

James Jennings

Pan Africanism: Reconsidered

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The purpose of this paper will be to focus on the concept of Pan-Africanism. Without stating explicitly one definition of Pan-Africanism, I will attempt to suggest the various political ideas connected with it. As it stands, there seems not to be much literature on this subject, thus perhaps accounting for its elusive nature. The paper will begin with a historical sketch of the various organisational attempts at Pan-Africanism. Perhaps one reason why many of these attempts failed, is because not many political scientists have bothered to define it, and bring it into focus. I will hope to offer an introduction to the concepts of Pan-Africanism, first, by giving an overview of it in relation to African politics, and then focusing on more detailed political study connected with Pan-Africanism such as Nkrumah's ideas, the East African Community of 1963, and finally Tanzania's Pan-African policies. There are two very important considerations directly connected with Pan-Africanism: The position of doctrine and the position of the small state in a Pan-African union. The discussion on Nkrumah will have the aim of clarifying the relation between Pan-Africanism and a particular political doctrine. The East African Community discussion will pose the problem of the small state and Pan-Africanism.

HISTORICAL OUTLINE¹

Because of Africa's long colonial status, the question of an African nationalism on a continental basis did not arise until the period after the Second World War. There were only two independent states in Africa previously, Ethiopia and Liberia. By the late 40's and early 50's the independence of many Asian countries began to encourage the educated African nationalists. At this time, there appeared an upsurge of political parties in Africa demanding independence. Dr. Nkrumah, from as early as 1949, not only campaigned for political independence, but also for a United States of Africa. Mainly because of his influence many Pan-African conferences were held which saw political independence as very shaky if European powers were allowed to follow a policy of Balkanisation. This is the arbitrary division of Africa into boundaries which rather than reflecting African life and African considerations, reflect the political and economic interests of the European powers.

One of the first and important conferences was the Bandung Conference in 1955. This conference was important because it had highlighted Nasser's leadership in the Third World. In 1956, Nasser also offered the example of a Third World nation opposing through confrontation, the strong powers which had dominated African politics.

The conference at Accra in April of 1958, was also very important. The members called for African unity and economic and cultural co-operation. This had been the first time that African States joined together and declared that unity would be their political and economic goal. This particular period was also highlighted by Sekou Touré, who had refused to let Guinea join the French Common Market. This opened a road of complete independence from Guinea's colonial masters. It re-emphasised on the African continent a tone of self-respect and dignity for the African.

PAFMECA, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, came out more strongly for African unity and co-operation. This conference had signalled a shift to Dr. Julius Nyerere as the new leader of Pan-Africanism. In 1962, this conference committed themselves to the idea of a wider continental African unity by offering membership to any African organisations committed to the ideals of Pan-Africanism.

Previous African unity movements were highlighted in 1963 with the Organisation of African Unity created at the Addis Ababa Conference. The major issues discussed here were the colonial situation in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, and the question of creating economic co-operation. This is very significant, for it is one of the first clear statements of free African States to question the validity of another country's domestic policy towards Africans. It was an official statement which disregarded the present African disparities; the boundaries, the movement of domestic nationalisms, the "tribal hostilities" which we have heard so much about. The statements at the OAS Conference went beyond these considerations and called for freedom of their oppressed brothers in the colonial regimes. It was a clear example of communication between Africans despite the political and economic and historical obstacles posed by the European powers.

It is true, the OAU remains a very weak organisation. It has suffered many setbacks and its members often cannot agree on everything due to differences in political doctrines. But at least it offers a hope of "feeling out". It is at least an attempt at looking toward real federation, just as the Articles of Confederation of the 13 American colonies was a weak attempt. It may be yet an ideal. But it does, nevertheless, stand as a measuring stick to be used in assessing efforts at Pan-Africanism. The present ideals of Pan-Africanism were very adequately embodied in its preamble on purposes:

ARTICLE II

1. The organisation shall have the following purposes:
 - (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States.

- (b) To co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa.
 - (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence.
 - (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and
 - (e) To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. To these ends, the member states shall co-ordinate and harmonise their general policies especially in the following fields :
- (a) Political and diplomatic co-operation.
 - (b) Economic co-operation, including transportation and communications.
 - (c) Educational cultural co-operation.
 - (d) Scientific and technical co-operation.
 - (e) Co-operation for defence and security.²

PAN-AFRICANISM AND AFRICAN POLITICS

This paper will attempt to define the political implications of "Pan-Africanism" in terms of certain countries' political policies. As fluid and loose a concept as Pan-Africanism is, there must be an attempt to define it, or at least parts of it in order to study it. One way of doing this is by perusing the actions of the Pan-Africanists. It is fortunate for political study that many times the most vocal advocates of this idea are the political leaders of the emerging African nations: Sekou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere are among the most outspoken disciples of Pan-Africanism.

Is this concept a philosophical movement born out of mental extrapolations, or is there a real political foundation, a tangible economic basis for the development of a Pan-African movement? Can a nation politically operate on a platform of Pan-Africanism? How do two Pan-Africanists, political leaders of different nations operate in relation to each other? What are their relationships to a non-Pan-Africanist leader in Africa? In order merely to begin to probe these questions, we must begin with the most difficult task of all, the attempt to define Pan-Africanism.

Historically, this concept of one Africa had its greatest impetus through the colonisation of Africans by Europeans. It was a common denominator force, which held all Africans in common. Europeans classed Africans together through colonisation by treating all Africans as "natives".³ No matter what differences in languages, customs, or heritage that may have existed before the coming of the whites to Africa, these were largely overlooked by the foreign powers. Frantz Fanon has stated on this point :

"Colonialism has never ceased to maintain that the Negro is a savage; and for the colonialist, the Negro was neither an Angolan nor a Nigerian, for

he spoke simply of 'the Negro'. For colonialism, this vast continent was the haunt of savages, a country riddled with superstitions and fanaticism, destined for contempt, weighed down by the curse of God, a country of cannibals—in short, the Negro's country . . . (thus) the native intellectual affirms the African culture. The Negro, never so much a Negro as since he has been dominated by the whites, when he decides to prove that he has a culture and to behave like a cultured person, comes to realise that history points out a well-defined path to him: he must demonstrate that a Negro culture exists."⁴

One aspect of human relations which make similar the colonisation in West Africa, to that of East Africa, to that of South Africa, was that everywhere the European was the master, and the African the slave. This situation made for a total, "African" cause.

Leopold Senghor while agreeing to this particular historical analysis, goes a bit further and states that Pan-Africanism involves a concept of "negritude".

"Negritude is the whole complex of civilised values—cultural, economic, social and political—which characterises the Black peoples, or more precisely the Negro—African world. All these values are essentially informed by intuitive reasoning. . . . In other words, the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the gift of rhythm, such are the essential elements of Negritude, which you will find indelibly stamped on all the works and activities of the Black man. . . ."⁵

It is not merely an idea based on geographical boundaries, but spiritual boundaries. There is a cultural, spiritual and historical link, between one Black nation and another Black nation. Thus for Senghor, Pan-Africanism, becomes the desire to give Negritude a political basis.

Nkrumah, holding a similar view on the cultural affinity of Black Africa stated:

"In meeting fellow Africans from all parts of the continent, I am constantly impressed by how much we have in common. It is not just our colonial past, or the fact that we have aims in common, it is something which goes far deeper. I can best describe it as a sense of oneness in that we are Africans."⁶

The question of whether in fact, Pan-Africanism is an authentic cultural ethos cannot be discussed in the limited scope of this paper. However, we must realise that this may not even be important; what is of more significance is that the people and the political leaders of Africa believe in Pan-Africanism in this cultural sense. The belief in a cultural Pan-Africanism is voiced by leaders on all points of the political spectrum, from Nkrumah, to Touré, to Cabral, to even someone as conservative as the late President Tubman.

In seeking to define a workable concept of Pan-Africanism, it may be important to clarify it by speaking of the force in Africa which may limit Pan-

Africanism, that is what Doudau Thaim calls, "African Micro-Nationalism".⁷ As Pan-Africanism tends to opt for a more united Africa, micro-nationalism tends to secure a more divided Africa. The nation's own peculiar interest, which would be a synonym for micro-nationalism has certainly been the strongest force behind the domestic and foreign policies of African nations.

Nyerere has consistently stated that the forces of micro-nationalism, rather than necessarily leading to a more divided Africa, if properly persuaded, could lead to a united Africa; "the African national state is an instrument for the unification of Africa, and not for dividing Africa; that African nationalism is meaningless, is dangerous, is anachronistic if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism."⁸ Frantz Fanon, states this proposition philosophically:

"The consciousness of self is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee. . . the most urgent thing today for the intellectual is to build up his nation. If this building up is true, that is to say if it interprets the manifest will of the people and reveals the eager African peoples, then the building of a nation is of necessity accompanied by the discovery and encouragement of universalising values. Far from keeping aloof from other nations, therefore, it is national liberation which leads the nation to play its part on the stage of history. It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows."⁹

Despite this idea, the forces of nationalism seem to me, to be at times very "meaningless, dangerous, and anachronistic," rather than forces for Pan-Africanism.

Africa has been arbitrarily sliced by the forces of colonization. As imperialism became stronger in the African nations, bureaucracies were created, infrastructures built, differences in language and customs became more emphasized by the colonial powers. An inhabitant of Mozambique, came to regard himself as a Portuguese and an inhabitant of Zimbabwe became to regard himself as a Rhodesian. What colonial administrations did in effect, due to their various political and economic policies, was to create arbitrary divisions and nurture national consciousness, which was largely absent in Africa prior to the invasion of Europeans.

The history of independence accentuated the forces of micro-nationalism. Independence in Africa was a fragmented force, that is, Africa did not become totally independent at one instant, as was the case with the American colonies. This in effect did not allow for the development of one national African consciousness, as the total independence of the thirteen colonies at one instant allowed for the growing of one national American consciousness.

It must be realized that though Pan-Africanism may be a doctrine for one Africa, for African unity and integration, it may, as is emphasized, contribute more to African disunity and in reality be a force for disintegration. As Pan-Africanism increases its appeal, it may create national forces to

counteract its influences. Donald Rothchild, studying regional treaties of Africa stated:

“. . . efforts to weld disparate peoples into tight-knit unitary states are encountering unforeseen obstacles. . . . The appeals of local nationalism are not undermined by such tactics as the proclamation of new constitutional arrangements or public calls for national unity. Under these circumstances, centripetal pressures can become centrifugal, encouraging disintegration efforts aimed at preserving parochial identity and uniqueness in the face of powerful centralizing forces. A dialectical process between forces for and against integration may emerge which will be counter-productive to the very unity which the proponents of centralized government sought in the first instance.”¹⁰

Dr. Julius Nyerere has pointed out that the Pan-Africanist faces a real dilemma in this sense:

“On the one hand is the fact that Pan-Africanism demands an African consciousness and an African loyalty, on the other hand is the fact that each Pan-Africanist must also concern himself with the freedom and development of all the nations of Africa.”¹¹

In lieu of this, African political leaders will be walking a tight rope to push Pan-Africanism, but also making sure that they are not seen by smaller and weaker nations as representing another form of imperialistic aggression. Thus African leaders cannot jump head-on into Pan-Africanism. Philosophically it has not been fully defined, and if applied the wrong way politically, it may be more disintegrative than a force for unity.

Politically, Pan-Africanism must be approached in stages; perhaps an economic union or federation as was the case with the East African Community programme of 1963. It must be made sure that an adequate inter-nation administration exists that will be able to adjust to the strains and demands made upon the union. It will need to be, at least initially, such a flexible institution that it will be able to cope with problems of national identification, and national security. Perhaps an economic institution could be the first step toward entrenching a framework between nations that could handle political cooperation and integration. This is the example illustrated by the East African Community. President Kenyatta noted this treaty had wider implications than to be found in the economic field, he said:

“We have gone a step further than any other common market—indeed here lies the reason for calling ourselves an East African Community and not just a common market or a mere economic community.”¹²

East Africa, through this sort of arrangement may have become more politically and economically homogeneous. Thus providing a stronger foundation for future Pan-African claims.¹³

However, in focusing on Pan-African developments, the feeling for national consciousness, the force which liberated many Africans from the claims of colonialism, must not be disregarded. A looseness of arrangement will be needed initially at least to let the politicians in the separate sovereign nations feel that they are not being taken advantage of and are not being forced into any agreements of cooperation.

Another requirement for pursuing what will be a platform of establishing conditions for Pan-Africanism will be in the field of legal technicalities. Relevant laws will lend any political union an air of legitimacy and stability between equal partners. Again it must be emphasized that these initial legal arrangements must be of a loose nature. Only in this way, will they be strengthened, by national leaders being able to obey them. Connected closely with this, is the idea of constitutionalism. There should be constitutional bodies making sure that the laws are realistic enough to be able to be observed. An interesting note to this idea of constitutionalism, is the way Mali and Guinea have furthered the goals of Pan-Africanism by stating in their constitutions that they would be willing to forsake a part of their sovereignty for the realization of Pan-Africanism. The idea of sacrificing a part of a nation's sovereignty has been suggested by many African leaders and should convince anyone of the seriousness of Pan-Africanism.

Here, then is a brief blueprint for a Pan-African programme, for the eventual achievement of a united Africa, perhaps even a United States of Africa. The initial requirements might be stated in the following order:

- 1) begin with loose economic agreements,
- 2) establish loose legal structures to begin to cope with the problem of legitimacy for an international government and also to handle the concerns of national sovereignties.

There are two other very important requirements which I think would greatly aid the cause of a United Africa; the sacrificing of strong ideological biases, and also an initial emphasis on regionally based organizations. These two issues will be discussed shortly in relation to Pan-Africanism and Nkrumah, and in relation to the East African Community.

If we look at one of the most politically cohesive nations today, the United States, it must be remembered that this nation evolved from 13 separate, very sovereign colonies. They began to merge with small incursions in the field of economic cooperation, then move into loose political federations. These economic arrangements were also regionally based. A theme, which I have not elaborated, but would like to state briefly is that Americanism was to the thirteen colonies, what Pan-Africanism is today in Africa. Richard Merritt, studying colonial America, has suggested conditions in seventeenth century America that are similar to the conditions on the African continent today:

“The seventeenth-century American colonies existed in a state of semi-isolation, separated from one another, in many cases, by stretches of uninhabited wilderness and, more generally, by inadequate systems of intercolonial transportation and communication. Contacts with the mother country were often easier to maintain and, perhaps, more fruitful than those with the neighbouring colonies. . . . Even as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonialists were unable to organize an effective intercolonial defence against marauding Indians on the western frontiers and some voices expressed fears of armed conflict among certain colonies.”¹⁴

We must eventually come to the question of whether Pan-Africanism can be a viable policy for the foreign or domestic concerns of the African states. To answer this question, I will discuss certain developments which may point toward a workable definition of political Pan-Africanism. The various political interpretations of Pan-Africanism will be illustrated. These will include the ideas of Nkrumah on this subject, and also the ideas implicit in the East African Community of 1963. Tanzania's domestic and foreign policy from 1967 will be alluded to, in order to show how Nyerere has opted to pursue his own Pan-African strategy. Nkrumah's strategy emphasized a continental unity based on political ideology, stating this to be the only road to African unity. Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania in forming the East African Community seemed to have believed that unity must have a basis in economics and regional solidarity rather than political ideology. And although Nyerere has been one of the leaders in calling for Pan-Africanism on Nkrumah's model, he seems to have devoted most of his nation's policies to Pan-Africanism via regionalism.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND NKRUMAH

The Pan-Africanism of Nkrumah was of a continental-wide nature. Though early in his career he had hope for a political unity among West African States, he abandoned this in favour of a policy of a political continental unity. Pan-Africanism for Nkrumah consists of two developments: political independence for all African peoples, and the building of a political body which would have real authority over certain affairs common to African nations.

He said that a continental government could have a loose federal structure modelled after those of other unions of states such as the United States, Canada or the U.S.S.R. The strongest foundation for unity among these states would be the common issues which the African nations need to face. First the continental government should be secular, “in order that religion might not be dragged across the many problems involved in maintaining unity and securing the greatest possible development.”¹⁵ There should also be common trade and economic policies. This organization would also have

a military defence policy to be decided upon by the members and one united foreign policy.

In terms of the economic advantages of such a union, Nkrumah said that it is an accepted modern day idea that economic progress and development can only be achieved through policy planning and having large amounts of capital investment. Ideally then, a continental policy planning for all of Africa would be the goal for all African nations to develop. Such a plan would also pool vast capital resources.

“Each of us alone (individual African nations) cannot hope to serve the highest benefits of modern technology, which demands vast capital investment and can only justify its economics in serving an extensive population and our resources. This will alone give substance to our aspirations to advance from our preindustrial state to that stage of development that can provide for all the people the high standard of living and welfare amenities of the most advanced industrial states.”¹⁶

A highly centralized political regime is implicit, in order to direct these Pan-African efforts. Implicit also, would be a regime with power to implement its objectives. This, however, can be achieved only through total political unity.

The reason that Nkrumah believed a completely unified military defence policy would be necessary for this continental government would be to thwart the destructive tendencies of having African nations compete with each other for military strength. Such a military development would divert resources which could otherwise be used to invest in more economically and socially profitable sources. However, Nkrumah also pointed out that only through a unified military machine could independent Africa ever hope to destroy the imperialism of regimes such as those in South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Weak states if not protected by a Pan-African military union might move to protect themselves by joining alliances with foreign powers which would tend to dissipate the Pan-African movement.¹⁷

The goal of Nkrumah's Pan-African strategy was that under a major political union of Africa, there could emerge a united Africa, great and powerful in which the territorial boundaries which are the relics of colonialism will become absolute and superfluous, “working for the complete and total mobilization of the economic planning organization under a unified political direction. The forces that unite us are far greater than the difficulties that divide us at present, and our goal must be the establishment of Africa's dignity, progress, and prosperity.” Though Nkrumah campaigned hard for continental political unity, he did not advocate a complete disregard for national considerations. On this point, George Smith very sceptically writes, that if there was a choice even between Ghana's national interest and a Pan-African approach to a certain problem, Nkrumah would have consistently chosen the former.

“Although African political unity was Nkrumah’s answer to neo-colonialism, his first loyalty was Ghana’s national interest and his immediate political aims were directed towards that interest. Even while he was urging political unity, he was undertaking actions which may or may not have tended to foster political unity, but were specifically designed to foster Ghana’s national interest.”¹⁸

The same author points to Nkrumah’s un-Pan-African actions toward Togo, when as the leader of Ghana he advocated that this country should become a “region” of Ghana. Thus though Nkrumah has argued for political unity between equals in his Pan-African strategy, he seemingly did not desire Togo to have this opportunity. He wanted to make Togo a satellite of Ghana.

I do not believe that African leaders espouse certain doctrines for their own personal satisfaction or to “fool” the people, as George Smith seems to imply. I do believe, however, that an emerging political Africa, as of yet, will not be able to realize many of its Pan-African goals it has set before itself. Rather than concentrating on Nkrumah’s failure, I wish to emphasize his philosophy which may increase in its political significance as African political leaders are more able to relate their domestic needs to their political aspirations.

Nkrumah’s Pan-African strategy of a continental political unity has not taken a solid hold on Africa yet because his emphasis on unity seems to rest on a particular political doctrine. Nkrumah began formulating his ideas on Pan-Africanism when he came to the conclusion that political independence would be futile if the African economics were still controlled by European powers, that is if a relationship of neo-colonialism was maintained by European powers and their former colonies. Nkrumah asserted that there were many African leaders still connected with Europe in this sort of relationship, whereas in order to maintain a “true African Unity” not only the European powers must be expelled from Africa, but the “messengers” of these European powers must also be expelled. Thus Nkrumah found that Pan-Africanism, in order to ensure a real political independence had to rely on a doctrine which would reject the European powers in Africa. It would mean an alliance with but a few countries wholly devoted to this Marxian concept. It would also mean a struggle on two levels: A struggle against the former European colonial powers, and a struggle against the “lackeys of neo-colonialism”. Another aspect of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism is the support of guerrilla warfare as a means of Africans gaining political liberation.¹⁹ This has been a doctrinal tenet that not many Africans are willing to support wholeheartedly. Nkrumah believed that guerrilla-type operations should be supported on a continental level against European colonial powers, against white regimes in Africa such as is the case in Zimbabwe, and South Africa and also against the forces of neo-colonialism which would mean

armed struggle against indigenous African regimes. Many African leaders do not feel that such a doctrinaire stand on political unity would go very far in terms of African unity. Rather they believe this would be a force for disunity.

Modibo Keita has voiced a view similar to Nkrumah's saying that the lack of doctrinal unity will disintegrate any efforts at African unity as was the case with the short-lived Federation of Mali:

"We are convinced that the states of Africa will never be independent, in the full sense of the word, if they remain small states, more or less opposed to one another, each having its own policy, its own economy, each taking no account of the policy of the others . . . (but) one cannot build a complete whole with contradictions. Certain common viewpoints on international policy and on economic policy are absolutely necessary."²⁰

Because Nkrumah's policy puts too much emphasis on political doctrine it may be discarded by many African leaders as futile and not conforming to African reality. There is here almost a forcing of choice between a wide African unity, and a more narrow unity bound by political doctrine. Whereas African leaders seem to be moving towards a federation where African issues and African approaches are aired, and loosely-binding resolutions adopted, Nkrumah would sacrifice this to have more of a "real" unity to African states, even if it means struggle with the "lackeys" of European imperialist powers.

This is very important for it lends weight to a point previously made, that the wrong emphasis on Pan-Africanism could lead to more disunity than unity. Nkrumah wanted political unity on a continental basis in an environment where most of the independent African states have only recently gained their independence and where these countries are still in the process of nation building. Not many nations should be willing to sacrifice their new found independence in order to join another government, be it even in Pan-African Union.

Despite the setbacks that may be evident in parts of Nkrumah's Pan-African strategy, African leaders still claim that a continental political unity is the goal of all Pan-Africanists. However, the Pan-Africanism path shown by the former leader of Ghana is still too early for Africa to realize. As of yet, there are too many doctrinal and political disparities in Africa. What political basis could there be for unity between an oligarchic state like Liberia and a more democratic and nationalist one like Tanzania? Not a very strong one! The basis of unity must be sought somewhere else.

If one believes that Nkrumah represented a political doctrine close to "scientific Marxism," by way of deduction, it might be possible to conclude that scientific Marxism could be an obstacle to Pan-Africanism. Marxism puts its emphasis on a class struggle. It would then, in an African context,

put an emphasis on a sort of Pan-Africanism that would emphasize African against African: the African workers against the African bourgeoisie. This may be what Nkrumah is saying when he says that unity must be real; it must be the unity of the African worker. Scientific Marxism could prevent political dialogue among African nations, and thus lead away from a continental unity and create ideological camps.

Many African leaders, while avowing to be socialist, say that their strain of socialism is not "scientific", or the Soviet type, but more "African". Thus this socialism could not create ideological wars among Africans, for in a certain sense, being African would be part of an ideology. To be sure, this strain of socialism reflects a nationalist tendency among African leaders. This nationalism of being African, and of attempting to break away from the yokes of colonialism may at this point lead to a wider continental unity, to a more workable Pan-African union and Nkrumah's apparent emphasis on scientific Marxism. But if it is true that the presence of classes is absent in Africa, then certainly a nationalist Pan-African union would be more realistic for Africa, in that the classes would not be represented in a struggle of African against African but there would be more of a struggle of "African against European" issue.

Perhaps another stumbling block to Pan-Africanism à la Nkrumah, would be the economic weaknesses of such a union. This concept of political unity implies that the nations united on the basis of a political doctrine are strong enough to stand economically by themselves, and also strong enough to reject the benefits that would accrue from economic co-operation with neighbours that are of a different political training. There are no states in Africa that have this degree of economic and political strength. In such a union there must also be African states strong enough and self-sufficient enough to be able to act as a source of support and aid to the weaker African sources for economic development. The idea of Pan-Africanism on a level of a particular political doctrine alone may not be enough to attract African nations into a political union. These African nations also having the aim of modernisation for their societies, may at times have to sacrifice specific ideological objectives in favour of economic development.

Still another barrier to Nkrumah's Pan-African strategy is the geographical positions of countries that could form such a union. For example, if we consider the nations that could form a Pan-African Union on the basis of the Marxian political doctrines which Nkrumah advocated, we may look at Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Algeria and Egypt among the few. The first two are in West Africa, Egypt and Algeria are in North Africa, and Tanzania is in East Africa. This could pose problems of communication and transportation. Such states emphasizing political doctrines may also increase friction between themselves and their much closer neighbours.

After the oppressive impact of colonialism, Pan-Africanism may well be perhaps another rejection of a European-exported ideology. It may be that

Africans at this point are more interested in emphasising their Africanism, rather than pursuing an ideology which was patented by a European. Although espousing the ideals of socialism, Africans concerned about their political image may in pursuing a nationalist Pan-African strategy, be putting more emphasis on being African, than in being "proper" socialists. Thus comes their sacrifice of doctrinal unity, in favour of "African" unity.

For Pan-Africanism to become a stronger force in African politics it must temporarily abandon its emphasis on political doctrine and begin to operate in areas where the potential for African unity already exists, in the cultural and economic realm. If this is indeed the case, we must begin to look at regional trade organisations such as the East African Community Treaty of the early '60's.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE EAST AFRICA FEDERATION

Connected with the feelings of loss of national identification another obstacle to African political unity is the position that small weak states would have in a federation which would include stronger states. At the University of East Africa Conferences on Public Policy, held in 1963 and 1964, this question was pursued. One proposal for the relieving of suspicion on the part of a weak state, was the abandoning of the idea of setting up a formalised political structure. Instead there would be an emphasis on the political process. That is, there would be a mere "listing" of powers that might be confederal, and another listing for territorial powers. The former would be powers able to be exercised by the federation upon unanimous consent of all territorial representatives. However, this entire idea was discarded because no one could decide on specific powers to consign to this confederal arrangement. Though it was agreed that the confederal should embody general laws in the economic field, the specified could not be agreed upon. For example, it was a confederal proposal that the intergovernmental administration should have wide powers in the area of economic development, but this could mean intervening in the internal economic, and thus political affairs of an individual country, a proposition none too popular.

There would also be a list which would comprise those issues on which the individual governments would be in substantial agreement such as matters of defence. This would be one way of allaying the fears of a small state such as Uganda in the East Africa Federation.

Another, perhaps more effective manner in which a small state could be protected in a federation of powers would be by requiring that all decisions falling under the confederal powers should be acted upon by requiring that all decisions should be decided upon unanimously. In effect, the small state would have as much executive control in the political structure as a larger state. Other proposals for small state protection included: the creation of inter-governmental councils, such as the National Economic Development Council,

which would be a specialised agency for economic planning on which state interests would be carefully represented; provisions were also proposed for a legislative or executive veto by a particular state on certain matters; protection for a small state within the legislative branch of a federal structure might be achieved by prescribing an extraordinary majority in the federal legislature for certain resolutions. This would mean simply that no law could be passed unless it was so desired by a near unanimous majority.

One point that was made very obvious at this conference was that whether a Pan-African union would be created between two countries, or on a continental-wide basis, there would always be the fear by a small state that it would be swallowed by a more powerful state. If future Pan-African unions are to succeed, provision must be made that this suspicion whether well-founded or not, must be assuaged. Though the question of political doctrine may seem presently to be the biggest obstacle to a continental-wide unity, the position of the small state will be a determinant of how strong and extensive any Pan-African ventures will be. Any small African nation fearing a "Pan-African imperialism" may provide a strong enough incentive to make other small nations fearful of such a union.

Other provisions were made by the East African Community to provide for a Federal Civil Service, in which bureaucrats from different countries would have interchangeable positions.²¹ The state citizenship would even be abrogated for a federal citizenship. The rights of all residents of the federal government would be guaranteed under a general Bill of Rights, but state governments could make arrangements in their constitutions enabling the government to take certain security measures when the time called for it.

The concern that Africans have over achieving a balance between a federal government and a territorial government is latent throughout this entire scheme. There is a strong urge for Pan-Africanism, but the forces of micro-nationalism are indeed very strong. The proposal for the business of elections shows this concern. It was submitted that for the federal legislature, election should be on a direct, population basis. This would increase the national consciousness of the territorial governments, and perhaps stimulate the growth of national political parties by concentrating on national issues for election to the federal legislature. However, elections to the Senate of the federal house could be indirect providing for equal representation of the states.

It is very likely that the East African Community could perhaps have gone a long way in establishing a federal government. This would have been the basis for a political authority by the federal government over certain political, economic, and social affairs of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika. Although many Pan-Africanists would have condemned this merely as a "regional" organisation, I believe that it could have served as a model for wider Pan-African style politics. It was in a sense, a blueprint for Pan-Africanism. It would have had the purpose of also providing for a more solid basis for future Pan-African schemes. The acculturation and integration achieved

between these three countries would have meant a stronger commitment to unitary politics in any Pan-African programme, for it would have been more easy for this region, as representing a unified area, to link up with other regions on a Pan-African basis, than if it were attempted on a country by country basis.

Pan-Africanists who believed in a one step jump to continental unity may, as Nkrumah did, criticise this programme as the same "balkanisation" policy of the European powers. He stated in 1962:

"Local association, regional commonwealths and territorial groupings will be just another form of balkanisation, unless they are conceived within the framework of a large union based on the model of the United States . . . or the Soviet Union."²²

Nkrumah stated that regional organisations, such as the East African Community, were strategically weak. Regional treaties made for easier penetration and therefore control by foreign interests.

Pan-Africanism on the political level does eventually mean continental unity, but if Africans are to move from a cultural Pan-Africanism, to a political sort of Pan-Africanism, it can only be achieved through step-by-step programmes. One cannot proclaim Pan-African continental-wide institutions tomorrow, without reconciling the many multi-national concerns in Africa today. Granted, this state of different national interests and ill-conceived boundaries were arbitrarily created by European nations, but these divisions have become an African reality. A reality that must be considered. Mama Dia says that this colonial-imposed idea of territorialism must be dealt with for African unity to succeed.

"On the Senegalese side, the leaders who have been the main theoreticians of African unity, and who several times over have sacrificed their local political organisations and their personal positions to this idea, are, though in all good faith undeniably responsible. Their mistake—our mistake—has been, under the pretext of fighting 'Balkanisation', not to have taken into consideration the pre-colonial fact of territorialism. Our mistake has been not to have paid enough attention in our analysis to this phenomenon, which is the fruit of colonialism if you like, but also a sociological fact which no theory of unity, be it ever so laudable or attractive, can abolish."²³

Regional organisations, for the purpose of economic co-operation, with a federal structure underlying it, opting for a unified African political identification can more effectively deal with the present state of African affairs. Building regional associations may go very far in creating the foundation of a continental federal structure based on regional organisations. Despite the solemn calls for Pan-Africanism, it also seems that African nations are more willing to accept the regional organisation more readily at the present time.

But we must attempt to stay attuned to possible political policies. Even if we grant that regional communities may be more effective as a force for Pan-Africanism than present continental schemes, we must still ask the question, "Will even regional associations succeed in creating even a limited Pan-

Though the East African Community programme was abandoned by African political unity?"

June, 1965, its failure to stay alive, rather than show a weakness in regional organisations, proves that this type of organisation can be very effective and successful. The ill-fate of this particular community was due to the domestic difficulties of the territorial governments. There does not seem to be any evidence that the regional organisation itself was responsible for its own failure. There was no internal mechanical failure—in other words, someone merely pulled out the plug from the socket. Let us consider that Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda gained their independence very recently, in 1962, 1963, and 1963 respectively. These were very new emerging nations engaged in seeking a national political identity; the governments were very busy attempting to wield the authority and domestic programmes that could withstand the pressures of modernisation, and social mobilisation. Though their attempts at Pan-African unity were sincere, it may have been a bit premature for these new political entities to effect a solid regional community with a political structure. Uganda was trying to create effective political power, and the political leaders in Kenya were trying to create political order. Not only was there very little time to devote to Pan-African programmes, but there was also very little expertise available to devote to the development of regional organisations. Conceivably the East African nations could have borrowed this needed expertise from their former colonial masters, but then it would not really be Pan-Africanist strategy.

But what does such a failure mean? It means first of all, that there was a desire on the part of very politically weak governments to effect a federal relationship on a Pan-African basis. This only offers hope for the future of Pan-Africanism. We may say that perhaps as these governments solidify their political identities, that they will indeed be able to devote more time and expertise in their foreign policies to Pan-Africanism on an economic and political basis. It also means, that given the right internal political conditions of the territorial governments there does exist opportunities in regional associations, underlaid with a federal structure with its distinct political powers, to operate on the basis of Pan-African ideals. What was important was that the East African leaders did not abandon the regional organisation due to a failure of its political apparatus or because there was not a strong desire for a Pan-African union, but more because it would have meant sacrificing the national necessities of not yet politically cohesive countries.

As Dr. Obote put it, the "hope of unity survives". The leaders of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya realize this, and more overtures at Pan-Africanism on a political level, and an economic level, can be expected. Obote said in 1966:

"We must for the future take other bold decisions towards the ideal of unity. We tried to march towards that goal in 1963. We did not succeed. It is unnecessary to ask why we failed. It is more important to answer the question why not make a further attempt?"²⁴

President Nyerere has also stated:

"Now that one member of the East African Authority has sounded another positive call for federation, his hint should be given serious heed. The adverse experiences that have been gained during these years of separate development will serve to illustrate the urgency of federation. On her part, Tanzania has always stood for federation and shall continue to do so until it is achieved. Her faith in African unity is impregnable."²⁵

PAN-AFRICANISM AND TANZANIA

Many have said that Pan-Africanism is an ideal too high to be reached by Africans. Tanzania, more than any other nation on the Black Continent, shows that Pan-Africanism can be a viable policy both for domestic policy planning and foreign policy planning. Nyerere has tried to show that there is no contradiction between economic and political development and a particularly African way of doing things.

Before Pan-African unity can be achieved, whether one is opting for Nkrumah's form of unity, or that unity elicited by the East African Community, there must be a degree of independence on the part of the African country. The countries of Africa must be willing to sacrifice to the wrath of the western powers in order to give the concept of African unity validity. For example, when Tanzania accepted an East German diplomatic mission, West Germany threatened to withdraw her economic aid. Tanzania gave up West German aid in order to do something which she as a nation wanted to do; accept the East German diplomatic mission. When Ian Smith of Zimbabwe declared independence, Nyerere stated that if Britain did not act to curb the rebel government, he would sever all diplomatic relations with Britain. Because the British did not take meaningful actions against the Smith regime, Tanzania broke all diplomatic relations with Britain.²⁶ Note that Nyerere was not concerned with the fact that Smith had "illegally" declared independence as with the notion that this latter development would mean even more oppression for the majority of Blacks inside Zimbabwe under the rule of a racist white minority.

Tanzania's foreign policy is based on five important principles, including the idea of African unity as an objective for Tanzania, as well as for the African continent. In Nyerere's foreign policy, he stated that African unity must be of foremost concern, this must have the urgent concern of all independent African states; "Total African liberation and total African unity are basic objectives of our Party and our Government."²⁷ The Tanzanian government has not only stressed that African unity is vital for Tanzania, but for all of Black Africa.

“Unity is therefore necessary for the safety, integrity and the development of Africa. If it does not secure these essentials, it is pointless. Unity must prevent our political fears and needs of those outside of Africa; it must ensure that Africa is able to police itself and build a minimum defence against outside aggression and it must prevent different parts of Africa from competing against the others for economic favours, in return for political concessions. Unity must ensure that Africa becomes one market, that its peoples cease to be divided by customs posts, and tariff walls along a hundred frontiers, and it must achieve that by instituting a single currency throughout the continent. In relation to the outside world, the separate national states must cease to exist. They must be replaced by one Africa. National sovereignty, in short, must be surrendered by the nation-states in favour of an all-African government.”²⁸

Note Nyerere’s feelings on African military unity:

“That is why during the difficulties in the Congo, when the idea of an African command was first proposed, I was very taken with it. . . . As for large military commitments, these should be done on an African basis . . . it would achieve two objectives at least. First it removes the danger I have already referred to—the danger of arming ourselves against ourselves, and thus depriving ourselves of the chance of achieving African unity . . . and secondly, it provides a real force for the defence of Africa against external aggression.”²⁹

These statements could have been written word for word by Nkrumah. Ideologically, Nyerere is trying to evolve into the same Pan-Africanism that Nkrumah proclaimed. However, the difference lies in the word “evolve”. Awakening from the yoke of colonialism, Nyerere realises that the fragmented African states must have time to nationally assert themselves, as Tanzania is now doing. As was shown, Nkrumah did not take national realities into hand. But as Nyerere implies, a criticism of Nkrumah does not lie in his ideology, or his commitment, but rather in his astuteness as a politician in moving toward the goal of African unity. Unlike Nyerere, Nkrumah did not realise the extent to which the social forces of colonialism fragmented the people of Africa. President Nyerere stated in 1967:

“The requirement of unanimity is not easy to achieve despite our great will to co-operate. Each of our three governments (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania), is answerable to the people of its own country. Each of them is beset with the urgent needs of one part of the total East African area . . . in all our joint meetings, each member can look at the interests of East Africa as a whole only to the extent that these do not conflict fundamentally with the requirement of his own nation’s immediate needs.”³⁰

Tanzania in applying a “spill-over” concept to the ideas of African unity has sought to strengthen the Organisation of African Unity. This organisation

has a similar structure to that of the East African Community. By setting up "regional-federal" structures, it was hoped that co-operation between African states could become more institutionalised in time and thus create an apparatus for handling inter-African national politics on a basis of political solidarity. For this purpose, Julius Nyerere has given much political and financial support to the OAU.

In supporting a Pan-African foreign policy, Nyerere has been led to denounce and oppose many African leaders who are acting in a "non-Pan-Africanist" manner. This may show much in illustrating the force of Pan-Africanism today. Not only Tanzania, but many other nations are willing to sacrifice their relationship with other African nations for the sake of Pan-Africanism. Nyerere has been very critical of Malawian President, Hastings Banda, and Houphuet Boigny for advocating dialogue with South Africa. This Pan-African stance takes on more strength when one considers that South Africa has made overtures of economic aid to African nations who could use it very much. Thus conceding to Nkrumah, Tanzania does not believe that ideology should be completely sacrificed for mere regional co-operation. Though this framework may be useful in reaching a Pan-African political unity, it will fail if ideology is completely sacrificed. This may have been the reason why a summit meeting of "revolutionary" nations in Africa was called in April, 1967. Guinea, Mali, Algeria, and Egypt all took part with Tanzania in calling for political unity against the Smith regime in Zimbabwe. However, although this was according to Nyerere, an exclusive "revolutionary summit meeting", it was pointed out that it was talking within the scheme of the OAU. Thus while a particular revolutionary ideology was stressed, as much importance was attached to the fact that this stressing was done under the auspices of the OAU which included various African ideologies.

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