

Social Choice 2/23/21 - spoilers

1. Suppose $W=\{A,B\}$ in an election with candidates A through Z, and $W'=\{B\}$ after Q is removed. Just based on this evidence, what can we conclude for sure?

- A A is a winning spoiler.
- B A is a losing spoiler.
- C Q is a winning spoiler.
- D Q is a losing spoiler.
- E There are no spoilers.
- F Inconclusive. (You might have to check other candidates.)

spoiler because "weird" effect:
 $W \neq W'$ and $W \neq W' \cup \{Q\}$
losing spoiler because $Q \notin W$

2. From lecture: What does "two-way fairness" have to do with spoilers?

- A Every 2WF election system admits spoilers. Since 2WF is absolutely basic to democracy, we better not demand that systems be spoiler-proof, so we should start refining the concept.
- B 2WF systems are spoiler-proof, so if we don't want spoilers, we better insist on 2WF. This means that Borda count is an especially bad choice.
- C Only Dictatorship is both 2WF and spoiler-proof. So that system looks better every day!

"two-way fair" means that if there are only two candidates, the winner is the one with more votes.

We showed that any 2WF system admits spoilers — the proof used a simple Condorcet cycle.

We can't have both! Since 2WF is more basic, we better give up on spoiler-proofness.