

## Worker-Management Relations

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## **Key Findings**

- This brief examines relations between workers and supervisors, including abuse and available channels of communication for reporting issues.
- At the baseline, Better Work factories were more likely to have unions, collective bargaining agreements, and worker-manager committees.
- At the endline, all factories in Vietnam are less likely to have collective bargaining agreements and worker-management committees. Workers over time are less likely to be part of a union and less likely to feel comfortable approaching their coworkers for help, yet these effects are not mitigated by Better Work.
- There are detrimental effects of time on worker support systems in Vietnam, mitigated by Better Work only in the case of reducing frequency of yelling at workers.
- Although Better Work factories maintain numerous support systems such as unions and collective bargaining agreements, over time, all workers feel less comfortable approaching numerous support systems for complaints or concerns about work.

Worker-management relations capture a number of measures indicative of a positive environment for workers. This section looks at the communication between workers and their managers and supervisors, including verbal abuse, and how workers feel about those interactions. It also addresses the organizations that support workers and the grievance procedures in place for workers to report problems.

Baseline SEM analysis suggests that verbal abuse and negative feelings surrounding supervisor interactions are linked to lower life satisfaction and increased turnover intention.

Summary statistics for Vietnam in Table 1 and Indonesia in Table 2 suggest that Better Work employees at baseline tended to have better worker-management relations than non-Better Work employees in many aspects, with almost identical results across countries. Better Work employees were more likely to believe that their management listens to ideas and complaints and that they can get all the information related to their work from supervisors and HR. They were less likely to be yelled at by their supervisors and made to feel unimportant or angry. Better Work factories were more likely to have unions, collective bargaining agreements, and workermanager committees, which are all indicative of communication and compromise between employer and employee. In terms of work support systems, Better Work employees in Vietnam were more likely to be part of a union; however, we do not observe this result in Indonesia. Better Work employees in both countries felt more comfortable going to HR, trade unions, and worker-manager committees with complaints or concerns about work, while in Indonesia, Better Work employees were also more comfortable going to complaint boxes and their supervisors.

## Variable Definitions

- *Management\_Listen*: Measures worker belief that management always listens to ideas and complaints (agreescale)
- *Sup\_HR\_Information*: Measure of how easy workers can get information related to work from supervisor or HR (agreescale)

- Acceptable\_Yell: Measure of how acceptable yelling at workers is within the factory (commonscale)
- Supervisor\_Yell: Measure of how often a supervisor yells at a worker to work faster or for making a mistake (commonscale)
- *Unimportant*: Measure of how often a worker feels small or unimportant after talking to a supervisor (commonscale)
- *Angry:* Measure of how often a worker feels angry or frustrated after talking to a supervisor (commonscale)
- Factory\_Union: Factory has a union (binary)
- Factory\_Bargaining: Factory has a collective bargaining agreement (binary)
- Factory\_Committee: Factory has a worker-manager committee (binary)
- *Union:* Worker is the member of a union (binary)
- *Union\_Termination:* Measures if it is likely that a worker will be fired if they join a union (binary)
- *Coworker\_Help:* Measure of a worker's comfort in seeking help from a co-worker with complaints or concerns about work (comfortscale)
- *HR\_Help:* Measure of a worker's comfort in seeking help from HR with complaints or concerns about work (comfortscale)
- *Trade\_Union\_Help:* Measure of a worker's comfort in seeking help from the trade union with complaints or concerns about work (comfortscale)
- *Committee\_Help*: Measure of a worker's comfort in seeking help from a worker-manager committee with complaints or concerns about work (comfortscale)
- *ComplaintBox\_Help:* Measure of a worker's comfort in seeking help through a complaint box with complaints or concerns about work (comfortscale)
- Supervisor\_Help: Measure of a worker's comfort in seeking help from a supervisor with complaints or concerns about work (comfortscale)

Table 1 Vietnam Baseline Worker-Management Relations Summary Statistics

	Better Work Factories				Non-Better Work Factories						
											Mean
VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max	N	mean	sd	min	max	Difference
Management_Listen	678	3.928	0.670	1	5	651	3.848	0.796	1	5	0.08**
Supervisor_HR_											
Information	677	4.004	0.512	1	5	654	3.901	0.696	1	5	0.103***
Acceptable_Yell	674	2.932	1.067	1	5	643	2.978	1.131	1	5	-0.046
Supervisor_Yell	677	2.034	1.087	1	5	649	2.149	1.139	1	5	-0.115*
Unimportant	681	1.286	0.698	1	4	652	1.371	0.772	1	5	-0.085**
Angry	682	1.491	0.831	1	5	651	1.596	0.915	1	5	-0.105**
Factory_Union	682	0.997	0.0541	0	1	646	0.941	0.235	0	1	0.056***
Factory_Bargaining	608	0.901	0.298	0	1	576	0.811	0.392	0	1	0.09***
Factory_Committee	602	0.890	0.313	0	1	582	0.813	0.390	0	1	0.077***
Union	682	0.629	0.483	0	1	645	0.558	0.497	0	1	0.071***
Union_Termination	618	0.0680	0.252	0	1	597	0.0787	0.270	0	1	-0.0107
Coworker_Help	673	3.982	0.869	1	5	643	4.006	0.807	1	5	-0.024
HR_Help	632	3.677	0.910	1	5	591	3.538	0.868	1	5	0.139***
Trade_Union_Help	626	3.840	0.885	1	5	559	3.673	0.879	1	5	0.167***
Committee_Help	574	3.713	0.870	1	5	541	3.556	0.845	1	5	0.157***
ComplaintBox_Help	544	3.779	0.887	1	5	510	3.720	0.858	1	5	0.059
Supervisor_Help	680	3.788	0.873	1	5	649	3.758	0.878	1	5	0.03

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 2 Indonesia Baseline Worker-Management Relations Summary Statistics

	Better Work Factories				Non-Better Work Factories						
											Mean
VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max	N	mean	sd	min	max	Difference
Management_Listen	188	3.415	0.813	1	5	190	3.068	1.064	1	5	0.347***
Supervisor_HR_											
Information	200	3.545	0.722	1	5	183	3.230	1.012	1	5	0.315***
Acceptable_Yell	201	2.313	1.033	1	5	200	2.445	1.016	1	5	-0.132
Supervisor_Yell	203	1.857	0.957	1	5	202	2.054	0.953	1	5	-0.197**
Unimportant	202	1.530	0.893	1	5	202	1.817	0.993	1	5	-0.287***
Angry	203	1.488	0.864	1	5	202	1.673	0.859	1	4	-0.185**
Factory_Union	199	0.945	0.229	0	1	190	0.758	0.429	0	1	0.187***
Factory_Bargaining	196	0.888	0.316	0	1	181	0.707	0.456	0	1	0.181***
Factory_Committee	138	0.848	0.360	0	1	144	0.639	0.482	0	1	0.209***
Union	202	0.624	0.486	0	1	200	0.545	0.499	0	1	0.079
Union_Termination	171	0.304	0.461	0	1	167	0.234	0.424	0	1	0.07
Coworker_Help	199	4.141	0.943	1	5	201	4.065	1.025	1	5	0.076
HR_Help	195	3.672	1.048	1	5	193	3.399	1.114	1	5	0.273**
Trade_Union_Help	193	3.824	1.104	1	5	188	3.580	1.228	1	5	0.244**
Committee_Help	170	3.506	1.095	1	5	161	3.292	1.202	1	5	0.214*
ComplaintBox_Help	193	3.674	1.156	1	5	172	3.401	1.250	1	5	0.273**
Supervisor_Help	197	3.701	1.119	1	5	201	3.050	1.399	1	5	0.651***

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Regression Results**

Tables 3-5 support the significant coefficients that we saw in the Vietnam summary statistics on the variables <code>Supervisor\_HR\_Information</code>, <code>Factory\_Union</code>, <code>Factory\_Bargaining</code>, <code>Factory\_Committee</code>, <code>HR\_Help</code>, <code>Trade\_Union\_Help</code>, and <code>Committee Help</code>. When controlling for demographic variables, we see that significance of <code>bw\_factory</code> on the variables <code>Management\_Listen</code>, <code>Supervisor\_Yell</code>, <code>Unimportant</code>, <code>Angry</code>, and <code>Union</code> at baseline disappear. This shows that in Vietnam, these worker-management and worker support factors may be explained away by demographic differences between factory types.

We find that there are detrimental effects of time on worker support systems in Vietnam. At endline, all factories are less likely to have collective bargaining agreements and worker-management committees. We also find that workers over time are less likely to be part of a union and less likely to feel comfortable approaching their coworkers for help. Unfortunately, we see these effects are not mitigated by Better Work. The only instance where Better Work employment seems to be advantageous at endline is in column 3 of Table 3, where we see that yelling at workers becomes less acceptable in Better Work factories over time.

Table 3 Vietnam Worker-Management Relations Regression Results (1)

Table 5 Vielnan	u worker-man	agemeni Keiai	nons Kegressio	m Kesuiis (1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Supervisor_	Supervisor_						
	HR_	$HR\_$	Acceptable_	Acceptable_	Factory_	Factory_	Factory_	Factory_
VARIABLES	Information	Information	Yell	Yell	Union	Union	Bargaining	Bargaining
bw_factory	0.102***	-	-0.0393	-	0.0526***	-	0.0790**	-
	(0.0376)		(0.0808)		(0.0193)		(0.0324)	
endline	-0.000316	0.0123	0.0831	0.0499	0.00263	0.00695	0.0402	0.0465*
	(0.0365)	(0.0456)	(0.0648)	(0.0693)	(0.0107)	(0.0151)	(0.0252)	(0.0263)
bw_endline	-0.0396	-0.0299	-0.171*	-0.152	-0.00909	-0.0109	-0.0301	-0.0252
	(0.0521)	(0.0525)	(0.0931)	(0.0921)	(0.0125)	(0.0128)	(0.0318)	(0.0320)
Constant	3.632***	4.227***	2.437***	2.568***	1.107***	1.233***	0.737***	0.973***
	(0.425)	(0.672)	(0.308)	(0.807)	(0.0928)	(0.330)	-0.167	(0.229)
Worker Time								
Effects	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Observations	2,535	2,535	2,526	2,526	2,521	2,521	2286	2,286
R-squared		0.015		0.020		0.036		0.025
Number of								
uniqueID	1,333	1,333	1,332	1,332	1,334	1,334	1,300	1,300

Robust standard errors in parentheses

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 4 Vietnam Worker-Management Relations Regression Results (2)

Total Community	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Factory_	Factory_			Coworker_	Coworker_	$HR\_$	$HR\_$
VARIABLES	Committee	Committee	Union	Union	Help	Help	Help	Help
								_
bw_factory	0.0704**	-	0.0745	-	-0.0246	-	0.139*	-
	(0.0343)		(0.0733)		(0.0635)		(0.0828)	
endline	-0.0641**	-0.0432	-0.390***	-0.426***	-0.0934	-0.137*	0.0988	0.0965
	(0.0322)	(0.0307)	(0.0432)	(0.0516)	(0.0573)	(0.0702)	(0.0640)	(0.0721)
bw_endline	0.0181	0.0251	-0.0727	-0.0410	0.124	0.126	0.0528	0.0791
	(0.0427)	(0.0440)	(0.0677)	(0.0698)	(0.0854)	(0.0852)	(0.0794)	(0.0801)
Constant	0.638***	1.027***	0.214	0.226	3.689***	3.606***	3.156***	3.918***
	(0.197)	(0.308)	(0.191)	(0.659)	(0.309)	(0.730)	(0.316)	(0.911)
Worker Time								
Effects	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Observations	2,201	2,201	2,544	2,544	2,527	2,527	2,378	2,378
R-squared		0.041		0.353		0.022		0.038
Number of								
uniqueID	1,285	1,285	1,335	1,335	1,333	1,333	1,312	1,312

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 5 Vietnam Worker-Management Relations Regression Results (3)

_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Trade_Union_Help	Trade_Union_Help	Committee_Help	Committee_Help
bw_factory	0.162*	-	0.158**	-
	(0.0843)		(0.0754)	
endline	0.0681	0.0412	0.129	0.103
	(0.0720)	(0.0850)	(0.0801)	(0.0902)
bw_endline	0.0344	0.0613	-0.0182	-0.00627
	(0.0862)	(0.0883)	(0.0939)	(0.103)
Constant	3.234***	4.215***	3.039***	2.971***
	(0.303)	(0.847)	(0.306)	(0.841)
Worker Time Effects	RE	FE	RE	FE
Observations	2,341	2,341	2,148	2,148
R-squared		0.042		0.032
Number of uniqueID	1,302	1,302	1,269	1,269

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Tables 6 and 7 support some of the significant coefficients we saw in the summary statistics, such as those on the variables <code>Factory\_Union</code>, <code>Factory\_Bargaining</code>, <code>Factory\_Committee</code>, <code>Trade\_Union\_Help</code>, and <code>Supervisor\_Help</code>. When we control for demographic variables, we see that the significant effect of <code>bw\_factory</code> on the variables <code>Management\_Listen</code>, <code>Supervisor\_HR\_Information</code>, <code>Supervisor\_Yell</code>, <code>Unimportant</code>, <code>Angry</code>, <code>HR\_Help</code>, <code>Committee\_Help</code>, and <code>ComplaintBox\_Help</code> disappears. This shows that these differences at baseline may be partially or completely explained away by demographic differences between factories.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

We observe numerous time effects on worker-management relations and worker support systems in Indonesia. Both Better Work and non-Better Work employees feel less comfortable approaching coworkers, HR, trade unions, worker-management committees, and supervisors for support at endline. Better Work workers are relatively more comfortable compared to non-Better Work workers, but are less comfortable seeking help than they were at the baseline. In the case of *Factory\_Committee*, we see that although Better Work employees start off feeling more comfortable going to worker-management committees, this advantaged disappears over time and converges to non-Better Work levels. The narrative we observe is that although Better Work factories maintain numerous support systems such as unions and collective bargaining agreements, over time, all workers feel less comfortable approaching numerous support systems for complaints or concerns about work.

Table 6 Indonesia Worker-Management Relations Regression Results (1)

Table o maonesia v				1				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Factory_	Factory_	Factory_	Factory_	Factory_	Factory_	Coworker_	Coworker_
VARIABLES	Union	Union	Bargaining	Bargaining	Committee	Committee	Help	Help
bw_factory	0.205**	-	0.228**	-	0.256**	-	0.0896	-
	(0.0951)		(0.109)		(0.128)		(0.158)	
endline	-0.00805	-0.0160	-0.0316	-0.0286	-0.0911	-0.116	-0.407***	-0.476***
	(0.0831)	(0.0711)	(0.0933)	(0.0877)	(0.0879)	(0.0850)	(0.108)	(0.117)
bw_endline	-0.00484	-0.00911	-0.189	-0.165	-0.249**	-0.225*	0.151	0.148
	(0.0967)	(0.0862)	(0.118)	(0.106)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.160)	(0.165)
Constant	0.404	0.848***	0.697***	0.966**	1.187***	1.114***	5.334***	4.200***
	(0.336)	(0.200)	(0.158)	(0.373)	(0.262)	(0.313)	(0.308)	(0.675)
Worker Time								
Effects	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Observations	746	746	731	731	627	627	762	762
R-squared		0.234		0.184		0.303		0.119
Number of								
uniqueID	407	407	406	406	380	380	408	408

Robust standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 7 Indonesia Worker-Management Relations Regression Results (2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			$Trade\_$	$Trade\_$				
			$Union\_$	$Union\_$	$Committee\_$	Committee_	Supervisor_	Supervisor_
VARIABLES	HR_Help	HR_Help	Help	Help	Help	Help	Help	Help
bw_factory	0.262	-	0.364*	-	0.305	-	0.561**	-
	(0.211)		(0.212)		(0.197)		(0.244)	
endline	-0.575***	-0.529***	-0.367*	-0.347	-0.299*	-0.279	-0.479*	-0.539*
	(0.188)	(0.167)	(0.219)	(0.211)	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.288)	(0.297)
bw_endline	-0.175	-0.138	-0.297	-0.274	-0.282	-0.199	-0.378	-0.249
	(0.292)	(0.285)	(0.290)	(0.260)	(0.261)	(0.266)	(0.410)	(0.438)
Constant	2.616***	5.099***	3.014***	4.263***	3.245***	3.005***	3.999***	5.827***
	(0.538)	(0.777)	(0.384)	(0.866)	(0.478)	(0.609)	(0.820)	(0.548)
Worker Time								
Effects	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Observations	750	750	744	744	694	694	760	760
R-squared		0.195		0.243		0.185		0.168
Number of								
uniqueID	408	408	407	407	398	398	407	407

Robust standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1