modernization, will be established." Not only the new Turkish state but also Turks would be indebted to the Western powers and they would be a "peaceful and hardworking nation, which will deserve to be the member of the League of Nations."

The borders of the Turkish *vatan* explicated by the Ottoman delegation in Paris became three years later the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey at the Lausanne Conference, with four major differences: 1) Batum district, 2) İskenderun district, 3) Western Thrace, and 4) Mosul district. These four districts, which were announced as parts of the Turkish *vatan*—first by Damat Ferit, then in the National Pact by the Ottoman Parliament and later by the Ankara government and Mustafa Kemal—were ceded by the Ankara government to the Soviet Union, to

³⁸⁹ Mustafa Budak, *İdealden Gerçeğe* (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002), 78.

the French mandate of Syria, to Greece, and to the British mandate of Iraq respectively. The Ankara government's decisions to cede these territories faced severe opposition in the parliament and had and continue to have an important impact on the foreign policy of Turkey.

Two weeks after the Ottoman delegation submitted its memorandum and its dissemination to the Turkish media, the delegates of the eastern Anatolian cities convened in Erzurum under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The second article of the conclusions of the Erzurum Congress, which brought delegates only from the Eastern Anatolian cities, declared that the objective of "National Forces" is "to protect the integrity of the Ottoman *vatan*." The sixth article mentioned the boundaries of the *vatan* without going into the details:

We insist that, within the boundaries specified in the Armistice signed by the Allied powers on October 30, 1918, like in all parts of the country, those areas of East Anatolia in which Muslims live and where Muslim culture and economic dominance has existed must remain within our borders. There can be no dividing; our national unity, historic rights and traditions and religion must continue, and all efforts against this must not succeed.³⁹⁰

The uncertainty about the boundaries continued at the Congress of Sivas, which was held in September 1919 with delegates from all over Anatolia. The declaration of the congress argued that territories "within the boundaries specified in the Armistice signed on October 30, 1918" were inseparable from each other and from the Ottoman state. The vagueness of the decisions of the both congresses was not a result of an unintentional mistake on the part of the leaders of the national movement. Mustafa Kemal acted pragmatically and did not make a clear announcement about the boundaries, which would have been a binding reference point in the future for the national movement. However, in his meetings with National Rights Societies and in his communications with leading figures, Mustafa Kemal hinted that it would be impossible to

³⁹⁰ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire* Volume II, 696.

include some of the territories in which Turks and Muslims had a majority into the national *vatan*. He clearly separated the defense of the Eastern Thrace from that of the Western Thrace. In his meeting with the delegates from Thrace in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal argued that Eastern Thrace was an indispensable part of the Turkish *vatan*. He defined the Western Thrace as “an abandoned part of *vatan*,” since it was ceded to Bulgaria after the Balkan Wars: “To state the unification of the Eastern and Western Thrace is not right for Ottoman diplomacy. Eastern Thrace is an unequivocal part of the Ottoman country. Western Thrace was an abandoned part of *vatan*, which was ceded with an agreement once upon a time.”³⁹¹ Another problematic region was the Three Districts, namely Batum, Kars, and Ardahan. Although the Muslims and the Turks were the majority in the Three Districts, from the legal point of view their inclusion in the Turkish *vatan* would be a thorny issue, as they were ceded to Russia in 1878. In the Erzurum Congress, Mustafa Kemal detached the issue of the Three Districts from the defense of Eastern Anatolia, and he did not allow the participation of the delegates from this region in the congress. Furthermore, the first article of the decisions of the Erzurum Congress argued that the cities of Eastern Anatolia, namely Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, Bitlis, Van, Diyarbakır, and Mamuretülaziz, “are an inseparable whole which cannot be separated from one another and from the Ottoman community.”³⁹² It was striking that the cities of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum were not mentioned as part of Eastern Anatolia in the decisions of the Erzurum Congress.

The National Pact, which was the manifesto of the National Liberation War, was announced by the Ottoman Parliament on February 17, 1920. In the introductory section, the National Pact underlined the fact that “the independence of the State and the future of the Nation can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum

³⁹¹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* Vol. 3 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973), 1225-1226.

³⁹² Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire* Volume II, 696.

of sacrifice and which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace.”³⁹³ The first article of the National Pact defined the boundaries of the Ottoman state without going into the details. The National Pact acknowledged that the destiny of Ottoman territories, which were peopled by an Arab majority and were under Allied occupation, would be determined by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. With reference to the rest of the territories, it made a significant difference to the decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses: “The whole of those parts whether *within or outside the said armistice line* which are inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other’s racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance. [Emphasis mine]”³⁹⁴ It was clear that the members of the last Ottoman parliament did not restrict the boundaries of the Ottoman state to the Armistice line. Although Mustafa Kemal and Kazım Karabekir objected to the word “outside” in the text, by adding it to the National Pact, the members of the last Ottoman parliament claimed that the districts of Aleppo, Kirkuk, and Süleymaniye, which were beyond the Armistice line but not inhabited by the Arab majority, were indispensable parts of the Ottoman state. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the textbooks and other written materials omitted the word “outside” from the text of National Pact. Furthermore, the second and third articles claimed that to integrate the Three Districts into the Caucasus and the Western Thrace into the Ottoman state, the Ottoman parliament was ready to accept holding referendums in these regions.

³⁹³ Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1914-1956* Vol. 2 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956), 74.

³⁹⁴ Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1914-1956*, 74-75. For the Turkish version, Mustafa Budak, *İdealden Gerçeğe*, 156-157.

The National Pact prioritized the territorial principle of “unity of geography” (*vahdet-i coğrafiye*) to draw the new borders. Noticeably, this principle was first coined by the newspaper *Minber*, which was founded by Mustafa Kemal and Fethi Okyar in Istanbul on November 1, 1918. The editorial “Unity of Our Geography” published on November 8, 1918 argued that “there isn’t any *vatan* in the world that is inhabited by only one nation. Therefore if the nationality principle is implemented as the only legitimate criterion, there won’t be any state left on earth.”³⁹⁵ According to the editorial, the districts of Izmir and Aydın could not be separated from the Ottoman *vatan*, even if it was assumed that Greeks were the majority in them, because such a policy would be detrimental to the “whole of national *vatan* and unity of geography.” During the National Liberation War, the Ankara government claimed the sovereignty of Turkey over the regions, in which the Kurds had a majority, by proposing the principle of the unity of geography.³⁹⁶ Moreover, during the negotiations with France over the border between Syria and Turkey in June 1921, the Turkish delegation based its claims regarding districts, such as İskenderun, on the principle of the unity of geography.³⁹⁷

After the proclamation of the National Pact, the Allies decided to occupy Istanbul officially. The Allied forces closed the Ottoman parliament and arrested its members. On April 23, 1920, a new parliament opened in Ankara and on that day, for the first time, Mustafa Kemal explicitly defined the “borders of our *vatan*” in his speech at the parliament by referencing the decisions of the Erzurum Congress instead of the National Pact:

The Eastern border includes the Three Districts. As we know, the Western border passes from Edirne. The biggest change happened in the Southern border. The Southern border starts from the south of İskenderun. It passes between Aleppo and the Katma [train] station and arrives to the Cerablus Bridge. The eastern part includes the Mosul district

³⁹⁵ “Vahdet-i Coğrafiyemiz,” *Minber* 8, November 8, 1918.

³⁹⁶ Mustafa Budak, *İdealden Gerçeğe*, 144.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 246.

and the surrounding areas of Kirkuk and Süleymaniye. Efendis, this border was not only drawn by military concerns; it is a national border. . . However, do not think that there is only one type of Islamic nation within this border. Within this border, there are Turks, Circassians and other Islamic societies. This border is a national border of fellow nations, which live in a fused way and put together all of their ideals.³⁹⁸

Defending the national *vatan* was the building block of the decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the National Pact. The comparison of these texts with the Ottoman delegation's memorandum at the Paris Conference reveals that whereas the nationalist forces in Anatolia emphasized Ottomanness and Islam, the Ottoman delegation used Turkishness against the Allied powers in Paris to defend Anatolia and Thrace. Whereas the Ottoman memorandum used concepts such as "Turkish *vatan*," "Turks," "Turkish-Arab border," and "Turkish national sovereignty," nowhere in the texts of the decisions of the congresses and the National Pact was there any reference to the Turkish *vatan* or Turkishness.³⁹⁹ Anatolia and Thrace were identified as the "Ottoman *vatan*," and the people who inhabited these territories were jointly called the "Ottoman society." These texts employed Islam rather than ethnicity as the main point of reference. They argued that as the majority of the people in Anatolia and Thrace belong to the same religion, they formed a whole and did not admit of divisions of these territories for any reason. Furthermore, during the National Liberation War, Mustafa Kemal underlined that the "national border" did not only refer to Turks:

³⁹⁸ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 61. On December 28, 1919, when Mustafa Kemal arrived in Ankara, he gave a speech to the leading people in the city. In his speech, he declared that the southern border included İskenderun, Mosul, Kirkuk and Süleymaniye. According to Mustafa Kemal, "this border is defended by our army with arms and at the same time it is the border of our *vatan*, which Turkish and Kurdish elements inhabited." See, Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 37.

³⁹⁹ The words "Turk," "Turkish," "Turkish people," or "Turkish *vatan*" were not used in the original texts of the declarations of the congresses and the National Pact. However, the English translations of these texts erroneously used the term Turkish Empire instead of Ottoman Empire. Only the third article of the National Pact used the word "Turkey" as a geographical concept: "The determination of the juridical status of Western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the peace of Turkey, must be affected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom."

When the border issue was defined, we said that our national border passes from the south of İskenderun, goes to the east and includes Mosul, Kirkuk, and Süleymaniye. This is our national border. Nevertheless, in the north of Kirkuk, there are Turks as well as Kurds. We did not separate them. Therefore, the nation, which we are seeking to defend, is not constituted by one [ethnic] element. There are various Islamic groups. Each Islamic group, which is part of our society, is our brother and they are our citizens and we have common interests.⁴⁰⁰

The Ottoman delegation in Paris highlighted the Turkish ethnic element, since they believed that maintaining Ottoman rule in Anatolia and Istanbul through an armed struggle against the Allies was impossible. According to Sultan Vahdettin and his grand vizier Damat Ferit, the only way for the Ottoman Empire to survive was for it to base its claims on the right to self-determination of the Turks, which was also recognized by Wilsonian principles. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters believed that the armed struggle against the Greek and Armenian armies was inescapable if they wanted to save Anatolia. Contrary to the Turkish official discourse, which depicted the National Liberation War as a number of wars waged against the major European powers, the Turkish army under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal fought only against Greece and Armenia, not against Britain, Italy and France.⁴⁰¹ In his speech in the Erzurum Congress on July 10, 1919, Mustafa Kemal underlined two important points about the international balance of power that would have a great impact on the national liberation movement: 1) the Allies would not act against the “national will” of the Anatolian people, 2) the Allies would not be able to unite, due to their conflicting interests, to fight a war against the national forces in Anatolia.⁴⁰²

The national liberation movement headed by Mustafa Kemal combined concepts such as “Ottoman *vatan*” and “Ottoman society” in their discourse with nationalist terms such as

⁴⁰⁰ Mustafa Kemal’s speech in the Grand National Assembly in Ankara on May 1, 1920. Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 105.

⁴⁰¹ Although there were some local guerilla activities against the French army in the southeast of Anatolia, these were local armed campaigns, not major wars fought by regular armies.

⁴⁰² Cevat Dursunoğlu, “Erzurum Kongresi Sırasında Atatürk’ün Düşünceleri,” *Belleten* no. 108 (October 1963): 636.

“national borders,” “national pact,” “national parliament.” However, their understanding of Ottomanness was clearly different from the concept of Ottomanism, which was championed by the ruling elites, since Tanzimat. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters imagined a national Ottoman unity that was geographically limited to Anatolia and did not have any imperial ambitions. Expansionist policies of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were clearly rejected by Mustafa Kemal:

As we seemed to be looking like we were accomplishing fantasies, which are in reality unachievable, we drew the enmity and hate of the entire world towards this country and nation. We did not pursue pan-Islamism. Maybe we said that ‘we are pursuing or we will pursue.’ Then the enemies said ‘to stop them to pursue it, let’s kill them right away.’ We did not pursue pan-Turanism. We said that ‘we pursue, we are pursuing, we are going to pursue’ and they said again “let’s kill them. . .’ Instead of running after ideas, which we did not and cannot pursue, and instead of increasing the number of our enemies and the pressure on us, we should return to the natural borders, to the legal borders.⁴⁰³

In their imagination of Turkey, there was no place for the Christian groups in Anatolia, namely Greeks and Armenians, which were in any case not interested in joining to the national liberation movement. There was not a single representative of the Greeks and Armenians at the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Until 1921, Mustafa Kemal and other leaders pragmatically did not put forward the Turkish ethnicity in the national liberation struggle. Instead, they adopted a territorial approach and used the concept of the “common *vatan*,” namely Anatolia, to obtain the support of all the Muslim groups for the armed struggle against the invading forces. However, the territorial approach adopted by the National Pact was unprecedented. For the first time in the Ottoman history, it separated the destiny of the Muslim people in Anatolia from that of the Arabs.

⁴⁰³ Mustafa Kemal’s speech in the Grand National Assembly on December 1, 1921. Earlier in the meeting with the American General Harbord in Sivas on September 22, 1919, Mustafa Kemal limited the objectives of the national movement to the national borders: “We consider Turanism as a harmful ideal. We are not interested in illusions like this that are far from our borders.” Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 267; Gotthard Jaeschke, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri*, 170.

The response of the Allies to the National Pact was the Sevres Treaty, signed on August 10, 1920, between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire. The Sevres Treaty partitioned Anatolia and Thrace, in which Muslims were in the majority, among Armenia, Greece, Britain, France, and Italy. Eastern Thrace, including Edirne, was given to Greece. Moreover, Greece would have administrative and military control over the Izmir district, whose status would be determined after five years using a plebiscite. Armenia obtained northeastern Anatolia, including Trabzon, Erzurum, Van and Bitlis. According to the treaty, the boundary between Turkey, Armenia and the autonomous Kurdish region would be designated by U.S. President Wilson. The Straits would be governed by an international commission. The rest of Anatolia was divided between Britain, Italy, and France into zones of influence. Before signing the treaty, the Grand National Assembly rejected the Sevres Treaty and the Council of Ministers declared Damat Ferit and other Ottoman statesmen who participated in the negotiations to be “traitors.” In reality, neither the Allies nor the Ottoman government in Istanbul had enough military resources to implement the terms of the Sevres Treaty apart from the Greek Army in Anatolia. This situation was best described by Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill’s confidential memorandum sent to all the members of the British cabinet: “Are the Allies, thus weakened at the very centre of their influence upon Turkey, nevertheless persist in a Treaty which they have no power to enforce, with the consequent condemnation to anarchy and barbarism for an indefinite period of the greater part of the Turkish Empire?”⁴⁰⁴ The signing of the treaty by the Ottoman government was disseminated to all those in Anatolia via the newspapers. The Istanbul government lost all its credibility in the eyes of Turkish people, and the authority and legitimacy of the nationalist movement in Ankara was further entrenched.

⁴⁰⁴ Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic* Vol. 3, 1137.

The concept of defense of *vatan* was employed intensely not only at the congresses in Anatolia, in the official declarations of parliaments, and in speeches made by Mustafa Kemal and other leading figures of the Ankara government, but also in articles and poems written by intellectuals who supported the national struggle. During the National Liberation War, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty), the official newspaper of the Ankara government, publicized the views of Kemalists to obtain the support of people in Anatolia and Istanbul and also to influence public opinion in European countries. The newspaper was established in January 1920, a couple of weeks after Mustafa Kemal arrived in Ankara. Between 1920 and 1922, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* published numerous articles about the borders and how to form a national *vatan* in Anatolia. The analysis of these articles reveals that Kemalists did not bring forward the Turkish ethnicity in 1920 and the first half of 1921. Instead, they employed Islamic notions to obtain the support of non-Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds, Circassians, and Lazes. Nonetheless, after winning the Second İnönü Battle in March 1921, Kemalists and intellectuals supporting them modified their discourses and underlined the significance of Turkish nationalism in the defense of the ‘national’ *vatan* and the formation of the new ‘national’ state.

The article “The Border Problem,” published by *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* on January 24, 1920, openly rejected the creation of a common *vatan* with Arabs in Iraq and Syria. It also refused the establishment of a mandate of a European power over Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq that would integrate these regions with each other: “To draw a border, which includes Iraq and Arabia, by accepting a protectorate will destroy the future of Anatolia at a stroke . . . According to these [Wilsonian] principles, each nation has the right to determine its own destiny. For that reason,

Arabs also have the right to determine their present [politics] and future.”⁴⁰⁵ The article argued that the new border passes “from the south of İskenderun, north of Aleppo and between Aleppo and Katme and leaves the Cerablus Bridge, Deyrizor and Süleymaniye district in our side. To the south of this border, the Arabic language, civilization and society are dominant.”⁴⁰⁶ The article published by *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, “The Britain’s Politics of Islam,” put together Kurds, Circassians, and Turks under the title of “Muslims of Turkey” and invited them to establish a common front against the invaders to defend Islam. Another article, “Anatolia,” argued that a new ideology was born in Anatolia after the Mudros Armistice.⁴⁰⁷ This ideology was very similar to the Monroe Doctrine; its motto was “Anatolia belongs to Anatolians:” “Today, Anatolia is not only a geographical concept; it also means an ideal. . . Anatolia is a political entity. It is such a political entity that it is independent against the outside and free on the inside.”⁴⁰⁸

During the National Liberation War, some well-known Turkists such as Ziya Gökalp and Hamdullah Suphi, who refused to limit Turkism in Anatolia in 1918, adjusted their views regarding the changing conditions and wholeheartedly defended the national movement in Ankara that rejected expansionist imperial policies and restricted its objectives to the liberation of Anatolia. Ziya Gökalp, who had announced in 1911 that “the *vatan* of the Turks is neither Turkey, nor Turkistan, their *vatan* is a vast and eternal land: Turan,” modified his concept of *vatan* in 1920 in his poem “Shepherd and Nightingale:”

⁴⁰⁵ Although the article was published without an author’s name, it was presumably written by Mustafa Kemal, as some of the themes in the article were very similar to those of Mustafa Kemal’s speech in Ankara on December 28, 1919. “Hudut Meselesi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 4, January 24, 1920.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ “İngilizlerin İslam Siyaseti,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 23, April 20, 1920; “Anadolu,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 72, November 7, 1920.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

Shepherd said: Although all countries forsake me, Anatolia does not secede from me. Nightingale said: Although the enemy envies me, the voice of the Turk will sing in Istanbul . . . Shepherd said: From Edirne to Van and to Erzurum, All belong to me, Nightingale said: Izmir, Maras, Adana, İskenderun, and Kirkuk are all pure Turkish.⁴⁰⁹

Similarly, Hamdullah Suphi, who had rejected the idea of limiting the field of activity of the Turkish Hearths to Turkey in 1918, since it would have offended the Turks outside of Anatolia, labeled the Anatolian unity as the unconquerable in his speech in the parliament in Ankara in 1920: “The force to combat the enemies will surface from the inner Anatolian territories. Therefore to prevent it, they [the enemies] will seek to destroy the inner Anatolia. There is not a single piece of our territory left out which is not under the threat of this danger.”⁴¹⁰

The Turkish national anthem, “Independence March,” written by Mehmet Akif and officially adopted by the parliament in Ankara on March 12, 1921, was a remarkable example of how Islam was the dominant factor in the national discourse during the first years of the National Liberation War. While there was not a single word about Turks, Turkey or Turkishness in the ten-stanza-long national anthem, there were repeating references to Islam and God. Similarly, Mehmet Akif’s imagination of *vatan* in the national anthem was more religious than national.⁴¹¹ He elevated *vatan* to a sacred territory that should be defended by the “God-worshipping nation.” Particularly, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth stanzas of the national anthem sanctified the homeland:

My friend! Leave not my homeland to the hands of villainous men!

Render your chest as armor and your body as trench! Stop this disgraceful rush!

⁴⁰⁹ Ziya Gökalp, “Çoban ile Bülbül,” *Genç Yolcular* 3 (January, 1, 1920).

⁴¹⁰ “Milletvekillerinin Heyecanı,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 33, May 23, 1920.

⁴¹¹ Recently, the prevailing Islamic spirit in the national anthem was criticized by the retired army general Doğu Silahçioğlu in his article “Supporters of Ummah and Nationalists” published by the uncompromising Kemalist newspaper *Cumhuriyet* on February 22, 2008. Doğu Silahçioğlu argued that whereas religious Mehmet Akif could not find a place for the word “Turk” in the ten-stanza-long national anthem, he “skillfully installed” in the anthem religious words such as “God,” “azan,” “paradise,” and “faith.” Doğu Silahçioğlu, “Ümmetçiler ve Milliyetçiler,” *Cumhuriyet*, February 22, 2008.

For soon shall come the joyous days of divine promise...

Who knows? Perhaps tomorrow? Perhaps even sooner!

View not the soil you tread on as mere earth - recognize it!

And think about thousands who lie so nobly beneath you without shrouds.

You're the noble son of a martyr, take shame, and do not hurt your ancestor!

Unhand not, even when you're promised worlds, this paradise *vatan*.

Who would not die for this heavenly piece of *vatan*?

Martyrs would gush out should one simply squeeze the soil! Martyrs!

May God take my life, all my loved ones and possessions from me if He will,

But may He not deprive me of my one true *vatan* for the world.

Oh glorious God, the sole wish of my pain-stricken heart is that,

No heathen's hand should ever touch the bosom of my sacred Temples.

These azans, whose testimonies are the foundations of my religion,

May their noble sound last loud and wide over my eternal homeland.

After winning the defensive battles of İnönü and Sakarya against the Greek army in the western front in 1921, the Islamic tone of the national struggle was lessened and the nationalization of the *vatan* was intensified by the Kemalists. Other important developments were the defeat of the Armenian army in eastern Anatolia and the signing of the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet Union in March 1921, through which the Kemalists reached their territorial objectives on the eastern front except for the Batumi district, which was ceded to Georgia. Furthermore, the local armed struggle against the French troops in the southeast also ended in March 1921. As a result of these military and diplomatic successes, the Ankara government entrenched its authority in the east of Anatolia, where the Kurds were the majority.

The support of the Kurds for the national liberation war was not as noteworthy as it had been two years ago. As the national forces were prepared for a final assault to oust the Greek army from Anatolia, the focal point of the national discourse moved from Turkeyism to Turkish nationalism, which gave special importance to the Turkification of the *vatan* rather than emphasizing the harmony of different Islamic ethnic groups inside the borders announced by the National Pact. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal started to identify the national liberation war as an anti-imperialist struggle against European powers.

Before 1921, Mustafa Kemal refrained from using terms such as “Turkish nation” in his speeches and preferred to mention terms like “people in Turkey.” His discourse changed in 1921, and he started to emphasize Turkish nationalism in his addresses in addition to the geographic unity of different ethnic groups in Anatolia. In his statement to the Associated Press in August 1921, Mustafa Kemal proclaimed that “Turkey belongs to Turks.” According to him, this was “the motto of nationalists.”⁴¹² Starting in the winter of 1921, Mustafa Kemal depicted the “invasion of the Turkish homeland by Greek forces” as “the imperialist desire of Britain.” In his speech in the parliament on January 29, 1921 about the forthcoming negotiations in London with the Allied forces, Mustafa Kemal identified “the imperialist and capitalists forces” as one of the main threats to the nation: “Imperialist forces consider our nation as a flock of animals that does not have qualities like justice, honor, and independence. According to his thinking a large and valuable country, which has plenty of natural resources, cannot be left to such a flock.”⁴¹³

⁴¹² Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 236. The influential and high-circulation daily newspaper *Hürriyet* selected Mustafa Kemal’s phrase “Turkey belongs to Turks” as its motto one year after its foundation and has been using it on the front page since 1949.

⁴¹³ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 194. Six months before Mustafa Kemal’s speech, on July 3, 1920 İsmet İnönü argued in his speech in the parliament that the invasion of Anatolia by Greece was instigated by the “imperialist leaders.” *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları 1920-1973* Vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992), 15.

In the same way, intellectuals, who supported the national forces started to underline Turkish nationalism in their writings after 1921. Ruşen Eşref (1892-1959) compared the area between Bursa and Eskişehir, in which national forces were fighting against the Greek army, with the Hedjaz region, which included sacred cities of Islam in Mecca and Medina. He named the area between Bursa and Eskişehir “the sacred of house of the Turks.”⁴¹⁴ According to him, this invasion was completely different than the previous military losses in the Balkans, in which only the conquered territories had been lost. This time, the invaders were taking control of “Turkish districts, Turkish architecture, Turkish capitals, Turkish honor, Turkish tradition, and Turkish religion.” Ruşen Eşref argued that “the remaining *vatan*” without Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul was so small that “there was not a single sultan tomb in it.” Even the grave of Namık Kemal, “the poet of *vatan*,” in Gallipoli was surrendered to “the infidels.” For him, “to own the *vatan*, we should all be a part of the *vatan*.”

According to Falih Rıfkı (1894-1971), because of the heroic resistance of the national forces during the Sakarya Battle, the name of the river of Sakarya moved “from national geography to national history.” For him, “the river Sakarya prevents the territories from becoming dirty by carrying the Greek blood to the sea for seven days.”⁴¹⁵ In another article, Falih Rıfkı underlined that Mustafa Kemal was taking Turks to “the promised land.” However, “the promised land” was neither in the Caucasus nor in Central Asia. For Falih Rıfkı, “the promised

⁴¹⁴ Ruşen Eşref was the first journalist in the Ottoman media who conducted a long interview with Mustafa Kemal, published by the journal *Yeni Mecmua* in 1918. Ruşen Eşref’s interview about Mustafa Kemal’s military achievements in the Battle of Dardanelles elevated Mustafa Kemal’s image in the eyes of the public. Ruşen Eşref became the secretary general of the President of Turkey in 1933. After Mustafa Kemal’s death, he served as an ambassador in Rome, London, and Athens. Ruşen Eşref, “Azim ve İman,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 257, August 7, 1921.

⁴¹⁵ Falih Rıfkı became a leading journalist after the end of the National Liberation War. He was the chief editor in the newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* and *Ulus*, which were official newspapers of the Republican People’s Party. Until Mustafa Kemal’s death in 1938, he had been a trusted member of the Mustafa Kemal’s entourage and regularly attended his dinners in the Çankaya Palace. Falih Rıfkı, “Sakarya’nın Suları Neler Anlatıyor,” *Akşam* 1054, August 31, 1921.

land is the territories of unity and freedom for Turks. In this promised land, Turks are going to meet with themselves, they are going to work for themselves, they are going to live for themselves, and they are going to die for themselves. This promised land is ‘the national *vatan*.’”⁴¹⁶

Yahya Kemal, who criticized the expansionist policies of the CUP during World War I, enthusiastically supported the national forces’ defense of Anatolia against the invading armies. In his article “Our Sense of Independence,” Yahya Kemal compared the national liberation war with the Polish struggle for independence: “The sense of independence have been waiting in the hearts of Turks for centuries like a fire under the ashes. When it was realized that it was going to be extinguished, it sparkled furiously.”⁴¹⁷ For Yahya Kemal, heroic Turkish resistance to invaders vindicated Namık Kemal’s dictum that “in each part of our territory, there is a lion waiting.”⁴¹⁸ As a result of the victories of Turkish armies, “the Armenian map, which gave the area from Sivas to Adana to Armenia, and the Greek map, which encircled all the ports and coasts of the Western seas [Aegean Sea], were left over on the walls.” In another article, “The New Turkish Sprit,” Yahya Kemal argued that in the fifty years between Namık Kemal and Mustafa Kemal, a “new Turkish sprit” had surfaced that reached its zenith in the national struggle in Anatolia. The major characteristic of this “Turkish national spirit” was that whereas before Namık Kemal the “love of *vatan*’ had consisted of only misery and melancholy, after Namık Kemal it became a passionate and encouraging ideal. For him, “the last three years of Anatolia illustrated the new Turkish sprit even to those who were not willing to realize it.”⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁶ Falih Rıfki, “Allah Senden Rız Olun,” *Akşam* 1076, September 22, 1921

⁴¹⁷ Yahya Kemal, “İstiklal Hissimiz,” *Tevhid-i Efkar* 311, April, 20, 1922.

⁴¹⁸ This sentence belongs to the poem of “The Song of *Vatan*” written by Namık Kemal for his well known play “*Vatan* or Silistre.”

⁴¹⁹ Yahya Kemal, “Yeni Türk Ruhu,” *Tevhid-i Efkar* 334-337, May 13-16, 1922.

Ziya Gökalp, who supported Turanism and the expansionist policies of the CUP, became an ardent anti-imperialist during the National Liberation War. In his poems, he argued that the Greek invasion of Anatolia was planned by Britain and not by Greek statesmen. Therefore Gökalp considered Greece as Lloyd George's puppet: "Lloyd George deceived Greece once again . . . Our hatred does not consider Greece as the enemy; this slave [Greece] revolted because of you [Lloyd George]; after a couple of slaps he will be regretful, but you will remain our eternal enemy [Britain]."⁴²⁰ Similarly, in his poem "Beware of Britain," Gökalp identified Britain as the main threat for *vatan*: "It [Britain] destroyed all *vatans*, it took over hundred states, it drowned the freedom, it enslaved this nation . . . All of the world became his slaves, only Anatolia is left as a free country, it [Anatolia] is fighting a holy war against this injustice, our duty is to come to its rescue."⁴²¹

Mustafa Kemal announced a written declaration after the national forces drove all Greek forces out of Anatolia as a result of the final assault, which started on August 26, 1922 and ended within two weeks. He addressed all the people in Turkey as the "grand and noble Turkish nation."⁴²² One month after the military victory, Mustafa Kemal told the American news reporter Richard Danin that in the war, the Turks lost "Macedonia and Syria. But, now we demand every place and everything that belong to Turks. We decided to save them and we are going to save them." Mustafa Kemal underlined that he was not going to stop until he had saved all the Turkish territories, which are "Istanbul, Thrace until the Meriç River, Anatolia, the territories of Mosul, and half of Iraq."⁴²³ Indeed the Turkish delegation and its head İsmet İnönü to the Lausanne Conference were instructed by parliament not to make any concessions on the issue of national

⁴²⁰ Ziya Gökalp, "Kara Destan," *Küçük Mecmua* 4 (June 26, 1922): 13-14.

⁴²¹ Ziya Gökalp, "İngiliz'den Sakın," *Küçük Mecmua* 6 (July 10, 1922): 11-12.

⁴²² "Dumlupınar Zaferi Üzerine Türk Milletine Beyanname," *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri* 4 (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991), 474.

⁴²³ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 382-383.

borders. There were fourteen articles in the ordinance prepared by the cabinet. About the two articles, the delegation was instructed to leave the conference if the Allies would not accept Turkey's terms on two subjects. They were Article 1: Eastern Borders: Rejection of the establishment of an Armenian state in the Eastern Anatolia; and Article 8: Abrogating the capitulations.⁴²⁴ The second article was about the Iraqi border that claimed to take back Süleymaniye, Kirkuk, and Mosul. The third article was about the border with Syria and called for a change that would transfer cities such as Harim, Meskene, and Müslimiye between Aleppo and the current border and Deyri Zor to Turkey. According to the fourth article, the delegation should insist on regaining the Aegean islands close to the coast. The fifth article accepted the 1914 border of eastern Thrace, which left Edirne to Turkey. According to the sixth article, there should be a plebiscite about the status of the Western Thrace.

During the first part of the Congress of Lausanne that ended in February 1923, after three months of intense negotiations between the representatives Turkey, Britain, France, and Italy, the Turkish delegation realized that reaching the borders announced by the National Pact was impossible through the peace negotiations, as France and Britain were not willing to give the control of districts of İskenderun and Mosul to Turkey. During this period, there were also passionate debates in the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. The majority of the members of the parliament seemed to stand firm about the territorial objectives proclaimed in the National Pact. Some of the members of the parliament even argued that they preferred to continue to fight against the enemies rather than to accept a humiliating peace agreement.⁴²⁵ After breaking off the negotiations in Lausanne, the Turkish delegation returned to Ankara and its head, İsmet İnönü,

⁴²⁴ The original version of the ordinance was published by Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu. Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da Milli Mücadele* Vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), 104-105.

⁴²⁵ Mustafa Budak, *İdealden Gerçeğe*, 362-369.

encountered a parliament eager to insist on the terms of the National Pact. Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü, two leading politicians of Turkey, decided to change their strategy of saving all the Turkish territories in order to Turkify those territories that would be left to Turkey through the peace agreement.

İsmet İnönü's speeches in the parliament after the breaking off of the diplomatic negotiations revealed that Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü preferred to sign the peace agreement and consolidate their political status in Turkey rather than compelling European powers, if necessary militarily, to agree to cede the Mosul and İskenderun districts to Turkey. On February 27, 1923, İsmet Pasha emphasized that Turkey would give some concessions on territorial issues to obtain the abrogation of capitulations: "We thought that our life would not be safer in a *vatan*, which has larger borders. The real issue is living in the *vatan* of the Turks, wherever it is going to be, like any other nation. We committed to uphold this principle and told the Allies that in terms of the territorial issues, we will satisfy the Allies by finding a position in accordance with the National Pact . . . This is our decision."⁴²⁶ İsmet İnönü told the members of the parliament that if the Mosul issue was not resolved in the negotiations between Britain and Turkey, the League of Nations would decide on the status of the district. The members of parliament reacted to this decision by shouting that "we are ceding Mosul."⁴²⁷

Whereas some scholars criticized the Turkish delegation in Lausanne, as it lost the districts announced by the National Pact, namely Mosul, and accepted the international regime of the Straits, some others applauded İsmet İnönü for securing the abolition of capitulations and the population exchange, which ended with the expulsion of 1.5 million Greeks from Anatolia.

⁴²⁶ *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları 1920-1973* Vol. 1, 83.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.

However, both of these analyses were anachronistic, because the Turkey that included Mosul and İskenderun or the Turkey with a 1.5 million Greek population in Anatolia never existed. Indeed, the Republic of Turkey was established on October 29, 1923, three months after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne. After signing the Treaty of Lausanne, İsmet İnönü announced in his speech in parliament that as a result of the treaty, “we cured a disease that we have suffered from for centuries. We accomplished a *vatan* in Anatolia, which has a homogenous population.”⁴²⁸ According to İnönü, Turkey would not have a significant Christian minority, which was defined by him as a “state within a state.”⁴²⁹ In the last part of his speech, İnönü “summarized” the achievements of the Treaty of Lausanne with following sentences: “Homogeneous and stable *vatan*: within it we don’t have internal concessions that resemble government within a government, and there aren’t any unusual financial obligations. A free and wealthy *vatan*, whose rights can be defended without a doubt: the name of this *vatan* is Turkey.”⁴³⁰ İnönü’s arguments for legitimizing the national *vatan*, which was significantly smaller than the imperial *vatan*, revealed that the concept of *vatan* was changed radically for İnönü, who fought as a colonel in the Ottoman army in Yemen during World War I: “We all know that the sons of *vatan*, who were not able to defend even our borders and our *vatan*, had been squandered outside of *vatan*.”⁴³¹

In his speech in the parliament on August 13, 1923, Mustafa Kemal analyzed the political outcome of the National Liberation War. For him, the Ottoman Empire ended when Istanbul was invaded by the Allies on March 16, 1920. Since then, the “national state” was established in Anatolia on the basis of “national sovereignty.” It formed a “national army” to expel the invading armies from the “Turkish *vatan*.” According to Mustafa Kemal, the new Turkey faced

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 137.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 120.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 140.

⁴³¹ Ibid., 114.

difficulties and problems during the peace negotiations due to the “bad inheritance from the 400-years-old [Ottoman] period.” As with İnönü, in the concluding part of his speech, Mustafa Kemal sanctified the *vatan*: “Let’s leave aside the details and look at the holy entity of *vatan* from a general point of view. It is a simple piece of black soil, which is devoid of everything needed to live and to reach [modern] civilization. Under the black soil there are treasures, and on it, a noble and brave nation exists. We have faced all these difficult and long struggles . . . for *vatan*’s and nation’s freedom and protection.”⁴³²

Conclusion

This chapter examined how the spatial consciousness of the Ottoman ruling elites was changed from an imperial *vatan* to a national one between 1908 and 1923. The loss of territories was one of the foremost factors that had a deep impact on the imagination of physical and mental boundaries of the *vatan*. During this turbulent era, three different ideologies—Islamism, Ottomanism, and pan-Turkism—challenged each other to become hegemonic in politics with the objective of maintaining the Ottoman Empire. Although there were major differences between them, they all had imperial visions about *vatan*. With the occupation of various parts of Anatolia and the victory of the national struggle, the fourth one—Turkish nationalism—emerged with a completely different objective of establishing a ‘national state,’ which would be governed by ‘national assembly’ and protected by a “national army.’ Turkish nationalism overcame the major predicament of Islamism, Ottomanism, and pan-Turkism of ‘how to save the Ottoman state and *vatan*’ by imagining a new state and *vatan*. By doing so, it disqualified the other three ideologies gradually and became hegemonic when the war ended in 1922.

⁴³² Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 559-569.

It is important to emphasize that at the beginning of the national struggle, defending the *vatan* against ‘the enemies of Islam,’ which invaded Anatolia for their ‘imperialistic’ interests, formed the building block of the coalition of various groups led by Mustafa Kemal. With the consolidation of their power, Kemalists started to put more emphasis on the Turkishness of the *vatan*. Turkish nationalism determined the “general condition of the modern body politic” after the proclamation of Republic with its distinct and innovative form of territoriality, which combined “material and emotional powers of space.”⁴³³ However, the new Turkish *vatan* and Turkish identity, like any other constructed national homeland and identity, were far from “homogenous and stable” as claimed by İsmet İnönü after the Treaty of Lausanne. Their physical and conceptual borders have been contested by various political and social groups since 1923. The next chapter analyzes the quest of the Turkish ruling elites for the creation of a uniform and homogenous nation within the territory of the Republic of Turkey.

⁴³³ Tom Nairn, “Scotland and Europe,” in *Becoming National*, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80; Jan Penrose, “Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought,” *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no.3 (2002): 285.

Chapter 4

“From Geography to Vatan”⁴³⁴

Remzi Oğuz Arık’s article “From Geography to *Vatan*,” published by the journal *Millet* in 1942, exemplified the Kemalist elites’ efforts and policies to nationalize the territories within the boundaries of Turkey after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. According to Arık, the main difference between geography and *vatan* was that the former was simply an area where certain physical actions were performed, whereas the latter was a sanctified territory that has a venerated value for those who act within it. For Arık, “at first glance, the geography of a country seems to be miserable and inferior.”⁴³⁵ It is merely a soil on which “enemies and friends trampled carelessly.” This “inanimate geography” turns into “a *vatan*” when people share miseries and victories in it and act together for a common cause. From now on, “the man takes the name of the territory and, in return; the territory takes the name of the man. Hereafter, if the man attacks or is attacked, he will act in the name of a determined society and its country. *Vatan* was born.”⁴³⁶ Arık identified all civilizations other than Turks, such as “Byzantium, the Roman Empire, Greece, Iran, Asur and Hittites,” in Anatolia—which he named “mother *vatan*”—as “exploiters.” After sweeping all the alien entities in Anatolia, however, Turkic tribes unified it by founding their own *vatan*. Arık argued that Turks lost centuries by devoting themselves to religious and imperial *vatans*, namely “Islamic internationalism and the Ottoman Empire.” Turks

⁴³⁴ I borrowed the title of this chapter from Remzi Oğuz Arık’s book *Coğrafyadan Vatana* (From Geography to Vatan). The book includes collected essays written by Arık. It was first published in 1956 in memory of him, two years after his death in a plane crash. This book was later published by the Ministry of National Education. Arık wrote essays on nationalism and he can be considered one of the earliest founders of rightwing nationalism in Turkey, where it has been an influential political movement since the second half of the 1960s. Arık founded the rightwing Peasant Party of Turkey in 1954, which later became the Republican Peasants’ Nation Party in 1958 and eventually the Nationalist Action Party in 1969. See Remzi Oğuz Arık, *Coğrafyadan Vatana* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969).

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

regained their national features with the establishment of national *vatan* in Anatolia at the end of the National Liberation War.

Remzi Oğuz Arık was truly devoted to the ideology of nationalism, which insists on an isomorphism between place and ethnicity and considers the linkage between citizens of states and their territories as natural. In the nationalist imagination, the concept of homeland is the dominant symbol that portrays the contested and unfixed association between people and place as obvious, commonsensical and agreed upon. The representation of the world to the schoolchildren as a collection of nation-states in a multicolored school atlas entrenched the nationalist rationale that Turkey is where the Turks live, while Germany is where the Germans live.⁴³⁷ As Gupta and Ferguson rightly put it, as a result of the commonsense nationalist ideas, “space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed. It is in this way that space functions as a central organizing principle in the social sciences at the same time that it disappears from analytical purview.”⁴³⁸

After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the state played a crucial role in the formation of the Turkish nation and homeland. As mentioned in the previous chapter, securing the “national borders” announced by the National Pact was the foremost objective of the national liberation movement in Anatolia. After achieving this objective with the Treaty of Lausanne, Kemalist elites sought to institutionalize the territories within the “national borders” as national homelands and conceptualize them as sources of identification for people in Turkey. The national discourse of the newly established Republic had temporal and spatial dimensions. The temporal dimension constructed a narrative of a Turkish nation that established an uninterrupted

⁴³⁷ Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees,” *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (1992).

⁴³⁸ Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference,” 7.

link between Turkish people in Anatolia and the ancient civilizations in Central Asia. Furthermore, the race based “Sun Language Theory,” supported by Mustafa Kemal in the 1930s, argued that all human languages descended from the Turkish of Central Asian tribes. The natural outcome of the “Turkish Thesis of History” was that because Turks established the first civilization on Earth, the Sumerians and Hittites, who inhabited Anatolia before the ancient Greeks and Armenians, had Turkish origins.⁴³⁹

Whereas the temporal dimension legitimated the Turkish national identity by tracing back to a fictional common past, the spatialization of the Turkish nation was another key element in the national discourse that tied territory with national identity. Kemalist elites established inclusive and exclusive forms of territoriality to promote Anatolia as the national homeland. Indeed, the representation of Anatolia as the homeland of Turks played an essential role in the homogenization of various ethnic groups in Turkey.⁴⁴⁰ One of the first articulations of the Turkification of Anatolia was İsmet İnönü’s speech at the Turkish Hearths in 1925. İnönü gave this nationalist speech after the suppression of the Şeyh Sait Revolt in the Diyarbakır region, in which Kurds were in majority:

We are openly nationalists . . . and nationalism is the only element for our unity. As Turks are in the majority, other [ethnic] groups do not have any power. Our mission is to Turkify non-Turkish groups in the Turkish *vatan*. We are going to extirpate groups, who oppose Turks and Turkishness. The primary criterion we seek for those who are going to serve for this country, is to be a Turk.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁹ There is an extensive literature on the Turkish Thesis of History and the Sun Language Theory. See Büşra Behar Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de Resmî Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu, 1929-1937* (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992); İlker Aytürk, “Turkish Linguists Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk’s Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no.6 (2004): 1-25. For an interesting article published by the New York Times, see “Turks Teach New Theories,” *New York Times*, February 9, 1936, E7.

⁴⁴⁰ Anssi Paasi, “Territorial Identities as Social Constructs,” *Hagar – International Social Science Review* 1, no. 2 (2000): 100-101.

⁴⁴¹ İsmet İnönü gave this speech on April 25, 1925. Bilal Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye’de ‘Kürt Sorunu’ 1924-1938* (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1975), 58.

Most of the scholars, intellectuals, and journalists supported the Kemalist policy of homogenization and the assimilation of non-Turkish ethnic groups in order to create solidarity inside the Turkish *vatan*. Like İnönü, Remzi Oğuz Arık was very aggressive about non-Turkish groups in Anatolia: "...those, who want to come to this *vatan* and join to this nation, have to accept and appreciate the conditions that were considered necessary by the founders of the *vatan*."⁴⁴²

Turkish nationalism constructed the meaning of homeland set against the 'Others.' These 'Others' were sometimes identified as internal enemies in Anatolia, and other times they were identified as external enemies. However, contrary to most of the other European nation-states, which presented minorities as the internal 'Other' and identified them as the main enemy, non-Turkish ethnic groups in Turkey were actively forgotten by ruling elites. For example, the word 'Kurd' became a taboo in Turkish political discourse and was not mentioned by the majority of politicians and intellectuals until the 1980s. During the Cold War, right-wing parties and politicians readily labeled left wing opposition groups as internal enemies and accused them of working in the interests of the Soviet Union. The relationship between the Turkish homeland and the external 'Others' was also problematic. The national discourse identified European imperial powers, which had sought to partition the Turkish homeland after World War I, as external enemies. Nevertheless, to realize Mustafa Kemal's objective of "elevating Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization," the Turkish state had to consider the external enemies, namely European countries, as its model. This dilemma still carries a heavy burden in Turkish politics, as its secular and pro-Western military-bureaucratic elite considers reforms, which are necessary for Turkey's full accession to the EU, as threatening to national security.

⁴⁴² Remzi Oğuz Arık, *Coğrafyadan Vatana*, 7.

Nationalism not only shaped the political and social life in Turkey after 1923, but also increased the presence of the state in daily life. National identity, which stipulated for citizens to define themselves as Turks, became prevalent against other individual identifications such as gender, religion, and class. In the first two decades after 1923, the state increased its authority all over Anatolia. It cultivated and disseminated Turkish national identity by establishing modern institutions in the media, transportation, and education. In 1927—five years after the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had started radio broadcasting—two radio transmitters began radio broadcasting in Istanbul and Ankara. In 1935, in the Fourth Great Congress of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), radio was announced “as a valuable instrument to educate the nation culturally and politically.”⁴⁴³ Indeed, radio as a key media institution became the “lips of the state and ears of citizens,” as the number of radio receivers increased from 1178 in 1927 to 180,000 in 1946.⁴⁴⁴ In terms of transportation, Anatolia experienced a railway revolution in the first 25 years of the Kemalist regime. The young Republic inherited 4559 kilometers of railway lines from the Ottoman Empire. With the objective of transporting goods in a most efficient way, Kemalists made railway construction an industrial priority, and by 1940 the railway network was almost doubled by reaching 8637 kilometers.⁴⁴⁵ The 10th Year Anthem, which was written in 1933 and still sung at many national holidays and celebrations, announced the success of the regime in transportation with the following line, which was added by Mustafa Kemal: “We have covered the motherland with the iron nets from end to end.”⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴³ Uygur Kocabaşođlu, *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1980), 116.

⁴⁴⁴ Uygur Kocabaşođlu, “Radyo,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ansiklopedisi*, Vol 10 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), 2735.

⁴⁴⁵ See for a detailed report about the history of Turkey’s railways prepared by the Turkey’s Public Workers Union, *Türkiye’de Demiryolunun Tarihi Gelişimi* (accessed April 4, 2009); available from <http://www.kamusen.org.tr/imag/arge/demiryolu.pdf>.

⁴⁴⁶ Behiç Erkin (1876-1991) was the first director of State Railways of Turkey and a close friend of Mustafa Kemal. The grandson of Behiç Erkin wrote two interesting books based on Erkin’s unpublished memoirs. Emir Kırırcık,

While radio and railways became effective state institutions in the legitimation of the newly established Turkish state, another institution, education, was the focal state organ for the Kemalist regime to enter the daily life of citizens in order to establish naturalized links between the national homeland and its people. Kemalists modernized and reformed mass education to inculcate the national identity and the Turkish homeland in the young, so that, eventually, all individuals would presuppose that they are part of the Turkish nation and the Turkish homeland. In March 1923, just after the end of the national liberation war, Mustafa Kemal launched a war in education: “During the war, schools provided educated and sophisticated young people, who were recruited as officers in the war fronts. These valuable people will return to the classroom in schools and in an area of peace and stability, they will transform war equipments into maps and books. National education will rise as a fort against ignorance and the future will be conquered and captured in classrooms.”⁴⁴⁷

This chapter examines how nationalist discourse had become prevalent in educational materials, and particularly how state education implanted national ideals into geography textbooks and promoted Turkish national identity and the country’s spatial and cultural features. Anssi Paasi employed the term “pedagogy of space” to describe “the role of school geography in the creation of spatial representations, regional narratives, knowledge, images and stereotypes regarding the ‘national character,’ cultures or identities of ‘we’ and ‘them.’”⁴⁴⁸ The comparison of the “pedagogy of space” in Turkey before and after 1923 reveals that the newly established Turkish state effectively used education in geography to construct spatial consciousness about the national homeland and to popularize collective national duties. A comparison of geography

Büyükelçi (Istanbul: GOA Basım Yayın, 2007); Emir Kıvırcık, *Cepheye Giden Yol* (Istanbul: GOA Basım Yayın, 2007).

⁴⁴⁷ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 494.

⁴⁴⁸ Anssi Paasi, “Nationalizing Everyday Life: Individual and Collective Identities as Practice and Discourse,” 13-14.

textbooks published before and after 1923 illustrates how education became an important tool in the nationalization of space and everyday life by the state. The spatial representations used in geography textbooks, such as maps and images, changed dramatically with the establishment of the Republic. The analysis of this transformation reveals that the nationalist ideology used various forms of exclusion, active forgetting, and images of the ‘Other’ to unite people inhabiting the territories saved from ‘foreign invaders’ and named them as ‘Turks,’ whose national duty was to defend the Turkish *vatan*. The objective of this chapter is to analyze the nationalist representation of space in Turkey and the production of geographical knowledge by the Turkish state to justify its own power and authority over its citizens.⁴⁴⁹ Instead of considering national essences as commonsense and matters of fact, I seek to deconstruct them to reveal processes of power and rhetoric. Processes rather than essences invent national homeland and national boundaries and treat them as meaningful.

Geography Education during the Late Ottoman Period

Geography as a science had attracted the attention of Ottoman intellectuals such as Piri Reis and Katib Çelebi since the 16th century. Whereas Ottoman elites were updated about the recent developments and discoveries initiated by European geographers, the general public, which had a literacy rate of about two or three percent, did not have any geographical information about the empire’s vast territories. As a result of Tanzimat reforms, the educational institutions developed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The number of schools increased dramatically during the 19th century, which resulted in the rise of the literacy rate to 15 percent by the end of the century.⁴⁵⁰ In 1853, the Ottoman state decided to open 25 high schools

⁴⁴⁹ Michel Foucault argued that “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.” Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 52.

⁴⁵⁰ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 167.

(*Rüşdiye*) in major cities. At that time, there were only 12 high schools in Istanbul. This number increased to 70 in Istanbul and to 619 in the Empire by the end of Abdulhamid's rule in 1908, and the number of pupils attending the elementary school was about one million in a total population of 37 million people.⁴⁵¹

Geography courses were compulsory for high school students for all classes ranging from one to three hours per week. Selim Sabit Efendi (1829-1910) was one of the first instructors who employed pedagogical tools in education, such as maps and the abacus.⁴⁵² By introducing students to maps, Sabit Efendi and other lecturers in high schools caused uproar among conservatives. They considered maps as blasphemous drawings and destroyed them.⁴⁵³ The minister of education advised Selim Sabit Efendi that he should be “progressing step by step, not straight away.”⁴⁵⁴ Indeed, a decade later educational reforms were firmly established and maps became indispensable part of geography education. In 1874, Selim Sabit Efendi instructed teachers about geography classes in his book, *Instructions for Teachers*: “In geography [classes] five continents should be presented to students on the map and on the terrestrial globe. They should be taught about how to draw maps.”⁴⁵⁵

In the last quarter of the 19th century, maps and geography textbooks became the prevailing educational means of inculcating loyalty and identification among students with the imperial territories.⁴⁵⁶ Ottoman scholars adapted these maps from Western European models, which divided the earth into continents and represented each continent on a separate map, and

⁴⁵¹ Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 100; Güler Eren, *Osmanlı* Vol.8 (Ankara: Semih Ofset, 1999).

⁴⁵² Selim Sabit was a leading reformer in education and the first modern pedagogue in the Ottoman Empire. He studied in Paris and returned to the Ottoman Empire after completing his studies in 1861.

⁴⁵³ Osman Nuri Ergin, *İstanbul Mektepleri ve İlim, Terbiye ve San'at Müesseseleri Dolayısıyla Türkiye Maarif Tarihi* (Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaası, 1939-1943), 460.


⁴⁵⁴ Ahmet Ali Özer, “Selim Sabit Efendi Hayatı ve Eserleri,” *Yağmur Dergisi* 42, (January 2009).

⁴⁵⁵ Güler Eren, *Osmanlı* Vol.8.

⁴⁵⁶ Benjamin C. Fortna, “Change in the School Maps of the Late Ottoman Empire,” *Imago Mundi* 57, no.1 (2005): 23-24.

therefore they did not reflect the fact that the Ottoman territories extended over three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—in a unified way.⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore, since all Ottoman territories were on the edges of three continents, these maps gave readers the impression that the empire was marginalized in Europe, Asia, and Africa. One clear exception to this trend was the map in Selim Sabit Efendi’s “Short Book on Geography,” first published in 1870, that showed Ottoman territories in Europe, Asia and the north of Egypt together.⁴⁵⁸ Although it did not include the Ottoman territories of Yemen, Hedjaz and Tripoli, a map appeared in a textbook that showed the territories of the Ottoman Empire in three continents in a unified way for the first time (See Map 1).

Map 1: The map published by Selim Sabit Efendi in the geography textbook “Short Book on Geography” in 1874. The districts of Hakkari and Bitlis were marked as “Kurdistan.”



⁴⁵⁷ Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 177-184.

⁴⁵⁸ Selim Sabit Efendi, *Muhtasar Coğrafya Risalesi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1874).

The book included six more maps: a world map and five maps of Asia, Europe, North and South America, Oceania, and Africa. In these maps, Selim Sabit Efendi imitated British cartographers and marked the Ottoman territories in pink. During that era, coloring Ottoman territories in pink became a tradition among Ottoman cartographers, and the practice would continue until the disintegration of the empire. In Selim Sabit Efendi's book, the map of the European continent included the Ottoman territories in Asia in its lower right corner. Whereas the Ottoman territories in Europe were marked with the color pink, Anatolia, Syria and upper Mesopotamia were left uncolored. In the same manner, the map of Africa did not mark Ottoman territories in Asia, and the map of Asia left the Ottoman territories in Europe and Africa uncolored. Moreover, in the map of Asia, Yemen and Hedjaz were not shown as part of the Ottoman Empire (See Map 2), and in the map of Africa, Egypt was shown as a British colony despite the fact that it belonged to the Ottoman Empire at the time. These inaccuracies about the Ottoman territories demonstrated that even an avant-garde Ottoman scholar, Selim Sabit Efendi, did not have a clear image of the "geo-body" of the Ottoman Empire when adapting European maps, which did not respect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁹ According to Thongchai Winichakul, "the geo-body of a nation is a man-made territorial definition which creates effects—by classifying, communicating, and enforcement—on people, things, and relationships." Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1994), 17.

Map 2: Map of Asia published by Selim Sabit Efendi in the geography textbook “Short Book on Geography” in 1874.



All of the geography textbooks published in the late Ottoman period divided the Empire geographically into three parts: 1) Ottoman Europe (Avrupa-i Osmani), 2) Ottoman Asia (Asya-i Osmani), and 3) Ottoman Africa (Afrika-i Osmani).⁴⁶⁰ However, there was no consensus among the authors of these textbooks about how to subdivide the three continental parts of the Empire. Selim Sabit Efendi divided Ottoman Asia into two parts: Anatolia and Arabia. According to him, whereas the “Country of Anatolia” included regions such as Baghdad, Basra, Aleppo and

⁴⁶⁰ See Selim Sabit Efendi, *Muhtasar Coğrafya Risalesi*; Ahmed Cemal, *Coğrafya-i Umumi* (Istanbul: Harbiye-i Şahane Matbaası, 1891); Mehmed Hikmet, *Coğrafya-i Umriani* (Istanbul: Nişan Berberyan, 1895); Ali Tevfik, *Memalik-i Mahruse-i Şahane Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Kasbar Matbaası, 1900); İbrahim Hilmi, *Memalik-i Osmaniye Cep Atlası: Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyyenin Ahval-i Coğrafya ve İstatikiyesi* (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1907).

Damascus, the “Country of Arabia” consisted of the regions of Hedjaz, Yemen, and Nejd.⁴⁶¹ Ahmet Cemal divided Ottoman Asia into six parts in his geography textbook written for military school students: 1) Anatolia, 2) the Islands, 3) Kurdistan, 4) Al-Jazeera, Iraq and Al-Hasa, 5) Syria and Palestine, 6) Hedjaz and Yemen.⁴⁶² The Kurdistan region included the cities of Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakır, Beyazid, Erzincan, Harput, Mosul, Kirkuk, Süleymaniye and Urfa.⁴⁶³

Geography textbooks published before the 1908 Revolution consisted of factual information about the Ottoman Empire and the continents, such as size, population, rivers, and mountains. Geography was defined as “a science, whose education is indispensable” for “people, who are in the service of the state.”⁴⁶⁴ Therefore, statesmen had to be educated about the Ottoman territories, “which spread into three continents.”⁴⁶⁵ Indeed, Mehmed Hikmet argued that, because of its geographic location, the Ottoman Empire was “in the center of world trade.”⁴⁶⁶ The geography textbooks published before 1908 did not seek to promote patriotic loyalty to the homeland, nation and state that was one of the most central themes in the geography education after 1908. There was not a single reference to Ottomanism and Islamism, which were the two prevailing ideologies during Abdulhamid’s reign. Another important characteristic of the geography textbooks published before 1908 was that students were not informed about the loss of Ottoman control over regions such as Bosnia, Tunis, Bulgaria and Egypt. Although Bosnia was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, Tunis was lost to France in 1881, Britain became the de facto ruler of Egypt in 1882, and Bulgaria took control of Eastern Rumelia in 1885 and became a de facto independent state, these countries were still

⁴⁶¹ Selim Sabit Efendi, *Muhtasar Coğrafya Risalesi*, 21-25.

⁴⁶² Ahmed Cemal, *Coğrafya-i Umumi*, 110.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 112-113.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁴⁶⁵ Mehmed Hikmet, *Coğrafya-i Umrani*, 7.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

considered Ottoman possessions like any other.⁴⁶⁷ However, students noticed the weakness of the Ottoman state in daily life when they read newspapers and realized that the vision of the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire presented in textbooks was an exaggeration. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın (1875-1957), a well-known political journalist from the 1908 Revolution to the early 1950s, who studied in military school in Serez and high school in Istanbul in the 1890s, stated his disappointment about Bulgaria's de facto independence: "We fooled ourselves by still referring to the 'Prince of Bulgaria' and the 'Governor of Eastern Rumelia.' In our schools we had our children read, 'Bulgaria is ours.' Bulgaria had been long gone."⁴⁶⁸

The content, approach and even the title of textbooks changed dramatically after the 1908 Revolution. Ali Tevfik revised his book "Geography of Ottoman Domains," republished in 1909 after the Revolution, and he sought to inculcate students with Ottoman patriotism. He argued that "the people of Ottoman Asia were composed of various groups such as Turks, Tatars, Kurds, Circassians, Arabs, Lazes, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. They are all united under the name of Ottoman and proud of it."⁴⁶⁹ Behram Münir's geography textbook, published in 1912 before the Balkan Wars, had the title "Sacred *Vatan* or the Geography of Ottoman Domains." Throughout the book, Behram Münir sought to imbue the students with Ottomanism and "Ottoman brotherhood." In the introductory pages, he exalted the Ottoman territories in which "the first achievements of the civilization had appeared." Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire was located

⁴⁶⁷ Ali Tevfik, *Memalik-i Mahruse-i Şahane Coğrafyası*. Ottoman maps published during Abdulhamid's reign also had an exaggerated view of Ottoman territories: "[A] pocket-sized Ottoman atlas approved by the Ministry of Education in 1906 and published the following year presents a rather fanciful view of the extent of Ottoman dominion. The pink of Ottoman sovereignty is extended to include 'Tunus emareti,' whereas Tunis had been occupied by France since 1881. Likewise, Egypt is presented as Ottoman, even though Ottoman rule was little more than a legal fiction after the British military occupation of 1882. Bulgaria is treated as an Ottoman tributary, and Eastern Rumelia, annexed by Bulgaria in 1885, is presented as a province of the empire like any other. The province of Yemen is drawn without regard for the British presence in Aden or the Hadramawt." Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 190.

⁴⁶⁸ Quoted in Benjamin C. Fortna, "Change in the School Maps of the Late Ottoman Empire," 31.

⁴⁶⁹ Ali Tevfik, *Memalik-i Osmaniye Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Kasbar Matbaası, 1909), 56-57.

“in the most important part of the world and it possesses the most beautiful and exceptional regions of nature.”⁴⁷⁰

Behram Münir analyzed demographic characteristics of the empire and classified the population according to ethnicity and religion. He called all ethnic groups together as “Ottomans” and emphasized that the multiethnic character of the Ottoman population was a fortune for the empire: “[The Ottoman Empire] should have advanced because it was composed by different nations. However today, it is in a regrettable condition.”⁴⁷¹ For Behram Münir, the reasons for the decadence of the empire were “heavy despotism, lack of patriotism in the education, the influence of foreign countries on some sections of the society that caused these sections to act against the interests of *vatan*, the feeling of hatred among various groups that emerged because of the history, and some people who worked for the interests of their ethnic groups that harmed other groups.”⁴⁷² Although the empire was in a desperate situation, he recommended for students to be hopeful about the future, because the establishment of a constitution in 1908 would restore the “Ottoman brotherhood” and the empire would soon advance.

Another radical departure from the traditional geography education was the emphasis put on the Turkish element in the empire. The language of the geography textbooks for primary school students started to use possessive nouns of ‘we’ and ‘ours’ when they talked about Ottoman territories and wars. The tragic defeat of the Empire in the Balkan Wars and the CUP’s rise to power in 1913 had a crucial impact on textbooks. The CUP considered geography teaching as an educational tool to build a social consciousness about patriotism and a sense of

⁴⁷⁰ Behram Münir, *Vatan-ı Mukaddes Yahud Memalik-i Osmaniye Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Murettibin-i Osmaniye Matbaası, 1912), 2.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

belonging to Ottoman territories among students. Mehmet Ali Tevfik (1889-1941), who was a leading member of Turkish Hearths and a member of the Unionist intellectual entourage, elaborated the theoretical framework of the patriotic geography education in a conference called “New Life, Spiritual Homeland,” organized by the CUP in Thessaloniki on January 18, 1912.⁴⁷³ Mehmet Ali Tevfik’s speech was published by the journal *Genç Kalemler*.⁴⁷⁴ A couple of months later, he published another article with the title, “Once Again Spiritual Homeland.”⁴⁷⁵

According to Mehmet Tevfik, there were two types of *vatan*: 1) Physical *vatan*, and 2) Spiritual *vatan* or spiritual homeland (*yurt*).⁴⁷⁶ He argued that, since primitive times, human beings had a sense of loyalty to their native place or physical *vatan* where they were born. In modern times, he continued patriotism and a sense of loyalty to a spiritual homeland developed among European people. On the other hand, spiritual homeland “connects present people with people who lived in the past, psychologically. As soon as memory and tradition mix with the ideas about *vatan*, physical *vatan* turns to spiritual *vatan*.”⁴⁷⁷ He claimed that the “Turkish nation and Turkish *vatan* should be constructed by learning Turkish ethnography, Turkish geography, Turkish history and a Turkish source of pride.”⁴⁷⁸ The major obstacle for “constructing Turkish *vatan*” was the “apathy of the youth towards its *vatan*.”⁴⁷⁹ Therefore, by using “methods in education,” the youth would be indoctrinated with patriotism based on the concept of *vatan*.

⁴⁷³ After the CUP came to power, Mehmet Ali Tevfik started to work in the Ministry of Public Works. From the beginning of World War I to September 1916, he worked for the War Magazine (*Harp Mecmuası*), which was sponsored by the Ottoman War Ministry for propaganda purposes. Between September 1916 and July 1919, Mehmet Ali Tevfik worked as geography teacher in various schools in Istanbul. With the establishment of Republic, he was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1937, he became the consul of Turkey in New York and died in New York in 1941. See; Ali Birinci, “Mehmet Ali Tevfik Yükselen,” *Türk Yurdu* 27, no. 243 (November 2007): 58-62.

⁴⁷⁴ Mehmet Ali Tevfik, “Yeni Hayat, Manevi Yurt,” *Genç Kalemler Dergisi* 3, no. 20 (April, 27, 1912): 437-444.

⁴⁷⁵ Mehmet Ali Tevfik, “Yine Manevi Yurt,” *Türk Yurdu* 3, no. 25 (October, 31, 1912): 18-21.

⁴⁷⁶ Mehmet Ali Tevfik used the words *vatan* and *yurt* interchangeably in his speeches and writings.

⁴⁷⁷ Mehmet Ali Tevfik, “Yeni Hayat, Manevi Yurt,” 438.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 443.

⁴⁷⁹ Mehmet Ali Tevfik, “Yine Manevi Yurt,” 19.

After the Balkan Wars, Mehmet Ali Tevfik identified geography education as the building block to raise a patriotic young generation, who would be aware of “the lost territories [in the Balkans] up to the smallest villages.”⁴⁸⁰

After 1908, geography became not only a central instrument for patriotic education in primary and high schools, but it was also institutionalized as a modern science in academia.⁴⁸¹ For modern geography professors such as Faik Sabri, Ali Macid and Selim Mansur, who were trained in France, geography was not limited to enumerating districts and places. According to Faik Sabri, geography should analyze the influence of natural factors on people. However, Faik Sabri rejected the crude determinism of geography over politics. He argued that humans could overcome nature’s power by using their intelligence:⁴⁸²

As a result of a remarkable transformation in the last years, geography’s nature is not the same as it was thirty years ago. Geography [teaching] should leave aside the knotty and useless rigmaroles. In classes, students should not be forced to memorize names. Instead, geography should leave traces in the minds of students by teaching them unforgettable memories. Geography is constituted by reasons, ideas and observations not by spiritless names.⁴⁸³

After 1912, the promotion of revenge for the lost territories increased significantly in Turkish textbooks. The primary school geography book, “Geography Stories for Children,” written by Saffet Bey (Geylangil, 1875-1944) and published in 1916, displayed “the map of revenge,” which showed the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars:⁴⁸⁴ “My

⁴⁸⁰ Mehmet Ali Tevfik’s article, “First of all Passion and Enthusiasm,” analyzed the significance of geography and history education for a patriotic society. It was written on June 27, 1913. Mehmet Ali Tevfik, *Turanlının Defteri* (Istanbul: Milli Hareket Yayınları, 1971), 74-79.

⁴⁸¹ Klaus Kreiser, “Geographie und Patriotismus, Zur Lage der Geowissenschaften am Istanbuler Darulfunun unter dem Jungtürkischen Regime (1908-1918),” in *Hommes et terres d’Islam*, ed. Xavier de Planhol (Tehran: Bibliothèque Iranienne, 1997), 71-87; Erol Tümertekin, “Development of Human Geography in Turkey,” in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, eds. Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, Fatma Mansur (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 6-18.

⁴⁸² Faik Sabri, *Coğrafya-i Tabii Dersleri* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Orhaniye, 1917), 136.

⁴⁸³ Faik Sabri, *Osmanlı Coğrafya-i Tabii ve İktisadisi* (Istanbul: Kanaat Matbaası, 1917), introduction.

⁴⁸⁴ Saffet Bey, *Küçüklerle Coğrafya Hikayeleri* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916), 113-114.

dear sons, you all know this deplorable memory. . . [Balkan states] They took the beautiful Rumelia from us. Look at the map of revenge, which shows the places we lost. . . Do not forget this tragic disaster. . . Do not fail to remember their revenge even for a second” (See Map 3).

Map 3: “Map of Revenge,” which displays the area lost by the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars. It was published by Saffet Bey in the textbook “Geography Stories for Children” in 1916.



A similar book, written by Faik Sabri (Duran, 1882-1943) with the title “Geography Reading for Children,” reminded students about the lost territories through a conversation between two children named Ferit and Reşit:

Reşit said: As you see Ferit, our country is located on three continents. We possess few places in Europe. However, in the past we had more territories. In the end, we lost all of them including huge Rumelia. In Europe, only Edirne and Istanbul remained in our hands. . . Ferit: We are not going to forget Rumelia, are we my brother? Reşit: You are right Ferit. We are never going to forget these places. We should always remember our defenseless coreligionists, who remained there.⁴⁸⁵

Saffet Bey also analyzed the lost territories in the Balkans region by region in the textbook “Ottoman Geography,” published for high school students in 1916. He argued that “we have to teach our lost territories to the young generations, so that they won’t be brought up without having a feeling of *vatan*.”⁴⁸⁶

Ahmed Cevad’s book “Talks on *Vatan*,” published in 1916 for secondary school students, was the prime example of the nationalist agitation about the lost territories in the Balkan Wars. The dramatic conditions of refugees and the desperate situation of Muslim people in Rumelian cities captured by Balkan armies were narrated in detail. The author asked the question “why Turks and Muslims were sacked from all parts of Rumelia by Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and Montenegrins?” The students were told that “because they are all our enemies and they all covet our *vatan*.”⁴⁸⁷ Ahmed Cevad classified *vatan* into two parts: 1) Captured *vatan*, 2) the remaining *vatan*, which was exposed to threats and attacks. For Ahmed Cevad, the only way to resist the enemies was that every person from the ages of 19 to 60 should be a soldier to defend the *vatan*.

⁴⁸⁵ Faik Sabri, *Çocuklara Coğrafya Kiraatleri* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916), 85.

⁴⁸⁶ Saffet Bey, *Coğrafya-i Osmani* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916), 129-130.

⁴⁸⁷ Ahmet Cevad, *Musahabat-i Ahlakiye, Sihhiye, Medeniye, Vataniye ve İnsaniye* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Orhaniye, 1916), 124-125.

He referred to children as “small soldiers” and advised them “to prepare themselves for the military service.”⁴⁸⁸

There was a significant difference between textbooks printed before and after 1908. Whereas the former sought to conceal the deterioration of the empire, the latter repeatedly emphasized the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire since the end of the 18th century. At the beginning, students were taught about the Ottoman armies fighting in the center of Europe to capture Vienna and about the Ottoman navy controlling the Mediterranean and turning the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake.⁴⁸⁹ Subsequently, they were instructed about how the empire suffered defeats and failed to maintain Libya, Bosnia, Rumelia, Crimea, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia. Nevertheless, to prevent an inferiority complex in relation to the West among students, the remaining parts of the empire were compared with European countries in terms of territorial size. In “Ottoman Geography,” Saffet Bey told students that Anatolia was as big as France, Upper Jazeara and Erzurum Plateau was larger than the sum of Romania and Montenegro, Al-Jazeera and Iraq was as large as the combination of Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, Syria and Palestine was larger than Italy, and Ottoman Arabia was larger than the total of all Balkan states.⁴⁹⁰

Authors of the geography textbooks argued that the existence of the Turkish element was essential for continuing the multi-ethnic structure of the empire. In the textbook “Sacred *Vatan* or Geography of Ottoman Domains,” Behram Münir argued that “Turks formed the Ottoman government and they stay away from acts which are harmful for others.” He called “the existence of Turks as God’s grace” as they “prevent the enmities among other groups.”⁴⁹¹ In another

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 128.

⁴⁸⁹ Saffet Bey, *Coğrafya-i Osmani*, 39.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., 41-42.

⁴⁹¹ Behram Münir, *Vatan-ı Mukaddes Yahud Memalik-i Osmaniye Coğrafyası*, 17, 45. Behram Münir considered the missionary activities of the Catholic and Protestant churches among Ottoman Christians as a crucial threat for the

textbook written by Saffet Bey, students were told that the total number of Turks was between 11-12 million and they were “the constitutive part of the population in Anatolian cities.”⁴⁹² As Turks were employed in the military and bureaucracy, Saffet Bey continued, they left economic activities to other ethnic groups. According to him, Turks had always respected the rights of other ethnicities, and if they had not existed, other ethnic “groups would have slaughtered each other.”⁴⁹³ While Faik Sabri called Anatolia “the Turkish homeland” in his geography textbook, in “the Book of Anatolian Child,” written by Mehmet Asım and Ahmed Cevad, Istanbul was named “as the head of *vatan* and Anatolia as its body” in the section entitled “Turkey.”⁴⁹⁴ Furthermore, students were introduced with the ethnic map of Anatolia (See Map 4). The map divided the Anatolian population into four groups and gave the number of each population: 1) Muslims (12,559,786), 2) Greeks (1,614,971), 3) Armenians (1,214,452) and 4) others (226,006). In an earlier version of the same book, a map with the title “From Turan to Anatolia” was presented to students.⁴⁹⁵ Turan was defined as “the *vatan* of old Turks.”⁴⁹⁶ (See Map 5)

social integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He argued that “Christians, who left the Eastern Churches, are dangerous both for their ethnic groups and for the Ottoman *vatan*.” Ibid., 19.

⁴⁹² Saffet Bey, *Coğrafya-i Osmani*, 91.


⁴⁹³ Ibid., 92.

⁴⁹⁴ Faik Sabri, *Osmanlı Coğrafya-i Tabii ve İktisadisi*, 47. Mehmet Asım and Ahmed Cevad, *Anadolu Yavrusunun Kitabı* (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1919), 351-352.

⁴⁹⁵ Mehmet Asım and Ahmed Cevad, *Anadolu Yavrusunun Kitabı* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1917), 188.

⁴⁹⁶ Mehmet Asım and Ahmed Cevad, *Anadolu Yavrusunun Kitabı*, 280.

Map 4: Ethnic map of Anatolia published by Mehmet Asım in the textbook “The Book of Anatolian Child” in 1919. In squares, white colors showed the proportion of the Muslim population, gray colors showed the proportion of the Greek population and the black color showed the proportion of the Armenian population.



Almost all of the geography textbooks published after the Balkan wars put a special emphasis on Anatolia and identified it as the “homeland of the Turks.” There was indistinctness about the geographical borders of Anatolia in most of the textbooks. Anatolia did not include cities such as Erzurum, Van, and Diyarbakir, which were studied in the region of Upper Jazeera. Indeed, the two leading geographers, namely Faik Sabri and Saffet Bey, claimed that the area of Anatolia was 501,000 square kilometers, which was 254.868 square kilometer less than the current area of Anatolia.⁴⁹⁷ Although Anatolia had a special status in geography textbooks, this did not mean that authors did not consider other regions as a part of the Ottoman *vatan*. In the geography textbook “Geography Stories for Children,” students were encouraged to travel to all Ottoman territories: “The Ottoman Empire is so beautiful that our *vatan* should be traveled in order to appreciate these beauties.”⁴⁹⁸ Saffet Bey told the story of a teenager who traveled from Zonguldak, located in the western Black Sea Coast, to Yemen. During the journey, the students were informed about the Ottoman cities such as Izmir, Beirut, Mecca and Jeddah that were all considered indispensable parts of the Ottoman *vatan*.

After 1912, paralleling the political developments, students were told detailed ethnic information about Turks. Almost all of the textbooks published claimed that Turks belong to the Turanic race. Maps about Turan were published in order to visualize the journey of Turks from Turan to Anatolia. Another important development during this period was the revenge-based discourse of geography textbooks. Textbooks published maps about the territories lost in Rumelia. Students read the dramatic stories of the migrants who escaped from the advancing Balkan armies. They were admonished not to forget Rumelia. Between 1919 and 1923, because

⁴⁹⁷ Saffet Bey, *Coğrafya-i Osmani*, 41; Faik Sabri, *Osmanlı Coğrafya-i Tabii ve İktisadisi*, 19. Today, according to the official statistics, the area of Anatolia is 755,688 square kilometers. This number also included the Hatay district, which is 5,403 square kilometers. Hatay became part of Turkey in 1939.

⁴⁹⁸ Saffet Bey, *Küçüklerle Coğrafya Hikayeleri*, 125.

of the occupation of various regions of Anatolia and the National Liberation War, very few geography books were written and published. The ones published during this period were the new editions of older books. With the establishment of the Republic, the content and discourse of the textbooks changed fundamentally once again.

Turkification of Geography after the Establishment of Republic

As I examined in the previous chapter, especially during the first two years of the national liberation struggle, the discourse of the ruling elite was based on the unity of all Muslim ethnic groups in Anatolia. The leading political figures put emphasis on Turkeyism rather than on Turkish nationalism. After decisive victories against the Greek and Armenian forces, the discourse of national struggle started to change and Turkish nationalism came into prominence. Rıza Nur (1879-1942), who served as the Minister of Education in the first Ankara government in 1920 and was the second man of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne Conference after İsmet İnönü, published an article entitled “The Character of Our State and Its National Name,” in the journal *Türk Yurdu* in November 1924. He argued that the ancient nations of Anatolia, such as “Urartu, Elam, Sumer, Tobal, Hittite, and Kumak” all belonged to the Turan family.⁴⁹⁹ They were later assimilated by Greeks, Romans and Byzantines and they lost their Turanic characters. According to Rıza Nur, with the arrival of Turks in Anatolia in the 11th century, Selcuks turned the assimilated people of Anatolia back to their original roots and therefore Anatolia became “a new Turkistan or a new Turan.”⁵⁰⁰ Although Rıza Nur was exiled less than one year later after the publication of this article due to his opposition to Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü, Kemalists envisaged a vision of geography and history that was very similar to Rıza Nur’s nationalistic

⁴⁹⁹ Rıza Nur, “Devletimizin Mahiyeti ve Milli Adı,” *Türk Yurdu* 15, no. 162 (November 1924): 54.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

worldview. At the end of the article, Rıza Nur compared a number of names, such as the Turkish state, the Anatolian state, the Turkmen state and Turkey for the newly established Republic. He argued that the name Turkey was the best alternative as “we are Turks of Turkey within the great Turkish family.”⁵⁰¹

In November of 1925, Mustafa Kemal stated in his speech before the Ankara Law School that the cement that kept the nation together for centuries changed with the establishment of Republic: “Instead of religious and sectarian relationships, people are united with the cement of Turkish nationality.” On April 26, 1926, Mustafa Kemal told the delegates of Turkish Hearths that “we are explicitly nationalist and Turkish nationalists. Our Republic is founded on the Turkish nation. If the members of this society are molded with Turkish culture, the Republic, which is based on this society, will be stronger.”⁵⁰² In accordance with the rising nationalistic political discourse, the Third Congress of the Republican People’s party announced the definition of *vatan* in its program that regarded the remnants of ancient Anatolian civilization as part of Turkish national heritage: “*Vatan* is the historical vestiges of the Turkish nation that are under the soil [of Anatolia] and at the same time it is the homeland within our current borders.”⁵⁰³

The change of the political discourse about the *vatan* also affected the textbooks printed after 1923. One of the first textbooks published after 1923 was “Information about Vatan,” written by Muhiddin Adil, who was a professor of law, for primary school students.⁵⁰⁴ The students were told that *vatan* was “the territories, sea, and air that belong to us and to our

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., 56.

⁵⁰² Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 703.

⁵⁰³ *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabıtları* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 25.

⁵⁰⁴ Muhiddin Adil, *Malûmatı Vataniye* (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1925).

ancestors.”⁵⁰⁵ Muhiddin Adil argued that there were two types of *vatan*. While physical *vatan* included “territories owned by us, ideational *vatan* is larger than this. Every place in which Turks live and Turkish is spoken belongs to ideational *vatan*.”⁵⁰⁶ The book also praised Mustafa Kemal and National Liberation War. Mustafa Kemal was identified as a “chieftain” who “sought to strangle the enemy in the center of the mother *vatan*.”⁵⁰⁷

Between 1928 and 1932, two fundamental reforms drastically changed the cultural life of Turkish society. The first one was replacing the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet in 1928. Mustafa Kemal himself was involved in teaching the new alphabet by traveling to various Anatolian cities and encouraging everyone to learn the new letters. As Feroz Ahmad stated, the alphabet revolution, “more than virtually any other, loosened Turkey’s ties with the Islamic world to its east and irrevocably forced the country to face west.”⁵⁰⁸ The success of the alphabet revolution encouraged the Kemalist elite to remove all Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language. In a couple of years, they created a pure Turkish language by reintroducing words from Turkic dialects in Central Asia and ancient literary sources.⁵⁰⁹

The second reform was the construction of the Turkish Historical Thesis in the years 1931 and 1932. According to the thesis, Central Asia, which was the ancient homeland of the Turks, was the cradle of civilization. Due to the drought, Turkish tribes migrated to other parts of Eurasia and formed new civilizations in Mesopotamia, Anatolia and Europe. By stating that Hittites and other ancient Anatolian societies were part of Turkish civilization, Kemalists sought to prove that “Anatolia had been a Turkish country since time immemorial, thus extending the

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., 12-15.

⁵⁰⁸ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 82.

⁵⁰⁹ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: Tauris, 2005), 189-190.

roots of the citizens of the republic in the soil they inhabited.”⁵¹⁰ The Turkish Historical Thesis established the central framework of the history textbooks since 1932 until today.

As Bernard Lewis rightly argued, the major obstacle for Kemalists was that “the loss of Empire was recent, and still rankled with many, to whom the idea of a comparatively small nation-state seemed unsatisfying and unattractive.”⁵¹¹ Instead of supporting pan-Turkist ambitions for a Turkish Empire, which would unite all Anatolian and Central Asian Turks in one state, Kemalists initiated a campaign of territorial nationalism. This territorial nationalism would strengthen the national psyche of Turkish people that had been undermined by uninterrupted military defeats and territorial losses since 1774: “... Kemal sought to adapt and inculcate the new idea of an Anatolian Turkish fatherland. His aim was to destroy what remained of the Islamic and Ottoman feelings of loyalty, to counter the distractions of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist appeals, and to forge a new loyalty, of the Turkish nation to its homeland.”⁵¹² Bernard Lewis stated that Kemalists chose history as an instrument to raise a new patriotic generation, who “considered Turkish Republic as the final fruition of land and people.” Although teaching history was a decisive instrument in inculcating Turkish people with territorial nationalism through the republican educational institutions, another discipline, geography, was also considered by Kemalists as a valuable instrument to realize their objectives and also played an important role in the nationalization of the territory of the Republic.

In 1929, less than a year after the alphabet revolution, Faik Sabri wrote the first geography textbook in Latin letters with the title “the Geography of Turkey.”⁵¹³ The book was printed in the State Press in Istanbul and had excellent print quality. Faik Sabri argued that

⁵¹⁰ Ibid., 191.

⁵¹¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 358.


⁵¹² Ibid., 358-359.

⁵¹³ Faik Sabri, *Türkiye Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929).

Turkey was located “in a prominent place of the Earth.”⁵¹⁴ This was also illustrated with a map, which showed Turkey in the center of Asia, Europe and Africa. Indeed, Faik Sabri used spatial representations such as maps, graphics and figures throughout the book to demonstrate to the students that they belonged to a country that was larger than its neighbors and that occupied one of the most important places on Earth. One figure compared Turkey’s territories with Balkan countries and confirmed that Turkey was larger than the sum of Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. In another figure, students were informed that Turkey’s population was larger than that of all of its neighbors. In order to show that Turkey had the largest population among its neighbors, Faik Sabri displayed Armenia and Georgia instead of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that these two countries were not independent at that time and were parts of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, while all other countries were represented with ethnic dresses, Turkey was represented by an apparently Western man with a hat, jacket and tie. (See Figure 2)

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., 1.

Figure 2: Comparison of Turkey's population with its neighbors in Faik Sabri's book "Geography of Turkey" published in 1929. It is striking that although Turkey was represented by an apparently Western man with a hat, jacket and tie, all of Turkey's neighbors, including Greece and Bulgaria, were represented with ethnic dresses. The countries from left to right are Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Georgia and Armenia.



Similar to geography books published after 1912, Faik Sabri's book included a number of maps that showed the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire in the last two centuries. However, the major objective of the author was not to inculcate vengeful ideas among students about these lost territories. Rather, Faik Sabri sought to justify the establishment of the new Turkish state, as Turks became an ethnically homogenous society in Anatolia as a result of a centuries old retreat

from the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East: “Finally Turkey has become a politically and ethnically united country in a territory that is inhabited only by Turks . . . The Republican government was established and a new Turkey was born within the national borders.”⁵¹⁵ Faik Sabri underlined that as a result of the National Liberation War, “non-Turks and those who are foreign to Turkishness either remained out of the *vatan* or were removed from it and by doing so the national unity was accomplished.”⁵¹⁶ The students were introduced in the section of “The People and the Government of Turkey” with the non-Turkish Muslim groups, such as Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians, Albanians and Georgians. However, the author argued that these non-Turkish Muslim groups were “eventually Turkified.” There was also information about the non-Muslim groups of Greeks, Armenians and Jews.⁵¹⁷

In the secondary school geography textbook, “Geography Courses,” written by one of the prominent geographers of the Republic, Hamit Sadi (1892-1968), Turkey was defined “as the name of the new state established by the Turkish nation after the disintegration of the Ottoman reign.”⁵¹⁸ Students were taught about the main difference between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey: “Unlike the [Ottoman] empire, this state [Turkey] does not include various nations and countries. It forms a unity with the nation and the country. As a geographical term, Turkey represents the national territory of the newly established Turkish state.”⁵¹⁹ In the section “Population and Administrative Sections,” non-Turkish groups were specified as Greeks, Armenians and Jews. According to the author, the non-Muslims in Anatolia, whose population was less than 400,000, “mushroomed” in Anatolia during Ottoman rule. Furthermore, students were told that “there are around one million Kurdish-speaking people.” Whereas the geography

⁵¹⁵ Ibid., 10-11.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., 177.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., 177-178.

⁵¹⁸ Hamit Sadi, *Coğrafya Dersleri* (Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1930), 3.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

textbooks published until the first half of the 1930s emphasized the existence of non-Turkish groups, such as Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Kurds, the textbooks published after the 1940s did not even mention the names of these groups. For example, the geography textbook, “Geography of Turkey,” written by Besim Darkot (1903-1990), analyzed the characteristics of the population of Turkey. The author told the students that there were “foreign ethnic groups” in the Ottoman Empire, such as “Arabs, Albanians, Serbians, Greeks, Armenians and Bulgarians.”⁵²⁰ Darkot emphasized various factors that contributed to the establishment of a homogenous society in Turkey: 1) the countries populated by these ethnic groups seceded; 2) Greeks migrated to Greece as a result of the population exchange; 3) Armenians left Anatolia. As a result of these factors “the population of Turkey consists of only Turks.”⁵²¹ There was not a single reference to the existence of Kurds in Turkey in this textbook, as was the case in textbooks published after the 1940s.

Another key characteristic of the textbooks published after 1928 was their extensive use of maps in order to imbue the students with the “geo-body” of the newly established Turkish state. As Thongchai Winichakul stated, “a map merely represents something which already exists objectively. In the history of the geo-body, this relationship was reversed. A map anticipated a spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent. A map was not a transparent medium between human beings and space. It was an active mediator.”⁵²² In the case of Turkey, the use of various maps contributed to the construction of the narrative of the nation and the naturalization of the borders of the Republic. The first print edition of Mustafa Kemal’s famous six-day long Speech, which was

⁵²⁰ Besim Darkot, *Türkiye Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942), 110.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, 130.

delivered in October 1927 to the Republican People's Party congress, included the map of Turkey according to the Sevres Treaty. Mustafa Kemal analyzed the accomplishments of the National Liberation War by comparing the borders of Turkey drawn by the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne. Consequently, almost all of the textbooks published after 1928 compared the borders of Turkey according to the Sevres Treaty and the Lausanne Treaty with maps. In this way, the establishment of the Republican regime was justified in the eyes of students, as Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Republic, was portrayed as a savior who had liberated the invaded parts of the Turkish homeland. Mümtaz Soysal, who served as the foreign minister of Turkey in 1994, argued that the textbooks constructed a collective "Sevres syndrome" for all Turkish people:

[T]he map of 'Anatolia according to Sevres' remained in the pages of schoolbooks as a symbol of hostile intentions on the last piece of land left to Turks at the end of their historic adventure from the steppes of Central Asia to the center of Europe. The memory of the map is always very vivid in the minds of all those who have gone through the republican educational system and still influences the thinking of both civilian and military cadres, creating a suspicious attitude toward any suggestion of encouraging regionalism or establishing an independent Kurdish state, even outside the present borders of the Republic.⁵²³

In the textbook "Geography of Turkey," Faik Sabri published two maps of Turkey (See Maps 6 and 7). The first map shows the borders of Turkey according to the Sevres Treaty. According to the map, Izmir was given to Greece, Erzurum and Trabzon to Armenia and an autonomous region was established in the east, which "was prepared for a probable independence."⁵²⁴ The map also shows the Italian, British and French zones of influence. Only the remaining white area in the center of Anatolia was left to Turkey. Other map showed the borders of Turkey after Lausanne and the demilitarized zones in the Straits and in Thrace.

⁵²³ Mümtaz Soysal, "The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy," in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 41.


⁵²⁴ Faik Sabri, *Türkiye Coğrafyası*, 190-191.

Moreover, in the text attached to the maps, students were told how the Turkish nation under the leadership of “the savior,” namely Mustafa Kemal, repelled the enemies:

The Lausanne Treaty was a glamorous political success that defends the independence and the interests of Turkey. If this map is compared with the map of the Sevres project on the opposite page, it is easily realized that national struggle achieved great results. Except for Turks living in Mosul, İskenderun and Antakya, Turkey assured the national borders, which include all the regions in Anatolia that are inhabited by Turks.⁵²⁵

Map 6: Map of Turkey according to Sevres Treaty published by Faik Sabri in the textbook “Geography of Turkey” in 1929.


Sevres (Sevr) projesi Trkienin istiklline nihayet veriyordu. Yunanlar İzmir ve havalisini alıyor ve Çatalca ve Bykpekenece kadar gelerek İstambula sokuluyorlardı. Şarkta byk bir Ermenistan Emirhanı, Trabzuna alıyor ve Fırat valisinden tede bir muhtariyet ve muhtemel bir istiklal hazırlanıyordu. Gerikalan yerlerin, en mhim oksamında Fransızlara ve İtalyanlara nfuz mstekaları ayırılmıştı. Bu fuzlarla Marmara havzası hayretmel bir komisyon kontroluna hıvakiydi. Ordn kadi usuriye indirilecek, Anıpolilerin mli kontrol kabul edilecekti. Osmanlı Padışahu bu zilleti kabul etti. Fakat trk milleti, byk halskrı Gazi Mustafa Kemal Hazretlerinin etrafında toplandı. Asinle, şiddetle dşmanlarına mukavemet etti.



⁵²⁵ Ibid.

Map 7: Map of Turkey according to Lausanne treaty published by Faik Sabri in the textbook “Geography of Turkey” in 1929.

Lozan Muahedesi Türkiye'nin istiklâlini ve menâfîini siyaset eden pek perâk siyasi bir muvaffakiyettir. Bu harita diğer sahifedeki Sèvres (Sevr) projesi haritasile mukayese edilecek olursa millî mücadelenin ne büyük neticeler vermiş olduğu kolaylıkla anlaşılır. Türkiye, İskenderon, Antakya ve Musul havâlisinde bir miktar Türk harîp olmak üzere Anadolu'da türklerin sakin bulunduğu bilâhale memleketlerde millî hudutlarını temin ediyor, ecebîlere verilmiş olan imtiyazlar (Kapitülasyonlar) lağvediliyor ve memleket çoktandır malik olmadığı tam bir istiklâlî sahip oluyordu. Büyük halâskârımızın pek değerli rehberliğile mühim inkılapları yapan Türkiye artık millî, demokrat, lâik ve tamamile asri bir hükûmet şekline giriyordu.



çoktandır malik olmadığı tam bir istiklâlî sahip oluyordu. Büyük halâskârımızın pek değerli rehberliğile mühim inkılapları yapan Türkiye artık millî, demokrat, lâik ve tamamile asri bir hükûmet şekline giriyordu.

Another textbook, “Geography for Secondary Schools,” written by Abdulkadir Sadi and published in 1935, displayed a similar map, with the title “Sevres is Death, Lausanne is Life; Sevres belongs to the Sultanate, Lausanne belongs to the Republic.”⁵²⁶ The author also exalted Mustafa Kemal, who succeeded “to take the Turkish nation from the abyss of Sevres to the zenith of Lausanne”⁵²⁷ (See Map 8).


⁵²⁶ Abdulkadir Sadi, *Yeni Orta Coğrafya* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1935), 6.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

Map 8: This map indicates the differences between the borders of the Serves and Lausanne treaties. It was published by Abdulkadir Sadi in the textbook “Geography for Secondary Schools” in 1935.

Sevr ölüm, Lozan hayat; Sevr saltanatın, Lozan Cümhuriyetin.

Sevr Muahedesine göre Türkiye'nin tahsisi ve Lozanda çizdiğimiz Türk millî sınırı.



Geography Education after the Second World War

İsmail Habib Sevük (1892-1954), a journalist and ardent supporter of Kemalism, published his travels throughout Anatolia in a book entitled “Writings from the Homeland.”⁵²⁸ When the book was published in 1943, two decades had passed since the establishment of the Republic, and Kemalist policies were entrenched in political institutions and social life. In the introductory pages of the book, Sevük emphasized that there had been apathy among intellectuals about Anatolia before 1923. In a similar way, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who was born in Rumelia, admitted that children of Rumelia knew nothing about Anatolia other than what they had imagined: “We realized that the real Anatolia was totally different from our imaginations and desires. This was the biggest disillusionment of our life and I believe that we were totally committed to Anatolia because of this disillusionment.”⁵²⁹ Similarly, Sevük argued that “*vatan* was disintegrating because of our lack of information about *vatan*.” Anatolia had remained a backward country during the six century long Ottoman rule, Sevük continued, because Turks wasted the inexhaustible power of Anatolia in far-away countries.⁵³⁰ However, the establishment of modern Turkey signified the end of the unfortunate fate of Anatolia. Throughout the book, Sevük sought to familiarize Anatolia to the readers as if it had been an unknown country. For example, the river Euphrates filled the hole opened in the consciousness of Turks due to the loss of the Danube. Sevük talked to the Euphrates: “For me you became a Danube.”⁵³¹ Sevük further argued that after winning the national struggle, Kemalists started to wage an industrial war to make Anatolia an advanced country. The nationalization of the coal

⁵²⁸ During the National Liberation War, İsmail Habib Sevük ardently supported Mustafa Kemal in the newspaper *Açıksöz* published in Kastamonu. He published two books about his travels in the 1930s. The book “From Danube to the West,” published in 1935, was about his travels in Europe. İsmail Habib Sevük, *Yurddan Yazılar* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1943).

⁵²⁹ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 69.

⁵³⁰ İsmail Habib Sevük, *Yurddan Yazılar*, 5-9.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

mines in the Zonguldak region was labeled as “İnönü and Sakarya” wars of national development.⁵³²

Alan K. Henrikson argued that “ one of the first steps of a newly independent country is often to commission a national atlas, to print stamps with a map of the country’s outline on them, and otherwise to use the emblem of the map to assert the country’s new identity in a new setting—a new pride of place.”⁵³³ In the same way, Kemalists were waging another war in geography education in order to create a national homeland in Anatolia. In June of 1941, the First Geography Congress brought together all prominent geographers of Turkey, such as Faik Sabri Duran, Saffet Geylangil, Besim Darkot, and Hamit Sadi Selen, under the leadership of the Minister of Education, Hasan Ali Yücel. President İsmet İnönü also visited the congress and was debriefed about the recent developments in the discipline of geography. In the opening speech of the congress, Yücel defined the mission of geography education: “The primary subject of geography is [to study] every region and aspect of our *vatan*, Turkish country and Turkish nation. Our mission is to examine the Turkish *vatan*—we sacrifice our life in order to defend it and we are ready to sacrifice everything we own—from the perspective of science and train the future generations with the same perspective.”⁵³⁴

The Congress’ major task was to divide Turkey into geographic regions and to identify of their borders. Geographers categorized Turkey into seven regions: 1) the Marmara Region, 2) the Aegean Region, 3) the Mediterranean Region, 4) the Black Sea Region, 5) the Inner Anatolian

⁵³² Ibid., 158.

⁵³³ Alan K. Henrikson, “The Power and Politics of Maps,” in *Reordering the World*, eds. George J. Demko and William B. Wood (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 102.

⁵³⁴ Kemal Kaya, *İlkokulda Coğrafya Öğretimi* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942), 161-169.

Region, 6) the Eastern Anatolian Region, and 7) the Southeast Anatolian Region.⁵³⁵ Geographers preferred to use the names of the seas for the coastal regions. Inner regions were named according to their locations in Anatolia.⁵³⁶ Geographers were hesitant to use regional names such as Lazistan and Kurdistan, which were widely used during Ottoman times, as they had ethnic connotations.

One of the most important consequences of the First Geography Congress was the institutionalization of geography education in secondary and high schools. Geography courses became compulsory for all students from the sixth to the eleventh grades for two hours per week. The Congress decided to organize geography education into three different categories. In the sixth and ninth grades, the objective was to teach about general geography. Whereas seventh and tenth grades' geography education was about countries and continents, in the eighth and eleventh grades students were taught about Turkey's geography.⁵³⁷ Moreover, the Ministry of Education established a strict monitoring mechanism over the geography textbooks and teaching materials.

Five years after the First Geography Congress in 1946, RPP decided to end the one party regime, and, in 1950, the Democrat Party took power after free elections. Political parties, which controlled the National Education Ministry after 1950, had changed the textbooks according to their worldview. An examination of geography textbooks published after the Second World War reveals that the content of the textbooks was heavily influenced by the changes in the domestic and foreign politics of Turkey. During the thirty years between 1950 and 1980, center right

⁵³⁵ The reports and presentations made in the Congress were published by the Ministry of Education. In the conclusion of the Congress, the Minister of Education Hasan Ali Yücel praised Faik Sabri Duran and Saffet Geylangil. Yücel emphasized that their books written in the late Ottoman period, which included pictures and maps, influenced him deeply. These books, Yücel continued, were totally different than the geography books he studied during secondary school that were based on memorization. *Birinci Coğrafya Kongresi: Raporlar, Müzakereler, Kararlar* (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1941), 114.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁵³⁷ Halil I. Tas, "Geographic Education in Turkish High Schools," *Journal of Geography* 104, no. 1 (2005): 35-39.

parties dominated Turkey's politics except for short periods after military coups in 1960 and 1971. As they wholeheartedly supported Turkey's relations with NATO, geography textbooks published during this period gave special emphasis to Turkey's role in the 'Western Bloc.' Furthermore, as the center right parties embraced nationalism and conservatism, textbooks published after 1950 had a clear nationalist perspective. The military coup in 1980, which was initiated after long and bloody conflict between leftist and rightist groups during the 1970s, resulted in a complete change in geography education. Textbooks inculcated students with the worldview of the military that imagined Turkey surrounded by 'internal and external enemies.' Students were disciplined and trained as soldiers of the Turkish nation and were prepared to sacrifice themselves to save their homeland. After the second half of the 1990s, various civil and political actors challenged the political discourse based on national security. For example, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) supported a complete reform in education and published alternative textbooks in history, geography and philosophy.

The content of the textbook "Geography of Turkey," published in 1950, reflected Turkey's changing perceptions about international politics. At the beginning of the book, there was a map that showed Turkey in the center of the earth. Authors identified Turkey "as the real bridge between Asia and Europe"⁵³⁸ (See Map 9). By showing the world map centered on Turkey to students, the authors aimed to demonstrate the primary importance of Turkey's location.

⁵³⁸ Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör, *Türkiye Coğrafyası* (Ankara: Ahmet Sait Basımevi, 1950), 7.

Map 9: The world map in the textbook “Geography of Turkey,” written by Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör and published in 1950. Turkey was shown in the center of the world.



According to the authors, the current borders of Turkey were shaped as a result of centuries' old political struggle, as the Republic of Turkey was established on the territories that “had been the center of the Ottoman Empire and the origin of its power.”⁵³⁹ As mentioned earlier, unlike textbooks published in the 1930s, non-Turkish ethnic groups were not mentioned throughout the book:

⁵³⁹ Ibid., 8.

First of all our borders are national. Within our current borders, the number of non-Turkish citizens is negligible (just 2% of the whole population of the country); and they are concentrated in couple of large cities (especially in Istanbul). Nevertheless, the percentage of minorities is very high in our neighbors. For example, minorities in Greece constitute 8% and in Bulgaria 15.6% of the population. On the other hand, outside of our state borders, there are a significant number of Turks who remained in the neighboring countries.⁵⁴⁰

Indeed, Turks living outside of the borders of Turkey was one of the most prevalent subjects in the textbooks published after 1950. Whereas detailed information was given to the students about Turks in Greece, Bulgaria, Soviet Union, Iraq, Syria and Iran, non-Turkish ethnic groups in Turkey remained a terra incognita for students.

Geography textbooks published during the Cold War attached special importance to Turkey's membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The textbooks "Geography of States" and "Geography of Turkey," written by Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör and published in 1975 and 1976 respectively, informed students in their introductory chapters about the political developments after the Second World War.⁵⁴¹ The authors examined states in three categories based on economic and political characteristics: 1) Capitalist countries, 2) Socialist or communist countries, 3) Non-aligned countries. Students were given detailed information about the international organizations such as NATO, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Warsaw Pact, the European Economic Community (EEC), the Council for Mutual Assistance (COMECON), and the Council of Europe.⁵⁴² Turkey's membership in the "western bloc" was also displayed with maps (See Map 10). Authors defined Turkey as the "only European country in the Middle East."⁵⁴³ They underlined the fact that although just a small portion of Turkey's territories was in the European

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., 9.


⁵⁴¹ Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör, *Ülkeler Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1975); Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör, *Türkiye Coğrafyası* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976).

⁵⁴² Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör, *Ülkeler Coğrafyası*, 6-11.

⁵⁴³ Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör, *Türkiye Coğrafyası*, 4-6.

continent, “close cultural, political and economic relations with Europe established after 1923” confirmed Turkey’s “Europeanness”⁵⁴⁴ (See Map 11).

Map 10: This map was published in the textbook “Geography of Turkey,” written by Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör and published in 1976. It shows NATO countries, CENTO countries, Warsaw Pact countries and neutral countries. Turkey was the only country that was the member of both NATO and CENTO.



⁵⁴⁴ Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör, *Ülkeler Coğrafyası*, 55.

Map11: This map was published in the textbook “Geography of States” in 1975 written by Sırrı Erinç and Sami Öngör. Turkey was shown in the region of Southern Europe to underline Turkey’s “Europeanness.”



A major change happened in the content and structure of textbooks after the military coup in 1980. To begin with, the name of the course in the sixth and seventh grades was changed from ‘Geography’ to ‘National Geography.’ The subjects of the books were also modified according to the requirements of ‘National Geography.’ Textbooks published after 1980s divided the Earth into continents and analyzed the leading countries of each continent. They studied the continents under the title of “The Geographic Distribution of Turks in the Earth.”⁵⁴⁵ For example the

⁵⁴⁵ *Milli Coğrafya* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), 63.

textbook “National Geography” for the sixth grade students analyzed Asia in terms of “countries and regions of Asia, in which Turks live.” The Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were collected under the title of “West Turkistan.”⁵⁴⁶ The Xinjiang region of China was named as “East Turkistan.” Azerbaijan, Yakutistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Cyprus were also examined in detail and identified as countries that had a significant Turkish population. In the European continent, the textbook gave information only about Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania, which had a significant Turkish population. The textbook did not have any information about other European and Asian countries such as Britain, Germany, India or Japan. Textbooks trained students about continents from a purely ethnic Turkish perspective. The crystallization of this policy came after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when the Ministry of National Education required that in the disciplines of geography, history, and literature, each primary and high school textbook must have at the last page of the book the map of the “Turkish World” (See Map 12).

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., 71-95.

Map 12: "Map of the Turkish World." After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it became compulsory for primary and high school textbooks in social sciences to have this map on their last page.



Another crucial change in the geography education was that “National Geography” textbooks for seventh grade classes published after the second half of the 1980s included a chapter about “Turkey’s Strategic Situation.”⁵⁴⁷ The chapter started with the definition of geopolitics: “Geopolitics is the science, which studies a country’s status in world geography and its relations with neighboring countries.”⁵⁴⁸ There were four subcategories in the chapter: 1) Turkey’s geopolitical importance, 2) Internal enemies, 3) External enemies, and 4) Love of homeland. Students were taught about how Turkey was a geopolitically important country in the world. According to this rationale, as Turkey was geopolitically very important, it was surrounded by internal and external enemies:

The unique geographical location of Turkey attracted the interest of states, which aim to establish their authority in the world and especially in the Middle East. Those who sought to capture our Straits during the First World War and destroy our country with the Treaty of Serves, endeavored to take the advantages of our country’s geographical status. If a state rules our country and the Straits, it will control the routes and trade between Europe and Asia. It will also benefit from the oil fields in the Middle East. Some countries still seek to realize these types of objectives openly or secretly.⁵⁴⁹

Although the section of internal enemies did not name any group or ideology specifically, it was clear that armed Kurdish insurgents and left-wing opposition groups were considered as main threats to national unity. In the next section, Syria and Greece were identified as the primary external enemies of Turkey. Against these enemies, students were advised to love their homeland and defend national unity. Sam Kaplan, author of the book, “The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in post-1980 Turkey,” attended a geography class in a school in small town of Yayla. As the class was about the geopolitical situation of Turkey and threats to national unity, it is worth quoting Kaplan’s comments in length:

⁵⁴⁷ İbrahim Atalay, *Milli Coğrafya 7* (Istanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 1997), 161-166; Fuat Yahşi and Ayşe Başkurt, *Milli Coğrafya* (Istanbul: Düzgün Yayıncılık, 1996), 177-185.

⁵⁴⁸ Fuat Yahşi and Ayşe Başkurt, *Milli Coğrafya*, 178.

⁵⁴⁹ İbrahim Atalay, *Milli Coğrafya 7*, 163.

In the lesson on Turkey's geopolitical situation, which I attended, the instructor wove his religious nationalist views into the reading passages. Through his performance of the text in class, the instructor not only articulated reasons for his political beliefs but also actualized them. An outspoken supporter of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, he took advantage of his role as teacher to explicitly link foreign ideologies to Marxism-Leninism. In class, he asserted that the internal threat was none other than those atheistic leftists who served in the interests of Moscow and were intent on 'weakening the Turkish people's religious unity' and 'creating divisions among the people with their materialist ideologies.' He concluded the lesson by reminding pupils that they were 'permanent soldiers on duty' who must keep alert to dangerous, subversive atheists.⁵⁵⁰

Indoctrination of students with Turkish nationalism was not only limited to secondary schools and high schools. Even the books studied in universities did not question the official ideology of the state and did not recognize the existence of Kurds as a different ethnic group. In addition to the policy of omitting the words 'Kurds' and 'Kurdistan,' university textbooks also argued that Kurds were of debased Turkish origin, and were therefore referred to as 'Mountain Turks.' The textbook "The Cultural Geography of Turkey" written by Hayati Doğanay for university geography departments in 1994, argued that as 99% of Turkey's population was constituted by Turkish Muslims, Turkey's national solidarity was much more powerful than the United States and Russia: "There does not exist any minority in Anatolia called Kurds. Although it is believed that they speak a different language, this language is a degenerated version of Turkish. They are Turkish Kurds like Kirgiz, Turkmen, Azeri and Uzbek Turks. If they had been a different nation, they would have had a separate state in the past."⁵⁵¹

Conclusion

With the establishment of the Republic, geography education was changed in order to raise citizens who would be loyal to the Turkish homeland and nation. This was the main dividing line between the late Ottoman and Republican geography education. Ottoman textbooks

⁵⁵⁰ Sam Kaplan, *The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in post-1980 Turkey* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 197-198.

⁵⁵¹ Hayati Doğanay, *Türkiye Beşeri Coğrafyası* (Ankara: Gazi Büro Kitabevi, 1994), 163.

published after 1908 emphasized Turkish people as the backbone of the empire. However, they also informed students about other ethnic groups in the empire, such as Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and Arabs. Geography textbooks published after 1923 adapted the national discourse of the newly established Republic and aimed to inculcate students with loyalty to the national homeland. Whereas textbooks published between 1923 and the early 1930s mentioned non-Turkish ethnic groups, the ones published after the second half of the 1930s completely omitted the names of non-Turkish groups such as the Kurds. Nationalist discourse became even more entrenched in geography textbooks after the 1940s, as “the republic that evolved became a Republic of Turks at the end of various policies of homogenization of the population via exclusionary as well as assimilation policies.”⁵⁵²

During the Cold War, geography education integrated the changing foreign policy preferences of the Turkish state. Students were trained about Turkey’s special relations with the Western military institutions of NATO and CENTO. Furthermore, during this period textbooks started to allot more space to Turks living in neighboring countries. After the military coup of 1980, there was a radical change in the content of geography education. While the name of the course was changed to “National Geography” for sixth and seven grades, textbooks portrayed Turkey as a country, which was located in one of the most important regions on the Earth and therefore surrounded by internal and external enemies. By doing so, geography education legitimized the military’s strong presence in Turkish politics in the eyes of students, and, at the

⁵⁵² Ayşe Kadioğlu, “Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience,” *Citizenship Studies* 11, no. 3 (2007): 291.

same time, it encouraged “a passive citizenry burdened with duties to protect national unity and the indivisibility of the country.”⁵⁵³

In the last twenty years, new sub-state and non-governmental actors emerged and became increasingly vocal in Turkish politics as a result of economic and political liberalization that was also reinforced by the developing relations between Turkey and the EU. When Turkey became an official candidate to join the EU at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the disagreement between these new actors and the military-bureaucratic elite crystallized over the adoption of international societal norms, such as cultural pluralism and linguistic rights for ethnic groups and the rejection of the traditional national security discourse. Education in general, and geography education in particular, became one of the contested issues between pro-EU actors and Eurosceptics. In 2002, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) published an alternative geography textbook.⁵⁵⁴ In the introduction, the authors emphasized that “instead of imposing to young individuals a feeling of loneliness and isolation in the world and in his/her region,” the book seeks to assist him/her to embrace “a citizenship based on global and democratic values.”⁵⁵⁵ The authors divided the textbook into three sections: 1) The Earth, 2) Europe and 3) Turkey. Whereas the textbook prioritized Europe and Turkey’s relations with the EU, it notably ignored analyzing the Middle East and the Caucasus. In accordance with TÜSİAD’s policy of promoting liberalism in Turkey, the authors portrayed “the United States as the single superpower and liberal democracy as the single political model.”⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵³ Kenan Çayır and İpek Gürkaynak, “The State of Citizenship Education in Turkey: Past and Present,” *Journal of Social Science Education* 6, no. 2 (February 2008): 55.

⁵⁵⁴ The book was written by a committee of fourteen people headed by Füsün Üstel. Füsün Üstel, *Coğrafya* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 2002).

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

Chapter 5

Vatan and Turkey's Foreign Policy Discourse

This chapter examines how Turkey's foreign policy discourse generated specific systems of meaning, commonsense and regimes of truth in order to legitimize the Turkish state as a political unit. By using representations of threats and dangers to *vatan*, ruling elites formed a historical bloc to discipline Turkish people and eliminate other antagonistic groups, which challenged their power and hegemony. As David Campbell rightly put it,

Foreign Policy is a discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in its legitimation. Foreign Policy is a number of discourses of danger circulating in the discursive economy of a nation state at any given time. . . . But in the context of the modern nation-state, Foreign Policy has been granted a privileged position as the discourse to which we should turn as the source of the preeminent dangers to our society and ourselves.⁵⁵⁷

Turkey's foreign policy discourse has not embodied uniform characteristics since 1923. There have been three distinct periods, separated by radical breaks, "a *creatio ex nihilo*."⁵⁵⁸ In the first, between 1923 and 1939, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism weighed considerably in Turkey's foreign policy. During this period, Turkey had been meticulous about not entering into the orbit of any great power and had sought to form regional alliances against revisionist powers. In the second, between 1945 and 1991, anti-communism and association with the Western camp against the Soviet Union, most importantly, shaped Turkey's foreign policy. In the third period, after 1991, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, integration to the EU became the main point of reference for groups competing for hegemony in the foreign policy arena.

⁵⁵⁷ David Campbell, *Writing Security*, 70.

⁵⁵⁸ Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005), 228.

Since 1923, two significant dislocations—the emergence of bipolar structure in world politics after the World War II and the disintegration of the Soviet Union—triggered political developments that could not be represented, symbolized, and integrated within the hegemonic foreign policy discourses.⁵⁵⁹ During these two dislocations—the years between 1945 and 1952, and 1991 and 2004—various political groups in Turkey competed fiercely against each other for hegemony in politics and foreign policy. While the first antagonistic struggle ended in 1952 with Turkey’s entry into NATO, the second resulted in 2004 when the EU decided on starting accession negotiations with Turkey.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars in IR have increasingly explored the shifts in Turkish foreign policy.⁵⁶⁰ The prevalent, unquestioned assumption in these studies emphasizes that because Turkey is centered in a strategically critical region, its geography determines its foreign policy and security decisions. In addition to geographical determinism, these studies were based on an ideologically driven and extremely politicized form of analysis based upon the functional principle of the “production of knowledge to aid the practice of

⁵⁵⁹ According to Torfing dislocation is “a destabilization of a discourse that results from the emergence of events which cannot be domesticated, symbolized or integrated within the discourse in question. For example, the concurrence of inflation and unemployment in the early 1970s dislocated the Keynesian orthodoxy suggesting ‘stagflation’ would never occur. Likewise, the process of globalization tends to dislocate the idea of the nation-state as the privileged terrain of economic activity.” Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*, 53, 301.

⁵⁶⁰ The relevant literature is enormous. See especially Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey, Challenges and Continuity* (London: Routledge, 2005); Lenore Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds., *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Stephen Larrabee and Ian Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in An Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 2003); Michael Radu, ed., *Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003); Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın, eds., *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century : A Changing Role in World Politics* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003); Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik* (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002); Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, eds., *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002); Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, eds., *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*; Mustafa Aydın, ed., *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives* (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998); Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role* (Westport: Praeger, 1994); Graham Fuller, *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications For Western Interests* (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1993).

statecraft and further the power of the state.”⁵⁶¹ The Cold War geopolitical paradigm still influences significantly scholarly analyses of Turkey’s foreign policy. It can be best summarized with Nicholas Spykman’s dictum of “geography does not argue; it just is.”⁵⁶² As this approach considers geography as a permanent, fixed, unchanging factor in international relations, the obvious outcome is that Turkey’s geographic demands have remained the same for centuries.

In a related vein, William Hale explained, “[F]or a state of its size and strength, Turkey had to deal with an extraordinary wide range of international questions, mainly due to its geographical location.”⁵⁶³ This allows Turkey to “extract some strategic rent” from great powers, but also it heightens Turkey’s chances of being attacked by any of the great powers who have aspirations in the Balkans, the Middle East or the Caucasus.⁵⁶⁴ Similarly, Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür concluded that among the many factors influencing Turkey’s foreign policy, “geopolitics has been the most constant theme.”⁵⁶⁵ For them, geography is an inescapable reality for Turkey, making it a pawn of the Great Powers especially in the 19th century between Britain and Russia, and after the World War II between the US and the USSR.⁵⁶⁶ Mümtaz Soysal, former foreign minister of Turkey, presented a similar perspective in the article “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,” stressing the factors of Turkey’s location “at the center of the world” and the consequences of this “precarious geostrategic position.” Soysal wrote, “Few states have a more multifaceted historic destiny and geographic position than the Turkish Republic.”⁵⁶⁷ Turkey has been primordially concerned for “national defense and security considerations” due to the

⁵⁶¹ Gearoid Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 11, no: 2 (March 1992): 192

⁵⁶² Nicholas Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy II,” *American Political Science Review* 32, (April 1938): 236.

⁵⁶³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 322.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

⁵⁶⁵ Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey, Challenges and Continuity*, 88.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

⁵⁶⁷ Mümtaz Soysal, “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 37.

competition among big powers with the risk of involving Turkey “in their violent clashes.” So many other countries desire Turkey’s territory, Soysal explained, because of “the value of its position.”⁵⁶⁸

A methodological problem of these studies is that they seek to produce analyses and policies founded on timeless geographical truths. While such a method assumes these geographical realities as the *raison d’être* of Turkey, scholars cannot ignore that “the realness of this real” is constructed by a nation’s political and social culture.⁵⁶⁹ They turn their subjective interpretations into undeniable and objective facts by examining ‘geographical realities’ of Turkey. By underlining the significance of enduring geopolitical oppositions (e.g. East and West, Islamic World and Europe) in Turkey’s foreign policy, scholars seek to bring to light the deep truths and secrets veiled by the quotidian practices of foreign policy. Gearoid Tuathail, among the leading critics of geographical determinism, called this line of reasoning, “Cartesian perspectivalism.” Tuathail added the geographer, by employing “Cartesian perspectivalism” can act “like the detached observer of a distant battle” and “can see the world as it really is, can narrate the truth of things, [and] can effectively represent the complex way things objectively are.”⁵⁷⁰

In this chapter, the author critically denaturalizes social constructions in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse, such as threats and dangers to Turkish *vatan*. Furthermore, in terms of their changes, the social constructions within these discourses are seen as products of specific social practices in specific historical conditions. In the first section, Turkey’s foreign policy between 1923 and 1939 is examined. During this period, Turkey’s foreign policy was based upon the

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., 37-46.

⁵⁶⁹ Gearoid Tuathail, “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 19, no: 3 (1994): 263.

⁵⁷⁰ Gearoid Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 167.

notion of non-alignment. To protect the territorial integrity of the Turkish *vatan*, the Kemalist regime sought to establish alliances with other states in the Balkans and the Middle East against the aspirations of revisionist powers, particularly Italy. Until 1939, the Soviet Union was considered a friendly regime by Ankara, an acknowledgement of the military and financial assistance during the period of national struggle. In the next section, Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War is analyzed through two case studies. The first is focused on relations between Turkey and Soviet Union after the World War II and the second concerns Turkey's participation in the Korean War. In each case, the representations of threats and dangers to Turkish *vatan* played an important role in determining foreign policy and constructing notions of national interests. The last section of the chapter is an analysis of how the traditional Turkish foreign policy discourse towards Cyprus question has been challenged and transformed by new internal players and globalized dynamics after the end of the Cold War.

Nonaligned Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1939:

Defending *Vatan* against European Imperialism

Jawaharlal Nehru, a founder of the Nonaligned Movement, praised the nationalist and anti-imperialist character of Kemalist regime in Turkey in his book "The Discovery of India," written during the World War II when he was in a prison camp operated by the British colonial regime:

Kemal Pasha was naturally popular in India with Moslems and Hindus alike. He had not only rescued Turkey from foreign domination and disruption but [also] had foiled the machinations of European imperialist powers, especially England. . . .The old pan-Islamic ideal had ceased to have any meaning; there was no Khilafat and every Islamic country, Turkey most of all, was intensely nationalist, caring little for other Islamic

peoples. Nationalism was, in fact, the dominant force in Asia as elsewhere, and in India the nationalist movement had grown powerful and challenged British rule repeatedly.⁵⁷¹

The National Liberation War had a distinct anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist character. That continued to be the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy from the establishment of the Republic up until the end of the 1930s. Another factor shaping Turkey's anti-colonial attitude arose from the new Republic being surrounded by great European powers to the south. While Iraq was under British control, France established mandatory rule in Syria, and fascist Italy was Turkey's southwestern neighbor, with the Dodecanese Islands belonging to Italy from 1912 until the end of the World War II. The Italian threat was one of the reasons that influenced Turkish leaders' decision to choose Ankara as the capital of the Republic. Compared to other cities in the western Anatolia, Ankara could not be reached by Italian warplanes stationed in military bases on the Dodecanese islands.⁵⁷² After the rapprochement with Britain in 1930s, even though Kemalists toned down their anti-colonialist rhetoric, Turkey was still one of the few European countries to resist the demands of revisionist dictators, particularly Mussolini. This unique feature of Turkey's foreign policy echoed in reports by George Orwell who observed, "In the years 1935-9, when almost any ally against Fascism seemed acceptable, left-wingers found themselves praising Mustafa Kemal."⁵⁷³

During the national struggle Mustafa Kemal announced "the whole capitalist and imperialist world" as the enemy of the nation. In July 1922, he once again emphasized Turkey's fight for independence was undertaken by the nations of the East: "Today, if Turkey's struggle

⁵⁷¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (London: Meridian Books, 1960), 352-353.

⁵⁷² Aptülâhat Akşin (1892-1974), who started his career in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1913 and later appointed as Turkey's ambassador to Argentina, Syria and Poland, heard this argument from the Foreign Minister of Turkey Tefvik Rüşti Aras. Aptülâhat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), 218.

⁵⁷³ George Orwell, "Who are the War Criminals?" *Tribune*, October 22, 1943; quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy," 22.

was limited with its interests, it would be easier and less sanguinary to accomplish its objectives. Turkey is making a supreme effort, because it is defending the interests of all aggrieved nations and the case of the whole East. Until it accomplishes its objectives, Turkey is certain of the support of all eastern nations unto itself.”⁵⁷⁴ During the war against Greece and proxy wars against Britain, France and Italy, the Soviet Union was the main supporter of Kemalists. As George F. Kennan postulated, the friendly attitude of the Soviet regime toward Turkey was “a forerunner of the tolerance which Moscow was to show on so much a wider scale in later decades for nationalist regimes in non-European countries whenever these latter were animated by anti-European sentiments and policies.”⁵⁷⁵

The first official contact between Kemalists and the Soviet Union came in Moscow in the summer of 1920. Before leaving Turkey, Mustafa Kemal instructed the Turkish delegation, then led by Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey, to inform Soviet leaders that “Turkey is ready to unite its destiny with the destiny of the Soviet Union.”⁵⁷⁶ In Moscow, the Turkish delegation met with Lenin and Georgy Chicherin, then the Soviet foreign minister. The negotiations were deadlocked when the Soviets insisted on returning the districts of Muş, Van and Bitlis to Armenia. Although Mustafa Kemal told Bekir Sami Bey that Kemalists could not even consider the Soviet demands as an issue in the negotiations, he advocated for continuing to normalize relations between the two countries, as the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks signed the first treaty at Moscow in March 1921. Earlier, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to Lenin in January 1921, identifying “the destruction of the western imperialism” as “the common objective” of both nations.⁵⁷⁷

Correspondingly, the introductory portion of the Treaty of Moscow indicated that Turkey and the

⁵⁷⁴ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 347.

⁵⁷⁵ George F. Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1960), 51-52.

⁵⁷⁶ Salahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika* Volume 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), 50.

⁵⁷⁷ Salahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika* Volume 2, 50.

Soviet Union shared “the principles of liberty of nations and the right of each nation to determine its own fate.” Furthermore, both nations emphasized their “common struggle undertaken against imperialism.”⁵⁷⁸ In the first clause of the treaty, the Soviet Union recognized the territories defined by the National Pact as Turkey. According to the fifth clause, the status of the Straits would be determined by “a conference composed of delegates of the littoral States” of the Black Sea, provided that the decisions of the conference would not diminish the full sovereignty of Turkey or the security of Istanbul. In the eighth clause, the countries announced they would not tolerate, within their territories, organizations and associations, “whose aim is to wage war against the other State.”

During the Lausanne Conference, contrary to the terms of the Moscow treaty, Turkey was forced by the European powers to discuss the status of the Straits with non-Black Sea states, including Britain, France, and Japan. Moreover, although the Soviet Union supported Turkey’s full sovereignty over the Straits, the Turkish delegation, pressured specifically by British resistance, compromised on this issue and accepted the jurisdiction of the international commission over the Straits. Nevertheless, cordial relations between the two countries, tinged by a shared animosity toward the Western powers, continued after the Lausanne Conference. On another thorny issue, namely the status of the Mosul district, the Soviet Union supported Turkish claims against Britain. Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin stated in 1924, “[I]t is absolutely clear that Turkey will not abandon an important part of its people because the English capitalists and

⁵⁷⁸ “D’accord sur les principes de la fraternité des nations et sur les droits des peuples à disposer librement de leur sort, constatant leur solidarité dans leur lute contre l’impérialisme, ainsi que le fait que toute difficulté survenue a l’un des deux peuples aggraverait la situation de l’autre, et étant entièrement animés du désir de voir régner toujours entre eux des rapports cordiaux et des relations de sincère amitié continue, bases sur les intérêts réciproques des deux pays, ont décidé de conclure un traite d’amitié et de fraternité et ont a cet effet nomme pour leurs Plénipotentiaires.” The full text of the Moscow Treaty in Turkish and French can be reached at <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/>.

other capitalists want to take petrol from the Mosul.”⁵⁷⁹ Just one day after the League of Nations decided to award the Mosul district to the British Mandate of Iraq by refusing Ankara’s claims, Turkey signed a treaty of friendship and neutrality in December 1925 with the Soviet Union in Paris. The Turco-Soviet treaty aimed not only to counterbalance Britain but also to deter Mussolini’s expansionist policies over Anatolia. During the Mosul crisis, Italy was waiting for the Kemalist regime to disintegrate as a result of an armed conflict between Britain and Turkey, occurring simultaneously with an insurgent uprising in the Kurdish populated areas of Eastern Anatolia.⁵⁸⁰ As reported in *The Times*, the British position was greatly strengthened by Mussolini’s speeches which focused “on the necessity for the Italian people of expansion overseas combined with the recovery Greece to discourage even the most Chauvinist Turkish politicians from regarding the moment as propitious for an aggressive adventure.”⁵⁸¹ Italian military intelligence opened new centers in Cairo, Rhodes and Piraeus to survey the Anatolian coast for a possible military operation in the summer of 1926.⁵⁸² Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras met with his counterpart Chicherin at Odessa in November 1926 and sought to obtain Soviet support against the growing Italian threat.⁵⁸³ As Dilek Barlas observed, “the handling of the Mosul issue by the Great Powers convinced the Turkish political elite that these powers could, at any time, form a coalition against Turkey.”⁵⁸⁴ Plans to partition Anatolia as laid out by

⁵⁷⁹ Harish Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan* (Geneva: Michael Joseph Limited, 1966), 137.

⁵⁸⁰ Dilek Barlas, “Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-1936,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (2004): 232-233; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Türk Diplomasisi: 1920-1955,” *Yeni Türkiye* (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi, 1959), 76.

⁵⁸¹ “The Mosul Agreement,” *The Times*, June 7, 1926, 15.

⁵⁸² John Gooch, *Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy 1922-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 64-65.

⁵⁸³ Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiyenin Dış Politikası* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973), 73.

⁵⁸⁴ Dilek Barlas, “Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-1936,” 237.

the same European powers during the First World War still remained vivid in the Kemalist elite's memory.

In March 1928, for the first time after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey participated in an international disarmament conference with Soviet support. Litvinov, the Soviet representative, emphasized the significance of Turkey's participation, because of the "Republic of Turkey's important role in world politics and its geographic location."⁵⁸⁵ In April 1932, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras visited Moscow, just a couple of months before Turkey joined the League of Nations, of which the Soviet Union was not a member at the time. Aras conditioned Turkey's entry into the League as a concerted effort of support with the Soviet leaders.⁵⁸⁶ Ankara notified Moscow that if the League of Nations decided to take hostile action against the Soviet Union, Turkey would not consider itself bound by Article 16 obligations of the Covenant requiring the cooperation of League members against aggressor states.⁵⁸⁷

From the establishment of the Republic in 1923 to Turkey's entry into the League of Nations in 1932, the Turkish ruling elite's priority was to consolidate the Kemalist regime with social and political revolutions. At the same time they sought to suppress large-scale revolts in Eastern Anatolia and to purge strong political and military leaders such as Rıza Nur, Kazım Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, who did not support radical revolutionary programs. During these turbulent years in addition to political and social problems, Kemalist elites had to confront deteriorating economic conditions resulting from the Great Depression that began in 1929. Hence, during the first decade of the Republic, ruling elites concentrated on domestic political

⁵⁸⁵ Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiyenin Dış Politikası*, 74-75.

⁵⁸⁶ Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Görüşlerim* (Istanbul: Tan Basımevi, 1945), 130.

⁵⁸⁷ Gönlübol and Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiyenin Dış Politikası*, 94-95; Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey* (New York: Brill, 1998), 127.

circumstances and challenges, and pursued an isolationist foreign policy. An important feature of Turkey's foreign policy during Mustafa Kemal's presidency was Tevfik Rüştü Aras' thirteen-year tenure at the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aras, who still holds the record as Turkey's longest serving foreign minister, was a principal architect of the Kemalist foreign policy of non-alignment. Aras left his post November 11, 1938, just one day after Mustafa Kemal's death, and one of two ministers left out of the new government, which was established immediately after İnönü had been elected Turkey's second president. İnönü sent Aras to London as ambassador in 1939, and, after the World War II, Aras became one of İnönü's most significant opponents, accusing him of abandoning Mustafa Kemal's nonaligned foreign policy.

During the first decade of the Republic, relations with the Soviet Union comprised the cornerstone of Turkey's foreign policy and remained as such throughout the 1930s. However, given the hostility of the European powers toward Turkey and the Soviet Union, the cordial tone of their relations arose from pragmatic concerns and self-interests rather than ideological affinities. Although both Kemalists and Bolsheviks established their respective regimes as a result of anti-imperialist struggles, both differed significantly in terms of social and economic policies. Mustafa Kemal never considered communism as a suitable ideology for Turkey, remaining meticulously vigilant about not turning his country into a Soviet satellite. In a parliament address on January 3, 1921, Mustafa Kemal emphasized that communism did not determine nor define Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union: "In our relations with Russians, communist principles, which are against capitalism, were not even mentioned. To establish relations, nobody told us that 'you should be communist' or 'you have to become communist.' We never said that 'in order to be your friend we decided to become communist.'"⁵⁸⁸ While the

⁵⁸⁸ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 170.

Kemalist regime openly rejected communism and outlawed the communist party, the Soviets continued supporting them militarily, politically and economically. In the years following the worldwide economic collapse in 1929, the Soviet Union was alone in extending eight million dollars of interest-free credit annually to Turkey for twenty years.⁵⁸⁹ A clear example of Turkey's balanced attitude toward the Soviet Union was Mustafa Kemal's decision granting political asylum to Leon Trotsky, Stalin's political enemy, from 1929 to 1933.⁵⁹⁰ The editorial comment published by *The Times* just after Turkey became a member of the League of Nations summarized succinctly Turkey's foreign policy between 1923 and 1932:

For some time after the foundation of the League Turkey remained aloof, apparently one of the countries least likely to associate with its activities. The first impulse of the new State created by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha seemed to be to break away from Europe and European institutions, and the country with which it cultivated the closest relations was Soviet Russia. The Ghazi soon made it plain, however, that Turkey intended to establish a form of government copied from no other country, but suited to the characteristics of Turkish race and to the demands of modern life. Gradually the national movement was seen to be by no means anti-European, but rather an adaptation of European methods, an extension, as it were, of Europe into Anatolia.⁵⁹¹

The tenth-anniversary celebrations of the Republic in 1933 symbolized the consolidation of the Kemalist regime in Turkey. The striking characteristic of these celebrations showed how the ruling elites preferred to portray material achievements – such as the construction of railways, factories, and bridges – as the major achievements of the young Republic.⁵⁹² On October 29, 1933, the semi-official newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* devoted its entire front page

⁵⁸⁹ Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey*, 127.

⁵⁹⁰ Feroz Ahmad, "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy," 16-17. The mutual respect between the two countries was very well depicted in the article published by New York Times during the tenth-anniversary celebrations of the Republic on October 29, 1933: "Soviet Russia is undoubtedly republican Turkey's greatest friend. The Russians helped the Turks when the latter were fighting the Greeks, and this has not been forgotten. M. Surritch, the Russian Ambassador at Angora, occupies a privileged position. Several treaties have been concluded between Angora and Moscow, and the political understanding is so close that no other great power is able to disturb it. On the other hand, the Russians realize that the Kemalists will not tolerate any Communist propaganda among the Turks." Walter Collins, "Kemal's Turkey is Ten Years Old," *New York Times*, October 29, 1933.

⁵⁹¹ "Turkey in the League of Nations," *The Times*, July 19, 1932, 15.

⁵⁹² Halil Nalçaoğlu, "Turkey: Nation and Celebration: An Iconology of the Republic of Turkey," in *National Days/National Ways*, ed. Linda K. Fuller (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 269.

to illustrations depicting these material achievements of the regime. The celebration committee organized a ceremony about bringing small amounts of soil collected from the central squares within every district of the country and presenting them to Mustafa Kemal as a precious gift, signifying the unity of the Turkish homeland. During the celebrations, Mümtaz Bey, a member of the RPP's Ankara council, spoke about, "Turkey's unity, indivisibility, and collectivity in the path toward Ghazi's ideal . . . We give this soil as the heart of the whole nation. And we want to declare to the whole world that our homeland is indivisible."⁵⁹³

With the regime's entrenchment bolstered by material and ideational achievements in the first ten years, the Kemalist elite's main concern in foreign policy shifted from sustaining Turkey's survival to becoming a regional power and establishing coalitions in the Balkans and the Middle East with the larger aim of resisting territorial ambitions of revisionist powers. And, similarly to the foreign policy making approaches of most European nations in the 1930s, Turkey's authoritarian regime did not tolerate any opposition or divergent opinion challenging the state's exclusive authority in determining its external orientation. Prime Minister İnönü, Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak, and Foreign Minister Aras worked closely with Mustafa Kemal in monopolizing Turkey's foreign policy discourse, based upon principles of inviolable independence, territorial integrity, absolute priority of national interests and mutual respect among nations.⁵⁹⁴ These central foreign policy architects succeeded in restoring Turkey's sovereignty over the Straits with the completion of the Montreux Convention in 1936 and in annexing the Alexandretta district to Turkey in 1939.

⁵⁹³ Quoted in Esra Özyürekli, *Nostalgia for the Modern* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 131.

⁵⁹⁴ Türkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965), 1.

After 1933, the Turkish political elite's perception of Italy as threatening Turkey's territorial integrity shaped the direction of foreign policy. Mussolini's announcement of the Four Power Pact in March 1933 convinced Turkish leaders about the formation of a great powers bloc to harmonize their competing interests at the expense of other European states. Mussolini, holding a hostile attitude toward the League of Nations, envisioned a new Concert of Europe between Britain, France, Germany and Italy to divide Europe into respective spheres of influence. To counterbalance a possible alliance in the Balkans between Italy and Bulgaria that advocated revising treaties signed after the First World War and for modifying boundaries, Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece signed in February 1934 the Balkan Entente to guarantee mutually the inviolability of the existing boundaries and to consult with one another in the face of any act of aggression. The coalition of Balkan states was a stunning success of Turkish diplomacy considering that the same Balkan countries had united just two decades before to carve the Ottoman territories in Europe. As Turkey had demonstrated its commitment to a nonaligned foreign policy since 1923, the Balkan states were convinced that Ankara would not act with any of the European great powers to resurrect old imperial ambitions.

Just a month after the conclusion of the Balkan Entente, Mussolini's announcement of Italy's "historical objectives" further deteriorated Turkish-Italian relations:

The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and Africa. South and East are the cardinal points that should excite the interest and the will of Italians. There is little or nothing to do towards the North and the same towards the West, neither in Europe nor beyond the Ocean. These two objectives of ours are justified by geography and history. Of all the large Western Powers of Europe, Italy is the nearest to Africa and Asia. A few hours by sea and much less [time] by air are enough to link up Italy with Africa and with Asia.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹⁵ Quoted in Henderson B. Braddick, "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics," in *European Diplomacy Between Two Wars 1919-1939*, ed. Hans Wilhelm Gatzke (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972), 153.

Turkey's suspicions about Italy's ambitions were justified by Mussolini's speech in the eyes of Kemalist elite, as it was obvious that with "Asia" he hinted Anatolia, particularly the Antalya district, occupied by Italy after the First World War. With the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935, the British and French policy of appeasement toward Mussolini alarmed Turkish diplomats about the validity of the collective security regime as documented in the League of Nations articles. In the spring of 1936, Ankara decided to act more decisively in the Mediterranean, informing the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty in writing that the existing demilitarized regime of the Straits did not guarantee Turkey's security. Ankara was "ready to undertake negotiations which would lead, in a short time, to the conclusion of new agreements for regulating the status of the Straits, with conditions of security necessary for maintaining the inviolable and indivisible character of Turkish territory."⁵⁹⁶ During negotiations in Montreux, Turkey's draft convention had been used as the basis for discussion with Turkey insisting on the unconditional militarization of the Straits and abolition of the International Straits Commission as well as freedom of passage and navigation for merchant vessels. Turkey also proposed limitations on the passage of warships, suggesting a maximum allowable tonnage for warships in the Straits of the non-Black Sea of 14,000 tons and for riparian states at 25,000 tons. The Soviet Union supported Turkish claims on militarization and reestablishment of Turkish sovereignty by abolishing the International Committee. However, it insisted on the unrestricted passage of warships carrying the flags of Black Sea states. Although, Britain was the principal in imposing the internationalization and demilitarization of the Straits in Lausanne, it was careful about not rejecting the Turkish claims because it believed that a hostile Turkey with the support of the Soviet Union would harm British interests in the Mediterranean. The Montreux Convention, signed on July 20, 1936, restored Turkish sovereignty over the Straits and allowed Turkey to

⁵⁹⁶ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), 63-68.

militarize the region. The Soviets also reached their goals by restricting the passage of warships of non-Black Sea states through the Straits. Although the Convention could have been regarded as a retreat for Britain, gaining Turkey's friendship and preventing an alliance between the Soviet Union and Turkey played an important role in Britain's conciliatory approach.⁵⁹⁷

Another successful example of Turkey's diplomacy during this period was the annexation of the Alexandretta district. Turkey exerted diplomatic pressure upon France by using the deteriorating political situation in the eastern Mediterranean because of Mussolini's aspirations. On the eve of the World War II, obtaining Turkey's support against Italy and Germany was much more important for France than continuing its mandatory obligations in Syria. Consequently, it accepted the cessation of the Alexandretta district from Syria.⁵⁹⁸ The Montreux Convention and the annexation of Alexandretta showed Turkish leadership did not prefer to solve foreign policy problems through unilateral actions as was the case for Germany's militarization of the Rhineland or for the annexation of Sudetenland. Turkey was the first state to employ peaceful and legal methods to revise the post-war treaty, namely the Lausanne Treaty, concerning the Straits issue.⁵⁹⁹

With these diplomatic successes, Turkey, as a nonaligned country, could play an important role in world politics and protect its national interests. Turkey accomplished almost all of its objectives in Montreux without going into an alliance with a Great Power. Defending Turkey's interests in the international arena by taking a nonaligned position defined Turkey's

⁵⁹⁷ New York Times defined the signing of the Montreux Convention accordingly: "In profit and loss of power it brings distinct gain for Turkey, Russia and the League and a loss for Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Japan, France and the United States. The League's gain is most unexpected; Russia's gain is the most complete; Turkey's gain is the most immediately important." Clarence K. Streit, "New Straits Agreement Lifts League Prestige," *New York Times*, July 19, 1936, 5.

⁵⁹⁸ Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish Syrian Relations (1939-1956)," *Middle East Journal* 10, no. 4 (Autumn 1956): 380-381.

⁵⁹⁹ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*, 3.

foreign policy during Mustafa Kemal's presidency but it would be abandoned immediately after his death in 1938. A conversation between Mustafa Kemal and Sir Percy Loraine, then the newly appointed British ambassador to Ankara, on June 17, 1934 revealed how Mustafa Kemal considered Turco-Soviet relations and rapprochement with Britain mutually exclusive issues. Mustafa Kemal left no ambiguities in articulating Turkey's serious intentions not to let Britain or any other European state interfere with its foreign policy:

The Gazi [Mustafa Kemal] said he had the greatest esteem for England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why could we not come closer together? Did England attach no value to Turkey or her friendship? . . . I [Loraine] myself saw no reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends; we had certain interests in common, there were no questions of any gravity dividing us, and our relations were already good. I must, however, say one thing in this connection, and I wished His Excellency to hear me out. Turkey's most immediate friend today was Russia, whereas our relations with Russia, if correct, were certainly not close. . . . The Gazi then held up his hand to check me and said, "Ah! if that is so, then very well." I sensed that this was the crucial point in the conversation, and his meaning seemed obviously to be that if we thought Turco-Russian intimacy a bar to Anglo-Turkish friendship, it was no use pursuing the latter question any further.⁶⁰⁰

Although Kemalists highly valued Soviet friendship, they were judicious about sustaining relations within the context of two equal sovereign states. During the negotiations in Montreux, Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov privately proposed to Foreign Minister Aras the joint defense of the Straits. Aras rejected Litvinov's offer since joint defense of a portion of Turkey with a Great Power would have contradicted Kemalist principles of full sovereignty and independence.⁶⁰¹ Between 1923 and 1939, the Turkish political leadership scrupulously avoided entering into alliances with Great Powers. Although Turkey maintained cordial relations with the

⁶⁰⁰ This conversation was sent by Loraine with a telegram to the British Foreign Office. The full text of the telegram was published by Ludmila Zhivkova. See Ludmila Zhivkova, *Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1939* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976), 119-120.

⁶⁰¹ At the closing session of the conference, Litvinov stressed the friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union since 1923 "is not merely a temporary combination." According to Litvinov, the outcome of the Montreux Conference was the "first crushing blow for those who are seeking the supremacy of brute force." "New Convention of the Straits," *The Times*, July, 21, 1936, 15.

Soviet Union, Ankara refused to sign an alliance treaty with the Soviets in the second half of the 1930s despite Moscow's willingness to proceed. Instead of following a Great Power in international politics, Kemalists prioritized collective security and collaboration with Turkey's neighbors. So they initiated regional pacts such as the Balkan Entente and Sadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Mustafa Kemal even questioned the necessity of the regional pacts, suspicious about any potential political and diplomatic damage to Turkey's nonaligned foreign policy. Hasan Rıza Soyak, Mustafa Kemal's general secretary after 1934, wrote in his memoirs about how Mustafa Kemal wrestled with his conscience after the completion of the Balkan Entente. Mustafa Kemal told Soyak he was restless during the night worrying about changes in Turkey's foreign policy: "As you know, until today we have been busy with our own internal and external problems and have pursued an independent diplomacy. But now we are entering into the [arena of] international politics and we have new responsibilities. I have been pondering what will be the possible outcomes for us and therefore I could not sleep."⁶⁰²

The consensus among Turkey's top-level statesmen ended in 1937 as İnönü and Mustafa Kemal disagreed publicly over Turkey's foreign policy orientation. In 1937, the Turkish delegation under the leadership of Foreign Minister Aras participated in the Nyon Conference with other European countries to discuss responses to the increasingly frequent attacks by Italian submarines. Mustafa Kemal instructed the Turkish delegation to allow French and British forces to use Turkish ports. Although Prime Minister İnönü resisted cooperating with Britain and France against Italy, because he believed that such a policy would bring Italy and Turkey to the brink of war, the Turkish delegation followed Mustafa Kemal's instructions and the Turkish

⁶⁰² Quoted in Aptülahat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*, 272.

parliament approved the Nyon Treaty on September 18, 1937. Both leaders also disagreed on the diplomatic approach with France concerning the Alexandretta district. While Mustafa Kemal advocated for an unconditional position against France and did not rule out military intervention if necessary, İnönü preferred a more conciliatory approach to sustain French-Turkish relations. At the end of September 1937, Mustafa Kemal asked for İnönü's resignation as prime minister and appointed Celal Bayar to the post the following month.

In 1938, with Mustafa Kemal's health deteriorating, leading members of the Kemalist elite devised plans for a presidential succession that would keep İnönü's still-dominant political influence in check. In the cabinet, Prime Minister Bayar, Foreign Minister Aras and the Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya were seen as legitimate candidates to succeed Mustafa Kemal as was Fevzi Çakmak, the chief of general staff. Although Çakmak was not a politician, he was the only marshal after Mustafa Kemal and, as head of the Turkish army since 1924; he held the potential to change the political balance against the mighty İnönü.⁶⁰³

Bayar and Çakmak were not eager about opposing İnönü, who had been prime minister for twelve years and had maintained total control over parliament, key bureaucrats and party members. Aras and Kaya, the two leading members of the anti-İnönü camp, sought to remove İnönü from the political scene by exiling him to the United States. In his memoirs İnönü wrote that Aras offered to appoint him as Turkey's ambassador to the United States at a 1938 meeting.⁶⁰⁴ Aras also stated in an article, published by the daily *Milliyet* less than year before his death, that he planned to send İnönü to the United States in order to "calm down both Atatürk

⁶⁰³ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945* Vol. 1 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1996). 127-137.

⁶⁰⁴ İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), 298-299.

and İnönü.”⁶⁰⁵ İnönü fiercely rejected Aras’s plans: “I raised hell. I yelled at him that if he attempted to do such a thing, I would bring the world down upon his head.”⁶⁰⁶ On November 10, 1938, Mustafa Kemal died, and a day later, İnönü was elected as the second president of the Republic, garnering 348 out of a possible 387 votes. The remaining thirty-nine votes were abstentions, the silent parliamentary protest guided by Aras and Kaya. Shortly thereafter, Bayar announced the new cabinet without Aras and Kaya, both of whom had served the government for more than a decade. In less than thirty-six hours after Mustafa Kemal’s death, İnönü had carried out a carefully orchestrated plan to win the presidency and eliminate his two strongest opponents with stunning clockwork efficiency. Ironically, Aras, who had sought to send İnönü to the United States as ambassador, lost his seat in the cabinet and was appointed by İnönü as the ambassador to London in January 1939. In the same month, Prime Minister Bayar resigned and Refik Saydam became the fourth prime minister of the Republic.

With İnönü’s ascendancy to power, “the political atmosphere became more illiberal.”⁶⁰⁷ As Selim Deringil observed, “[T]he system was as hierarchical as it was authoritarian; the authoritarian principle permeating all levels of the İnönü government. İnönü himself, as the authoritarian head of an authoritarian government, was at the pinnacle of power and the focal point of all this centralization.”⁶⁰⁸ After Mustafa Kemal’s death, İnönü removed all other strong statesmen from the political scene and ensured there was no power vacuum. Unlike Mustafa Kemal, who also was authoritarian but kept many associates and advisers in his circle, İnönü refused to allow anyone to come close to him. As Frederick Frey rightly argued, “İnönü had no

⁶⁰⁵ Tevfik Rüştü Aras, “Neler Olacaktı,” *Milliyet*, March 14, 1971.

⁶⁰⁶ “İnönü’nün Hatıra Defterinden Sayfalar,” *Hürriyet*, January, 19, 1974.

⁶⁰⁷ Clement Henry Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), 23.

⁶⁰⁸ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the World War II: An ‘Active’ Neutrality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 41.

İnönü.”⁶⁰⁹ During the World War II, an already authoritarian regime morphed into a dictatorial one under İnönü’s leadership. The style, tone, and content of Turkey’s politics, along with its foreign policy, changed significantly with İnönü’s presidency. Despite İnönü’s dictatorial tendencies, the opposition front was intact even if it was in a silent mode of dormancy during the war. Contrary to the official history, which characterized İnönü’s succession to Mustafa Kemal as a smooth political transition, İnönü rose to the presidency as a result of a power struggle against Aras, Kaya, and some other members of the Kemalist elite. The silenced opposition resurfaced immediately after the end of the World War II and resumed its vocal challenge to İnönü’s leadership.

Turkey’s Foreign Policy Discourse During the Cold War:

Protecting *Vatan* from the Enemies

The declaration of a mutual assistance pact between Turkey and Britain on May 12, 1939 was a turning point in Turkey’s foreign policy. Prime Minister Saydam told the parliament that Turkey’s neutrality, the most important characteristic of its foreign policy since 1923, had ended with the signing of the declaration:

You know that political events have lately occurred with lightning speed and have seriously occupied the attention of those burdened with the responsibilities of Government. At first, this Government decided that Turkey’s best course was to remain neutral, but when events involved the Balkan Peninsula and raised the question of security in the eastern Mediterranean we were faced with a situation pregnant with danger making it impossible for us to remain neutral. It is our conviction that the Mediterranean should be free to all nations on an equal footing, and that any attempt to interfere with that freedom would endanger Turkish security. Believing that this danger now exists, we have made up our minds to cooperate, and, if necessary, to fight with those equally anxious to preserve peace.⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁹ Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965), 35.

⁶¹⁰ *Ulus*, May 13, 1939.

Five months after the Anglo-Turkish declaration, Britain, France, and Turkey concluded a Tripartite Treaty indicating that if Turkey was attacked by a European power, Britain and France would provide mutual assistance to the nation. On the other hand, if France and Britain entered into a war as a result of events in the Mediterranean region or as a result of their guarantees to Greece and Romania, Turkey would assist them. However, Turkey could remain neutral, if Britain and France entered into a war because of events outside of the Mediterranean region. The Anglo-Turkish Declaration and the Tripartite Treaty were devised as a hedge against Italian aggression in the Mediterranean and the Turkish government considered the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939 as the first step of Mussolini's general offensive in the Balkans.

During this period of strained relations between Turkey and Italy, the Turkish press started to publish articles about the Italian aggression in southeast Europe.⁶¹¹ The booklet, "Do Not Touch This Lion," published in 1939 by Faruk Gürtunca, one of the first publishers of Turkish comic strips and children's magazines in the 1930s, had a notable influence on Turkish society.⁶¹² The booklet's unprecedented impact in the Republic arose from Gürtunca's use of maps and images to influence public opinion against Italy.⁶¹³ On the cover was a lion statue, a Turkish flag, and a map of Turkey carrying the tag, "do not touch this lion." (See Figure 3) On

⁶¹¹ For example, Zekeriya Sertel criticized Turkish broadcasts of Italian radio in March 1939. See Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the World War II: An 'Active' Neutrality*, 72.

⁶¹² M. Faruk Gürtunca, *Dokunmayın Bu Aslana* (Istanbul: Ülke Kitap Yurdu, 1939). Faruk Gürtunca was born in Edirne in 1904. He graduated from a teacher's school and worked in the *Yeni Asır* newspaper in Thessaloniki. He published the children's magazines *Çocuk Sesi* and *Afacan*. In 1947, he founded the nationalist newspaper *Hergün*, which later became one of the well-known newspapers of the Nationalist Action Party in the 1970s. Gürtunca was elected to parliament in 1957 from the Democrat Party and was arrested after the military coup in 1960. He died in 1982.

⁶¹³ Sixty years after the publication of "Do Not Touch This Lion," doyen journalist Hasan Pulur wrote in his column that in the primary school he read and still remember the poem "Do Not Touch This Lion," which was written by Gürtunca in July 1926. Similarly, the leading journalist of the far-right media Altemur Kılıç wrote in this column that he could not forget the cover of the booklet "Do Not Touch This Lion." See Hasan Pulur, "Türkiye'ye Aşk Mektubu Yazan İtalyan," *Milliyet*, March 25, 2002; Altemur Kılıç, "Dokunmayın Bu Aslana," *Yeniçağ*, February 2, 2008.

an inside page, a Turkish soldier standing on the map of Turkey faced the Dodecanese Islands, which then belonged to Italy. (See Figure 4) Gürtunca intended the book to reach as wide an audience as possible and kept the language simple and frequently coarse. Throughout the book, the conquest of Italy by Attila and the Huns and the Ottoman naval victory against the Christian Alliance in the Battle of Preveza in 1538 were illustrated extensively with iconic images with the purpose of fomenting nationalistic agitation against Italy and creating public support for the government's foreign policy. After the World War II, similar publications were extensively used to manipulate public opinion and suppress opposition in other landmark foreign policy issues such as the conflict with the Soviet Union after 1945, the Korean War, and the Cyprus conflict.

Figure 3: The Cover of the booklet “Do Not Touch This Lion” published in 1939 against the ‘Italian threat.’ The lion represented Turkey and the link between lion and Turkey was established through a map, which has the title of the booklet on it.




Figure 4: A Turkish soldier facing the Dodecanese islands, which belonged to Italy in 1939. “Do Not Touch This Lion” was one of the leading publications, which used a map to create an image of the ‘enemy’ in the public opinion.



At various times during the World War II, Turkey’s political leaders reiterated the nation’s position of “active neutrality” toward the Allies and the Axis powers. Turkey was the only ally of France and Britain to sign non-aggression and friendship agreements with Germany and the Soviet Union. Turkey’s friendly stance toward Germany until 1944 was criticized as immoral by British and American policy makers and media (See Figure 5). Against these

criticisms, Turkish politicians defended themselves, stressing the objective of active neutrality was to protect Turkey's territorial integrity. Unspoken, of course, was the strategy's effect in sustaining İnönü's political domination.

Figure 5: The cover of Time magazine published on July 12, 1943. Turkey's Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu was shown in front of a weather vane, with the national symbols of Britain, United States, the Soviet Union, and the Nazi Germany representing the four directions and the Turkish national symbol atop the vane . The caption read, "[I]n the lexicon of neutrality, the final word is war."



Representation of the Soviet Union as a Threat to *Vatan*

Most scholars, who analyzed Turkey's foreign policy after the end of the World War II, accepted uncritically the Cold War thesis that the Soviet Union was preparing for an offensive war against Turkey to acquire the Kars and Ardahan districts in 1945 and 1946. Therefore they claimed, the threat of 'Soviet expansionism' had a tremendous impact upon Turkish policymakers and compelled Ankara to join the Western Camp against Moscow in order to protect its territorial integrity.⁶¹⁴ The conventional assumption in these studies suggests Soviet "demands" and "threats" formed the organizing principle of Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War. William Hale explained that, just after the World War II, "Turkey's territorial integrity and its future as an independent state was gravely threatened by a resurgent Russia, and that Turkey urgently needed to find allies to fend it off."⁶¹⁵ Hale added Turkey's joining into the anti-Soviet Western alliance was unavoidable as "Turkey was forced into the Western camp in the Cold War because it was directly threatened by the Soviet Union."⁶¹⁶ Likewise, Kemal Karpat asserted that

it was the immensity of Soviet military power and her insatiable ambition for territorial and ideological expansion in 1946, which forced Turkey to seek full affiliation with the West almost at any price, and embark at the same time upon a policy of identification with the West in the economic, social, political and cultural fields. Probably at no time in history was the Westernization of Turkey so intensive and one sided as in the period after WWII, and this thanks to the pressure coming from the Soviet Union.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Eduard Mark, "The War Square of 1946 and Its Consequences," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 383-416; Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000): 103-139; Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma," *The International Spectator* 27, no. 1 (January-March 1992): 19; William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, 109-145; Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*; Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: 1920-1953* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991).

⁶¹⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 109.

⁶¹⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 110.

⁶¹⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, 2.

During talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper in June 1945, Molotov insisted on three conditions if Turkey wanted to renew the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression that would end after November 7, 1945. The Soviets proposed for a bilateral agreement to revise the Montreux Convention, establish Soviet military bases in the Straits for joint defense, and to cede the Kars and Ardahan districts in northeastern Anatolia to Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia, respectively. In August 1946, Soviet Union, without mentioning any territorial demands, proposed the joint defense of the Straits and a new Straits regime between Turkey and other Black Sea states. The Soviet proposals were seen as an existentialist threat against Turkey by President İnönü, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, and other leading statesmen as well as the media. To Turkey, the proposals, which were often described as demands in the press, verified fears that the Soviet Union hope to realize finally the imperial ambitions of the Russian Tsars in the Straits and Turkish territories. Much of the academic literature on this subject suggested that by articulating the “demands” about the Straits and the northeastern Anatolia in 1945 and 1946, the Soviet Union changed sentiments among Turkey’s leaders who were then forced to make alliances with the Western bloc.

Between the two world wars when relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey were friendly, Soviet leaders had put forward similar proposals about the Straits and eastern Anatolia. Before negotiations during the summer of 1920 in Moscow, Mustafa Kemal instructed the Turkish delegation to tell the Soviets that Turkey accepted rights of free passage for the Black Sea states. In addition, Mustafa Kemal indicated Turkey was ready to defend the Straits together with the Black Sea states.⁶¹⁸ During the talks, the Soviet Union proposed returning the districts

⁶¹⁸ Salahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika* Vol. 2, 9.

of Muş, Bitlis, and Van to Armenia.⁶¹⁹ Although Soviet proposals were rejected by Ankara, Turkey's leaders did not change their stance toward Moscow and continued their diplomatic initiatives to establish friendly relations with the Bolsheviks. During the negotiations at Montreux in 1936, Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov asked Aras, his Turkish counterpart, about defending the Straits jointly with the Soviet Union. Even though Aras told Litvinov Turkey was not interested in joint defense of the Straits and rejected Soviet offer, Ankara did not see the proposal as a threat to Turkey's sovereignty. While Turkish statesmen did not consider Soviet proposals about the Straits and the territorial concessions as threats to Turkey's territorial integrity during the interwar period, the position changed after the World War II when similar proposals were now seen as encroachments to Turkey's independence and sovereignty and the Soviet regime was publicly identified as Turkey's greatest enemy.

The author refuses to attach an ontological status to the 'Soviet danger' in Turkey's foreign policy, explaining instead that terms like 'danger,' 'security,' and 'threat' are not objective entities existing "independently of those to whom it may become a threat."⁶²⁰ Their meanings are contingent upon the contemporary dynamics of foreign policy discourses. The construction of dangers is central for the architects of foreign policy to control and discipline the political struggle and eliminate any oppositional groups. Therefore, Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War cannot be understood comprehensively by considering the prior existence of a 'Soviet danger' to the territorial integrity of Turkey as suggested by Hale, Karpat and other scholars.

⁶¹⁹ Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları (21/11/1920 – 2/6/1922)* (Istanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955), 70-71; Stanford J. Shaw, *The Turkish War of National Liberation* Vol. 3, 1468, 1479.

⁶²⁰ David Campbell, *Writing Security*, 1.

After the World War II, Molotov articulated territorial concessions privately with the Turkish ambassador Sarper, adding this was a precondition if Turkey wanted to renew the friendship and non-aggression treaty. This issue was raised by Molotov during the Potsdam Conference:

The Turkish government showed initiative and suggested the Soviet government should conclude an allied treaty. The Turkish government put this question first before our Ambassador in Ankara, and then, later in May, through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow. In early June I had two meetings with Sarper in Moscow. Asked by the Turkish government about an allied treaty, we responded that the Soviet government does not object to concluding such a treaty on certain conditions. I gave instructions that when concluding an allied treaty we should settle mutual claims. We have two questions to be settled. Conclusion of the allied treaty means that we should jointly protect our borders: the USSR not only its own but Turkish ones as well; Turkey not only its own but Soviet ones as well. However, in some parts, we consider a border between the USSR and Turkey to be unfair. Indeed, in 1921, a territory was annexed from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia. This includes areas of Kars, Artvin and Ardahan.⁶²¹

The second issue was the revision of the Montreux Convention. Molotov said that according to the Montreux Convention “the rights of the Soviet Union are similar to those of the Japanese Emperor:”

The Turkish government was said that if it was ready to settle basic disputed issues, we are ready to conclude an allied treaty after their resolution. In saying so, we expressed our willingness to settle the issues put forward by Turkey. We added that if the Turkish government considers it inadmissible to resolve both issues, we were ready to conclude an agreement on the Straits only.⁶²²

Although Molotov explicitly stated to his British and American counterparts in Potsdam and to the Turkish ambassador Sarper two months before the conference that territorial changes were a precondition for an alliance between Turkey and the Soviet Union, Turkish politicians and media exaggerated the situation as if Soviets were preparing to annex these districts, if necessary by deploying military force. Turkish politicians and journalists identified the Soviet

⁶²¹ Jamil Hasanlı, *USSR-Turkey: From Neutrality to Cold War (1939-1953)* (Unpublished manuscript), 180.

⁶²² *Ibid.*, 180-181.

Union and, therefore, communism as the greatest dangers to Turkish *vatan*. Soviet proposals were not only used as a foreign policy means to justify Turkey's entry into the Western camp against the Soviet Union but also as a rational excuse to silence the opposition. During the crucial period between 1945 and 1950, when political parties had risen against the RPP and its leader İnönü, the Republicans categorized all left-wing groups as well as those criticizing the government in any way or form as being tied directly or indirectly to communism and the Soviet Union. By doing so, they established strict control over the opposition and outlawed any political group challenging the government, depicting them as enemies of the Turkish nation and as traitors to *vatan*. What David Campbell said about the politics of the United States after the World War II was valid for Turkey as well: "Danger was being totalized in the external realm in conjunction with its increased individualization in the internal field, with the result being the performative reconstitution of the borders of the state identity. In this sense, the cold war needs to be understood as a disciplinary strategy that was global in scope but [also] national in design."⁶²³

Even long before the Soviet proposals were announced in 1945, the deteriorating relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union caught the media's attention in Turkey, the United States, and other nations. On February 28, 1943, *The New York Times* published an article carrying the headline, "Russia's Ambitions are Secrets of Kremlin."⁶²⁴ At the end of the world war, the Soviet Union "will insist on control of Europe as far as the Adriatic, ownership of the Hellespont and the Dardanelles or all of Scandinavia or of all Iran, and possibly Afghanistan." In the Middle East, the article continued, "[T]here is some possibility that the Turco-Russian parleys now taking place may involve Soviet demands on former Russian regions surrounding

⁶²³ David Campbell, *Writing Security*, 153.

⁶²⁴ C. L. Sulzberger, "Russia's Ambitions are Secrets of Kremlin," *New York Times*, February 28, 1943, E3.

Kars and Ardahan.”⁶²⁵ On July 12, 1943, *Time* magazine published a cover article with the title “Choice.”⁶²⁶ The article praised Turkey’s neutral policy as directed by Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu since the beginning of the world war. However, the *Time* correspondent added Turkey had to enter the war with the Allies in order to have “a strong voice at the peace table.” The correspondent explained Şükrü Saraçoğlu “would easily find a place for himself in the rough-and-tumble political arena of the US. He likes America, Americans and things American – automobiles, cigarets, architecture, movies, industry, government.” In the last section of the article, Turkish politicians were warned about the Soviet danger that would threaten Turkey after the war:

Probably the most powerful trump card Allies can play is the prospect of furnishing postwar influence for Turkey against Soviet Russia. Despite the ‘series of most advanced treaties’ which Saraçoğlu announced as having consolidated the Turkish rapprochement with Russia, Russian postwar aims remain Turkey’s greatest fear. Control of the Dardanelles, Russia’s only outlet to the southern waterways, has been a sore point between the two nations for decades; Turkey’s control of it today hinges on the Montreux Convention of 1936. The Government’s fear of Communism is another stimulant to Turkish suspicion.⁶²⁷

Although the American press asserted as early as 1943 the Soviet Union would be a crucial threat for Turkey’s security in the post-war era, Aras, Turkey’s former foreign minister who resigned in 1942 from the ambassador’s post in London and had returned to Turkey, supported Soviet policies in Eastern Europe in an interview published by *The New York Times* on December 25, 1943.⁶²⁸ Aras emphasized that the Soviets carried the burden of the war alone in the last two years in Europe against Germany and, therefore, they had the right to support friendly governments along their boundaries:

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ “Choice,” *Time*, July 12, 1943.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Joseph M. Levy, “Turks Sees Russia Reducing Poland,” *New York Times*, December 25, 1943, 20.

It was Russia before the war, incessantly advocated collective security, but to no avail. The Russians are aware that hostile neighbors and an inimical world hoped that Germany would destroy the despised Soviet regime, but fate willed differently. Today the hitherto loathsome Russians are cheered as great heroes who helped to save Britain, and the Red Army is still fighting with fervor to drive out the invaders, thus helping to free the European Continent from the German yoke.⁶²⁹

In the summer of 1943, an unprecedented political dispute erupted in Turkey between left wing and ultra-nationalist groups which had published journals and pamphlets vehemently accusing each other of being puppets of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Since the start of the World War II the activities of pan-Turkist groups had increased dramatically in Turkey as they publicly endorsed Turkey's entry into the war on the side of Germany against the Soviet Union "in order to fulfill their irredentists' visions."⁶³⁰ Émigrés from Crimea, Tataristan, and Azerbaijan, such as Zeki Velidi Togan, Mehmet Emin Resulzade, and Ahmet Caferoğlu, actively disseminated their anti-Soviet and pan-Turkist views through publications. They supported the formation of fighting units in the Nazi army among the Turkic prisoners of war in German camps. There also were high-ranking military officials in the Turkish army – such as General Ali Fuad Erden, General Cemil Toydemir, retired General Hüseyin Hüsnü Erkilet and Nuri Pasha, the stepbrother of Enver Pasha – who supported pan-Turkism and Nazi Germany. After Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Erden and Erkilet visited Berlin and the eastern front in October of that year. They met Hitler and other high-ranking German officials and discussed Turkey's participation in the war against the Soviet Union, and after returning to Ankara, Erden reported to İnönü, Çakmak, and Saraçoğlu in a meeting lasting six hours.⁶³¹

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 115.

⁶³¹ Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1997), 213; Uğur Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990), 41.

The counterpoint to pan-Turkists sentiments came in “The Greatest Danger,” a pamphlet published by Faris Erkman in May 1943.⁶³² Erkman accused pan-Turkists of racism, condemning their irredentist policies and explaining when the Soviet armies were retreating against Nazi Germany in the Eastern Front, pan-Turkists started to dream about ministerial posts in the pro-Nazi governments that would have been established in Azerbaijan and Crimea by Germany. He rejected the pan-Turkist vision of a Turkish Empire which ran against Kemalist foreign policy principles: “Anti-imperialist Turkey, which waged a national liberation war against foreign domination to free itself from the semi-colonial status during the War of Independence and Republican Revolution, does not have any expansionist objective.”⁶³³ The pamphlet had a significant impact on Turkish politics. Leading pan-Turkists – including Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, and Orhan Seyfi Orhon – responded with their own publications, defending pan-Turkism and depicting communism as “the greatest danger.”⁶³⁴ Erkman’s pamphlet caught the attention of parliament with Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu openly rejecting pan-Turkism on the parliamentary floor: “We could only wish happiness and well-being for Turks, who are outside of our borders. Our policy and our Turkism are limited with the Turks living within the borders of this *vatan*.”⁶³⁵ In having the foreign minister and not the interior minister make the statement for the formal parliamentary record, the government made clear that pan-Turkism was significant not only as a domestic issue but, even more so, as a foreign policy one.⁶³⁶

⁶³² Faris Erkman, “En Büyük Tehlike,” in *Kırklı Yıllar* (Istanbul: TÜSTAV, 2002).

⁶³³ Ibid., 21.

⁶³⁴ Orhan Seyfi Orhon, *Maskeler Aşağı: En Büyük Tehlikenin İcyüzü* (Istanbul: Ülke Basımevi, 1943); Reha Oğuz Türkkan, *Solcular ve Kızıklar* (Istanbul: Stad Matbaası, 1943).

⁶³⁵ Nizam Önen, *İki Turan: Macaristan ve Türkiye’de Turancılık* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 318.

⁶³⁶ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945* Vol. 2, 216.

In March 1944, Radio Moscow broadcasted Nazi activities in Turkey and gave a list of Turkish people who supported Nazi Germany.⁶³⁷ İnönü, who had been impartial between left-wing and pan-Turkist groups until then, decided to suppress pan-Turkist activities in 1944 as the Allies' victory became increasingly evident in Europe. İnönü's speech on May 19, 1944 signaled that he had changed his stance toward pan-Turkists, accusing them of being in the service of foreigners and portraying them as detrimental to the Turkish youth: "Turanism is a harmful and sick demonstration of the latest times."⁶³⁸ Well-known pan-Turkists – including Nihal Atsız, Zeki Velidi Togan, Reha Oğuz Türkkan and several army officers such as Alparslan Türkeş – were arrested and pan-Turkist newspapers and journals, which supported the destruction of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and advocated the unity of all Turks, were closed. Eventually, in March 1945, pan-Turkists were sentenced from one to ten years in jail. However, as tension with the Soviet Union increased after the summer of 1945, the court revoked the sentences and all pan-Turkists were released from the jail. It is striking that just a month after İnönü's attack on pan-Turkists, the president forced Numan Menemencioğlu, who was considered pro-German but, in fact, was a key architect of Turkey's 'active neutrality' policy, to resign from his post as minister of foreign affairs. By doing so, İnönü vindicated himself in the eyes of Allies, scapegoating Menemencioğlu as the primary Turkish politician who advocated and coordinated plans to build friendly relations with Nazi Germany.

In the second half of 1944, criticisms against İnönü and particularly his stance on foreign policy increased in the Turkish press and parliament. Bayar, who had been silent since resigning as prime minister, criticized the government's economic policies in May 1944 during budgetary sessions in the parliament. Aras started to write critical articles in the Turkish newspapers, *Tan*

⁶³⁷ Ibid., 349.

⁶³⁸ Ibid., 225.

and *Vatan*, which opposed İnönü's authoritarian policies. In the article "Our Great Neighbor and Friend" published by *Vatan* on June 13, 1944, Aras wrote that Turkey and the Soviet Union should enter into an alliance.⁶³⁹ For Aras, a Soviet-Turkish alliance was a necessary element for establishing security in the Mediterranean. Two weeks later, Aras wrote another article with the title "I Am Going to Say Clearly," where he indicated that if there was a conflict between the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain after the end of the war, it would be very damaging for the whole of humanity.⁶⁴⁰ Aras stressed Turkey, already an ally of Britain, could play an important role in preventing future conflicts among the Allies if it entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union. In concluding, Aras asked: "To establish security in our region after the end of the war, is there a better and more stable way than Turkish-Russian friendship as it had been in the past?"⁶⁴¹ Aras's articles, in stressing the significance of the alliance between Turkey and the Soviet Union, had widespread repercussions in Turkish and foreign papers.⁶⁴² Ahmet Emin Yalman and other columnists debated about how such an alliance would be possible, if there was a disagreement between Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union over the future of Europe. As early as 1944, Aras stated that in a conflict between Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, Turkey should avoid becoming an Anglo-Saxon outpost against the Soviet Union as advocated by some policy experts, because such a decision would create risky and dangerous conditions for Turkey's foreign policy.⁶⁴³

In August 1944, Turkey broke off relations with Germany and, six months later in February 1945, declared war on Germany and Japan in order to join the United Nations

⁶³⁹ Tefik Rüştü Aras, "Büyük Komşumuz ve Dostumuz," *Vatan*, June 13, 1944.

⁶⁴⁰ Tefik Rüştü Aras, "Daha Açık Söyleyeceğim," *Tan*, June 26, 1944.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Joseph M. Levy, "Turco-Soviet Pact Desired in Ankara," *New York Times*, June 26, 1944.

⁶⁴³ Tefik Rüştü Aras, "Sovyet Rusya ile İttifak Tabirinden Kastedilen Mana Nedir?" *Vatan*, July, 19, 1944.

Conference in San Francisco. Although the Soviet Union rejected the participation of neutral states such as Spain and Portugal in the conference, it did not reject Turkey's participation. Nevertheless, in March 1945, Soviet Union notified Ankara it would terminate the Treaty of Friendship, which had been in effect since 1925, because it "no longer corresponds to new conditions and needs considerable improvement."⁶⁴⁴ Three months later, Molotov laid out the conditions essential to renewing the twenty-year-old treaty: revise the Montreux Convention, allow Soviet Union bases in the Straits, and cede the Kars and Ardahan districts to Soviet Armenia and Georgia.

Russian scholars Zubok and Pleshakov indicated Stalin "raised territorial demands only as a bargaining chip; he dropped them in August 1946."⁶⁴⁵ In his last years, Molotov also admitted that territorial proposals were "ill-timed and unrealistic."⁶⁴⁶ Strangely enough, almost all of the Turkish politicians realized the Soviets' main objective was to acquire political and military privileges in the Straits and they were not serious about territorial proposals. Ambassador Sarper, in one of the few official reports published by Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote that the Soviets put forward the territorial proposals to strengthen their position on the issue of the Straits: "They are not going to cut off the talks. I sensed that Molotov brought up this issue [territorial proposals] in order to obtain compromises on other issues."⁶⁴⁷ Moreover, Sarper also emphasized that although the Soviets seemed to be firm on the issue of Soviet bases

⁶⁴⁴ According to the Soviet Information Bureau's announcement, Molotov told Turkey's ambassador Sarper that the Soviet Union, in "recognizing the value" of the treaty, concluded that it would be feasible to maintain friendly relations but, nevertheless, considered that "the great changes taken place, particularly during the World War II," require a new understanding. "Soviet Wants Treaty With Turks Revised," *New York Times*, March 26, 1945, 3.

⁶⁴⁵ Vladislav Martinovich Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 93.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁷ *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları 1939-1946* (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1973), 266.

in the Straits, they would accept a joint defense formula of the Straits during wartime.⁶⁴⁸ Fevzi Çakmak, who was forced to retire as chief of general staff in 1944 by İnönü, explained at the time why he could not understand the worries about Turkish-Soviet relations:

Even Stalin's proposal did not make me anxious. In my opinion, we have to talk with the Soviets. There is no need to be angry about their erroneous demands. On the contrary we have to sit at the table and explain their mistakes to them. . . . During the Liberation War, there were some disagreements between the Soviets and us. However, we talked about them. In the end, we not only solved our problems but also established a friendship with them. . . . Now they demanded the three districts. There is no need to worry. When they realize they made a mistake, they will give up this zeal.⁶⁴⁹

Saffet Arıkan, who served as Turkey's ambassador in Berlin between 1942 and 1944, considered the Soviet proposals as a bluff tactic,⁶⁵⁰ explaining there was no reason to be "afraid of Russians. They are exhausted and tired."⁶⁵¹ In April 1946, Bayar, interviewed by a North American Journalists Association correspondent, was asked about the Soviet proposals. He said there were only rumors and he did not take them seriously:

Soviet Union and Republican Turkey had solved all the problems—inherited from Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire—in a friendly atmosphere. There is no issue in dispute between us. I personally participated in official negotiations and agreements. The private conversations should be considered as small talk and should not be taken seriously. As someone who closely witnessed the coherent Turkish-Russian relations, I cannot accept the opposite argument.⁶⁵²

Similarly, in August 1946, Fuat Köprülü, among the four founders of the Democrat Party, said the ruling party was fabricating rumors about the external threats in order to preserve its

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), 269.

⁶⁵⁰ Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar 1939-1954* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977), 287.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² "İnkilap Türkiyesi ile S. Rusya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Çarlık Rusya arasındaki bütün pürüzleri ortadan kaldırmışlardır," *Vatan*, April 29, 1946.

power: “In my opinion our current foreign situation is not as dangerous as the government believes or as it sought to make the nation believe in order to influence the elections.”⁶⁵³

Three weeks after the Molotov-Sarper talks in Moscow, İnönü came to Istanbul for two meetings with high-ranking military officials and bureaucrats about the recent developments in Soviet-Turkish relations.⁶⁵⁴ After summarizing the Soviet proposals, İnönü, not expecting a Soviet military attack, told the high-ranking military officials that “the situation is not serious” and there was no need for a military mobilization.⁶⁵⁵ He believed the Soviets would not dare take such a grave step just after the San Francisco Conference at which fifty nations mutually pledged respect for the territorial integrity of others. İnönü added, “Russians will not look for a new adventure after tremendous sufferings” during the World War II.⁶⁵⁶ İnönü asked the meeting participants: “If they [the Soviets] are not going to attack us right away, why did they put forth secret aims and ideas?” For İnönü, the Soviet proposals were intended to ignite consternation in the Turkish public and military as a pretext for the eventual disintegration of the political regime in Turkey.

During these meetings İnönü stressed democracy’s importance for Turkey’s postwar development. But he also said it would be necessary to guide Turkish democracy in order to avoid dangerous political factions, which supported friendly relations with the Soviet Union and which could prove disruptive to the nation’s internal integrity and stability. The real risks for

⁶⁵³ “Fuat Köprülü’nün Mühim Beyanâtı,” *Vatan*, August 2, 1946.

⁶⁵⁴ The first meeting took place in the suburb of Istanbul, Hadımköy, with military officials on July 8, 1945. Next day, İnönü met with bureaucrats in the Dolmabahçe Palace. Although both of these meetings were closed to the press, İnönü’s speeches were published in 2003. The author believes İnönü’s speeches during these two meetings were landmark events reflecting the ruling elite’s state of mind after the World War II. İlhan Turan, ed., *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1944-1950* (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2003), 34-46.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

Turkish democracy, İnönü continued, were pro-Soviet groups that would hijack the newly established opposition party, transforming it into a communist party commanded by the Soviet Union.⁶⁵⁷ To eliminate the ‘communist threat,’ the President demarcated the limits of Turkish democracy which remained valid until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Turkey’s political system during the Cold War was, for all purposes, a ‘guided democracy.’

Toward the end of the World War II, domestic and international pressures compelled the Republican ruling elites to establish a multi-party democracy. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Turkey accepted the United Nations charter, committing itself to liberalizing the political regime at home and setting the stage for opposition political parties to arise. From the spring of 1945 onward, the opposition’s voice in and out of the RPP also grew steadily in volume and tone. Within the RPP, the opposition was galvanized around four members of parliament: Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü, Refik Koraltan, and Adnan Menderes. In June 1945, they proposed three basic democratic reforms: restoring the National Assembly’s power to control the government; granting individual political rights, and establishing a multi-party regime.⁶⁵⁸ Out of parliament, the left-wing newspaper *Tan* became the gathering place for intellectuals including Zekeriya Sertel, Sabiha Sertel, and Behice Boran as well as politicians who were purged by İnönü, such as Aras and Cami Baykurt. Although these intellectuals and politicians condemned the right-wing posturing of the leading Republicans, such as Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, they stepped gingerly in avoiding explicit criticism of İnönü’s policies.

In opening the parliamentary session on November 1, 1945, İnönü declared that an opposition party was needed for Turkey to establish a multi-party democracy: “The only thing

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., 38.

⁶⁵⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 145.

we lack is an opposition party confronting the party in government.”⁶⁵⁹ However, İnönü did not imagine a full-fledged multi-party democracy representing the whole range of political factions. As Kemal Karpat rightly observed, “İnönü had in mind, at this stage, a rather limited democracy that would not challenge the Republican Party’s rule.”⁶⁶⁰ In the second half of 1945, leading opposition figures such as Bayar, Sabiha Sertel, Aras, Baykurt, and Köprülü met several times before forming a political front against the RPP.⁶⁶¹ As a first step, they agreed on publishing their political views in a newly established journal *Görüşler* (Views), whose premier issue was published on December 1, 1945. The first cover depicted a theatrical stage and a partially opened curtain revealing three men symbolizing the “fascism, profiteering, and corruption” prevalent during İnönü’s rule.⁶⁶² There also were photos of Bayar, Aras, Köprülü, Menderes, Sabiha Sertel and Baykurt on the front page, presented to readers as the journal’s staff of contributors. Sabiha Sertel, who owned the journal, recalled Bayar, Menderes, and Köprülü were unable to write for the first issue because they were engulfed in establishing the new Democrat Party. Sabiha Sertel’s opening article for the journal, headlined “Enchained Freedom,” accused Turkey’s rulers of blocking democratic reforms. Sertel detailed the group’s objective in forming a new Turkey that would recognize individual rights and freedoms:

Turkey should be a free *vatan* in the free world . . . This *vatan* does not belong to people, who live on top of us. It is a *vatan* in which we will work with machines and share the collective sufferings and troubles. We are going to turn it into a utopia. Should the occasion arise, we will die for it. But we are going to love it as a *vatan* of free and unprivileged people.⁶⁶³

The opposition bloc, including well-known politicians who had served as prime minister, foreign minister, and interior minister as well as respected leftist intellectuals, alarmed

⁶⁵⁹ Metin Hepar, *İsmet İnönü* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 190.

⁶⁶⁰ Kemal Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics*, 147.

⁶⁶¹ Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi: Demokrasi Mücadelesinden Bir Kadın* (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1986), 288-292.

⁶⁶² *Görüşler*, no.1 (December 1, 1945).

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

Republican political circles with their vigorous campaign. İnönü permitted an opposition in order to save Turkey from being isolated in the international arena and to rehabilitate his public image domestically and internationally, especially as American and British diplomats considered İnönü an authoritarian leader who had flirted with the Nazis during the war. However, the opposition, seen by some as a stalking-horse party in a guided democracy, challenged İnönü by demanding free press, land reform, individual rights, the formation of trade unions, the right to strike for workers and other substantive democratic reforms. Soviet proposals and the communist ‘threat’ were used by the Republican elite as bogeymen to suppress the opposition and their democratic demands. They branded any critic against the government as part of communist activity and therefore labeled their opponents outright as Soviet agents. For them, the means of communism were designed to realize much older territorial ambitions as the Soviet Union had inherited Tsarist Russia’s drive to the warm seas. Accomplishing such an objective would require the formation of left-wing groups targeted toward transforming Turkey into a Soviet satellite. In 1945, government-controlled newspapers initiated a political campaign against the opposition by exaggerating the Soviet territorial demands, identifying left-wing activists as ‘traitors to *vatan*’ because they supported friendship with the Soviet Union and thus the destruction of Turkish *vatan* through territorial concessions.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a Republican parliament member and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Tanin*, openly attacked the new opposition in an article headlined “Rise up the Sons of the Vatan,” published on the front page on December 3, 1945.⁶⁶⁴ It was striking that Yalçın borrowed the headline from Namık Kemal, who had used it against the despotism of Abdulhamid. Yalçın wrote that the opposition, which came together at the *Görüşler* journal, was

⁶⁶⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan,” *Tanin*, December 3, 1945.

totally subordinate to Moscow, a de facto fifth column of the Soviet Union. For Yalçın, the opposition's emergence after the articulation of territorial "demands" by the Soviet leadership substantiated Soviet ambitions regarding Turkey. Against these "threats," he called for the creation of a nationalistic "front of *vatan*." Yalçın was concerned that this anti-leftist thinking, prevalent in the Turkish political discourse during the Cold War, sought to validate communism as an internationally acceptable ideology, anticipating the unity of all workers around the world. More directly, Yalçın explained all Turkish leftists were disloyal to the Turkish *vatan*. As leftists did not have any patriotic feelings for Turkish *vatan*, they were indifferent toward Soviet territorial "demands" and uninterested in the defense of Turkey's territorial integrity.⁶⁶⁵ Yalçın's impassioned defense for nationalism, which considered any critic against the government as treasonous to *vatan*, was an iconic snapshot of the hegemonic political discourse during the Cold War. Hence it is worth quoting his article at length published just one day before the destruction of the *Tan* newspaper office by a mob of students:

For centuries, this country defended itself against attacks from the north with its blood, spirit and army. Our nation's being was molded by these sufferings and disasters. This time, territories from the mother *vatan* and bases on the Straits have been demanded that would end Turkish independence. Our National Chief [İsmet İnönü] reflected the nation's spirit when he said that we are going to live as a proud people and we are going to die as a proud people. However, the enemy has started infiltrating us in the form of communist propaganda. The publications of *Yeni Dünya* and *Görüşler* removed any doubt on this subject. The situation is clear: The fifth column is working and has started the offensive . . . The voice of the great patriot Namık Kemal is today's slogan: Rise up, oh! Sons of *vatan*! The struggle is beginning. We have to start. We cannot let the furious and merciless propaganda destroy Turkish citizens with its devastating and disheartening poison. Every Turk, who wants to own a *vatan* and to live freely and independently within this *vatan*, has to resist this propaganda and to make his own propaganda against it.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶⁵ One of the best examples of this thinking is Yalçın's article with the title "To Understand the Sprit of Communism" published in 1946. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Komünistliğin Ruhunu Anlamak İçin," in *Benim Görüşümle Olaylar* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1946), 28-30.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

Other pro-government journalists such as Asım Us and newspapers like *Vakit* and *Tasvir* joined this propaganda campaign and started to level frequent volleys in print against the leftist groups.

On December 4, 1945, a mob of students, organized by the Istanbul branch of the RPP, looted the *Tan* newspaper and other leftist publishers.⁶⁶⁷ During the unrest, the police were present but did not stop the violence as students carried posters of İnönü and anti-Russian banners and shouted slogans such as “down with communists.”⁶⁶⁸ With the ‘Tan Raid’ one of the most vigorous segments of the opposition was silenced by the Republicans. Afterward, the Soviets sent a written note to Turkey’s foreign ministry stating, “the Soviet government cannot ignore these provocative actions against the USSR and as such, declares the Turkish government is responsible for these actions.”⁶⁶⁹ In addition, an article headlined “Our Legitimate Claims From Turkey,” written by Georgian professors S. Janashia and N. Berdzenishvili was published first by the Georgian newspaper *Kommunisti* on December 14, 1945 and immediately afterward

⁶⁶⁷In 1967, Kazım Alöç, who was the general attorney of Istanbul at that time, stated that the mob of students were under the leadership of RPP’s chief inspector Ali Tiritoğlu. Kazım Alöç, “İfşa Ediyorum,” *Yeni Gazete*, April 12, 1967.

⁶⁶⁸*Tanin*, December 5, 1945.

⁶⁶⁹Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov in Ankara proposed to make an official statement to Britain and the United States that “fascist and anti-Soviet demonstrations in Istanbul may compel the Soviet Union to take adequate measures to ensure its security.” He also suggested publishing a TASS report that “owing to the fascist anti-Soviet demonstration in Turkey, the Soviet government decided to reinforce garrisons along the Soviet-Turkish border” and to break off any contacts with Turkey. It was striking that the Politburo of the Central Committee harshly criticized Vinogradov’s proposals: “We consider your proposals to be absolutely unacceptable and thoughtless. You must understand that we cannot make any official presentations to the Turkish government regarding the growth of fascism in Turkey, since it is the domestic affairs of Turks. We also consider your proposal about our statement to the British and Americans as inadmissible and not serious, since the sabre-rattling may have provocative consequences. Your proposal on publishing TASS information that the Soviet government, due to the fascist anti-Soviet demonstration in Turkey, decided to reinforce garrisons along the Soviet-Turkish border is too frivolous. We cannot either accept your proposal on discontinuing our contacts with Turks. You should not make thoughtless proposals that may lead to political complications for our government. Think it over once again and be more sober-minded to comply with your post and mission.” The reaction of the Politburo against Vinogradov’s proposals revealed that the Soviets did not want to provoke their relations with Britain and the United States because of anti-Soviet unrest in Turkey and were careful about not interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey. See, Jamil Hasanlı, *USSR-Turkey: From Neutrality to Cold War*, 244.

by *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*.⁶⁷⁰ The article was a historical analysis about the northeastern Anatolia and both authors concluded this portion of Anatolia had belonged rightfully to the Georgian nation since the second millennium B.C. They explained as Turkey had harmed the anti-Hitler coalition during the World War II by “siding with Fascist Germany. . . the districts of Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Tortum, İspir, Bayburt, Trabzon, and Gümüşhane” should be returned to Georgia.⁶⁷¹

Turkish newspapers started their own campaign against the Soviet Union following the controversial article’s appearance in the Moscow media. Newspapers including *Tanin* and *Ulus* published photographs of Trabzon, Artvin, and Kars and announced slogans on their front pages to agitate the public opinion, such as “the Turkish *vatan* is indivisible,” “Our nation is ready to sacrifice in order to live.”⁶⁷² Although it was impossible for Georgian professors to publish their article in two prominent Soviet newspapers without the approval of Soviet authorities considering the strict centralized control over Soviet media, similar articles had been published during the Second World War by pan-Turkist journals such as *Gökbörü*, *Bozkurt*, *Çınaraltı*, and *Orhun* that openly promoted territorial ambitions in the Caucasus and the Central Asia. These publications had been tolerated by the İnönü regime until 1944.

In early February 1946, Gürtunca, who wrote the provocative booklet “Do Not Touch This Lion,” in response to Italian territorial ambitions in 1939, published a similar one against the Soviet Union with the title “Do Not Touch This *Vatan*.”⁶⁷³ For Gürtunca, the booklet was a “reply to Muscovites,” full of militaristic and nationalistic illustrations and poems. The Turkish

⁶⁷⁰ The article was translated into Turkish and published by the journal *Tarih ve Toplum*. S. Canasia and N. Brerdzenisvili, “Türkiye’den Haklı İstemlerimiz,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 8, no. 46 (October 1987): 49-52.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁶⁷² *Tanin*, December 27, 1945.

⁶⁷³ Faruk Gürtunca, *Dokunmayın Bu Vatan* (İstanbul: Ülkü Basımevi, 1946).

soldier, who faced Italy in the previous booklet, was now confronting Russia. (See Figure 6) While the author recounted the invasion of Russia by the “Hun Turks” from the Urals to the Volga, he also offered a humiliating reminder to the Georgians about their concubines being the most desirable women in the Ottoman harem. In addition to the historically steeped warnings, the booklet contained writings from nationalistic poets about the defense of the Turkish *vatan*: “Mother *vatan*, use your chest as a shield against weapons; The bullets cannot hurt you as they could not for years; My dear mother *vatan*: Spread thunderbolts from your chest; The Reds should understand the sacredness of the independence!”⁶⁷⁴

Figure 6: A map used in a popular booklet “Do Not Touch This *Vatan*” that emphasized the defense of Turkey against the ‘Russian threat.’



⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., 26.

In the middle of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda war during the first winter following the end of the World War II, the Democrat Party was established under the leadership of Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan, and Köprülü on January 7, 1946. Although Aras, who wrote articles about the necessity of the Turkish-Soviet friendship, participated in founding the Democrat Party, he was excluded by Bayar after the ‘Tan Raid.’ With the escalating propaganda war in the Turkish press and political forums, Bayar decided to distance himself and the Party from the left, which the ruling elite had associated with ‘Soviet aggression.’⁶⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Democrats could not avoid being accused as “communists” and “Moscow’s pawns” by Republican politicians and journalists whenever they criticized the İnönü regime. The Democrats’ criticisms about the government’s poor economic performance, suppression of the press, and irregularities in the 1946 elections were deemed ‘communist tactics’ by Republican circles. To silence these criticisms, Republicans leveled barbs upon the Democrat Party suggesting they were being “directed from Radio Moscow” and “financially supported by Bolsheviks.”⁶⁷⁶ Furthermore, in order to influence Turkish public opinion and American and British officials, Republicans argued that if Democrats won the elections, there would be a regime change in Turkey similar to Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Albania.⁶⁷⁷ On January 29, 1947, Şükrü Sökmensüer, the interior minister, spoke at length about “communist activities” in Turkey.⁶⁷⁸ According to Sökmensüer, while the Republicans’ sought to establish closer relations with Britain, Fevzi Çakmak and Democrats argued that it was necessary to “come to an

⁶⁷⁵ John F. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 125.

⁶⁷⁶ *Demokrat Parti Başkanlığı*, no. 60 (Ankara, Arbas Matbaası, 1947), 40.

⁶⁷⁷ “Fuad Köprülü Cevap Veriyor,” *Vatan*, May 17, 1946.

⁶⁷⁸ “Mecliste Komünistler İçin Dünkü İfşaat,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 30, 1947.

agreement with the Soviets in order to save the country and strengthen national independence.”⁶⁷⁹

Between 1945 and 1947, the Republican ruling elites successfully exploited the Soviet territorial proposals to establish a ‘guided democracy’ in Turkey and to situate an opposition that did not threaten İnönü’s and his party’s power. They linked substantial critiques against the government with perceptions of communist ‘threat’ and treason to *vatan* in order to discredit the opposition. During this period, the state authorities tolerated and, even in particular cases, supported civil disobedience and vandalism against the left-wing publications and institutions. In terms of creating an anti-communist rhetoric in politics, there were striking similarities between Turkey and the United States, where McCarthyism was beginning to cast a shadow over American political discourse. This period played a significant role in the formation of the hegemonic Cold War political discourse with the ‘communist threat’ to the Turkish *vatan* functioning as a nodal point. In 1948, the Democrat Party’s leading figures realized that the ‘communist threat’ was a powerful tool for them to eliminate their opponents within the party. In 1948, some Democrat parliamentary members harshly criticized the Democrat leadership for using an authoritarian model in the party hierarchy. In return, the Democrat leadership said “the Red Danger” was seeking to infiltrate the party and characterized the opposition within the party as “Moscow’s collaborators.”⁶⁸⁰ Bayar, accused by Republicans of collaborating with the Soviets, employed the same tactic to neutralize opposition, successfully forcing his critics to resign from the party. Even İnönü was not immune from accusations of being Moscow’s pawn. Before the general elections in 1965, İnönü announced that RPP positioned itself to the “left of the center,” a move sharply criticized by the right-wing Justice Party and conservative members

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁰ *Demokrat Parti Kurucuları Bu Davanın Adamı Değildirler* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1949), 34, 66.

of the RPP. The slogan – “the left of the center is the road to Moscow” – was frequently deployed during the election campaigns to damage İnönü’s public image among nervous voters.

Turkey’s anti-Soviet stance after 1945 left deep marks on the nation’s foreign policy during the Cold War. While Soviet proposals about the Straits and the eastern Anatolia in the interwar period – when Turkey considered the USSR a ‘friendly regime’ – did not harm the close relations between the two countries, similar proposals in the postwar era represented grave threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity and were consequently manifested in the hegemonic foreign policy discourse positioning the Soviet Union as Turkey’s ‘enemy.’ Furthermore, after 1945, Turkish foreign policy makers based their rationale for establishing closer relations with Britain and the United States upon the increasing Soviet threat and Turkish public opinion was swayed by the political discourse suggesting Anatolia was under siege. Therefore, the general public accepted Turkey’s entry into the Western camp as a symbolic liberation from the ‘communist threat’ and most Cold War scholars accepted the conventional explanation that Soviet proposals compelled Turkey’s integration into the western sphere and the NATO. Kamuran Gürün believed that Turkey would have continued its nonaligned foreign policy had the Soviet Union not insisted on territorial “demands” and the establishment of bases in the Straits.⁶⁸¹ Similarly, Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer observed, “had the Soviet Union not pushed Turkey into the western fold with her demands in 1945-6, the same balance might have been maintained without Turkey's participation, and she might then have enjoyed the benefits of peace without having to choose between the two poles.”⁶⁸²

⁶⁸¹ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, 315.

⁶⁸² Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” *Adelphi Papers* 21, no. 164 (1981): 13.

While Western and Turkish scholars generally agree that Soviet proposals confirmed the Soviet expansionist push toward the south, revisionist scholars such as Melvyn Leffler, Thomas Paterson, and Haluk Gerger criticized the entrenched Cold War rhetoric and its common-sense arguments.⁶⁸³ Leffler explained, “Soviet demands on Turkey had a substantial defensive component” and they sought to control the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf in order to defend their industrial areas and oil fields in the Caucasus against prospective military attacks originating in these regions. The American strategic defense planners wanted to capitalize upon the Soviet Union’s extreme vulnerability in the region by establishing military bases in Turkey.⁶⁸⁴ Bruce Kuniholm described Turkey’s pivotal role in NATO as “bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO's southern flank, and serving as a staging ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union.”⁶⁸⁵ In order to realize these objectives, NATO and American bases were established in the cities of Adana, Diyarbakir, Izmir, and Izmit.⁶⁸⁶

While Turkey, in 1945 and 1946, had vehemently refused official Soviet proposals concerning the joint defense of the Straits as encroachments upon its sovereignty and independence, the same Turkey, several years later, allowed the establishment of US and NATO military bases in its territory, saying these were necessary for the defense of the nation’s territorial integrity. It also was clear that the aggressive Soviet policy toward Turkey as directed by Stalin and Molotov played an important role in the Turkish leadership’s capacity for

⁶⁸³ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (March 1985): 807-825; Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War* (New York: Norton, 1979), 55-56; Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası* (Istanbul: Belge, 1999), 49-50.

⁶⁸⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War,” 813.

⁶⁸⁵ Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 34.

⁶⁸⁶ Nur Bilge Criss, “U.S. Forces in Turkey,” in *U.S. Military Forces in Europe – The Early Years, 1945-1970* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 331-349.

demonizing the image of the Soviet Union as a fatal enemy. Two months after Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviet Union sent a written note to Turkey renouncing the territorial claims and the proposals for bases in the Straits. However, the Soviet policy shift toward Turkey did not challenge Ankara's allegiance to NATO nor its distrustful stance toward Moscow. Soviet demands were not a real threat for Turkey's territorial integrity, but served as an effective excuse for Turkish leaders to integrate the nation into the Western camp. İnönü's statement about Turkey's foreign policy in 1948 confirmed this stance: "Even if the Soviet Union had reversed its claims, I still would have preferred to collaborate closely with the United States."⁶⁸⁷

Representing the Korean War as a Fight for *Vatan* against Communism

The USS Missouri's visit to Istanbul in April 1946 signified the establishment of close relations between Turkey and the United States. Afterward, proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and the subsequent aid package of \$100 million for Turkey indicated the extent to which Washington considered Turkey an indispensable ally in its global struggle against communism. Later, Joint American Military Mission for Aid (JAMMAT) was created to administer American aid to Turkey, and by May of 1948, 350 American personnel were deployed in Turkey to examine the national army's needs for modernization. With the inclusion of Turkey in the Marshall Plan, the number of American personnel administering economic and military assistance to Turkey increased to 1,644 in 1952 and to 5,000 in 1955.⁶⁸⁸ Although military and economic relations with the United States warmed significantly after the Missouri's 1946 visit to Istanbul, Ankara's diplomatic campaign to join NATO, established in April 1949,

⁶⁸⁷ Jamil Hasanlı, *USSR-Turkey: From Neutrality to Cold War (1939-1953)*, 452. A similar statement was made by Adnan Menderes on August 27, 1948. See Haluk Kılıçık, ed., *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri* Vol. 1 (Ankara: Demokratlar Kulübü Yayınları, 1991), 316.

⁶⁸⁸ Gavin D. Brockett, "Betwixt and Between: Turkish Print Culture and the Emergence of a National Identity" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 2003), 121.

was rejected initially by the United States, which hesitated to expand its military commitments outside of the Atlantic region, as well as by Britain, which was more willing to cooperate with Turkey in the Middle East than in Europe.

The general elections on May 14, 1950 resulted in the Democrat Party's victory with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. Bayar was elected by the parliament as the third president of the Republic while Menderes and Köprülü were appointed prime minister and foreign minister, respectively. Unlike Mustafa Kemal and İnönü, Bayar, Menderes and Köprülü had no military background. On June 25, 1950, just one month after the Democrats came to power, North Korean armies crossed the Thirty-Eighth Parallel and invaded South Korea and Turkey was among the first countries to respond positively to the United Nations' call for assistance. Foreign Minister Köprülü, in briefing parliament on the conflict in Korean peninsula and the United Nations' role, told members, "Turkey had communicated to them its willingness to execute loyally the engagements that it had entered into as a member of the United Nations."⁶⁸⁹ On July 25, 1950, after an extraordinary meeting of the cabinet, Turkey offered a brigade of 4,500 soldiers to the coalition forces, its first involvement in an international military conflict since the end of the national liberation war in 1922.

Of the twenty-one nations that participated in the Korean War, Turkey was the only Muslim country and the fourth largest military unit after the United States, Britain, and Canada.⁶⁹⁰ Based on official statistics, up until the armistice in July 1953, 14,936 Turkish soldiers served in Korea. Of a total 3,277 Turkish casualties, there were 721 killed in action, 175

⁶⁸⁹ "Türkiye Kore İşinde Üzerine Düşen Vecibeleri Yapacak," *Hürriyet*, July 1, 1950.

⁶⁹⁰ Cameron S. Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," *Review of International Studies Association* 34, (2008): 95.

missing in action, 234 prisoners of war, and 2,147 wounded.⁶⁹¹ At twenty-two percent, the Turkish casualty rate in the Korean War was exceeded only by the United States. Turkey and the United States were the only two nations within the United Nations command, to have more than 700 fatalities in the war.⁶⁹²

What seemed striking about the government's decision to participate in the Korean War, in a distant part of Asia, was the lack of parliamentary debate. Although Article 26 of the Turkish constitution stipulated that "the power to declare war and participate in a war as well as to declare peace belongs to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey," the Democrat Party government did not even seek parliamentary counsel in its decision to enter the war.⁶⁹³ By acting rapidly without consulting the parliament and the opposition parties, the Democrat leadership anticipated that Turkey's decision to side with the United States in Korea would lead quickly to Turkey's entry into NATO. American Senator Harry Cain echoed these sentiments in a press conference in Ankara on July 25, 1950: "I can say we are going to be much more sympathetic in helping those who helped most in Korea, [and] we want all of our friends tied together as free nations militarily, economically and politically."⁶⁹⁴ Turkey submitted its formal proposal to join NATO just one week after its decision to send Turkish soldiers to Korea.⁶⁹⁵ As Cameron Brown rightly observed, the Democrat leadership wanted to "prove that this new government could succeed where the legendary İsmet İnönü, Atatürk's confidant and successor president, had

⁶⁹¹ *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri (1950-1953)* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1974), 417.

⁶⁹² Allan Reed Millett, *Their War for Korea: American, Asian and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945-53* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002), 266.

⁶⁹³ Füsün Türkmen, "Turkey and the Korean War," *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 170.

⁶⁹⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950* Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1978), 1282.

⁶⁹⁵ Cameron S. Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," 103.

failed just several months ago.”⁶⁹⁶ As expected, the Korean War played a decisive role in Turkey’s admittance to NATO in 1952.

Following Köprülü’s announcement about Turkey’s readiness to fulfill its obligations to the United Nations, a nationalistic and anti-communist environment took hold in Turkish society. Newspaper editorial writers and columnists supported enthusiastically sending troops to Korea. By fighting against communism in a distant land, Turkey would demonstrate its determination to the Russians, who also had “threatened Turkey” with the invasion of northeastern Anatolia after the World War II.⁶⁹⁷ In the war euphoria, the only critical voice about sending troops to Korea came from the Turkish Association of Peace-Lovers, which was founded in May 1950 by a left-wing intellectual group led by Adnan Cemgil and Behice Boran. The group distributed 25,000 copies of an anti-war brochure in Istanbul, which suggested the Menderes government decided to send troops as a result of American pressure, directed by Senator Cain, who came to Turkey on July 23 and had met with the foreign minister and chief of staff. The brochure’s authors asked that instead of participating in the Korean War, Turkey should offer peace and ceasefire proposals, like Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, to end the “internal war” in Korea.⁶⁹⁸ After the mass brochure drop, the association cabled parliament asking its members to reverse the government’s decision because it was illegal and any war declaration came under jurisdiction of parliament, not the executive cabinet.⁶⁹⁹

At a July 28, 1950 press conference, Prime Minister Menderes responded to the accusations of the Turkish Association of Peace-Lovers, alleging the group was supported by

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Füsün Türkmen, “Turkey and the Korean War,” 170.

⁶⁹⁸ Pınar Selek, *Barışamadık* (Istanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2004), 217.

⁶⁹⁹ *Zafer*, July 29, 1950.

external powers. Menderes told reporters, “while Turkey was preparing to counter the communist attacks in Korea, the objective of a similar provocation inside our nation was being realized by Turkish public opinion.”⁷⁰⁰ Furthermore, Menderes said communists were patronized by leading statesmen during the previous Republican governments, adding the Democrat government would continue to fight against communism. Menderes defended the government’s decision to send Turkish soldiers to Korea by stressing “the independence and existence of the states could not be maintained by defending only their own geographical borders.”⁷⁰¹ Just two months before this press conference, Menderes stated he was determined in the struggle against “leftism,” which he considered more dangerous than racism.⁷⁰² Likewise, Foreign Minister Köprülü described the anti-war activities of the Turkish Association of Peace-Lovers as “communist propaganda.” The objective of the association, Köprülü added, was “to destroy the nation’s power of resistance in order to turn it into a slave of foreign ideologies.”⁷⁰³

Mainstream newspapers joined in the government’s anti-communist rhetoric to silence the single opposition group regarding Turkey’s participation in the war. Ali Naci Karacan, a columnist in the daily *Milliyet*, labeled members of the association as “red agents” and called for immediate governmental action against the group: “In a situation of war, the fifth column, which is the enemy’s hand within Turkey’s borders, cannot be allowed to pursue this type of provocation and defeatism.”⁷⁰⁴ The government subsequently outlawed the Turkish Association of Peace-Lovers and its leaders Boran and Cemgil were arrested, tried and sentenced by a

⁷⁰⁰ Haluk Kılçık, ed. *Adnan Menderes’in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri* Vol. 2 (Ankara: Baskı Ofset, 1991), 128.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁷⁰³ *Ayın Tarihi Temmuz 1950* (Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1950), 73-74.

⁷⁰⁴ Ali Naci Karacan, “Bozguncuları Tasfiye Zamanı Gelmiştir,” *Milliyet*, August 1, 1950.

military court to jail for up to three years.⁷⁰⁵ As John VanderLippe explained, the association's closing and the arrest of pro-peace academics and intellectuals "established a pattern of political repression by the Democrat Party, which had come to power on a promise of ending political repression."⁷⁰⁶

The Democrat leadership realized even amid nationalist euphoria concerning Turkey's mobilization for the war, the positive atmosphere inevitably would dissipate as soon as news about Turkish casualties appeared on newspaper front pages. In order to legitimize the decision to send Turkish soldiers and to counter anticipated criticisms and objections, Turkish leaders framed the Korean Crisis as a religious war to defend Turkish *vatan* against atheist communists in a distant land. In August 1950, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, the head of the religious affairs directorate, announced, "the mightiest weapon to defy communism is the power of faith and spirit. It is out of any reasonable question for a true believer to get along well with communist ideas."⁷⁰⁷ The directorate published a book entitled, "The Religious and Political Necessity of our Participation in the Defense of Korea," justifying Turkey's participation in the Korean War from a religious perspective. In defining "the road to Korea as Allah's road," the book positioned the war as a jihad, and those who died in Korea would be regarded as "martyrs."⁷⁰⁸ With the Korean War, Turkish political discourse, which had been scrupulously secular since 1923, amalgamated anti-Communism and nationalism with religious and Islamic sentiments. An icon

⁷⁰⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, December 31, 1950.

⁷⁰⁶ John M. Vander Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000): 98.

⁷⁰⁷ Quoted in Mim Kemal Öke, *Unutulan Savaşın Kronolojisi: Kore, 1950-53* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990), 71.

⁷⁰⁸ *Kore Savunmasına Katılmamızda Dini ve Siyasi Zaruret* (Istanbul: Acun Basımevi, 1950), 50-51.

of this change was the photograph published by the daily *Hürriyet* showing General Tahsin YAZICI, the Turkish brigade commander in Korea, kissing the Koran before he left Turkey.⁷⁰⁹

After parliament opened on November 1, 1950, Turkey's role in Korean War was being challenged in debates among the parties and newspaper columnists. Although the opposition parties of RPP and Nation Party did not object to sending troops to Korea, they accused the government of not consulting parliament on such a grave matter of life or death. For the opposition and İnönü, the "problem was not 'why,' but rather 'how,'"⁷¹⁰ and both called for the Menderes government to resign. By sending Turkish troops to Korea the opposition leaders equated the participation to a formal declaration of war, and said the Menderes government acted unconstitutionally by subverting parliamentary approval. Replying to the parliamentary inquiry, Prime Minister Menderes accused the opposition of initiating a defamatory campaign with the intention of rendering the Democrat government disreputable in the eyes of the Turkish people. He emphasized the government responded properly to the United Nations' appeal and said the decision of sending Turkish soldiers to Korea could not be regarded as a declaration of war. However, in the last portion of his speech, Menderes invoked a nationalistic tone, stressing the Turkish nation had already rendered a decisive response to the parliamentary inquiry: "Today our country is once again experiencing the spirit of the National Forces. It is enthusiastic. Dear Friends, 4,500 sons of *vatan* that we sent there [Korea] have established a new *vatan* with their blood."⁷¹¹ Deputies of the Democrat Party reiterated the prime minister's words, accusing the opposition of generating polemics to impair the government while Turkish soldiers were dying in a heroic war against communism. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, who had played a key role in

⁷⁰⁹ *Hürriyet*, September 28, 1950.

⁷¹⁰ Füsün Türkmen, "Turkey and the Korean War," 170.

⁷¹¹ Haluk Kılçık, ed. *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri* Vol. 2, 203.

Turkish nationalism after the Balkan Wars, explained the threat Turkey faced in the Caucasus, and the disaster encroaching Korea, were directed from the same center: “Poor Turkish nation. After thousands of disasters, the Turkish nation is still continuing to raise heroes, who are fighting a battle far away from the Turkish *vatan*. That war is also my war. All the Asian territories are the *vatan* of ancient Turks . . .”⁷¹² Tanrıöver proposed leaving aside internal problems and disagreements and bringing together all the parties and factions against “the worldwide danger” as it had occurred during the National Liberation War.⁷¹³ After this steady stream of nationalistic speeches, the parliamentary enquiry was rejected by the Democrat deputies. Until the armistice in 1953 and well into 1954, the Democrat leadership continued to use the Korean War as a political tool against the RPP and İnönü, the party’s leader. Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, minister of state, criticized İnönü’s foreign policy during the World War II, disparaging the former neutrality and championing the Democrat Party’s pro-war foreign policy. Karaosmanoğlu said İnönü “killed the country’s masculinity and bravery” by staying neutral during the World War II, adding the Democrat Party proved to the whole world that “our masculinity and bravery is still alive.”⁷¹⁴

After the battle of Kunu-ri in November 1950 when Turkish soldiers broke the Chinese army’s circled barrier with a bayonet attack, leading columnists in Turkish newspapers bolstered the government’s nationalistic rhetoric, fully supporting its pro-war stance. On December 3, 1950 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote:

Turkish soldiers are fighting for Turkish *vatan* and at the same time for the dignity and salvation of the humanity. . . This is what is going to happen: As a result of the enemy’s defeat in Korea and China, the enemy’s forces, which are directed also for an attack

⁷¹² *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi Dönem 9* Vol. 3, (1950), 181.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, February 8, 1951.

against Turkey, will be reduced in size. The victorious United Nations' army in Korea will prevent the invasion of Turkish *vatan*. After all if Turkey is attacked, Turkey's companions at arms in Korea—Americans, British and other United Nations' forces—will come to destroy the Reds on Turkish soil. From now on, there is only one front in the world: civilization versus barbarity.⁷¹⁵

The nationalistic sentiments bubbled over not only in the national dailies but also on the front pages of regional newspapers. Mehmet Tuncer, a columnist at the *Yeni Asır* newspaper published in Izmir, characterized the Turkish soldiers' fight in Korea as “a defense of this *vatan* that is taking place in a distant land from the territories of this *vatan*.”⁷¹⁶ Tuncer wrote Turkish soldiers were going to be victorious in Korea because they knew exactly what they were fighting for: “[The] Turkish soldier was conscious of what he is going to fight for when he left *vatan*'s soil. He carried the whole *vatan* in his heart. This is the reason for his defense of Korean soil inch by inch as if it was part of the soil of his *vatan*. . .”⁷¹⁷

The Democrat Party continued to play up Turkey's presence in Korea as a political instrument to attract voter interest and disparage the opposition parties. Before the 1954 general elections, the party published two booklets about Turkey's entry into NATO, and Turkey's participation in the Korean War.⁷¹⁸ The first booklet with the title “Turkey and Atlantic Pact” was based on the well-established Cold War thinking of geographical determinism: “Our sacred *vatan* is located at the meeting point of Europe and Asia that is strategically very important.”⁷¹⁹ The party authors explained that although the Turkish nation had defended its homeland against its enemy, namely Russia, in the last centuries, “today it is very difficult to defeat the enemy with its satellites, whose population is fifteen times, territory thirty times, and economy approximately

⁷¹⁵ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Mehmetçiklerimiz,” *Ulus*, December 3, 1950.

⁷¹⁶ Mehmet Tuncer, “Mehmetçik Kore'de Türk Vatanını Müdafaa Ediyor,” *Yeni Asır*, December 4, 1950.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

⁷¹⁸ *Demokrat Parti Neşriyatından 7: Türkiye ve Atlantik Paktı* (Ankara: Güneş Matbaası, 1954); *Demokrat Parti Neşriyatından 8: Düşmanı Kore'de Karşıladık* (Ankara: Güneş Matbaası, 1954).

⁷¹⁹ *Demokrat Parti Neşriyatından 7: Türkiye ve Atlantik Paktı*, 6.

twenty to thirty times larger than ours.”⁷²⁰ The natural outcome of this dangerous geopolitical situation was, the booklet continued, Turkey’s integration into the Atlantic Pact: “Our admittance to the Atlantic Pact hit Soviet imperialism like a thunderstorm. The Straits, the deep blue waters of the Mediterranean, and historic Istanbul – targets of centuries-long aspirations – became an unapproachable dream. These national objectives of Russia were buried in the true history.”⁷²¹ The second booklet with the title “We Countered the Enemy in Korea” sought to legitimize the extent of Turkish casualties in the Korean War. The booklet indicated that, in 1953, while approximately 1,300 people died in traffic accidents in Turkey, the total number of Turkish soldiers who died in the Korean War was less than 1,000. In return, the party authors wrote Turkey became a member of NATO and the Soviets renounced their demands on “the Straits, Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin.”⁷²²

It is worth reiterating in the conclusion of this section that since the North Korean invasion in June 1950, the Democrat leadership did not consider the Korean crisis as a first step to worldwide communist expansion. In a meeting on June 28, 1950, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü conveyed this belief to General Horace McBride, the head of the US military mission to Turkey: “The impression was left that the Turkish authorities considered this more or less a local affair and that it would not spread beyond the Korean area.”⁷²³ However, the government and mainstream newspapers represented the Korean War as a substantiation of ‘Soviet imperialism,’ identified as the most serious threat to Turkish *vatan* since 1945. The anti-communist and nationalist rhetoric of the government was so influential that even Turkish soldiers regarded Korea as part of their *vatan* in the same vein as their fathers, who had fought in the Ottoman

⁷²⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁷²¹ Ibid., 14.

⁷²² *Demokrat Parti Neşriyatından 8: Düşmanı Kore’de Karşıladık*, 6, 12.

⁷²³ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950* Vol. 5, 1275-1276.

armies in Yemen and Galicia and considered these countries as parts of their imperial *vatan*.⁷²⁴ However, right from the start of the war, the government's main objective was to pave the way for Turkey's membership into the NATO. To realize this objective the Democrat leadership repressed any opposition to sending Turkish soldiers to Korea, and used effectively the notion of *vatan* by linking criticism of the war effort to 'traitors to *vatan*.'

Cyprus: From Baby-*Vatan* to a Gangrenous Problem

No other issue than the Cyprus question better indicates the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy and political discourse after the Cold War. Starting in the early 1950s, Cyprus had been represented as a baby-*vatan* (*yavru-vatan*) and its unification with the mother-*vatan*, Turkey, was perceived as the crucial national cause by the ruling elites. However, this well-established foreign policy stance toward Cyprus changed dramatically in the new century. At the 1999 European Union's Helsinki Summit, Turkey officially began the candidacy process for EU membership but the Cyprus problem needed to be settled as a precondition for Turkey to start negotiations for full membership.⁷²⁵ Turkish foreign policy decision makers, including the National Security Council and large segments of Turkish society, from business associations to trade unions formed an unprecedented coalition to realize the objective of integrating Turkey into the EU, considered as the only viable option for a better future for the nation's people. They now regarded the Cyprus issue a gangrenous problem threatening Turkey's Europeanization that

⁷²⁴ Mim Kemal Öke, *Unutulan Savaşın Kronolojisi*, 85.

⁷²⁵ Paragraphs 4 and 9a of the conclusions of the Helsinki Summit highlighted the importance of the settlement of the Cyprus problem for Turkey's membership: "4) In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. 9a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion."

should be surgically excised and doing so represented a *sine qua non* for Turkey's EU integration. In 2004, the Turkish government's acceptance of the Annan Plan as the basis of a settlement in Cyprus was the turning point in Turkey's foreign policy. The historical bloc eliminated the opposing nationalist groups and actors, foremost the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, who actively participated in the struggle against Greek Cypriots since 1950s and described the Annan Plan as "the annihilation plan for Turkish Cypriots."⁷²⁶

This section documents how Turkey's integration into the EU became a hegemonic project in foreign policy discourse replacing the traditional national cause of integrating the *baby-vatan*, namely Cyprus, into Turkey with the more urgent need of solving the Cyprus problem so that Turkey's membership in the EU could proceed.⁷²⁷ However, this shift cannot be analyzed by isolating it from recent Turkish and global social, economic and political transformations. In the last three decades, while democratic reforms changed Turkey from a country ruled by military junta in 1980 to a viable candidate for the EU that met the Copenhagen criteria, the unprecedented efforts of liberalization and privatization converted the Turkish economy from import substitution industrialization based on strict government control to an export-oriented structure aimed at integrating Turkey with the global markets. As a result of these revolutionary changes, the platform upon which state-society relations were based shifted from an authoritarian tone to a democratic one. Interest groups and non-governmental organizations with no say in the foreign policy making process during the Cold War started to influence and shape Turkey's relations with the external world. Turkey's new foreign policy stance toward Cyprus in the 2000s predicated on settling the Cyprus question according to an

⁷²⁶ "Denktaş'a Uyarı," *Radikal*, March 5, 2004.

⁷²⁷ According to Torfing, a hegemonic project is "a political project, including a vision of how state, economy and civil society should be organized, that aspires to become hegemonic." See Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, 302.

internationally supported plan involving the United Nations, United States and the European Union became the archetype for this transformation.

Cyprus, which was transferred to British rule in 1878, was not considered as part of the Turkish *vatan* in the National Pact announced in 1920. During the Lausanne Conference, Britain insisted that Turkey renounce all rights with regard to Cyprus and recognize the annexation of the island by Britain.⁷²⁸ After World War II when the British colonial empire started to disintegrate, Greek Cypriots, led by the communist party AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) and Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus raised their demands for self-determination and Enosis, namely the unification of the island with Greece. Until 1954 when Greece applied to the UN to apply the self-determination principle to Cyprus, Turkey occasionally indicated that it preferred continuing British colonial rule on the island. On January 23, 1950, a couple of months before the Democrat Party's rise to power in Ankara, Turkey's Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak announced, "[T]here does not exist any problem called the Cyprus question. I told this to journalists explicitly some time ago. Today, Cyprus is under the sovereignty and control of Britain and we firmly believe that it will not transfer Cyprus to any other country."⁷²⁹

Ankara's pro-status quo policy about Cyprus continued with the Democrat Party government. On April 1, 1954, Turkey's Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, when asked by a parliamentary member about the Turkish government's attitude on Cyprus, said, "There has

⁷²⁸ According to Articles 16 and 20 of the Lausanne Treaty: "16) Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. 20) Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914." Accessed November 22, 2008. Available from <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/>.

⁷²⁹ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi: 1954-1959* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963), 20.

never been a conversation or negotiation with our Greek allies and friends over Cyprus because the island is a British possession and it would be improper to discuss the subject with Greece. No Cyprus question exists for the Turkish government. But if a day arrives when the fate of Cyprus becomes a matter for discussion with Britain, naturally the presence of an important Turkish minority on the island will defer to Turkey the right to have her say.”⁷³⁰ Turkey’s support for British colonial rule in Cyprus coincided with Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy stance in the 1950s. The Menderes government condemned, along with Britain and the United States, the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.⁷³¹ Contrary to Greece, which supported self-determination movements in Asia and Africa with the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN, Turkey sided with France and “voted in favor of the French position at the UN GA [General Assembly] regarding the independence of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in the 1950s.”⁷³²

Although the Turkish government sought to refrain from making assertive declarations about Cyprus in the first half of the 1950s, nationalist groups and newspapers, backed by the government against the ‘communist threat’ since 1945, embraced the Cyprus issue and started to mold public opinion about it. During the 1950s, the *Hürriyet* newspaper took the lead and Sedat Simavi, its editor-in-chief, published articles about Cyprus and advised the Turkish people and government to react against Greek ambitions aimed at turning Cyprus into another Crete by expelling all Turks from the island. As the political situation became exacerbated on the island, *Hürriyet* accused Istanbul’s Greek minority of assisting Greek insurgents on Cyprus and laid the

⁷³⁰ *Hürriyet*, April 2, 1954; “No ‘Cyprus Question’ For Turkey,” *The Times*, April 3, 1954.

⁷³¹ Simon C. Smith, *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 124.

⁷³² Berdal Aral, “Fifty Years On: Turkey’s Voting Orientation at the UN General Assembly, 1948-97,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 2 (March 2004): 138-139.

groundwork for the pogroms against the Greek minority on September 6-7, 1955.⁷³³ Another important player was the National Students Federation of Turkey declaring the Cyprus question as the “national cause of the Turkish youth” as early as June 1953.⁷³⁴ Strikingly, just three weeks after Turkey’s Foreign Minister Köprülü’s statement indicating there is no Cyprus question for Turkey, the student group countered by declaring, “Cyprus is an indivisible part of mother-*vatan*.”⁷³⁵

From 1954 on, Turkey’s hegemonic political discourse identified Cyprus as the baby-*vatan* and its eventual unification with Turkey was embraced by governments and newspapers as a national cause. In August 1954, immediately after Greece’s application to the UN for a self-determining rule of Cyprus, the ‘Cyprus is Turkish Committee’ was founded by the National Students Federation of Turkey and more than 100 branches throughout the country opened in less than a year. As a result of establishing close contacts with Cypriot Turks, Fazıl Küçük, the leader of the Cyprus Turkish National Party, changed his party’s name to ‘Cyprus is Turkish.’ In the 1950s, the Cyprus issue became the predominant playground for nationalists and pan-Turkist groups in Turkey. They gave up their unification hopes with the Turkic groups in the Caucasus and the Central Asia because of the Soviet Union’s postwar consolidation in the region. While these nationalist groups fiercely rejected the Greek Cypriots’ aspiration for Enosis (unification of the island with Greece), they advocated, oxymoronicly, the counter argument for the Turkification of the island through Turkey’s annexation. According to these groups, the “red danger” of the north sought to encircle Anatolia by establishing a communist regime in Cyprus under the leadership of Makarios, whose pro-nonaligned stance was seen as a serious threat to

⁷³³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, 46.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

Turkey's well being. As early as 1950, Ahmet Emin Yalman stated, "We are encountering a sabotage of Moscow" in Cyprus.⁷³⁶ In the second half of the 1950s, nationalist publications illustrating Cyprus as a "baby-vatan" for the benefit of moving Turkish public opinion expanded rapidly in circulation.⁷³⁷ As the general Turkish public did not have any notions about Cyprus because there was no information about the island in Turkish schoolbooks, the nationalistic publications employed maps to create the compelling image of Cyprus indelibly tied to Turkey. Among the most prominent examples was of the "Cyprus is Turkish" publication with a front-page map showing Cyprus chained to Turkey.⁷³⁸ (See Figure 7)

⁷³⁶ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Neden Bir Kıbrıs Meselesi Var?" *Vatan*, January 18, 1950, quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, 23.

⁷³⁷ For a representative nationalistic book with poems and articles, see F. Cemal Oğuz Öcal, *Kıbrıs'a Seferim Var* (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaası, 1958).

⁷³⁸ *Kıbrıs Türktür* (Ankara: Güzel İstanbul Matbaası, 1958).

Figure 7: The front cover of a booklet with the title “Cyprus is Turkish” published in 1958. The map of Cyprus is chained to a crescent encircling the map of Turkey. Note the photo of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the star on the top of the page. This pictorial image was widely used in the late 1950s at mass rallies in Turkey and Cyprus.



As a result of increasing nationalistic sentiments in Turkish society and the beginning of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters' (EOKA) armed struggle to unify the island with Greece, the Turkish government realized its status-quo policy in Cyprus had to change in anticipation of Britain's eventual withdrawal from the island. In August 1955, Turkey and Greece were invited to the Tripartite Conference in London to discuss Cyprus, thus legitimizing Turkey as an official part of the Cyprus question. Just a day before the Turkish delegation left Istanbul for the London Conference, Adnan Menderes clarified the Turkish thesis: "Turkish Anatolian coast is today surrounded by the advanced posts of a foreign country [Greece] and Cyprus is the only area free from this danger. Consequently, the Turkish thesis which will be put forward at the London conference is to sustain the status quo, the minimum threshold acceptable to Turkey; in the event of the island's changed status, Cyprus should be returned to Turkey."⁷³⁹ In line with the nationalist rhetoric of "Cyprus is Turkish," Menderes predicated his declaration upon the geographic proximity between Cyprus and Anatolia, thereby defining "Cyprus as an extension of Anatolia." It was striking that Menderes rejected partitioning the island into two ethnic states, a position that would define Turkey's foreign policy regarding Cyprus after 1957. Menderes explained, "[V]atan is not a piece of fabric in the hands of a tailor, who can cut it at his own will. It is a geographic entity constituting a geographic, political, economic, and military unity and whose borders are defined as a result of historical events."⁷⁴⁰ Similarly, in July 1956, the Democrat Party's parliamentary group announced, "Cyprus is part of the mother-*vatan* and

⁷³⁹ "Turkish Case on Cyprus," *Times*, August 25, 1955. For the entire speech, see *Ayin Tarihi*, August 1955 (accessed February 12, 2009); available from

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1955/agustos1955.htm>.

⁷⁴⁰ *Ayin Tarihi*, August 1955.

belongs to Anatolia from all geographical and historical points of view and [the island] is vital for Turkey's security."⁷⁴¹

The Turkish government soon realized its objective reunification was not feasible, because Turkish Cypriots constituted only twenty percent of the total population. On December 28, 1956, Menderes reversed Turkey's stance toward Cyprus, declaring, "we are in favor of the partitioning of the island."⁷⁴² The move was crucial for Turkish political leadership not only for the protection of Turkish Cypriots but also for strategic reasons: "It is a piece of land that guards the security of 25 million people. We believe it is absolutely necessary to establish an advanced post there."⁷⁴³ The partitioning (*taksim*) of the island into two ethnic states was accomplished in 1974 when Turkey intervened militarily. The impulse of *taksim* had rooted itself deeply in the minds of the Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots with the slogan of 'partition or death' extensively used in mass demonstrations during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s.

The Cyprus Republic was established in 1960 following the 1959 conferences in Zurich and London. Its political system arose from a power sharing federation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots with Turkey, Greece, and Britain acting as guarantor powers. In accepting the republic's existence, while Turkey seemed to back away from the partition thesis, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political leaders never abandoned of the goal of forming an independent Turkish state in the island's north sector. In 1964 after skirmishes erupted between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü stressed, "[O]fficially, we promoted the federation

⁷⁴¹ *Ayin Tarihi*, July 1956 (accessed February 12, 2009); available from <http://www.byeqm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1956/temmuz1956.htm>.

⁷⁴² Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, 288.

⁷⁴³ *Ibid*, 287.

concept rather than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the Treaty.”⁷⁴⁴ After the ultranationalist military coup which was backed by the Greek military junta and attempted to unify the island with Greece, Turkey physically and ethnically divided the island as a result of two military operations in July and August 1974. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was established in the north of the island controlling thirty-six percent of Cyprus’ total territory. As the UN Security Council denounced the formation of the TRNC as “legally invalid,” only Turkey formally recognized the island republic, a country that was totally dependent upon Turkey.

Although Turkey justified the “Cyprus Peace Operation” as restoring the rightful independence and constitutional order of the Cyprus Republic, the establishment of an independent Turkish state which included expelling nearly all Greek Cypriots living in the north and the continuing presence of 30,000 Turkish military personnel contradicted the military operation’s declared peaceful objectives. Politicians and military officials never considered the presence of Turkish military personnel and garrisons in Cyprus as temporary that would leave the island as soon as Greek and Turkish Cypriots reached a settlement. Since 1974, Turkish military operation has been represented as recovering the *baby-vatan* from Greek oppression. Bülent Ecevit, Turkey’s prime minister in 1974, who ordered the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus, became a national hero and was hailed as “the Conqueror of Cyprus,” reminiscent of Mehmet the Conqueror, who conquered Istanbul in 1453 and ended the Byzantine Empire. Rauf Denktaş, who served as the president of the TRNC from its establishment until 2005, always believed it was impossible for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together peacefully.

⁷⁴⁴ *Dışişleri Belleteni* no.2 (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1964), 63. Emin Dirvana, Turkey’s first ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus, revealed that Rauf Denktaş never believed in the newly established state’s viability. Dirvana accused Denktaş of “disputing unnecessarily with the Greeks” instead of working for the economic and social development of the Turkish community as the President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber. *Milliyet*, May 15, 1964.

Emphasizing the unfeasibility of the Cypriot identity, Denktaş stated, “[T]he only true Cypriot is the Cypriot donkey.”⁷⁴⁵ Accordingly, in all negotiations with the Greek Cypriots after 1974, Denktaş insisted on conditions of establishing a confederation or loose federation based on two sovereign states that would legalize the island’s partitioning and would, therefore, pave the way for the independence of Turkish Cypriots.

Between the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and the Annan Plan referendum in 2004, Turkey’s traditional foreign policy toward Cyprus, based on defending the *baby-vatan* as a separate Turkish state, dramatically changed. Eager to dispense Cyprus as a national cause, Turkey now considered it the main barrier to its EU membership. In Helsinki, the EU conferred Turkey’s official status for EU candidacy, adding its progress was contingent upon a satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus question. By doing so, the EU hoped the Turkish political leadership would pressure Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader, to negotiate a compromise with Greek Cypriots. Consequently, the high-level debate emerging between the anti-EU and pro-EU camps ostensibly over Cyprus expanded into public ponderings about Turkey’s future and whether it would become a democratic country fully integrated into the globalized world through the EU or would become an isolated country resisting “the transformation brought about by the process of globalization.”⁷⁴⁶

The pro-EU actors, namely TÜSİAD, liberal and social democrat columnists and newspapers, civil society organizations, Kurdish intellectuals, and the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which rose to power after the 2002 general elections, stressed Turkey should solve the Cyprus issue by revising its traditional national security discourse and employing all possible

⁷⁴⁵ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısılcığında Kıbrıs* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), 294.

⁷⁴⁶ Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization,” *European Journal of Political Research* 44, (2005): 182.

means to become a member of the EU. In 2001, Turkey experienced one of its most severe economic crises since 1923 as the Turkish currency plunged more than fifty percent, hundreds of thousands lost their jobs, and nearly a dozen private banks owned by Turkish conglomerates declared bankruptcy. During this economic downturn, Turkey's largest industrialists and large capital owners decided to intervene in Turkey's foreign policy, issuing press releases and mass media publications urging the settlement of the Cyprus question as the essential pretext to clearing the way for full EU membership and recovering from the economic crisis. In November 2001, TÜSİAD highlighted the significance of resolving the Cyprus question for Turkey's future:

Our country's primary national interest is to realize the objective of EU membership. For this reason, it is essential to handle the Cyprus issue in a way it would not become an obstacle barring Turkey's membership to the EU and would not generate serious crises within the EU. It should not be forgotten that a deadlock on the Cyprus issue would result in a breakdown of Turkey-EU relations and in the larger perspective of Turkey's full membership status. Therefore its historical and social responsibility would be very heavy.⁷⁴⁷

Almost a year after this announcement, the JDP came to power amid a landslide victory in the 2002 general elections, winning 363 of 550 seats in parliament. However Tayyip Erdoğan, JDP's leader, was barred from participating in the elections because of a 1998 conviction for inciting hatred on religious grounds after reading in public a well-known poem by Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who also wrote Turkey's national anthem. At the time Erdoğan knew he would not have a political future in an undemocratic Turkey controlled by the military bureaucratic establishment that was cut off from the EU. Immediately after the general elections, Erdoğan campaigned for Turkey's EU membership, declaring he was committed to solving the Cyprus problem. Erdoğan endorsed the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiations:

⁷⁴⁷ "TÜSİAD: Aman Kıbrıs AB'yle Aramızı Bozmasın," *Hürriyet*, November 17, 2001.

According to our point of view, the Cyprus question should not be a matter weakening Turkey any further. Therefore, we are ready to negotiate. We are not in favor of using the established status quo language regarding the Cyprus question. We think it necessary to find a solution to the forty-year-old Cyprus question. Both sides in Cyprus should refrain from accepting deadlocked negotiations as a kind of politics. According to our point of view, the plan presented to both sides on the island by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan is a viable basis for negotiation. Some circles claim the plan is non-negotiable. They are wrong. No one can give up Cyprus or underestimate it. We propose to act reasonably by participating in the negotiation process and by taking into consideration the mutual future of Turkey and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).⁷⁴⁸

On the other side, there were Euroskeptics, namely the conservative military officials and bureaucrats, nationalists, and political parties such as RPP and Nationalist Action Party (NAP). They insisted on supporting the long-standing national cause, refusing to compromise. They described any move to reestablish a common state between the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus as ‘selling *vatan* to Greeks.’ As negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders continued in New York City, General Hurşit Tolon, commander of the Aegean army, stated, “[W]e quickly forgot the territories, which were flooded by the blood of martyrs. This country brought up beautiful people. But now it is also raising traitors. Is someone not a traitor who says ‘give and get rid of it?’ Are we going to leave our ethnic and religious brothers to the enslavement of Greeks? ... The children of this nation are not going to abandon even a small stone.”⁷⁴⁹ In the Turkish media, a peculiar alliance emerged among newspaper columnists, who fiercely refused the settlement of the Cyprus question by way of Turkish concessions. Oddly, the debate brought together columnists such as İlhan Selçuk, a Cold War era left-wing intellectual who fiercely criticized right-wing governments during the 1960s and 1970s; Emin Çölaşan, who vehemently criticized right-wing politicians, and columnists in nationalist and Islamic newspapers such as *Tercüman*, *Milli Gazete* and *Vakit* which supported the Nationalist Action Party and the Felicity

⁷⁴⁸ “Turkish Leader Says UN’s Cyprus ‘Negotiable Idea,’” *BBC World Wide Monitoring*, January 5, 2003. Accessed March 11, 2009. Available from LexisNexis.

⁷⁴⁹ “Tolon: Çakıl Taşı Vermeyiz,” *Radikal*, January 18, 2004.

Party (FP), the main voice of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.⁷⁵⁰ They accused the JDP government and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan as well as other supporters of the Annan Plan, such as TÜSİAD, of “selling *vatan*’s soil.”⁷⁵¹ Moreover, by associating Cyprus with Crete, which had become a Greek island as a result of a decades-old struggle against the Ottoman Empire, they labeled any compromise for the settlement of the Cyprus problem as “treason to *vatan*.”⁷⁵²

İlhan Selçuk criticized Tayyip Erdoğan’s policies in an article headlined, “Baby-*Vatan* was Lost. Is Mother-*Vatan* going to be lost too?” published by *Cumhuriyet* on March 5, 2004. After accusing Erdoğan of exploiting religion for his political interests, Selçuk called upon Rauf Denktaş to save Turkey from Erdoğan: “Rauf Denktaş, the leader of Cyprus, is seeking to save the ‘baby-*vatan*’ from Ankara. But he is not able to save it. At least he has to come here and save the ‘mother-*vatan*.’ Turkey needs a real leader.”⁷⁵³ In articles published in the *Hürriyet* newspaper, Emin Çölaşan also criticized the political leadership for supporting the Annan Plan, explaining that the pro-EU camp aimed to integrate Turkey into the EU by advocating the campaign of “give and get rid of it.” Çölaşan identified the pro-EU camp as “inclined to sell *vatan*’s soil.”⁷⁵⁴ Similarly, Özgen Acar, a columnist at *Cumhuriyet*, labeled the business world, ruling elites, and the majority of media in Turkey and Cyprus supporting the settlement as “give and get rid of it” actors and urged the readers to consider the fundamental question: “Under these

⁷⁵⁰ More than 80 people of an extreme secularist group, known as ‘deep state,’ including retired General Hurşit Tolon and the chief editor of *Cumhuriyet* İlhan Selçuk are currently on trial, accused of plotting to overthrow Turkey’s elected government.

⁷⁵¹ Emin Çölaşan, “Kıbrıs Gerçekleri,” *Hürriyet*, December 9, 2003.

⁷⁵² Özgen Acar, “Mazoşistler: ‘Haydi Annan, Bastır!’” *Cumhuriyet*, February 10, 2004.

⁷⁵³ İlhan Selçuk, “Yavru Vatan Gitti.. Anavatan Gidiyor mu?” *Cumhuriyet*, March 5, 2004.

⁷⁵⁴ Emin Çölaşan, “Kıbrıs Gerçekleri.”

conditions who is the traitor to *vatan*? Denктаş, who is at the negotiating table, or masochists who are shouting to Annan and Greeks to ‘go ahead.’”⁷⁵⁵

Nearly every opposition party went up against the government’s conciliatory approach that TÜSİAD and other leading NGOs supported. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party of RPP, criticized Erdoğan’s statement suggesting a specific amount of Cyprus territory could be ceded. Baykal said, “a dangerous crack and submission is emerging in Turkish foreign policy.”⁷⁵⁶ Devlet Bahçeli, the Nationalist Action Party leader, also condemned Erdoğan’s foreign policy, explaining that Erdoğan was ignoring Turkey’s forty-year-old struggle in Cyprus. Bahçeli added, “[I]f the government gives Cyprus and saves itself, it will not save itself from the [Turkish] nation.”⁷⁵⁷ Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the Democratic Left Party hailed as the ‘conqueror of Cyprus’ since 1974, considered “the government as a serious threat not only for the regime, but also for the satisfaction of national unity.”⁷⁵⁸

Prime Minister Erdoğan responded against these accusations, saying “no one has the right to claim that he loves his country more than any other person. ... We will achieve nothing by accepting the stalemate as a solution, pursuing passive wait-and-see policies, producing paranoiac fears and isolating ourselves from the world.”⁷⁵⁹ Hadi Uluengin, a columnist in the daily *Hürriyet*, criticized Euroskeptics, emphasizing no one has the right to claim a monopoly over *vatan* and patriotism: “Traitor to *vatan*. This is the most delicate part of the matter. One who has the right to speak loudly and is able to pound the table vigorously thinks ‘*vatan*’ belongs only to him. He knows everything. Others with different opinions are seen as traitors who are

⁷⁵⁵ Özgen Acar, “Mazoşistler: ‘Haydi Annan, Bastr!’”

⁷⁵⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, February 2004 (accessed March 23, 2009); available from <http://www.byeqm.gov.tr/ayintarihidetay.aspx?Id=71&Yil=2004&Ay=2>.

⁷⁵⁷ “Hükümete Kıbrıs Eleştirisi,” *Cumhuriyet*, February 17, 2004.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, February 2004.

⁷⁵⁹ “İsimsiz Eleştirdi,” *Hürriyet*, January 23, 2004.

selling Cyprus.”⁷⁶⁰ Similarly, Cüneyt Ülsever, another liberal columnist at *Hürriyet*, wrote some high-level military officials and bureaucrats inhabit the syndrome of “what would *vatan* do without me? They inextricably identified themselves with their positions [in the state institutions], in the end, they gradually become *vatan* and *vatan* becomes them. ... The nation does not take them seriously and does not pay attention to the political parties they establish but they relentlessly save the state, contemplating about Cyprus. ... According to them, anybody, who does not agree with them, is a traitor to *vatan*.”⁷⁶¹

Although the Euroskeptic and pro-EU camps debated about Cyprus, the disagreement in reality became a testing ground involving two irreconcilable worldviews about Turkey’s future. Euroskeptics considered giving concessions for a settlement in Cyprus as the first step of revitalizing the Sevres project by the European powers. The Euroskeptics explained that if Turkey retreated in Cyprus, this would be followed by democratic reforms for the Kurds, thus ending the Turkish state’s unitary structure and consequently would end with the state’s disintegration. Even unprecedented large-scale privatizations after 2002 were regarded as ‘selling *vatan*’ to foreigners by this opinion camp.⁷⁶² Their solution to defend Turkey’s independence and integrity against the offensive of EU and global economic forces and their ‘collaborators’ within Turkey was outright isolation.

In line with the isolationist’s worldview, some high-level military officials in the Turkish army, who staunchly supported Mustafa Kemal’s goal since the Republic’s founding of achieving eventually parity in civilization with Turkey’s continental neighbors, advocated breaking off relations with the EU. In March 2002, Tuncer Kılınç, secretary-general of Turkey’s National Security Council and a four-star general, said, “[T]he EU had taken an unfavorable

⁷⁶⁰ Hadi Uluengin, “Vatan ve Kıbrıs,” *Hürriyet*, November 23, 2001.

⁷⁶¹ Cüneyt Ülsever, “‘Bensiz Vatan Ne Yapar?’ Sendromu,” *Hürriyet*, May 19, 2003.

⁷⁶² Mustafa Balbay, “Recep’le Acep Kuvvet Tanımıyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 16, 2005.

stance” regarding Turkey’s application for membership and, therefore, “Turkey should pursue closer ties with Iran and Russia without compromising its relations with the United States.”⁷⁶³ Although opponents of the Annan Plan – in particular, Rauf Denктаş, Turkish Cypriot leader – embraced the generals’ publicly stated position, Hilmi Özkök, the chief of general staff and presumably the most democratic general in the army in Turkey’s modern history, declared the military would not be involved in the political negotiations process being pursued by the Turkish government. Furthermore, the National Security Council press release in January 2004 indicated, “Turkey continues to support the goodwill mission of the UN secretary general and reiterates its political determination to reach speedily a solution through negotiations in line with the realities on the island as based on the Annan Plan.”⁷⁶⁴ This statement took a swing at Euroskeptics, who anticipated Turkish military would never allow the Annan Plan to be implemented.

The pro-EU actors rejected this isolationist approach, explaining Turkey’s national interests necessitates integration into the EU and they welcomed globalization and its effects such as the free movement of capital and goods, privatization, foreign direct investment, and participation in supra-national institutions. The fierce debate over Cyprus ended with the pro-EU camp’s victory when Turkey gave the green light to the Annan Plan, which was then put in referendum in the Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus on April 24, 2004. While Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly backed the Annan Plan (sixty-five percent saying yes), it was not implemented as the Greek Cypriots rejected it with even a more overwhelming majority (seventy-six percent voting no). Nevertheless, in December 2004, EU decided to initiate accession talks with Turkey largely due to Ankara’s collegial approach toward settling the Cyprus issue.

⁷⁶³ “Yeni Arayış,” *Cumhuriyet*, March 8, 2002.

⁷⁶⁴ “MGK’da Kıbrıs’ta Müzakere Çıktı,” *Hürriyet*, January 23, 2004.

Last of all, the Turkish Cypriots' will and conviction to change the status quo and unify Nicosia, the last divided capital in the world, was crucial in changing fundamentally Turkey's previously uncompromising stance toward Cyprus. In 2000, an extraordinary meeting in the Turkish Republic on the island brought together 41 NGOs and trade unions with two opposition parties in a platform headlined, "This country is ours," under which mass-scale demonstrations were organized in favor of a Cyprus settlement. Platform organizers accused Denktaş of advocating Turkey's strategic interests over those affecting the future of Turkish Cypriots. The general elections in December 2003 turned into a referendum for the Annan Plan. Opposition parties, which supported the settlement against the status quo, won fifty-one percent of the votes, a major blow for Euroskeptics in Turkey. The disappointment was reflected strikingly in a *Star* newspaper headline after the elections: "Honey [Yavru-m] *Vatan* ... Apparently one part of Cyprus known as baby-*vatan* by us seems to have been so enthusiastic about Greeks for years now. They want to have a Greek leader. We learned this grim reality as election results were announced."⁷⁶⁵ The pro-settlement groups in northern Cyprus replied to these accusations, labeling them as unpatriotic, by citing Nazım Hikmet's well-known poem "Traitor to *Vatan*," a personal response to his citizenship being stripped in the 1950s because of his political views which were considered as treason to *vatan* by the Menderes government in 1951.⁷⁶⁶ Nazım Hikmet criticized the undercurrent of patriotism, dominated by the hegemony of ruling elites, writing, "Yes, I am a traitor, if you are a patriot; if you are a defender of our *homeland*, I am a traitor to my homeland; I am a traitor to my *vatan*." In quoting the poem and supporting unification, Turkish Cypriots turned against national dogma, which had suggested that living

⁷⁶⁵ Yavrum Vatan," *Star*, December 16, 2003.

⁷⁶⁶ "On Binler Çözüm Dedi," *Radikal*, January 15, 2003.

peacefully with the Greek Cypriots was incomprehensible and the only way for them to survive was to establish and protect their independent nation-state.

Conclusion

With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Kemalist leadership employed a modern territorial approach to organize the new state's borders, institutions, citizenship, everyday life, education and foreign policy based on the national *vatan*. As their imagined national sense of *vatan* based on territorial sovereignty radically differed from the imperial *vatan* in late Ottoman times, new political norms – such as anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, non-alignment, and, most importantly, absolute independence – gradually came to dominate in Turkey's foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s. Although the European great powers in Lausanne recognized Turkey's sovereignty, the Kemalist leadership did not trust the European great powers, believing they were waiting for an opportunity to resurrect the Sevres project. Furthermore, Kemalists were aware that the National Liberation War would be a model for other Eastern nations in their struggle against European colonialism and, because of this, they would be isolated by the European powers in the international politics arena. To overcome this seclusion, Kemalists cooperated with the Soviet Union and established regional pacts in the Balkans and the Middle East to resist the revisionist powers' ambitions. Another important characteristic of Turkey's foreign policy during 1920s and 1930s was that as Kemalists expelled all the members of the Ottoman dynasty and purged all of their opponents, they did not need to create 'external threats' in order to sustain their hegemony in domestic politics. Instead their spatial imagination was centered upon "rebuilding the *vatan* and becoming the owner of the sovereignty in order to live happily and freely in it."⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶⁷ Ali Sevim, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 612.

With İnönü's rise to power in 1938, Turkey's foreign policy changed significantly. In 1939, İnönü regime put an end to the Kemalist principle of nonalignment and allied with Britain and France. Another important change was that pragmatism and the preservation of political power rather than the pursuit of ideology defined the focal points for İnönü and his colleagues in foreign policy.⁷⁶⁸ For example, at the beginning of World War II, Turkey was the ally of Britain and France and had a friendship agreement with the Soviet Union. Later, it signed a non-aggression pact with Berlin and exported crucial raw materials such as chrome to Nazi Germany until 1944. Although Turkish foreign policy makers promoted such a policy as active neutrality, it was more appropriate to characterize it as "chameleon neutrality."⁷⁶⁹ The lack of distinct ideology and "chameleon neutrality" was manifested because İnönü never sensed he was secure enough in his political power. Although the official history portrayed İnönü's succession of Mustafa Kemal as an abrupt shift in consensus among the Kemalist elite, there were other leading politicians, such as Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Şükrü Kaya, who contested İnönü's leadership. However, this power struggle did not manifest fully until the end of World War II. As the opposition became better organized in the second half of 1944, İnönü realized he would face a difficult future on the domestic and international political scene as he was perceived by the Allies as authoritarian and unreliable because of his earlier foreign policy stance toward Nazi Germany.

Soviet proposals in 1945 gave a much-needed lifesaver to the İnönü regime intent on staying in power and suppressing the opposition. In representing the Soviet proposals as an imminent threat to Turkish *vatan*, the İnönü regime created a paranoia-like political environment, in which major opposition political figures were seen as the fifth column of the Soviet Union and

⁷⁶⁸ Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Görüşlerim*, 3-4.

⁷⁶⁹ Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 295.

were labeled as communist traitors to *vatan*. Communism as a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity became a fulcrum in Turkey's political discourse during the Cold War. Reflecting, in part, Owen Lattimore's comment about the Great Wall, which "was more a product of the kind of state created within China than kind of pressure against China from the steppe," Turkey's foreign policy after 1945 based on defending *vatan* against communism was more a product of the Turkish ruling elite's mindset than the Soviet Union's stance toward Turkey.⁷⁷⁰ Moreover, the 'communist threat to *vatan*' became a crucial territorial component of Turkish national identity, which was employed by the political leadership for the purposes of maintaining a cohesive society and eliminating the opposition. The Democrat Party leaders, who also had been accused of adopting communist tactics before coming to power in 1950, soon realized the 'communist threat to *vatan*' was a powerful political tool to exorcise any criticism against the government. During the Cold War, the 'communist threat to *vatan*' successfully legitimized, in terms of public opinion and the government, crucial foreign policy decisions such as sending Turkish troops to Korea, represented subsequently as a defense of *vatan* against communist expansionism in a remote part of Asia. In the 1950s, even the Greek Cypriots' political project of Enosis was described as a communist encirclement of Turkish *vatan*.

The Cold War's end dramatically affected Turkey's foreign policy. In addition to the disappearance of the Soviet 'threat,' Turkey's liberalization and integration into the world indicated the long-standing foreign policy discourse as based on 'threats' to *vatan* became meaningless. The change of Turkey's stance toward Cyprus in the 2000s exemplified this transformation. New political actors emerged and defended Turkey's membership in the EU as the only viable option for the country's future. They challenged Turkey's traditional foreign policy towards Cyprus, which had considered the island as a baby-*vatan* and had previously

⁷⁷⁰ Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 434.

rejected any compromise by labeling it a betrayal. Now, the new generation of political actors said continuing this stance would risk isolating Turkey from the world. These shifts in the foreign policy attitude toward Cyprus and the acceptance of the Annan plan suggested representations of *vatan* were not static, nor fixed, and, most importantly, were not being hegemonically directed by the ruling political elite as it had been during the Cold War. Instead, representations of *vatan* were continuously contested and dynamically evolving on a stage of new global and local political actors.

Conclusion

In 1951, geographer Jean Gottmann raised a question far more profound and beyond the theoretical importance of his discipline: “[I]f the earth’s surface had been as even and uniform as a billiard ball, would it have been divided into so many political compartments?”⁷⁷¹ Gottmann was not quite sure about the answer at the time but, in an article published in 1978, he had his answer: “Geographical partitioning is fundamentally rooted in the minds of men.”⁷⁷² The state-centered system of territories essentially defines how we understand the world and how our geopolitical imagination of the world is produced, organized and used in constructing the nation-state system. State territoriality indicates all individuals should belong to a nation and each “state presides over, maintains, and is identified with, one kind of culture, one style of communication, which prevails within its borders.”⁷⁷³ This rationale is pertinent to formulating our worldviews and identities.

Kemalist reforms were unprecedented in terms of combining Turkish identity with territoriality. Mustafa Kemal’s notion of modernization was fundamentally different from all previous interpretations during the late Ottoman period. Atatürk rejected all forms of ambiguous nationalism, such as pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism, in favor of making Turkey an independent and territorially based state. With the establishment of the Turkish state, a sense of nationalism substituted servitude to the sultan with loyalty to the homeland. During the War of Independence and the reform period after 1923, not only the Turkish state was established but also the very

⁷⁷¹ Jean Gottmann, “Geography and International Relations,” *World Politics* 3, no. 2 (1951): 153.

⁷⁷² Jean Gottmann, “The Mutation of the American City: A Review of the Comparative Metropolitan Analysis Project,” *Geographical Review* 69, no. 2 (1978): 205; for a detailed analysis of the question and the answer; Jean Gottmann, “Spatial Partitioning and the Politician’s Wisdom,” *International Political Science Review* 1, no. 4 (1980): 439-440.

⁷⁷³ Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 140.

idea of Turkish nation was “imagined.”⁷⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Kemalism, with its emancipating discourse, was an authoritarian ideology aimed at establishing hegemony over the society, politics and economy. Ernesto Laclau’s judgment about the antagonism between egalitarian and authoritarian tendencies in Jacobinism, taken as a model by Mustafa Kemal and other leading politicians, rightfully applied to Kemalism. On the one hand, Kemalism was, in every sense, revolutionary by establishing a Turkish nation with the motto that “sovereignty rests unconditionally with the nation.” On the other hand, it became authoritarian as a result of “the dissolution of the plurality,” “the affirmation that society must be radically reconstituted from a single political point,” and an apodictic stance claiming “for itself an incontestable ‘rationality.’”⁷⁷⁵ Like any other nation-state in the twentieth century, the Turkish nation-state, which formed with the assertion of unifying the society within a politically and ethnically homogeneous *vatan*, became like “a vortex sucking in social relations to mold them territorially.”⁷⁷⁶

Vatan, far from a static territorial structure as suggested by nationalist ideology, has been continuously deterritorialized and reterritorialized by the hegemonic political discourse as internal and external conditions changed. After World War II, because of the change from a one-party system to a multi-party one and as well as Turkey’s industrialization, new political parties and social classes emerged, demanding a more egalitarian political and economic system. However, the Cold War’s dichotomous international structure allowed the ruling elites to contain the competition over politics and economy at high levels by restricting comprehensive

⁷⁷⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. He demonstrated meticulously nations were not the determinate products of given conditions such as language or ethnicity or race but they had been imagined into existence.

⁷⁷⁵ Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, 169-170, 194.

⁷⁷⁶ Peter J. Taylor, “The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System,” in *State/Space A Reader*, eds. Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 102.

democratic participation. *Vatan*, represented under the ‘threats and dangers’ associated with Turkey’s ‘fixed’ geographic characteristics, significantly justified the bureaucratic-military establishment’s capabilities to maintain its political influence and the politicians in power’s refusal to reform Turkey’s ‘special’ democracy. Up until the Soviet Union’s collapse, left-wing groups and intellectuals were accused of working as the fifth column of communism in Turkey and were labeled as traitors to *vatan*. Turkish soldiers sacrificed their lives defending the same *vatan* in Korea against communist ‘expansion’ and, in Cyprus, a baby-*vatan* was born, whose protection became the Turkish people’s national cause.

The ruling elites have used these constructed mental maps to impose order and identity that have made the world understandable for Turkish people. The fading of Cold War antagonisms has compelled Turkey to embrace a new meaningful vision of foreign policy and has stirred up new discourses on *vatan*. The meanings of territory and nation in Turkey have been reconstructed under the strong currents of globalization, and new internal players have emerged, including industrial regions, business associations and civic organizations. They cooperate and compete with global and external actors such as the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), global financial institutions and multinational companies to influence how the Turkish *vatan* and Turkey’s foreign policy are reconstructed. Although the Turkish state continues to be the main player within the *vatan*, these sub-state and supra-state actors challenge the territorialization of social relations based on a national scale continuously. They not only decenter but also seek to reconfigure the Turkish state, which is no longer able to stabilize social order and maintain the welfare system and, thus, must strive to establish a democratic political system and liberal economy amenable to attracting transnational capital. Even the Turkish military, once considered the ardent defender of the nation-state and *vatan*, has

not been excluded from this transformation. On the one hand, the Turkish military continues to rely on the slogan ‘everything is for *vatan*,’ proclaiming it on garrison walls and putting it on the mountains of Eastern Anatolia, where it has been fighting against the Kurdish insurgency for more than two decades. Turkish soldiers still shout out the well-known motto, ‘*vatan*, I am ready to sacrifice myself for you,’ every morning in their warm-up exercises. On the other hand, the military operates the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (OYAK), one of the largest industrial conglomerates in Turkey with a total of \$8 billion being managed. The Turkish military benefited from the liberalization of Turkish economy by selling its bank which had been purchased in 2001 for \$36,000 and had grown significantly with OYAK’s \$750 million investment before being transferred to the Dutch ING Bank for \$2.7 billion in 2007.⁷⁷⁷ Editors for the *Milliyet*, a Turkish daily newspaper, ridiculed the OYAK bank sale in an article headlined, “The Soldiers’ Bank Has Gone to Foreigners,” especially because Coşkun Ulusoy, OYAK’s chief executive, criticized past transfers of large-scale state economic enterprises to private foreign companies in the name of “Turkey’s strategic importance.”⁷⁷⁸ Although *vatan* continues to be the nodal point of Turkey’s political discourse like any other country – it was somewhat remarkable that U.S. Senator John McCain used the slogan “Country First” in his 2008 presidential campaign – today, questions ‘where is *vatan*’ and ‘against whom should we defend *vatan*’ are debated by different groups and are much more difficult to answer straightforwardly than two decades ago.⁷⁷⁹ However, one thing is certain: the Turkish state no longer has a monopoly over its territory in the Weberian sense.

⁷⁷⁷ Carl Mortished, “Turkish Giant Causes Consternation in Brussels,” *The Times*, June 18, 2008;

⁷⁷⁸ “Asker Bankası Yabancıya,” *Milliyet*, June 20, 2007.

⁷⁷⁹ The Internet address of U.S. Senator John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign site was <http://www.countryfirstpac.com/>.

Bibliography

Books and Articles

- Adak, Hülya. "New Introduction." In *Memoirs of Halide Edib*, Halide Adıvar Edib. New York: Gorgias Press, 2004.
- Adıvar, A. Adnan. *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970.
- Adıvar, Halide Edib. *Yeni Turan*. Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2006.
- Adorno, Theodor W. *Negative Dialectics*. Translated by E. B. Ashton. London: Routledge, 1973.
- Agnew, John A. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Agnew, John, and Stuart Corbridge. *Mastering Space*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Agoston, Gabor. "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry." In *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Türk Alemleri." *Türk Yurdu* 1, no. 1 (November 30, 1911).
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. Routledge: New York, 1996.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Ahmed Cemal. *Coğrafya-i Umumi*. Istanbul: Harbiye-i Şahane Matbaası, 1891.
- Ahmet Cevad. *Musahabat-i Ahlakiye, Sıhhiye, Medeniye, Vataniye ve İnsaniye*. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Orhaniye, 1916.
- Ahmet Cevdet Paşa. *Tezahir*, ed. Cavit Baysun. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953.
- Ahmet İzzet Paşa. *Feryadım* Vol. 2. Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1993.
- Akçura, Yusuf. *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. Ankara: Lotus, 2005.
- Akçura, Yusuf. "Peyam'a Cevap." *Türk Yurdu* 66 (May 28, 1914).
- Akçura, Yusuf. "Türk Aleminde." *Türk Yurdu* 1, no. 17 (July 11, 1912).
- Akçura, Yusuf. "Türklük Şuunu." *Türk Yurdu* 25 (October 31, 1912).
- Akçura, Yusuf. "Türklük Şuunu." *Türk Yurdu* 49 (October 2, 1913).

- Akçura, Yusuf. *Yeni Türk Devletinin Öncüleri: 1928 Yılı Yazıları*. Ankara: Aydınlar Matbaacılık, 2001.
- Akşin, Aptülahat. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.
- Ali Tevfik. *Memalik-i Mahruse-i Şahane Coğrafyası*. İstanbul: Kasbar Matbaası, 1900.
- Ali Tevfik. *Memalik-i Osmaniye Coğrafyası*. İstanbul: Kasbar Matbaası, 1909.
- Altunışık, Meliha Benli, and Özlem Tür. *Turkey, Challenges and Continuity*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1993.
- Anderson, James. "Nationalist Ideology and Territory." In *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, eds. R. J. Johnston, David B. Knight, and Eleanor Kofman. New York: Croom Helm, 1988.
- Angell, Norman. *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*. London: W. Heinemann, 1910.
- Angold, Michael. *Eastern Christianity*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Aral, Berdal. "Fifty Years On: Turkey's Voting Orientation at the UN General Assembly, 1948-97." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 2 (March 2004): 137-160.
- Arar, İsmail. "Giriş." In *Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Aras, Tevfik Rüştü. *Görüşlerim*. İstanbul: Tan Basımevi, 1945.
- Arık, Remzi Oğuz. *Coğrafyadan Vatana*. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969.
- Armaoğlu, Fahir. *Kıbrıs Meselesi: 1954-1959*. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963.
- Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969.
- Ashley, Richard K. "Political Realism and Human Interests." *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 204-236.
- Ashley, Richard K. "The Poverty of Neorealism." *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (Spring, 1984): 225-286.
- Ashley, Richard K., and R. B. J. Walker. "Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies." *International*

Studies, Special issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies 34, no.3 (September 1990): 367-416.

- Atalay, İbrahim. *Milli Coğrafya* 7. İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1997.
- Ataöv, Türkkaya. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965.
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Nutuk* Vol. 3. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973.
- *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri* 4. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991.
- Atay, Falih Rıfkı. *Başveren İnkılapçı*. Ankara: Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu, 1954.
- Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *Suyu Arayan Adam*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976.
- Aydın, Mustafa, ed. *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives*. Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998.
- Aydın, Mustafa. "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctions during the Cold War." *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000): 103-139.
- Aydın, Ersel, and Dov Waxman. "A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey's Entry Into the European Union." *Current History* 100, no. 649 (2001): 381-388.
- Aytürk, İlker. "Turkish Linguists Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no.6 (2004): 1-25.
- Badie, Bertrand. "The Impact of the French Revolution on Muslim Societies: Evidence and Ambiguities." *International Social Science Journal* 41 (1989).
- Bahir, Yekta. "'Milli,' Daha Doğrusu 'Kavmi' Edebiyat Ne Demektir?" *Genç Kalemler* 4, no. 2 (June 8, 1911).
- Barber, Peter. "England II: Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 1550-1625." In *Monarchs Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe*, ed. David Buisseret. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Barlas, Dilek. "Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-1936." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (2004): 231-252.
- Barlas, Dilek. *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey*. New York: Brill, 1998.
- Bartelson, Jens. *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

- Barutçu, Faik Ahmet. *Siyasi Anılar 1939-1954*. Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977.
- Bayram, Fatih. "Ebubekir Ratib Efendi as Envoy of Knowledge between the East and the West." Master Thesis, Bilkent University, 2000..
- Behram Münir. *Vatan-ı Mukaddes Yahud Memalik-i Osmaniye Coğrafyası*. Istanbul: Murettibin-i Osmaniye Matbaası, 1912.
- Benhabib, Seyla. *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *Arap Dünyasında İslamiyet, Milliyetçilik, Sosyalizm*. Istanbul: Köprü, 1969.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Routledge: New York, 1998.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *Unutulan Yıllar*. Istanbul: İletişim, 1997.
- Bernstein, Jay M. *Recovering Ethical Life*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Bernstein, Richard J. *The New Constellation*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
- Beyatlı, Yahya Kemal. *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım*. Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1976.
- Bıyıklıoğlu, Tevfik. *Trakya'da Milli Mücadele* Vol. 2. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987.
- Bike, Suyum. "Gecelerimden." *Türk Yurdu* 64 (April 30, 1914).
- Bilgin, Pınar. "'Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography': The Uses of 'Geopolitical Truths' in Turkey." *Political Geography* 26, no. 7 (2007): 740-756.
- Bilgin, Pınar. "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization." *European Journal of Political Research* 44, (2005): 175-201.
- Birinci, Ali, ed. "Vatan Tehlikede." *Tarih ve Toplum* 54 (June 1988): 337-342.
- Birinci, Ali. "Mehmet Ali Tevfik Yükselen." *Türk Yurdu* 27, no.243 (November 2007): 58-62.
- *Birinci Coğrafya Kongresi: Raporlar, Müzakereler, Kararlar*. Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1941.
- Blumenberg, Hans. *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Translated by Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983.

- Booth, Ken. "75 Years on: Rewriting the Subject's Past – Reinventing its Future." In *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Booth, Ken. "Critical Explorations." In *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
- Booth, Ken. "Dare Not To Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future." In *International Relations Theory Today*, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Polity, 1998.
- Braddick, Henderson B. "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics." In *European Diplomacy Between Two Wars 1919-1939*, ed. Hans Wilhelm Gatzke. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972.
- Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod, eds. *State/Space: a Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
- Brockett, Gavin D. "Betwixt and Between: Turkish Print Culture and the Emergence of a National Identity." Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 2003.
- Brown, Cameron S. "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War." *Review of International Studies Association* 34, (2008): 89-108.
- Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West." *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 34.
- Budak, Mustafa. *İdealden Gerçeğe*. Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002.
- Butler, Murray. *Between the Two Worlds: Interpretations of the Age in Which We Live*. New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1934.
- Butler, Nicholas Murray. *A World in Ferment: Interpretations of the War for a New World Order*. New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1917.
- Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, and Richard Little. *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Campbell, David. "Poststructuralism." In *International Relations Theories*, eds. Tim Dunne, Milya Kurki, and Steve Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

- Canasia, S., and N. Brerdzenisvili. "Türkiye'den Haklı İstemlerimiz." *Tarih ve Toplum* 8, no. 46 (October 1987): 49-52.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan, 1939.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1949.
- Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. *Sınıf Arkadaşım Atatürk*. İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1967.
- Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. *Moskova Hatıraları (21/11/1920 – 2/6/1922)*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955.
- Cemal Paşa. *Hatıralar*. İstanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959.
- "Choice." *Time*, July 12, 1943.
- Clark, Kenneth. *Looking at Pictures*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
- Cox, Robert W. "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun." In *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, eds. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Cox, Robert W. "Critical Political Economy." In *International Political Economy and Understanding Global Disorder*, eds. Robert W. Cox and Bjorn Hettne. Halifax: Fernwood, 1995.
- Cox, Robert W. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, (1983): 162-175.
- Cox, Robert W. "Realism, Positivism and Historicism." In *Approaches to World Order*, Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Cox, Robert W. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10 (1981): 126-155.
- Cox, Robert W., and Timothy J. Sinclair. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Cox, Robert. "The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order." In *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
- Criss, Nur Bilge. "U.S. Forces in Turkey." In *U.S. Military Forces in Europe – The Early Years, 1945-1970*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

- *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabıtları*. İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931.
- Çayır, Kenan, and İpek Gürkaynak. "The State of Citizenship Education in Turkey: Past and Present." *Journal of Social Science Education* 6, no. 2 (February 2008): 50-58.
- Çelebi, Katip. *Tuhfetü'l-Kibar Fi Esfari'l Bihar*. İstanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık ve Basın Sanayii, 1980.
- Çelik, Hüseyin. *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1994.
- Darkot, Besim. *Türkiye Coğrafyası*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*. New York: University Press of America, 1994.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. *Stratejik Derinlik*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002.
- *Demokrat Parti Başkanlığı*, no. 60. Ankara, Arbas Matbaası, 1947.
- *Demokrat Parti Kurucuları Bu Davanın Adamı Değildirler*. Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1949.
- *Demokrat Parti Neşriyatından 7: Türkiye ve Atlantik Paktı*. Ankara: Güneş Matbaası, 1954.
- *Demokrat Parti Neşriyatından 8: Düşmanı Kore'de Karşıladık*. Ankara: Güneş Matbaası, 1954.
- Deringil, Selim, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no.1 (January 1993): 3-29.
- Deringil, Selim. "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45 (2003): 311-342.
- Deringil, Selim. *Turkish Foreign Policy during the World War II: An 'Active' Neutrality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Derrida, Jacques. *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Devetak, Richard. "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 24 (1995): 27-51.
- Devetak, Richard. "Theories, Practices and Postmodernism in International Relations 1." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 12, no. 2 (1999): 61-76

- Dews, Peter, ed. *Habermas: a Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
- *Dışışleri Belleteni* no.2. Ankara: Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 1964. Dickinson, G. Lowes. *Causes of International War*. London: Swarthmore Press Ltd., 1920.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. *The International Anarchy 1904-1914*. New York: Century Company, 1926.
- Dizdarođlu, Hikmet. *Şinasi: Hayatı, Sanatı, Eserleri*. Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1954.
- Dodd, Clement Henry. *Politics and Government in Turkey*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969.
- Dođanay, Hayati. *Türkiye Beşeri Cođrafyası*. Ankara: Gazi Büro Kitabevi, 1994.
- Dryberg, Torben Berch. "The Political and Politics in Discourse Analysis." In *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, eds. Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Dursunođlu, Cevat. "Erzurum Kongresi Sırasında Atatürk'ün Düşünceleri." *Belleten* no. 108 (October 1963).
- Duru, Kazım Nami. *İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım*. Istanbul: Sucuođlu Matbaası, 1957.
- Edib, Halide, "Felaketlerden Sonra Milletler." *Türk Yurdu* 40 (May 29, 1913).
- Enginün, İnci. *Halide Edib Adivar'ın Eserlerinde Dođu ve Batı Meselesi*. Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2007.
- Erden, Ali Fuad. *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Suriye Hatıraları*. Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003.
- Erden, Ali Fuad. *Paris'ten Tih Sahrasına*. Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1949.
- Eren, Güler. *Osmanlı* Vol.8. Ankara: Semih Ofset, 1999.
- Ergin, Osman Nuri. *İstanbul Mektepleri ve İlim, Terbiye ve San'at Müesseseleri Dolayısıyla Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*. Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaası, 1939-1943.
- Erinç, Sırrı, and Sami Öngör, *Türkiye Cođrafyası*. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976.
- Erinç, Sırrı, and Sami Öngör, *Ülkeler Cođrafyası*. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1975.
- Erinç, Sırrı, and Sami Öngör. *Türkiye Cođrafyası*. Ankara: Ahmet Sait Basımevi, 1950.
- Erkin, Feridun Cemal. *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*. Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968.
- Erkman, Faris, "En Büyük Tehlike." In *Kırklı Yıllar*. Istanbul: TÜSTAV, 2002.
- Ersanlı, Büşra Behar. *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu, 1929-1937*. Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992.

- Ersoy, Mehmed Akif. "Hala mı Boğuşmak?" In *Safahat*. Istanbul: İnkilap Kitapevi, 1958.
- Esmer, Ahmet Şükrü. "Türk Diplomasisi: 1920-1955." *Yeni Türkiye*. Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi, 1959
- Eşref, Ruşen. "Azim ve İman." *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 257, August 7, 1921.
- Faik Sabri, *Osmanlı Coğrafya-i Tabii ve İktisadisi*. Istanbul: Kanaat Matbaası, 1917.
- Faik Sabri. *Çocuklara Coğrafya Kiraatleri*. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916.
- Faik Sabri. *Coğrafya-i Tabii Dersleri*. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Orhaniye, 1917.
- Faik Sabri. *Türkiye Coğrafyası*. Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929.
- Falih Rıfkı. "Allah Senden Razı Olsun." *Akşam* 1076, September 22, 1921
- Falih Rıfkı. "Sakarya'nın Suları Neler Anlatıyor." *Akşam* 1054, August 31, 1921.
- Ferid, Ahmed. "Türk Ocakları." In *Nevsal-i Milli*. Istanbul: Artin Asaduryan Matbaası, 1914.
- Fevzi Paşa. *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai ve Balkan Harbi'nde Garb Cephesi Harekatı*. Istanbul: Erkan-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1927.
- Fontana, Benedetto. "The Democratic Philosopher: Rhetoric as Hegemony in Gramsci." *Italian Culture* 23, (2005): 97-123.
- *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950* Vol. 5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978.
- Fortna, Benjamin C. "Change in the School Maps of the Late Ottoman Empire." *Imago Mundi* 57, no.1 (2005): 23-34.
- Fortna, Benjamin C. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- Foucault, Michel. *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984*, ed. L. D. Kritzman. London: Routledge, 1988.
- Foucault, Michel. *Power/Knowledge*. New York: Pantheon, 1980.
- Fox, William T. R. "E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision." *Review of International Studies* 11, no. 1 (January 1985): 1-16.
- Frey, Frederick W. *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965.
- Fromm, Erich. *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Rinehart, 1941.

- Fuller, Graham. *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests*. Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1993.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- George, Jim. *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*. Boulder: Lynne, 1994.
- Georgeon, François. *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*. Translated by Alev Er. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999.
- Gerger, Haluk. *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası*. Istanbul: Belge, 1999.
- Gerth, Hans H. and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
- Goffman, Daniel. "Negotiating with the Renaissance State: the Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy." In *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Gooch, John. *Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy 1922-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Goodrich, Thomas D. *The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth Century Ottoman Americana*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1990.
- Gottmann, Jean. "Geography and International Relations." *World Politics* 3, no. 2 (1951): 153-173.
- Gottmann, Jean. "Spatial Partitioning and the Politician's Wisdom." *International Political Science Review* 1, no. 4 (1980): 432-455.
- Gottmann, Jean. "The Mutation of the American City: A Review of the Comparative Metropolitan Analysis Project." *Geographical Review* 69, no: 2 (1978): 201-208.
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Çoban ile Bülbül." *Genç Yolcular* 3 (January, 1, 1920).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Eskiliğin Mukavemeti." *Genç Kalemler* 2 (May 9, 1911).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "İngiliz'den Sakın." *Küçük Mecmua* 6 (July 10, 1922).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Kara Destan." *Küçük Mecmua* 4 (June 26, 1922).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Millet ve Vatan." *Türk Yurdu* 67 (May 28, 1914).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Türkçülük ve Türkiyecilik." *Yeni Mecmua* 2, no 51 (July 4, 1918).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak." *Türk Yurdu* 35 (March 20, 1913).

- Gökalp, Ziya. "Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak 6." *Türk Yurdu* 47 (September 4, 1913).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Turan." *Genç Kalemler* 14 (1911).
- Gökalp, Ziya. "Yeni Osmanlılar." In *Makaleler I*, ed. Şevket Beysanoğlu. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976.
- Gönübol, Mehmet, and Cem Sar. *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973.
- *Görüşler*, no.1 (December 1, 1945).
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers, 2005.
- Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference." *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (February 1992): 6-23.
- Gusterson, Hugh. "Missing the End of the Cold War." In *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Gürtunca, M. Faruk. *Dokunmayın Bu Aslana*. Istanbul: Ülkü Kitap Yurdu, 1939.
- Gürtunca, Faruk. *Dokunmayın Bu Vatana*. Istanbul: Ülkü Basımevi, 1946.
- Gürün, Kamuran. *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: 1920-1953*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.
- Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity: an Unfinished Project." In *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, eds. Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib. Cambridge: Polity, 1996.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Translated by J. Shapiro. London: Heinemann, 1971.
- Hagen, Gottfried. "Katib Celebi: Cihannuma." In *Exhibition Catalog 400 Jahre Atlas*. München: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 1995.
- Hagen, Gottfried. "Ottoman Understanding of the World in the Seventeenth Century." In *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Celebi*, ed. Robert Dankoff. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

- Halide Edib. "Evimize Bakalım: Türkçülüğün Faaliyet Sahası." *Vakit*, June 30th, 1918.
- Hall, David L. *Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism*. Albany: SUNY Press, 1994.
- Hamit Sadi. *Coğrafya Dersleri*. Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1930.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Hasanlı, Jamil. *USSR-Turkey: From Neutrality to Cold War (1939-1953)* Unpublished manuscript.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Philosophy of Nature Volume I*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Heisenberg, Werner. "Planck's Discovery and the Philosophical Problems of Atomic Physics." In *On Modern Physics*, ed. Werner Heisenberg. New York: Clarkson Potter, 1961.
- Helbert, Josef Alexander. *Über Nationalgeschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand ihrer Pflege in Österreich*. Prag: Calve'schen Buchhandlung, 1853.
- Held, David. *Models of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
- Henri Lefebvre, "Reflections on the Politics of Space." *Antipode* 30, no. 2 (8 May 1976): 31.
- Henrikson, Alan K. "The Power and Politics of Maps." In *Reordering the World*, eds. George J. Demko and William B. Wood. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
- Heper, Metin. *İsmet İnönü*. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
- Herz, John H. *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Hess, Andrew C. "Piri Reis and the Ottoman Response to the Voyages of Discovery." *Terrae Incognitae* 6 (1974): 19-37.

- Hess, Andrew C., "The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525." *The American Historical Review* 75, no.7 (Dec. 1970): 1892-1919.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hoffman, Mark. "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16, (1987): 231-249.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. "An American Social Science: International Relations." In *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Relations*. London: Westview Press, 1987.
- Holsti, Kal J. *The Dividing Discipline*. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987.
- Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Translated by John Cumming. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.
- Horkheimer, Max. *Critical Theory / Selected Essays*. Translated by Matthew J. O'Connell. New York: Seabury Press, 1972.
- Horkheimer, Max. *Eclipse of Reason*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Hourani, Albert Habib. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939* London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Howarth, David. *Discourse*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000.
- Hurewitz, Jacob C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1914-1956* Vol. 2. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956.
- Ismael, Tareq, and Mustafa Aydın, eds. *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century : A Changing Role in World Politics*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2003.
- İbrahim Hilmi, *Memalik-i Osmaniye Cep Atlası: Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye'nin Ahval-i Coğrafya ve İstatikiyesi*. Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1907.
- *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları 1939-1946*. Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1973.
- İlhan, Suat. *Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır? Jeopolitik Yaklaşım*. Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000.
- İnalçık, Halil. "Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- İnönü, İsmet. *Hatıralar*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987.

- *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları 1920-1973* Vol. 1. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992.
- Jaeschke, Gotthard. *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri*. Translated by Cemal Köprülü. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.
- Johnson, Laurie M. *Thucydides, Hobbes and the Interpretation of Realism*. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993.
- Jones, Adam. "Interview with Kal Holsti." *Review of International Studies* 28, no.3 (July 2002): 619-633.
- Kadioğlu, Ayşe. "Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience." *Citizenship Studies* 11, no.3 (2007): 283-299.
- Kafadar, Cemal. "The Question of Ottoman Decline." *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4, no. 1-2 (1997-1998): 30-75.
- Kahler, Miles. "Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945." In *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.
- Kalan, Mehmet, and İnci Enginün. *Devrin Yazarlarının Kalemıyla Milli Mücadele ve Gazi Mustafa Kemal* Vol. 1. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981.
- Kaleşi, Hasan. "Şemsettin Sami Fraşeri'nin Siyasi Görüşleri." In *VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1973.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: St Martin's Press, 1970.
- Kaplan, Sam. *The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in post-1980 Turkey*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Kapur, Harish. *Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan*. Geneva: Michael Joseph Limited, 1966.
- Karabekir, Kazım. *Hayatım*. Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995.
- Karamustafa, Ahmet T. "Cosmographical Diagrams." In *The History of Cartography: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies*, eds. J. B Harley and David Woodward. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

- Karpat, Kemal H. *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*. Leiden: Brill, 1975.
- Karpat, Kemal H. *Turkey's Politics: the Transition to a Multi-Party System*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Kaya, Kemal. *İlkokulda Coğrafya Öğretimi*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942.
- Kayalı, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Kazancıgil, Ali. "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism." In *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun. London: Hurst Company, 1981.
- Kemal, Namık. *Renan Müdafaaamesi*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988.
- Kennan, George F. *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941*. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1960.
- Keohane, Robert O. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 379-396.
- Keohane, Robert. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Khalifeh, Haji, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*. Translated by James Mitchell. London: A. J. Valpy, 1831.
- *Kıbrıs Türktür*. Ankara: Güzel İstanbul Matbaası, 1958.
- Kılçık, Haluk, ed. *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri* Vol. 1. Ankara: Demokratlar Kulübü Yayınları, 1991.
- Kılçık, Haluk, ed. *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri* Vol. 2. Ankara: Demokratlar Kulübü Yayınları, 1991.
- Kınalızade, Ali Efendi. *Devlet ve Aile Ahlakı*. İstanbul: Tercüman, n.d.
- Kıvırcık, Emir. *Büyükelçi*. İstanbul: GOA Basım Yayın, 2007.
- Kıvırcık, Emir. *Cepheye Giden Yol*. İstanbul: GOA Basım Yayın, 2007.
- Kızılyürek, Niyazi. *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.

- Knorr, Klaus Eugen, and James N. Rosenau. *Contending Approaches to International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.
- Kocabaşođlu, Uygur. "Radyo." *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 10. İstanbul: İletişim, 1985.
- Kocabaşođlu, Uygur. *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1980.
- Koçak, Cemil. *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945* Vol. 1. İstanbul: İletişim, 1996.
- *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri (1950-1953)*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1974.
- *Kore Savunmasına Katılmamızda Dini ve Siyasi Zaruret*. İstanbul: Acun Basımevi, 1950.
- Köprülü, Fuat, "Edebiyatı Milliye." *Servet-i Fünun* 1041 (1911).
- Köprülü, Fuat. "Ümit ve Azim." *Türk Yurdu* 32 (February 6, 1913).
- Köprülü, Fuat. *Edebiyat Araştırmaları I*. İstanbul: Ötüken, 1989.
- Köprülü, Mehmed Fuad. "Türklük, İslamlık, Osmanlılık." *Türk Yurdu* 44 (July 24, 1913).
- Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. "Türkçülüğün Gayeleri." *Vakit*, July 16, 1918.
- Kreiser, Klaus. "Geographie und Patriotismus, Zur Lage der Geowissenschaften am Istanbuler Darulfunun unter dem Jungturkischen Regime (1908-1918)." In *Hommes et terres d'Islam*, ed. Xavier de Planhol (Tehran: Bibliothèque Iranienne, 1997).
- Kuniholm, Bruce R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. 2nd edition. London: Verso, 2001.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. London: Verso, 1990.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso, 2005.
- Landau, Jacob M. *Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History*. London: Hurst, 2004.
- Landau, Jacob M.. *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- Lapid, Yosef. "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory." In *Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

- Larrabee, Stephen, and Ian Lesser. *Turkish Foreign Policy in An Age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 2003.
- Lattimore, Owen. *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (March 1985): 807-825.
- Leitsch, Walter. "East Europeans Studying History in Vienna." In *Historians as Nation-Builders*, eds. Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak. London: The Macmillan Press, 1988.
- Lewis, Bernard. "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey." *Journal of World History* 1, (July, 1953): 105-125.
- Lewis, Bernard. "Watan." *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no.3/4 (Sept. 1991): 523-533.
- Lewis, Bernard. *Muslim Discovery of Europe*. New York: W. W. Norton&Company, 1982.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Linklater, Andrew, and John MacMillan. "Introduction: Boundaries in Question." In *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations*, eds. Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan. London: Cassell Publishers, 1995.
- Linklater, Andrew. "The Achievements of Critical Theory." In *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- *Lise Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi*. Istanbul: Devlet Kitapları, 2004.
- Lyotard, Jean Francois. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

- Lyotard, Jean Francois. *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985*. Translation edited by Julian Pefanis and Morgan Thomas, translated by Don Barry, Bernadette Maher and Virginia Spate. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
- Mahmud Raif Efendi. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli*. Translated by Arslan Terzioğlu and Hüsrev Hatemi. Istanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1988.
- Makdisi, Ussama. "Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire." *International Journal of the Middle East* 34, no.4 (November 2002): 601-617.
- Makdisi, Ussama. "Ottoman Orientalism." *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 768-796.
- Makovsky, Alan and Sabri Sayarı, eds. *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.
- Malkki, Liisa. "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees." *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (1992) 24-44.
- Mango, Andrew. *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role*. Westport: Praeger, 1994.
- Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia: an Introduction to the Society of Knowledge*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies*. London: Routledge, 1964.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Studies in Critical Philosophy*. Translated by Joris de Bres. London: NLB, 1972.
- Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
- Mark, Eduard. "The War Square of 1946 and Its Consequences." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 383-416.
- Martin, Lenore, and Dimitris Keridis, eds. *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.

- Mehmed Hikmet. *Coğrafya-i Umrani*. Istanbul: Nişan Berberyar, 1895.
- Mehmet Asım and Ahmed Cevad. *Anadolu Yavrusunun Kitabı*. Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1919.
- Mehmet Asım and Ahmed Cevad. *Anadolu Yavrusunun Kitabı*. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1917.
- Mehmetefendioğlu, Ahmet. *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Kurucu Üyelerinden Dr. Reşid Bey'in Hatıraları: Sürgünden İntihara*. Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1993.
- Millett, Allan Reed. *Their War for Korea: American, Asian and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945-53*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002.
- *Milli Coğrafya*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*. 5th ed. New York: Knopf, 1978.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.
- Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. 6th Edition. New York: Knopf, 1985.
- Muhiddin Adil. *Malumatı Vataniye*. Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1925.
- Mumcu, Uğur. *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*. Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1990.
- Murray, Gilbert. *The Ordeal of This Generation*. New York: Harper&Row, 1929.
- Mustafa Sami Efendi. *Bir Osmanlı Bürokratının Avrupa İzlenimleri: Mustafa Sami Efendi ve Avrupa Risalesi*, ed. M. Fatih Andı. Istanbul: Bayram Matbaacılık, 1996.
- Müteferrika, İbrahim. *Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usüller*. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 2000.
- Naim, Ahmed. *İslamda Kavmiyetçilik Yoktur*. Istanbul: Bedir Yayınevi, 1991.
- Nairn, Tom. "Scotland and Europe." In *Becoming National*, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Nalçaoğlu, Halil. "Turkey: Nation and Celebration: An Iconology of the Republic of Turkey." In *National Days/National Ways*, ed. Linda K. Fuller. Westport: Praeger, 2004.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. *The Discovery of India*. London: Meridian Books, 1960.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*. New York: Charles Schribners' Sons, 1930.

- Niebuhr, Reinhold. *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, a Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense*. New York: Schribner's Sons, 1944.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
- Niyazi, Ahmet. *Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Hatıratı*. İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2003.
- Orhon, Orhan Seyfi. *Maskeler Aşağı: En Büyük Tehlikenin İçyüzü*. İstanbul: Ülkü Basımevi, 1943.
- Ortaylı, İlber. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*. İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1983.
- Öcal, F. Cemal Oğuz. *Kıbrıs'a Seferim Var*. İstanbul: Sinan Matbaası, 1958.
- Öke, Mim Kemal. *Unutulan Savaşın Kronolojisi: Kore, 1950-53*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990.
- Önen, Nizam. *İki Turan: Macaristan ve Türkiye'de Turancılık*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.
- Özer, Ahmet Ali. "Selim Sabit Efendi Hayatı ve Eserleri." *Yağmur Dergisi* 42, (January 2009).
- Özön, Mustafa Nihat. "Bazı Küçük Notlar." In *Vatan Yahut Silistre*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972.
- Özön, Mustafa Nihat. *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1938.
- Özükan, Bülent ed. *Kitab-ı Cihannüma*. İstanbul: Boyut, 2008.
- Özyürekli, Esra. *Nostalgia for the Modern*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Paasi, Anssi. "Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World Flows." In *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*, ed. David Newman. London: Taylor and Francis, 1999.
- Paasi, Anssi. "Territorial Identities as Social Constructs." *Hagar – International Social Science Review* 1, no. 2 (2000): 91-113.
- Parla, Taha. *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1826-1924*. Leiden: Brill, 1985.
- Paterson, Thomas G. *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War*. New York: Norton, 1979.
- Penrose, Jan, "Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought." *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 3 (2002): 277-298.

- Quataert, Donald. *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Radu, Michael, ed. *Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003.
- Rıza, Ahmet. *Anılar*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 2001.
- Rıza Nur. "Devletimizin Mahiyeti ve Milli Adı." *Türk Yurdu* 15, no. 162 (November 1924).
- Rosenberg, Justin. *The Empire of Civil Society*. London: Verso, 1994.
- Rubin, Barry, and Kemal Kirişçi, eds. *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. "Review: Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis." *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-285.
- Sadi, Abdulkadir. *Yeni Orta Coğrafya*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1935.
- Saffet Bey. *Coğrafya-i Osmani*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916.
- Saffet Bey. *Küçüklerle Coğrafya Hikayeleri*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916.
- Said Halim Paşa, *Buhranlarımız*. İstanbul: Tercüman, no date.
- Sanjian, Avedis K. "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish Syrian Relations (1939-1956)." *Middle East Journal* 10, no. 4 (Autumn 1956).
- Sati Bey, *Vatan İçin Beş Konferans*. Dersaadet: Kader Matbaası, 1913.
- Selek, Pınar. *Barışamadık*. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2004.
- Selen, Hamit Sadi. "Cihannüma." In *Katip Çelebi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985.
- Selim Sabit Efendi. *Muhtasar Coğrafya Risalesi*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1874.
- Sertel, Sabiha. *Roman Gibi: Demokrasi Mücadelesinden Bir Kadın*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1986.
- Sertel, Zekeriya. *Hatırladıklarım*. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977.
- Sertoğlu, Mithat. "Mütareke Devrinde Saltanat Şurası ve Milli Şura Hazırlıkları." *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 22 (July 1969).
- Sevim, Ali, İzzet Öztoprak, and M. Akif Tural. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*. Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık, 2006.
- Sevük, İsmail Habib. *Yurddan Yazılar*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1943.

- Seyfeddin, Ömer. "Türklük Mefkuresi." In *Türklük Üzerine Yazular*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2002.
- Seyyid Mustafa. *İstanbul'da Askerlik Sanatı, Yeteneklerin ve Bilimlerin Durumu Üzerine Risale*. Istanbul: Tüyap, 1986.
- Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma." *The International Spectator* 27, no. 1 (January-March 1992): 17-32;
- Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. "Turkey's Security Policies." *Adelphi Papers* 21, no. 164 (1981).
- Shaw, Stanford J. *From Empire to Republic* Vol. 1. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000.
- Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire* Volume II. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Shimko, Keith L. "Realism, Neorealism and American Liberalism." *The Review of Politics* 54, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 281-301.
- Smith, Simon C. *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2008.
- Smith, Steve. "Positivism Beyond." In *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Sonyel, Salahi R. *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika* Volume 2. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986.
- Soucek, Svat. "Piri Res and Ottoman Discovery of the Great Discoveries." *Studia Islamica* 79 (1994): 121-142
- Soysal, Mümtaz. "The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy." In *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004.
- Spykman, Nicholas. "Geography and Foreign Policy II." *American Political Science Review* 32, (April 1938): 213-236.
- Stavrianos, Leften Stavros. *The Balkans Since 1453*. New York: New York University Press, 2000.
- Styan, David. *France and Iraq*. New York: Tauris, 2006.
- Sultan Abdülhamid. *Siyasi Hatıratım*. Istanbul: Hareket Yayınları, 1974.

- Şakir, Ziya, *1914 Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik*. İstanbul: Muallim Fuat Gücüyener Kitap Deposu, 1943.
- Şakir, Ziya. *1914-1918 Cihan Harbini Nasıl İdare Ettik*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası. 1944.
- Şimşir, Bilal. *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye’de ‘Kürt Sorunu’ 1924-1938*. Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1975.
- *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi Dönem 9* Vol. 3. (1950).
- Tanpınar, Ahmet Hamdi. *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*. İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006.
- Tansel, Fevziye Abdullah. *Şinasi: Makaleler*. Ankara: Dün-Bugün Yayınevi, 1960.
- *Tanzimat: Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetile*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940.
- Tas, Halil I. “Geographic Education in Turkish High Schools.” *Journal of Geography* 104, no.1 (2005): 35-39.
- Taylor, Peter J. “The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System.” In *State/Space A Reader*, eds. Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
- Temo, İbrahim. *İbrahim Temo’nun İttihat ve Terakki Anıları*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987.
- Tefvik, Mehmet Ali. “Yeni Hayat, Manevi Yurt.” *Genç Kalemler Dergisi* 3, no. 20 (April, 27, 1912).
- Tefvik, Mehmet Ali. *Turanlının Defteri*. İstanbul: Milli Hareket Yayınları, 1971.
- Thompson, K. “Toward a Theory of International Relations.” In *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, ed. Stanley Hoffmann. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1960.
- Togay, Muharrem Feyzi. *Yusuf Akçura: Hayatı ve Eserleri*. İstanbul: Hüsnütabiat Basımevi, 1944.
- Torfing, Jacob. *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
- Tuathail, Gearoid. *Critical Geopolitics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Tuathail, Gearoid, and John Agnew. “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy.” *Political Geography* 11, no: 2 (March 1992): 190-204.

- Tuathail, Gearoid. "Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 19, no: 3 (1994): 259-272.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Volume 3. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.
- Turan, İlhan, ed. *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1944-1950*. Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2003.
- Tümertekin, Erol. "Development of Human Geography in Turkey." In *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, eds. Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, Fatma Mansur. Leiden: Brill, 1974.
- Türkgeldi, Ali Fuad. *Görüp İştiklerim*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1949.
- Türkgeldi, Ali. *Moudros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*. Ankara: Güney Matbaacılık, 1948.
- *Türkiye’de Demiryolunun Tarihi Gelişimi*. Accessed April 4, 2009. Available from <http://www.kamusen.org.tr/imaj/arge/demiryolu.pdf>.
- Türkkan, Reha Oğuz. *Solcular ve Kızıklar*. Istanbul: Stad Matbaası, 1943.
- Türkmen, Füsün. "Turkey and the Korean War." *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 161-180.
- Uğurlu, Seyit Battal. "Ulum Gazetesi’nin Tematik İncelemesi." Master Thesis, Van Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi, 1997.
- Ülken, Hilmi Ziya. *İnsani Vatanperverlik*. Istanbul: Remzi Kitaphanesi, 1933.
- Ülken, Hilmi Ziya. *Millet ve Tarih Şuurı*. Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1948.
- Ülken, Hilmi Ziya. *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*. Istanbul, Ülken Yayınları, 1966.
- Üstel, Füsün. *Coğrafya*. (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 2002).
- VanderLippe, John M. "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey’s Participation in the Korean War." *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000): 92-102.
- VanderLippe, John F. *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.
- Vasquez, John A. *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Wade, Rex A. *The Russian Revolution, 1917*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- Walker, Rob B. J. "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory." *International Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (March 1987): 65-86.
- Walker, Rob B. J. *International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Walter Benjamin. *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt and translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.
- Waltz, Kenneth, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Wank, Solomon. "The Habsburg Empire." In *After Empire*, eds. Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.
- Wasti, Syed Tanvir. "Halil Mentese: The Quadrumvir." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 3 (July 1996): 92-105.
- Wight, Colin. "Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations." In *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. London: Sage Publications, 2002.
- Wight, Martin. "Why There Is No International Theory." In *Diplomatic Investigations*, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. London: Allen&Unwin, 1966.
- Wight, Martin. *Power Politics*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946.
- Winichakul, Thongchai. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1994.
- Yahşi, Fuat, and Ayşe Başkurt. *Milli Coğrafya*. Istanbul: Düzgün Yayıncılık, 1996.
- Yahya Kemal, "İstiklal Hissimiz." *Tevhid-i Efkar* 311, April, 20, 1922.
- Yahya Kemal. "Yeni Türk Ruhu." *Tevhid-i Efkar* 334-337, May 13-16, 1922.
- Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit. "Komünistliğin Ruhunu Anlamak İçin." In *Benim Görüşümle Olaylar*. Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1946.
- Yavuz, M. Hakan. "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen." *Middle East Journal* 53, no.4 (Autumn 1999): 584-605.
- Yeşil, Fatih. "Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi's Observations." *Bulletin of SOAS* 70, no.2 (2007): 283-304.

- Zhivkova, Ludmila. *Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1939*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1976.
- Zubok, Vladislav Martinovich, and Konstantin Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Zurcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: Tauris, 2005.
- Zurcher, Erik Jan, "Kosovo Revisited: Sultan Resad's Macedonian Journey of June 1911." *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 1999): 26-39.
- Zurcher, Erik Jan. *The Young Turks – Children of the Borderlands?* Accessed December 2, 2008. Available from http://www.tulp.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/wap/ejz16.pdf.

Newspapers

Akşam

Cumhuriyet

Hakimiyet-i Milliye

Hürriyet

Milliyet

Minber

The New York Times

Radikal

Sabah

Star

Tan

Tanin

Tevhid-i Efkar

The Times

Ulus

Vakit

Vatan

Yeni Asır

Yeni Gazete

Yeniçağ

Zafer

Websites

<http://www.tulp.leidenuniv.nl>

<http://www.kamusen.org.tr>

<http://www.tsk.mil.tr>

<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr>

<http://www.ourdocuments.gov>

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr>

<http://www.countryfirstpac.com>

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>