Currently viewing the tag: "South Sudan"

Global Rights Compliance (GRC) and the World Peace Foundation (WPF) at The Fletcher School (Tufts University), partners in the project “Accountability for Starvation: Testing the Limits of the Law” have published a series of memos documenting how existing international law might apply to starvation conditions, and why it should be applied to Syria, South […]

Continue Reading

In South Sudan’s political marketplace, a bad peace deal—or a badly-implemented peace deal—can be as bad as no deal at all. A collapsing peace deal has the potential of unleashing exceptionally severe violence.

According to the ‘do no harm’ precept, those who design peace agreements and steer their implementation, should not allow optimism of the […]

Continue Reading

In March 1990, Africa Watch (the Africa division of Human Rights Watch) published a report on Sudan entitled Denying ‘The Honor of Living,’ Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster. Chapter 4 was entitled ‘Starvation as a Weapon of War’. It was the first HRW report to document links between human rights violations and the […]

Continue Reading

The Conflict and Research Programme at the London School of Economics, of which WPF is a partner, has just published a new South Sudan Policy Memo, “The Perils of Payroll Peace.”

South Sudan’s peace is structured to create material incentives for political elites and soldiers to stick to the agreement. But it also […]

Continue Reading

This month’s Employee of the Month comes to us via Annie Fairchild and Catriona Murdoch, both of our partner organization, Global Rights Compliance.

In light of the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2417, September’s Employee of the Month is Starvation, and specifically those political and military leaders who have continued to utilise starvation as […]

Continue Reading

The sanctions were maintained because the Sudanese government has an extremely poor record on human rights and democracy. But if sanctions are to serve as any kind of incentive for the government to change its behavior, they will only work if they are credible—that is, if they are lifted when the government does what is asked of it. If the sanctioning country changes the criteria every time the sanctions come up for review, they cease to be an instrument of policy and simply become a signal of condemnation.

Continue Reading

Tufts Privacy & Terms of Use Policies