Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War

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Eradicating Bolivian Coca

Efforts to disrupt production of the coca leaf, the source of cocaine, have been directed toward Bolivia for decades. In 1988, Bolivia adopted Ley (or Law) 1008, which broadened police and military powers to pursue a tough coca eradication policy, following the passage of the Drug Abuse Acts in the United States.[1] The great irony of this situation is that coca was once promoted in Bolivia as a culturally appropriate development tool slated to save an economy suffering from the collapse of the mining industry.[2] It is increasingly the view of international observers, however, that eradication and related programs "are pushing some 35,000 former coca-growing families in the region toward economic ruin, hunger and, inevitably, back to coca cultivation."[3] At the same time, the United States and Bolivian governments insist eradication has been a success and continue to emphasize this policy. What are the real development implications of the 'War on Drugs' in Bolivia? If it is true that "conflict and underdevelopment . . . feed on each other and make it difficult for societies to overcome either condition alone,"[4] is eradication the best approach to development in Bolivia and can militarization occur in concert with development advances? What are the costs to Americans in social and economic terms of continuing policies that severely compromise the rights of Bolivian citizens?

The Community of Growers

Coca has long been a staple of the Bolivian economy and was even utilized in colonial times in lieu of money to pay the miners in high-altitude mines. However, while there is a long and continuing history of coca use in the Andes for cultural and medicinal purposes, it is undeniably the case that much of the coca leaf cultivation is being used to produce coca paste, the raw form of cocaine. This is particularly true in the area called the Chapare, which lies to the Northeast of the city of Cochabamba in the tropical heart of Bolivia and bears the concentrated brunt of military eradication campaigns. Dr. Preston Pattie, a policy advisor to USAID-funded alternative agriculture efforts in the region, suggested that perhaps 90% of the coca in the Chapare had been forcibly eradicated between 1998 and 2000. A significant number of those coca growing families had descended from the high desert mining regions of the Western altiplano when the

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government encouraged, and even forced, the migration of miners in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[5] In the Chapare, coca leaf production is considered to be overwhelmingly intended for cocaine production, and in the mid-80s the Bolivian government declared the Chapare a "transition zone," where the state would split its efforts between incentives to farmers to grow crops other than coca and an assault on the traffic of drugs.[6] This program was the Bolivian government's response to diplomatic and aid pressures put on it by the United States in support of a 'supply-side' approach to the problem of domestic American drug use.[7]

The Bolivian eradication program expresses a complex political logic. It is reasonable to assume that the destruction of coca at the primary source will reduce its availability to drug producers and narcotraffickers. However, the American position follows the logic that the subsequent inability for traffickers to acquire enough of the coca leaf would reduce their demand for this incredibly profitable product, undercutting the market and forcing growers to switch to alternative crops.[8] American foreign policy shifted to mirror this theory, with large amounts of monetary aid and training assistance going to the Bolivian military for eradication efforts, buffered by nascent spending on alternative agriculture. What this plan failed to take into account was the fact that Bolivia is one of the region's poorest countries, suffering inflation during the mid-80s of between 20,000 and 50,000 percent annually.[9] Following the international economic wisdom of the time, the Bolivian government adopted severe austerity measures that resulted in massive currency devaluation and freer markets, including lifting tariffs on imported agricultural goods, further weakening the rural economic structure.[10] The impact of these economic realities, taken in concert with the large rural population and poor infrastructure, provided drug producers with an almost infinite supply of laborers, hidden in the tropical forest, willing to grow any crop that would guarantee a stable market and steady income, however meager.

The price of the coca leaf is inflated hundreds of times before it reaches the streets of the United States as cocaine.[11] The substantial profits of the illicit drug trade are maintained by a select few that control the trade, and these are the people that ultimately pay growers a minimal price for the coca leaf. While the income is stable and generally provides subsistence, the growers themselves live an extremely modest life, one of poverty by American standards, with an average annual rural income of less than US $500 per capita.[12] Coca growers live much like their rural counterparts in other developing countries in Latin America. The ubiquitous encounters of dirt-floored shacks housing several family generations and children running around in rags and bare feet among the farm animals are indistinguishable from other agricultural communities growing licit crops. Often times there is no electricity or local health service, sanitary conditions are severely wanting, and education is nearly impossible to acquire beyond primary schooling. Considering this lifestyle, there is little discretion for families making choices about their survival, and crops are chosen based on their marketability and the security of their income

generation. Alternatives to coca have been advanced in the rural areas, but they have been largely unsuccessful.

Alternative Agriculture

Despite the United States' emphasis on the eradication of coca plantations in the Chapare, *The Economist* reported in the mid-90s that new coca cultivation was outpacing eradication efforts.[13] Although the inflation of the 80s has been largely brought under control, and the governmental corruption and clientelism that strangled public sector services have improved, the agricultural sector is still suffering and growers are still reluctant to renounce coca. Prompted by this reluctance and by U.S. foreign policy pressures, the Bolivian president, former dictator Hugo Suarez Banzer, implemented *Plan Dignidad*, the "Dignity Plan," in the late 90s. This gave greater power to the military to conduct forced eradication, subverting many civil liberties, and called for alternative agriculture initiatives. The growers' continued reliance on coca, however, is largely due to the fact that attempts to promote agricultural alternatives have been a failure. Although recent eradication numbers have been higher than expected, a correlated increase in alternative crop production has not occurred. In fiscal year 2000 "[t]he wholesale value of licit produce leaving the Chapare ($49 million) fell short of the expected target ($65 million)."[14] This is a shortfall of nearly 25% and a *decrease* from the 1999 fiscal year of over 12%.[15]

There are a number of practical factors at work in the growers' decision to continue to cultivate coca. For example, coca can be harvested multiple times each year, while most alternative agricultural products cannot, and coca can be harvested around a year and a half after first being planted, while some of the alternative crops promoted by the Bolivian government require upwards of four years.[16] Coca growers also enjoy a secure market and relatively small agricultural inputs into cultivation. The market and infrastructure for traditional coca use is well established, and the traffickers who wish to buy leaves for illicit use have the resources to ensure that they can gain access to the growers. Alternative crops, on the other hand, are often hard to sell and expensive to market, and their growing techniques have yet to be perfected. Quality and prices are inconsistent and, while a few crops can theoretically earn more than coca, they usually require substantially greater effort and expense.[17] Most international markets, including that of the United States, are protective of their domestic agriculture and have strong preferential relationships with large corporate trading partners, making it very hard for small Latin American farmers to rely on export. The Americans currently employ contradictory policies of supporting alternative agriculture through USAID programs on the one hand and maintaining closed "markets for the sale of [those] alternative products" on the other.[18] Additionally, infrastructure that would facilitate market access within the country is not in place, meaning that many of the alternative products, which are perishable, spoil long before they

can reach a market of any size. Coca leaves, however, can be dried, bagged, and transported long distances.

In the minds of coca growers, the attack on coca amounts to economic warfare on the agricultural sector of the Chapare. They have asked that their economic insecurity be recognized officially and their concerns be legitimized by the institution of a policy allowing them to plant a *cato* of coca, which is equivalent to 1,600 square meters.[19] This is especially urgent in light of the fact that compensation for voluntary eradication will be eliminated under *Plan Dignidad* by the year 2002.[20] The Bolivian government has previously developed a series of enticements for the growers, but they have had little cumulative effect. Growers most recently rejected an offer of cash in return for producing an alternative crop. They claimed it would not provide for future earnings, and in truth their government has a checkered past with regard to its compensation program for voluntary eradication.[21] When growers accepted these monetary incentives in the early 90s, funded in part through U.S. development aid, much of the money went unaccounted for and many farmers did not receive their promised compensation. Large amounts of money slated for business loans also never materialized.[22] Even those farmers who are currently substituting other crops, such as pineapple and palm hearts, maintain much of their coca crop. They see it not only as an investment and proven income source, but have become accustomed to the idea of compensation money paid for voluntary eradication. "Paradoxically the cash-for-eradication scheme makes coca a good hedge against the failure of other crops."[23] There was a common perception, when compensation was first announced, that if a farming family needed extra money it could simply call upon the military and 'voluntarily eradicate' its coca. Those who did so often simply replanted the torn-out shrubs, which, by some estimates, successfully re-root 40% of the time.[24] This cycle requires repeated eradication and has led the government to threaten to expropriate the land of any farmer who replants. The only economic certainty that the growers have been offered has come from those who would purchase the coca leaf, for licit or illicit purposes. Just as the government has steadfastly refused to consider the planting of coca in the region, so too have the growers refused to accept government offers of compensation.[25]

The newly installed Quiroga government, like the Banzer government before it, has been intransigent in its support for eradication. This is in no small part a result of warnings from the United States Ambassador, Manuel Rocha, who threatened to cut off aid if 'Drug War' policies were not adhered to.[26] The U.S. pumps hundreds of millions of dollars into Bolivia, which is suffering from an external debt of over US $4 billion, and therefore commands a great deal of attention.[27] Under increasing pressure from its own constituency, the Bolivian government has made some cursory commitments to studying alternative uses for legal coca products, but has steadfastly rejected demands for changes in the eradication policy.[28] In addition to the Bolivian government's failure to use the American aid money to assist coca growers with the transition from the security of the

coca market, the international donor community has failed to make good on its own stated support for rural assistance. A report published by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs claims that, in 1999, alternative agriculture aid commitments were slated at US $700 million, over 70% of the total military and development aid under *Plan Dignidad*. However, while the military aid was successfully disbursed, in a meeting later the same year only US $53 million in development aid was reaffirmed by the UNDCP. All other international donors, including the U.S., were suffering from a "lack of interest."[29]

Corruption and Abuse

Bolivian federal law number 1008, which provides much of the justification for extreme measures in support of coca eradication policies, was adopted on 19 July 1988. The law itself has been criticized for violating due process and contravening the nation's constitution. It was reputed to have been drafted by U.S. advisors and its immediate consequence was an explosion of the prison population.[30] "In the San Sebastian prison [in Cochabamba], 8 men and 2 women were imprisoned in 1987 as opposed to the 175 men and 80 women in 1994."[31] The law is set up such that the trial process takes an inordinately long time and requires little respect for the rights of the accused. "More than 1,000 of the nearly 1,400 prisoners jailed in Cochabamba have never been sentenced, never had the chance to defend themselves at trial."[32] Many of the human rights abuses that are recorded in relation to the coca conflict have been excused by or perpetrated under the auspices of Ley 1008. At present, there is little in the way of universal and impartial application of the rule of law in eradication-related cases. Human rights are of marginal importance, as is painfully apparent in the wake of a statement from the Bolivian Justice and Human Rights Minister, Mario Serrate: "Human rights are not the key issue; the main topic is coca eradication in the Chaparé."[33]

The most significant impact of the widespread arrests and human rights abuses has been the production of a deep insecurity in the community and disruption of the family. Without these two social structures, rural life simply cannot function. The rural poor depend upon these social support networks for economic survival. For this reason, when the men in the family are arrested, the women and children often voluntarily accompany them to prison. The resulting burden on the prison system is enormous, as these rudimentary punitive institutions can hardly be expected to provide social, medical, and educational services for families or children. In the summer of 2000, in the jail in Chimoré, for instance, there were over one hundred people, an indoor market, and soccer teams complete with jerseys, all housed in a building and small grounds that were intended to hold around a dozen prisoners in transition to larger jails or court systems.[34] The nature of their crimes is often very suspect. For instance, common chemicals used in everyday household management, such as bleach, can also be used as precursors in the production of cocaine. During raids and crackdowns, farmers transporting personal amounts of these materials are targeted by officials looking to increase arrest numbers and are often apprehended on local buses and

thrown in jail. Some of the prisoners have "languished in prison for years without proper judicial process, sometimes for possession of as little as five liters of kerosene that authorities assume is being used to process cocaine."[35]

The measures of government abuses are not difficult to locate. Human Rights Watch, The Andean Information Network, The Democracy Center in Cochabamba, religious organizations, and others publish accounts of raids and arrests that result in beatings, killings, rape, and illegal entry into and robbery of homes.[36] Ley 1008 gives the anti-drug task forces of the Bolivian military, DIRECO and DINACO, wide mandates that result in a panoply of abuses, elements of which are "seriously at odds with international standards of due process."[37] In order to reach the coca reduction levels decreed by the U.S., the military began in the mid-90s to violate the limits of even the draconian Ley 1008, and to destroy seedbeds and new coca in the transition zone, an act explicitly prohibited by the law and resulting in significant increases in violence.[38] With the aid of American money, the Bolivian government is building three new military bases in the Chapare, which have been the site of recent protests by farmers concerned about the spending on military infrastructure while rural social development is largely ignored. Amnesty International drew a direct correlation between "increased military presence [and] the exacerbat[ion] of the conflictive situation in the Chapare."[39]

Governments in Latin America have a less than perfect record of protecting the civil liberties and human rights of their citizens over the last several decades, and Bolivia is no exception. The Conference of Bolivian Bishops, in their publication on the conclusions of the Jubilee 2000 forum, began by noting the corruption that distorts poverty reduction plans and the political system that fails to respond to the demands of the civil society.[40] Members of the American government are aware that they have imperfect partners in the governments of the countries where they fight the drug war. Corruption and collusion between politicians, military leaders, and the drug industry are common. In August of 2001, Bolivia emerged 84th out of 91 countries ranked by the council on hemispheric affairs in terms of relative systemic corruption.[41] The Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, Ted Galen Carpenter, noted in 1993 that "one senior U.S. official concludes, 'The Bolivian military has never done anything whatsoever against narcotics traffickers, nor will it'."[42] While peasant farmers are prosecuted to the full extent of the law for injuries that police sustain while breaking up demonstrations, military and police killers rarely see the inside of a courtroom. The United States continues tacitly to approve of this distinction in access to rights and legal parity by failing to act on its own Leahy Amendment to the anti-narcotics legislation governing U.S. aid to Bolivia, which includes requirements for prosecution of human rights abusers.[43]

In civil society, military action and arrests have been overwhelmingly directed against the poor farmer rather than the wealthy narcotrafficker, and arrest numbers are increasing in order to prove Bolivian 'compliance' with the drug war. Conveniently, the Bolivian

government offered narcotics traffickers immunity from extradition to the U.S. shortly before the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Special Forces began operations to capture them.[44] The greatest negative impact that these policies have on development lies in the fact that they fail to attack the most important elements of the problem. If the United States insists on pursuing a military solution to the drug problem, the arrest and abuse of large numbers of indigent farmers will certainly not bring about a quick end. Incentives for coca production will remain, instability in the countryside will grow, and the potential for violent conflict will increase as desperation and frustration set in on both sides.

Bolivian coca growers continue to express their despair through civil disobedience. In late 2000 and early 2001, the growers erected roadblocks to prevent the entry of soldiers who were forcibly eradicating coca. President Banzer ordered a military crackdown and in the end over 20 people were killed, hundreds were wounded, and many were arrested.[45] The conflict became more pronounced in the final months of 2001. In early November, after the rejection of coca growers' calls for discussion of the eradication policy, growers announced a series of planned marches, road blockades, and strikes. The government made a number of statements challenging the growers, who responded with threats of violence.[46] On November 6th, the protests began and were immediately met with military repression. Dozens of abuses suggesting torture were documented over the next few days.[47] On 13 November, security forces fired either live ammunition or tear gas at the offices of the Permanent Human Rights Assembly in Eterazama, one of the areas of conflict. Meeting inside were members of the coca growing communities and the Assembly, including the leader of the six coca-growing federations, Evo Morales.[48] Violations of civil liberties, the receipt of death threats, and coercion have all been cited with relation to the protests as the government says it refuses to discuss the situation.[49]

Environmental Impact

The United States Department of State has tried to frame an additional argument against coca in environmental terms. They claim that slash and burn techniques and the unregulated use of chemistry for cultivation has caused serious environmental damage.[50] However, like other indigenous sub-canopy shrubs, coca has multiple beneficial characteristics for sustainable agriculture. Primarily, since the coca plant itself is never destroyed by the grower, it does not need the cycle of regrowth that annual cultivars require, thereby reducing the drain on soil nutrients. One of the principle reasons that agriculturalists use slash and burn cultivation is the depletion of soil nutrients that occurs when a field is repeatedly planted with the same annual crops, effectively killing the soil. Other export crops traditionally cultivated in the heart of South America, such as cotton, require enormous amounts of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, and can deplete the soil of nutrients in a period of a few years. The inappropriate use of chemistry in agriculture is not due to the licit or illicit nature of the crops; it is due to a lack of adequate agricultural

training of farmers who traditionally grew for subsistence rather than export. In contrast, U.S. designed coca-eradication techniques, especially in Colombia, have relied heavily on massive quantities of herbicide dumped from low-flying aircraft.[51] This makes the environmental argument at best a poor understanding of the relevant science, and at worst a blatant pandering to the American public's increased 'green' concern in order to garner more support for a continuation of the 'Drug War.'

The truth, however, is that coca is more environmentally sound in numerous ways than many alternative crops. The root system of the shrub and the cover that coca provides act as protection from wind and rain, preventing erosion of critical, nutrient-rich topsoil. Unlike the coca plant, the unused portion of many alternative crops is usually burned, destroying whatever nutrients are stored in the plant and leaving fields exposed during the off-season. In addition, the partial shade that coca supplies makes it the ideal crop for inter-planting, a means by which multiple crops can be produced on the same land, providing shelter and nutrient absorption for one another. By some industry standards, coca is ideal for both the agricultural and economic climate, making it a perfect development tool.[52] In contrast, the international and national businesses that are actually taking greater hold in the Chapare are not agricultural; they are oil and timber interests, which "predictably fail to take into account concerns for the environment."[53]

The International Effect

The United States is guilty of attacking the supply of a product for which there is unflagging demand. This demand originates almost exclusively in the wealthier developed nations of Europe and North America, principally the United States. Conditions in Latin America are such that willing producers will be in abundant supply for the foreseeable future. A basic economic production curve suggests that by reducing supply to an existing and eager market, the price of the product will only increase. Consequently, the willingness of suppliers to provide it to the market, considering the greater profits, will increase as well. It would follow, therefore, that pinching off the supply of coca while not confronting the demand would be the worst logical strategy for convincing producers to switch to another product, a fact that is only compounded by the weak markets for other, licit goods. MIT Professor Noam Chomsky estimates that the cost of the drug war is 20 times that of treatment programs, and that the latter, coupled with education campaigns, have proven highly effective in dealing with other forms of addiction.[54] It seems, however, that the political cost of such an approach is much more significant. The popular impression of drug addicts in the United States is one of social parasites and violent miscreants, rather than persons suffering from a sickness that deserves a humane and supportive response. While it is futile to deny that addicts of any sort must demand of themselves the personal strength required to overcome their desire, the media and the law have vilified 'hard drugs' disproportionately to other substances. Our passive acceptance of alcohol and tobacco use, considered by some to be far more socially pernicious and

medically perilous, illustrates the disparity in popular and policy responses to these substances.

Tackling these differences would almost certainly demand an accounting of racial and economic disparities in the application of substance abuse laws and domestic arrest statistics. It seems clear that neither law enforcement agencies nor politicians are willing to face the statistical inequalities. In a disturbing assessment, ABCNEWS.com reported a 5-to-1 ratio of white to black drug users, but a nearly double the number of blacks arrested on drug charges compared to whites.[55] A policy shift toward treatment would require a reeducation of the population as a whole, starting with the legal mechanisms. It would also require politicians to muster the political will to confront the largely wealthy domestic cocaine user. Perhaps military action abroad is more politically palatable and can more easily obfuscate the myriad issues of rights and social justice that would be unearthed were the problem dealt with at a domestic level. It is certainly more challenging for the American public to make itself aware of the actual impact of activities in the distant tropics and their implications for human rights than it is for them to support the facile vilification of drug producers.

The cost to Americans is not only social and political. The drug war also justifies many sizeable economic expenditures outside of Bolivia, including a package of over US $1.3 billion approved by the Clinton administration, overwhelmingly composed of military aid, to shore up the Colombian government in the face of its worsening war with leftist guerillas/cocaine producers. This is a war that has been notorious for its astonishing human rights violations. In order to justify continued Andean interventions the U.S. government has put a great deal of effort into propaganda claiming that coca-grower resistance in the Andes is entirely 'anti-government' and linked with the socialist elements that validated the original U.S. Cold-War military policy in Latin America.[56] The example of Colombia is used as support for this generalization, but the regional fear is that the impact of the drug war will mean radicalization of conflict in other Andean countries, including Bolivia.

The pressure that has been put on the Bolivian and Peruvian coca farming communities has had another unwanted effect. Coca production has begun to shift largely to Colombia, once merely the final transit point for coca paste. In the last five years of the 90s, coca cultivation doubled in Colombia.[57] The government there has little control over a significant percentage of the countryside. The consolidation of production and export from Colombia actually makes it harder to attack the problem, leaving overall production no better off for the eradication efforts in other Andean nations. Because of this shift, prices of cocaine in the Unites States have remained largely constant while drug producers have increased their efficiency dramatically, thereby multiplying drug profits in direct contrast with the intended goal of eradication.[58] In recent years, the cultivation of poppy and marijuana for export has blossomed in the Andes. Some observers believe that if the

newly reinforced Colombian military crashes headlong into the rebel controlled south it will force the growers and the rebel groups, especially the economically and militarily powerful FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), to cross the border into Ecuador and Peru. The region into which they would cross has been the site of a border conflict between the Peruvians and Ecuadorians for decades. While they have recently made an effort to solve this dispute, tensions throughout this area have traditionally run high, with some manner of armed clashes occurring every few years. This means that the region has remained largely underdeveloped, with little infrastructure and little security patrolling, since jurisdiction is an unclear and sensitive issue. To force an armed contingent of drug exporters into the area will make them harder to dislodge, and most likely serve to exacerbate the inter-state dispute. This would ultimately result in an unstable militarization of the Andean region running in a swath from Bolivia to Colombia.

Although the enormity of the illegal drug economy is not in dispute, many have begun to question the multiple negative side effects of the drug war and the economy that is created through drug prohibitions. The president of *Common Sense Drug Policy*, Kevin Zeese, quoted House Speaker Dennis Hastert as calling the drug trade the "financial engine that fuels many terrorist organizations."[59] This group and others have made different proposals for legalization that would undermine the economics of illicit drugs. Despite these admissions, widespread human rights travesties, the Colombian war, the increased violence and instability in the rest of the Andean region, unchanged domestic consumption of drugs relative to the expense of the drug war, the desperate need for treatment programs and a review of drug sentencing in the United States, and international pressure, the U.S. continues to cling to its strategy of coercion in Latin America. The long-term effects will be more than a development lag in the region we consider to be our 'back yard' and newly found trading-block partners. It could well manifest as broad and destabilizing political violence, or as building resentment and rejection of American presence and partnership in the region.

Conclusions

As the impetus behind the Bolivian drug policy, the United States plays a critical role in any possible resolution of the coca conflict or in the continuation of its abuses. Since the Reagan era, the policy has been one of wielding economic, political and military might abroad to attempt a 'supply side' control of a drug problem that is largely domestic. Reagan approved US $2.2 billion over five years for source-country cocaine prevention in the late 80s.[60] Since that time the American government has tied the success of eradication efforts to its continued approval of aid, causing international development programs in Bolivia to become inextricably linked with the eradication of coca. The publicly stated American aim in this conflict is a reduction in cocaine inflows into the U.S., but there is reason for the widespread skepticism that has emerged, considering the relative lack of success of the program despite its inordinate expense.[61] In a recent letter to the American

Ambassador to Bolivia, seven Congresspersons expressed "concern regarding the social conflict sparked by U.S. sponsored eradication efforts in the Chaparé."[62]

The government of Bolivia claims that the Dignity Plan emerged from a national dialogue. There are disputes to this claim, and it might well be that this conflict has generated a situation in which another, more inclusive and honest national dialogue can occur, the results of which might further leverage the United States to consider alternate strategies in the region. Whatever the ultimate solution is, a number of issues need to be urgently addressed. An independent review of all cases related to Ley 1008 should take place immediately, as nearly 50% of Bolivian prisoners are currently jailed under that law.[63] Ley 1008 itself should be reviewed for reform. This will require that the "US government . . . permit the repeal [of the eradication policy] . . . thus respecting Bolivian sovereignty, its constitution and international human rights standards."[64] Progress cannot be made if the interests and legal framework of international human rights and the Bolivian government's legal framework are at odds. In addition, international and national actors need to begin building much needed trust with the Bolivian population. The Rocha letter from Congress states, "only one-quarter to one-half of families in the Chaparé have received alternative crop assistance, leaving thousands of families with no livelihood once their coca has been eradicated."[65] The results of alternative agriculture and its failings should be investigated closely and integrated into rural planning.

The security concerns of the government, specifically legitimate concerns about drug trafficking, should be addressed. This means, however, that arrest records and other records of the exercise of power to impede drug production should be evaluated honestly for their efficacy. Attention should be increasingly directed toward the illicit drug vendor, not the coca leaf producer, and the Americans should recognize the counter-productiveness of judging compliance by arrest numbers. Greater emphasis on licit coca leaf use will be an asset in the resolution of this conflict. However, this will require U.S. efforts to repeal international classifications of the coca leaf as a Class 1 drug. The coca leaf is not cocaine, and much like other substances, has medicinal uses in its natural form that are distorted when it is concentrated.[66] Coca also has profound cultural significance for the various Andean indigenous groups, most importantly the Aymara, who use the leaf in their seasonal rituals and consider it to be one of the four pillars of natural mysticism, as manifest in the Southern Cross constellation.[67] Absolute eradication of coca for the purposes of confronting domestic drug problems in the U.S. not only infringes on Bolivian sovereignty but also expresses a callous indifference to the centuries-old culture of these people.

Following the recent work of theorists such as Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, development studies have begun to recognize that successful development cannot be defined solely in terms of economic growth. It has become critical to evaluate progress in terms of the intended result of that economic growth, its associated human development.

This denotes not only increased income levels, but an improvement in standard of living that is reflected in part by political, social, and educational access. As Sen argues, development must be seen as "a process of expanding substantive freedoms that people have."[68] If coca eradication in Bolivia has been a failure in economic terms, it has been a radical failure in terms of development variables based on expanded freedoms.

The militarization of the Bolivian tropics is clearly linked to the disruption of rural economic structures, the displacement of populations, and the fracturing of family and community structures. The correlative effects of this are directly contrary to long-term development goals. Only in an atmosphere of stability can Bolivia engage in the methodical process of development, which requires generations of education, investment, and the equitable protection of legally prescribed rights. The United States is spending vast amounts of economic, political, and social capital in the Andean drug war, at the expense of more effective treatment and education programs at home, with little cumulative effect on domestic drug use. In addition, the Bolivian government has chronically failed to respond adequately to the needs of the Bolivian people that result from the eradication campaign. Social and economic development in both countries is suffering. In order to reverse this trend and effect positive development advances in Bolivia, the realities behind the eradication efforts, including contradictory policies, corruption, and short-term political gain, need to be honestly evaluated and redressed. The American government, as the prime mover behind the policies in question, has the majority share of this responsibility.

Notes

[1] Ted Galen Carpenter, "Declaring an Armistice in the International Drug War," *Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 26 July 26, 1993, available online at: http://www.tni.org/drugs/ research/airbridg.htm
[2] Harry Sanabria, (1993) *The Coca Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 37-61.
[3] R Morgan, "Bolivia's Zero Coca Program Leaving Hunger in its Wake," *Colombia Report,* 22 October 2001, available online at: http://www.colombiareport.org/ colombia86.htm.
[4] Edward Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions" in *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Edward E Azar, and John Burton, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, Inc, 1986), 155.
[5] Sanabria, *supra* no.2.
[6] "The Charms of Coca," *The Economist (US)*, 28 October 1995, 52(1).
[7] Sanabria, *supra* no. 2 at 173.
[8] *Ibid*.
[9] *Ibid*., 57.
[10] *Ibid*., 170.
[11] Elena H. Alvarez, "Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* Fall 1995, 25.
[12] Extrapolated from data from the "Bolivia Data Profile" of the *World Bank Group* and Alvarez, E. Alvarez lists 1995 rural income as US $390 per capita and the World Bank indicates a growth of overall per capita income of just under 14% from 1995 to 1999.

[13] "The Charms of Coca," *supra* no.6.
[14] "Activity Data Sheet: Bolivia," USAID CBJ FY 2002: Bolivia, available online at: http://www.usaid.gov/country/lac/bo/511-005.html.
[15] *Ibid*.
[16] Carpenter, *supra* no.1.
[17] "The Charms of Coca," *supra* no.6.
[18] "Recommendations," *Andean Information Network,* available online at: http://www.sccbs-bo.com/ain/ain/English/recomm.htm.
[19] Sanabria, *supra* no.2 at 241.
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[23] "The Charms of Coca," *supra* no 6.
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