
Kenya Short Mission Brief, Kenya

I. Activity Summary:

Overview

Kenya's descent into violence in the aftermath of 2007's disputed elections came as a shock to many both in Africa and around the world, especially given the nation's reputation as a regional success story. However, as subsequent commentators have noted, the political problems and ethnic divisions that eventually led to conflict had been present and festering, unaddressed, since Kenya's independence in 1963.

The subsequent African Union (and UN supported) mediation effort, led by Kofi Annan, is widely considered a success story, both for ending the immediate violence and for creating a coalition government with a mandate to make constitutional and institutional changes aimed at addressing the roots of the conflict. However, a number of major issues, such as accountability for past violence, land ownership, and the resettlement of IDPs, remain largely unresolved. It remains to be seen whether the post-elections reforms sparked a process robust enough to prevent future violent instability.

Background

Kenya's first post-independence president, Jomo Kenyatta, ruled Kenya as a one-party state and was widely believed by Kenya's other 41 ethnic groups to have unfairly favored his own Agikuyu^[i] co-ethnics in such key areas as the redistribution of fertile farmland left by departing British settlers. Kenyatta was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi, who was similarly believed to favor his own group, the Kalenjin, as well as those of Agikuyu elite whose support he depended upon to keep power.

Internal protest and international pressure forced Moi to hold multi-party elections starting in 1992, though he was able, partially through manipulation of patronage, to keep power until 2002. He was succeeded in a reasonably free and fair election by Mwai Kibaki, at the head of a broad coalition, though himself Agikuyu. Each of these elections was surrounded by sporadic inter-communal violence as well as legally dubious or de facto reallocations of valuable land, and each produced increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), who had generally not been resettled by the time the next round of violence and displacement began. As of 2002, there were roughly 350,000 displaced people still awaiting resettlement.^[ii]

The 2007 Elections and the Outbreak of Violence

In the 2007 elections, Kibaki faced off against challenger Raila Odinga, who had positioned himself as the representative of ethnic groups, like his own Luo, who had not yet "had their turn" controlling the patronage resources of the presidency, the font of most power and resources in Kenya's centralized, "winner take all" political system. Susan Mueller has insightfully described the subsequent crisis, after the 2007 elections, as "a reflection of failed attempts by the power elite to agree on how to devolve power from the imperial presidency to a reformed, but integrated executive" in the post-dictatorship era.^[iii]

The election was close, with Kibaki claiming victory by a very small margin. Odinga rejected the result, credibly alleging numerous problems with election, “including the appointment of commissioners to the Elections Commission of Kenya (ECK), voter registration, and allegations of voter intimidation by the state and vote rigging.”^[iv] As Laibuta has noted, all of these problems had been pointed out as potential issues before by the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as part of Kenya’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process^[v], and yet all had been ignored by the government and the ECK.^[vi]

In the wake of the disputed election, what began as spontaneous protests against Kibaki in several regions of the country grew into targeted militia action by various groups against Agikuyu civilians, swiftly followed by reprisal attacks from Agikuyu militias.^[vii] Kenyan security services, often poorly paid and poorly trained, were not only unable to halt the violence, but were later found to have significantly contributed to it, committing numerous serious human rights abuses.^[viii] By the time the violence finally ended in April of 2008, roughly 2,000 people were dead and somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000 had been displaced, at an estimated cost to the Kenyan economy of \$1.5 billion.^[ix] Despite extensive efforts by the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to develop early warning systems in the region, neither had seen the conflict coming.^[x]

Getting to the Table: Early Mediation Efforts

In the chaos immediately following the December 27th election, a number of actors quickly pushed to halt the violence and begin a mediation process. An early eminent arrival was South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who arrived on behalf of the All Africa Conference of Churches three days after clashes began. Tutu was quickly able to meet with Odinga and secure his commitment to participate in international mediation efforts, though the opposition leader at first declared a power-sharing deal off the table. Kibaki initially refused to meet with Tutu, maintaining that the violence was a Kenyan internal matter. He eventually reversed himself under immense pressure from the international community, which was extremely concerned about the destabilizing regional effects if violence were to spread and escalate. However, meeting with Tutu, he maintained that the violence had to stop before any talks could be held, and that foreign mediators were unnecessary.^[xi]

While Tutu’s visit was not immediately successful, it did signal a very high level of international concern (major donors threatened to suspend assistance until Kibaki agreed to mediation) and significantly raise the external pressure to negotiate faced by both parties.^[xii] There was also high-level engagement across the board. Africa Forum members, former presidents Kenneth Kaunda, Quett Masire and Joachim Chissano came three times during January. Jendayi Frazier, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, also came and spent two weeks in Kenya. The UN Secretary-General was very fast in acting on the crisis and dispatched the first UN team to Nairobi on January 5. Another significant party calling for peace talks was an organized group of Kenyan business elite including many who had helped bring Kibaki to power five years previously. This combined internal and external pressure paved the way for then-President of the African Union John Kufour’s visit on January 8th and led Kibaki to reverse his position on accepting external mediation.^[xiii]

Kufour managed to persuade Odinga and Kibaki to accept an AU mediation chaired by Kofi Annan, whose team soon expanded to include former President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa and Dame Graça Machel-Mandela (known formally as the Panel of Eminent African Personalities). Odinga was ready to accept international mediation from the outset. President Kibaki was reluctant, and Kufuor actually had to trick Kibaki into accepting any mediation at all. At his departure, at the steps of his aircraft, when Kibaki and his team were eager to see Kufuor to board and disappear with empty hands, the Ghanaian President asked Kibaki, as if naively, whether he would accept a mediator from him, as the current President of the AU. Kibaki said “yes”. Kufuor left saying nothing further on mediation.

The following morning the ambassador of Ghana in Nairobi delivered formal letters to Kibaki and Odinga from Kufuor on the appointment of the Panel of Eminent Personalities led by Annan to mediate in the crisis. The letters referred to the previously achieved oral consent of the two leaders. Kibaki was not able to decline this, which could potentially lead to his isolation on the continent by the AU. As Khadiagala notes, while it had become fairly common for highly respected African figures to mediate disputes, this was the first time that three such figures had been included on one panel, one sign of the high importance the AU and international actors in general placed on a quick resolution and return to stability. [\[xiv\]](#)

The Annan Mediation

The AU mediation team first sat down with Odinga, Kibaki, and their respective teams on January 22nd. Annan had conditioned his participation on his mediation being the “only game in town”, in contrast to past regional crises, where several actors would attempt to mediate simultaneously and without coordination, leading to forum shopping by the conflicting parties. Indeed, the choice of Annan was partly in order to be able to unify international efforts in this manner. As a result, the Annan effort received full-throated public support from virtual all major international actors, greatly increasing the “muscle” of the mediation team. [\[xv\]](#)

The day before, the AU Peace and Security Council had issued a Communiqué supporting Annan’s effort. [\[xvi\]](#) A week thereafter, during a fortuitously-timed meeting of the AU Assembly, the AU would release its only Resolution [\[xvii\]](#) on the issue, which called for the parties to commit themselves to the Annan process and dialogue generally. However, critics of the AU response have pointed out that while these documents called on the AU Commission to closely monitor the situation and report back, there is no evidence that these reports actually took place, and neither did they “identify concrete actions to be taken during the mediation process or provide a framework for the AU Assembly to monitor the process.” [\[xviii\]](#)

The United Nations Security Council chose to leave the situation to Annan and the AU, issuing a statement pledging full support for the mediation on February 6. More concretely, the UN also assisted by lending staff members who conducted analysis, offered policy advice, and generally served as staff support to Annan’s team. [\[xix\]](#) The entire mediation, although AU in name, was financially, logistically and staff-wise supported by the UN. A special support trust fund was established by UNDP/-Kenya to receive contributions, as the whole exercise was an extra-budgetary exercise and could not be financed from regular sources. A dozen of UN staffers were permanently assigned to the mediation, and the UN provided information technology, conference services, etc. The UN team worked discreetly in support of the mediation and produced vital documents beginning with the draft for the agenda for the talks.

Annan has noted that his AU mandate was “very short – almost one line” essentially empowering him to use own judgment, a lack of restriction he found helpful in this case. [\[xx\]](#) One key element of his approach was continuous, in-depth, and wide-ranging consultation with various Kenyan interest and civil society groups, as well as the media, both before and during the formal mediation process, which was fittingly named the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process (KNDRP). This approach created a sense of domestic ownership over the process, raised issues important to citizens that the parties might otherwise have overlooked, and created cross-pressure on Kibaki and Odinga from within their far-from-united constituencies. [\[xxi\]](#)

Consequently, public support for the process remained high. Further, beyond the gatherings of the various negotiation teams, Annan insisted on regular meetings with Kibaki and Odinga personally as the process continued, in order to get their personal approval for various points and avoid later disavowals. [\[xxii\]](#)

The mediation team overall adopted a “building block” approach – beginning with less challenging issues to build the confidence to deal with more contentious ones. The basic agenda agreed upon by the parties was as follows:

“Agenda One: immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental human rights.

Agenda Two: addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting national reconciliation.

Agenda Three: negotiations on how to overcome the current political crisis.

Agenda Four: Developing long-term strategies for durable peace.”[\[xxiii\]](#)

By February, the parties had agreed on a plan for ending the violence focused on disarming militias and ending security force abuses. Observers have pointed out that this was largely in the interests of the parties in any case, as they were gradually losing control of their more violent supporters as the conflict assumed its own momentum, as well as experiencing ever-increasing pushback from constituencies whose business and personal interests were suffering.

Other issues were more difficult, but by the end of February Odinga and Kibaki had reluctantly agreed on a political power-sharing agreement that would leave Kibaki as President and give Odinga the newly created, and fairly powerful, position of Prime Minister. Both signed the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ on February 28, 2008. Notably, in an attempt to stay at least somewhat within the boundaries of Kenyan law and avoid further institutional erosion, this agreement became the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, later passed by parliament as an amendment to the Kenyan Constitution.

The larger idea behind this settlement was that the resulting Grand Coalition government – a major expansion and large expense, with a 40-person cabinet – would be able to craft a new constitution as well as (informed by a national dialogue process) a series of major legal and institutional reforms that would address Kenya’s deep-rooted political/structural problems and halt the worsening cycle of elections followed by violence.[\[xxiv\]](#) With all major parties involved, it was hoped, there would be strong incentives to break from the extreme centralization and winner-take-all structures of the past, decreasing future motivation to fight over the presidency as the only prize worth having.

The most pressing issues having been resolved, Annan departed and his place as lead negotiator was taken by Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji. Adeniji’s role was to work out many of the details of Agenda Four, the plan for durable peace, but the attention and commitment of the parties quickly decreased as the new government formed and began operating. As Juma notes, he was mostly able to finalize arrangements for already-agreed upon follow-up mechanisms – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the Independent Review Commission on the 2007 elections and the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV, often known as the Waki Commission).[\[xxv\]](#) Throughout this period Annan remained closely in touch, using his leverage and suasion to good effect.

However, the Annan team, and by extension the African Union, were aware that the ambitious reform agenda laid out in the agreement would need to be supported and monitored to make sure it was actually implemented. To that end, the AU passed a resolution[\[xxvi\]](#) calling on the Annan team to provide continuing support to the new government as implementation took place, which they did by establishing Coordination and Liaison Office in Nairobi to oversee the process. Further, the Kofi Annan Foundation convened periodic follow-up meetings bringing together stakeholders in the mediation effort, civil society leaders, and other relevant experts to review and issue reports concerning reform progress.[\[xxvii\]](#)

Aftermath

In terms of halting and preventing violence (at least in short term) the Annan team's effort must be called a success. The new Constitution passed a popular referendum in 2010 with 66% of the vote.^[xxviii] It included or was passed alongside numerous decentralization provisions and other institutional reforms. The 2013 Presidential elections, monitored by an AU observer mission (AUEOM)^[xxix], were largely peaceful, and judged to be generally free and fair.

However, there is reason for long-term concern. Despite the work of TRC and the Waki Commission (CIPEV), few have been prosecuted for their role in organizing or executing the post-election violence. As part of the post-election settlement, the parties had agreed that if Kenya proved unable within a certain period of time to set up a tribunal to try high-level perpetrators, the matter – and a list of major suspects – would be turned over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, when the new government proved unwilling to follow through, the ICC's Prosecutor (for the first time) chose to pursue indictments through "proprio motu", or through his own authority and judgment. When the ICC issued these indictments in 2011, there was a tremendous outcry from the Agikuyu and Kalenjin communities, as both of their major political leaders, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, were charged. This had the perverse effect of driving these two communities, the major antagonists on opposite sides of the 2007 conflict, to form a political alliance, Jubilee.

This alliance was successful – the 2013 elections saw Kenyatta elected President and Ruto Vice President. Consequently, it is somewhat difficult to tell how much of the comparative peace of these elections was due to the success of political/structural reforms, and how much due to this pragmatic alliance of former adversaries. Worryingly, post-election polls found that while over 90% of Kalenjin and Agikuyu found the 2013 contest fair, only 72% of the nation as a whole agreed.^[xxx] Many observers have voiced the opinion that the 2007 violence and specter of state failure scared the Kenyan population as a whole into a "peace at any cost" mentality for a time, but that this fear is unlikely to suppress political discontent forever.

Since 2013, this unrest has been highest in the north and west, dominated by non-Kalenjin and Agikuyu ethnic groups who have voiced accusations that the ruling party is favoring their own co-ethnics when it comes to IDP resettlement and other government services.^[xxxi] A huge backlog of IDPs wait to be resettled, and long-standing grievances over land allocation have yet to be effectively addressed. Overall, it remains to be seen whether or not Kenya will keep making progress toward resolving the underlying issues that led to violence, or whether it has merely shifted grievances and purchased a temporary reprieve.

II. Key Issues, Dilemmas, and Lessons From Kenya

1. Failure of early warning & AU peer review

As noted previously, Kenya's post-electoral violence came as a surprise to many. However, after the fact, considering the steadily escalating violence after every previous election, along with the ethnic, political, and structural weaknesses previously noted, conflict seemed over-determined. This oversight clearly reveals weaknesses in regional, continental, and global early warning systems, in particular an inability to examine the fundamentals of state stability and question conventional wisdom as to which states are and are not at risk.

It also underlines some weaknesses of the African Peer Review Mechanism, which had uncovered some of Kenya's electoral flaws but been unable to either persuade or pressure (either directly or by effectively publicizing results) the Kenya government to take action to address these issues.

2. Virtues of strong and coordinated backing of a sole mediation

Kofi Annan has repeatedly identified the international community's respect, and strong support for, his team's role as sole mediator as being absolutely key to its rapid success. The Kibaki government reportedly refused international mediation at first in the belief that international attention would quickly abate, allowing it to hold on to its dubious electoral victory and handle the matter internally. Several actors worked in tandem to challenge this perception. Archbishop Tutu and AU President Kufour's visits before mediation, the appointment of not one but three major African figures to the mediation team, and the US, UK, and other players willingness to bring their considerable leverage to bear in support of the Annan team's agenda, made it clear that there be no return to business as usual without a deal – a deal that could be struck only through cooperation with Annan.

3. Virtues of a rapid response

The quick and intensive international response shortly after violence broke out helped convince all sides that, essentially, they were being watched. Thus, the risk of actively promoting further violence became greater than the potential leverage and intimidation value of doing so. Given this dynamic, it is likely that much of the non-spontaneous violence could have been prevented if observers had been on the ground and well-prepared to report on the immediate aftermath of the elections, not simply its result. The AU learned this lesson in Kenya, sending long-term observers to monitor the preparation, execution, and aftermath of the more successful 2013 elections. In future, this model is potentially a proactive, proportionate, and affordable tool for states like Kenya in 2007, where conflict has been low-level or only nascent, but further escalation seems possible.

4. Virtues of wide-ranging internal engagement

Virtually every account of the post-election violence recounts the praiseworthy attempts of Kenyan civil society and business groups to halt the violence once it had begun. While these efforts were unsuccessful until international pressure grew, the Annan team has cited engagement with these groups, and with other Kenyan actors not at the negotiating table, as key to their success and the durability of the eventual agreement. By continually consulting with these actors, the Annan team could gain valuable intelligence, exert indirect pressure on the parties, and work to ensure that any final agreement would be acceptable to the majority of Kenyans, and thus reasonably likely to be implemented. They also forged ties with these groups that were useful during the implementation period, as these actors were best positioned to monitor and report back on reform progress on the ground, as well as to continue to exert pressure for reform on both national and subnational levels.

5. The Key Role of Women

An atypically high number of women were involved in the Annan Team's mediation, and in a wide variety of roles – on both of the parties negotiating teams, as one of the Eminent African Personalities (Dame Machel-Mandela), and as advisors/support staff from the AU, UN, and private groups. This reflects the active role of women in Kenyan politics and in grass-roots mobilization. The Kenyan example lends further support to research showing that peace processes in which women play a significant role are more likely to succeed than those in which they are largely excluded, and gives some insights into why this might be the case. While more complete accounts are available elsewhere^[xxxii], one key element was the involvement of women's civil society groups, in consultation and with the support of Machel-Mandela, in shaping Agenda Four – the specific long-term strategies meant to create the conditions for durable peace.

6. Importance of follow-up

The implementation of the Annan team's Agenda Four – developing long-term strategies for durable peace – was imperfect, but did in fact take place with international support. As previously noted, the Annan team, at the request of the AU, continued to monitor reform and confer with both governmental and civil society actors for several years after the mediation concluded. In a less coordinated fashion, many donors and other organization devoted considerable resources toward community peace building initiatives and developing the capacity of pro-peace elements of Kenyan civil society. The Waki Commission, made up of a combination of Kenyan and international jurists, was a strong attempt to avoid impunity for perpetrators. While it was largely unsuccessful in holding political leaders to account, it did uncover and publicize the extent of security force involvement in the post-election violence, leading to considerable internal pressure for security force reform and better training. The fact that Kenya is a relatively rare case of strong post-conflict follow-up and support to a reform agenda, and also in many ways a success story, suggests that such follow-up might bear similar fruits in other cases.

7. Problematic aspects of the ICC

The referral of a list of many of the political leaders suspected of organizing post-election to the ICC for indictment was intended to protect these prosecutions from internal Kenyan political pressures. However, it had the previously mentioned, unanticipated effect of making several Kenyan communities feel that they were being attacked through the indictment of their leaders and turn against accountability efforts as a consequence, especially because the use of *proprio motu* to issue indictments meant that the elected government of the country played no role. Further, the ICC was not able to protect its witnesses from intimidation within Kenya, leading the collapse and withdrawal of the cases against several suspects. It is currently rather doubtful that any of those indicted will be convicted. Consequently, referral to the ICC seems to have had the effect of enhancing rather than preventing impunity. The path to avoiding a similar chain of events in future is not obvious, but it is clear that the same procedure cannot be followed unmodified without risking a similar outcome.

III. Kenya Literature Review

Reports/Scholarly Works:

Griffiths, Martin. "The Prisoner of Peace: An interview with Kofi A. Annan." *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue* 3 (2008). 3-4

This piece is a long and in-depth interview with Kofi Annan regarding his role as chief mediator, exploring in particular his strategies and reasoning.

Juma, Monica Kathina. "African mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 election crisis." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2009): 407-430.

Juma focuses mostly on the strategies and approaches of the Annan Team mediators, particularly the way their backgrounds and particular strengths aided the effort. She also devotes time to examining the peace constituencies within Kenya, as well as the issues left unresolved once the primary mediation was over.

Kagwanja, Peter, and Roger Southall. "Introduction: Kenya—A democracy in retreat?" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2009): 259-277.

This work takes a wide lens, discussing the underlying factors and history that led to the 2007 post-election violence, the domestic factors that made a mediated settlement possible, and the dangers that may lie ahead if Kenya is unable to sustain its commitment to reform and, especially, the diffusion of political power.

Khadiagala, Gilbert M. "Forty days and nights of peacemaking in Kenya." *Journal of African Elections: Kenya: Special Issue 7*, no. 2 (2008): 4-32.

This piece focuses tightly on the period during and just before the Annan mediation, examining in particular the factors that led to the failure of previous mediation attempts as contrasted with the Annan team's success.

Laibuta, Mugambi. *The African Union and Kenya's Constitution-Building Process*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014

Laibuta analyses the African Union's role in resolving Kenya's 2007 post-election violence in depth, reflecting critically on the failure of AU institutions to prevent the violence as well as the organization's immediate response. He then goes on to consider the role of the AU in constitution-building and institutional reform, giving a useful overview of the various Kenyan reform acts in the process. Generally, he attempts to assess what the AU should learn from its case and how it should modify its practice accordingly.

Lynch, Gabrielle. "Electing the 'alliance of the accused': the success of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya's Rift Valley." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 1 (2014): 93-114.

Lynch's piece focuses on the longer-term aftermath of the 2007 violence, in particular the political fallout and strange bedfellows created by the ICC's indictment of several key leaders. She links recent developments to longer trends of grievance and violence that have persisted within Kenya since independence.

McGhie, Meredith Preston. *Beyond the numbers: women's participation in the Kenya national dialogue and reconciliation*. HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011.

Written by a member of Kofi Annan's mediation team, this review does an excellent job of connecting women's participation in the process with progress toward an agreement, as well as the quality and durability of that agreement.

Official Statements, Agreements, Resolutions, etc.

African Union. 2008c. Peace and Security Council 109th Meeting Communiqué PSC/PR/BR (CIX), 22 January in Addis Ababa.

Assembly/AU/ Dec.187 (X) – Calls for parties to commit themselves to the Annan Team's mediation

African Union Commission. "*Report of African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya*"

Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government

National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008

United Nations Security Council. "Statement by the President of the Security Council". S/PRST/2008/4, February 6, 2008.

PSC/PR/Comm (CXV), March 14th 2008 – Calls for post-agreement support to the agreed-upon reform agenda.

[i] Often referred to as the Kikuyu, though some from the group find this term offensive.

[ii] UN Disaster Prevention, Management and Co-ordination Unit (DPMCU)

December 31, 2002: 37

[iii] Kagwanja, Peter, and Roger Southall. "Introduction: Kenya—A democracy in retreat?" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2009): 271

[iv] Laibuta, Mugambi. *The African Union and Kenya's Constitution-Building Process*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014: 7

[v] *ibid.*

"A voluntary self-assessment tool instituted by African Heads of State in 2003, the APRM was designed to promote more effective governance across four thematic areas: Democracy and Political Governance, Corporate Governance, Economic Governance and Management, and Socio-economic Development." - <http://aprm-au.org/about-us>

[vi] Laibuta: 11

[vii] Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Forty days and nights of peacemaking in Kenya." *Journal of African Elections: Kenya: Special Issue* 7, no. 2 (2008): 4-5

[viii] Waki Commission. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence." *Nairobi (October)* (2008).

[ix] Kagwanja and Southall: 260

[x] Laibuta: 11

[xi] Khadiagala: 10-11

[xii] *ibid.*

[xiii] *ibid.*

[xiv] *ibid.*

[xv] Martin Griffiths. "The Prisoner of Peace: An interview with Kofi A. Annan." *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue* 3 (2008). 3-4

[xvi] African Union. 2008c. Peace and Security Council 109th Meeting Communiqué PSC/PR/BR (CIX), 22 January in Addis Ababa.

[xvii] Assembly/AU/ Dec.187 (X)

[xviii] Laibuta: 8

[xix] Monica Kathina Juma. "African mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 election crisis." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 3 (2009): 17

[xx] Griffiths: 3-4

[xxi] Juma: 417

[xxii] Griffiths

[xxiii] Khadiagala: 13

[xxiv] Kagwanja and Southall: 260

[xxv] Juma: 421

[xxvi] PSC/PR/Comm (CXV), March 14th 2008

[xxvii] <http://kofiannanfoundation.org/node/798>

[xxviii] Laibuta: 6

[xxix] The AU, in addition to 69 short-term observers, deployed for the first time 5 long-term observers who arrived in Kenya several months prior to, and remained several weeks after, the March 4th elections, in order to get a more complete and contextualized view of the situation.

African Union Commission. "Report of African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya"

[xxx] Gabrielle Lynch. "Electing the 'alliance of the accused': the success of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya's Rift Valley." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 1 (2014): 94

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Meredith Preston McGhie. Beyond the numbers: women's participation in the Kenya national dialogue and reconciliation. HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2