Attacks On Aid

Mapping Attacks, Blockades and Delays on Aid Convoys and Facilities in Syria

Mapping Humanitarian Challenges

Over the course of the last ten years, attacks on humanitarian aid convoys and individual humanitarian workers have increased across the globe. In 2016, 158 major attacks against aid operations occurred globally, with the majority these being concentrated in Syria. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, attacks on aid convoys have repeatedly and increasingly placed humanitarian workers at risk, and prevented vulnerable communities from receiving aid. Even more condemningly, the attacks on aid convoys have been combined with repeated delays and blockades. Under International Law, the United Nations, who are responsible for the vast majority of the aid delivered in Syria, along with any other international organization, must be granted permission by the Syrian Government to enter the country and deliver aid. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is responsible for this. On repeated occasions, the Syrian Government has imposed blockades or significant delays on the vast majority of aid deliveries. Ongoing fighting, also, has impacted the ability of humanitarian convoys to reach their destinations. In 2016 and 2017, over 80% of aid convoys in Syria were blocked or delayed by the Government. This resulted in instances such as December 2016, where less than 1% of the Syrian population the UN requested to deliver aid to were served. Some observers of the situation have claimed that these blockades have been enforced as part of an ongoing strategy by the Government to force certain parts of the rebellion into submission, which is illegal under international humanitarian law. It is estimated that there are currently 2.98 million people living in hard-to-reach areas in Syria, with 419'000 of those in UN-declared besieged areas. This project seeks to explore the concentration of attacks, blockades and delays on aid convoys and facilities recieveing aid in Syria, and subsequently, the population of persons of humanitarian concern that health sites recieving aid are able to serve, and those that they are not.

Concentration of Attacks On Aid Convoys and Facilites in Syria June 2011 - March 2018



Concentration of Attacks On Hospitals in Aleppo June - March 2018



Sucessful UNOCHA Aid Deliveries in Syria

Delivery Site ID	Number of Successful Deliveries	Number Delayed	Number Blockaded	Crossing	Origin Country
19	5	3	2	Tall Kujik	Iraq
18	2	2	0	Tall Kujik	Iraq
96	1	1	0	Tall Kujik	Iraq
59	1	1	0	Tall Kujik	Iraq
207	450	410	200	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
129	1793	1541	900	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
73	3000	1500	723	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
45	2000	1254	921	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
44	1000	813	345	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
63	1000	590	175	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
207	4500	4050	1520	Bab Al-Hawa	Turkey
40	721	671	502	Bab Al-Salam	Turkey
47	511	472	419	Bab Al-Salam	Turkey
148	424	347	304	Bab Al-Salam	Turkey
225	364	310	297	Bab Al-Salam	Turkey
167	772	510	413	Dara	Jordan
174	921	783	860	Dara	Jordan
109	1212	923	974	Dara	Jordan
90	1381	1292	1300	Dara	Jordan
TOTAL	20058	15473	9855		
		Percentage Delayed	Percentage Blockaded		
		77%	49%		

Population Receiving Aid as of March 2018



Population of Concern as of March 2018



Obstruction of Humanitarian Aid

To determine the areas experiencing the highest concentration of attacks on aid facilities and convoys

Physicians for Human Rights maintain an excellent database of the number of attacks on different hospitals and convoys (which are normally the final delivery points for UNOCHA deliveries). However, this data did not exsist in excel format, so I created an excel table with the number of attacks, perpetrators, and incident rate of attacks on various hospitals. I then used a table join to connect the relevant data to its corresponding point. For the attacks on convoys which did not have a correspointing point, I used latitutde and longitude to inport it as XY data, then turning it into points. Using the spatial analysis tool, I then used the kernel density for points of 1500m and a search radius clipped to the administrative boundaries to visualize this.

To determine the humanitarian population of concern that can be served by the aid delivery points (and those who cannot)

Using the spacial analysis tool, I used a buffer to select the humanitarian population of concernt that were within three miles of the aid delivery sites (which had been provided by the REACH initiative's work on humanitarian needs inside Syria). Although three miles was an arbitrary number, and may not refelect the actual number of people supprted by these deliveries, I referred to the literature on huamnitarian needs inside the country to inform what might be a realistic distance individuals might be able to travel in order to recieve aid. I then used kernel density points of 2500 to visualise where this population was. I then used the raster calculator to deduduce the population who were outside of this area, and would not realistically be able to access the deliverires.

To determine the number of aid worker fatalities

I was not able to determine aid worker fatalities by location given the data available, so instead of creating points, I instead joined the number of fatalities by Governate to the aministrative leve, using gradient colours to demonstrate the level of severity. I then used the point data on the number of incidents to create propotional symbols demonstrating the zones where these attacks were most concentrated. A closer analysis

Aid Worker Fatalities as of March 2018



at this data, shown in the map of Aleppo, revealed that the majority of these attacks were undertaken by the Syrian Government and Russian airstrikes.The overwhelming cause of death was by shelling. The second was shooting, and thir execution and torture. As these attacks were concentrated in areas of non-government control, or along besignement lines, this indicates that the blocking of humanitarian aid is a deliberate tactic by the Syrian Government.

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Sources: Physicians For Human Rights, United Nations Office For the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Syria Coordination Office (UNOCHA ROSC), REACH Initative, International NGO Safety Initative, Uppsala University Conflict Management Center, ESRI World, 2010
Projection: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

Cartographer: Roisin Maire Taylor, May 2018