"Justice Without Corruption, It's Possible – I'm Committed"

Final Evaluation Report

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Besa: Catalyzing Strategic Change

Besa is a social enterprise committed to catalyzing significant change on strategic issues in places experiencing conflict and structural or overt physical violence. Besa utilizes a 'whole of organization' approach to our work, which emphasizes holistic responses that balances process and results based on technical expertise and experience in the fields of peacebuilding, governance, anti-corruption, rule of law and civil society strengthening. The organization seeks to be a thought leader; advancing new frameworks and approaches to context analysis, program design, monitoring and evaluation. Besa seeks to develop strong partnerships based on mutual values and complimentary expertise.

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

CDA (www.cdacollaborative.org) is a US based non-profit organization committed to improving the effectiveness of those who work internationally to provide humanitarian assistance, engage in peace practice, support sustainable development, and conduct corporate operations in a socially responsible manner.

RCN Justice et Démocratie

RCN Justice & Démocratie has been working in the DRC since 2001 in the field of governance and justice sector reform. It possesses extensive experience working with all the actors operating in the judicial chain, both in the civil and criminal justice sectors. RCN J&D has implemented projects in the provinces of Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Katanga, Kivus, Ituri, and Kasaï-Occidental.

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Cover photo: Project T-Shirt. Credit: Longin Baranyizigiye.

Kuleta Haki "Provide Justice" Executive Summary

This evaluation examined what elements of the Kuleta Haki pilot project have catalyzed change within participants and beyond, based on the project's theory of change. It looked at whether the theory of change is proving valid, why this is so, and what needs to be altered to increase the likelihood of making a difference on corruption in the criminal justice system (CJS) in Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo?

In late 2015, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) and RCN Justice & Démocratie (RCN J&D) established an anti-corruption 'Network,' or dedicated community, called "Kuleta Haki" in local dialect, to provide strength in numbers to disparate 'islands of integrity'. These 'islands' are judicial actors who were already taking a stand on their own – when possible - against corruption. The Network is composed of diverse members; predominately including actors within the criminal justice system pertinent to pre-trial detention, but also individuals external to the CJS, such as defense lawyers, judicial reform advocates, journalists, and other civil society actors.

The project's theory of change was developed through a diagnostic analysis designed and implemented by CDA/Besa in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, DRC. The analysis sought to understand how the system of corruption operates within the criminal justice sector, as perceived by Congolese in these cities. This work is part of a wider program, the Central Africa Accountable Service Delivery Initiative (CAASDI), funded by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).

Kuleta Haki celebrated its first-year anniversary in October 2016, marked by a formative evaluation. Conducted internally by CDA/Besa and RCN J&D, with the support of one external academic from the region, this evaluation adopted a Utilization-Focused evaluation approach with mixed-method data collection. Forty semi-structured interviews were conducted, plus two focus groups and a questionnaire.

Does Kuleta Haki Help Diminish Corruption in Pretrial Detention?

Corruption is more regularly resisted by members. It appears that Kuleta Haki has given those with existing personal convictions greater confidence, motivation and practical strategies for resisting corruption. The evaluation showed that members across the Network are taking concrete actions to resist corruption and, for a small cohort, such actions are increasing in frequency. For example, 55% of those interviewed gave examples of concrete actions taken to resist corruption or support others in their resistance. Four main types of action were noted (in order of most to least frequently referenced): talking to people/colleagues/corrupt individuals, saying no to money, waiting rather than giving in to corruption, saying no when a boss asks a case to be passed through.

In terms of the next tier of influence, the evaluation team noted that Network members are actively talking to colleagues who are not participating in Kuleta Haki and reporting positive

interest; yet little behavior change is apparent amongst these colleagues. The evaluation team felt that this was understandable given the limited size of the current Network and relative youth of the project.

Different types of corruption are difficult to resist for different actors. There is no discernible pattern in the types of corruption most often resisted by the Network. The three types of corruption identified as most difficult to resist cover a wide spectrum and include corruption within the judicial hierarchy, paying at each step in the judicial process, and paying 'preemptive gifts' to those you would like to curry favor with in advance. These types of corruption were difficult to resist for diverse reasons and by various people.

What We Know About Why Concrete Action is Occurring

Prise de conscience: Network members, internal to the CJS especially, explain that they now recognize the collective harm caused by corruption. Forty percent of the interviewees identified a "prise de conscience" – or an "awakening" – to corruption in their professional lives. This is a particularly important finding because systems thinking posits that a shift in a 'mental model' (values, assumptions and beliefs that shape a system) have significant potential to change the system. The corruption systems map developed by the Network identifies one mental model as "corruption is normal". It seems there is early evidence of a shift in this 'mental model', that corruption is seen as less normal and more as potentially harmful.

Personal Conviction: The most common reason Network members gave for acting against corruption was their personal conviction (i.e., that personal values were more important than professional ethics in motivating anti-corruption efforts).

Knowledge Creates Motivation: Some members have found newly acquired knowledge about types of corruption, strategies to resist and theory of change created more motivation and confidence to resist corruption.

Physical Symbols of Commitment Matter: T-shirts with the slogan "It's possible, I'm committed" have been a source of pride amongst members and prompted interest from others to discuss corruption.

What We Do Not Know Yet

An area requiring further inquiry is whether the project's overall theory of change is the source for this increase in resistance. Only 7/40 (17.5%) reported that a group (or, 'strength in numbers') helped them resist. This is a particularly important finding, given that this is central to the project's Theory of Change.

The evaluation team felt it was too early to discount the theory of change as it could be sound. It is possible that the Network has not yet reached the 'right size' and/or greater visibility of the Network may be necessary for strength in numbers to be felt. The evaluation revealed that Network members do, in fact, want greater public visibility of the Network. Thus: the 'safety in

numbers' theory may be debunked or it may simply need expanding and reinterpretation about who is able to provide safety, and how.

What We Know About Why Greater Resistance is Not Occurring...

Finances: There exist both perceived and real financial needs that lead Network members to participate in corruption.

Not Interested: Some CJS professionals do not resist corruption because they do not want to resist. Among interviewees, 33% explained that CJS professionals do not resist because they are not motivated to change their behavior on this issue.

One ineffective tactic: Network efforts to document emblematic cases of pretrial detention was not an effective mechanism in supporting the members to take action against corruption. It is possible that this is due to insufficient clarity on the purpose of the process.

Consequences of Acting Against Corruption

Over the course of this project, the project team has repeatedly monitored the safety of project participants (given the potentially contentious nature of the project). To date members indicate they do not feel threatened because the project itself is seen by many as "social" rather than "political". Nonetheless, consequences for acting do exist. For example:

- *Teasing is a common response received by members.* Over a third of interview respondents reported some form of teasing from colleagues because they resist. In the DRC, good-natured teasing is common; it is the impression of the evaluation team that the teasing is mostly good-natured with a minority of instances of mean-spirited mockery.

- *Members experience fewer demands for money due to their 'good' reputation.* The data behind this conclusion is limited, but 8 of 40 members – mostly internal to the system – spoke of how their "good" or "tough" reputation amongst those working within the CJS has resulted in a decrease in demands for payment or favors.

- *Fear and impunity were rarely mentioned.* Fear of the consequences and impunity for those involved in corruption do not appear to deter members in their resistance. It was rarely mentioned as reasons barring members from resisting corruption. Though counter to common assumptions this is validated by the Lubumbashi systems map[1] which does not show these as key factors.

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[1] See, Woodrow, Peter. "A Systemic Analysis of Corruption in the Criminal Justice System in Lubumbashi, DRC." http://www.blog.cdacollaborative.org/a-systemic-analysis-of-corruption-in-the-criminal-justice-system-in-lubumbashi-drc/?src=ES.

Recommendations

The evaluation team proposed the 22 recommendations below for the implementing team's consideration that ranged from the tactical to the strategic; along with eight ideas as food for thought. Recommendations encompass: improving internal Network functioning, recommendations to maintain the security/comfort of members, concrete steps for engaging colleagues, recommendations to monitor progress of Kuleta Haki.

The Network should discuss the Kuleta Haki theory of change, which currently asserts knowledge changes, changes in trust within the Network, and feelings of "safe space" will lead to concrete action. Are these the correct pre-requisites for action? Also, are the actions necessary different for men than for women? Why is it that the frequent resistors are predominately women?

The Network should also discuss why the rest of the membership is not yet regularly avoiding corruption.

Continue to make the link to the collective harm and collective benefit for the country of fighting corruption in the CJS and be sure to give this message adequate attention in the new sub-groups.

Discuss with core network what size and composition the network would need to have in order for a sense amongst members that they have strength in numbers sufficient to catalyze more behavior change and create a sense of protection. Within this conversation, also discuss if this is the most effective way to proceed.

Discuss within the network whether personal conviction is possible to build or change in an adult and if so, how?

The Network should discuss which type is more difficult for different actors inside and external to the system to identify more targeted ways of supporting people.

Given how effective the consciousness awakening was within the existing Network, give extra attention to purposefully replicating this within the new subgroups, for instance by exposing the new subgroups to external speakers.

Program team to review list to see if there are ideas that have not been discussed within the Network and if so, include them in forthcoming strategic discussions.

Influencing up the hierarchy will be critical if the Network is to expand its influence in a meaningful way. A focus in year 2 on identifying feasible changes at the provincial and national level and strategies to achieve these changes should be considered.

For future monitoring – consider focusing a new round of Most Significant Change monitoring on influencing the hierarchy.

Discuss with the Network if they think more influence on colleagues has happened or should be expected to happen and if they feel it is sufficient, impressive or lacking and what can be done about it.

The program has always maintained that having mechanisms for accountability between Network members will be key to long term success. Developing these mechanisms to encourage more action should be a priority for Year 2. One idea – of many possible – would be to develop some form of tracking or documenting of 'effects' that members submit regularly to the Program Team or Core Group.

Discuss the future use of visual symbols (e.g. T-shirts) to determine how to maximize their value for all members. For instance, do all members of subgroups have a T-shirt? According to the workshop, members get a T-shirt when they demonstrate the values of the Network in their professional life. If it requires their professional life to be in accordance with the slogan, who and how is that decided? Would items that are more suitable to a professional legal environment be more useful e.g. lapel pins, pens? Are there visual symbols more appropriate for specific groups – e.g. scarves for women?

For future monitoring – consider tracking if there is a gender difference in use of and response to the T-shirts.

Develop a list of positive responses to mockery or teasing, so that members are equipped to verbally deflect this situation in a positive manner.

Organize similar workshops for sub-groups, with further thought given to how to make these experiences inspirational without losing the educational value. Perhaps focusing on people's experience more, or highlighting the benefits or positives of saying no could inspire people more.

For future monitoring e.g. feedback forms – track the inspiration felt by different strategies to gain a better understanding of what motivates people.

Discuss with the Core Network if the Code of Conduct is the right way to create common values and to hold people accountable. If so, think of ways to make the network more aware of its content

The evaluation team feels that the listening clubs should only be continued if a clear strategy for how they will support Network member's corruption resistance is articulated. This recommendation needs to be discussed by the Network.

Coordinate timing of activities further in advance to facilitate members' schedules.

Interviewees gave several recommendations on how to improve the Network. The responses to this question are aggregated in the report and are not the opinion of the evaluation team. It is useful to point out that a majority of the questionnaires corroborated the interview statements about how to improve Network functioning. The questionnaires requested that the Network be made larger (5 responses), as well as "legalized" and given a structure (3 responses). More capacity building was also requested (5 responses).

Discuss how visibility of structure and message will increase the Network's ability to resist e.g. due to more people involved, more status coming from membership etc. List out all possible risks associated with the answer and identify ways we can tackle them. (with the network)

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

RCN J&D – RCN Justice & Démocratie

CAASDI – Central African Accountable Service Delivery Initiative

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

CJS – Criminal Justice Sector

CSO – Civil Society Organization

LICOCO – Ligue Congolaise Contre la Corruption

ESSOR – DFID Anti-Corruption Program[2]

OSISA – Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa

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[2] Essor is a DFID-funded flexible program to improve the business environment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Essor is part of DFID DRC's wider private sector development program for the period 2015-2020. ESSOR's portfolio of activities is built around 7 projects, including one anti-corruption project.

Introduction

Commissioned and conducted internally by CDA and RCN J&D, this formative evaluation is a key aspect of the learning component central to this program. The evaluation was implemented at month 15 of the programming portion of the CAASDI grant that supports Kuleta Haki in Lubumbashi, DRC. With data collected in November 2016 and early findings reviewed by the Core Network that same month, the evaluation will inform the Network, program and learning team for year 2 of the program. More information on the evaluation may be found in the Terms of Reference (**Annex 1**). See below for a short guide on how to navigate the information provided in this report.

Project Background

The Kuleta Haki project vision is a criminal justice system that is free of monetary corruption and political interference in the DRC. (Note that political interference encompasses i) interference by public authorities for their own political gain, *as well as*, ii) interference by public authorities in the justice system on behalf of commercial or private interests for which they receive a bribe or other gain).

Addressing complex problems like corruption requires an adaptive, open-ended approach. CAASDI set out to take a "systems" view of corruption and the criminal justice sector to understand how corruption operates to impede services in the justice system and why. Systems thinking is a way of understanding reality—a context, conflict, corruption, etc.—that emphasizes the relationships among a system's parts, rather than the parts themselves. Systems analysis helps to identify dynamic relationships among different factors; it also has the potential to help bridge the gap between analysis and programming by facilitating thinking about how to interrupt or change the system.

Before designing the Kuleta Haki pilot (2015-2016), the system of corruption in Lubumbashi was mapped and analyzed to uncover important entry points for the project. Two important entry points were revealed: (1) Individuals who did not participate in corrupt activities faced dangers from these acts of resistance, which precluded them from fully realizing their professional and ethical responsibilities. Thus, the CDA team theorized that if a safe space for these "islands of integrity" existed, action to fight against corruption may be possible. (2) From the research, there appeared to be few cases of collective action undertaken by CJS actors *in collaboration with civil society actors*. Thus, with strategic support, cross- sector anti-corruption collaborations might more effectively engage the local population, and build upon existing degrees of frustration and discontent to effectuate positive change in the system.

In addition, CAASDI found a widely-held perception amongst justice sector actors that pre-trial detention is where the prosecution and judiciary earn considerable illicit money, suggesting motivation in favor of issuing pre-trial detention. CAASDI found prisons in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi to possess deeply integrated corruption to the extent that prison is almost

impossible to exit without payment. During year one of Kuleta Haki, the system of corruption within preventive detention and police custody in Lubumbashi was selected by the anti-corruption Network as a key area of focus. (For a detailed description of the project to-date, reference ***Annex 2***).

In sum, the program approach is based on a core assumption that there is an untapped pool of people – both providers and consumers of the security and justice system – who are discontented with the effects of corruption on the access and quality of justice, and whose individual and collective mobilization can strengthen resistance to the complex practice of corruption.

Theory of Change

To begin, this project believes that if the Network, comprised of individuals inside and external to the criminal justice system, shares the same understanding of corruption (e.g., anti-corruption strategies, legal rights), and participating actors accept that corruption is collectively/ mutually harmful, these actors (especially **magistrates,** but not limited to them) will start to demand mutual accountability – particularly in their daily work.

Meanwhile, the Network will increasingly be perceived as a "safe space" for discussing corruption, because the Network will hold team-building events to share their stories and experiences with corruption. They will also continue to remind one another of the rules for maintaining Network confidentiality and adhere to a common unifying Code of Conduct and slogan for the Network.

These actions will result in judicial actors (inside and external to the official criminal justice system) beginning to feel confident to act against corruption – particularly after further motivation in the form of stories from those that have successfully resisted corruption.

For the purposes of this evaluation, an **internal** judicial actor is employed by the State (a "*fonctionnaire*") while an **external** is not e.g. journalists and defense attorneys. Yet they all work within the criminal justice system.

Program Objectives

As stated in the program documentation the objectives are:

- Objective 1: As a result of judicial actors starting to take actions against corruption in the 1-year pilot, these actors will now strategically resist and support colleagues standing up to corruption.
- Objective 2: The Network creates conditions that enable CSOs and others to resist the practice of corruption in the CJS.

How to Read This Report

- ***Recommendations Versus Ideas***: both capture the evaluation team's sense of what needs to happen, but they differ in terms of the strength of conviction held by the evaluation

team. Ideas should be considered suggestions for next steps because the team had less confidence in the notion or there was insufficient evidence from the evaluation. Recommendations, on the other hand, are next step ideas that the evaluation team feels stronger about in terms of necessity and evidence basis.

- *Interpretation of Data*: answers given are based on trends in the data and shown whenever possible with the evidence base supporting a conclusion. This is shown as the number of supporters from the total number of possible e.g. "16 of 40 interviews stated." As the methodology of this evaluation did not require that every interviewee answer every question, the difference between the total number (e.g. 40) and the number of supporters (e.g. 16) of an idea cannot be seen as those who do not support. They may not have been asked this question or they may have offered other responses that did not add up to a trend.

- *Double and Single Quotes*: double (") quotations indicate this is a direct quote from the interviews, while single quotes (') show something that is indicative of what was said.

The Evaluation

Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to determine what elements of the theory of change have catalyzed change (of any type) within participants and beyond, why this is so and what needs to be altered to increase the likelihood of making a difference on corruption in the judicial process. To this end, the evaluation focused on three areas: assessment of whether Kuleta Haki is achieving intended results; identification of positive and negative unintended consequences of this intervention; and, review of the assumptions underlying the project. The evaluation was intended to provide RCN J&D and CDA with learning opportunities to improve implementation of Kuleta Haki during Phase Two of the project (2016-2017).

It was critical that this evaluation prompt an updated and expanded programmatic theory of change. To this end a facilitated design workshop was later held (2 weeks after evaluation field work), to review and challenge the findings and consider the implications for the next year of work.

Evaluation Criteria and Evaluation Questions

Five evaluation criteria accompanied by several evaluation questions were developed by the evaluation team in consultation with the program team and Core Network. These five are: Impact, Effectiveness, Theory of Change, Implementation and Looking Forward. For a detailed list of the evaluation questions please see the **Terms of Reference – Annex 1**.

Methodology

A four-person blended team (3 internal to the program, 1 external) conducted this evaluation, using a Utilization Focused evaluation approach with mixed-method data collection. Significant time was spent in the preparation phase ensuring that the evaluation questions responded to the needs of the Network and program team. Forty semi-structured interviews were conducted using a purposeful stratified sample (see **Table 1** for demographic information) plus two focus groups of 4 people each. Eighteen interviewees had been in the Network since the beginning of the project (approx. 15 months), 8 participating for 7-9 months, 10 participating for 1-6 months, and 4 were not in the Network. In addition, nineteen completed questionnaires, monitoring data and the post-data collection workshop conversation were incorporated. The draft evaluation conclusions and recommendations were taken back to the Network for review

and comment through a two-day working meeting. The evaluation adhered to the African Evaluation Association Guidelines.[3]

Table 1. Interviewee demographics

	Internal to CJS	External to CJS	**Total**
Total Male Interviews	14	8	22 Men
Total Female Interviews	9	9	18 Women
Total	23 Internal	17 External	**40 Total**

As with most evaluations, this process had limitations. A short time frame, possible positive bias resulting from the internal team members, the English-French translation and challenges with maintaining anonymity with the questionnaires all surfaced. These were mitigated to the extent possible and should be kept in mind as the reader continues through the report.

For a detailed explanation of the methodology and its limitations please see ***Annex 3***.

Evaluation Team Operating Principles

The team committed to the following principles to guide the evaluation:

- Conclusions are data-driven
- Participants are guaranteed anonymity
- The team's process, framing and conclusions show respect for different voices & perspectives
- The evaluation has a transparent purpose & process
- What works matters as much as what can be improved

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[3] Patel, M. 2013. "African Evaluation Guidelines." *African Evaluation Journal* 1(1): 5. http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/aej.v1i1.51

Conclusions, Ideas and Recommendations

The evaluation team sought to answer the set evaluation questions as directly as possible. To this end this section is organized as follows: our answers to the question labeled as Conclusions, followed by Ideas and/or Recommendations.

1. Effectiveness

1.1 Evaluation Question: What concrete actions have network members taken, if any, to resist corruption or support others in their resistance that they would not have taken before their participation in the Network?

1.1a A small number of Network participants, after joining the Network, are more frequently taking concrete action [of any type] to resist corruption

6 of the 15 interviewees that discussed this issue said they were **not frequently** resisting corruption before joining the Network, which suggests there is some evidence that the project effectively changed the ability of participations to take concrete action to resist or support others. This group clearly felt resistance was now a priority in their lives, for varying reasons (see *section 1.2a*). The majority of the 6 frequent resistors were women, internal to the criminal justice sector. Unsurprisingly, newer project participants (e.g., joined in the last 2-7 months) had fewer concrete examples to give about actions taken to resist corruption.

Of the combined 40 interviews and 19 most significant change stories (gathered over two monitoring trips), 22 different individuals have given examples of concrete actions taken to resist corruption or support others in their resistance.[4] Five types of action were noted (in order of most to least frequently referenced):

- *talking to people/colleagues/corrupt individuals,*
- *saying no to money,*
- *waiting rather than giving in to corruption,*
- *saying no when a boss asks a case to be passed through,*
- *refusing to give their own child a free pass through the criminal justice system (1 instance).*

It is important to note when discussing types of resistance that inaction (e.g., waiting rather than giving in to corruption) was considered a concrete action by the evaluation team.

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[4] The difference between this group and the earlier group is the regularly of the resistance.

Ideas:

- Could the Network make a 'how-to' resist corruption guide based on real examples from the Network. Describe situations and how the individual avoided participating in corruption.

An ***idea*** is just that – a notion that the evaluation team has had in response to the conclusion for the Network's consideration.

- As discussed in the workshop, could the Network identify instances where it was not possible to resist or take action and discuss why and what else could have been done to help generate options.

Recommendations:

- The Network should discuss the Kuleta Haki theory of change, which currently asserts knowledge changes, changes in trust within the Network, and feelings of "safe space" will lead to concrete action. **Are these the correct pre-requisites for action?** Also are

A ***recommendation*** is a proposed course of action the evaluation team wishes the Network to seriously consider.

the actions necessary different for men than for women? Why is it that the frequent resistors are predominately women?
- The Network should also discuss why the rest of the membership is not yet regularly avoiding corruption?

1.1.b. Many Network members, internal to the CJS especially, now recognize the collective harm caused by corruption. 16 of 40 interviewees (40%) identified a *"prise de conscience"* – or an "awakening" to corruption in their professional lives as a result of the project; many directly correlating this 'awakening' to a desire for action. The phrase appears to mean two things:

1. Participants felt that they are now "aware" of corruption [i.e., that there are payments demanded which are not legal];
2. They see these forms of corruption more frequently because they understand the negative effects corruption has (and, possibly, how it undermines a larger system).

This phrase does *not* mean participants now simply understand what was legal vs. illegal re: corruption. This is not a so much about fact learning as *early evidence of a possible paradigm shift*. Several actors explicitly stated that they knew about many different forms of corruption prior to joining.

In the project's original Theory of Change, the project team determined that if participants shared a common knowledge of corruption (e.g., types of corruption, corruption strategies) and also *accepted* that corruption is collectively harmful, judicial actors would feel confident to act against corruption. Thus, this paradigm shift is an important result not only becomes it suggests a pillar of the theory of change is accurate, but also because systems theory states that paradigm shifts offer the most significant impact on a system.

Of the 16 that discussed their awakening, roughly 2/3 (10 members) hold positions internal to the criminal justice sector (e.g., magistrates, judges or clerks). This is significant, because the only way to change the system is by engaging with those on the inside of the system.

Internal: this term describes individuals who are employed by the State in the criminal justice system.

1.2 Evaluation Question: Why have actors been able to take concrete action?

1.2.a Some members have found newly acquired knowledge created more motivation and confidence to resist corruption. Interviewees (16 of 40) stated that their increase in knowledge was a key result of their participation in the Network. The most commonly cited knowledge gain, in order from most to least frequently mentioned, included:

- the different types of corruption,
- strategies to resist [specific types weren't mentioned] and
- theory of change.

Women were more likely to attribute a gain in knowledge than men (10 women and 6 men).[5] Why this is the case, is not clear to the evaluation team. It could be that women are more comfortable admitting to lack of knowledge, it could be different training or years of experience between groups, or it could be something else entirely. This gain in knowledge is a somewhat surprising finding for the evaluation team given the education process for the types of professions involved in the Network. It has usefully challenged the Learning Team's assumption about the existing understanding of corruption within CJS professionals.

Self-assessments linked the increase in knowledge –through primarily the sharing of experiences – to galvanizing **motivation to resist** and their **courage and/or confidence** to do so. This increase in motivation and courage was felt more so by women than men.

A small number of members (8 of 40) also explicitly mentioned that they found it motivating to make the direct connection between corruption and the possibility of changing the justice system and by extension the country. For some this clearly had a powerful impact and a few quotes will illustrates this point:

- "I learned that good justice elevates a nation. And that starts with us."
- "Corruption hurts the development of our country!"
- "I've been very affected in learning there's a chance for justice in the best sense."

> **Idea:** Discuss the value of including confidence-building measures explicitly related to corruption in the gender and corruption sub-group or even in all of the newer sub-groups. Activities could include role plays in how to handle sensitive situations related

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[5] N.B.: it is entirely coincidental that there were 16 out of 40 interviewees responding to both question 1.1.x as well as question 1.2.a. Although members of these groups may overlap, the groups are not identical.

to corruption as well as more 'success-stories' from those who have been in the Network longer.

Recommendation: Continue to make the link to the collective harm and collective benefit for the country of fighting corruption in the CJS and be sure to give this message adequate attention in the new sub-groups.

1.2.b. Majority of members are not pointing to 'strength in numbers' as a factor behind their ability to take action.

A small number of respondents (7 of 40) explained their ability to resist as directly related to the existence of a group. These respondents clearly noted the difference this makes compared to acting in "isolation" and in terms of generating "moral support". This is a particularly important finding because a central tenet of the overall theory of change of this program is 'strength in numbers' – connecting the islands of integrity so they are able to support each other in order to do more against corruption.

With so few mentioning this as helpful, it raises the question as to the validity of this theory. Yet in separate parts of the interviews, respondents regularly recommended an expansion of the size of the Network and there is a strong desire amongst many for more Network visibility. With so many competing variables it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion on the validity of the theory. The sense of the evaluation team is that it is still likely that the theory is sound, but we have not yet done sufficient work to create the sense of strength in numbers in the Network and therefore capitalize on it as a force for change. This could include reaching the 'right size' for a sense of strength in numbers to be created and/or it could be related to the need for greater visibility of the Network. It should be noted that bigger may not always be better when it comes to the 'right' size as one will lose trust and relationships as the numbers grow.

Recommendation: Discuss with core network what size and composition the network would need to have in order for a sense amongst members that they have strength in numbers sufficient to catalyze more behavior change and create a **sense of protection**. Within this conversation, also discuss if this is the most effective way to proceed.

1.2.c. The most common reason members gave for taking action against corruption was due to personal conviction. Some respondents explained that their resistance to corruption was due to a belief (i.e. personal conviction) that corruption is 'bad' or disapproved by God. The source of that conviction came from one or more of the following factors: Character/Values (13 mentions), Christianity (11 mentions) and Family Upbringing (4 mentions).[6] This raises the

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[6] Mentions are not equal to number of people as one person may have mentioned several of these factors e.g. Values and family upbringing. Further it is clear that these factors are inter-related and probable that someone who mentioned character may also have been meaning Christian values or their upbringing.

question; if personal conviction is key to resistance, how transferable is this to others? As one interviewee noted, "there is a proverb that says, the tree grows when it is young."

Driver: those factors that cause corruption.
Enabler: those factors that permit corruption to happen.

A core assumption of the CDA team is that both drivers and enablers of corruption must be altered if corruption is to sustainably diminish. In some contexts lack of personal conviction e.g. greed may be a driver so if this was changed that could alter the system. However greed is not the only or dominant driver according to the systems map in Lubumbashi. For instance, the real need of paying for basic expenses such as school fees, which can drive corruption. In this case, how does personal conviction become more important than those other drivers?

A small number of respondents (5 of 40) explained that an individuals' ability to resist was because they had access to "sufficient" resources. "Sufficient" in this case is subjective and defined differently for each person. The thrust of this finding is that if a certain individual perceives they have 'enough' resources then they will *feel enabled* to resist corruption. Although this finding is small (5 of 40), it is significant as it could explain an important **condition for resistance**. Given that insufficient salary is identified as a critical reason why individuals participate in corruption, it also begs the question: what is the relationship between personal conviction and a sense of having sufficient resources? Are those who feel they have sufficient resources more able to act on their personal conviction to resist corruption? Or does personal conviction impact one's perception of how much is sufficient?

> **Recommendation:** Discuss within the network whether personal conviction is possible to build or change in an adult and if so, how?

1.2.d. A small number of members experience less demand for money due to good reputation amongst those working within the criminal justice system. The data behind this conclusion is limited, but the relationship between this possible reason behind successful resistance and the network desire for greater visibility makes it worthy of inclusion. A small number of members (8 of 40) – mostly internal to the system – spoke of their "good" or **"tough" reputation**; meaning that others in the system know that they do not participate in corruption. They assert that this reputation has resulted in a decrease in demands for payment or favors; for instance they are able to enter the Palais de Justice without anyone requiring payment. The team was not able to ascertain how much participation in the Network helped to build these 'tough' reputations.

1.3 Why have actors not been able to resist corruption?

1.3.a Different types of corruption are difficult to resist for diverse actors.

The evaluation identified three types of corruption that respondents felt were difficult to resist. In order from most to least mentioned: Corrupt Hierarchy, Paying for each step in a process and Pre-emptive Gifts. Interestingly these three types cover quite a large spectrum of the

possible corruption risks. Respondents who commented on this were medium and long-term members; either since inception of the Network or having been a member for 8-9 months.

1. *The Corrupt Hierarchy.* Corrupt bosses and pressure from said bosses are seen by all types of CJS actors to be difficult to resist. This issue was raised in 30% (12 of 40) of the interviews, with no differences of note between internal, external, male or female.   That said, it was predominately mentioned by long-term (i.e. since inception) members of the Network.   There was insufficient information to draw conclusions around the specific type of corruption being required by the Hierarchy e.g. extortion.[7]

> **External:** *these are positions that work on or with the criminal justice sector but are not employed by the state. E.g. private lawyer*

2. *Paying for each step in a process.* The daily fees charged to move from step to step in the justice process were felt to be difficult to resist. Phrases used to describe these events in the interview notes included "*cautionnement*", "*amendes transationelles*" and "*frais de fonctionnement*". Eight respondents referenced this type; again there were no differences between internal, external, male or female. The duration of time in the Network varied more greatly in this group, with long and medium-term and recently joined members referencing the difficultly in resisting this form of corruption.

3. *Pre-emptive gifts:*   Referenced the least, was the giving of gifts to officials with the expectation of future preferential treatment. This was mentioned by only three female respondents (2 internal & 1 external) using terms such as "*le plan financiere-l'argent*" and "*les pots de vins*".

The data shows clearly that different people find the different types more or less difficult to resist. Of the 12 who pointed at the corrupt hierarchy as the most difficult to resist, only one also said paying for each step in the process was difficult to resist. There was not adequate information available to determine what differentiates these individuals any further.

Moreover, these three types encompass both the giving and receiving (i.e. supply and demand) side of corruption as well as the pressure to participate in either side. It was not clear from the interviews if there was a dominant form.

> **Recommendation:** The Network should discuss which type is more difficult for different actors inside and external to the system to identify more targeted ways of supporting people.

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[7] There was one explicit reference to influence trafficking and two to the expectation that one is to pay up the chain.

1.3.b. Perceived and real fiscal needs lead to participation in corruption.

By far the most common reason given for participating in corruption (27 of 40) was the need for money. This was generally framed in terms of the low salary and poor living conditions of judicial actors. Far more internal actors spoke of this than externals (18 of 27) however, there were more internal actors as part of our pool. For some this was seen as a 'real' need linked to being able to look after one's family e.g. pay school fees etc.

For a far larger number of respondents, the asserted need for money was more driven by a 'perceived' need and thus an act of greed.[8] Greed, lack of morals or a desire to live beyond one's means to meet societal expectations were used to describe this driver of corruption. One interviewee explained it this way, "[t]hose who don't resist are greedy and they don't have moral behavior. They are weak."

> **Idea:** Start to discuss what the Network can do to encourage the State to fulfill its obligations to state employees in terms of paying salaries. This work would need to be done in a very sensitive manner so that the Network did not create the perception of challenging the government and being labeled an opponent. One option would be to consider a more collective approach to advocacy whereby the Network identified partnerships. Alternatively, RCN could partner with others such as LICOCO, ESSOR, OSISA so that it was collective advocacy through institutions, but that could be contrary to Network sustainability independent of RCN J&D.

"...among magistrates it's necessary to uphold a certain standing. They try to live a bit outside of their means..."
one interviewee

1.3.c. Often CJS professionals do not resist corruption because they do not want to. Approximately 33% (13 of 40) explained that CJS professionals do not resist corruption because they did not have any motivation or will to change how things are currently done. This was sometimes linked to the normalization of corruption in the system and in a few cases explained as a lack of education[9]. Of note, men working in the system and women working outside the system were far more likely to point at the lack of interest in changing, than men external or women internal to the criminal justice system. Past conversations with the Program Team suggest that this is possibly because women working inside the system are not reaping as many

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[8] N.B.: previous research indicates that certain types of corruption are perceived as "real" corruption (e.g., a bribe that is demanded for the personal use of the public servant); whereas other types are seen as necessary, or "functioning" corruption. For example, fake "fees" demanded by traffic police so they can perform their jobs (e.g., buy gas). It should be noted that the functioning form of corruption necessitated by poor working conditions was rarely, if ever, mentioned in the interviews.

[9] This seemed to reference formal schooling as well as family upbringing and values, but often it was left just as lack of education without further specificity.

benefits from the status quo – though there is no evidence from this evaluation to support this hypothesis.

> **Recommendation:** Given how effective the consciousness awakening was within the existing Network, give extra attention to purposefully replicating this within the new subgroups, for instance by exposing the new subgroups to external speakers.

1.3.d. Fear and impunity were rarely mentioned as reasons behind members feeling like they cannot resist corruption. Two commonly cited reasons in the literature as to why individuals will not stand up to corruption are impunity and the perceived risk of acting against the interests of those in power; which are clearly linked to each other. Yet, in this evaluation, these two factors were very rarely mentioned. Fear of the consequences of resisting e.g. being fired were raised by 3 women and 1 man while impunity (i.e. the fact that there will be no sanction taken against those who engage in corruption) was mentioned by 2 women.

What makes this finding particularly relevant to the program is that there were many interviewed who advocated for greater sanctions to be applied to those who are caught in corrupt acts. This would suggest that it is the lack of sanction (i.e. impunity) that is a force behind these corrupt acts – yet it was very rarely mentioned as such.

1.3.e. The membership has many ideas about how the Network can support resistance. A number of ideas were offered that respondents felt might bolster resistance to corruption. The following list captures all ideas given, in no order of preference, and should not be seen as endorsed by the evaluation team. This is simply an accurate reflection back of the data collected.

- Develop '*prise de conscience*' for leaders
- Expand the mechanisms of resistance
- Have an exterior force (e.g. RCN) denounce corrupt actors
- Expand the network
- Provide more information on how to resist, the actual process and fees and how corruption destroys our country
- Build capacity through more training and external materials
- Lawyers should develop an alternative arbitration structure to avoid the formal system
- Enforce the 2012 law to punish authorities who are corrupt

> **Recommendation:** program team to review list to see if there are ideas that have not been discussed within the Network and if so, include them in forthcoming strategic discussions.

1.4 Evaluation Question: What effects have members of the Network/subgroup had on their colleagues at work, if any? Why or why not?

This section analyzes Network member reports that their behavior had an effect on colleagues. Nineteen of 40 of interviewees (47.5%) indicated having an effect on colleagues in some way, negative or positive.

1.4.a. Members feel they have created interest in the Network and corruption amongst colleagues; though little evidence of behavior change in colleagues was found. The trends observed were overwhelmingly positive; with the majority of respondents talking about catalyzing an interest in the Network or a desire to know more about corruption amongst colleagues. Nineteen people commented on effecting colleagues; 15 of which were positive comments.

Ten of the 15 respondents who responded affirmatively were female Network members. They reported that they had witnessed colleagues respecting them more and/or expressing more interest in the Network's activities since joining while only 5 male members reported the same. Additionally, for all those that reported a positive effect on colleagues - 10 of these respondents were internal to the CJS, and 5 were external. These differences stand out, but we do not have data to explain them.

Two members talked about colleagues who had changed their behavior because of advice given. This suggests influence is possible, though to achieve the Network's mandate far more of this will need to occur.

Stories about influencing bosses received significantly less attention in the interviews. In the few instances were bosses had positive reactions to Network members it was reported as having more respect for the member, and showing surprise when the member won cases without corruption.

Recommendations:

- Influencing up the hierarchy will be critical if the Network is to expand its influence in a meaningful way. A focus in year 2 on identifying feasible changes at the provincial and national level and strategies to achieve these changes should be considered.
- For future monitoring – consider focusing a new round of Most Significant Change monitoring on influencing the hierarchy.

The evaluation team disaggregated members' effects on colleagues by length of time the member has been participating in the Network.[10]   Seventeen of the total forty interviewees have been in the Network since inception. Of these, 53% (9 of 17) reported that effects on colleagues had been achieved; which suggests that 47% of those in the original group had no

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[10] Of the 40 total interviewees there were 17 that have participated in the Network since its start.

effect on colleagues to report.[11]   In considering this achievement, it is recognized that some of these original participants may be in civil society groups where changing colleagues is not required and others may be in very difficult work environments. This however does not account for all of the remaining individuals in this original group or those that have participated for well over 6 months.

It is encouraging that some Network members perceive that they have had positive impacts on their colleagues. Yet it is also notable that this is not the norm among membership and that there were few reports of behavior changes amongst colleagues in terms of resisting corruption. Interpreting whether these results are on track is for the Network to decide.

Recommendations:

- Discuss with the Network if they think more influence on colleagues has happened or should be expected to happen and if they feel it is sufficient, impressive or lacking and what can be done about it.

- The program has always maintained that having mechanisms for accountability between Network members will be key to long term success.   Developing these mechanisms to encourage more action should be a priority for Year 2. One idea – of many possible – would be to develop some form of tracking or documenting of 'effects' that members submit regularly to the Program Team or Core Group.

1.5 Evaluation Question: Why are some individuals that have expressed interest in the past no longer participating?

1.5.a Members perceive lack of attendance to be due to a combination of busy schedules and disinterest in the mission.[12]   The most common perception as to why Network members cease to participate was that they must be "too busy".   It was not clear from the discussions if this was meant to be understood literally or if it was meant to suggest disinterest in the Network mandate.   However, 9 interviewees did directly interpret the lack of attendance by others as due to a lack of interest or a lack of prioritization of the Network.

Interestingly for the Network to consider given the conflict sensitivity implications, 4 interviewees mentioned that Network members may feel negatively judged when at Network activities and are thus participating less. Interviewees explained that members who still accept monetary

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[11] This percentage – 47% – should be understood to be an approximation as it is possible that people forgot to mention issues or that in some interviews this question was not asked. That said, it was a priority issue and so every effort was made to ask it every time.

[12] These conclusions are based on perceptions of those who are participating about those who are no long attending. Insufficient numbers of individuals who were no longer active were interviewed to draw first hand conclusions.

forms of corruption to use for school payments/food for their family might feel skeptical if told they should stop doing this (i.e., because it is "bad").

> **Idea:** As discussed in the workshop, should those who have stopped attending be interviewed privately by members of the Network to learn more about what has stopped their participation? This information could be brought back to the Network to improve its work.

2. Impact

2.1 Evaluation Question: What unintended positive/negative changes have occurred as a result of this project in any manner e.g. amongst individuals, the collective network etc.? How did this come about?

2.1.a. T-Shirts Bolster Pride Among Members and Prompt Interest of Others.   Nine of 40 members[13]provided evidence that T-shirts have had a positive impact on Network members.   Network t-shirts seem to be:

1. *A visible symbol of member commitment to anti-corruption*.   For instance, one actor mentioned this has been a way guards identify him as someone that fights corruption, and thus don't ask him to pay when he visits preventive detention centers; or another mentioned when he wears his shirt others say 'oh, he's the guy that never gives money.'

> ***Unintended Impact****.* 'unintended impact' is an evaluation expression used to distinguish between what the program and learning team expected to happen compared to those things that did happen. Unintended impacts can be very significant and should be considered of equal importance to intended.

2. *A source of pride amongst members.* They have led these members to feel they can 'teach others' about corruption as they create discussion and spark curiosity of others.

This finding also offers an important lesson for the program and learning team at CDA and RCN J&D.   Originally, it was difficult for us to understand how distributing T-shirts to Network members would support the project's theory of change. The Network members, on the other hand felt T-shirts with the Network's slogan ("*justice without corruption, it's possible - I'm committed")* would validate the Network's presence.   Seeing the positive consequences of adapting to local expertise is valuable.

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[13] The evaluation team did not explicitly ask about the impact of the T-shirts in the interviews. Six members voluntarily discussed the T-shirts and 3 more gave examples in the follow up workshop. It is entirely possible that there is far more evidence supporting this finding if all members had consistently been asked.

Recommendations:

- Discuss the future use of visual symbols (e.g. T-shirts) to determine how to maximize their value for all members. For instance, do all members of subgroups have a T-shirt? According to the workshop, members get a T-shirt when they demonstrate the values of the Network in their professional life. If it requires their professional life to be in accordance with the slogan, who and how is that decided? Would items that are more suitable to a professional legal environment be more useful e.g. lapel pins, pens? Are there visual symbols more appropriate for women e.g. scarves?

- For future monitoring – consider tracking if there is a gender difference in use of and response to the T-shirts.

2.1.b. Teasing – good natured and mean-spirited - is a common response received by Members when they abstain from corruption. Over a third (15 of the 40 or 38%) of interview respondents reported some form of teasing from colleagues in response to their opting out of corruption. In the DRC, good-natured teasing is common whereas mean-spirited teasing (i.e. mocking) can be humiliating and, overall, quite negative. It is the impression of the evaluation team that the teasing is mostly good-natured with some mockery occurring as well.

This finding also has an interesting gendered component as of the 15 respondents, 11 were men and 4 were women. Why are women not being teased as frequently or are they not reporting being teased as often? If women are being teased less, is this because they are not visibly fighting corruption as often as men in their workplace? If women are being teased just as often as men, but reporting it less frequently – is this due to a cultural factor or could this imply teasing is of a harsher variety and thus more shameful to admit?

Of the 11 men that experienced teasing, 8 were judicial actors internal to the CJS. There was insufficient evidence to determine why this internal-external difference existed. There are many possibilities such as greater feelings of disdain for those who resist from judicial sector colleagues, more teasing could be contextually common amongst this group or it is simply a social deflection when colleagues don't want to discuss sensitive corruption issues.

Ideas:

- Discuss with the network the use of good-natured teasing as a strategy to stop colleagues from participating in corruption.
- For future monitoring – if the Network feels that teasing is more mockery than good natured and if this could start to deter participants from resisting, it may be worth tracking the frequency and nature of these incidents.

Recommendation: Develop a list of positive responses to mockery, so that members are equipped to verbally deflect this situation in a positive manner.

3. Theory of Change

3.1 Evaluation Question: How have the stories and experiences from exemplary anti-corruption actors impacted the Network? Why?

3.1.a. Exemplary actors were appreciated but not inspirational to Members. The three exemplary actor workshops with Julien Bareguwera and Marie Ingabire were intended to inspire Network members to action. Though the majority of data collected reflected favorably on the workshops, Members did not indicate that they were inspired by these individuals. The positive comments were mostly related to learning general facts about corruption, that it's possible to fight and some of the useful ways to do so. The feedback forms from the events confirm that participant's felt that they had gained new information and did not inquire about inspiration levels.

The evaluation sought to determine if country of origin and language of presentation impacted the reception of an exemplary actor. With regards to language preference, due to some data challenges we cannot draw a firm conclusion on whether or not the language of the presentations impacted the potential learning.

With regards to origin of speaker, the majority of data indicated that the origin of the speaker did not matter to the member. 69% of the questionnaires and those who were asked in interviews felt the presentations from regional speakers were relevant to the DRC context. Yet this is not a clear-cut acceptance of the value of these speakers as 25% of questionnaire-takers answered that they were 'unsure' of the relevance to their context. Further one comment relayed in an interview identified the Rwandan speaker as from a country that commits offenses in Eastern Congo. It should be recognized that this was only one individual, but the point was sufficiently important to be captured.

Recommendations:

- Organize similar workshops for sub-groups, with further thought given to how to make these experiences inspirational without losing the educational value. Perhaps focusing on people's experience more, or highlighting the benefits or positives of saying no could inspire people more.

- For future monitoring e.g. feedback forms – track the inspiration felt by different strategies to gain a better understanding of what motivates people.

3.2 What effect has the Code of Conduct had on the network as a whole or individually, if any? Why?

3.2.a. The Code of Conduct is not known amongst Members, which raises questions about its effectiveness. The Code of Conduct, which is intended to build confidence between members of the Network and is referenced at all team-building events. Yet the document is not known by its name amongst the Membership, as only 4 of 40 members seemed familiar with the Code

itself. For instance, in interviews with Network members and sub-group members it was difficult to discuss if it an effective tool because there was confusion about what the interviewer meant by Code of Conduct.[14]

Conversely, the evaluation team heard words like accountability and commitment as values within the network. These are values enshrined in the Code of Conduct but people did not refer to them in this manner. As it is not the existence of the Code that matters as much as the content of it, this could mean it has been effective in the way that matters most. It is possible that these values were referenced by interviewees because of the Code of Conduct discussions that take place during Network meetings. Equally it is possible that these references had nothing to do with the Code and came from other conversations.

> **Recommendation:** Discuss with the Core Network if the Code of Conduct is the right way to create common values and to hold people accountable. If so, think of ways to make the network more aware of its content.

3.3 What difference have the emblematic cases showcased by the club d'écoute made for individuals, the subgroup, the network, others?

3.3.a. Emblematic cases and case studies made negligible contribution to anti-corruption efforts amongst Members[15]. Not all members participated in this set of activities. Of the 40 interviewed, monitoring reports suggest 10 had attended these events.

Cases studies: 9 interviewees had knowledge of the case studies, approximately 90% women. Of this group, only 3 internal actors noted that they had gained knowledge from the cases.

Emblematic cases: about 30% (approx. 12 of 40) of respondents had knowledge of emblematic cases. The others did not remember or did not participate. Commentary was ad hoc, though generally positive. For instance, one woman - who is very involved in the listening clubs - said that emblematic cases inspired other network members; though members themselves did not speak of this. Three respondents talked about how they appreciated the "methodology" of the study on emblematic cases.

The workshop participants maintained that case documentation is a strategy for visibility. This argument possibly sheds light on one of the reasons that this work is being questioned – the purpose of doing it is insufficiently clear. Are these cases being conducted for Network structure

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[14] The questionnaire also asked about the Code of Conduct, but the confusion was so consistent in the interviews, that the evaluation team decided to omit the questionnaire data on this topic, as we could not be sure that the responses were accurate.

[15] According to the monitoring reports e.g. monthly Carnet, approximately 25% of those interviewed in the evaluation participated in emblematic cases and / or listening clubs.

or message visibility or is it to help Network members resist corruption or is it to help the women being illegally detained get past the corruption that keeps them imprisoned?

3.3.b. Listening clubs had positive consequences on other aspects. Respondents spoke of the positive effect of these clubs in aiding female detainees get released. Further the listening clubs seem have generated a common purpose for the gender and corruption sub-group which is one criteria of a good network. The listening clubs had a positive impact of the sub group's cohesion but not directly on resistance strategies.

> **Recommendation:** the evaluation team feels that the listening clubs should only be continued if a clear strategy for how they will support Network member's corruption resistance is articulated. This recommendation needs to be discussed by the Network.

4. Implementation

4.1 Evaluation Question: Is the network functioning well – as defined by the characteristics of a successful Network identified in December 2015 plus one new characteristic?[16]


Characteristics of a Successful Network

- Participants regularly attend and propose ideas e.g. activities
- Good circulation of information
- A shared common goal
- A structure that enables cooperation
- A process that catalyzes trust
- Leadership
- Participants respect the rules and procedures
- The structure and membership of the network is best-fit to support their work

Source: December 2015 Program and Learning Team workshop

---

4.1.a. Network Structure Enables Cooperation

■ **Strongly Agree**   ■ **Agree**

■ **Neither**   ■ **Disagree**

6%
5%
11%
78%

4.1.a. Network has a structure that enables cooperation: 89% of questionnaire respondents agree or strongly agree when asked if the Network structure permitted cooperation.

4.1.b. Network Shares Information Well

■ **Strongly Agree**   ■ **Agree**

35%
65%

4.1.b. The Network has done well sharing information about events. 100% of questionnaire-takers agreed or completely agreed that the Network has done well sharing information about Network events. The latter is also supported by responses given during interviews, with one caveat. Interviewees often highlighted that the timing/planning of Network meetings needs to be more consistent and done further in advance.

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[16] The findings in this section rely primarily on questionnaire responses, rather than the interview data.

Recommendation: Coordinate timing of activities further in advance to facilitate members' schedules.

4.1.c. Members Speak Honestly During Network Events

■ **Strongly Agree** ■ **Agree**

26%

74%

4.1.c. Network Members Feel Comfortable Speaking Honestly During Network Events. 100% of respondents (19 of the 19 that responded) felt comfortable speaking honestly about corruption during Network events.

4.1.d. Network Reinforced Trust Among Members

■ **Strongly Agree** ■ **Agree**

21%

79%

4.1.d. Network Has Reinforced Trust Among Members. 18 out of 19 respondents to the questionnaires indicated that they felt they could trust members of the Network.

4.1.e Interview Responses about What Network Needs to Improve

Category	Value
More money/materials	2
Have a permanent office/official structure	4
Coordinate timing better	4
More sub-groups/grow bigger	8
More capacity building/trainings	6

4.1.e. Member Recommendations: Interviewees gave several recommendations on how to improve the Network. The responses to this question are aggregated below and are not the opinion of the evaluation team. It is useful to point out that a majority of the questionnaires corroborated the interview statements about how to improve Network functioning. The questionnaires requested that the Network be made larger (5 responses), as well as "legalized" and given a structure (3 responses). More capacity building was also requested (5 responses).

5. Looking Forward

5.1 How would greater public visibility help or hinder the Network?

> "[The] *eye of the network*"
> one interviewee

5.1.a. Data stated clearly that the membership wants greater public visibility. When asked, who should know of the Network in order for the Network to be successful, 17 of the 19 questionnaire respondents replied that the public should know, which is consistent with most of the data collected for this evaluation.

100% of questionnaire respondents said that visibility would have a positive impact, including: bringing courage (7 people of which 5 were external actors), create more awareness on how the justice should work (3 people), create strength and inspire others (6 people).   According to interviewees, visibility would create pressure on CJS actors to play according to the rules. The notion of putting pressure on CJS actors as an important thing to do was mentioned often in the interviews.

For the majority of respondents, the biggest risk is that authorities would want to "control" or "stop" activities of the network (7 people), particularly if it became too successful. There were 3 respondents, all internal actors, who did not think there were any risks to visibility. Notably, members of the focus group (not members of the network) perceived more risks in visibility than advantages.

The next grouping that respondents felt were important to know of the Network was close colleagues and offices.   Seven of the 19 respondents (37%) said that both their closest colleagues and their entire office should be made aware of the Network's mission if the Network is to succeed in its fight against corruption. Six of 19 (32%) said their professional networks should know about the Network.

This data about wanting your closest colleagues to know is supported by responses given in the interviews, however it is unclear why this is not yet happening (see previous discussion re: colleagues). It is interesting to learn, however, that an equivalent response to wanting colleagues to know is also wanting your entire office to know, as this was not something frequently brought up in the interviews. This has different implications, as it requires going beyond close professional relationships to engage colleagues that are not necessarily "bought into" the fight against corruption – a step the Network may want to take at this juncture, but has not yet.

5.1.b. There is more to understand about visibility.   During the interviews, it was not clear if network members thought of visibility in terms of their message or visibility of the structure (the network itself).   The workshop discussions clarified that visibility of the structure should come first and after which would come visibility for the message. Given that many interviewee

respondents associated visibility with Network size, it would appear that the workshop interpretation aligns with some, if not all, of the evaluation interviews. It is possible that this is linked to the strength-in-numbers idea mentioned earlier; that with more numbers comes more visibility, which creates more strength to act. It is also possible that with Network structure visibility, there is the assumption that members will achieve a form of status that will help them resist and make others think twice about pressuring them.

> **Idea:** Learn more about what *barriers* exist for sharing information with colleagues and professional Networks and take steps to remove these barriers.

> **Recommendation:** Discuss how visibility of structure and message will increase the Network's ability to resist e.g. due to more people involved, more status coming from membership etc. List out all possible risks associated with the answer and identify ways we can tackle them (with the network).

*"**No one is proud of being corrupt.**"*
two interviewees

5.2 Will pride in professional ethics instill a sense of integrity among judicial actors, and thus enabled them to resist corruption?

5.2.a. Personal values are more important than professional ethics in motivating anti-corruption efforts. Sanctions were mentioned as a common way to make people feel embarrassed if caught in a corrupt act. It is our interpretation that this embarrassment would be due to personal values and not due to the breach in professional ethics.

Professional ethics was not brought up as a reason why people resist corruption. "In my professional experience, the good professional is more dedicated by his conscious and religious belonging beyond law and ethics" (focus group 2). The "system" is stronger than professional ethics, thus professional pride does not have sufficient importance to be a lever of change. We can assume a CJS actor can be professionally proud and corrupted at the same time.

> **Idea:** Include as a message to convince colleagues the fact that corrupt behaviors can make people be less respected.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Mid-Term Evaluation
RCN J&D/CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

I. Overview

The Terms of Reference outlines the requirements for a formative evaluation to be conducted at month 15 of the implementation portion of the CAASDI grant which supports the Kuleta Haki project in Lubumbashi, DRC. RCN J&D and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects are interested in learning more about the project's outcomes, the current status of the project's theory of change and what might be assumed going forward to inform the effective design of future programming. It is critical that the evaluation feeds an updated and expanded programmatic theory of change. To this end a facilitated design workshop will be held building from the evaluation results.

II. Background

The Kuleta Haki project vision is a criminal justice system that is free of monetary corruption and political interference in the DRC. (Note that political interference encompasses i) interference by public authorities for their own political gain, *as well as*, ii) interference by public authorities in the justice system on behalf of commercial or private interests for which they receive a bribe or other gain).

Addressing complex problems like corruption requires an adaptive, open-ended approach. CAASDI set out to take a "systems" view of corruption and the criminal justice sector to understand how corruption operates to impede services in the justice system and why. Systems thinking is a way of understanding reality—a context, conflict, corruption, etc.—that emphasizes the relationships among a system's parts, rather than the parts themselves. Systems analysis helps to identify dynamic relationships among different factors; it also has the potential to help bridge the gap between analysis and programming by facilitating thinking about how to interrupt or change the system.

Before designing the Kuleta Haki pilot (2015-2016), the system of corruption in Lubumbashi was mapped and analysed to uncover important entry points for the project. Two important entry points were revealed: (1) Individuals who remained unwilling to engage in corrupt activities faced dangers from acts of resistance, which precluded them from fully realizing their professional and ethical responsibilities. Thus, the CDA team theorized that if a safe space for these "islands of integrity" existed, action to fight against corruption may be possible. (2) From the research there appeared to be few cases of collective action undertaken by CJS actors *in collaboration with civil society actors*. Thus, with strategic support, cross- sector anti-corruption collaborations might more effectively engage the local population, and build upon existing degrees of frustration and discontent to effectuate positive change in the system. In addition,

CAASDI found a widely held perception amongst justice sector actors that pre-trial detention is where the prosecution and judiciary earn considerable money, suggesting motivation in favor of issuing pre-trial detention. CAASDI found prisons in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi to possess deeply integrated corruption to the extent that prison is almost impossible to exit without payment. During year one of Kuleta Haki, the system of corruption within preventive detention and police custody in Lubumbashi was selected by the anti-corruption Network as a key area of focus.

In sum, the program approach is based on a core assumption that there is an untapped pool of people – both providers and consumers of the security and justice system – who are discontented with the effects of corruption on the access and quality of justice, and whose individual and collective mobilization can strengthen resistance to the complex practice of corruption.

Theory of Change:

To begin, this project believes that if the Network, comprised of individuals inside and external to the criminal justice system, shares the same understanding of corruption (e.g., strategies, rights), and participating actors accept that corruption is mutually harmful, these actors (especially **magistrates,** but not limited to them) will start to demand mutual accountability – particularly in their daily work.

Meanwhile, the Network will increasingly be perceived as a "safe space" for discussing corruption, because the Network will hold team building events and informal "clubs d'écoute" to share their stories and experiences with corruption. They will also continue to remind one another of the rules for maintaining Network confidentiality and adhere to a common unifying slogan for the Network.

These actions will result in judicial actors (inside and external to the official criminal justice system) beginning to feel confident to act against corruption – particularly after further motivation in the form of stories from those that have successfully resisted corruption.

Program Objectives: (as per the original design document)

Objective 1: As a result of judicial actors starting to take actions against corruption in the 1-year pilot, these actors will now strategically resist and support colleagues standing up to corruption.

Objective 2: The Network creates conditions that enable CSOs and others to resist the practice of corruption in the CJS.

III. Evaluation

Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine what elements of the theory of change have catalyzed change (of any type) within participants and beyond, why this is so and what needs

to be altered to increase the likelihood of making a difference on corruption in the judicial process. To this end an assessment of whether Kuleta Haki is achieving intended results as well as identifying positive and negative unintended consequences of this intervention will be done as well as a review of assumptions. The evaluation will provide RCN J&D and CDA with learning opportunities to improve implementation of Kuleta Haki during phase two of the project (2016-2017).

Evaluation Objectives and Evaluation Questions

1. **Impact:** What unintended positive/negative changes have occurred as a result of this project in any manner e.g. amongst individuals, the collective network etc.? How did this come about?

2. **Effectiveness:**

    2.1. What concrete actions have network members taken, if any, to resist corruption or support others in their resistance, that they would not have taken before their participation in the Network?

      2.1.1. In relation to concrete actions, are there any differences between network and subgroup members? Why?

    2.2. Why have actors been able to take concrete action?

      2.2.1. What is the role of status in their ability to resist corruption?

      2.2.2. What enables some people within the system to resist, but not others?

    2.3. What effects have members of the Network/subgroup had on their colleagues at work, if any? Why or why not?

    2.4. Why aren't certain individuals – especially those that have expressed interest in the past – participating?

3. **Theory of Change:**

    3.1. How have the stories and experiences from exemplary anti-corruption actors impacted the Network? Why?

      3.1.1. Did the language/country of origin matter?

    3.2. What effect has the Code of Conduct had on the network as a whole or individually, if any? Why?

    3.3. What difference has the emblematic cases showcased by the club d'ecoute made for individuals, the subgroup, the network, others?

4. **Implementation:** Is the network functioning well – as defined by the characteristics of a successful Network identified in December 2015 plus one new characteristic?

    - Participants regularly attend and propose ideas e.g. activities
    - Good circulation of information
    - A shared common goal
    - A structure that enables cooperation
    - A process that catalyzes trust
    - Leadership

- Participants respect the rules and procedures
- The structure and membership of the network is best-fit to support their work

5. **Looking Forward**

5.1. How would greater public visibility help or hinder the Network? Do people need to know what the Network is and what they do in order for the Network to be effective?

5.2. Will pride in professional ethics instill a sense of integrity among judicial actors, and thus enabled them to resist corruption?

Audience

The audience of this evaluation will be RCN J&D M&E Coordinator, the Project Team, CDA Learning Team and the Core Network.

IV. Theory of Change Planning [details of this to be finalized]

Using the results of the evaluation a three-day [not finalized duration] workshop will be facilitated with the Network [actual participation TBD] to review and update the existing Theory of change. This will result in an updated, detailed program design. The new engagement with police officers will also be designed during the same workshop. Will we have time to get a few select police vetted so they can attend?

The workshop will start by engaging the participants in the evaluation findings and conclusions and then use systems-based thinking to update the Judicial (existing) theory of change. The same process will be used to engage with the police engagement.

IV. Implementation Information

Managed by Sandra Sjögren and implemented by an internal team of RCN J&D and CDA staff, the team will:

- plan and implement the evaluation,
- provide deliverables
- present evaluative conclusions back to the intended audience for discussion and
- facilitate a systems-based theory of change workshop to build from the evaluation, resulting in a detailed program design.

The team will be comprised of 5 people. A team lead, 2 data collectors, 1 workshop facilitator and a critical reviewer to act as a counter-weight to the internal structure of the majority of the team. The team will work in two stages of the evaluation: Stage 1 = Design/Data Collection/Analysis, and Stage 2 = Discussion of Findings & Theory of Change and Program Design Refinement.

Location: The data collection and workshop will be held in Lubumbashi, DRC.

Deliverables

1. Inception Report: this will design the actual evaluation.

2. Draft Evaluation Report: this will be circulated for feedback to all users in English.

3. Final Evaluation Report (English and French if budget allows)
   - Table of Contents/List of acronyms
   - Executive summary
   - Brief overview of the context
   - Org/Program Background
   - Evaluation methodology
   - Evidence-based conclusions
   - Recommendations
   - Appendix A – Terms of Reference

4. Workshop Purposes (tentative):
   - Presentation of conclusions for validation or correction
   - Update systems map and refine existing theory of change with concrete workplan
   - Design a program to integrate police into this work. The product needs to be at a level of detail to enable implementation.

5. Updated program design for the existing judiciary and a police engagement design.

Final report will be in English and French (pending budget) and a presentation will be done in French during the workshop. RCN J&D will manage the responsibility of translation. The workshop and program design will be in French.

Confidentiality
Given the nature of this work, participants will not be referred to by name in the Evaluation report.

Dates & Deadlines
   - Preparation: October 1 – November 5
   - Data Collection Field Trip: Nov 7 - 13
   - Analysis & Draft Conclusions: Nov 14 - 18
   - Presentation & Theory of Change Workshop: Nov 21 - 25
   - Final Evaluation Report: Dec 19
   - Final Theory of Change with clear program goal, objectives, etc. plus quarterly workplan and budget: Dec 23

Logistical Support
   - RCN J&D: will provide logistical support on the ground, including visa assistance, hotel booking, provision of a car and driver, office space, documents and interview set up support.

- CDA: will be responsible for contracting the external participant, finalizing visas and booking flights.

VI. Budget

CDA will be covering the costs for Kiely, Cheyanne, Peter and the external member of the team. RCN J&D will cover the costs of Sandra and the implementing team.

Annex 2: Kuleta Haki Project Detailed Description

In alignment with the adaptive management approach of this project, Kuleta Haki is constantly evolving. The summary below depicts the program from its initiation in October 2015 to the end of 2016.

Kuleta Haki ("Provide Justice" in Swahili) activities began in October 2015. Significant effort was spent within the first several months of the project (Oct-Dec) to build relationships with local authorities, criminal justice sector actors, and civil society actors in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa.

At the Kinshasa level in these early months – RCN J&D spent significant time engaging with the Ministry of Justice, Superior Court of Judges, Thematic Group for Justice and Human Rights, Observatory for the Professional Code of Ethics, and the General Prosecutor of the Republic, the principal advisor on administrative and legal matter at the Presidency of the Republic and military court. The overall objective was to explain the project, especially the 'Core network,' and identify possible 'Core network' members. Overall, there was a very high amount of verbal commitment at this level, but only some follow-through afterwards as project implementation continued. Among those who verbally expressed their commitment, the project took in account the goal / the objectives to achieve and selected 9 people to start the Core network.

In Lubumbashi ("L'shi"), the purpose of these conversations was the same (conversations with local authorities included: the Commissariat de la Police, Procureur de la République, Président du Tribunal de Grand Instance, Premier Président de la Cour d'Appel, among many others). However, in L'shi the team also spoke with lawyers, the head of the Bar association in Lubumbashi, women from UCOFEM, university professors from l'école de criminologie, among many others. The team met with 9 authorities in Kinshasa, and 26 authorities and civil society members in Lubumbashi between Oct-Dec 2015.

At both levels, the team's intention was to engage a breadth of actors *not* based on their group affiliation (e.g., *"7 with a religious background, 10 with specific political affiliations"*...etc) but rather based on the assumption that: (1) to effectively fight corruption in a group individuals must be committed to changing corruption dynamics (an idea supported by the CAASDI program's original research - that "islands of integrity," individuals within a variety of social circles, exist and are committed to fighting corruption but need protection to do so); and (2) that the project must engage managers/presidents/prosecutors (those with authority to mandate change at higher levels) in order to be able to take collective action to push back against corruption. The team spoke with individuals with these criteria in mind, and paid special attention to the reputation of actors – as a significant "risk" factor identified early on in the project was the possibility that a Network member was widely known as a corrupt figure (which would have instantly tarnished the Network's nascent reputation).

Many of these issues were discussed in an initial meeting with CDA and RCN J&D in Kinshasa. Over the course of a 3-day workshop, the team focused on determining the project's activities and establishing the project's M&E system. This workshop was also key to support the RCN J&D

team with the Theory of Change approach. It helped create a vision of what the expectations were for one year. At this point, the first meetings of the Core Network (first meeting in November with 4 women, 3 men took place. Meeting 2 took place in December with 3 women, 3 men) the group met to discuss initial theories of change and the project's action plan. The Core has met consistently every month afterwards, although their role as a group has evolved over time (more below).

Initial Core Network activities included building the group's internal management systems and building overall ownership of the project. For example, the group decided early on (Jan 2016) to work with corruption in preventive detention and police custody specifically. At this same time, the Core group highlighted the main criteria for identifying new members ((1) integrity, (2) willingness and constant practice to fight corruption, (3) free and voluntary expression against corruption in L'shi). They discussed already-emerging internal challenges (e.g., lateness to meetings, and defensiveness when discussing personal experiences with corruption). The group also called on one another to contribute solutions to these problems – further concretizing early feelings of ownership and responsibility for the Core Network's collective attitude and cohesion.

As ownership and systems were put in place to stabilize and grow the larger Network (e.g., early development of internal 'codes' like the larger Network's Terms of Reference and Code of Conduct), the Core group were also building their shared knowledge of corruption (e.g., debating what corruption "means" at different levels, i.e. prosecution, court, police and lawyer levels) as well as starting to establish trust and build relationships with one another (e.g., sharing stories during "listening clubs" and other early teambuilding activities).

By February 2016, the Core Network was ready to begin growing. On the 12th of the month, the Core shared the "basic documents" mentioned above (TOR… etc.) with new members (at this point, 7 new members had joined), signed a "commitment act" as a group and created a slogan to unify the group under a common anti-corruption banner/identity. This group also elected a "Steering Committee," however felt they needed to discuss a new risk: new members might feel marginalized if steering committee candidates were just the Core members. Thus, all those present at the February 12th meeting were identified as candidates, and 3 were elected by majority vote; members felt comfortable recognizing that the steering committee could be assessed for relevance and possibly reformulated as the project progressed. The steering committee met 2 more times in March.

The tension about how best to incorporate new members continued in the first months of 2016, a time that represented a vital moment of growth for the project. The Terms of Reference, and knowledge-building (e.g., building on the legal framework and anticorruption strategies) were key ways to share learning, grow common knowledge about legal frameworks & anticorruption strategies, build internal confidence among members and equalize the status of all Network members, old and new. The "collective aspect" of the project was further established through mutual adherence to a Code of Conduct and via regular team building activities. At the first training on frameworks and strategies, 8 women and 7 men attended and participated. Building knowledge around this time also meant further understanding how each member defined/understood corruption. For example, is it corruption if an "envelope for good work" is

given to an exemplary police officer by a citizen (in appreciation/as 'thanks')? Some members believed this was corruption, yet others did not.

As knowledge grew so too did conversations within the growing Network about *why* corruption occurs. Further to this point, a training was held in March 2016 to discuss ethics and deontological principles with judges and magistrates. The project team hoped the moment was ripe for members to start "un-trivializing" corruption (e.g., counter the overwhelming sense of "banalisation" in this context, or the belief that corruption is unavoidable in the judicial system). Discussing each member's assumptions about corruption and providing unique examples that contradicted these assumptions (e.g., some think lack of salary causes corruption, but magistrates are well paid and are still corrupt) helped the group feel hope that change was possible. To further promote this sense of hope and motivation to act against corruption, 3 external actors were invited to speak. One of whom, a former prosecutor from Burundi (Julien Bareguwera), was asked to train in this ethics workshop. Testimonies from these 3 actors about resisting corruption were meant to inspire and persuade the group that action was possible as well as instill in them the confidence to pursue this goal.

The expanding Network met several more times between January and March. By March, the 'Core' Network stood at 10 members (four women, six men. 1 Judge of the Appellate Court, 1 Substitute of General Prosecutor at the Appellate Court, 1 Judge of High Court, 1 Judge of First Level Court, 1 Clerk at the Appellate Court, 1 First Substitute of Prosecutor, 1 Parquet Secretary, 1 Police Inspector, 1 Lawyer/University Professor, 1 Journalist). Throughout this period the project team continued to meet with local authorities and other actors in hopes of recruiting new Network members (15 meetings were held between January-March; 40% with INGOs; 60% with individuals).

Also at this time (March 2016), the Network began working to understand the intersection of gender and corruption dynamics. It took a few months from the Core group's inception to find the "best" moment to begin work on gender, however it was discussed that the Core group should be solidified before gender work began so as to let the project team identify who would be appropriate members for the gender group, and for the Network to be prepared enough to help the gender group develop its own objectives. This work has been central to the project and developed over time, however in March the initial meeting (co-organized with UCOFEM, the Congolese Union of Women in Media) was focused mainly on reflection about the key issues central to this topic. Women discussed the ways gender discrimination occurs within the criminal justice sector (CJS), how discrimination interacts with corruption (i.e., is caused by corruption, further fuels corruption) and their early ideas about how to change both discrimination and corruption (e.g., help women build courage to push back against discrimination, teach men that harassment and influence peddling are "bad").

The Network's "sub-group" on gender and corruption was officially started in April 2016, with a kickoff meeting led by Mme Immaculée Ingabire, a Director at Transparency International in Rwanda. 30 women were invited to this meeting, and all 30 attended. As of June, the sub-group on gender and corruption had 13 female members (2 lawyers, 3 judicial defenders [lawyers working at the Peace Court or Tribunal de Grande Instance], 2 police officers, 3 magistrates and

3 women from UCOFEM). The goal of this group is to reflect deeply on the link on gender and corruption so to have strategies in an action plan which is a part of the global work plan of the network.

In tandem to the first gender and corruption sub-group meeting, the entire Network continued to bond and establish trust as a cohesive unit through teambuilding activities. For example, several lunches, quizzes (e.g., on the Network's Code of Conduct, types of local/national/international corruption… etc.), competitive games, and dinners were organized by the Network from January-March as fun, initial relationship-building events to unify the growing group.

Also during this time, in CDA's Headquarter office in Cambridge (late March), the team launched an anti-corruption blog[17] – a web-based platform to promote open conversation about systems-inspired strategies/tactics for changing corruption dynamics, and better means to analyze these dynamics in order to design innovative and effective programs.

The project's first monitoring trip (to collect stories from the Network utilizing the Most Significant Change technique) took place in April led by RCN J&D's M&E coordinator, who was based in Kinshasa. The Network also convened in April to learn about systems analysis with CDA's Executive Director. In this time, they were able to discuss the specific drivers of corruption in preventive detention and police custody, map these to visualize the larger system of corruption in these institutions and then begin brainstorming strategies for taking action. The project team had a day at the very beginning of the week to build the initial systems map and then met again on the last day to spend time discussing strategies and possible future activities as a result from the workshop analysis. 20 participants were invited and attended over the course of the 3-day workshop (9 Core network and 11 members of the network).

Returning to our discussion of the Core Network (still functioning as a cohesive unit, replete with steering committee), in May meetings with the Core continued. At this time, the role of this Core group shifted. While the Network was growing in early 2016 (larger Network: 20 members), the Core group had become accustomed to serving as the "backbone" to the Network – providing input on strategy, etc. Beginning in the Spring, the group also started to lead the Network in establishing relationships with external court clerks, secretaries, Judges, and Officiers du Ministère Public, magistrates, and judicial police (carnets de mai, juin & juillet). Several workshops were held, one in May with clerks and secretaries (14 men, 10 women; 5 of which were Network members) one in June with judges and magistrates (10 women, 3 Network members and 7 magistrates; and 13 men, 2 Network members and 11 magistrates) and one in July with OPJ and OPM members (6 members of the network, 12 judicial police, 6 magistrates, & a representative of the prison).

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[17] http://www.blog.cdacollaborative.org/what-can-we-learn-about-corruption-in-fragile-states/

The Network (the Core delegating Network members the task of engaging with court clerks, secretaries…etc) believed these workshops would open the door for participants to share stories about the types of corruption they witness daily and make plans for steps forward. However, and perhaps most importantly at this moment in the project's development, these workshops also ended up setting the stage for continued dialogue with these groups of actors and eventual planning to assemble them into different Network sub-groups. This work continues today (October 2016).

In early summer (May), UCOFEM and RCN J&D agreed to collaborate on a project together using UCOFEM's unique approach for gathering stories. These stories would come from women in preventive detention. A main goal of this project has since been to collect "emblematic" case studies, to: (1) add to the Network's knowledge base examples of types of corruption women (specifically) experience in prison/preventive detention, but also (2) identify successful strategies for women to fight corruption and (3) herald the exemplary women currently doing this (in line with the Kuleta Haki theory of change - that exemplary actors can build hope and instill confidence that action is possible). The Terms of Reference for this project were established in June. In July, August and September emblematic case studies continued to be collected (July & August: focused on detainees' and families' experiences with Kasapa prison and met prison/judicial authorities; September: focused on the town of Kampemba). This work continues today (October, 2016).

The sub-group on gender and corruption has felt comfortable steering the collaboration with UCOFEM on les clubs d'écoutes, and concretized this management by electing an internal steering committee at their second meeting. The sub-group has recently begun a research endeavor, proposing a few Core initial questions for further study/research: (1) women who are in the judicial system / police/ lawyers – are they less corrupt or more corrupt than men? (2) How do these women react when faced with the effects of corruption, and what action do they take to push back (i.e., strategies)? (3) How does corruption allow them to advance in their career / access to treatment of important issues (as a litigant or professional, as a magistrate, agent, judicial police officer, lawyer etc.) or – on the other hand – prevent them from advancing? (carnet de septembre).

Data from case studies that have helped launch this endeavor including tracking of the varieties of corruption issues women face in prisons and preventive detention (e.g., some forms include: sexual favors, and traffic of influence). The gender sub-group, along with the Project Team (who have contributed 2 blog posts further unpacking issues of gender discrimination and corruption for the CDA anti-corruption blog) feel much is still left to learn about this still very-general research topic.

As sub-groups and gender work have developed, the larger Network has maintained it's internal cohesion through continued teambuilding activities, which have also slightly shifted in nature from previous iterations. Over the summer months, an ad hoc technical committee was created to assist the Core Network with decisions regarding regular Network activities (e.g., teambuilding events), and new activities were introduced (e.g., anti-corruption marches, which succeeded in removing Network members of their professional titles that so often dictate social

norms and behavior in this context.) An "equal" space was developed for the entire group where they could build trust, let down their guard around one another, feel increasingly comfortable sharing personal stories about experiences with corruption, and discuss tricky and complex issues (e.g., reflecting how (with which strategy and attitude to adopt) to resist corruption with OPJ, OMP or judges; or how to explain to the boss/chef such as a prosecutor or president or director that corrupt practices in they engage with daily are harmful! OPJ, OMP or judges can be angry or not open to discussing corruption practices, which is why this activity is useful.)

Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology

- A four-person team conducted the evaluation consisting of three people who have been involved in the project and a French-speaking academic, originally from the Great Lakes Region who has not been involved in the project. This role was explicitly to challenge and critique.

- The evaluation adhered to the African Evaluation Association Guidelines[18].

- As a formative evaluation, the team used a Utilization Focused Approach[19] (UFE) whereby all steps are judged against their ability to generate usable findings and evaluative conclusions.

- Significant time was spent in the early stages of the evaluation to finalize the evaluation Terms of Reference in a manner that insured all evaluation questions were truly useful to the Network and project team.

- A mixed method approach was used adopting semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire to build on the monitoring data (Most Significant Change (MSC)stories and monthly report). Two MSC story collections had occurred prior to the evaluation and the raw notes from these experiences were available to the evaluation team.

- We used a purposeful stratified sample so that we had approximately equal numbers of men and women and internal and external to government held positions within the CJS from each layer of the network: Leadership/Core, General Network and subgroups. In addition, we tried to speak to individuals who had stepped back from the Network as well as colleagues of those in the Network. (see limitations)

- In one week in Lubumbashi, a total of 40 interviews were conducted, 2 focus groups with civil society leaders and CJS actors not involved in the Network plus approximately 20 completed questionnaires by network members.

- The analysis was conducted in Cambridge, MA through an initial 2 day working meeting with the evaluation team looking for patterns in the qualitative data. This set if tentative conclusions and recommendations were then taken back to the field by the CDA Executive Director who facilitated a discussion around the veracity of the information and implications for the Network going forward.

Limitations

All evaluations have limitations and this one is no different. All conclusions should be read with these limitations in mind.

1. Consequences of Limited Time: with only one week for data collection we were only able to do the most basic data disaggregation – sex and internal vs external roles. This means that

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[18] Patel, M. 2013. "African Evaluation Guidelines." African Evaluation Journal 1(1): 5. http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/aej.v1i1.51

[19] http://betterevaluation.org/en/resource/guide/UFE_checklist

important insights by other sub-sets of the participants may not have been captured; for instance, by age or religion.   Further we were not able to triangulate reported impacts on colleagues that the Network members described.   This means that those conclusions need to be understand as a set of perceptions.

2. Mixed team bias: it is acknowledged that a mixed team may bring internal bias to the process either through their own confirmation bias or because those involved in the program do not wish to criticize staff affiliated with the program. To mitigate against this, the team gave extra attention to providing explicit evaluation reasoning (A10 Justified Conclusions Afrea Guidelines) so that all judgement and data is provided for the reader to review. Also the external reviewer's role was to challenge assumptions as a protection against this bias.

3. Two languages: the evaluation will be conducted in English and French. This presents the risk of nuance being lost in translation. To minimize this risk, multiple people were involved in reviewing translations.

4. Questionnaire: Over the course of distributing the questionnaires the distributors needed to add first and last names to the external envelopes so as to ensure that all distributed questionnaires were collected (the evaluators were unable to collect all of the questionnaires themselves). The instructions (which did seem to be followed) were for the Network member to seal their anonymous questionnaire into the envelope before returning it, which occurred in all of the cases. However, this was still considered a limitation during the evaluation, particularly because questionnaire respondents might have doubted their responses' anonymity they may have answered more "favorably" so as not to be seen as giving negative answers. To mitigate this limitation, the evaluators attempted to collect as many of the questionnaires as possible, but were only able to collect less than half in-person. They also explained to anyone that expressed concern that the envelopes would be immediately trashed after withdrawing the questionnaire.

5. No Baseline: no baseline was gathered at the beginning of the project. This was a purposeful decision by CDA because it was felt that it would be harmful to relationships to take more time of individuals for more data gathering. There had been such significant research conducted as part of the analysis and then more meetings at the beginning to build relationships, that there was a strong sense that key individuals would lose interest if action was not started.   This is a notable limitation to the evaluation as it is not possible determine degree of change.   The evaluation team attempted to mitigate this through the inclusion of questions that acted like a retrospective baseline. However, the conclusions should be read with this limitation in mind.