

Series 1, Number 1

# Taking the Blinders Off.

Questioning How  
Development Assistance is  
Used to Combat Corruption.



## Institute for Human Security

The Institute for Human Security (IHS) at The Fletcher School, Tufts University focuses on the security and protection of individuals and communities while promoting peace and sustainable development. To achieve this, IHS catalyzes collaboration between and creates synergies among the fields that place people at the center of concern: conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian studies, and political and economic development. Our research, education, and policy engagement emphasize the following principles: protection and promotion of the rights of at-risk populations, empowerment of people, and promotion of responsible government and institutional practices.

For more information on the research project, please visit [fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security/Research/Building-State-Legitimacy](http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security/Research/Building-State-Legitimacy)

## Corruption, Justice and Legitimacy Project

The Corruption, Justice, and Legitimacy (CJL) project advances innovative approaches to corruption analysis in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Focusing on the criminal justice sector, the project supports more holistic efforts to diminish corruption in core state activities related to human security. Building upon prior research for the U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the CJL project has discovered that the principal-agent theory of change which dominates Western aid policy rarely alters corruption dynamics. The project puts policy makers' assumptions about corruption's effects on state legitimacy to evidential tests, and generates nuanced analysis of the dynamics of the corruption-legitimacy relationship. This is prerequisite to designing effective anti-corruption responses.

This paper is the first in a series of papers that will result from this project. The project will also be blogging about the latest insights and findings on the Collaborative for Development Action blog (<http://www.blog.cdacollaborative.org/category/anti-corruption/>) amongst others.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Cheyenne Scharbatke-Church** is a Professor of Practice within the Institute for Human Security at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her work on corruption has evolved from a broad corruption and conflict interest to a focused inquiry on the nexus of corruption and justice in fragile and conflict-affected states. With over 15 years' experience, Cheyanne has led programs on the ground, advised on donor strategies, been an organisational change catalyst on effectiveness issues, and contributed to the scholarship of the evaluation field. In 2009, Cheyanne founded Besa, a social enterprise committed to catalyzing significant change on strategic issues in places experiencing conflict and structural or overt physical violence.

**Diana Chigas, JD**, is Professor of the Practice of International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Co-Director of Collaborative Learning at CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. At CDA, she works with governmental and non-governmental on systemic conflict analysis, strategic planning and reflection and evaluation to improve the impact of peace programming. Diana has over 25 years' experience as a facilitator and consultant in negotiation and conflict resolution, as well as supporting and evaluating social change programming in conflict-affected countries. Her interest in corruption emerged from her experience supporting peacebuilding programming, where corruption has consistently been a key factor hindering effectiveness and driving conflict.

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This project was made possible by the fiscal contribution of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, whose ongoing support for key research issues pertinent to fragile and conflict-affected states makes them a leader in this field. Acknowledgement is also due to Dr. Eileen Babbitt, Dr. Dyan Mazurana and Professor Ian Johnstone of The Fletcher School. The authors are deeply appreciative of being included in their overarching work on legitimacy. Finally, credit must be given to Dr. Marina Travayiakis, who has shepherded the Institute for Human Security and all of its associated projects with a deft hand and sense of humor.

## Executive Summary

Despite significant development assistance for anti-corruption efforts, and the global attention that has been given to reducing corruption in the recently approved Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 16), the international community's toolbox for fighting corruption carries a remarkably limited set of tools. While the evidence of effectiveness of these tools is weak, they dominate programming and continue to be replicated across contexts.

This paper suggests that the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption programming, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states, stems from a problem-strategy mismatch, wherein a simple response is being applied to a complex, systemic problem that is inseparable from the socio-political context in which it takes place. **Current anti-corruption responses are predominantly simple** because they:

### conflate enablers with causes

While opportunities and incentives are enablers, they are not the *reasons* why corruption occurs; other forces interact with enablers to determine whether people and institutions seize opportunities for corruption.

### focus on the individual transaction


Simple approaches focus predominantly on the individual as the main unit of analysis, seeking to understand (and alter) *individuals'* incentives to engage in corruption from a rational (cost-benefit analysis) perspective. By drawing the boundaries of analysis at the individual, it becomes hard to understand the way the multiple drivers of corruption interact.

### apply recipes

Simple approaches use recipes across contexts, as best practices are useful ingredients when developing a response. They take the model, rather than the context, as the starting point for analysis.

Weak program design reinforces many of the simplistic aspects of current anti-corruption programming. Our review showed that **anti-corruption program design was weak** in several areas: relevance, project logic, clarity of change, and strategies linking the goal to the wider vision. All of these weaknesses contribute to assumptions going untested, and to the ongoing dominance of recipe-based responses to corruption.

We posit that **corruption in fragile and conflict affected states is actually a complex, adaptive system**, and therefore requires a complex response. Complex systems share certain characteristics that resonate clearly with the reality of corrupt contexts.



Practically, a shift of paradigm, from the simple to the complex, would require **changes in the way we analyze and develop anti-corruption strategies and programs:**

- **Broader and more systemic analysis** that seeks to identify the functions and dynamics of corruption in the larger socio-political context. This includes mapping the sources and dynamics of the resilience of corruption (resistance and adaptation to change), and how the multiple drivers of corruption interact, as well as understanding, mapping and tracking potential unintended secondary effects of anti-corruption strategies beyond the program boundaries.
- **Implement strategic, emergent design and adaptive monitoring.** This means articulating the specific changes sought and assumptions regarding how and why a given program will be able to catalyze those changes, as well as recognizing where the emergent character of the system needs to be honored. When these principles of good program design are implemented, underlying assumptions will be explicit and testable, and the resulting programs more robust. Monitoring will be key to testing if the program is on track, as well as aiding in the ongoing tailoring of those elements that emerge or become clear only as the program progresses.
- **Pursue more multi-dimensional strategies.** Beyond the standardized reforms aiming to influence monopoly, discretion, accountability, and social trust, strategies must embrace those elements that drive corruption. In particular, consideration of the role social norms play in corruption, the function of corruption in political culture and potential secondary, unintended effects of programming (including the potential to do harm) need to be addressed adequately in anti-corruption programming

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## I. Introduction

Corruption is a complex, dynamic, and often contradictory phenomenon. It is hidden yet widely acknowledged, harmful yet at times beneficial, where a victim today can be a perpetrator or beneficiary tomorrow. It is this complexity that enables corruption to systematically undermine development assistance outcomes. It distorts the rule of law, keeps essential basic services out of reach of the poor, exacerbates grievances, and buttresses illicit power structures within the state apparatus, all the more so in fragile and conflict-affected states. The international community has made combating corruption a global priority in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); a key element of promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies (SDG 16) – *is to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms.*<sup>1</sup>

This commitment to combat corruption is also evident in the substantial allocations of resources by international donors to anti-corruption programming. The United States Government invested approximately \$1 billion per year between 2007 and 2013<sup>2</sup>; the United Kingdom Department of Foreign and International Development (DFID) similarly invested £22 million in anti-corruption initiatives in 2013-2014 alone.<sup>3</sup> These figures only represent programs categorized as anti-corruption, which omits a significant number of interventions where anti-corruption programming has been mainstreamed into work done under a broader theme (e.g. health or education), so the full amount of resources devoted to anti-corruption is probably even larger than they indicate.

Despite this significant investment, there is sparse evidence that current strategies to reduce corruption through development assistance are effective. Program evaluation efforts are not consistently of high quality, making it difficult to draw conclusions with confidence. Where evaluations and research are robust enough, the evidence of effectiveness is mixed at best. In fact, there is strong evidence of *ineffectiveness*<sup>4</sup> for some very popular interventions—such as the creation of anti-corruption authorities, civil service reform, and aid conditionality. Of even greater concern is the emergence of research showing anti-corruption efforts resulting in increases in corruption.<sup>5</sup>

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
This paper offers an analysis of the causes of ineffectiveness in anti-corruption programming, with a particular emphasis on fragile and conflict-affected states. The intent is to contribute to the development assistance community’s efforts to make progress on this issue, which is vital not

only to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal #16, but of all SDGs. It is widely acknowledged that the SDGs are inter-related.<sup>6</sup> As a cross-cutting issue that has the potential to undermine any and all of the goals, corruption is therefore of critical importance for the entire development sector. We find that the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption programming stems from weak program design practices, particularly from underlying assumptions about how corruption occurs and can be combatted. These assumptions are implicit and therefore unquestioned, yet central to analysis and programming choices that currently dominate the field.

We begin by reviewing current theories about corruption, and identify assumptions underlying prevalent practice. This analysis is based on a review of anti-corruption program documentation and evaluations of anti-corruption programming from the top 8 OECD DAC donors in the areas of governance, civil society, and security sector reform, and of literature on corruption and anti-corruption.<sup>7</sup> We then identify key gaps in theory and practice, and propose that improving effectiveness will require broader and more holistic analysis and strategies, as well as better program design processes.

## II. What are current approaches to understanding corruption?

Two theoretical models dominate the anti-corruption field's thinking about how corruption happens and how it can be addressed: **principal-agent** and **collective action**. In the "principal-agent" model, corruption is seen as a breakdown of the principal-agent relationship. The "principal" delegates tasks and ensuring compliance with regulations to an "agent". This agent is empowered to make decisions on the principal's behalf. This is the basis on which all governments function. For example, the clerk who administers driver's licenses is an agent of the Minister of Transportation (the Principal), while the rank and file police officer is an agent of the Minister of Interior (the Principal). In democratic societies, ministers and senior public officials may themselves be viewed as agents of citizens.



Problems arise if the agent's interests differ from those of the principal. As agents have more information than the principal about their tasks and transactions, they can choose not to disclose key information to the principal. Without this information, the principal has limited ability to control what the agents do. According to this model, corruption arises when agents have the opportunity to make use of asymmetric information, and pursue their private interests at the expense of the principal's interests (and, by extension, the public good).


The best-known articulation of this theory of corruption is Robert Klitgaard's "formula":

$$\text{CORRUPTION} = \text{MONOPOLY} + \text{DISCRETION} - \text{ACCOUNTABILITY}^8$$

In other words, corruption is a function of the degree of monopoly the institution or agent has over a given issue (i.e. whether it is the sole source of authority for that activity), the discretion (or leeway) the agent has to make decisions on how they conduct the activity, and the degree to which he or she is accountable to the principal (i.e. whether there are mechanisms of control and sanction). According to this theory, combatting corruption requires restricting monopoly and discretion and increasing accountability. For example, through monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to promote accountability, such as empowering citizens to be “watchdogs”; through checks and balances limiting the agents’ discretion to decide, such as requiring two individuals (“four eyes”) to conduct transactions<sup>9</sup>; or when the creation of online applications for birth certificates breaks an agent’s monopoly, and the use of standardized forms limits discretion.

**“Collective action”** has emerged in recent years as a competing explanation of how corruption happens (and why it is so hard to combat). It asserts that the assumptions underlying the “principal-agent” model are not appropriate in most (non-Western) contexts. In these contexts, the principal is not often principled—in other words, there is no benevolent principal who will control the agent in service of the public interest.<sup>10</sup> Democratic elections, a common mechanism of control and accountability, are not adequate to reign in governmental abuses because voters regularly seem to demonstrate indifference to the moral culpability of elected officials. We would argue that in many immediate post-conflict societies, the fatigue of war is such that an ‘anything but violence’ attitude can dominate voting decisions and diminish the role of elections as a check on other egregious behavior.

In “particularistic” societies, which are often found in fragile and conflict affected states, public goods are distributed according to status, closeness to power, and social networks.<sup>11</sup> In these contexts, corruption is not an exception to a norm of integrity and equal treatment, but is the norm itself.<sup>12</sup> As such, people participate in corruption because they believe others do; without trust that others will not engage in corruption, people have few incentives to act in a non-corrupt way. In fact, to act in a non-corrupt manner would mean one would lose out. Thus, although non-corrupt behavior is collectively in the group’s interest, it is in no one’s individual best interest to unilaterally act in a non-corrupt way. As



a result, corruption persists, even when everyone dislikes it.<sup>13</sup> The existence and resilience of corruption is thus a form of “collective action” problem.

**With this understanding of corruption, classic principal-agent responses are argued to be ineffective, because they hinge on the assumption that there is political will to enact change.**<sup>14</sup> For instance, in order for increased accountability to work, there must be someone willing to enforce the rules in a fair manner. If this is not in the interests of the Principal, however, it is unlikely to happen, thus undermining any effort to punish corrupt behavior.

**Our review of anti-corruption programming found that the majority of programs that combat corruption with foreign aid are based, implicitly or explicitly, on the “principal-agent” theory.**<sup>15</sup>

Despite the common refrain found in the development community that context matters, this (often implicit) theory of corruption spans contexts, stakeholders, and types of corruption. Further, some program approaches that were described as “collective action”-inspired could also be seen as part of a “principal-agent” model. In our review of corruption program designs, we identified two broad approaches that focus on different parts of the “chain” linking principals and agents:

1. **Bureaucratic principal-agent:** these programs seek to change individual transactions within governments, viewing elected officials and senior bureaucrats as principals and civil servants as their agents. Civil servant capacity-building programs that seek to develop better disciplinary procedures, merit-based promotion systems, or secondment of international mentors to departments all seek to reinforce an ideal model of the principal-agent relationship that assumes that the public interest lies at the heart of every principal’s actions.
2. **“Citizen” principal-agent:** These were often inspired implicitly or explicitly by “collective action” theories, but in practice became a variation on a principal-agent approach. In these cases the “principal” is not an elected official or bureaucrat, but citizens or representative NGOs organizing to hold authorities accountable. Elected officials essentially become agents who are meant to take decisions on behalf of ‘the people’. These programs typically include advocacy campaigns demanding action from their elected officials, education and public awareness raising, media campaigns, non-violent resistance or electoral processes.

### Collective Action in action: The “zero rupee” campaign

One example of a program that did demonstrate the influence of a collective action theory of corruption is the Fifth Pillar in India. This organization offers a “zero rupee” note (resembling the 50 rupee note) to Indian citizens to “pay” to officials who request bribes, as a “non-violent weapon of non-cooperation.” The note allows the citizen to register their opposition to the illegal request. It helps them do so because the act of “payment” reduces “the fear of facing an encounter with persons in authority” and because people know the “initiative is being backed up by an organization—that is, they are not alone in this fight.”<sup>16</sup>



### III. The need for a “complex” approach to analysis and strategy

#### A MISMATCH BETWEEN STRATEGY AND PROBLEM

The academic debate to date has focused on which theory better or more fully explains corruption as a phenomenon: principal-agent or collective action. Is it important to analyze opportunities, discretion and sanctions and fill the gaps? Or should we be focusing on group dynamics and lack of trust that maintain inertia? We would argue: both and neither.

#### BOTH THEORIES ARE VALID...

*Both* theories offer valuable insights into what variables enable corruption, and thus provide useful conceptual frameworks for analysis that helps develop approaches to combat corruption. Understanding and addressing how discretion, monopoly, and accountability affect people’s incentives is important. At the same time, collective action theories bring the important insight that group dynamics also affect incentives—i.e. that there are no incentives to initiate changes in corruption practices when there is no trust that others will do the same. As Marquette and Peiffer conclude in their 2015 paper on *Corruption and Collective Action*, it is more useful to identify how both lenses can complement each other in analysis and strategic planning.<sup>17</sup>

#### ...BUT NEITHER LEADS TO EFFECTIVE STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMING


*Neither* theory offers an explanation of corruption and its persistence that can adequately provide an effective basis for anti-corruption strategy. Marquette & Peiffer suggest that both approaches fail to recognize that corruption persists because it, in fact, solves problems. They propose a third lens for understanding corruption: identifying the functions corruption serves and the political dynamics that underpin it.<sup>18</sup> This is an important insight (that we will address later), but still does not go far enough. We suggest that the lack of attention to this “third perspective”<sup>19</sup> is a symptom of a larger blind spot in anti-corruption practice. It points to certain implicit but fundamental assumptions about the nature of the problem of corruption, in that “principal-agent” and “collective action” theories both treat corruption as a “simple” or “obvious” problem. In reality, corruption is a “complex” and resilient social problem that cannot be understood, or addressed, separately from the broader political, social, cultural and economic context in which it takes place.<sup>20</sup> In other words, it is not only important to know what factors to look for in a corruption analysis, but also to understand how those factors interact.

The differences between “simple” and “complex” are illustrated in Figure 1.<sup>21</sup> By “simple” or “obvious” we do not mean easy, or unsophisticated; a “simple” problem is one whose causes and solutions are well-known (even if complicated and requiring specialized expertise)—like a difficult engineering problem with many moving pieces. “Best practice” and expertise can reliably and predictably “solve” the problem. “Complex” problems, by contrast, have multiple interdependent causes that interact dynamically

(and non-linearly), making it difficult to predict the results of any intervention, or to understand the problem without understanding how the different parts or causes relate to each other. Perspectives also often differ on what the nature of the problem is and how to deal with it—in other words, there is no agreement on what the causes and solutions are. Dynamic causality, where causes and effects are intertwined and feed back to each other, makes these problems “sticky” and resistant to change.

**WHY DOES THIS MATTER FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY?**

Simple and complex systems evolve and change differently. The “complexity” or “simplicity” of the situation one is trying to address will affect what kinds of strategies and programs will be effective in promoting change. Yet when a situation is understood—and analyzed—as a simple problem, the risk of adapting a “simple” strategy that cannot address the dynamics of a complex problem is high. This, we argue, is a challenge in anti-corruption strategy. When “principal-agent” and “collective action” strategies treat corruption as a “simple” or “obvious” problem, a mismatch between the nature of the problem and the frameworks for analyzing and addressing it is created. This results in a limited and narrow analysis that hinders the development of effective strategies. Consequently, both models, together or separately, are unlikely to generate strategies that will succeed.



**WHAT MAKES CORRUPTION COMPLEX?**

Complex systems share certain characteristics that resonate clearly with the reality of corrupt contexts<sup>22</sup>:



**Lack of agreement on what the problem is:** Transparency International’s definition of corruption – the abuse of power for personal gain – dominates the current discourse, but in practice, what constitutes an abuse of power varies in each context, making it impossible to create a universal understanding of what the corruption “problem” is. For example, our research shows that in some contexts payments to public officials are seen as bribery, whereas other contexts view them as a “fee for service” — as long as the service is received in return. Moreover, there is no consensus about what constitutes the most harmful forms of corruption—with some pointing to extreme graft by politicians and others to political interference, and some even suggesting that corruption is not an unmitigated source of harm.<sup>23</sup>



**Interconnectedness:** In a system, “[a]n individual element or phenomenon exists in relation to other phenomena as if in a spider web, where pulling one strand of the web will likely affect many others.”<sup>24</sup> Corruption is characterized

by such interconnectedness: it is deeply embedded in social, political and economic dynamics, and cannot be isolated from them because of its many interconnected causes and effects. For instance, a police officer's demand for a bribe from an ordinary citizen is linked to a chain of expectations and power relations at higher levels of power.<sup>25</sup> There are also social expectations from within his/her group that drive the need for additional resources. Corruption thus cannot be addressed only at the level of the police officer as though it was an isolated transaction between individuals in that situation.



#### **Non-linearity and the impact of feedback:**

In complex systems, “the relationship between causes and effects is neither unidirectional nor always direct or proportional. The scale of the effect can be unrelated to the cause...and the cause is often separated in time and space from effect.”<sup>27</sup> This non-linearity often stems from feedback in the system, where “[a] change to any one piece in the system will reverberate [in] or affect other parts.”<sup>28</sup> With corruption, causes and effects influence each other in this non-linear fashion. For instance, citizens may offer a bribe to a court clerk because they believe that the justice system does not function

without payment. Yet their perception of the need to bribe is, in part, itself the result of the payments they have made and the number of times such bribes have been seen to have facilitated a transaction with the courts—a classic vicious cycle. Any effort to address corruption—by building trust between citizens and the government, for example<sup>29</sup>—is likely to be undermined by the very corruption the effort is trying to address.



**Robust and adaptive:** Complex systems are said to be robust (or resilient) because they are able to weather disturbances in the system or environment (e.g. removal of an actor, change of a law) as they adapt in response.<sup>30</sup> They adjust

to disturbances in order to continue to fulfill their “function”—which in the case of corruption could be political mobilization, redistribution of resources, stability and coalition building, social cohesion, among others<sup>31</sup>—and cannot be fully captured by a formal hierarchy or central control. We find corruption to be highly resilient and evolutionary. New forms of corruption emerge in response to various anti-corruption efforts, as people, norms, and practices adapt to the new environment. As a result, short-term successes may be unsustainable, or even generate negative effects in the longer run. For instance, the use of Information and Communication Technology to increase transparency and reduce corruption can also empower and enable ICT experts to engage in electronic corruption.<sup>32</sup>

#### **Interconnectedness and Context Specificity: Fixes that succeed in some places, fail in others**

In 2010 the Ghanaian government doubled the salaries of police officers in an attempt to diminish petty corruption on its roads. According to a 2016 study of the effort, “[r]ather than decrease petty corruption, the salary policy **significantly increased** the police efforts to collect bribes, the value of bribes and the amounts given by truck drivers to policemen in total. The results show that raised salaries for Ghanaian police officers caused the police to increase the effort they put forth to get bribes by 19 percent, the value of bribes taken at each individual stop by between **25-28 percent**, and increased the total amount taken on the road, even while they reduced the number of times they received a bribe.”<sup>26</sup>

## WHY ARE CURRENT APPROACHES PREDOMINANTLY SIMPLE?

Principal-agent and collective action approaches fail to account for the complex aspects of corruption in several specific ways.



**They conflate enablers with causes:** While opportunity and incentives are often important enablers, they are not the reasons why corruption occurs; other forces interact with these enablers to determine whether opportunities for corruption are taken up. One is not corrupt simply because one has a monopoly, or because of insufficient oversight or accountability. Nor does corruption result only (or necessarily) from lack of intra-group trust preventing collective action against corruption. Indeed, intra-group trust may perpetuate corruption when people call on social obligations and loyalties to obtain services. In contexts in which corruption is highly vertically integrated, for example, opportunities for corruption and individual calculations about the likelihood of being caught may be less important factors to focus on if those responsible for monitoring and enforcement are themselves corrupt.

“

**One is not corrupt simply because one has a monopoly, or because of insufficient oversight or accountability.”**



**They focus on the individual transaction and not the system:** Collective action theories criticize principal-agent explanations for not paying attention to the role of expectations about group behavior in shaping incentives; however, principal-agent and collective action models both take the individual as the main unit of analysis, seeking to understand (and alter) *individuals'* incentives to engage in corruption from a rational (cost-benefit analysis) perspective.<sup>33</sup> Efforts that focus on the individual corrupt transgression ignore the interconnected nature of corruption, especially as seen in most fragile states. By drawing the boundaries of analysis at the individual (incentives and constraints), it becomes hard to understand the way all of the multiple drivers of corruption (political culture, social norms, monopolies, accountability, discretion, incentives, etc.) are present and *interact* to create the corruption dynamic in a specific place. For instance, a focus on identifying and prosecuting individuals engaging in corrupt procurement practices may achieve success in punishing bad acts—i.e. securing convictions. However, the processes, structures, and interactions that allowed those individuals to commit a corrupt act remain unaddressed—in other words, the system is still operating. The approach of punishing individuals assumes that addressing individual events eventually will “add up” to diminish corruption—by removing corrupt people and by setting an example—without the need to tackle underlying structures and patterns that generate the corrupt behavior. We suggest there is a disconnect between these isolated “wins” and systemic change.



**They are focused on recipes, not on context:** The Klitgaard equation epitomizes the simplistic nature of principal-agent-based analysis and strategy. It is not alone, however in using a formulaic recipe.<sup>34</sup> The popular corruption risk assessment processes that are used in the anti-corruption world tend to detail where corruption commonly happens in different sectors (labelled as risks) and identify what

standardized tools should be used to respond.<sup>35</sup> These assessments provide universal theory, or “recipes,” that can be replicated across contexts—with variations only in the details of implementation. As Johnston notes:

[W]e rely extensively on corruption indices ranking entire societies along one dimension. As a consequence we implicitly view corruption as essentially the same wherever it occurs, varying in extent but not in nature. Not surprisingly, reform strategies tend to be similar from one case to the next. Corruption is not an aggregate national attribute like GDP per capita; much more often it originates in highly specific dealings among particular people in specialized niches and situations.<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, the belief in the need for a “recipe” is sufficiently embedded as accepted practice in the anti-corruption field that it has been used as a critique of work that lacks sufficient recipe.<sup>37</sup> Nor is this emphasis on recipes limited to “principal-agent”-grounded approaches. While collective action-based strategies have pointed out significant pitfalls in the principal-agent approaches, they too lean to the formulaic. Analysis tends to focus on diagnosing which of several pre-identified “types” of governance system and “types” of corruption exist,<sup>38</sup> in order to identify which pre-determined tools and approaches to apply to combat them.

Both approaches take the model, rather than the context, as the starting point for analysis. The resulting solutions—such as promoting civic engagement, or education and trust-building—are considered universally appropriate to apply in all contexts. Neither model questions whether the model itself in may be inappropriate or insufficient to capture what is happening in the specific context. Yet the fact that evaluations to date have found mixed evidence of effectiveness, and have underlined the importance of contextual preconditions and factors, suggests that the recipes are not the solution, as they treat the problem of corruption as separate from the context. Even if they have short-term impact, they are unlikely to be effective in the long run.

They are based on weak program design: Our analysis showed that **a factor contributing significantly to the focus on recipe rather than context is the insufficient application of robust program design principles.** Commonly referred to as a ‘theory of change’ approach, program design involves developing a set of hypotheses around the most significant change that can be achieved by any given project, the changes required to achieve the desired goal and the activities an implementer will carry out to catalyze those changes. Weak project logic (i.e. the lack of an explicit and plausible rationale behind why change will happen) diminishes the likelihood that a project will be effective in creating the desired change on the ground,<sup>39</sup> and substantially reduces the potential to learn about how change might be possible in this context.

Table 1 summarizes the prevailing consensus within the professional evaluation community on the criteria for good program design.<sup>40</sup> When followed, these principles increase the likelihood that a program will be effective (e.g. create lasting change on the ground), and enhance the potential for evaluations to generate relevant and useful learning about what works and what does not.

**TABLE 1: CRITERIA FOR ROBUST PROGRAM**

DESIGN COMPONENT	IMPORTANCE
<b>Relevance:</b> <i>program design is derived from quality analysis</i>	A program is more likely to be effective if it is appropriately situated in the context, <sup>41</sup> responding to key corruption drivers. Where anti-corruption programming is conducted in conflict contexts, programs must also minimize the possibility of exacerbating conflict which requires a careful conflict analysis. <sup>42</sup>
<b>Change:</b> <i>program states the changes it seeks</i>	All social change programming seeks to catalyze some form of change in a context. Quality program design explicitly states the type of change being sought at each level in the program. <sup>43</sup> For instance, the goal should clearly state the most significant change that a project seeks to achieve.
<b>Clarity:</b> <i>have clear theories of change at each level</i>	Tying a program goal to peace writ large through a grand theory of change will provide focus in determining the most significant possible change.
<b>Project Logic:</b> <i>designs include key assumptions</i>	A clear programmatic theory of change enables: quality monitoring and evaluation, identifying and testing/verifying assumptions, adapting the program, and learning the effectiveness of different approaches. Explaining critical assumptions that underpin a program helps to tease out how and why a program will catalyze change. Tracking the validity of those causal and contextual assumptions is critical to helping a program adapt to a changing context and evaluating why a program is more or less effective.
<b>Critical Actors:</b> <i>identify partners, constituencies, key and more people<sup>44</sup></i>	Research has shown that programs that engage with key and more people within the same program have a greater likelihood of success. These groupings need to be strategically designed into the program, as do mitigating strategies to handle possible spoilers—those who stand to lose from an effective program. Broader actor maps provide a roadmap for outreach, engagement and implementation, and illustrate who has influence on corruption dynamics.
<b>Learning and adaptation:</b> <i>create mechanisms for feedback and continued learning and adaptation</i>	Programs are likely to be more effective if they include robust mechanisms for collecting and acting on feedback, not only on implementation and whether the desired outputs and outcomes are achieved, but also about how the context and the causes of corruption are evolving, and about effects not captured by the indicators of the program, including unintended impacts of development assistance.
<b>Be engendered:</b> <i>change processes recognize different groups may have unique needs</i>	Identifying that different groups (such as gender, ethnicity, religion, or ex-combatants) may require different approaches, activities, and sensitivities make the program more likely to be effective.

Our review of anti-corruption program documentation and evaluations found that most anti-corruption programs fall short on many of these criteria. We highlight four central weaknesses that surfaced from our review, that directly reinforce a simple and often recipe-centric approach to anti-corruption.

- **Irrelevance:** While most reviewed documents provided a brief context analysis, highlighting the pertinent dynamics and how the overall approach of the program worked to address these dynamics, the programs failed to ground the design in the analysis. In other words, there was no direct connection between a corruption driver or potential leverage point in the system and the intervention proposed.
- **No achievable change:** The programs tended to lay out general visions—for example, to “diminish corruption” and/or a description of the activities to be undertaken (e.g., public service announcements denouncing corruption) —with little articulation of the program goal. In other words, the goals were either vague and ambitious, or too specific and not representing a clear articulation of *what* will change. Without articulating what specific changes (e.g., attitudes, behaviors, processes) are necessary within a context, it is very difficult to make strategic decisions regarding the activities best placed to be effective.
- **No link between the ‘vision’ and the program goal:** Though programming documents were rife with broad aspirational statements, these were generally not well-articulated visions. Further where goals were stated or implied, rarely was the link between the implied vision and a programming goal made clear through a grand theory of change. In other words, the explanation as to why the achievement of this goal would contribute to the advancement of that vision was generally absent.
- **Weak Project Logic:** Where a theory of change approach requires justifying every element of the intervention in terms of how or why it will catalyze change, a recipe-based approach assumes that the project logic embedded in the recipe is the correct pathway to change. Without engaging in good design practices, the assumptions that underpin program choices are left implicit, and their consequences are not sufficiently thought through in terms of impact on programming success.

Our review found a general absence of programmatic theories of change in program documents. For those that did articulate a programmatic theory of change, these almost always failed to describe their associated assumptions of how change will occur (causal assumptions) or about the context (contextual assumptions). Such weak project logic not only means that much time and money will be spent working on projects with limited likelihood of making an impact on corruption, but also that it will be difficult to learn what works and what does not—whether through credible evaluations or practitioner learning.

“

**Our review found a general absence of programmatic theories of change in program documents.”**

## IV. What would a complexity-informed approach to corruption require?

We would suggest that three critical factors affecting patterns of corruption need to be included in any analysis of the phenomenon: social norms, political dynamics and cause-effect interaction or feedback. Current programming also seems to have significant room for improvement in adopting sound program design principles, so as to avoid some of the weaknesses previously mentioned.

### IDENTIFY SOCIAL NORMS THAT DRIVE CORRUPTION

Social norms are a critical influence on behavior. They provide the informal “rules” that specify what is or is not acceptable or legitimate behavior within a group. These “rules” are often maintained and “enforced” through social influence; when behavior contradicts these expectations, there is some form of social sanction from the group—such as being ostracized, ridiculed, or even intimidated. While our inquiry is preliminary, we believe that in contexts of systemic corruption, specific social norms in each group and context do contribute to driving corrupt behavior, and are often a significant obstacle to the success of principal-agent or collective action based approaches to reducing corruption.

These are not norms of corruption; the fact that social norms can sustain corruption does not mean that there is *approval* or moral acceptance of corruption. Rather, it means that informal rules and expectations that sustain social cohesion may also, under certain circumstances, influence people’s willingness to engage in or accept corrupt behavior. For instance, the expectation that when one member of a “family” has a job, all members should benefit, can lead civil servants to demand or accept bribes in order to fulfill their family obligations.<sup>45</sup>

We are not suggesting that social norms have been ignored completely in theory and practice. Collective action theories highlight the role of expectations in shaping individuals’ willingness to engage in corruption, and thus begin to address the role of norms in reinforcing persistent patterns of corruption.<sup>46</sup> Yet social norms are broader than the expectations about others’ behavior emphasized by collective action theories. They are constructed not only from what an individual believes that others actually do (descrip-

#### Social norms and corruption:

In many West African countries, an expectation that “when I eat we all eat” creates a social accountability mechanism that drives many corrupt practices. For example, the expectation that a family member with a government job should cover the school fees for children in their extended network may create obligations that well exceed his or her actual income and lead him/her to demand or accept bribes. While they do not in themselves necessarily lead to corruption, expectations regarding social obligations are as powerful as expectations that everyone is engaged in corrupt behavior (an assumption of collective action theory) in shaping individuals’ incentives and sustaining patterns of corruption.

tive norms), but also from what an individual believes that others think she or he has an *obligation* to do in a particular situation (injunctive norm).

These norms often reflect “simple rules” that guide people’s decision making and behavior across many issues and in many areas of life unrelated to corruption. As we discovered in analyzing how systemic corruption patterns are generated in the Democrat-

### **Police and Traffic in Bogota, Colombia: A Multi-Pronged Strategy**

In Colombia the absence of a norm of legal obedience is described in detail by the former Mayor of Bogota, Antanas Mockus.<sup>47</sup> There is a widespread belief within some groups that clever people cut corners to get ahead and only fools play by the rules.<sup>48</sup> This norm legitimizes and in fact encourages officials to abuse their power for personal gain, and creates willing participants in corrupt practices. In this context, the city government, under its Civic Culture program, designed an initiative aimed at aligning legal, moral and social norms in the domain of traffic regulation, which was beset by widespread corruption. It publicized the message that traffic regulation is meant to reduce injury and death (moral conscience), and distributed thumbs-up (social approval) and thumbs-down (social disapproval) cards to drivers that they could use to communicate with other drivers. Mockus also replaced corrupt traffic police with a corps of mimes on city center streets who ridiculed traffic violators (social disapproval), before ultimately closing down the notoriously corrupt transit police department. This multi-pronged program changed normative expectations about traffic compliance. As injuries and fatalities decreased and the city publicized the results, expectations about how people behaved in traffic changed, leading to greater respect for traffic laws.<sup>49</sup>

ic Republic of the Congo, “acquiesce to power” and “fend for yourself and your own group”<sup>50</sup> were simple rules that dictated a wide range of behavioral choices well beyond corruption. “Fend for yourself” (“débrouillez-vous”), enshrined in public consciousness in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the fictitious “Article 15” the Constitution, has had enormous influence on people’s behavior; it has underpinned tremendous resilience and survival of citizens in difficult circumstances, but also made corruption more acceptable at all levels. Effective anti-corruption efforts need to identify the roles of descriptive (what people believe is happening) and injunctive (what people believe is expected of them) expectations that drive corruption, and develop strategies to align them with the legal and moral proscriptions of corruption that are often targeted by programming.

The omission of social norm considerations may not only undermine the potential impact of anti-corruption programming, but even lead to harm. As Antanas Mockus, former mayor of Bogota, Colombia, commented,

when there is a gap between legal and social norms, corruption may be inadvertently reinforced. He notes that when the social dimensions of corruption are not addressed:

“In Colombia, the stronger the rules against ‘clientelism’ get, the stronger the complicity among those engaged in ‘clientelism’ becomes. This could be seen as a kind of perverse social capital. ‘Clientelism’ is legally prohibited but widely accepted in our culture. This is a very clear case of divorce between law and culture.”<sup>51</sup>

Similarly, harm can be unintentionally caused when social norms are not properly taken into account in strategies to shock people into taking action by raising awareness of the extent of corruption. Research in North America has shown that once people are told how most people behave, they adjust their behavior to align. In theory, this could mean that well-meaning public service announcements that expose the amount of corruption that happens in a specific department of the government actually lead to more corruption as people align their behavior to the norm.<sup>52</sup> Without an analysis of the role of social norms underpinning corruption in any given context, the risk of designing a failed strategy is high.

### UNDERSTAND THE FUNCTION OF CORRUPTION IN POLITICAL CULTURE

Critics of the “principal-agent” approach argue that anti-corruption programs are not as effective as they could be because they are often not fit for the political culture and power dynamics in the target society. In our analysis, “political culture” refers to the way in which politics are organized and how political power and/or wealth are amassed, used and exchanged, with specific inquiry into the role that corruption (the abuse of this power for personal gain) plays in these processes. Patterns of corruption differ depending on the underlying political and economic development processes in the countries in question—i.e., how people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power, and how institutions facilitate or impede these processes. Consequently, as Michael Johnston notes, “reformers must have political strategies as well as good ideas for corruption control; and as for the latter, what might seem to be a good reform idea in country A may well be impossible in B, irrelevant in C, and downright harmful in D.”<sup>53</sup>

“**Political culture is the way in which politics are organized and how political power and/or wealth are amassed, used and exchanged.**”

In a country where one clan or “big man” (or woman) maintains power by purposefully keeping state institutions weak, for example, an anti-corruption commission could be used as a way to oppress opposition, as the risk of elite interference is high.<sup>54</sup> In a political system in which the political party is the mechanism for control, while authority and freedom to act is decentralized, there might be little vertical integration of corruption, but efforts will need to deal with local incentives and interests. Developing appropriate strategies that also minimize potential negative impacts requires robust analysis of the political context and stakeholders.

Some analytic frameworks have been articulated to assess the political-economic context and stakeholders. The most developed of these, Michael Johnston’s “corruption syndromes”, has been integrated into USAID’s Anticorruption Assessment Handbook.<sup>55</sup> They provide important insights into how political power is organized and the implications for anti-corruption strategy, including the need to approach corruption *indirectly* (e.g., through property reform, opening political space, etc.) in order to achieve success in reducing it. These frameworks tend to provide macro-level typologies and broad strategies, but little guidance on how to use them or to connect sector-, institution- or

program-level analysis to them—with the risk that “off the shelf”, standardized, simple approaches continue at the program level. Yet in our experience, moving from this level of analysis to program design at local or sectoral level is difficult. We argue that people designing and implementing programs need to engage in deeper analysis and strategy development about political *dynamics*, specifically:

- Greater understanding of the role and function of corruption in *political dynamics* in the specific local or sectoral context, and how they play out and can be engaged at the program level. We have found the following questions to be helpful:

➤ **What functions does corruption serve?** As a complex system, corruption may be negative or a problem, yet simultaneously serve a function and solve problems people face—from helping leaders to command the loyalty of diverse groups or providing a means for the center to retain control over peripheral areas of the country, to political mobilization and access to state benefits for marginalized populations. It is also both a cause and a consequence of governance problems—what are key strengths and weaknesses of political culture in that context?

“  
...corruption may be negative or a problem, yet simultaneously serve a function and solve problems people face...”

➤ **How might the system “push back” against efforts at reform?** Who are key people – people with influence over the factors that drive corruption – and how will they respond to or resist reforms? How will actors and institutions adapt, circumvent or resist reforms?

➤ **What is the connection between local and/or sectoral actors and issues relevant to corruption to national level political actors and dynamics?**

- Attention to factors that influence “*political will*” for governance and corruption reform. “Political will” is often considered to be a critical pre-condition for anti-corruption reforms to succeed and be sustained.<sup>56</sup> Yet it is rarely deconstructed and analyzed. Most analysis seeks to discover only whether (and where) it is present or absent. Some analysts have sought to disaggregate the concept of political will into measurable components;<sup>57</sup> however, existing frameworks do not inquire into the *dynamics* of political will, i.e. how and why it may exist or not exist, and therefore are of limited value in guiding efforts to generate political will, or to strengthen and expand it where it does exist. As a result, advice on addressing political will is general or incomplete, ranging from supporting integrity pledges and public education campaigns, to identifying and working with local champions for reform, rephrasing goals to emphasize governance rather than anti-corruption reform, and providing incentives (including monetary incentives) for implementation of reforms.<sup>58</sup> A more useful assessment of the forces that determine political will would ask:


➤ **What are the interests and relationships among key actors?** How can we understand not only “vested interests,” but broader interests, resources and power of different affected people and groups, as well as relationships and

patterns of influence among them, including the role and relationship of corruption to these interests?<sup>59</sup>

- **Where is there energy for change (sometimes called tension in the system), and what is the linkage between the people and issues involved and political dynamics at the center?**
- **What are possible implicit or explicit coalitions against corruption—in what areas?** Where do interests of various actors align on issues affecting levels of corruption? What is their potential strength to overcome blocking coalitions?

#### MAP POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INTERVENTIONS

Very little attention is given to secondary and unintended effects of anti-corruption interventions in the theory and practice literature that discusses context analysis and program design. Reactions and responses in the system that may not only feed back to undermine achievement of programmatic goals, but also undermine other important social, political or economic dynamics as well. For example, support for making judicial decisions more transparent and for mobilizing citizens against corruption could



**sometimes undermine achievement of programmatic goals**

**sometimes undermine other important social, political or economic dynamics**

create pressure on judges to refuse bribes and resist political pressure. However, it could also threaten corrupt elites and, as Johnston notes, “encourage [them] to shift thievery into overdrive,” find new and more damaging ways of pursuing their goals, or result in repression or violence.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, “frying a big fish”—prosecuting and imprisoning prominent figures for corruption—could send a useful message both to potential bad actors as well as those resisting corruption, but could also be used as a means to neutralize political opposition, or it could raise expectations about change that are disappointed once corruption returns after the excitement has subsided.<sup>61</sup> And, we argue, if this society is divided or emerging from conflict, promoting civic activism when there are few bridges across conflict lines, and without understanding the differential impacts of corruption across the divides, could deepen divisions and escalate violence.

“

**How could reforms backfire in the long run?”**

In complex systems it is thus important to ask: How could reforms backfire in the long run? How might anti-corruption efforts unleash dynamics that could undermine the sustainability of reforms in the long run? What are the broader (un-

intended) effects anti-corruption efforts might have in other areas – such as security of citizens, recruitment of judges, social cohesion, etc.? As understanding of the “problem” and of consequences of our actions often only comes as “solutions” are tried, it is important to monitor and update analysis frequently.

## V. Conclusion: Implications for Analysis and Strategy

In this paper we have identified a number of shortcomings of the predominant paradigms underlying anti-corruption programming. We have also argued that addressing these gaps—and improving effectiveness of programming—requires a shift in the way we think about corruption: from a “simple” problem that is solvable through application of best practice, to a more complex understanding of corruption as embedded in a dynamic socio-political context that must be approached holistically for good solutions to emerge. Understanding corruption as a “complex” phenomenon entails significant changes in how we do analysis, strategy and program design for anti-corruption efforts. Specifically, we argue that this means we need to:



### CONDUCT SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS THAT IS GROUNDED IN CONTEXT

Analysis must go beyond understanding how much corruption exists, how money flows, what the incentives are for individual acts of corruption, and identifying monopolies, discretion or a lack of accountability that might be addressed through external intervention. It needs to illuminate the *interconnections* between corruption at various levels, as well as the dynamic interrelationships among the different drivers of corruption and its function in political, social and economic life. We have argued that social norms, power and politics, and feedback loops that can dampen or alter the impacts of anti-corruption efforts are of particular importance. Greater research and experimentation is needed to identify how to analyze these drivers and integrate that analysis into program design.

It should be self-evident that this analysis must be grounded in the peculiarities of each context. This is advice that is ubiquitous, but rarely implemented in practice. As Marquette and Peiffer note, “[t]he context should drive efforts to tackle corruption, not the theory or model,” whatever the theory may be.<sup>62</sup> If we continue to treat corruption as a “simple” problem, our capacity to analyze context “without prejudice”<sup>63</sup> will necessarily be limited because it will be difficult to look beyond tweaking “best practice” solutions (whether grounded in principal-agent or any other model) to account for context, and open our vision to less obvious specific conditions and factors that may accelerate or dampen attempts to bring about changes.



### IMPLEMENT STRATEGIC, EMERGENT DESIGN AND ADAPTIVE MONITORING

As corruption is a complex problem, anti-corruption programming design needs to engage in good design practice, including recognizing that some of what is being sought is inherently emergent. This requires practitioners to do their due diligence in thinking through Relevance, Change, Clarity, and Project Logic (see Table 1) as derived from a nuanced corruption analysis, recognizing that there will always be areas where it will not be possible to map the change pathway due to the number of uncertainties involved.

Because there will always be emergent (and unpredictable) dimensions of the theory of change, as well as known and unknown feedback loops in the system, anti-corruption program design should not be viewed as a single stage in a project cycle: a design that is static will risk becoming irrelevant. Through experimentation, experience, and good monitoring data, the design should be constantly adapting as the system evolves and responds to the intervention itself. As knowledge is gained through this process, the elements that were previously deemed to be emergent will become more clear. At that point, good design thinking may be further applied to adapt the program to this emergent reality.



#### **PURSUE MULTI-FACETED STRATEGIES**

While a Principal-Agent derived strategy will likely always be necessary and useful, it will rarely be sufficient to positively affect corruption dynamics in foreign assistance contexts.<sup>64</sup> Anti-corruption programming in these situations need to incorporate multiple strategies, including developing a wider range of strategies for dealing with social norms; political interests, incentives and dynamics among stakeholders; informal practices and institutions (e.g., patronage networks); social and cultural rules, etc.



#### **LAYER STRATEGIES, AND PURSUE STRATEGIC COOPERATION**

Greater cooperation among different efforts—rather than “mutually exclusive” thinking about combatting corruption—are needed. Strategies should promote greater cooperation among efforts working in different sectors that are linked by the corruption systems that distort effective functioning of the sector. Where corruption is affected by *dynamic* interaction among different elements, including the presence of anti-corruption programs, it is crucial to understand and pursue linkages between anti-corruption efforts so they can amplify each other to “add up” to better effects on corruption than have been registered to date, and avoid undermining or dampening each other’s impacts inadvertently.

## End Notes

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6. See International Council for Science and International Social Science Council. (2015). *Review of Targets for the Sustainable Development Goals: The Science Perspective*. Paris: ICSU and ISSC. <http://www.icsu.org/publications/reports-and-reviews/review-of-targets-for-the-sustainable-development-goals-the-science-perspective-2015/SDG-Report.pdf> (accessed 28 May 2016).
7. Conducted in 2015, the review identified all documents related to corruption from 2012-2015 in the top eight donors' databases and categorized them by primary theory of change. (USAID, GIZ, DFID, SIDA, IRDB, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, AusAid, MCC). Evaluation reports of these donors' corruption-related programs available in their databases were also identified, and a more detailed analysis of a sample, selected randomly, amounting to 50% of the documents, was conducted.
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10. Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and Teorell, J. (2012). "Why Anti-Corruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem." *Governance*, 26: 449-471.
11. Mungiu-Pippidi defines particularism as "a mode of social organization characterized by the regular distribution of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power within such societies." In other words, unlike universalist societies, where people receive equal treatment regardless of group or status, in particularistic societies people's treatment depends on their status or position in society, and their closeness to power. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). "Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 3: 86-99.
12. Mungiu-Pippidi (2006). See also Johnston, M. (2005). *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
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14. New work by Lambsdorff (2015) argues that these approaches are ineffective because they are based on a premise of distrust, and do not take into account what is known to generate behavior change as found in the behavioral science literature.
15. Marquette and Peiffer (2015) argue that both Principal-Agent and Collective Action explanations of corruption can lead to some of the same programming types. Due to the limitations of a document review, we are not able to know for certain the analytic basis that programmers used to make their decisions. This is acknowledged as a limitation to the review, but does not undermine the argument that these theories need to be far more nuanced, contextually grounded and integrated.
16. Statement by 5th Pillar, <http://zerocurrency.org/> and <http://www.5thpillar.org/programs/zero-rupee-note> (accessed 24 January 2016).
17. See Marquette & Peiffer (2015). (Arguing that principal-agent and collective action explanations of the persistence of corruption are complementary, and that a multi-faceted, coordinated approach is needed to enhance effectiveness).
18. Marquette & Peiffer (2015): 7-11.
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20. We draw on the distinctions made by David Snowden in his "Cynefin" framework between "simple", "complicated", "complex" and "chaotic" situations. In simple situations, the relationship between cause and effect is known and reliable and effective best practice can be generated. In complicated situations, the relationship between cause and effect is still knowable, but it requires deeper expertise and analysis to develop that understanding and devise appropriate solutions. Complex problems are the realm of the unknown unknowns—i.e. the relationships between cause and effect are not perceivable. For purposes of this analysis, we do not distinguish between simple and complicated, as complicated problems share characteristics of simple problems that causes and interrelationships of parts are known (or knowable)—except that in complicated situations, specialized expertise may be required. See Snowden, D. (2000). *Cynefin, a Sense of Time and Place: An Ecological Approach to Sense Making and Learning in Formal and Informal Communities*. In Depres, C. & Chauvel, D. *Knowledge Horizons: The Present*

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  25. In 2016, for example, the average policeman in the Eastern DRC is expected to pay their supervisor 50,000 Congolese francs per month.
  26. Foltz, J. and Opoku-Agyemang K. (2016). "Do Higher Salaries Lower Petty Corruption? A Policy Experiment on West Africa's Highways." *International Growth Centre Working Paper*, Feb 6, 2016. <http://www.theigc.org/project/can-raising-police-salaries-reduce-petty-corruption-in-ghana/> (accessed May 19, 2016.)
  27. Ricigliano and Chigas (2011), p.3.
  28. Ibid.
  29. This is a prescription advocated by proponents of "collective action" theories to help people take the risk to behave differently. See Johnston, M. (2014). *Corruption, Contention and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; Rothstein?
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  33. See Marquette and Peiffer (2015).
  34. Jesper Johnson has also found a "one size fits all" approach to anti-corruption programming. See Johnson, J. (2012). "Theories of Change in Anti-Corruption Work: A Tool for Programme Design and Evaluation." *U4 Issue* 2012(6).
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  36. Johnston (2014) notes that because we rely extensively on corruption indices that rank whole societies along one dimension, the tendency is to view corruption as the same everywhere, although in reality it originates in highly contextually-specific dealings among particular people in particular situations.
  37. "Policymakers in developing states no longer have any excuse for not prioritizing police anticorruption reforms. Nor can they plead ignorance of the ingredients required. But a list of ingredients does not itself make a stew. That takes a recipe for how to combine the ingredients: in what proportions and when. And that is one reason why the volume is so frustrating: it lacks a recipe for police reform." (Italics added.) Messick, R. "The Challenge of Police Reform in Developing Nations." *Global Anticorruption Blog*, 20 November 2015. <https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/11/20/the-challenge-of-police-reform-in-developing-nations/> (accessed 28 May 2016).
  38. For Mungiu-Pippidi (2006, p.91), the question is to "understand whether corruption is the exception or whether it is the norm." For Johnston (2005), the question is to diagnose what corruption "syndrome" exists and apply the appropriate approach.
  - 39.
  40. This table has been generated through a review of select theory of change literature and key evaluation resources. See Church, C. and Rogers, M. (2006). *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground; Reimann, C. (2012). "Evaluability Assessments in Peacebuilding Programming." CDA Working Paper on Program Review & Evaluation #3. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects; Chigas, D., Reimann, C. & Woodrow, P. (2012). "An Alternative to Formal Evaluation of Peacebuilding: Program Quality Assessment." CDA Working Paper on Program Review & Evaluation # 4. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects; Davies, R. (2015). "An Evaluability Assessment Checklist." Davies, R. (2013). *Planning Evaluability Assessments: A Synthesis of the Literature with Recommendations. Report of a Study Commissioned by the Department for International Development*. London: DFID, p. 19-20; Center for Theory of Change, <http://theoryofchange.org> (accessed 28 May 2016).
  41. See, for example, CDA. (2013). *Reflecting on Peace Practice Participant Training Manual*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, pp. 3-5. <http://cdacollaborative.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Reflecting-on-Peace-Practice-1-Participant-Training-Manual.pdf> (accessed 26 May 2016).
  42. See for example, Kreidler, C. (2009). "Can Fighting Corruption Harm Building Peace?" In Scharbatke-Church, C. and Reiling, K. *Pilfering the Peace: The Nexus between Corruption and Peacebuilding*. *New Routes* Volume 14, 3-4/2009: 38-41.
  43. See for example, Church, C. & Rogers, M. (2006). "Understanding Change." *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Chapter 2. Washington, D.C.: Search for Common Ground. <http://dmeformpeace.org/sites/default/files/>

- SFCG\_Designing%20for%20Results\_Ch2.pdf (accessed 26 May 2016).
44. "Key people" has been defined as people or groups that have a significant influence on the evolution of the conflict; "more people" refers to approaches that target a broader constituency, seeking to involve a broader range of groups in the peace process. Anderson, M. & Olson, L. (2003). *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. p.48.
  45. Bicchieri, C. and Muldoon, R. "Social Norms" *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2011 Edition
  46. Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) argues that reforms that treat corruption as the exception to a norm of integrity (punishing individuals, for example) will not work where corruption is an expression of the political culture. Johnston (2005) categorizes patterns of corruption ("corruption syndromes") according to the underlying political and economic development processes—i.e., how people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power and how institutions facilitate or impede these processes—and argues that strategies must match the political-economic context they are designed to influence.
  47. Mockus, A., "Co-existence as Harmonization of Law, Morality and Culture." *Prospects* 32(1), March 2002.
  48. As described in a personal conversation with Antanas Jurksaitis. (April 2014.)
  49. Mockus, A. (2004) See also Mockus, A. "The Art of Changing A City." *New York Times*, July 16, 2015; Mackie, G. et al. *What are Social Norms? How are they Measured?* UNICEF and University of California, San Diego Center on Global Justice (2015).
  50. Holladay, R. *Simple Rules: Organizational DNA*. HSD Institute, 2005. [http://s3.amazonaws.com/hsd.hero-kuapp.com/contents/73/original/Simple\\_Rules\\_-\\_Final\\_05-01-06.pdf?1345845880](http://s3.amazonaws.com/hsd.hero-kuapp.com/contents/73/original/Simple_Rules_-_Final_05-01-06.pdf?1345845880). The concept of simple rules has grown out of the development computer simulations to recreate system behavior—such as flocking of birds. In one of the most famous (called "boids"), the program was able to replicate bird flocking behavior through a set of rules to assure alignment, togetherness and proper separation: fly toward the center of the flock, match the speed of other "boids" (simulated birds), and avoid running into other "boids." The simple rules in computer simulations are metaphors for a commonly agreed (implicitly or explicitly) set of rules to guide people's behavior in a group—and in specific contexts become social norms or expectations of what one will and ought to do.
  51. Mockus, A. (2004). "Do Constitutions Constrain? Legal, Moral, and Cultural Self-Bindings to Prevent Shortcuts." Paper presented at Columbia 250 Symposium, *Constitutions, Democracy and the Rule of Law*. p.14. [http://c250.columbia.edu/c250\\_events/symposia/constitutions/papers/mockus\\_paper.pdf](http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_events/symposia/constitutions/papers/mockus_paper.pdf); video [http://c250.columbia.edu/c250\\_events/symposia/constitutions/constitutions\\_vid\\_archive.html](http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_events/symposia/constitutions/constitutions_vid_archive.html) (accessed 26 May 2016).
  52. Perkins, H. and Berkowitz, A. (1986). "Perceiving the Community Norms of Alcohol Use among Students: Some Research Implications for Campus Alcohol Education Programming." *International Journal of the Addictions* 21:961-976. The authors recommended providing accurate information on actual peer drinking behavior, to encourage students to reduce their alcohol consumption to align more with the norm.
  53. Johnston (2014).
  54. Ibid.
  55. Spector, B., Johnston, M., and Winbourne, S. (2009). Johnston's "syndromes" identify distinctive patterns of corruption problems ("corruption syndromes") in different types of political-economic systems: influence markets (private wealth seeking influence in well-institutionalized democracies and markets); elite cartels (elites colluding to share spoils in moderately strong states); oligarchs and clans (oligarchs contending in a setting of pervasive insecurity); and official moguls (dominant inner circle acting with impunity). Johnston (2005); *USAID Anticorruption Assessment Handbook* (2009). Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) provides a framework of questions for diagnosing whether "corruption is the exception or whether it is the norm," in order to understand whether the problem is one of "modern corruption" in a "universalist" system, corruption is an exception to the norm of equal and fair treatment for all, or "particularism" where corruption and privilege are the norm.
  56. See, for example, Spector, B. Winbourne, S. and Dininio, P. (2015). *USAID Practitioner's Guide for Anticorruption Programming*. Washington, D.C.: USAID and Management Systems International; Boucher, A. et al. (2007). *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in Wartorn States*. Stimson Center Report 61. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center.
  57. Brinkerhoff, D. (2010). "Unpacking the Concept of Political Will to Confront Corruption." U4 Brief No. 1. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Brinkerhoff identifies 7 elements: Government initiative, policy choices based on balanced consideration of options and outcomes, mobilization of stakeholders, public commitment and allocation of resources, application of credible sanctions, continuity of effort and monitoring and adaptation of efforts.
  58. Spector, Winbourne, and Dininio (2015).
  59. The USAID Anticorruption Assessment Handbook does provide a framework an actor analysis, though it stops at identification of reform allies and opponents, and does not deepen analysis to understand relationships and interests driving behavior. Spector, Johnston, and Winbourne (2009).
  60. Johnston (2014).
  61. Marquette and Peiffer (2014, p.11.)
  62. Marquette and Peiffer (2014, p.11.)
  63. Ibid.
  64. Stephenson, M. (2015). "Corruption is BOTH a "Principal-Agent Problem: AND a "Collective Action Problem"," *Global Anticorruption Blog*, April 9, 2015, <http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/04/09/corruption-is-both-a-principal-agent-problem-and-a-collective-action-problem/> (accessed 28 May 2016). See also Kolstad, I., Fritz, V. and O'Neil, T. (2008). "Corruption, Anti-Corruption Efforts and Aid: Do Donors have the Right Approach?" *Working Paper 3, Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction Working Paper Series*. London: Overseas Development Institute.