The World Peace Foundation, an operating foundation affiliated solely with the Fletcher School at Tufts University, aims to provide intellectual leadership on issues of peace, justice and security. It believes that innovative research and teaching are critical to the challenges of making peace around the world, and should go hand-in-hand with advocacy and practical engagement with the toughest issues. To respond to organized violence today, we not only need new instruments and tools—we need a new vision of peace. Our challenge is to reinvent peace.

Alex de Waal is the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, author of The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power and the forthcoming book, Mass Starvation: The history and future of famine.

“...Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world... As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first... The United States will forever be a great friend to the world, and especially to its allies. But we can no longer be taken advantage of, or enter into a one-sided deal where the United States gets nothing in return. As long as I hold this office, I will defend America’s interests above all else. But in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it’s in everyone’s interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous, and secure.”

President Donald J. Trump, speaking at the United Nations, 2017
Overview

This paper examines the position of Africa in the current world turmoil, focusing on the role played by multilateral norms, institutions and mechanisms in promoting peace and security and other international public goods. The multilateral world order is currently in turmoil, with leading powers—notably the United States—adopting transactional politics as their modus operandi. This has far-reaching implications for peace and security in Africa, including the expansion of rivalrous and militarized power politics in the Greater Middle East to encompass half of the continent, and the ascent of cynical power politics in the domestic and regional arena across all of Africa.

The paper argues that Africa, as a weak continent, has much to gain from multilateralism, and especially from its stronger more normative versions. The past seventy years witnessed substantial gains which should be recognized and defended. However, today’s crisis in multilateralism and the ascent of transactional politics need to be understood so that they can be managed and transcended. The starting point of this is the nature of multilateralism, which is more than collective bargaining by sovereign nations in pursuit of their immediate interests.

The paper examines how Africa can respond to its emerging threats with a strategy for conflict prevention and mediation and enhanced peace support operations. This requires a fuller implementation of the norms of the African Union and strengthening its institutions and mechanisms. It also requires further developing the AU’s inter-state conflict management capacity to complement its existing capacity that focuses on intra-state conflicts, with special attention to developing a peace and security strategy for the ‘shared spaces’ of the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean/Sahara.

Armed conflicts need to be prevented, mediated, managed and resolved at multiple levels, from the local through the national to the regional and trans-regional. This poses complex challenges for Africa’s peacemakers.

Introduction: The Current Turmoil

Any rule-based international order depends upon functioning multilateral institutions and norms. At its most basic, multilateralism provides for a mechanism inter-governmental negotiation in which bilateral deal-making is replaced by a predictable, norm-based security order. This protects the weak from the strong and underpins the principles and mechanisms for collective security. A stronger form of multilateralism—such as has emerged since World War Two under the United Nations—promotes international law, shared norms and standards, and global public goods. This richer form of multilateralism enables states to pursue higher goals. It is essential, notably, for global collective action to combat climate change, and for equitable globalization. It is also essential to protect the more basic form of collective security. The collapse of the League of Nations in the 1930s occurred in part because multilateralism must move forward—developing its norms and networks—if it is to survive. If it is no more than calculated self-interest, it is fragile.

Having achieved sustained progress in the six decades after World War Two, the multilateral global order is in crisis today. It was rocked by unilateral military action by its most powerful member states, in Iraq and Ukraine. Humanitarian principles have been rejected outright by militant extremist groups such as ISIS and Al-Shabaab, and undermined by some aid donors that use emergency aid as a political instrument. In the last eighteen months, multilateralism has been sent into reverse by Brexit and the U.S. withdrawal from the UN budget. In the Middle East, countries such as Saudi Arabia are practising old-fashioned power politics. Moreover, this is not simply a tactical readjustment but an outright assault on the very norms of collective security and global public goods. President Donald J. Trump’s security and economic advisors have written, ‘The president embarked on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a “global community” but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage.... Rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we
embrace it.' In short, two of the historic leaders of the multilateral world order—the U.S. and the U.K.—have turned their back on the edifice they constructed. However, at this moment, many European Union leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism, and the Chinese leadership has asserted its readiness to champion globalization.

One way of conceptualizing the shift is the ascendancy of transactional politics—bargaining over power, using resources, threats and coercion, and deceit—over rule-based institutional politics based on a social contract. The conduct of politics has become more akin to running a business than to governing a polity for the common good. This is particularly evident in the Greater Middle East, where power politics has long been dominant, and has been reinforced recently by the repercussions of the ‘Global War on Terror’ and by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Africa, we are witnessing both the encroachment of the Greater Middle East competitive power politics and also Africa’s own rivalries over hierarchies of state power.

In the 1990s, African politics and governance were shaped by the ‘democracy wave’, by the proliferation of internal conflicts, and by the near collapse of a number of governments which were unable to muster the resources required to finance basic state services, including security. For 25 years, the dominant framework for analyzing conflict and fragility in Africa has been that weak states, facing strong and divided societies, have been vulnerable to internal conflict and the breakdown of law and order, including violent extremism and terrorism, and the principal project for peace and security consists in delivering economic development, good governance and more inclusive political systems. This agenda remains valid today.

However, it is becoming evident also that conflict and fragility are equally driven from above: by the tensions and turmoil within the global political economy itself. Some of the global drivers of conflict in Africa include: the encroachment of Middle Eastern power rivalries into Africa; the militarization of international assistance under the umbrella of the ‘war on terror’; the opportunities for personal enrichment of the political class and funding of political parties opened up by transnational corporations, natural resource rents and offshore secrecy jurisdictions in which financial assets can be hidden, along with transnational organized crime. Africa demonstrates an exaggerated version of a world phenomenon in which inequality has intensified and the principal beneficiaries of economic growth consist of a globalized and deracinated global elite, disconnected from communities deprived of most of the immediate and visible advantages of globalization.

The extreme inequalities between regions of the world (with Africa as the poorest) are driving major threats to global stability, such as mass migration and violent extremism. The inequalities within countries (found everywhere in the world, but marked in any African countries) are driving discontent with existing political orders including democracies.

The nineteenth century ‘Scramble for Africa’ consisted of European colonial powers jostling for control of the continent’s primary resources and strategic ports and waterways. Elements of that remain, as highlighted by Pres. Trump’s remark to African leaders on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, ‘Africa has tremendous business potential. I have so many friends going to your countries, trying to get rich. I once again be a true friend.’ Wall St. Journal, 30 May 2017.

1 H.R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn, ‘America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone; We are asking a lot of our allies and partners. But in return the U.S. will
congratulate you. They’re spending a lot of money.’ However, today’s ‘Scramble of Africa’ differs in that Africans are equal partners in the scramble, and that the resources in question are not only natural resource rents but access to global finance and security cooperation, as well as the spillover of the struggles of the Greater Middle East.

The strategic challenge for multilateral organizations including the United Nations and African Union is how to generate continental and global public goods that serve the whole of humanity in this context. We need a new multilateralism suited to the contemporary order. Of immediate necessity, there will be a collective leadership of those countries that had previously been content to follow the strategic choices of the superpowers. Of strategic necessity, that leadership will need to address the global challenges of overcoming gross inequality in life chances and an agenda that tackles climate change and its impacts. Vitally important, both for its own sake and as an essential precondition for meeting the agenda of planetary sustainability, is the agenda of peace and security.

Africa in the Multilateral World Order

As the weakest continent, Africa is a major beneficiary of multilateralism in the security and political arenas, and increasingly in politics, economics, culture and the environment.

A century ago, African politics was shaped by the League of Nations. The South African white minority leader Jan Smuts was one of its proponents and theoreticians. The question of who would be able to attend its conferences, and would be allowed to claim the right of self-determination, stimulated nationalist political mobilization in countries including Egypt and Sudan. Most famously, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie addressed the League of Nations when his country had been invaded by Fascist Italy, demanding that this act of aggression contrary to the foundational principles of the organization, be denounced and reversed, not only for the sake of Ethiopia but the world as a whole. His speech to the League of Nations, with his eloquent affirmation of the principles of collective security and the perils of abandoning them, should be re-read by anyone concerned with the global order then and now.

The United Nations was similarly shaped by Africa. Although some of the architects of the UN—including Jan Smuts, the only leader to have attended the foundation of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, and the author of the famous preamble to the UN Charter—envisaged the organization as a global version of the British Commonwealth, it was quickly evident to the leaders of the decolonizing world that the UN could serve as a legitimate and effective vehicle for their representation. One particularly symbolic moment was the adoption of the right of self-determination for colonized peoples in 1960. Another was the firm stand taken by the General Assembly against Apartheid South Africa. Two of the most famous and effective Secretaries General of the UN—Dag Hammerskold and Kofi Annan—were closely associated with the African continent.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded in the very depths of the Cold War, succeeding in uniting Africans aligned with each of the superpowers within a single continental organization, and actively promoting the total liberation of Africa from colonial and racist rule. Its singular historic achievement was attaining that goal. Primarily motivated to protect fragile African sovereignty from neo-colonial meddling and counter-attacks, the OAU also moved away from the people’s Pan Africanism that had inspired many of its founding fathers and instead became conservatively statist, preserving the boundaries inherited from the colonialists and—until the 1990s—regarding what happened within those


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borders as matters of domestic concern only. However, for all its well-known shortcomings, the conquest of colonialism and Apartheid, and the very existence and continued functioning of the OAU, and the adherence of its members to some basic shared norms, was an immense triumph.

In 2002, the African Union was founded with some of the strongest and most far-sighted normative commitments of any multilateral institution, including principles of constitutional democracy, rejection of mass atrocity, and a call for the participation of citizens in all the activities of the Union. In an important sense, the AU represented a return to a revived people's multilateralism in the continent, recalling the way that during the era of slavery and European imperialism, Pan Africanism and liberation had been led by popular movements and by civil society, aiming at transforming an oppressive world order. The aim of African popular multilateralism was seizing political power, but in order to effect emancipatory change. The pact made between anti-colonial liberation movements and the world powers was that they would be permitted to join the club of nations, as was their right, but that the rules of the club would need to be changed so as to prohibit the crimes that had led to their subjugation in the first place. In the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the leaders of the African continent—now entirely free of racist rule by Europeans and their brethren, but wracked by home-grown violence and disorder—took seriously the task of revising the rules of their own club of African nations. This was a testament to the African commitment to multilateralism.

The toughest agenda for the African Union has been peace and security. While the Constitutive Act formed most of the organs and processes of the organization, the African peace and security architecture took longer to be designed and built. The peace and security agenda preoccupies the greater part of the AU’s time, energy and resources. Fifteen years after its creation, the AU has transformed the landscape of peace operations in the continent. It takes the lead in most instances of political negotiations for conflict prevention, including intervening in cases of unconstitutional change of government that would threaten armed conflict. It is active in formal and informal mediation of disputes. It is an active partner with the UN in peace support operations. Two recent reviews of international peace missions, the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the World Peace Foundation report to the AU ‘African Politics, African Peace’ have both stressed the same core message, namely that achieving peace is first and foremost a political task, and that military operations such as peace support operations should be designed and implemented in such a manner as to support those political goals and strategies.

There is a dense network of African multilateral organizations and agencies, including the spectrum of AU institutions (some of which are under-resourced and under-utilized, such as the Pan-African Parliament and ECOSOCC), the Regional Economic Communities, and specialist institutions such as the African Development Bank. Africa’s multilateralism is founded on a strong sense of shared identity—nurtured by a history of Pan African sensibility and activism—by common interests in resolving the continent’s problems, and by shared aspirations for social and economic transformation. While African multilateral institutions are weak, the societal commitment to a collective future is strong: in short, African multilateralism enjoys exceptional legitimacy.

Africa is also an important beneficiary of a wide spectrum of United Nations activities and mechanisms. Business regarding Africa is a major part of the UN Security Council agenda. Most of the world’s peacekeepers are stationed in Africa and (increasingly) drawn from African troop-contributing countries. It is in Africa that the UN’s specialized agencies, from UNESCO to UNICEF and HABITAT to WFP, are able to fulfill their mandates to the full. Africa faces epidemics of new and re-emerging infectious diseases, food crises and other humanitarian challenges, and environmental challenges.

**Fifteen years after its creation, the AU has transformed the landscape of peace operations in the continent.**
exacerbated by global warming; multilateral action is essential to overcome these.

During the anti-colonial struggle and the first decades of independence, African liberation movements and, in due course, sovereign governments also joined hands with other countries emerging from imperial rule, to promote an emancipatory global multilateralism. Landmarks such as the Bandung Conference that launched the Non-Aligned Movement, the UN’s adoption of the right of self-determination for colonized people and the formation of the G-77 demonstrated Africa’s commitment to collective action to redress global power and economic inequalities. Africa worked hand-in-hand with other emancipatory forces across the globe in pursuit of a world order governed by principles of fairness, human rights and non-discrimination. Africa has an ongoing interest in UN reform, especially making the UN Security Council more representative.

However, Africa has been disadvantaged by other multilateral mechanisms and institutions, which represent the interests of the wealthy and powerful. Many of the trade regulations of the WTO and the financial orthodoxies of the IMF have not been developed or applied in a manner that is sensitive to the welfare and developmental needs of Africa. The standardized models of state-building and international drugs and migration policies have often disadvantaged the particular needs of Africa.

**Global Considerations**

Africa and the AU require a clear analysis of the nature of the current crisis of the multilateral world order and what this means for Africa and for global public goods. The crisis poses huge challenges for Africa and is bringing many unwelcome changes. But the crisis is an opportunity for Africa to reposition itself at the forefront of leading the new multilateralism. With the abdication of U.S. and British leadership of multilateralism, the AU can join those world powers (the EU and China) that are seeking to refashion multilateralism. Africa’s particular contribution to this new agenda is to highlight the way in which multilateralism can be a people’s agenda, and to emphasize the African experience in conflict resolution as a valuable model to apply elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East.

**The AU’s Norms and Principles**

The Constitutive Act of the AU and subsequent declarations and commitments entered into by the AU constitute an ambitious set of norms and principles. Few of these are fully implemented or even properly recognized by the AU, its Member States, and members of its consultative and participatory organs. The agenda for the next phase should consist primarily in educating people about these norms and principles and enforcing them, in preference to developing and adopting new norms and principles. The agenda of implementation involves many tasks including cooperation with partners at subregional and extraregional levels.

**The AU’s Peace and Security Mechanisms**

The AU’s principal mechanisms for peace and security need strengthening.

- The Peace and Security Council needs stronger staff support from the Peace and Security Department for it to play its required role of providing information, analysis and agenda-setting.
- Member States represented on the Council need to provide stronger support to their permanent representatives.

**Updating Africa’s Multilateralism for the Current Turmoil**

Africa’s multilateralism began in the civil society sphere with the Pan African Movement and the global movement for racial equality and emancipation of the oppressed. It moved into the state sphere with the OAU in 1963 and deepened its normative commitments in the 1990s, culminating in the formation of the AU. Africa’s multilateralism has thrived as it has moved forward. It must continue to do so.
• Relations between the peace and security mechanisms of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities need to be made more coherent.
• Specific structures such as mediation support need enhancement.
• The links between the PSD and the Political Affairs Division need strengthening and coordinating.
• Panels of experts are a workable mechanism for providing information and analysis to the PSC and the Commission.
• The particular role of the Peace Support Operations Division needs clarification, in line with identifying the best roles for African Union PSOs in support of political goals and strategies for these operations.
• The functions of the Pan African Parliament and ECOSOCC in the peace and security arena need to be reasserted and reinforced.

The African Union is currently embarking on an ambitious programme of reform. This must of necessity include both making its administration and finance more efficient and businesslike, and its political decision-making more principled and closely aligned with the vision enshrined in its Constitutive Act. Better institutional governance and enhanced politics of democratization, participation and peace are both needed, and neither should be sacrificed for the other.

Overlapping Multilateralisms

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter envisaged the establishment of regional multilateral organizations, none of which existed at the time when the UN was created. Today there is a profusion of these organizations, which represents a considerable strength in the international peace and security system, but a commensurate challenge in terms of how they are to be coordinated so as to complement and support one another rather than the opposite. In Africa, the particular challenges include:

• Mechanisms for dividing tasks among the AU and Regional Economic Commissions, particularly in cases in which REC Member States have vested partisan interests in the conflicts or crises in question, should be developed, at least for the time being making assessments on a case-by-case basis;
• The absence of mechanisms for engagement with Middle Eastern countries and multilateral organizations in the joint management of peace and security in the ‘shared spaces’ of the Red Sea and Mediterranean is a particular challenge, especially as many of these states do not have a tradition of working in a multilateral spirit;
• Partnerships with the UN and EU (which are at an advanced stage) can be further strengthened;
• Partnership with other emerging powers (China, India, Latin American countries) need to be developed, building on historic relations of solidarity but also schooling these partners in Africa’s particular experiences and the norms and mechanisms established by the AU;
• The links between short-term peace and security tasks and longer-term mechanisms for promoting global public goods such as sustainable climate action and more equitable economic growth.

Developing a Focus on Inter-State Rivalry and Conflict

Traditionally, conflict prevention and resolution has been the task of diplomats concerned with inter-state rivalries and disputes. In Africa over the last 25 years, the focus has been squarely on internal conflicts and inter-state conflicts have been put in the background.

In contrast to the UN, Africa has adopted a normal practice according to which neighbouring states take the lead in mediating settlements to internal conflicts in member states. The assumption behind this is that the ‘frontline states’ have a good knowledge of the internal affairs of their troubled neighbour and an impartial and shared interest in resolving those troubles. However, it is evident that in many cases, part of the challenge of conflict resolution is finding an agreed settlement of the different and possibly conflicting interests of neighbours who are also rivals. This entail several tasks, including identifying the best level at which conflict resolution should be pursued (i.e. whether it should be the UN, AU or REC), and
where necessary mediating among the neighbouring mediators themselves.

Inter-state rivalries and disputes as such have also emerged as a necessary focus for conflict resolution in Africa and the shared spaces. This requires special capacity and expertise within the AU Commission.

The Shared Spaces: Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean/Sahara

One of the major drivers of conflict and fragility in Africa is the incorporation of much of the continent into the Greater Middle East trans-regional conflict cluster. From the western Sahel through the Nile Valley to the Horn of Africa, including the Sahara and the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, Africa is embroiled within the conflicts arising from the power struggles and inter-state rivalries of the Middle East. Recent experience in Libya has starkly demonstrated how African interests and expertise in managing conflicts can be overridden by external powers with other priorities and interests including an unwarranted faith in the efficacy of military solutions. Among the issues at stake in the shared spaces, demanding joint political action in pursuit of shared objectives, are the following:

- Violent extremism remains a threat. However, it is important to recall that al-Qaeda came of age in Africa, but was successfully contained and largely defeated there by the late 1990s, although it subsequently returned in a different form. Africa has largely resisted exclusivist sectarian mobilization, save when such agendas are promoted by outside interests.
- Maritime security is currently well-managed and is the focus of a remarkable transnational coordinated effort, but demands continuing attention.
- Mass distress migration is a major agenda item, including various forms of labour migration by people with very fragile or nonexistent livelihoods, refugee flows, and human trafficking. Currently, the major destinations of these migrants (Europe, the Arabian/Persian Gulf and North America) are more concerned with handling the symptoms of the problem than the underlying causes—an approach that is fated not to succeed. Africa’s heavy burden of migrants and its interests in and approach to the migration issue need to be given greater consideration.
- Transnational organized crime is a concern, notably the Atlantic littoral and trans-Saharan smuggling routes. Africa has thus far mostly subscribed to the law enforcement approach to tackling this issue, rather than seeing it as the product of political-economic dysfunction and inequality.
- The involvement of governments from outside the region (especially from the Arabian/Persian Gulf) in internal conflicts in Africa is a particularly salient issue in the Horn of Africa currently, and is particularly worrisome when those governments do not operate with sufficient understanding and respect for Africa’s multilateral norms and mechanisms. Some of these governments also seek to build alliances on the basis of religious or sectarian identity, which is fundamentally antithetical to African norms and interests.
- The unresolved issue of the Western Sahara, which is a matter of principle as well as political interests.

Conflict Management at Multiple Levels

Armed conflicts need to be prevented, mediated, managed and resolved at multiple levels, from the local through the national to the regional and trans-regional. All four of these levels require attention. This poses complex challenges for Africa’s peacemakers. Local level and internal conflict drivers have been extensively analyzed, including such issues as local ethnic conflicts, conflicts over pasture and farmland, and disputes over the organization of local government including chieftaincies. These factors
remain important and should not be overlooked. National level conflict drivers, including electoral and post-election violence, disputed power transitions, unrepresentative and undemocratic security services, and challenges to the over-centralization of power, are also important and well-documented. In addition to these, mediators need to pay attention to inter-state and regionalized conflicts, including neighbouring countries sponsoring proxies and pursuing their interests either overtly or covertly, including through involvement in peace support operations (PSOs), and indeed mediation efforts themselves. An additional element, becoming increasingly salient, is trans-regional dynamics such as the involvement of non-African parties, especially Middle Eastern countries, in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

**Political Conflict Management alongside Military Peace Support Operations**

The tradition role of peace support operation is to support the parties to a peace agreement in implementing that agreement, subsequent to a successful negotiation. However, in the last two decades, mediators have been called upon to facilitate conflict resolution in countries in which there is already an active PSO. While having the capabilities for political analysis and advice, ceasefire monitoring, logistics and protection of mediators and monitors, civilian protection and even enforcement, may be an asset, there are also difficulties, among them the fact that managing all aspects of a PSO tends to become the principal task of a senior international representative, and the interests of troop contributors in the safety of their own personnel. These situations pose a whole set of challenges to mediators that have been incompletely analysed. The challenges are especially salient in cases in which neighbouring countries are contributing troops and have their own political interests in the conflicted host country.

**Conclusion**

The African Union, as the continent's foremost multilateral institution, is obligated to provide leadership for Africa on the challenges of multilateralism in the 21st century. It should analyze systematically the current crisis and its trajectory, and the kinds of multilateralism that serve Africa's interests. It should take a lead in organizing the continent to defend and promote its interests. It should draw upon the exceptional legitimacy that multilateralism commands among Africans, because it is rooted in the Pan African movement.

The core of Africa's multilateral interests lies in the arena of conflict prevention and resolution. This has immediate and broader dimensions.

Immediately, Africa's multilateralism involves the AU and RECs acting in a stronger and coordinated manner to prevent and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts within Africa. This involves enhancing all the pillars of the African peace and security architecture, with a particular focus on (a) bringing together the AU's peace and security and political departments, (b) establishing principles and procedures for the complementary roles of the AU and RECs in dealing with conflicts, (c) enhancing the partnership and complementarity between the AU and UN, and (d) establishing political mechanisms for Africa's effective engagement with multilateral organizations in neighbouring regions, such as the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, over the 'shared spaces' of the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea.

More broadly, Africa's multilateralism involves institutions and instruments that protect Africa's broader economic, societal and environmental interests, as it is such issues that are likely to drive future conflicts. For example, the effective management of interests relating to shared natural resources such as river basins, is an essential component of conflict prevention. Similarly, the successful negotiation of Africa's interests in international trade treaties is important to employment generation, future prosperity, and the reduction in future conflict risks. Africa's array of democratic and participatory institutions, such as the Pan African Parliament, ECOSOCC and the African Court of Human and People's Rights, are instruments of soft power that should not be overlooked in any
primary focus on vital higher-profile mechanisms such as the AU Peace and Security Council.

In all of these arenas, it is essential that Africa’s role involves setting the agenda and not only participating more fully in implementing it. In the field of peace and security, Africa’s focus on inclusive negotiations in accordance with the norms of the AU Constitutive Act, is an example of agenda setting, while seeking a more equitable financial formula for contributing troops to UN peace operations is an example of implementation.