SPECIAL THANKS
We would like to thank the Henry J. Leir Institute for all of the support they have given to the journal and for helping to make this print edition possible. We would also like to acknowledge our team of editors and senior editors who have given so much of their time and energy to PRAXIS, and have helped to revive the journal and spread meaningful ideas and perspectives in the field of human security.

SUBMISSIONS
PRAXIS collects articles from a wide geographic and disciplinary range of practitioners and academics to stimulate productive dialogue in the field of human security.
We invite you to send a short piece (op-ed, reflection, book review, case study, photo-journalism etc.) for publication in the Web Edition. Submissions should be 800 words maximum and are accepted on an ongoing basis throughout the school year. Citations should be in end-note format in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style.
Students are also encouraged to submit research in the form of a thesis, capstone project, or dissertation. The topic should be related to human security, and we ask that you submit a shortened version for publication (no longer than 800 words).

Please submit an electronic copy and a short biography to fletcherpraxisjournal@gmail.com

CONTACT
PRAXIS: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security
160 Packard Avenue
Medford, MA 02155, USA

Email: fletcherpraxisjournal@gmail.com
Web: www.fletcherpraxis.org
Twitter: @fletcher_praxis

On the cover: Photograph by Tomas Ayuso
Addressing Human Security and Cultivating Innovation: An analysis of the unique challenges facing victims of land displacement in Colombia in their return to rural livelihoods and the structure of government aid intended to ensure their future success
Ekow Edzie

Local and International Responses to Attacks on Healthcare in Conflict Zones: A Case Study of Syria
Karen Taylor

Indigenous Tongues in the Sonoran Desert: A reflection on Indigenous politics on the U.S.-Mexico border
Dillon Kim

Photojournalism, Migration, and Building Relationships
An Interview with Photojournalist Tomas Ayuso

Exchanging Égalité for Exclusion: What factors have impeded the integration of immigrants of Maghrebi descent?
Emma Blake

Be Curious, Do Research
An Interview with Professor Cynthia Enloe
While researching Fletcher as a potential program or thinking of ways they may want to be involved on campus, many potential and incoming students have likely noticed the impressive array of student publications and organizations on Fletcher’s campus. For someone considering field of human security, or for someone who has never even heard the term “human security” before, the PRAXIS journal may stick out. The student-run journal has been in existence since 1981, though prior to 2007, it existed as the “Fletcher School Journal of Development Studies”.

Upon starting at Fletcher in Fall 2018, those of us who were interested in human security were disappointed to find that the journal had unfortunately fallen dormant in 2016. Thankfully, Nitin Malik (MALD 2020) took the initiative to start the journal back up and asked me to join the team. Over the course of the first few months of the Fall semester, we gathered a team of editors and began reinventing PRAXIS, creating a new website, and putting out our first call for submissions. Two years later, we have a solid, committed editorial team and have been lucky to publish some fantastic articles, interviews, and blogs on the topic of human security. PRAXIS is proud to work with writers from a wide array of backgrounds, and is committed to showcasing new voices and diverse perspectives from across the globe.

Human security is a somewhat polarizing subject, as there exist a fair number of critics of the field, as well as proponents who passionately endorse its benefits.
At its core, human security brings together the concerns and practices that deal with “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.” This covers a broad range of issues and practices, but they all share three main analytic components: (1) person-centered, focusing on views of security from the ground up rather than the top down; (2) multi-dimensional, requiring both an interdisciplinary approach and one that integrates all voices and perspectives; and (3) preventive, choosing to look at root causes and early indicators to be pro-active rather than reactive to threat.

This year, the PRAXIS team committed to releasing the first print edition of the journal since 2016. This volume is comprised of a selection of some of the team’s favorite pieces that have been published over the past two years. The subjects range from land displacement and migration, to healthcare in conflict zones, indigenous politics and women’s empowerment. We hope you enjoy reading these stories, and that this selection helps broaden the discourse on human security and further bring it out of the shadows.

Sincerely,

McLane Harrington
Editor in Chief

Design by Katherine Haugh
www.katherinehaugh.com
ADDRESSING HUMAN SECURITY & CULTIVATING INNOVATION

An analysis of the unique challenges facing victims of land displacement in Colombia in their return to rural livelihoods and the structure of government aid intended to ensure their future success.

EKOW EDZIE

June, 2019

Some names and identifying details have been changed to protect the privacy of individuals.

Between 1985 and 2012 more than five million Colombians were forcibly displaced from the land they occupied due to the conflict between the Colombian government, guerrilla groups — most notably the FARC — and paramilitary groups.[1] The armed conflict caused more than 220,000 killings, of which 80% were civilian victims.[2] Additionally, 27,000 people were kidnapped while many others suffered from the frequent use of child soldiers and widespread sexual violence that accompanied the armed conflict.[3] In 2011, the government of Juan Manuel Santos created law 1448: The Victims and Land Restitution Law, which provided legal and institutional support for displaced victims of the armed conflict to return to their land.

The judicial and administrative phases of Colombia’s land restitution program confer official land title to successful land restitution claimants. At the conclusion of these processes, many land restitution beneficiaries receive support from the Colombian government and international aid organizations to establish productive agriculture on their restituted land. At this juncture, however, the land restitution beneficiary must confront obstacles that both encompass and significantly transcend the realm of agriculture. The land restitution beneficiary must navigate acute threats of violence, cope with poverty, collaborate with neighbors, manage psychological trauma and learn the agricultural methods that will be productive in the near term and in the drought-prone future.

On July 11th, 2018 I accompanied a staff member of the Colombian government’s Land Restitution Unit — hereafter referred to as the LRU — on the 165-mile drive from Santa Marta, a coastal historic city in the north of Colombia, to Chibolo, a remote inland town surrounded by immense expanses of grasslands. Liliana, the LRU professional, oversees the design of the agricultural projects that land restitution beneficiaries in the state of Magdalena receive in rulings by the state’s restitution judge.

We departed Santa Marta in the pre-dawn darkness in a white 4×4 pickup that the LRU contracts for restitution field visits. I sat in the backseat of the truck, next to a box of a dozen or so large folders, each containing the legal documents of a distinct restitution case. Liliana...
turned on the GPS unit that allows the central LRU office in Bogota to track the whereabouts of staff on field visits and Joaquin, the driver, focused on the winding roads that rise from the coast, over the foothills, into the central plains of Magdalena.

Five hours later we arrived in Chibolo. The last leg of our trip was at a crawl of a pace. The roads were unpaved, with large divots and ruts that Joaquin had to take in first gear; the truck’s transmission whined and sputtered.

We met a restitution claimant named Pablo, who led us along a path through shoulder-high grasses. Joaquin stayed by the truck. The path ended at a gate which opened to a wide clearing—the plot that Pablo had won the title to in the restitution court. At the gate, a large man in a tattered t-shirt leaned cross-armed. He was flanked by what seemed to be his entire family: a woman, three children, and two other men.

Pablo asked the cross-armed man to let us pass so that Liliana might complete her tasks. The man refused. Pablo pleaded in a soft-spoken, mild-mannered fashion. The man in our way was visibly distraught—eyes red and watering. His wife took out her phone and recorded the interaction, with a child in her other arm. “We didn’t push anyone off this land,” the man said. Pablo pleaded with him again to let us pass.

Liliana, clearly unnerved by the situation, turned around and told me that we were leaving.

Back at the truck, she chided Pablo for not having handled this situation before she arrived. He was going to have to manage this on his own, she said. Apparently, the LRU, accompanied by Colombian police, had already forcibly removed the family in question from his land. The man’s father had been complicit in the displacement of Pablo’s family a generation ago, one of the ‘testaferos’ or figureheads that paramilitary leaders hired as titleholders to lands that were forcibly taken for the paramilitary’s benefit. After this forced eviction, Pablo let the family return to continue living on the land in interim, before the completion of his agricultural project.

We left Pablo with the group of men at the crossroad, climbed back into the truck and drove to meet the next land restitution claimant on Liliana’s list.

The anecdote that I provided above is meant to provide the reader with a snapshot of the complexity of the political economy of land restitution in Colombia. Within the state of Magdalena, where my field research was focused, there is a diverse set of stakeholders with distinct motivations—colored by the ubiquitous forces of history, memory, and power—all operating within the sprawling reach of Law 1448 towards a mission that is by many estimates unachievable.

Ekow is a senior associate at the Consensus Building Institute, where he works on conflict resolution and multi-party negotiations on natural resource governance and public policy issues. Ekow graduated from The Fletcher School in 2019, where he concentrated in development economics and land governance. In the summer after his first year at Fletcher, Ekow received a Switzer Fellowship to conduct field research on the land restitution process in Colombia. Prior to Fletcher, Ekow worked with the international education firm EF Education First, where he managed partnerships between EF and non-profits operating across Latin America. Ekow served with the U.S. Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic and is a graduate of Middlebury College, where he studied environmental science and biology.

Notes
In stark abrogation of the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war, the number of attacks on healthcare workers and health facilities have reached unprecedented levels in armed conflicts around the world. In 2016 alone, health care workers and facilities in 23 conflict-ridden countries suffered attacks. The epicenter of these attacks has been Syria, where the conflict that began in March 2011 continues to rage unabated. In Syria, health care workers have been directly targeted, shot, abducted or tortured. Deliberate and systematic targeting of healthcare facilities and health workers has become known as the “weaponization” of healthcare.

Not only has this strategy resulted in large-scale loss of life, but it has sparked an exodus of health workers, added to the flow of Syrian refugees, and lent to the slow demise of healthcare infrastructure in the region. Inadequate healthcare has resulted in poor health outcomes, such as a lack of vaccinated children, the re-emergence of epidemics like cholera and polio, death from chronic but treatable illnesses, and a dramatic increase in unnecessary and risky caesarean sections. Although the prevalence of this issue has been brought to light by the efforts of human rights groups, NGOs and international organizations, research is limited as to how health care workers maintain resilience in the midst of attack and the coping strategies they employ to push forward. The risk of danger and the lack of available, accurate and reliable data in the midst of conflict in Syria poses significant limitations to conducting thorough research on this matter. With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to explore how healthcare workers in Syria have responded to a rise in attack on healthcare, how health care delivery has evolved and adapted, and what can be learned from the resilience and ingenuity of healthcare workers working in extreme danger.

The Scale and Scope of Attacks

Attacks on healthcare in the setting of conflict and insecurity are not new, however, the scale with which they have been occurring over the last decade is unprecedented. Even prior to the adoption of the First Geneva Convention, medical personnel and civilians sustained numerous attacks, and the shelling of facilities with recognizable
emblems has been decried since the siege of Paris in 1871.[3] Despite the Geneva Conventions and efforts to uphold justice through international criminal tribunals, violations of IHL have become increasingly common. Humanitarians using recognizable NGO logos and emblems are targeted more readily and frequently. This may in part be due to the changing nature of war from that of conventional, state-on-state war to a rise in internal conflicts and low-intensity irregular warfare characterized by insurgencies, acts of terror, psychological and guerrilla tactics and urban warfare.

According to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), medical facilities in non-government-held towns and cities in the governorates of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs, Daraa and Rif Dimashq have been the hardest hit. The Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) trained data collectors to track and verify attacks on medical personnel and facilities that occurred in some of these provinces from June to December 2016. All but four of these attacks were perpetrated by pro-government forces.[4]

How Healthcare Workers Adapt and Cope

Healthcare workers have adapted in countless ways to survive ongoing bombardment while providing care. They have moved underground, built cave hospitals, innovated medical equipment, used telemedicine and even started underground training facilities in an effort to provide some semblance of healthcare. Although the international community has attempted to end these attacks through repeated public condemnation, UN Security Council resolutions have been unsuccessful. Their failure has only further normalized the weaponization of healthcare. Early on in the conflict, medical staff learned to protect themselves by building “sacrificial floors” – two or three empty stories above their area of operations that could absorb the brunt of an attack. Medics built concrete walls around hospitals, covered all surfaces with sandbags and even began to change the colors of ambulances or camouflage them with mud. Underground and cave hospitals face other unique challenges, such as vulnerability to chemical attacks. Since gas is heavier than air, chemical gases like sarin and chlorine can penetrate deep into the ground. Hence, it is particularly important for underground and cave hospitals to have adequate ventilation and enough oxygen in case of a chemical attack.

“Early on in the conflict, medical staff learned to protect themselves by building “sacrificial floors” – two or three empty stories above their area of operations that could absorb the brunt of an attack.

Safeguarding the privacy of patient information is another key challenge in enhancing and expanding the use of telemedicine. In general, safeguarding patient privacy is one area that has been especially violated throughout the conflict — both with respect to the use of telemedicine and otherwise. A physician who was interviewed for this research stated, “Privacy is everything, information about any patient on paper or in their records, or even information that is circulated verbally — that was really, really violated. We couldn’t consider the security issues — like, if anyone knew that this patient was in this hospital today — that would be a problem. This is a very high security issue that has not been considered at all.”
The Psychological Impacts of Being a Target
Healthcare workers have utilized innovative methods for coping with dwindling resources and mounting pressures in their quest to provide care, however, the constant strains undoubtedly leave behind psychological and emotional wounds. A key challenge facing medical workers is that they find themselves the custodians of hope in the eyes of the people on the one hand and the object of suspicion in the eyes of the regime or armed groups on the other. The ethical dilemma that emerges from this oxymoronic position entangles doctors in a web of decisions that are impossible to make without letting themselves down or shouldering loss. Caught in the crosshairs of battle; eating, sleeping and working 18-24 hour shifts in austere conditions; facing increasing responsibility and anxiety, doctors are prone to lose morale and are seemingly damned by one side if they discharge their professional duties and damned by the other (or themselves) if they do not. As one medical professional who worked in Aleppo said, “We don’t have time to be scared. We are being crushed like bugs daily, and the world has abandoned us.”

Being forced to make difficult choices while in a constant state of psychological distress and physical hardship undoubtedly undermines morale. In this context, it is reasonable to wonder how long healthcare workers can withstand this level of duress without appropriate psychological support. An added danger may lurk around the issue of desensitization. Is it possible that the longer physicians are forced to adapt healthcare delivery to the changing dynamics of the conflict, the more this might subconsciously and inadvertently contribute to the normalization of violence against healthcare? Could a growing desensitization somehow further cement the normalcy of these attacks and diminish the urgency to end them?

Recommendations
To Medical Institutions and Members of Higher Education
- Safeguard medical knowledge and the pipeline of medical personnel
- Provide technical expertise to improve telemedicine platforms
- Design academic fellowships for Syrian medical students and physicians

To Donors
- Fund the fortification and building of innovative medical sites
- Directly fund local NGOs and medical organizations in Syria

To I/NGOs Supporting Healthcare Delivery in Syria
- Take measures to sustain and recruit more medical personnel

To the United Nations
- Continue to document attacks on healthcare
- Conduct internal reviews regarding allegations of complicity and take measures to address allegations
- Insist that all parties to the conflict cease attacks on healthcare
The crisis in Syria, and the unprecedented scale of attacks on healthcare in particular, is a watershed moment not only for Syria, but for the future credibility of humanitarian aid and the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions have been revised repeatedly since their origin in 1864. Perhaps now is the time for them to be revised again. Unless humanitarians and the international community begin to seriously contemplate and take steps to address these challenges, a climate of tolerance for violence against healthcare will continue. Attacks on healthcare, and the normalization of these attacks, are scourges on the meaning of humanity itself that can only be reversed if we, the international community, take diligent steps to put them to an end.

Karen is a recent graduate from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy where she studied humanitarian and international security studies, focusing particularly on the MENA region. Apart from her graduate career, she worked as a nurse for five years in Boston, studied abroad in Israel, interned with UNRWA in Jordan, studied Arabic in Syria, Lebanon & Morocco, and taught middle and high school history in Turkey. Recently, she provided trauma care in field hospitals as a disaster response nurse with Samaritan’s Purse in Ecuador after the 2016 earthquake, as well as near Mosul during the battle against ISIS. Karen was born and raised in rural Kenya, where her parents worked as teachers. She, her husband and newborn daughter currently live in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Notes
Every day in a stretch of the Sonoran Desert, a massive and mostly unseen movement of people negotiate the messy web of international migration policy. Combining the Yuma and Tucson sectors of U.S. Border Patrol operations for 2000-2018, 5,549,086 individuals have been apprehended for illegal entry in this swath of harsh desert and mountains.[1] There is currently no data recording how many of these individuals come from indigenous communities or speak indigenous dialects, as little has been collected around migrants from these groups. However, recent research has found that due to existing conditions of hardship, “people in communities with relatively high indigenous populations are more likely to migrate as undocumented rather than documented migrants.”[2] From my firsthand experience working in the U.S. borderlands, I can reflect on the implications of so many indigenous people intent on making this country their home, at least temporarily.

Between December 2018 and July 2019, I spent time along the U.S.-Mexico border in Baja, California, Arizona, and Sonora. I observed, participated in, and heard about only a slice of the challenges, tragedies, and triumphs shared by the millions who have left Central America and Mexico to head north. I worked with NGOs, including Al Otro Lado in Tijuana, who were responding to the massive increase in asylum cases and claims, as well as longtime humanitarian organizations affiliated with No More Deaths, who work to relieve suffering and prevent deaths in undocumented crossings in the Sonoran Desert. Before this, I also traveled in southern Mexico, documenting indigenous and campesino collectives and political organizations, trying to understand their diverse struggles for territory and self-determination in Oaxaca and Chiapas. A reality of the crisis at the border rarely discussed by policymakers and commentators, but constantly negotiated and dealt with on the ground, is the extent to which this crisis is defined by the complex politics of indigenous communities that straddle the Americas and are rooted in conflicts over land and resources.

Through translating testimonies of why many from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador fled their homes, and having conversations with patients in the Sonoran Desert when I volunteered in a remote respite-camp, I picked up countless stories of tremendous courage and tragedy. I do not have permission to divulge them, nor do I have any
interest in doing so, but I can describe what I heard: patterns of dispossession, the familiar accent of indigenous language speakers, the same story articulated with distinct details of family deaths, threats, and loss. From Tijuana to Nogales, across the Arizona-Sonora border, in Tucson’s Operation Streamline judicial proceedings, and on a Greyhound headed back to New York City, indigenous people from Guerrero, Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Petén, Alta Verapaz, Santa Rosa, and Intibucá were always present.

The crisis on the U.S.-Mexico border is equally a political question of indigenous communities across the region, because the politics that traverse indigenous communities are not isolated to a marginal population, but rather an underlying force in the region’s international politics. As much as mitigating the border crisis requires immediate action in terms of U.S. and Mexican immigration policy and border patrol, the root of the exodus lies in the complex web of resource extraction, indigenous rights abuses, and agrarian and international economic policies – none of which feature in U.S. approaches to the issue.

A conversation I had with one man who had left his countryside home for the first time has stuck with me. Explaining why he had left in Spanish (first asking his adolescent son to translate), he said, pointing upwards as if whoever ‘ran’ things were high above him: “Porque ellos quieren desarrollo.” Because ‘they’ want development, he and his son had to leave their home.

Several scholars have argued that the driving force of migrants north cannot be chalked up to the simplistic narratives of “gang-violence” or “economic duress,” but rather are due to a more complex intermingling of violence and displacement embedded into territories rich with resources, whose occupants are campesino and indigenous communities. Professors Dawn Paley and Ariadna Estévez have made this case. They argue that infrastructural projects, mines, expanding agricultural industrialization, and hydrocarbon extraction are driving thousands of people out of their homes through a mix of state and paramilitary violence.[3]

Adherence to principles outlined in international declarations, treaties, and customary international law are central to strategically approaching the root cause of the migrant crisis. In particular, articles and legislative instruments designed to defend indigenous land and the consensual use of their resources, such as the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169. Strengthening existing domestic and international institutions that support these efforts is critical in curbing the root causes driving the present migrant crisis.

Dillon was raised in Michigan by his Indigenous Mexican and Korean parents, and graduated from the University of Michigan with a degree in Sociology. His study at Fletcher has focused on Public International Law. Dillon is a joint JD-MALD student. He is a Huerta and Williams Achievement Scholar at the James E. Rogers College of Law at the University of Arizona.

Notes
The following is an edited version of a conversation with PRAXIS

For the purpose of our Journal, we want to ask how you would define “human security.” Human security is the natural right to dignity and justice. By dignity, I mean that you can be who you are, love who you want, and live how you want without any fear of repercussion, hate or persecution. By justice, I mean that no one can infringe on your life and that of your family based solely on arbitrary means designed by the aggressor. It is an aspirational concept, of course, but that is how I frame it when I use the phrase ‘human security’ in my texts.

What drew you to photography, and when did you begin your artistic career? When I was initially drawn to photography, I was an analyst on subjects dealing with gun trafficking and patterns of drug trafficking. I was able to gain access to various armed groups, as it were, because I was quite skilled at talking my way into places. Once I actually began to meet people, I started witnessing a whole range of situations that introduced me to characters and places that one would normally only see in the realm of film. After I transitioned from analysis into journalism in 2015, I retained that ability to speak with people from all walks of life, and I thought, “Why not pick up a camera?” Essentially, the short answer to how I came to photography was happenstance, and luckily, the ability to take an aesthetically pleasing picture to tell a story followed.

After starting off doing analysis work and then going into journalism — how have you seen photography tell stories differently, particularly when you’re working in these violent situations in Central America? How has photography allowed you to engage with communities and tell stories in a different way than through written journalism and analytic research? With written word, a reader has to imagine the character and what they look like, whereas with photography, imagery removes that nuance or ambiguity, and you see a person as who they really are. If it’s a story about a grieving mother who can’t find a disappeared son, you can see the pain in their face. And if it’s a picture of a conflicted killer trapped in the middle of this lifestyle, you can see in his face that he is blinded by sociopathy and wants to resort to violence. If you’re a really gifted writer,
you can express that, but a picture will always show something more. Photography eliminates the ambiguity, much more so than the written word.

You’ve noted that your goal is to portray “the human experience” amidst what is being laid out in the media. When you’re moving around and working in different places – from Honduras, to Mexico, to Colombia – what is the common human experience that you’re portraying, and how does the media create a different perception of what is going on?

More so than the media, I’d say the news cycle is something that has a steamrolling, flattening effect. As an example, take “the caravan” from last year. Prior to this, the conversation was about Central American life, and there was some nuance that was injected into understanding how Hondurans live, and how Salvadorans live, and so forth. But when it came to “the Central American caravan,” it was just completely two-dimensional. It was, on one axis, people leaving, and on the second, where they were going. All the color in between – if they came from the mountains, if they were indigenous, if they were mestizo, if they were city dwellers – that was completely disregarded.

Particularly when it comes to places of conflict and places that have endured a history of violence, my goal is always to show how despite the different forces that tear at a society, however big or however small they are, societies are able to express humanity and imbibe their space and time with different manifestations of culture.

In the case of “the caravan,” I wanted to show how Hondurans would celebrate their very clearly-defined anti-government stance with art and music and flags. These flags would be hand-painted and would have anti-government slogans, and when they were celebrating, they would dance our specific Honduran dance – something that would be lost on someone who wasn’t Honduran. I wanted to show things that wouldn’t fit into a news title that would say “CNN” or “Univision.” That is where the importance of these paradigm shifting moments of history happen. Those are the minutiae that have always interested me — what occurs in day-to-day life.

With that idea of “day-to-day,” have you built relationships with those who you’ve taken photographs of? How has that personal connection played into your work?

If a story involves someone with whom I developed a relationship, it will come through, either in the pictures or in the text. Behind the scenes, just like any relationship, you can’t pick and choose who your best friend is going to be or with whom you’re going to be in a relationship. Once you meet someone, you either connect with them or you don’t. But the best-case scenario is when you develop this strong, friendly, platonic relationship and it comes through in the story, because it is truly what happened.

There’s the story of a young man I met named Moises. That is a real friendship. From the moment that we met, we connected. There were 15 other boys and girls there, some of them gang members, some of them kidnappers, some of them killers. Moises was neither, but he exists in that social circle. We instantly connected, and I was the one he called to inform that he was leaving the country. I went as soon as I could to his village to see him off, and then he told me, heart to heart, “I don’t think I’m strong enough. I want you to come with me because I’m traveling with my daughter and my girl.” He confessed to me at that point that he saw me as an older brother. He just wanted someone to support him — which I would have done anyway, just to document what it looks like for someone to be displaced. These relationships, I think any journalist would tell you, are what define the work that someone does.
Do you ever worry if the impact of your photography will put someone in danger? You mention that the photographs are always consensual, but do you worry about the future impact of the published photography?

Yes. When it comes to the impact, I think about it as two separate gates that I go through. The first gate is the consent portion — is the person okay with me taking this picture? The second gate is, given how the rest of the world operates, will taking this picture endanger this person against people they might not know, or that I might not be aware of?

This has already happened to me — when someone said yes to a picture, it was published, and then this person changed their mind. You can’t assume that everything is going to be fine. It’s a gamble most of the time, but you can do your absolute best to get consent that is long-standing.

I think that most people get into sticky situations when they parachute in, take a picture and leave, without gaining the trust of the person in the photo.

Is there a particular series of photographs or situations that were really challenging or memorable for you?

For the longest time, no one cared about my project, “The Right to Grow Old,” which was looking strictly at Honduran life. But when “the caravan” happened, journalists from all over the world were suddenly in Honduras — PBS, Frontline, Xinhua News Agency, and the Japanese newswire. There was an entire babble of media, and at the time, I felt as though people were walking into my kitchen. This was memorable because, given my ability to code-switch, I could be a part of both the media and the Honduran community: I could speak like an American, but as soon as I spoke Spanish, it came out as “our Spanish.”

The issue with journalism about Honduras is that it usually only regards the question of migration,
because, in reality, that’s the key issue foreign media care about in Honduras.

It almost always feels as if, when foreign journalists come to Honduras, they come with an axe to grind. Imagine if I asked an American, every single day or every other week, “What is the issue with gun violence? Why hasn’t America stopped the guns?” If I were to ask that question constantly, all the time, reducing the entire American experience to gun violence, it would drive an American crazy. I’m assuming it would make them feel like a storytelling device for some hopeful hack on the other side of the planet.

This is what it feels like for a lot of people in Honduras — that we’ve become dehumanized, and that our country is just a place for gang violence.

People live that, and they don’t have to be reminded of that by foreign media, who may reduce their whole life experiences to something trivial.

Tomas Ayuso is a photojournalist from Honduras, whose work focuses on how drug war, forced displacement, and urban dispossession in Latin American conflicts impact day-to-day lives. Ayuso was the winner of the 2019 James Foley Award for Conflict Reporting, and his work has been featured in The New York Times, The Washington Post, National Geographic, and more. To see his current field journal, primarily featuring Honduras, Mexico, and Colombia, please visit his Instagram page @tomas_ayuso.

A selection of Toma’s photographs are featured on the following pages
A young Garifuna boy sells coconut bread in the port town of Omoa.
Photograph by Tomas Ayuso.
A volunteer firefighter clears debris from the ground in Dominica after Hurricane Maria laid waste to the small seaside capital of Roseau. Photograph by Tomas Ayuso.
At the Tijuana border, an uncle and his young nephew pray towards the border wall to bring it down as they did in Jericho. Photograph by Tomas Ayuso.
As immigration crises run rampant across the globe, dissecting these phenomena more critically is increasingly necessary for proposing more creative and transformative solutions. This paper explores North African immigrant exclusion in France. It investigates and combines existing academic research to examine the unique historical context, social and economic policy, and xenophobic attitudes that have systematically propelled and exacerbated the problems that these immigrants face. It pays particular attention to the French Republican Model, which seeks to unite French citizens but overlooks ethnic diversity, and creates discrimination in the housing and labor markets. This traps immigrants in an inescapable and socially entrenched cycle. Upon careful consideration of the factors driving immigrant exclusion, this paper suggests the application of solutions based in the concept of intersectionality, or the interconnectedness of different forms of discrimination based on identity, in order to more effectively guide policy targeting this marginalized community.

Immigration policy has long been a source of controversy in nation-states across the globe.[1][2] Questions of economic integration and social cohesion tend to dominate policy-making circles, and often highlight socio-political cleavages, ideological differences, and xenophobic attitudes. All of these issues are especially prevalent in France, a country that has historically accepted massive waves of immigrants and yet failed to effectively integrate them. Though France is home to generations of immigrants from several countries, North African immigrants, or immigrants of Maghrebi descent from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, are disproportionately segregated and victimized.[3] Furthermore, they are often subject to racism that manifests itself in social, political, and economic contexts and discrimination that is especially pronounced in the labor and housing markets. Above all, the failures of integrative frameworks in France can be attributed to their lack of an intersectional approach. The ways in which these frameworks overlook the interrelatedness of racial, social, and economic discrimination render them ineffective in comprehensively addressing the plight of North African immigrants and their descendants.

However, understanding the origins of the discrimination that this population faces is important for analyzing more contemporary issues that hinder
integration. Within the past two centuries, France has experienced three main waves of immigration.\[4\] The first took place during the 1920s and 1930s and was mostly comprised of Europeans who worked the same jobs and lived in the same areas. This wave set a precedent for a system that segregates immigrants according to occupation and neighborhoods according to ethnicity.\[5\] A second influx of immigrants arrived in the 1950s, as “labor shortages created by the reconstruction and modernization of France provoked the arrival of the first immigrant generations to come from the former colonies, in particular from North Africa.”\[6\] Unfortunately, urban structures were insufficient in housing this influx. As a result, these immigrants were forced to either settle in abandoned housing or build shantytowns in the outskirts of major cities.\[7\] The government responded with a program to rapidly construct cheap public housing, but this soon turned into a social disaster. In fact, “the bleak, unglamorous concrete-slab neighborhoods were gradually abandoned” by populations who could afford to exit.\[8\] The reaction to this program left immigrants, who already lacked political capital and voice, in substandard housing with little hope of exit.

The 1970s, however, saw the implementation of programs to eliminate slums and move immigrant families to transitional housing projects. This shift sparked the beginning of some integration for North African immigrants. As citizens of Maghrebi origins played increasingly significant roles in different sectors of the labor market and consequently moved into wealthier neighborhoods, the native French population began to voice dissatisfaction.\[9\] Specifically, the fact that immigrants became more noticeable strained neighborhood relations and intensified competition between the immigrant population and the local population as they sought increasingly scarce jobs.\[10\] At the same time, another massive influx of North African immigrants arrived in France only to be victimized by intense social stigma and institutionalized segregation. This social stigma became especially pronounced in the housing market. In fact, the presence of a large immigrant population in a particular area often led to the loss of prestige of that area, and in turn, the increased tendency of urban renewal projects to stop investing in these areas.\[11\] It was during the same time that French immigration policy took a xenophobic turn. In fact, the country implemented a national racial quota-based policy that defined the “assimilability” of immigrants based on their origins and indicated immigrants of North African descent to be the least desirable.\[12\]

In 1981, immigrant dissatisfaction with the conditions that arose from this policy manifested in public riots.\[13\] The government responded by implementing a policy targeting urban minorities known as politique de la ville.\[14\] An urban regeneration program that focused on “sensitive urban zones”, politique de la ville was somewhat effective in improving housing, but “never emphasized the ethnic composition” of those living in districts addressed by the policy.\[15\] Though some additional attempts at reform have taken place since 1981, “no policy [has] ever addressed the specific problems of immigrants.”\[16\] Rather, policies have simply addressed areas of lower socioeconomic status without considering the fact that populations of Maghrebi origin tend to disproportionately populate these areas. Altogether, France’s history of immigration policy and integrative frameworks, coupled with its failure to recognize the specific challenges faced by ethnic North Africans, has set precedent by policies that not only fail to effectively integrate this population, but also that discriminate against and victimize them.

Aside from historical policies, systems, and patterns, France’s Republican Model has severely impeded the integration of North African immigrants and their descendants in their communities. “Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic proclaims the French State as a nation-state ‘one and indivisible,’”\[17\] which, in principle, implies equal treatment for all.\[18\] In practice, however, this model fosters perceptions of immigration that consider it a
threat to order, unity, and French national identity. Similarly, this model "exiles cultural difference to a private sphere" and forces "assimilation to dominant French values that pretend to be universal."[19]

Moreover, it prohibits the recognition of specific ethnic and religious identities, and by extension, the implementation of programs that target discrimination based on these identities out of fear that doing so would threaten French Republican principles.[20] Issues of poverty, then, are "traditionally addressed through color-blind, state-run programs aimed at reducing inequalities, without consideration for the role race plays in inequality."[21] Fundamentally, these programs fail to recognize the concept of intersectionality, or the interconnectedness of different forms of marginalization. They disregard the ways in which the interactions of categories like ethnicity and class often compound social problems for certain groups of people. In particular, they overlook the ways in which Arab populations are disproportionately subject to discrimination, unemployment, worse housing, and lower levels of education.

Even worse, French census data only takes into account nationality and not ethnicity.[22] This practice only exacerbates the aforementioned issues, as the descendants of North African immigrants who were born in France are recognized to be nationally French but not ethnically Arab. As such, the French government ignores the distinctiveness of this population, the existence of ethnic-based discrimination, and the ways in which these differences intensify victimization.

Beyond the French Republican Model and its associated principles, xenophobic attitudes held by the French severely impede the integration of Arab populations. This discrimination is largely rooted in previously discussed historical phenomena, policies, and mindsets. French populations continue to hold the Republican Model in high regard, and consequently "perceive Arabs as symbolic threats to French culture."[23] Many also automatically associate populations of Maghrebi descent with Islamist extremism: in fact, a 2015 study by the Institut Montaigne found that in 2012, 43 percent of French citizens saw the presence of Muslims as "a threat to the identity of [their] country."[24] Some express their dissatisfaction by voting for extreme right-wing and populist political parties, like the National Front or Front National.[25] This only deepens cleavages between those who are of Maghrebi descent and those who are not.

These attitudes manifest in different contexts. For example, xenophobia is the root cause of a number of issues in the labor market. The Institut Montaigne drew attention to this issue through its dissection of a 2008 resume-based trial that discovered that "French citizens with origins outside Europe do suffer systematic discrimination" in the labor market and that citizens with North African origins suffer the most discrimination.[26] In fact, a 2011 report from the High Council for Integration found that French citizens of non-European descent are twice as likely to be unemployed in comparison to citizens of French or European origin; these statistics are even more severe for younger populations.[27] Obtaining a job becomes significantly more difficult without a high school diploma for these immigrants, but even when citizens of Maghrebi origins are more qualified, they are disproportionately unemployed in comparison to their European counterparts.[28] Similarly, even when descendants of North African immigrants are employed, their chances of reaching higher wage levels are between 15 and 25 percent lower than those of French origins working the same jobs.[29] Altogether, these studies and statistics are indicative of systematic labor-market discrimination. There are multiple and powerful consequences of this discrimination. North African immigrants tend to be disproportionately subject to poverty and forced to live in poorer, under-resourced, and overlooked communities.

This disproportionate concentration of people of Maghrebi origins in impoverished neighborhoods has
a number of ramifications. As per Burgess’ Human Ecology model, location is often tied to concentrations of certain demographics and the problems they face.[30] In France, people of Maghrebi descent are often confined to these poorer areas due to discrimination in the housing market. Neighborhood segregation in French society is indicative of “discriminatory practices in the private housing market by real estate agents and landlords,” as well as phenomenon like “white flight” and “white avoidance,” where white populations flee or avoid neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrants.[31] The fact that these privileged populations of French descent tend to live in homogeneous and wealthier neighborhoods enables “the reproduction of their institutional and cultural capital.”[32] Similarly, it reflects their enhanced capacity to exit and exercise voice. The tendency of wealthy populations to leave consequently removes political capital and voice from poor and marginalized immigrant communities.

The tendency of these immigrant communities to be less wealthy means that they are also over-represented in the public housing sector, which are generally located in the suburbs or the banlieues.[33] As such, they are victimized by ghettoization. Ethnic enclaves “are increasingly tied to the presence of large housing projects,” as are they to poverty, unemployment, lower levels of education, and delinquency.[34] Although these neighborhoods suffered from these problems due to economic crisis prior to the arrival of immigrant families, these families are often regarded as the cause of these problems, however, immigrant families are actually the victims. The tendency of wealthier and advantaged populations to flee these areas, coupled with housing market discrimination that disadvantages populations of North African origin, has left Arabs with diminished voices and little hope of exit.

Lack of integration has a number of other detrimental implications. Perhaps most significantly, the gap between what the French [Republican] model implies—meritocracy, rights, and citizenship—and the actual situation is one of the major causes of frustration and resentment” for North African immigrants and their descendants.[35] Politically, this resentment sometimes encourages populations of Maghrebi origin to exercise their voice in radical ways or turn to Islamic extremism.[36] Socially, the lack of integration further hinders social cohesion between the French and populations of North African descent. This contributes to the phenomenon of “othering,” whereby local and native populations consider Arabs to be outsiders and threats. Challenges of social integration are especially difficult for this group “because they are the last to have arrived...and because the conditions in which they find themselves in France are difficult.”[37] The segregation and exclusion of immigrants in the housing and labor markets are interrelated with this lack of social integration, and often means that populations of North African descent are less well-off than their French counterparts.

Though the multiple forms of discrimination that this marginalized population endures limits their ability to exercise voice, one implication of segregation has been a notable instance of collective action. This instance occurred in the form of riots in 2005 in the banlieues.[38] These riots represented a manifestation of the resentment of predominantly young, unemployed men of Maghrebi origin, and were indicative of the ways in which the ethnicity of these men contributed to their political, social, and economic marginalization. In other words, the riots demonstrated the ways in which the intersectional identities of these young men compounded the problems they faced. In this case, this particular marginalized community engaged in collective action in part due to self-interest, but also in part due to the bonds of solidarity they held with those who were enduring similar problems. This group likely united on the basis of shared experiences and common interests, which, as Fireman and Gamson suggest, are important in sparking and facilitating collective
Although these neighborhoods suffered from these problems due to economic crisis prior to the arrival of immigrant families, these families are often regarded as the cause of these problems, however, immigrant families are actually the victims.
action. Though violent, these riots highlighted the problems that populations of Maghrebi origins often endure and brought into the public sphere issues that the government refused to recognize. At the same time, the riots “othered” marginalized communities, depicting them as excessively extreme and savage in their actions. As such, effective forms of collective action have yet to take place.

Segregation and exclusion of this community persists. Perhaps one of the most significant reasons for this relates to perception: North African immigrants and their descendants are consistently depicted "as the causes of social and economic ills, rather than as the bearers of the brunt of those ills."[40] The fact that France doesn’t gather data based on ethnicity intensifies these issues, as it prevents the government from identifying the existence and concentration of racism and discrimination. The Republican Model also plays into this, as it theoretically assimilates populations of Maghrebi origin into French culture while socially excluding them.[41] As such, government intransigence has played a significant role in hindering integration. [42]

Beyond the government’s reluctance to recognize ethnic distinctiveness and promote social cohesion, however, issues in the labor market and housing market are two of the most significant factors that continue to perpetuate segregation. For example, immigrants have consistently been “over-represented in low-skilled jobs”, and their descendants tend to occupy the same positions in the labor market.[43] This is largely due to the previously discussed xenophobic attitudes of many employers, as well as lower levels of social integration of immigrants and their descendants. Altogether, these factors often trap populations of Maghrebi origin in socioeconomic standings similar to their ancestors.

Beyond the labor market, however, housing market discrimination against Arabs also perpetuates persistent segregation and exclusion. The fact that North African immigrant populations and their descendants are disproportionately concentrated in poor, under-resourced communities and lack possibilities for exit means that children are consistently educated in schools that are characterized by low rates of success and high rates of dropouts.[44] In this sense, Burgess’ Human Ecology Model is relevant: The neighborhoods in which these children live tend to dictate lower levels of educational attainment and success and, ultimately, reduced possibility of social mobility.[45] Once again, the disproportionate concentration of ethnic North Africans in these neighborhoods, coupled with their lack of political capital, prevents them from exercising the voice and collective action necessary to improve their situations. The lack of representation of their interests in prominent nationalist political parties only exacerbates these aforementioned problems. Similarly, nationalist rhetoric in France is normalized. It dominates French politics and does not prioritize the recognition of ethnic minorities. The fact that the French often fear that acknowledging difference will tear apart the French national fabric intensifies this phenomenon. Altogether, the combination of these processes and practices overlooks the needs and voices of vulnerable people.

The previously discussed forms of economic and geographic segregation are clearly interrelated and inextricably linked to ethnicity and background. At the same time, programs to address these problems have yet to take an intersectional approach. In other words, they have failed to address the relationships between race, class, and levels of education, and the ways in which populations of Maghrebi descent are disproportionately subject to discrimination in each of these areas. As such, a number of structural changes are necessary in order to effectively integrate these populations.

Arguably the most significant of these transformations requires a shift in France’s
fundamental approach to the existence of ethnic diversity. In order to effectively combat the plight of populations of Maghrebi origins, France must recognize the fact that it is ethnically diverse. A 2015 Report on the Prevention of Racism by the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) recommended the introduction of “a new article into the Charter of Secularism that highlights the sense of openness that secularism promotes” in order to foster tolerance and understanding of cultural and ethnic difference.\[46\] Furthermore, France must begin collecting census data on ethnicity in order to identify the tendencies of discriminatory practices. Though these reforms certainly have powerful potential, there are several obstacles preventing them from becoming a reality. The most notable is the fact that the French Republican Model is enshrined in the Constitution and consequently a foundational aspect of France’s statehood. However, moving towards the acknowledgement of ethnicity in nationally-collected data would allow for recognition of ethnic distinctiveness and the ways in which this distinctiveness dictates discrimination. Furthermore, it would make possible the development of programs that would more thoroughly address intersectionality, and more specifically, the ways in which ethnicity plays into the political, social, and economic segregation that past reforms have failed to adequately tackle.

The implementation of programs that seek to fight stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes directed towards populations of Maghrebi descent must accompany these approach-based changes. The government has indeed taken steps towards addressing racism on a more broad scale through the implementation of structures like an anti-racism hotline and the increased funding of programs to fight discriminatory attitudes.\[47\] However, the fact that intolerant attitudes towards the recognition of ethnic diversity are so entrenched in the French Republican Model and French society on the whole means that racism and xenophobia continue to persist. Altogether, intolerance poses a significant obstacle to the adoption and implementation of effective integrative frameworks.

Aside from attitude-based transformations, programs must be implemented in the labor market in order to curb socioeconomic-based discrimination and encourage integration, specifically for newer immigrants. A study by Sotomayor-Morales, Grande-Gascón, and Ajaouani found that incoming North African immigrants disproportionately suffer in the labor market because no system exists to account for the skills developed prior to their arrival.\[48\] The establishment of such a system is therefore a necessary component of effective programs to combat labor market discrimination. Additionally, employers and training programs should focus on the development of language, legal, labor, and social skills.\[49\] The existing disconnect between the realities of immigrants and their descendants, and the social programs that seek to address their problems, has rendered the implementation of comprehensive labor market integration strategies ineffective. Lack of funding for these programs has only exacerbated job-based segregation and discrimination. Current French President Macron sought to change this late last year by promising $17 billion to be directed towards job training specifically for members of impoverished immigrant communities.\[50\] Though the success of this program is unknown due to its novelty, it indeed provides hope for increased integration in the French labor market, and possibly, increased social mobility as a result.

In addition to job training, curbing discrimination in the labor market against populations of Maghrebi descent must include direct attacks on discriminatory hiring practices. The previously discussed Institut Montaigne has suggested that employers implement resume-based trials in order to assess the presence of discrimination. Once the existence of discrimination has been established, they suggest that employers train and sensitize employers, adopt more inclusive recruitment policies, and implement a hiring subsidy to promote the hiring of immigrants
Exchanging Égalité for Exclusion

and their descendants. Above all, these programs must be founded on the recognition that populations of Maghrebi descent experience multiple forms of oppression, and that their ethnicity often compounds the problems they face in the labor market.

Measures that focus on combating discrimination in the housing market must also complement solutions that target the labor market in order to address the multiple forms of marginalization that populations of Maghrebi descent experience. One possible reform includes increasing "the number of immigrants in small and dispersed housing projects" as it "would lend possibility to diminished geographic segregation." At the same time, it would allow marginalized populations access to better educational institutions and more developed community infrastructure. Similarly, it would likely give these groups of people, who tend to lack political capital, a greater degree of voice. Majority populations would be more inclined to listen to and cater to their needs if they were more closely integrated in neighborhoods. A notable obstacle to this solution involves the possibility of the exit of wealthier populations in areas with increased Arab presence. However, if implemented strategically in ways that created incentives for all populations to comply, this step would undoubtedly pave the path for decreased levels of neighborhood segregation in France.

One of the most significant obstacles to the aforementioned proposed solutions relates to the ways in which populations of French and European descent gain from the segregation of Arab populations. For example, the fact that North African immigrants and their descendants disproportionately suffer from discrimination in the labor market means that others benefit from relatively higher job opportunities and wages. Similarly, the fact that immigrant descendants tend to be concentrated in poorer neighborhoods means that the French are able to isolate themselves from the problems this disadvantaged population faces, effectively turning a blind eye from their plight. This complacency allows them to maintain intolerant and neglectful attitudes towards ethnic diversity. It also discourages them from challenging the negative implications of the policies and principles that guide France’s development. Above all, the fact that citizens of French descent tend to benefit from the marginalization of their Maghrebi counterparts has largely perpetuated the structural inequalities of which immigrants and their descendants are disproportionately victims.

Recently, however, changes in France’s political climate have supposedly lent possibility to the implementation of programs that encourage increased integration. In particular, the election of President Emmanuel Macron in 2017 was largely seen as a victory for leftists, who envisioned the creation of a much more tolerant and progressive political climate under his leadership. It supposedly symbolized the French population’s rejection of the far right, populist, and xenophobic attitudes that have become increasingly prevalent throughout Europe. However, although Macron has implemented some reforms to increase integration, including programs to fight labor market discrimination, his immigration policies have made asylum rules stricter, intensified penalties for illegal immigrants, and overall hindered progress in other areas related to the integration of North African immigrants. Similarly, though he enlisted a commission to reform the banlieues and thus target housing market discrimination and its associated issues, he decided not to implement most of its recommendations. Instead, he established a program that involved education reforms specifically for schools in areas with high concentrations of Arab populations. Though it did enact certain tangible changes, including a requirement that cut class sizes in half, this program was largely buried in “lofty rhetoric” that lacked specifics.

Despite the aforementioned critique, it does seem as though Macron has largely encouraged amplified
discussion on the segregation of immigrants and their descendants. However, should he continue to seek to guide change through general programs that do not actually target the structural root of the problem and the marginalization that the French Republic Model allows for, the likelihood that French society will experience increased integration significantly decreases. Nevertheless, should Macron maintain his campaign promises to represent all members of French society, including those who are most marginalized, he may indeed bring a greater degree of voice to marginalized populations of Maghrebi descent. If this political capital becomes sufficient to implement effective integration policies, these populations may become more socially, politically, and economically prominent in French society.

Clearly, France's current political climate lends some possibility to reforms that effectively encourage and established the increased integration of Arab populations in the country. At this point, it seems as though possibilities of some reform are likely. If they prioritize and address the intersectional nature of the marginalization that North African immigrants and their descendants face, increased integration may indeed be a possibility.

Emma Blake is a Junior at Brown University. She is studying International Relations, and is particularly interested in international law and women’s security studies.

Notes
[10] Ibid.
Exchanging Égalité for Exclusion

[28] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[34] Verdugo and Toma, “Can Public Housing Decrease Segregation?”, 1816.
[36] Ibid.
References


Blake
The following is an edited version of a conversation with PRAXIS

How do you define human security?
I have a really broad notion of security. Something I’ve learned is that people are very insecure in a lot of different ways. One really has to be curious about what makes somebody feel insecure, or what makes somebody feel secure. I think unless you’re curious, you won’t actually know what that person’s sense of security is because you don’t know what their insecurity is like. So, the first thing about human security is that one has to really listen to people to find out what makes them feel secure or insecure. It’s not a given.

The other thing to think about is about the word ‘human.’ There are some things that all humans share. Still, women and men can experience security and insecurity so differently. As a feminist, I never take “human” as my starting point. I’m always interested in a more intersectional and especially an intersectionally feminist curiosity about what an individual human person is experiencing. So, curiosity, I think, is where I start when I investigate both “human” and “security.”

At your panel at Fletcher’s November 2019 Conference on Gender and International Affairs, I remember your saying that, “patriarchy explains the working of power that foment certain kinds of violence against certain kinds of people.” How do you believe this relates to human security?
If somebody feels they are threatened or intimidated by any kind of violence, including psychological violence, then they cannot feel secure. Feminists who work on issues of domestic violence have taught us that you can feel profoundly insecure in the place called your “home.” Non-feminists, people who don’t think about patriarchy, are very likely to slide, I think lazily, into the presumption that home is a naturally secure place. It’s not secure, though, if you’re a woman who is living with a violent partner inside that home.

So, I think, we need to ask: “To what extent is the person whose security we’re trying to assess subjected to the intimidating or limiting processes of patriarchy?” This could mean that person is non-binary, or a gay man, and almost certainly, someone who identifies as a girl or a woman. Patriarchy has to be talked about, has to be assessed and monitored. The existence of patriarchy shouldn’t be
taken for granted, but it does have to be investigated in order to understand violence—both its looming presence and its actual existence. A woman who has been hit once by a partner, for example, is likely never to feel totally secure again in the same space as that partner lives. Without talking about patriarchy, I think one is really naive about security and insecurity. That's what I've learned. I didn't used to ask that question. I wasn't always a feminist. I was pretty naïve when I wasn't a feminist, but now I do always ask: “How is patriarchy operating here?” Patriarchy depends on and perpetuates inequalities of power. If you find it, you are looking at the ripe potential for intimidation.

Policymakers who work on human security issues often talk about empowering women. I am interested in your perspective on this rhetoric, what genuine empowerment of women around human security might look like, and whether empowerment is even the right word.

"Empowerment" may not be the right word. In fact, one should start with security. If you’re not genuinely secure, it’s very hard to have a voice, it’s very hard to be genuine in your expressions of your own assessments, and it usually means you don’t have the resources to even investigate the causes of your insecurity. That doesn’t mean a woman has to wait until she’s fully secure to speak up, to insist that she be heard. But it does mean that speaking up when your security is so tentative, so fragile, takes enormous courage. However, many of my friends and colleagues who work on gender empowerment for big organizations say that people at the top talk the talk, but at the middle and the bottom, where it matters, they don’t walk the walk. I also don’t think many of these people in organizations realize that increasing all women’s empowerment will lessen their own authority.

What do they think empowerment looks like? Oh, often it’s imagined to be something that will not affect them, their organization, their status, their budget, their reputation. Take the commonly sought goal of creating more equal household relationships among poor farmers in rural areas, for instance. Too often, development organizations’ leaders and staff people think that achieving that increased intra-household gender equality will have no upward, reverse trickle effect. Perhaps many development workers and their supervisors have learned to talk the talk, but they don’t really know what empowerment looks like in its full repercussions. When they do face it — that is, when marginalized women become more confident, less deferential, less patient — for instance, as a result of a local #MeToo Movement or a local reproductive rights movement, or during a garment workers’ or electronic factory workers’ strike — it can be a rude awakening to outside empowerment advocates, and they may not like it.

These same empowerment proponents, perhaps, have a very "pastel" understanding of empowerment because they’ve never really been curious about what it will actually produce. That’s not true of all proponents, but there are too many in large development, banking and humanitarian organizations who seem to imagine that their own lives won’t change if their mission to empower the most vulnerable women is fulfilled. They imagine that they won’t have to think differently about how they run refugee camps, that they won’t have to re-distribute their very tight budgets, and that they won’t have to re-imagine their own place in the organization. If they imagined any of those outcomes, they might not even talk the talk!

It’s because too many people working in empowerment projects think they can talk the talk without any of those repercussions that they are willing to put ‘women’s empowerment’ on their checklist. That sounds very cynical, and I don’t mean it’s true of every organization. Still, practitioners
need to candidly assess whether they talk the talk simply in order to win the next contract or to sound good to future employers or donors. To walk the walk, one needs to be pretty harsh on oneself, and probably needs to have a good feminist friend who will warn you, “Hey, look out. I think you’re beginning to just talk the talk.”

At last November’s Gender Conference, you mentioned that scholars and practitioners must be constantly self-reflective. How might that apply to those of us working on human security issues?

That brings us back again to what we’re not curious about. I’m struck by what I’m not curious about. Usually, somebody has to wake me up, make me realize what I’ve never bothered to ask. For example, I am realizing now that I’ve gone too long not asking questions about environmental insecurity — and how it’s gendered.

When the phrase ‘Human Security’ was first introduced, it didn’t sound serious, because it was anchored to militarized calculations. But now, all of you who study human security aren’t called flakey, you are at a point in history where you don’t have to explain the phrase. That can tempt you to not critically assess your understanding of it. In the early phase of any new concept, you have to justify it, so you’re more likely to assess it yourself. Now that “human security” has become a more established field, it’s a dangerous time. People in the field—or who aspire to be in the field—may not be as self-reflective, as tough on themselves and as curious as they should be about the assumptions underneath “human security.” Being curious should make us uncomfortable.

And where do we go with this discomfort?

Well, we should start sharing that discomfort with other people. We’re all working in organizations, so we really need to ask our colleagues—and our superiors, though that’s harder—to wake up to what they — and we — haven’t been asking, haven’t been rigorously measuring. Sometimes that means seeking funds for gender research that the organization never thought they (we) needed to do — on sea rise, on bus transport, on radio listening, on caring for post-war wounded.

That research on gender assumptions, criteria, and impact needs to be done by somebody with gender analytical skills, not just by the woman in the organization, the typical fallback. I’ve talked to a lot of women in big organizations who have been assigned to be the gender officer despite their lack of training in gender analysis.

Most superiors don’t want to hear that we need more research before we go forward because more research requires time, person-power, and money. But I think we do need to know more about what we face and then, later, what gender consequences (often not predicted) our work produces.
An Interview with Cynthia Enloe

Don’t agonize, organize. I’d add to that: Be gender curious, do gender research.

I want to come back to something you said earlier about how once you ask these questions, if you’re in a big organization, you have to be prepared to take steps that the research findings point to — for instance, to change how you are structuring refugee camps. I’m interested in why organizations are so resistant to doing the sort of questioning that might prompt new approaches. Most organizations are pretty set in their ways. Their leaders and staff people like missions that allow them to look good — especially to their donors. So, they select the matrixes and the assessment criteria that make them look as though they’ve reached their mission goals. If you, equipped with your new feminist-informed questions, come along and say that those matrixes make invisible how girls are faring compared to boys, and thus the organization needs to change its evaluation criteria, the people at the top will tell you that donors love the results the organization shows — for example, about the organization’s programming for poor children.

In your fresh, gender-explicit assessment, you’ve eschewed the common merging of boys and girls into the category of “children.” Thus, your gender-explicit assessment no longer hides any inequalities in schooling outcomes — or in health or caloric outcomes — of boys compared to girls. Your gender-explicit research makes your organization’s program results look less successful. And that could dampen donors’ enthusiasm. What then will the senior people in your organization do with your findings?

When you point out that your research has found that the organization’s current assessment criteria are not realistic because they hide the gendering of inequalities and insecurities in your organization’s programs, you will have to push hard. That calls for building alliances and probably being able to alter the understandings of your donors, which your superiors may resist. But, that’s what it means to change an organization. It’s really hard. You, though, are at Fletcher. Of course you can do that hard work. But to do it, you have to make alliances, you have to have evidence, you have to have good research processes that can show that no, our current assessment processes are just not up to par.

And what advice would you give to human security students who are confronting these questions, and working within their own discomfort?

Well, first, try to see your discomfort as valuable, not as embarrassing. Second, share your discomfort — its causes — with other people. Don’t just try to cope with it by yourself. Do your research in a group, too. It’s harder for your colleagues and superiors to dismiss a group of people who have derived their uncomfortable findings from solid research. Some people will still try to dismiss you, of course, but it’s harder to dismiss carefully produced evidence, and it’s harder to dismiss a group of committed people who are in solidarity around evidence.

You know the famous slogan of activists: Don’t agonize, organize. I’d add to that: Be gender curious, do gender research.

Cynthia Enloe is Research Professor at Clark University. Among her 15 books are "Bananas, Beaches and Bases," "Maneuvers" and the newest, "The Big Push." Her works have been translated into Korean, Japanese, Turkish and French, and she has appeared on BBC, NPR, Al Jazeera and in Ms. Magazine. Her name appears on the Wall of Justice at the ICC in the Hague.
Photo Credit


Page 1: A worker harvests coffee near the town of Santuario, Risaralda department, Colombia in May. RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP/Getty Images

Page 3: Rescuers assist a victim following airstrikes on the besieged rebel-held enclave of Kafr Batna, Syria, on Feb 6. AMER ALMOHIBANY/AFP/Getty Images

Page 5: Red Cross flags flutter in the wind on June 26, 2009 at the International Red Cross (IRC) humanitarian camp in Solferino, about 150km east of Milan to mark the 150th anniversary of the International Red Cross which was founded by Swiss Henry Dunant after the battle of Solferino. DAMIEN MEYER/AFP/Getty Images


Page 9: Photograph by Tomas Ayuso.

Page 16: A van burns as protesters clash with French riot police in Bobigny, a suburb of Paris, after attending a demonstration in support of Theo L. YOAN VALAT/European Pressphoto Agency

Page 20: ARNAU BACH/The New Yorker

