

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

**DIPLOMACY 264
FALL 2016**

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GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY IN EURASIA

COURSE OUTLINE

Global forces now are more complicated and powerful than at any time in the past and they are reshaping security problems concerning the supply of energy in Eurasia. How to comprehend the level of importance of this statement is not clear. Eurasia contains many states undergoing wide ranges of political and economic development requiring enormous amounts of energy. Fortunately for both developed and developing states large energy reserves are indeed available; but unfortunately the distribution of petroleum wealth in this huge geographical space is dramatically unequal. Here the famous example is that EU nations import about half of their gas from Russia and about 50 percent of their oil from the same country. And this concentrated distribution of raw material is not just a matter for Europe: if we look for the world's top oil producers, we run into another example of nature's unfair distributions of a key fuel for modern industrial growth. Here the major players capable of large scale oil production for export are the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia; and if we conduct a global search for the nations with big exploitable surpluses of natural gas, they are the US, Russia and Qatar. It is not hard to conclude that this lopsided distribution of valuable raw materials will encourage conflict.

Central Eurasian industrial history also provides another reason why the energy security question for Eurasia is so relevant. When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation appeared new rulers had to deal suddenly with old institutional networks and then shape a new order capable of fitting into the nation state structures which replaced USSR. At the same time the leaders of the Russian Federation had to contend with international oil demands and communication and financial technologies all operating at high levels of innovation. We will argue that the complexity and speed of this new framework is not stable and this instability is a major threat to the supply of oil and gas.

The Russian Federation is vulnerable to challenges both from a rebellion within society as in the Color Revolutions demonstrated or conflicts on the frontier of the new nation state system as in the case of the Ukraine in 2004. But this not the full story for modern communications technology spread internal violence widely throughout the southern rim of the Russian Federation. After 1991 the Chechen declared independence and the Russians not only perceived this politics as a threat to state stability in the Caucasus but also to their control of the petroleum rich resources of the Caspian Sea region. Their response to the Chechen uprising was to crush it. This tactic promoted an Islamic terrorist movement that introduced a new global level of threat

to the oil rich center of Eurasia. Thus the old institutional practices for the relatively peaceful transfer of oil and gas products during the Cold War gave way to a host of new global, national and technical considerations.

The story of Ukraine's rebellion against Russia's exploitative control over gas prices became a side show at the turn of the twenty first century when it became known that both China and India decided to adopt policies aimed at rapidly modernizing their societies. Before the Soviet Union disappeared the two East Asian countries had important good and bad relations with each other; but that was a frontier affair in East Asia. After consolidating control over their populations in the late twentieth century the leaders of these two huge nations decided to rapidly develop their economies in order to compete in a highly industrialized global economy. The energy requirements for this policy were huge. And the obvious source search for their initial energy demand was the nearby Russian Federation. Moreover, this event was associated with other political, commercial and technical developments that heightened Asia's trading connections with the rest of the world. This represented the earliest version of the Turn Toward Asia. But this combined (Eurasian) decision to engage in forced draft modernization involved dragging one third of humanity from low levels of economic performance up to European middle class incomes. We will argue that this affair generates major security concerns.

As our analysis of security risks moves into the first decade of the twenty first century, where the policy making concern for threats to the production of oil and gas in Eurasia increase as conflict now includes Pakistan, the Persian/Arabian Gulf, the Fertile Crescent and the eastern portion of North Africa. We also have to include Turkey, Caucasus and the Caspian Sea because the oil industry is highly involved through pipeline operations in this region. Over seventy percent of the world's oil and gas reservoirs are in this area.

Our final topic for the concluding portions of the course will deal with the complicated impact of modern technology on the societies of the Eurasia as a security issue. We will argue that the radical experience most of Eurasian society has had with the application of modern technology has encouraged a violent reaction against modernity. Our example for the serious for the character of this challenge to the security of petroleum operations starts with the Iranian Revolution and the arrival of terrorist threats to the security of Central Eurasian oil and gas production.

1. LECTURES

In view of the ambitious scope of this course, I will depend upon an interactive mixture of lectures, class discussions and media presentations to cover many complex issues. Students are encouraged to establish study groups early in the course and to draw up maps, short chronologies and a vocabulary of geographical, ethnic and industrial terms in order to keep the spaces and cast of characters straight for a period of major institutional change in Eurasia.

2. FORMAT

The course will be lectures mixed with class room discussion of major shifts in the

geopolitics of Eurasian energy development.

EVALUATION

The final grade will be based upon the following considerations:

20% for mid- term exam

70% for the final exam

10% for class participation

3. KEY READINGS FOR THE COURSE AND CAPSTONE PROJECTS

The major texts for this course for students interested in completing field requirements or capstone projects on one of the issues raised in the following lectures are listed below. All of these books are on Reserve in Edward Ginn Library or are posted to our electronic blackboard. Texts on Eurasian history, politics and culture are rarely best sellers and I do not encourage students to purchase the detailed studies of specific issues unless there is a special interest in mind. Books will also be available for purchase at the Tufts University Bookstore.

The best overall text on oil and gas industry is Daniel Yergin, **The Quest: Energy Security and the Remaking of the Modern World**, (New York, The Penguin Press, 2011); Parag Khanna, **Connectography: Mapping The Future of Global Civilization** (New York, Random House, 2016) provides the most innovative global framework for the analysis of energy geopolitics; for Security Studies students, Jan H.Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds. **Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition** (Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2nd edition, 2013)is inclusive; understanding the cultural backlash associated with the modern impact of the oil industry see, Mark Juergensmeyer, **Terror in the Mind of God** (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 2003); Michael Mann, **Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John A. Hall** (Malden, MA, 2011) summaries the complex relations between the nation state and society in the modern era of rapid industrialization; Kelly Sims Gallagher, **The Globalization of Clean Energy Technology: Lessons from China** (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2014); is crucial for understanding the relation between the rapid industrialization of China and the ability of the state to absorb and use modern technology; for American geopolitical interests in the Chinese experience with accelerated modern technology see, Kurt M.Campbell, **The Pivot** , (NewYork, Hachette Book Group, 2016); Angela E. Stent, **The Limits of Partnership** (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014) deals with the impact of the end of the Soviet Union on great power relations on the security situation in energy rich Eurasia; for maritime issues related to the rise of Asian consumption of oil , J. Mohan Malik. **Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from China, India and the United States** (London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); for forthcoming technological revolutions in general see the McKinsey Global Institute's point of view in , Richard Dobbs, James Manyika, and Jonathan Woetzel, **No Ordinary Disruption** (New York, Public Affairs Press, 2015).

If you have difficulty getting at the readings listed for each of the lectures, please see me. My office hours are Tuesday and Thursday from 10-12 in Cabot 603. Should these hours not

work out for you, call my assistant Ms. Rachel Brown at ex 72734 and make an appointment.

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PART 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY INSECURITY

September 6 Where is Eurasia, why is Southwest Asia such an important part of energy geopolitics and why is the current energy situation so unstable?

On the big connection between military affairs and energy demands see, www.vaclavsmil.com/wp-content/uploads/dos/smil-artical-2004-war-and-energy.pdf ; Yergin, The Quest, pp. 1-34; Khanna, Connectography, pp.1-34; Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, pp. xi-15.

September 8 From Great Game to Globalization; the changing geography of energy security and the complex geopolitics of threats to the supply systems for Eurasia

Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy (Los Angeles, Sage Publications, 2014), pp. 27-65; Kaliki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, pp. 69-87; and ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/docs/energyunion-en.pdf. (A Framework strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-looking Climate Change Policy).

PART II

THE ARCTIC, BALTIC SEA AND EASTERN EUROPE: REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS CONCERNING ENERGY AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 1991

September 13 The Collapse of the USSR in 1991 and New State Instabilities in Eurasia.

Peri Pamir addresses this problem in “Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy: Contemporary Manifestations”. This argument is available at WWW.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2-2/pamir.htm. For a recasting of the competition between Russia, Eastern European States and the United States see, Angel E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 1-48; and The Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy Sciences, Global and Russian Energy Outlook up to 2040 available at www.erivas.ru/files/2014/forecast_2040_en.pdf, pp 88-94. Gvosdev and Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy, pp.276-279.

September 15 Defrosting the top of the World: the struggle for the production and

transportation of oil and gas from Atlantic to Pacific Oceans via the North Sea and the Arctic.

Scott Borgeson; www.crystolenergy.com/assessing/-future-north-sea-oil-gas/
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arctic-antartic/2008-03-02/artic-meltdown>. And Kaliicki and Goldwyn, eds. Energy and Security, pp. 205-220 (Charles Emmerson, “The Arctic: Promise or Peril?”).

September 20 Russia and NATO: the unstable Geopolitics of Gas Pipelines in Eastern Europe

Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2014), pp. 1-37, 99-143; Keith C. Smith, Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine (Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), pp iv-76.

September 22 On Out Flanking NATO: Russian Energy Counter Strokes: the North Stream and The Baltic Sea Solution (the Blue Stream)

Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (London, Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 93-209; and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream. .

October 27 The new energy geopolitics of the Black Sea: From Blue Stream to South Stream to rusting pipes.

Shireen Hunter, Strategic Development in Eurasia After 11 September (New York, Routledge, 2004), pp. 55-75. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Stream. Why Russia Cancelled South Stream is in http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Stream.

September 29 Imperial boundaries revived: Russian Invasion of Crimea 2008.

WWW.USNEWS.Com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/04/17/Ukraine-crisis-is-a-geopolitical-game-changer-that-weakened-Russia. The counter argument to the game changer article is available in www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm.

PART III

THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY INSECURITY IN THE HISTORICAL CORE OF EURASIA: “THE CASPIAN DERBY”.

October 4 Political instability in crucial sub-regions of Central Eurasia: the security importance of the “Strategic Ellipse”.

Yergin, The Quest, pp. 43-63; for the larger role the Chechen uprising has played in political within the Caspian Sea region see [Carnegieendowment.org/2004/10/28/Chechnya-what-can-be-done/bbm](http://carnegieendowment.org/2004/10/28/Chechnya-what-can-be-done/bbm) Jan H.Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, Energy and Security, pp. 187-204; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baku%E2%8%93Tbilisi%E2%80%93Ceyhan_pipeline.

October 6 Oil America on the Warpath: Western International Oil Companies in the Caspian Sea; Tengiz, Kashagan and Baku Ceyhan pipeline.

Steven Levine, The Oil and the Glory: Chevron in Fortune on the Caspian Sea (New York, Random House, 2007), all.

October 11 Georgia Russians and the neo-imperial “colonization” of Georgia’s northern and eastern frontiers takes place. Is the Caspian Sea now a Russian lake?

Stent, Limits of Partnership, pp. 135-210; Herman Pirchner. Jr., Reviving Greater Russia? The Future of Russia’s Borders with Belarus, Georgia, Kazakistan, Moldova and Ukraine (New York, University Press of America, 2004), pp.1-64.

October 13 How the globalization of oil technology and modern financial networks destabilized the energy politics of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas production after 1991. See Maximilian Curtis’s article at <http://en.foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2013/02/kazakhstan-geopolitics>. For Kazakstan’s difficulties with modern oil technology see Catherine Putz at <http://www.the-diplomat.com/201604/will-kashagan-be-pumping-by-the-fall/> For Turkmenistan’s geopolitics of gas and the question of whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake see Martha Brill Olcott “Turkmenistan: Real Energy Giant or Eternal Potential?” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FullTextOlcott.pdf>.

Part IV

Eurasian Backlash Against Modernity, Entanglement of Great Powers in “The Greater Middle Eastern War” and the Explosive Asian Demand for Energy (1979-2016)

We will consider the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 a turning point in Eurasian security considerations dealing with energy. Warfare will in the Strategic Ellipse now involves global powers and powerful new technologies. The institutional impact of accelerated social and cultural changes resulting from modern warfare and industrial development creates a religious backlash to modernity; warfare destabilizes regional politics and threatens the production of oil and gas; and this violence is spreads throughout the

Greater Middle East at time when China and India are launching major state directed industrial development projects that demand vast supplies of energy imports. We argue the sum of these changes constitutes a new “turning point” in the history of Eurasia’s experience with modern forces.

October 18 For a discussion of the various usage of the term turning point see Niall Ferguson comments in [www-nytimes.com/2012/11/30/opinion/global/niall-ferguson-turning-points.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/opinion/global/niall-ferguson-turning-points.html). For the military involvement of great and small powers, see, Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, (New York, Random House, 2016), pp. 201-294. Khanna, Connectography, pp., xv-60 and Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003), pp xi-15, 61-84 covers other institutional developments considered to be a major part of the Globalization process. .

October 20 For Iran’s complicated response to Globalization and energy security see Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy Since the Revolution (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 368-427; for a discussion of how the Blowback effect of rapid Globalization produces sectarian divisions in the Gulf region, see Banafsheh Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Friends or Foes? (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 175-238; and consult Hamad H. Albloshi, The Eternal Revolution: Hardliners and Conservatives in Iran (New York, IB TAURIS, 2016), pp. 135-141. Steven Simon’s Russia and the Middle East: The View from Washington deals with how Russia might exploit the political and economic instability in the Gulf Arena is at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/05/russia-and-middle-east-view-from-washington/iwnl>.

October 25 Two Oxford Institute papers deal with India and Chinese demands for fuel: Sen, A. and Sen, A. (2016). “India Oil Demand: On the Verge of “Take-Off””? Oxford Energy Paper, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March. Available at <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2016/03/on-the-verge-of-take-off/>. And Meidan, Midhal. (2016). “The structure of China’s oil industry. Oxford Energy Paper, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, May. Available at <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2016/05/past-trends-and-future-prospects/>.

PART V

THE CREATION OF THE MODERN INDO/PACIFIC MARITIME FRONTIER AND ITS ROLE IN THE GLOBAL DEFINITION OF ENERGY SECURITY

PROBLEMS

October 27 What is the character of the statecraft necessary for meeting the security concerns for a major shift in production and consuming of oil and gas from the Center of Eurasia to the East? Gvosdev and Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy, pp. 293-363; Conversation between Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews on the “Pivot” to Asia” in <https://www.Chathamhouse.org/sites/fileschathamhouse/publi/Research/Americas/08133pp-pivottoasia.pdf>.

November 1 The Pivot toward Asia and on how the scale and scope of the new Eurasian security map for the supply and demand for oil and gas to Asia starts, see Richard Giragosian for energy security in East Asia at <http://www.iags.org/n0813042.htm>. Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West (Washington DC, The Brookings Institution Press, 2010), pp.3-102; for the Mediterranean expansion of the energy connectivity along Eurasia’s shorelines see <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/gas-discoveries-eastern-mediterranean-implications-european-union>. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/suez-canal.htm> addresses the strategic importance of the Suez Canal.

November 3 The Indian Ocean becomes the Geographic Center of the Global Oil Market and the emergence of large scale piracy marks its arrival. John Garofano and Andrea J. Dew, eds., Deep Currents and Rising Tides, The Indian Ocean and International Security (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 1-48; for security issues concerning the protection of sea lines of communication for tankers moving oil to the eastern Pacific coast of China see Bonnie S. Glaser at www.cf.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883

November 8 For Northeast Asia security considerations from see the Australian Strategic Policy discussion at <https://www.aspi.org.au/-data/assets/pdf-file/0012/15321/131022-NE-Asia-Defense-and-Security-Forum-Report.pdf>

November 10 As global supply of oil and gas dramatically increases through, around or over choke points some scholars argue that the need to protect globally connected networks that supply energy will surpass the importance of defending the sovereign territorial interests of national allies. See Parag Khanna, Connectography, pp. 137-323.

MODERN ENERGY SECURITY FOR EURASIA IN AN ERA OF

PART VI

ACCELERATED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

November 22 Security challenges in the first quarter of the twenty first century will be broader, more diverse, and significantly more difficult to predict. Therefor the scope and speed of policy making will also accelerate at rates not comparable with previous era. Finally, the frameworks for forming successful actions will be multiple: local, regional and global. Examples of how this new complexity will require new frameworks of analysis that grapple with the uneven distribution of oil and natural gas reserves, new environmental tensions such as global warming, powerful nuclear technologies, revolutionary expansion of the means to extract, move and manipulate energy and in unexpected technological events.

For an introduction to global security problems associated with accelerated technological change see Yergin, The Quest, pp. 523-717.

November 29 The Gas Revolution. the global spread of fracking technology began to weaken the ability of Russia to control the price of gas in Eurasia. See http://russia-insider.com/en/opinion/2014/12/02/07-43-21pm/russia-demonized-suspected-financing_anti-fracking-protests. And the arrival of global Liquefied Natural Gas Commerce created new operational and business environments for energy importers and exporter in Eurasia? Kaliki and Goldwin, Energy and Security, pp. 88-106.

December 1 Given the size, scale and speed with which the producing and consuming states of Eurasia are transforming in a negative manner the physical environment in Eurasia and the World, the oil industry is now endangering social existence. See Luca Anceschi and Jonathan Symons, Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 1-29; Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, pp. 499-514, for what might be done to address this fundamental issue.

December 6 To be optimistic about the diplomatic resolution of the energy and security issues will require a new management on a global level of power in human affairs. See Michael Mann, Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John A. Hall (Malden, MA, 2011), pp.1-176; meanwhile the spread of radical modern energy technology that now links the Great Powers: Kelley Sims Gallagher, The Globalization of Clean Energy Technology: Lessons from China (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2014); and for revolutionary management techniques, see and Richard Dobbs, James Manyika, and Jonathan Woetzel, No Ordinary Disruption (New York, Public Affairs, 2015), pp, 181-207.

December 8 Greater Middle Eastern War Goes Global. See Chas W. Freeman Jr., America's Misadventures in the Middle East (Just World Books, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2010), pp. 119-227

