'Time for Intensive Change': Ukrainian Revolutions in Global Context

Emily Channell-Justice

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This paper engages with the analytical category of 'revolution', drawing from contemporary and historical examples. Based on ethnographic research with leftist activists in Ukraine during the entire period of Euromaidan in 2013–14, I question the assumption that this should be accepted as a revolutionary event. Grounding my analysis in historical discussions of the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions of 1917–21, and comparing Euromaidan with other post-socialist revolutions, I argue that 'revolution' must be understood as a complex process with multiple claimants. Using definitions from political science, anthropology and philosophy, I suggest that revolutionary change is not simply the replacement of political figures at the head of a state. Rather, revolution should be seen as a long process that includes both social and political change. The case of contemporary Ukraine and the Euromaidan protests do not necessarily fulfil this understanding of revolution, but the unquestioned application of the term to these events provoke an essential challenge to understanding contemporary and historical political change.

The revolution is time for intensive change. We can do more than we can do in normal life. We have resources to manipulate. We did more during Euromaidan than we did in the last five years. And Euromaidan wasn't even such a fucking awesome revolution.[1]

Havryil, May 2014

Over black tea at our favourite cheap cafeteria, I listened to Havryil reflect on the events of the past six months.[2] Since the first rainy Friday in November 2013, when we walked to Independence Square to see the first small gatherings of what would become known as Euromaidan, or simply Maidan, Havryil had organized student campaigns, leftist and feminist rallies, and the occupation of the Ministry of Education in February 2014. During these months, a tent camp had occupied the Ukrainian capital's main square – Maidan Nezalezhnosti or Independence Square – and a hundred people had been killed during the peak days of violence in February, followed by the successful election of a new president, Petro Poroshenko. Havryil's reflections came at a time of respite from continual protest and organizing, a time when many participants began to think about what would come after Maidan.

This paper engages with a question that I see has been under-problematized in ongoing discussions of the events of Maidan and what has followed this uprising: was Maidan a revolution? When we use this term, what do we mean? What other terms

can more accurately capture the feeling and effects of the events in question? Often called the 'Revolution of Dignity (*Revoliutsiia hidnosti*)', a term I heard among North American Maidan supporters and pro-Western Ukrainians, the assumption of Maidan as a revolution has been so integrated into the ways it has been discussed that our ability to analyse this moment critically has been limited or even blinded by the desire to see a revolutionary outcome.

Other scholars who have worked extensively in Ukraine have also posed the question of the applicability of this designation and what effects seeing Maidan as a revolution might have on political society at large. Alexandra Goujon and Ioulia Shukan suggest that the continued use of 'revolution' reflects protesters' unsatisfied demands, despite the major transformations that took place in Ukraine following the mass mobilizations.[3] In other ways, however, the use of 'revolution' can serve as a legitimizing tool for those who were on a certain side during the protests, glossing over a party's or candidate's decidedly non-revolutionary positions or actions.[4] In this article, I contribute to what I hope will be ongoing critical analysis from various political and scholarly angles about the nature of these events in Ukraine, which may not be resolved definitively for years to come.

I enter this discussion through the lens of young, leftist activists like Havryil. My ethnographic research – which began in Ukraine in 2012 – has centred around broadly defined leftist groups with a range of self-identifications, from just 'left' to socialist, communist, Marxist, or anarchist. These activists see themselves as strongly connected to other global radical political struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and neoliberalism, but they are equally committed to current issues in domestic Ukrainian politics. Their participation in these mass protests shows an alternative vision of Ukraine's future and the possible revolutionary capacity of events like Maidan.

Leftists in general were active participants in Euromaidan for a variety of reasons. Some saw the protests as a site to promote leftist ideas like tolerance and LGBTQ rights; others attempted to criticize global capitalism and European integration, though the latter did not support integration with Russia either. Some leftists, like Havryil, used the word 'revolution' to talk about Maidan. Others refused to do so, or used the term in more complicated, contextualized ways. Following Steinberg – and in their own ways, each of the papers in this special issue – I find that a critical view of the language of revolution is necessary to understanding events of upheaval.[5] This critical view must include a discussion of the term 'revolution' itself. I ground my discussion in several diverse theoretical definitions of revolution, which provide various frameworks through which to consider the problem of Maidan as a revolution.

I provide several comparative case studies of so-called revolutions, from the Russian and Ukrainian Revolutions of 1917 to more contemporary global revolutions, namely the Colour Revolutions in the post-Soviet world and, more recently, the Arab Spring. From this, I conclude that in many ways, Maidan was *not* a revolution, and continuing to call it one is not only disingenuous but also obfuscates our analyses of this event. Using more thoughtful terminology allows us to assess the events of Maidan in a more accurate and representative way, reflecting on the diversity of voices present during the protests and the multitude of perspectives that are currently vying for power in Ukraine today. As the effects of Maidan in Ukraine are ongoing, these

comparisons should help us envision more diverse potential futures for Ukraine, including further revolutionary possibility.

To be clear, I would prefer to be able to call Maidan a revolution, and I understand that when many use the term 'Revolution of Dignity', the 'revolution' signifies the changed nature of the protest body that participated in Maidan, rather than referring to some kind of institutional political change. The 'revolution' allowed protesters to reclaim a collective and individual dignity by participating in protests, proving that they were not on the side of the regime, an undignified, criminal clan led by Viktor Yanukovych. I was in Ukraine during the entire period of Maidan, from 22 November 2013 until 30 June 2014, when the protest camp was cleared from Independence Square. I first heard the word 'revolution' on 2 December 2013, when I wrote in my field notes that 'now they're saying "Eurorevolution"'.[6] I did not hear the name 'Revolution of Dignity' until I returned to the United States after completing fieldwork. When I saw it used, it was by American scholars of Ukraine and by a few Ukrainian scholars writing in English.[7] I continue to hear Maidan referred to as 'the Revolution', both in casual conversation as well as, for example, at conference presentations.

I find leftist scepticism of the uncritical use of 'revolution' to be apt. Leftist activists tended toward an analysis of Maidan that saw the post-Maidan governing regime to be essentially the same as the Yanukovych regime, and thus they largely did not see Maidan as a revolution. A true revolution would only come when state representatives were no longer political and economic elites whose interests were always the same over time. Leftists continued to criticize the post-Maidan regimes, even as they had criticized Yanukovych; for instance, the protest sign in figure 1, drawn by an anarchist activist, reads, 'against the old-new government'. This protest took place outside of the Cabinet of Ministers in April 2014, when the interim government planned to make major cuts in social welfare programmes like family support and pensions for Chornobyl liquidators.[8] It was an early example of the manifestation of people's disappointments with

FIGURE 1 'Against the Old-New Government'. 8 April 2014. Photo by author.

such economic changes following Maidan, but leftists were ready to provide language to voice criticisms of the new regime because, in their eyes, it was similar to other regimes they had protested in the past. Even though Havryil used the word 'revolution' in our discussion, quoted above, he also noted that Euromaidan had not done enough to make real change.

Post-independence politics in Ukraine

The views of whether or not to call Maidan a 'revolution' stem from continued debates around the significant political protests that took place in Ukraine after its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti has seen several instances of occupation in which protesters have demanded political change. The so-called 'Revolution on Granite' took place in 1990–91 before the fall of the Soviet Union when 2,000 students occupied the square for 16 days while 200 students went on a hunger strike to demand a change in leadership and new elections.[9] In 2004, protesters famously gathered in a tent camp on Maidan again to protest rigged elections in what became known as the Orange Revolution. Part of the broader regional trend of Colour Revolutions, protests across post-Soviet space – including in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, in addition to Ukraine – these anti-establishment uprisings brought together youth activists who drew on the experiences from previous post-socialist protest movements, particularly in the former Yugoslavia.[10] While the Colour Revolutions saw varying levels of success in terms of establishing a new governing regime, the potential power of discrete activist groups coming together to demand change with non-violent tactics was perceived as a threat by those in power, especially in Vladimir Putin's Russia.[11]

In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution was the response to a run-off election in 2004 between pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, the hand-picked successor of the country's second president, Leonid Kuchma. Yanukovych was widely understood to be a continuation of a regime that prioritized Ukraine's relationship with Russia rather than European integration.[12] The Orange Revolution came on the tails of protests in 2000–01 that followed the death of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, the revelations of President Kuchma's hand in demanding his murder and the subsequent cover-up of the scandal.[13] The failure of this protest movement, known as 'Ukraine Without Kuchma (*Ukraina bez Kuchmy*)', to result in the resignation of the president or the prosecution of those responsible for Gongadze's murder was unsurprising, according to Nadia Diuk, because of the unclear demands of protesters and the strong repressive response of the Kuchma regime.[14]

Diuk argues that Gongadze's murder was the formative political experience of the youth who became the main participants in the Orange Revolution.[15] The lack of resolution around this event and the clear intentions of Kuchma to secure Yanukovych's election led to a rapid civic response to the fraudulent run-off elections in November 2004. After two months, protesters' demands were met and a new run-off took place in January 2005, resulting in Yushchenko's electoral success. But Yushchenko did not bring Ukraine into the West as many had hoped; pressure from the Putin regime and extensive infighting in the Orange government stagnated its potential.[16] Yanukovych ultimately became president in 2010 with an effective pro-Russophone platform and strong support from several wealthy businessmen who also owned media

outlets through which to endorse Yanukovych's alternative to the increasingly distrusted Orange government.[17]

Serhiy Kudelia argues that Yanukovych immediately moved to consolidate his power once becoming president, focusing on promoting stronger presidential powers in order to counteract dissent from Parliament.[18] Yet Yanukovych and his team found difficulties in striking a balance between a positive relationship with Russia and simultaneously supporting Ukraine's European ambitions – what Kudelia calls Yanukovych's 'ideological ambiguity'.[19] But because of his regime's politically-motivated prosecution of Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko's former Prime Minister and Yanukovych's rival in the 2010 elections, Ukraine's aspirations to secure an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) were put on hold. Rather than risk the potential Russian backlash from pushing Ukraine toward the EU, instead, Yanukovych suspended talks with the EU on 21 November 2013.[20] This move, including the refusal to release Tymoshenko from prison in Ukraine, prompted mobilizations that would ultimately become known as Euromaidan.

The civic response to Yanukovych's decision to turn away from the EU reflects the same kinds of frustrations that prompted the protests of the Orange Revolution in 2004. Euromaidan refocused citizens' dissatisfaction about the nature of political regimes toward Ukraine's European future. With these similarities in mind, I now turn to a discussion of the term 'revolution,' particularly focusing on the possibility of actual change in political structures. From this foundation, I explore historical and contemporary usages and implications of the notion of revolution. Then I present ethnographic evidence complicating the application of the idea of revolution to the events of Euromaidan in 2013 and 2014.

Theories of revolution

While Havryil's definition of revolution as a time for 'intensive change', when 'we can do more than we can in normal life' is evocative, the term itself deserves investigation. First used in its political sense to describe the rebellion against Louis XVI after the fall of the Bastille,[21] Hannah Arendt argues that a true revolution is a coincidence of 'the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning'.[22] Arendt cautions against reading a revolution into every coup d'état or change in regime, particularly when 'power changes hands from one man to another, from one clique to another',[23] remaining within the same sphere of governance as before. In other words, revolutions involve more than just regime change but a new chapter in history, not just for a government but also for people who are meant to be represented by that government.

In a different framing, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow define a revolution as 'a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the state's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc'.[24] In this definition, many instances of political change can be interpreted as a revolution. Yet, drawing from Arendt, this latter definition does not fulfil the expectation of novelty, nor does it incorporate the relationship between ordinary people and governing regimes. That is, Tilly and Tarrow assume that a population will back one or another group making a claim on power over the state. This definition requires a vision of

'the population' as unified in voice and spirit,[25] or at least suggesting that an analysis of the complexities of 'the population' is a different question than regime change.

To some extent, this framing can be corrected with an anthropological influence, such as what Michael Fischer proposes in considering the long history of revolution (s) in Iran. What he calls a 'social revolution' is 'the slow shifting of power away from the hands of corrupt elites into more participatory and representative government supported by an increasingly educated populace', working at 'both local and national levels, not in its outcomes, but in the growing insistence on freedom and participation that will not be stilled'.[26] Fischer concludes that those who participate in this type of revolution demand not only free elections, but also different economic forms and a sustainable future for young people. This 'social revolution' can take detours – it is not one linear path to the ultimate form of freedom – but Fischer shows that various historical periods can be analysed together through this slow, multi-scalar movement of revolutionary action, or the 'long-term respirations of the social revolution'.[27]

Jack Goldstone, assessing various definitions of revolution, claims it is best defined 'in terms of *both* observed mass mobilization and institutional change, *and* a driving ideology carrying a vision of social justice. *Revolution* is the forcible overthrow of a government through mass mobilization (whether military or civilian or both) in the name of social justice, to create new political institutions'.[28] In Goldstone's framework, large groups begin to see themselves as a united and righteous body large enough to demand and create change; the elite must also acquiesce to the overthrow of the governing regime, often leading the charge. The demand for social justice means the government is recognized as the cause of social ills – from economic inequality to violent repression – a target against which to mobilize.

In this paper, my assessment of revolutions synthesizes all of these definitions, rather than presenting some kind of rubric for what factors must exist to make a revolution. Here, I draw from Richard Rorty's inclusion of 'revolution' in his discussion of 'final vocabulary'. Each person, as he writes, 'carr[ies] about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives … It is "final" in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no non-circular argumentative recourse'.[29] Words like 'good' or 'right' or 'beautiful' constitute final vocabulary, but large, socially significant concepts including 'progressive' or 'professional standards' – along with 'revolution' – also figure into Rorty's analysis. This paper rejects what Rorty calls a 'commonsensical' position, one which 'takes for granted that statements formulated in that final vocabulary suffice to describe and judge the beliefs, actions, and lives of those who employ alternative final vocabularies'.[30] In other words, I do not assume that one single definition of revolution is universally applicable; neither do I assume that one person's assessment of a situation as a 'revolution' must be correct. To explore this, I turn to a discussion of several historical and contemporary revolutions and not-revolutions in order to place Ukraine's Maidan within a broader political context.

Revolutionary precedents I: Russia 1917

In modern history, the French and Russian Revolutions are understood to be the most important instances of revolution; the latter is certainly the most significant of the

twentieth century. The events of 1917 were seen and written about as a revolution in Russia even then.[31] But recent scholarship has problematized the chronology of this event. Peter Holquist argues that the Bolshevik Revolution was part of a longer chronology, from 1914 to 1921, of crisis across Europe, of which the revolution is one of the foundational events.[32] Sheila Fitzpatrick has also called into question whether 1917 is the correct start – and, more importantly, end – date for the Russian Revolution. Fitzpatrick includes material from 1905 through the Stalinist period in her discussion, though she notes that the 'timespan of the Russian Revolution', in her analysis, 'runs from February 1917 to the Great Purges of 1937–8'.[33] While historians of the Russian Revolution use hindsight to their advantage to debate when and how the revolution took place, Steinberg's extensive evidence also shows that what the revolution was and what it would do in Russia – and the world – was a topic of extensive discussion at the time. Andrei Bely wrote about it as an 'elemental force of nature', having the effect that Marx and Engels desired: 'a leap from existence shaped by the material limitations of nature and history to a radically new life where human action would be a matter of desire and possibility'.[34] Lev Trotsky's more radical 'permanent revolution' focused on an international working-class revolution that would ignite across Europe.[35]

Importantly, the revolutionary events that took place in Russia, at least in 1917, reflect all of the various definitions of revolution provided above. Steinberg describes ongoing debates around the definition of 'freedom' as well as around the notion that freedom was an essential aspect of true revolution, as Arendt also defines. Power certainly changed hands – violently – and new political institutions were created. The Bolshevik Revolution was based on a strong ideology, and central to that ideology was a vision of social justice that blamed the tsarist regime for the growing poverty among workers and peasants in Russia.[36] The leading proponents of the revolution promised social change for these populations, not only in the form of better political institutions, but also in an economic system that privileged the working class.

Crucially, then, the Bolshevik Revolution presented an additional enemy, bigger than any single governing power – that of capitalism itself. The utopian vision of the revolution based on communism as a goal for the future created the ideological drive for revolution. Whether the revolutionaries could *actually* create such a world was another question. The desired rejection of capitalism was not always as clear as revolutionary leaders wanted. Bolshevik political institutions were not always effective in securing the social justice demanded during the revolution. Thus, while the broadly-defined Russian Revolution fits most definitions of revolution, at the same time, we know that over the long term, it did not result in Trotsky's desired international 'permanent revolution'. The institutions built by the revolution still reproduced inequalities, albeit different ones than those that propped up the tsarist regime.

Here, it is important to note that the 'Russian Revolution' should be understood as including not just the Bolshevik Revolution that took place in Russian territories beginning in 1917 and the following years, but also multiple other revolutionary and independence movements throughout the territory of the former Russian Empire. Contemporary historiography of the Russian Revolution understands this event as a set of complex, interrelated and geographically diverse movements making a variety of demands and representing ideologically mixed positions.[37] In the next section of this paper, I explore Ukrainian revolutionary events beginning in 1917 following the Bolshevik Revolution to deepen the ensuing discussion of contemporary revolutions.

Revolutionary precedents II: Ukraine 1917–21

The revolution that ultimately brought the Bolsheviks to power was concomitant with several other major political movements throughout the former Russian Empire. In researching the unfolding of the Bolshevik presence in these regions, scholars assert the significance of World War I in the chronology of the geographically broad Russian Revolution.[38] Ronald Suny suggests 'the years 1917–1921 are usefully understood as a series of overlapping revolutions';[39] George Liber describes that these revolutionary movements brought questions of national identity to the forefront at the same time that they highlighted social inequalities, rural-urban divides and competition among robust political ideologies.[40] All of these played out in the Ukrainian territories in the years 1917–21, focused around a revolutionary declaration of independence, which ultimately disintegrated in response to internal divisions and Bolshevik repression. This section summarizes some major aspects of the so-called Ukrainian revolution taking place over 1917–21 to argue that, while these events may have been 'revolutionary', they did not achieve a revolution in Ukraine.

As Stephen Velychenko describes, no fewer than seven major groups vied for power on the territories of Ukraine from 1917–21, including the Central Rada, discussed below, as well as anarchists, Bolsheviks and Ukrainian leftists (Communists, Borot'bists and others) seeking to establish an independent communist Ukraine.[41] The Ukrainian Central Rada, established in March 1917, brought together representatives from pro-Ukrainian political groups, including socialist revolutionaries, social democrats and liberal moderates,[42] under historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky as president and Volodymyr Vynnychenko as General Secretary. The Rada's several declarations, known as Universals, made claims not only to Ukraine's self-determination but also a specific territorial form for Ukraine.[43] While these Universals presented a legitimate political body with which the Soviet Government could negotiate, by late 1917, Joseph Stalin (in his capacity as Commissar of Nationalities) assessed the Central Rada as 'oppos[ing] the interests of Soviet Russia and represent[ing] a counter-revolutionary orientation'.[44] After the Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine in 1917, continual negotiation between Ukrainian political and military groups – including Ukrainian socialists, anarchists and others – with the Russian Bolsheviks meant their consolidation of power in Ukraine, with Kharkiv as the capital, was achieved only in 1921.[45]

Social divisions within the Ukrainian territories exacerbated the ensuing military and political conflict between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Central Rada. Liliana Riga suggests that varied political trends competing with one another in the Ukrainian territories in this time, including internationalism and socialism as well as ethno-nationalism, were 'alternative responses to the same ethnic and geopolitical tensions'.[46] Bolshevism initially was not popular in Ukraine in 1917, especially among ethnic Ukrainians, but many people from industrializing regions became sympathetic to the possibility of 'a neutral social and political space for Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians' that Bolshevism presented in the guise of class universalism.[47] The Bolsheviks exploited existing ethnic tensions to expand their influence, appealing to the growing working class following World War I. However, this appeal did not extend easily to ethnic Ukrainians; as Liber points out, in 1918, only 3.2% of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolshevik) self-identified as Ukrainians.[48]

The Ukrainian peasantry – a crucial group, given Ukraine's agricultural role in the region – was won over neither by the Central Rada,[49] nor by the Bolsheviks.[50] Rather, figures such as the Borot´bists, previously the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, and Nestor Makhno and his anarchist movement gained the interest of those living in the countryside.[51] Christopher Gilley argues that at this time, Ukraine was a 'space of violence', and leaders like Makhno resorted to violence to appeal to people across the countryside because nationalist beliefs held little resonance there and had no unifying power.[52] These divisions, a lack of unified military supporting the Central Rada and Bolshevik control of urban centres in Ukraine, including transportation systems and production hubs, solidified Bolshevik victory. Ukrainian claims to sovereignty continued, but the territory's integration into the growing Soviet Union did not preserve these claims: 'Although Ukraine entered the union as a "sovereign" state, the new Soviet authorities soon whittled away almost all of its sovereignty'.[53]

Historians regularly describe this period as the Ukrainian Revolution. Its importance in launching Ukraine's bid for self-determination is itself revolutionary inasmuch as the contentious national question became a political ideology that manifested in significant institutions and movements over the course of the Soviet period in Ukraine. The Central Rada's regime established a currency, a crest, a flag, and a national anthem.[54] It also supported the creation of an education infrastructure, including the distribution of Ukrainian-language textbooks and building new schools in rural areas.[55] But the ultimate integration of Ukraine into the Soviet Union as *de jure* autonomous but *de facto* unsovereign territory should give us pause in our assessment of this period as revolutionary in the longer term, except as part of the many revolutions of 1917–21.

The question of how revolution is written and what constitutes a revolution certainly remains a crucial conversation. The legacies of these major political upheavals from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries live on. Throughout the world, recent uprisings against longstanding repressive regimes have reinvigorated the discussion of what makes a revolution. In the next section, I present several comparative examples, including that of Ukraine, to explore what makes a revolution in the contemporary world.

Revolutionary intentions

In a forum on the Egyptian Revolution in *American Ethnologist*, two authors present several perspectives on the terminology of revolution. Jessica Winegar justifies her use of the word because it is an appropriate translation of the word most commonly used to describe the events in Egypt, *thawra*, while still recognizing that 'it is far too early to render analytic judgment on whether this process constitutes a revolution in any of the myriad meanings of the word debated in political theory'.[56] Reem Saad also uses the term with the intention not to describe but to signify 'an intention and a goal'.[57] Writing about engaged anthropology in times of upheaval, Samuli Schielke notes that many have suggested caution when writing about a 'revolution', as revolutions 'count as such only if they are successful in fundamentally changing the system of government and economy against which the uprisings originally were directed'.[58] But Schielke counters this point with an example of the way the term is mobilized as 'propaganda to push forward a sense that what was going on was not just a protest

for the sake of reform, but a revolution to overthrow the system', as one Egyptian newspaper elected to do.[59]

These linguistic choices reflect what I described above as taking and having taken place in Ukraine, as well as the sense of never quite reaching the desired endpoint that seems to be woven through discussions of the Russian and Ukrainian Revolutions of 1917. People often use the word 'revolution' to project the desire for political change, not to describe a successful change in power structures. Yet each of these authors mentioned above creates a sense of continual movement forward, that using the notion of 'revolution' evokes a motivation to continue to fight. Havryil was one of the few people I spoke to who sensed that another revolution would be necessary to achieve real political change; other activists have been much more willing to state Maidan's success outright. Vasyl Cherepanyn, Director of Kyiv's Visual Cultural Research Centre, has stated, 'taken together, I think it is correct to call Maidan a revolution because it showed a new political subjectivity on an international scale ... This kind of occupying of space signifies the rise of a new political body ... This indicates the basic political intention to start again from the agora, re-launching the democratic procedures from the very beginning'.[60] Here, Cherepanyn's statement reflects the 'social revolution' described by Fischer, in which a new political body has arisen over time thanks to continual participation in the collective occupation of a central urban space.

Returning to the trend of Colour Revolutions in the 2000s, the example of the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia presents a significant critique to the revolutionary nature of post-socialist 'revolutions'. Manning describes this moment as a revolution that 'seemed to eradicate the inherited postsocialist cynicism and nihilism', as it was 'not merely a circumscribed political revolution, but a social one as well, as one might expect when social problems are perceived to be the result of political ones'.[61] Paul Manning differentiates this revolution from mass student protests that took place in the Georgian capital two years before, in which Eduard Shevardnadze's regime successfully discredited the protesters as uncivilized provocateurs who were predisposed toward violence.[62] In this case, Shevardnadze designated 'the streets' as an inappropriate place to present and perform politics; by 2003, Manning argues, protesters committed to non-violence used their peacefulness to show precisely that they were 'civilized and cultured', and therefore post-socialist and democratic.[63] Yet Manning concludes that Mikheil Saakashvili's regime, ushered in by the Rose Revolution, was repressive in new ways, including toward specific ethnic groups and toward television broadcasting.[64] Again, a revolution that promised social change has preserved a political structure in which those in power controlled the population's ability to challenge it.

In observing the significance of non-violence among Rose Revolution protesters in Georgia, Manning suggests that peaceful protest was a break from previous instance of political activism associated with the socialist regime. Yet, as Arendt has reminded us, the role of violence is a crucial component of any discussion of revolution. Different regimes will respond to street protest in various ways and activists themselves are aware of the importance of how they appear to outside observers. This includes both the willingness of state forces to use violence against protesters and, especially in Ukraine, the willingness of protesters to respond with force as well. In the next section, I describe how Maidan protesters responded to and later used violence, among other tactics, to gain sympathy for their growing protests.

Violence and change

By late November 2013, people, largely students and other young people, had begun sleeping on Independence Square. On 30 November, the militarized riot police, or *Berkut*, brutally attacked them. In a media frenzy that followed, it was unclear how many people had been attacked or what condition they were in.[65] One news story circulated that a girl had been beaten to death (it turned out to be false). A large number of those who were beaten were also arrested. Of course, this was not the first instance of violence on or near Maidan; Andrew Wilson refers to 'staccato repression' to describe the varied and unpredictable use of force at the hands of the state in the early weeks of Maidan, including attacks on journalists and the use of paid thugs (*titushky*) to beat up protesters and activists outside of the central square.[66] However, particularly this beating of students and other young activists – who had come to represent the protests with their 'European' views – was unacceptable to many Ukrainians.

Similar to Manning's description of the Shevardnadze regime's shifting attitudes toward street protest – from their initial attempt to discredit protesters by claiming street protest was 'uncivilized', to the peaceful protesters' successful demand for regime change in 2003 – the use of force in Ukraine changed the nature of the demonstrations deeply. The beating of students was a mechanism that shifted relations among actors on Maidan and encouraged further mobilization. It also changed the status of a contentious performance – gathering and sleeping on Maidan – from a confrontational episode into a violent one.[67] Its clear link to the same kind of performance used during the Orange Revolution made this type of gathering appear threatening to the regime, even though peaceful gatherings were theoretically legal under Ukrainian law. The repressive response of the *Berkut* changed protesters' attitudes toward the riot police and protesters began to see them as agents of a state that now allowed violence against citizens.

The claimants that appeared at this moment were multiple. First, those sleeping on the square were identified as students. While the group of Maidan was not representative of all students, the idea that the attacks were against such a protected group, well within their right to protest, was mobilized to show the absurdity of the attacks. How could the police attack students, people asked? Further, more people who were not associated with political parties began to mobilize in response to this episode. Again, this was not an organized group, but it formed the general 'protest body' of Maidan that participated outside of Oppositional politics.[68] Nadia Diuk points out that students and early groups of protesters discouraged politicians and political party representation,[69] and Olga Onuch's large-scale, multi-day survey provides evidence that most protest participants were not affiliated with specific political parties.[70]

On the other side, the *Berkut* became a target for the protesters. As an arm of the Yanukovych regime, *Berkut* officers who organized and participated in the beatings were understood as all that was wrong with the governing regime. Finally, *titushky* became active participants from this point. While not necessarily responding to a political platform, *titushky* were mobilized by the regime to commit violence, theoretically without implicating the state itself.

These claimants had complex and shifting relationships with one another. Importantly, while Opposition leaders spoke out against the violence, the beatings led more non-party citizens to participate in larger numbers on Maidan. The division between

the state (and its representatives, including Yanukovych, *Berkut*, and *titushky*) and the Maidan protest body – not by any means united as an ersatz Ukrainian nation but neither represented by the state – became more stark at this moment, strengthening the boundaries between protesters and their enemies. Importantly, at this time, many protesters promoted slogans such as 'The Police are With the People' (*Militsiia z narodom*). This also evoked the Orange Revolution, during which many police officers refused to use violence against protesters and defected from their posts to support them.[71] However, in 2013, such hopes did not come to fruition, and the boundaries between the state and Maidan remained.

Aside from these broad trends, my daily visits to Maidan enabled me to see the precise ways violence was restructuring the protests and protesters' relationships. Violence began to come from both sides: the constant police presence around Maidan suggested that they were ready for the possibility of an attack on the growing tent camp. At the same time, protesters were increasingly well-armed and beginning to divide into *sotnia*, or 'hundreds', modelled after Cossack military groupings of one hundred men (in February 2014, the Maidan self-defence claimed 12,000 participants).[72] Protesters also began to occupy buildings around the square, sometimes damaging property in order to claim the space for themselves. Because the protesters perceived that the police would have to use violence to force them out of the square, they were ready to respond with violence as well. Further, the initial use of even calculated force against the protesters on 30 November had largely discredited Yanukovych, whereas he had probably anticipated that such a response would scare other protesters off. The state's own legitimacy was under scrutiny, and how Yanukovych and his regime decided to use force to end the protests would define if the protests would be seen as a 'revolution' or as an anti-government provocation.

The mobilizations ended with three days of bloodshed in February 2014. Yanukovych fled Ukraine on 22 February 2014 and an interim government was installed until elections in May of the same year. Once elected, one of President Petro Poroshenko's first acts was to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union that had set the protests off in the first place. But does the achievement of these demands constitute a revolution?

Was Maidan a revolution?

Goldstone suggests an intriguing framework that places elites at the centre of mass mobilization. Oppositional political elites were indeed central to the early protests on Maidan, but they quickly lost credibility because of their unwillingness to break fully from the Yanukovych regime, continually attempting to compromise with the sitting president. Tilly and Tarrow's definition of revolution does suggest that Maidan can be called a revolution, but it is too limited to accurately represent the complex events of Maidan or the political shifts that have occurred since the Poroshenko regime took power in May 2014. To be sure, it is too soon to know if Maidan meets Arendt's requirements of novelty and freedom, but thus far we cannot say that it has. Fischer's long-term framing is certainly useful, particularly in order to connect various moments of 'revolution' through Ukraine's history, but it leads me to question whether we are simply tweaking the notion of revolution in order to apply it because we want so badly to use the term.

The 2004 Orange Revolution was organized around a clear leader, Yushchenko, whose regime did not bring the changes to Ukrainian society that Orange protesters had hoped, as several people told me in interviews.[73] On Maidan in 2013–14, protesters were motivated by memories of these failures. Many people over the course of my research mentioned disappointment with the Orange regime, even ten years later. Thus the Opposition leaders never drove the protests, and when they did not deliver the demands of the protesters, they became the targets of criticism. Over the course of the mobilizations, the Opposition leaders moved from being a central claimant against the Yanukovych regime to being seen as an extension of that regime. They gained control of the government simply because they were prepared to do so and they were in a position to take power. Recall that the interim government was not formed by any elections; voters were not asked about their preferences for political leaders until May 2014, three months later. In this circumstance, the goals of the body of protesters on Maidan and those of the Opposition were different. If this was a revolution, it was not a revolution to put Opposition leaders in power. However, the Opposition took advantage of this opening to reform the government with their goals in mind.

At the same time, protesters did not condemn the way power changed hands; indeed, they considered the events of late February as a victory. By Sunday 23 February 2014, once the smoke had cleared, Yanukovych had fled, Party of Regions deputies condemned the violence, and public transportation was running again, it seemed like the entire city wanted to go back to Maidan. The outer edges of Maidan, down Khreshchatyk toward where Lenin had stood, was a victory celebration. Trucks of men in uniforms and helmets drove toward Maidan, swarmed by cheering crowds (most often shouting 'Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!') and waving Ukrainian flags. Visitors young and old took photos with captured tanks and water cannons, as well as with serious-looking fighters who still obscured their faces with masks and scarves (see figure 2).

Closer to the centre of the square, however, the mood became more sombre. Tents where dead fighters had slept featured memorials with the images and names of those fighters, and memorials to Serhiy Nihoyan and Mykhailo Zhyznevsky remained. Stacks of cement bricks, pulled up from the sidewalks and unused in the fighting, remained around Maidan. In or around some, mourners piled flowers, lit candles, and topped them with helmets, shields and rosaries. The flowers – mostly carnations and largely red – were the most visible sign of mourning that also represented an individual connection to the events that had happened that, when they appeared together, symbolized the collective grief of Kyiv inhabitants and Maidan sympathizers. Maidan had been burned beyond recognition, covered for days in black soot, and the bright colours of the flowers were proof that Kyiv had survived this ordeal (see figure 3). In stark contrast to the grey and black square, flowers were placed on the streets, in walls of unused bricks, in patterns on the hills overlooking Maidan, and in leftover tyres.

Throughout the protests, public self-representation was a crucial aspect of gaining credibility for Maidan, and justifying the use of violence to protect and support protesters. There were many links between the public self-representation that appeared on Maidan and the Orange Revolution, with the major difference being that the social movement base that was mobilized on Maidan was *not* exclusively from Opposition political parties. In other words, Maidan protesters selected the elements of the Orange

FIGURE 2 Victory on Maidan. 22 February 2014. Photo by author.

Revolution that would most help them gain international sympathy, such as building a peaceful tent camp populated with young people and volunteers, or wearing coloured ribbons to show their support (orange in 2004; blue and yellow in 2013–14). In 2013, however, protesters rejected what most Ukrainians perceive as what led to

FIGURE 3 Flowers resting in front of a wall of unused cobblestones in front of the burnt Trade Union Building in Kyiv. 24 February 2014. Photo by author.

disappointments after 2004: protest for a political candidate. At the same time, *not* uniting around a political candidate led protesters to disagree on demands and tactics. Yet once the violence had ended, most people in Ukraine *did* unite around one candidate, Poroshenko, in order to ensure a swift and democratic transfer of power to someone who would certainly promote the European goals of the original protests.

Following the establishment of the interim government and continuing once Poroshenko was elected president in May 2014, the Ukrainian economy went into a severe downturn. Following the declaration of 'separatist' republics in the Donets'k and Luhans'k regions, which have the support of Putin, ongoing conflict in the eastern regions created major problems for the government's implementation of the requirements of the International Monetary Fund and left the new regime unable to prevent further economic instability.[74] The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the further encroachment of Russian and separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine led to placing questions of federalization of Ukraine at the forefront of political discourses, all while Poroshenko promoted de-communization legislation and tasks, including changing city and street names across the country. In the case of Maidan, a revolution was achieved in terms of power changing hands, but it was not the type of change demanded by the people who generated the possibility for revolution.

'It's better to forget humanism': Maidan's influence on the left

Maidan remained a tent camp for several months following the end of the violence, in part because people largely saw it as an ongoing memorial site for those who had given their lives for Ukraine. Through the month of March – the 200th birthday of national poet Taras Shevchenko – poetry readings continued on the main stage and the flowers and other commemorations remained. Maidan continued to represent a victory, and those who remained on the square now began to discuss mobilizing against Russian encroachments in Crimea and the eastern regions, as well as implementing lustration against Yanukovych and those Party of Regions members who had stayed by his side through the protests.

Among the leftist activists with whom I did the majority of my fieldwork, there was no consensus about whether or not they could consider their experience and efforts on Maidan as a success. While some simply said that no, Maidan was not a leftist space and was not successful for leftists, others considered that whether Maidan was 'left' or not did not matter as much as the real changes in society that had appeared directly because of Maidan. Some felt that while Maidan had an overall impact on changing Ukrainian politics, leftists were limited by the small scale of the initiatives they had created and the stronger sympathy for right-wing organizations. One activist, Danylo, reflected on this problem in an interview in the spring of 2014:

> There are cool initiatives, but in comparison with these common ideas (achieved by), for example, Right Sector, right?[75] That they in some sense had a kind of hegemony, even, on Maidan. It started everything. They just put up some tents and gathered these activists from the right circle, ultra-right circle, and in the left there wasn't anything like this. Well, there were some tents, there were anarchists who didn't especially push themselves forward. Ultimately, social rhetoric from

the left movement didn't succeed. Other than some things, like the open accounting of the Ministry of Education, it's cool, it's good.[76] But in comparison with the scale of this protest, that affected all of Ukraine, the President, at this scale, we can say it's almost nothing. That's why I can say that on Maidan, the left didn't conduct itself like it needed to. It's important that more about these ideas would be heard and taken to people. I have the impression that only now do they start to bring this consciousness to the majority of activists. They must also be able to defend their own views, including physically, right? In other words, be able to give opposition, defend their views in the street, against whatever encroachment of nationalists, Nazis, and others.[77]

Danylo did not necessarily think the left failed, but their presence was not as strong as that of the radical right, whose members were able to take advantage of the situation and promote their political ideology. He saw the positive effects of specific initiatives, like the occupation of the Ministry of Education, in bringing something positive to Maidan, but he did not see the left's social platform as successfully disseminated among the larger protest body.

Alternatively, Havryil, my friend with whom I visited Maidan on its first day, told me, in a second interview near the end of my fieldwork, after he had had significant time to reflect, that he had really 'awesome' impressions from Maidan, and he felt that 'we [leftists] won some stuff' and had done more than he had thought possible, given their lack of resources. He specifically mentioned the Student Assembly as an example of 'winning' for leftists, an initiative that preceded the occupation of the Ministry of Education and was arguably one of the most successful campaigns for Ukrainian leftists in recent history. The Student Assembly was a unique example of student activism on Maidan in that it was perhaps the moment of students', and leftists', most thorough integration into the fabric of the mobilizations. The Assembly began after a student strike at one of the main universities in Ukraine, Kyiv Mohyla Academy, was shut down by the university's administration. Students wanted to keep their organizing momentum going, and the activists who had recently occupied the Ukrainian House, on European Square, a short distance from the main tent camp on Maidan, offered the students space in the occupied building.

Leftists saw their presence in the occupied Ukrainian House as part of the Student Assembly as an opportunity to reach out to a new, non-student population about their organizing ideas. Leftists had not been well-integrated into the protests in terms of their political ideologies, as Danylo noted earlier, because they were at odds with the more dominant right-wing groups. Their actions and initiatives were largely removed from an explicitly leftist political perspective. But leftists wanted to present a critical view of what constitutes revolutionary change to those protesters on Maidan who would otherwise be sceptical of leftist ideas. As leftists saw it, the old regime was replaced by a similar one with little novelty, so the Poroshenko administration was, in their eyes, scarcely different from the Yanukovych one. A real revolution would be a socialist or communist one, with a total redistribution of wealth and political power. While certainly, this type of revolution is unlikely – and, importantly, leftists do not believe that the Soviet Union was a successful communist regime – many leftists still firmly believe that this type of revolutionary change is possible.

Returning to Havryil's statement that opened this paper, he described revolution as 'time for intensive change.' Maidan was not really a great revolution to him, but Havryil believed that people would recommit to challenging the regime: 'We will get new wind and people can do a lot, but now they are tired from the winter. So they didn't get all the way to the last step. And these are people who will give their last breath for fighting'. Somewhat ironically, after Maidan ended, Havryil returned to the village where his father was living to work for his family and, as far as I know, completely ceased to participate in political action. Perhaps this was because he participated in such a violent event, somewhat against his will. As he put it:

> It was terrifying while you are in the violence but it is also emancipatory, the spirit of violence. You have to be the first one to kick, be more aggressive. You can be dead in one moment so it's better to forget humanism.

Havryil may have presented one of the more radical perspectives, but many other leftists assessed Maidan as having been a positive experience. These assessments were built around the notion that people learned that they had the ability to make change happen based on their own skills and commitment – what leftists framed as 'self-organization'. It is important that so many leftists said that their experience of Maidan was positive. Each one was target of violence, first at the hands of the radical right and later at the hands of the state. Yet, for the most part, they felt pleased with how they had continued to participate despite these setbacks. They recognized the importance of Maidan for Ukraine and knew that it was necessary to participate in some capacity.

Leftists used Maidan to present alternatives to the dominance of national groups, to the EU as a capitalist entity and to governance by oligarchs. In their eyes, a leftist revolution would result in the creation of some kind of liveable alternative to these power structures. But leftists also proved realistic; many of them wanted to stand against unnecessary violence while others accepted violence as a key part of achieving something revolutionary. In thinking critically about Maidan, leftist critiques should make us think about a different kind of revolution, some aspects of which can become reality, and some of which remain unfulfilled and encourage people to keep fighting.

'People who are obsessed with Maidan kind of went blind': Beyond revolutionary action

Despite this positive assessment, many leftists became critical of the effects of activists' commitment to the violence on Maidan. They saw that activists lost sight of actual revolutionary goals and instead focused on ideological clashes between pro- and anti-Maidan groups. I interviewed, Anton, a leftist activist, in May 2014, after a horrifying event in Odesa, in southern Ukraine. On 2 May, clashes between pro-Maidan demonstrators and anti-Maidan/pro-government protesters in Odesa resulted in a massive fire in the occupied Trade Unions building, killing forty-eight people.[78] Several activists killed in the fire were associated with an anti-Maidan leftist organization called *Borot'ba* (Struggle), a group largely marginalized from the Kyiv leftist community (which had published a public letter distancing themselves from *Borot'ba* in response to the latter's anti-

Maidan, pro-Russia positioning).[79] Anton's response was to condemn the way that Maidan had become a symbol of something beyond any kind of revolutionary change:

> But now I see how it has grown really ugly, like what we spoke about in Odesa. Why would you set the building on fire? There are people inside it. I think that everybody, people who are obsessed with Maidan kind of went blind. They don't see themselves in the mirror of what's going on. It's stupid, people don't see that they don't have a general vision of what's going on, I clearly cannot support that.[80]

It was events like this one that led leftists to criticize the long-term effects of Maidan and the regime that took the place of Yanukovych and his cronies. To some leftists, people behaved *worse* than before Maidan had happened, certainly not a positive, revolutionary change. Returning to Arendt, it is necessary to reiterate that violence itself does not signify revolution:

> But violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.[81]

When violence is used to justify the swift replacement of one regime with a similarly structured one, as happened in Ukraine, it seems that violence has become a placeholder for actual critical discussion about whether or not Maidan was a revolution. In other words, because violence happened, and because the violence came from the hands of the state towards ordinary citizens, and because citizens did not let this violence stop them from staying committed to their causes, Maidan is interpreted as a revolution.

Yet, as we see from Arendt, violence does not result unequivocally in 'the constitution of freedom'; rather, violence often results in both overt and tacit repression. Indeed, the Poroshenko regime has continued to curtail the rights of Ukrainians since he came into office. Politician and activist Volodymyr Cheremys has argued that the post-Maidan government works in conjunction with rising power of right-wing groups to enforce self-censorship of society, leading opposing voices to fear dissent.[82] In 2017, Poroshenko banned access to the Russian social media sites VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, the most popular in Ukraine. His regime has cracked down on the display of communist symbolism, throwing a young man in jail for posting Soviet symbols on social media. None of these reflect a change in the behaviour of the people making up the Ukrainian state; they have selected different targets than Yanukovych did, but their goals of consolidating and remaining in power are inherently the same.[83]

In order to come to a more optimistic conclusion about Ukraine, we may wish to adopt a perspective like Fischer's, described earlier, that sees many 'revolutionary' events that unfold over time, gradually changing not just political regimes but also people's own attitudes toward political participation. Indeed, one leftist and feminist activist, Maria, told me that she felt people's entire consciousness (*svidomist'*) toward activism had changed. Previously, she described, her neighbours had never understood what she did as an activist or why she did it. After Maidan, however, she felt that these

same people were activists themselves, thanks to their experience of Maidan. As she put it, they 'can't forget it and can't reject it'. While it is difficult to hope that people will remain committed to revolutionary action after the disappointments of the Orange Revolution and, a decade later, Euromaidan, perhaps these gradual shifts will provide strength and momentum for real political change in the future. After all, Euromaidan wasn't really such a fucking awesome revolution.

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Notes

1. This interview was in English, the common language I used with Havryil when we met. All interviews were in Ukrainian, English or a combination of the two depending on the preference of the person being interviewed.
2. All activists' names have been changed.
3. Goujon and Shukan, 'Becoming a Public Figure', 3.
4. This process is reminiscent of similar usages of 'socialism' in Central and Eastern Europe; see Chelcea and Druta, 'Zombie Socialism'.
5. Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution*.
6. See also Oksana Denysova. '#Ievromaidan. IevroIolka. Ievrorevoliutsiia. Foto'. *Ukrainsʹka Pravda*, 2 December 2013.
7. I am not sure when this name was first used, but at this point, in most writings about Maidan, I see it used interchangeably with other names like Euromaidan.
8. The 'liquidators' were those people mobilized in the initial clean-up phases following the Chornobyl explosion. Here, and throughout this paper, I use Ukrainian transliterations of place names.
9. Diuk, *The Next Generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan*. See also Valentin Torba. 'The Lesson of the Revolution on Granite'. *Day*, 4 October 2016.
10. Nikolayenko, *Youth Movements and Elections in Eastern Europe*.
11. Diuk, *The Next Generation*; Zygar, *All the Kremlin's Men*.

12. Diuk, *The Next Generation*; Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*.
13. Diuk, *The Next Generation*; Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, Chapter 4.
14. Diuk, *The Next Generation*, 54.
15. Diuk, *The Next Generation*, 60.
16. Zygar, *All the Kremlin's Men*.
17. Kudelia, 'The House that Yanukovych Built', 20.
18. Kudelia, 'The House that Yanukovych Built', 21.
19. Kudelia, 'The House that Yanukovych Built', 24.
20. Kudelia, 'The House that Yanukovych Built', 28.
21. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 41.
22. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 21–2.
23. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 27.
24. Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, 155.
25. In Tilly and Tarrow's greater conversation about 'contentious politics', there is certainly room for multi-vocality. Yet this analysis is at the level of 'the people' who make claims on 'the state', a framing that reinforces a division between these two bodies. Perhaps Tilly and Tarrow are realistic in this framing, whereas Arendt explores this division through the question of 'no-rule' (isonomy) in comparison to democracy, which incorporates a division between ruling and not-ruling that is characteristic of the majority of contemporary governing regimes. See Arendt, *On Revolution*, 21–2.
26. Fischer, 'The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran', 499. His discussion of 'social revolution' is unrelated to Arendt's analysis of 'the social question', which is more focused on the politicization of poverty.
27. Fischer, 'The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran', 498.
28. Goldstone, *Revolutions*, 4.
29. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 73.
30. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 74.
31. Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution*.
32. Holquist, *Making War*. See also *Russia's Great War and Revolutions* volumes, including Lohr, et.al., *The Empire and Nationalism at War*.
33. Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*.
34. Cited in Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution*, 38–40.
35. Mieville, *October*; Steinberg, *The Russian Revolution*, 318.
36. See Goldstone, *Revolutions*.
37. Kolonitskii, 'On Studying the 1917 Revolution'; Novikova, 'The Russian Revolution from a Provincial Perspective'; Raleigh, 'The Russian Revolution after all these 100 Years'.
38. Lohr, et.al., *The Empire and Nationalism at War*. See also Baker, *Peasants, Power, and Place*.
39. Suny, 'The Russian Empire', 143
40. Liber, *Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine*.
41. Velychenko, *State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine*, 3. Velychenko describes *Borot'bists* as 'former left-wing members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries'.
42. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 345.
43. Liber, *Total Wars*, 59–62; Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 123.
44. Liber, *Total Wars*, 62.
45. Velychenko, *State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine*.
46. Riga, 'The Ukrainian Bolsheviks', 153.
47. Riga, 'The Ukrainian Bolsheviks', 154.

48. Liber, *Total Wars*, 71.
49. Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 125.
50. Liber, *Total Wars*, 73.
51. Liber, *Total Wars*, 62: Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 125.
52. Gilley, 'The Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik Risings of Spring and Summer 1919'. See also Baker, *Peasants, Power, and Place.*
53. Liber, *Total Wars*, 78.
54. Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 123.
55. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 357.
56. Winegar, 'The Privilege of Revolution', 70, n.1.
57. Saad, 'The Egyptian Revolution', 65, n. 1.
58. Schielke, 'You'll be late for the revolution'.
59. The inclusion of this material reflects its contested nature: while Goldstone includes Egypt and the broader uprisings known as the 'Arab Spring' in his book on revolutions, readers of this paper noted that the events in Egypt did not result in a meaningful revolution.
60. Cassauwers, 'Euromaidan'.
61. Manning, 'Rose Colored Glasses?', 200.
62. Manning, 'Rose Colored Glasses?', 192.
63. Manning, 'Rose Colored Glasses?', 201.
64. Manning, 'Rose Colored Glasses?', 202–3.
65. Wilson has written that 'official figures' claimed seventy-nine people were beaten; *Ukraine Crisis*, 68.
66. Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis*, 76–8.
67. See Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*.
68. I use the term 'Oppositional' to designate the coalition of three political parties working against the Yanukovych regime; namely, Vitaly Klitschko's UDAR party, Arseniy Yatseniuk's Bat′kivshchyna party and Oleh Tiahnybok's Svoboda party. This is in distinction from a more general use of 'opposition' to mean any kind of action against the governing regime.
69. Diuk, 'Finding Ukraine', 86.
70. Onuch, 'Who Were the Protesters?'
71. Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution.*
72. See Radio Svoboda, 'Samooborona Maidanu Stvoriueie "Iedynu Revoliutsiynu Armiiu" po vsiy Ukraini'. *Radio Svoboda*, 2 February 2014.
73. See also Diuk's *The Next Generation*, 35, and 'Finding Ukraine', 85.
74. See Dunn and Bobick, 'The Empire Strikes Back', for a detailed analysis of Russia's intentions in fomenting instability.
75. Right Sector was a non-party oppositional group that united several right-wing, nationalist organizations under one umbrella group. They were well-represented as militants on Maidan, became a volunteer battalion in the war in the Donbas, and later registered as a political party. See Shekhovtsov, 'The Spectre of Ukrainian Fascism'.
76. Students occupied the Ministry of Education at the end of February 2014. An economist and leftist activist created an important initiative to implement open accounting for the Ministry. Now, the Ministry is required to publish its financial information online (it is published in raw data form, so one must be trained to read this type of information in order to understand and analyse it). Activists hoped to implement this

open accounting system in other ministries to encourage transparency throughout the government.

77. Translated from Ukrainian by the author.
78. Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis,* 129.
79. *Borot′ba*'s name and ideology draws from the twentieth-century organization described above during the Ukrainian Revolution in 1917. The contemporary group, however, holds a distinctly anti-nationalist position and during Maidan participated in pro-Russian, anti-Maidan activities as well.
80. Interview in English.
81. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 28.
82. Cheremys, 'Totalitarian tendencies'.
83. See similarities in Manning, 'Rose Colored Glasses?', 202.

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Notes on contributor

Emily Channell-Justice is a Havighurst Fellow and Visiting Assistant Professor of International Studies at Miami University, Ohio. She holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the Graduate Center, City University of New York. *Address:* International Studies, Miami University, Ohio.

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