

## Ethiopia: A Test Case for UN Security Council Action Under Resolution 2417

4 March 2021

The issue of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies is on the UN Security Council's (UNSC) agenda this month. Today the UNSC will hold an 'any other business' meeting on the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia, and, on 11 March 2021, the UNSC is expected to hold a high-level video conference on food security. It is imperative that the UNSC's full attention is turned to the conflict induced food insecurity crisis in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian conflict in Tigray<sup>1</sup> serves as the first real test for the UNSC of whether it can take decisive and impactful action at the early stages of a conflict to reduce the risk of hunger or famine resulting from it,<sup>2</sup> thereby realizing one of the key objectives of UNSC Resolution 2417 (UNSC 2417).

Following the outbreak of the conflict in Ethiopia on 4 November 2020, numerous reports indicate that parties to the conflict engaged in direct or indiscriminate attacks<sup>3</sup> on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (OIS),<sup>4</sup> including agriculture and foodstuffs, medical facilities, the water supply and critical infrastructure. The Ethiopian authorities imposed a communications blackout – disconnecting electricity, phone and internet services in Tigray<sup>5</sup> and shutting down the local office of State-owned Ethio Telecom<sup>6</sup> – which persisted into February 2021 and left the region isolated.<sup>7</sup> They denied humanitarian access to the civilian population,<sup>8</sup> imposing prohibitive bureaucratic impediments on humanitarian actors.<sup>9</sup> Mass internal and cross-border displacement has also been a driver, and result, of food-insecurity in Tigray.<sup>10</sup>

Such obstructions, which form part of the prohibition of the use of starvation as a method of warfare,<sup>11</sup> severely endanger the survival of civilians in Ethiopia. As early as 19 December 2020, the European Union described Tigray as 'on the edge of a humanitarian catastrophe which risks destabilizing the whole neighbourhood,'<sup>12</sup> and reported on 22 February that 80% of the Tigray population is unreachable.<sup>13</sup> Despite reports by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) that 4.5 million people in Tigray are in need of food aid and hundreds of thousands are without access to essential medicines and basic services, humanitarian access remains severely limited.<sup>14</sup> There is a real risk of conflict induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity in Tigray, which is also contributing to the increasing unmet humanitarian needs in Sudan.<sup>15</sup> According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), much of central and eastern Tigray is faced with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) categorisation.<sup>16</sup>

If the UNSC is to meet the objectives it set through UNSC 2417,<sup>17</sup> it must operationalize the resolution by acting in a preventative manner before the consequences of conflict-related conduct lead to dire humanitarian consequences, including famine. Such intervention falls within the primary responsibility of the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security, its commitment to addressing conflict-induced food insecurity and famine,<sup>18</sup> and its longstanding responsibility towards the protection of civilians.

No concrete action has been taken by the UNSC during its meetings on Ethiopia<sup>19</sup> since the start of the crisis. The full attention of the UNSC is now required. As per paragraph 12 of UNSC 2417, the UNSC should require the UN Secretary-General to report swiftly to the Council and urgently consider the range of options available under the purview of UNSC 2417, with a view to preventing the starvation of civilians affected by the armed conflict in Ethiopia.

### What is the scope and purpose of UNSC Resolution 2417?

UNSC 2417 was unanimously adopted on 24 May 2018 following active engagement by the UNSC on issues related to famine and conflict in multiple country contexts.<sup>20</sup> In adopting the resolution, the UNSC recognized the link between conflict and hunger and condemned the use of starvation as a method of warfare, emphasizing that it may constitute a war crime. The UNSC urged States to conduct independent, impartial, full, prompt and effective investigations into violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) related to the starvation of civilians and hold those responsible to account.

The Resolution reflects the will of the UNSC to remain seized of the matter by requesting the UN Secretary-General to ‘provide information on the risk of famine and food insecurity in countries with armed conflict as part of his [annual] reporting on country-specific situations’ and to ‘report swiftly to the Council when the risk of conflict-induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity in armed conflict contexts occurs.’ By expressing ‘its intention to give its full attention to such information provided by the Secretary-General when [reports falling into the latter category] are brought to its attention,’ the UNSC expressed its desire to respond in a timely and effective manner to situations in which serious threats to humanitarian needs resulting from conflict arise. As such, UNSC 2417 aims not only to achieve prohibitive and accountability objectives, but to also operate as an essential preventative tool that protects civilian populations from conduct violating IHL that threatens their humanitarian needs.

### UNSC Resolution 2417 should serve as a preventative tool

To serve as an effective tool in such situations and achieve its preventative aims, the impetus is on UNSC Member States to ensure UNSC 2417 is triggered upon early warning of a conflict-related humanitarian crisis. Prior to and following the adoption of UNSC 2417, the UNSC, through Presidential statements, has called on the Secretary General to ‘provide early warning when a conflict having devastating humanitarian consequences and hindering an effective humanitarian response risks leading to an outbreak of famine’<sup>21</sup> and Member States ‘to support relevant early warning systems ... allowing for anticipation and early action to prevent and mitigate the effects of a food crisis in the context of armed conflicts.’<sup>22</sup>

Following UNSC 2417, UN OCHA submitted confidential white papers raising alarm about the critical humanitarian situations induced by the conflicts in South Sudan and Yemen to the UNSC,<sup>23</sup> which led to UNSC action, with food insecurity the hallmark of its resolutions.<sup>24</sup> Notwithstanding the fact that the conflict in Ethiopia appears to share similar factors to those found in South Sudan and Yemen, Ethiopia can be clearly distinguished from previous UNSC action under 2417 in light of the stage of the conflict. Seized of the matter at this critical early stage, the situation in Ethiopia serves as a test for the UNSC on act on early warnings of the risk of hunger or famine resulting from conflict.

Acting preventatively when there is a reasonable basis to do so – through information provided by Member States, UN actors and/or the UN Secretary General, or indeed other actors – does not require the UNSC to make a determination about whether any party to the conflict or individual is accountable for any violations of international law applicable during armed conflict. Indeed, requiring the UNSC to reach a level of certainty that parties to the conflict or individuals were responsible for violations of international law before it could take action

would undermine the objectives of UNSC 2417 to ‘break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity’ and ‘address conflict-induced food insecurity, including famine, in situations of armed conflict.’<sup>25</sup>

### What should the UNSC do in response to the situation in Ethiopia?

The situation in Ethiopia and, in particular, the Tigray region, clearly warrants preventative action by the UNSC. International and regional bodies and multiple States have already called for decisive action to address the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia. On 2 February 2021, the UN Secretary General “underline[d] the need for continued urgent steps to alleviate the humanitarian situation and extend the necessary protections to those at risk.”<sup>26</sup> The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,<sup>27</sup> the EU,<sup>28</sup> the United States,<sup>29</sup> Ireland,<sup>30</sup> France,<sup>31</sup> Germany<sup>32</sup> and the UK,<sup>33</sup> among others, have called on the parties to the conflict to guarantee unhindered humanitarian access. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the EU and the United States also called for an independent and impartial investigation into allegations that parties to the conflict committed war crimes and serious violations of international human rights law.<sup>34</sup>

The UNSC should take action with a view to preventing violations of international law and improving the humanitarian situation of the civilian population in Ethiopia. Under UNSC 2417, there are a range of tools available to meet its preventative aims, the following of which are appropriate for the UNSC to take in the circumstances.

#### *Provision of humanitarian assistance*<sup>35</sup>

- Calling on parties concerned, including neighbouring States, to allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, and unimpeded access of relief personnel, equipment and supplies to all those in need, including internally displaced persons and refugees, and remove any bureaucratic impediments to the flow of humanitarian supplies.
- Calling upon Member States to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Ethiopia of humanitarian personnel and relief supplies and, where appropriate, to provide gender and age sensitive humanitarian assistance.

In light of reports indicating that most of the Tigray region is inaccessible and the significant humanitarian needs of the civilian population, the obligation to allow and facilitate humanitarian access under IHL must be reaffirmed for normative purposes and to ensure ongoing monitoring of access can be reported on by humanitarian actors and the UN Secretary General (see below).

#### *Affirming State obligations with respect to conflict and hunger*<sup>36</sup>

- Calling on all parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law, including IHL and, where appropriate, international human rights law, to respect and protect civilians and civilian objects and humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations.

- Calling on parties to the conflict, and affected States, to comply with international law, in particular IHL, international human rights law and refugee law, regarding respecting and protecting civilians displaced by the conflict, whether internally or cross-border.

As the bearer of primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, affirmative statements by the UNSC calling on parties to a conflict to adhere to their obligations under international law has undeniable normative value, particularly in context-specific situations. In this context, in which the Ethiopian authorities have maintained they are engaged in a law enforcement operation,<sup>37</sup> affirming the application of international law and the concomitant duties imposed on parties to the conflict serves a necessary role in reiterating the applicable obligations and framing the lens through which the situation is viewed and subsequent measures taken by decision makers.

#### *Investigating allegations and preserving evidence<sup>38</sup>*

- Strongly urging States, including through the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and/or the UN Human Rights Council, to establish an independent and impartial fact-finding mission to investigate alleged violations of international law committed by parties to the conflict, including an explicit mandate to investigate attacks on OIS, restrictions on humanitarian assistance and other starvation-related conduct, with a view to preserving evidence and identifying perpetrators, and reporting swiftly to the UNSC, among other bodies.
- Requesting states to conduct, in an independent manner, full, prompt, impartial and effective investigations within their jurisdiction of such conduct and, where appropriate, to take action against those responsible in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.

Given the present gaps in information and the lack of an explicitly mandated body to investigate allegations of violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL in the conflict in Ethiopia, the UNSC should urge States to fill the information gap and ensure any allegations can be verified through an independent, impartial, prompt, effective and thorough investigation.<sup>39</sup> Any investigation should include an expert in conflict-induced hunger and starvation related crimes to ensure they are adequately documented and addressed in any conclusions and recommendations.

#### *Ongoing monitoring and further action<sup>40</sup>*

- Requesting States to bring to the UNSC's attention information regarding the attacks on OIS and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access in violation of international law in Ethiopia.
- Requesting the UN Secretary General to report to the UNSC within 30 days, and thereafter every 30 days, on the situation, including on food insecurity, humanitarian access and any attacks on OIS and other violations of international law, so that the UNSC may consider such information and take appropriate steps.



- Establishing a UN focal point on UNSC 2417 to report to the UN Secretary General and UNSC on a regular basis, as well as on an *ad hoc* basis when threats of conflict-induced hunger arise.

One of the key obstacles to effective responses to hunger and conflict is the absence of verifiable information about particular country contexts. Under UNSC 2417, there is no formal mechanism by which information can be directed to the UN Secretary General to fulfill his or her reporting function under the resolution, whether on an annual or urgent basis. Accordingly, the UN Secretary General and, consequently, the UNSC is reliant on the submission of information on an informal basis or through regular briefings by UN actors such as UN OCHA. This undermines the extent to which certain actors, including humanitarian actors, can securely provide relevant information to the UN Secretary General, which can result in delays in action necessary to prevent conflict-induced hunger.

Particularly given the extent to which it currently threatens peace and security in the region, the situation in Ethiopia is one that warrants regular reporting by the UN Secretary-General. This will ensure the UNSC can remain apprised of the ongoing humanitarian risks faced by the civilian population as a result of the conflict and take swift action to prevent it from eventuating. It will also enable the UNSC to make decisions about the appropriateness of other measures under UNSC 2417, such as the imposition of sanctions,<sup>41</sup> in response to evidence of the commission of war crimes or serious violations of IHRL

More generally, to fill the information gap, a UN focal point on UNSC 2417 would allow coordinated and regular reporting to support the UN Secretary General on a regular and *ad hoc* basis, and in relation to country- or conflict-specific situations. Such a role would enable the UNSC to meet the preventative goals of UNSC 2417 by receiving up-to-date information on a timely basis and reacting more swiftly when the need arises.

## WHO WE ARE

**Global Rights Compliance** is a foundation made up of international lawyers and development experts focused on “democratising” complex international human rights, criminal and humanitarian law. Drawing on decades of experience in conflict affected areas and transitional justice environments our “root and branch” philosophy combines innovative full spectrum accountability strategies, building the capacity of States to implement international humanitarian and human rights standards, bespoke expertise in evidence gathering in conflict settings, and assisting communities to seek remedies for violations. We possess unrivalled global expertise and granular knowledge on the crime of starvation and right to food violations, derived from a dedicated starvation portfolio established in 2017.

**World Peace Foundation** is an operating foundation affiliated with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. It aims to provide intellectual leadership on issues of peace, justice and security. Alex de Waal is the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation. Considered one of the foremost academics on Sudan and the Horn of Africa, his scholarly work and practice on famines is unparalleled. He was a member of the African Union mediation team for Darfur (2005-2006) and senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (2009-2012) and on the list of Foreign Policy’s 100 most influential public intellectuals in 2008.



<sup>1</sup> For more detail regarding the conflict and parties involved, see Council on Foreign Relations, [The Conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Region: What to Know](#), 10 February 2021; HRW, [Q&A: Conflict in Ethiopia and International Law](#), 25 November 2020; David Matyas, [The Tigrayan Conflict and the Laws of Humanitarian Assistance](#), *Opinio Juris*, 22 November 2020.

<sup>2</sup> See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), [Ethiopia: Situation Report](#), 28 February 2021, p.2.

<sup>3</sup> For direct attacks, including looting of OIS see: Amnesty International, [Demand full humanitarian access into Tigray](#); Oxfam, [Conflict compounded by Covid-19 and climate change pushes millions in Tigray to the brink](#), 22 January 2021; The Economist, [Soldiers have killed hundreds of civilians in Tigray](#), 27 February 2021; CNN, [Massacre in the mountains](#), 1 March 2021; Vice World News, ["They Started Burning the Homes": Ethiopians Say Their Towns Are Being Razed in Ethnic Cleansing Campaign](#), 27 February 2021; World Peace Foundation, [Who Will Call Out Eritrea's War Crimes in Tigray?](#) 23 December 2020; AP News, [Witnesses: Eritrean soldiers loot, kill in Ethiopia's Tigray](#), 26 January 2021; The Guardian, [Slaughtered like chickens': Eritrea heavily involved in Tigray conflict, say eyewitnesses](#), 21 December 2020. For attacks which could be direct or indiscriminate, see HRW, [Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling of Tigray Urban Areas, UN Inquiry Needed into Alleged Violations by Warring Parties](#), 11 February 2021.

<sup>4</sup> Objects indispensable to survival are non-exhaustively defined in [article 54 of Additional Protocol I](#) (applicable in international armed conflicts) and [article 14 of Additional Protocol II](#) (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions as 'foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.' Objects such as clothing, shelter, fuel and electricity may be included, depending on the specific circumstances. [International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\) Commentary to the Additional Protocols](#), p. 655, para 2103; Practice Relating to [Rule 54, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law \(IHL\) Database](#), referring to a statement of 1998 by the UN Security Council.

<sup>5</sup> [The New Humanitarian](#), [Relief for Tigray stalled as Ethiopian government curbs access](#), 11 February 2021; HRW, [Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling of Tigray Urban Areas, UN Inquiry Needed into Alleged Violations by Warring Parties](#), 11 February 2021.

<sup>6</sup> BBC News, [Tigray crisis: Ethiopia orders military response after army base seized](#), 4 November 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, [The Conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Region: What to Know](#), 10 February 2021. Banks were also closed at the commencement of the conflict. BBC News, [Tigray crisis: Ethiopia orders military response after army base seized](#), 4 November 2020. Electricity and banking services remain accessible only in major towns. [UNFPA Ethiopia Response to the Tigray Crisis, Situation Report #1](#), 16-31 January 2021, p.2. See also MSF, [Ethiopia: "If seriously ill people can't get to hospital, you can imagine the consequences"](#), 1 February 2021 (the communications blackout posed enormous challenges for enormous logistical challenge for humanitarian organisations attempting to provide humanitarian relief).

<sup>8</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Update: Situation Report](#), 28 February 2021, p. 3; The New York Times, [Why is Ethiopia at War With Itself?](#), 12 February 2021; Norwegian Refugee Council, [Statement by Secretary General Jan Egeland: Aid still not reaching Tigray](#), 01 February 2021.

<sup>9</sup> The Economist, [Ethiopia's government appears to be wielding hunger as a weapon](#), 23 January 2021.

<sup>10</sup> UN OCHA, [Ethiopia: Access Snapshot – Tigray Region](#), 19 January 2021; UN OCHA, [Ethiopia: Access Snapshot – Tigray Region](#), 28 February 2021; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), [Ethiopia: Situation Report](#), 28 February 2021; UNHCR UK, [UNHCR finds dire need in Eritrean refugee camps cut off in Tigray conflict](#), 19 January 2021. See also HRW, [Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling of Tigray Urban Areas, UN Inquiry Needed into Alleged Violations by Warring Parties](#), 11 February 2021.

<sup>11</sup> [Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, article 54\(1\)](#); [Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 14](#). As corollaries to the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare, it is prohibited to deny access to humanitarian aid intended for civilians in need, including to deliberately impede humanitarian aid and restrict the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel. See article 23 of the [Geneva Convention IV](#), articles 70(2) and 71(3) of [Additional Protocol I](#), and Rule 55 of the [ICRC Customary IHL Database](#).

<sup>12</sup> European Commission, [Tigray conflict: EU increases humanitarian support by €23.7 million in Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya](#), 19 December 2020. See also [Foreign Secretary statement following a meeting with the Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister](#), 25 November 2020 (noting as early as 25 November 2020 a 'looming humanitarian crisis').

<sup>13</sup> Preliminary remarks by Josep Borrell, [EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, during the Press Conference following the Foreign Affairs Council](#), 22 February 2021, at 5:00 – 5:30.

<sup>14</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Update: Situation Report](#), 28 February 2021, pp. 3, 8; UN OCHA, [Ethiopia: Access Snapshot – Tigray Region](#), 28 February 2021. See also World Food Programme, [WFP appeals for US\\$ 107 million to tackle food security and nutrition in Ethiopia's Tigray Region](#), 26 February 2021. UN requests for a six-month blanket travel permission has not been granted. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/2/11/Humanitarian-access-stalled-in-Ethiopia-Tigray>.

<sup>15</sup> UN OCHA, [Sudan: Situation Report](#), 1 March 2021, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> FEWS NET, [Continued conflict in Tigray coupled with low economic activity drives Emergency \(IPC Phase 4\)](#), January 2021.

<sup>17</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#).



<sup>18</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#) preamble. See also UNSC, [Presidential statement on conflict-induced hunger](#) (29 April 2020).

<sup>19</sup> On 24 November 2020, 14 December 2020 and 3 February 2021 the UNSC held meetings on the crisis under the 'other business' item of consultation, see <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/02/ethiopia-tigray-council-members-to-discuss-the-humanitarian-situation.php>. The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have attempted to broker peace talks, although these efforts have thus far appeared to gain little traction. See, e.g. South African Government, [The Presidency on visit of the African Union Envoys to Ethiopia](#), 30 November 2020.

<sup>20</sup> See, e.g. UNSC Res 2057 (5 July 2012) [UN Doc S/Res/2057](#) (South Sudan); UNSC Presidential Statement (3 August 2011) [UN Doc S.PRST/2011/16](#) (Syria); UNSC Res 2042 (14 April 2012) [UN Doc S/Res/2042](#) (Syria); UNSC Res 2140 (26 February 2014) [UN Doc S/RES/2140](#) (Yemen).

<sup>21</sup> UNSC, [Presidential Statement on the threat of famine in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and north-east Nigeria](#) (9 August 2017).

<sup>22</sup> UNSC, [Presidential statement on conflict-induced hunger](#) (29 April 2020).

<sup>23</sup> Both White Papers were confidential. See [What's in Blue, South Sudan Consultations](#) (9 August 2018) and UN Security Council Report, [Yemen](#) (October 2018).

<sup>24</sup> UNSC Res 2451 (21 December 2018) [UN Doc S/Res/2451](#); UNSC Res 2431 (30 July 2018) [UN Docs S/RES/2431](#), para. 51; UNSC Res 2472 (31 May 2019) [UN Docs S/RES/2472](#), para. 31; UNSC Res 2520 (29 May 2020) [UN Docs S/RES/2520](#), para. 35.

<sup>25</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#) preamble.

<sup>26</sup> [Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Ethiopia](#), Stephane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, 2 February 2021.

<sup>27</sup> OHCHR, [Provide unhindered access to whole of Tigray to protect civilians, Bachelet urges Ethiopia](#), 22 Dec 2020; OHCHR, [Bachelet updates Human Rights Council on recent human rights issues in more than 50 countries](#), 26 Feb 2021.

<sup>28</sup> [Preliminary remarks by Josep Borrell](#), EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, during the Press Conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, 22 February 2021, at 4:38 – 6:42. See also [Ethiopia: Joint-Statement by High-Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell, Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen and Commissioner Janez Lenarčič](#), 8 Feb 2021; [Tigray conflict: Joint Statement by HR/VP Borrell and Commissioner Lenarčič on massacres in Axum](#), 26 Feb 2021.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of State, Atrocities in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, [Press Statement](#), 27 Feb 2021; Reuters, [U.S. calls on African Union to exert pressure over worsening crisis in Ethiopia's Tigray](#), 1 Mar 2021.

<sup>30</sup> [Minister Coveney announces €2.4 million Irish Aid response to Ethiopia Humanitarian Crisis](#), 4 Dec 2020.

<sup>31</sup> Ethiopia - [Situation in Tigray](#) (29 January 2021).

<sup>32</sup> [Ethiopia: German-Ethiopian Relations Suffer Over Tigray](#), 22 Feb 2021.

<sup>33</sup> [Foreign Secretary statement following a meeting with the Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister](#), 25 November 2020,

<sup>34</sup> OHCHR, [Bachelet updates Human Rights Council on recent human rights issues in more than 50 countries](#), 26 Feb 2021;

<sup>35</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#), paragraphs 3 and 4; [Preliminary remarks by Josep Borrell](#), EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, during the Press Conference following the Foreign Affairs Council, 22 February 2021, at 4:38 – 6:42; U.S. Department of State, Atrocities in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, [Press Statement](#), 27 Feb 2021;

<sup>36</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#), preamble and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 7 and 8.

<sup>37</sup> See, Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, London UK, [The law enforcement operation in Tigray and the media: Lessons learnt](#), 1 January 2021.

<sup>38</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#), paragraph 10.

<sup>39</sup> The OHCHR has indicated its willingness to support a credible investigation. See OHCHR, 46<sup>th</sup> Session of Human Rights Council, Item 2 – High Commissioner's Oral Update, [Statement by Michelle Bachelet](#), UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 26 February 2021.

<sup>40</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#), paragraphs 4 and 12.

<sup>41</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (24 May 2018) [UN Doc S/RES/2417](#), paragraph 9.