AMISOM Short Mission Brief

I. Activity Summary: The AU and UN in Somalia

Background

Somalia demonstrates the tensions that arise when a post-colonial state attempts to establish conventional state structures in a society where traditional structures dominate social and political life. State capacity and legitimacy is limited in the Somali political milieu, whereas kinship and lineage affiliations form the most salient aspect of identity, providing an alternate basis for economic and political organization. Efforts to impose traditional state structures without regard to the underlying social structure tend to devolve into repression, in turn leading to humanitarian crisis, rampant piracy and crime, and the rise of terrorism.

Independence and Siad Barre Regime

Somalia gained independence from colonial rule[i] in 1960. Mohammad Siad Barre seized power in a military coup in 1969, and aimed to create a modernized and unified Somali identity. These efforts, while initially popular, met with diminishing returns: despite Barre's rhetoric on replacing clan loyalties with loyalty to the nation, his regime was deeply involved in clan politics, with his government being dominated by the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante clans.

In the 1970's, Barre's security forces carried out systematic terror campaigns against the Majerteen, Isaaq, and Hawiye clans. In 1982, the Somali National Movement (SNM), formed by a group of Isaaq dissidents in London, began a guerilla war against Barre's forces in the erstwhile British Somaliland (i.e. the northwest region of Somalia). This conflict peaked in 1988[ii], when battles between the SNM and Barre's forces (which resorted to a scorched earth strategy) left the major towns of Hargeisa and Burao completely destroyed.

At the height of the Cold War, Barre switched loyalties from the Soviet Union to the U.S., offering prime locations for military bases in exchange for defense equipment and financial aid. This clientelism paralleled his domestic politics: Barre licensed out corruption among his loyalists, creating a deeply kleptocratic system which eventually inflated the price of loyalty beyond his capacity to afford. When U.S. aid was cut off – in the aftermath of the destruction of Hargeisa – marked the beginning of the end for Barre.

In 1989, two militia groups – the United Somali Congress (USC) of General Mohamed Farah Aidid and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess – joined forces with the SNM; this coalition of rebel groups defeated and ousted Barre in January 1991. Having beaten their common enemy, however, the rebels were unable to maintain their unity; the USC forces splintered and fought in the streets of Mogadishu. In the middle of this conflict, USC leader Ali Mahdi unilaterally declared himself "interim President" of a national government "for all of Somalia".

The SNM had withdrawn its forces to the Isaaq-dominated north-west region, and secured ceasefires with other clans in the region as a prelude to setting up a federal regional administration. Following Mahdi's

announcement, the SNM convened conferences of clan leaders in February and April 1991. In May, the SNM and traditional leaders announced that Somaliland would dissolve its union with Somalia, and "revert to the sovereign status held at independence from Britain in 1960".[iii]

Despite these developments, Somalia received scant international attention until the conflict in Mogadishu escalated in late 1991. Fighting between rebel factions is estimated to have caused the deaths of 25,000 Somalis, and the displacement of 3.5 million more, between December 1991 and March 1992.[iv] Only in January 1992 did the UN send Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, James O.C. Jonah, as an envoy to various faction leaders in Mogadishu. Jonah reported broad support for a ceasefire and a UN role in bringing about national reconciliation, though General Aidid continued to oppose international involvement.

United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I): April 1992 – March 1993

Based on Jonah's report, the UNSC adopted a resolution imposing an arms embargo on Somalia[v]. In February 1992, the UN convened representatives from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the factions of Ali Mahdi and General Aidid in New York, which resulted in an informal ceasefire, followed by a formal ceasefire signed in Mogadishu a fortnight later.[vi]

At this time, Somalia faced severe famine – the Red Cross estimated 500,000 starvation deaths in 1992 – but humanitarian aid was often diverted. [vii] The ceasefire thus included UN forces to provide security to humanitarian assistance convoys, in addition to the military observers to monitor the ceasefire. Aidid and Mahdi signed a "Letter of Agreement" to this mission on 27 and 28 March respectively[viii]. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in April 1992;[ix] Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to Somalia.

UNOSOM was initially mandated to consist of 50 military observers, plus a protection force. UNOSOM observers under Brigadier-General Shaheen of Pakistan reached Mogadishu in July 1992. SRSG Sahnoun conducted intensive negotiations with principal faction leaders in Mogadishu, and was able to secure their agreement to deploy 500 UN security personnel in Mogadishu; this unit, also from Pakistan, was deployed in August 1992. In September, the UNSC further increased UNOSOM mandated strength to 3500 security forces and 719 logistical support personnel, and expanded UNOSOM area of operations to four new "zone headquarters" across Somalia[x].

United Task Force (UNITAF): December 1992 – May 1993

Despite UNOSOM presence, militias and armed groups continued to attack and loot humanitarian convoys. U.S. President Bush offered to provide significant forces to secure humanitarian access in Somalia. Accepting this offer, the UNSC provided Chapter VII authorization for an operation to "establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia"[xi]. This operation – UNITAF – included over 37,000 personnel from 24 countries,[xii] with around 25,000 of those drawn from the U.S., which designated their mission "Operation Restore Hope". Among other things, this enhanced U.S. presence renewed some Somali elites' expectations of a return to U.S.-funded clientelism.

UNITAF forces, deployed in December 1992, established a unified command structure in Mogadishu, and worked with UNOSOM on the broader, political process of peace and reconciliation. UNITAF secured humanitarian access to previously inaccessible regions of Somalia, with the resulting improvement in relief provision leading to sharp declines in child malnutrition and starvation-driven migration[xiii]. UNITAF was unsuccessful in disarming militias and bandits, however, which cast doubt on the sustainability of

these gains after its withdrawal. The UNSC thus asked countries contributing troops to UNITAF to transfer forces to bolster UNOSOM, creating "UNOSOM II" in May 1993.

UNOSOM II: March 1993 – March 1995

In March 1993, the UNSC granted[xiv] UNOSOM Chapter VII authorization to use force to sustain and expand the humanitarian access secured by UNITAF, while expanding its mandate to include disarmament[xv], national reconciliation, and support for creation of a national government. UNOSOM mandated strength was 20,000 military personnel, 8000 logistics support staff, and 2800 civilian staff. Former U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe took over as SRSG, and most of the U.S. forces (except for a small "quick reaction force") withdrew by May.

Aidid's faction – the USC(SNA)[xvi] – was signatory to the Addis Ababa agreement, but refused to disarm, and warned that UNOSOM attempts to take custody of their weapons would be treated as an act of war. On June 5, 1993, USC(SNA) forces attacked a UNOSOM Pakistani battalion approaching a weapons depot, killing 25 peacekeepers[xvii], abducting 10 others, and wounding 54. The UNSC called for the arrest and trial of those responsible for the attacks[xviii]; on June 17, SRSG Howe called for General Aidid to surrender for further investigation and to order his forces to comply with their commitment to disarm.

Aidid refused, and Howe called in the U.S. quick reaction force. On October 3, when U.S. forces moved to arrest key USC (SNA) leaders, Aidid's forces shot down two U.S. helicopters, and chased U.S. troops in a running firefight across Mogadishu. 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and their bodies were dragged through the streets, in scenes broadcast around the world[xix]. In response, President Clinton reinforced the quick reaction force with tanks and armored vehicles, but also announced that all U.S. forces would withdraw in March 1994.

In December 1993, the government of Ethiopia convened talks between the major groups of factions in Somalia: Aidid's SNA and Ali Mahdi's Group of 12 (G12). The parties were divided over the role of the UN: the G12 favored UN support for national reconciliation, whereas the SNA wanted regional powers in that role. In February 1994[xx], the UNSC tasked UNOSOM to support disarmament and the political process of Somali reconciliation and government formation – in effect, siding with the G12. Following a declaration on national reconciliation between the SNA and G12 in March 1994[xxi], UNOSOM downsized to 22,000 troops, and then to 15,000 troops by November 1994.

Aidid and Mahdi finally signed a peace agreement in February 1995[xxii]. When UNOSOM withdrew in March 1995, the humanitarian situation in Somalia was considerably improved, but political reconciliation remained distant. A small political support office – the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) – was maintained, with the task of monitoring and supporting the peace process and creation of a Somali national government.

Transitional Governments and Islamic Courts: 1995 – 2006.

The February 1995 agreement was never fully implemented, and Somalia entered a period of interregnum, where the processes of governance and conflict management – in the absence of overarching national authority – reverted to kinship-based arrangements. In this period, various clan elders, traditional leaders, and conflict-enriched warlords moved to secure their claims to power.

By contrast, Somaliland maintained its claim to independence, and conducted democratic elections at two-year intervals – still without international support or acknowledgment. Regional administrations were also established in Puntland (in the north-eastern region of Somalia) in 1998, in the Beletwayn region following a Hawiye clan peace conference in 1999, and by an Ethiopia-backed militia (the Rahanweyn Restoration Army) in the Bay and Bakool regions, also in 1999.

In Mogadishu, two parallel "governments" held sway. One was an association of "reformed" warlords, who had taken advantage of unregulated markets and support from the vast Somali diaspora to develop flourishing business interests. The other was a number of *sharia* courts, mostly set up by sub-clans of the powerful-but-disunited Hawiye clan. The courts, often operating in conjunction with Islamic charitable and financial institutions, gained a measure of popular support as being the only entities capable of enforcing law and order.

In 1999, militias associated with some of the courts took control of Mogadishu's central market. In 2000, senior leaders of a number of the courts, crossing over clan lines, came together to announce that they had formed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Over the next five years, the UIC steadily extended its influence over Mogadishu and the surrounding areas.

Over this period, various regional powers attempted to support the resumption of a Somali national peace process. Reconciliation conferences were convened by Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, and the League of Arab States. Ethiopia was alarmed by the presence of Eritrean military and trainers among the armed Islamist movements, and – having invaded Somalia to attack one such group in 1997[xxiii] – instead promoted using non-secessionist regional administrations (such as Puntland, which declared autonomy in 1998) as "building blocks" for a united country[xxiv]. Conversely, the Arab states largely supported the reestablishment of central government in Somalia, which could then expand its authority over the regions; the UIC, with the greatest claim to legitimacy in the capital, would be the most likely to gain power under such a strategy.

In this 6-year period, as many as 12 transitional governments were notionally established, but none were able to overcome Somalia's deep-rooted mistrust of claims to central authority. Only at the Arta Conference (convened by Djibouti) in 2000 was substantial progress made, on the basis of the innovative "4.5 Formula"[xxv], towards formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) [xxvi]. As with preceding agreements, though, the Arta Agreement was not fully implemented, and the formidable Hawiye factions in Mogadishu soon subverted the putative national consensus. Regional rivalries also played a role: the TNG was backed by Eritrea and the Arab states, so Ethiopia supported a rival coalition known as the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), led by Puntland regional administration President Abdellahi Yusuf Ahmed.

The Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian Invasion: 2004-07

In 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)[xxvii] took up Somalia portfolio. From 2002 to 2004, Kenya hosted the most prolonged of Somalia's reconciliation conferences. In 2004, all 25 of the major Somali factions at the time endorsed the Nairobi Agreement[xxviii], which established the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. In October 2004, representatives of the signatory factions elected Abdellahi Yusuf the first President of the TFG.

The TFG had a slow start: for two years, its members could not even determine where to meet – it finally convened in Baidoa in June 2006. Meanwhile, the UIC captured Mogadishu, Kismayo, and much of the Southern regions; concerned by the gains made by Islamist groups, the U.S. began targeting the group's leaders with covert operations and drone strikes. The UIC retaliated with the first recorded suicide bombing in Somalia: as TFG and UIC representatives met for peace talks in Khartoum, Abdellahi Yusuf survived an attack in Baidoa.

Yusuf used this attack to lend urgency to his repeated request for an armed AU incursion. Ethiopian troops were likely already attacking alleged Islamist training camps in Somalia at this time; Yusuf's invitation led Ethiopia to formalize and scale up this invasion. Ethiopian and TFG forces recaptured Mogadishu in December 2006, and Kismayo in January 2007. Ethiopia had tacit Western backing in this campaign, and the U.S. Air Force also bombed retreating UIC forces – apparently targeting Al Qaeda leaders present within their ranks.[xxix]

Locally, however, the TFG was unpopular even before its troops – drawn mostly from the Darood clan-dominated Puntland, and sharing few clan affiliations with local citizens – began abducting civilians and looting homes and shops. It had taken power with the aid of Ethiopia, a country that Somalis have seen as a bitter foe for generations. Yusuf himself was callous of the sufferings of civilians in Mogadishu, even suggesting that it was vengeance for the Hawiye's atrocities in 1991. A motley assortment of militias continued to resist, and the ensuing fighting displaced over 700,000 people in Mogadishu alone by November 2007[xxx].

The UIC remained a part of the resistance, but was split into political and military wings. Senior Hawiye leaders (including UIC *Shura* Chairman Hassan Dahir Aweys and Executive Chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed) fled to Eritrea, and opened discussions with other political parties opposing the TFG. Following their discussions, these groups eventually formed the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007. The military wing of the UIC remained in Somalia under the command of Aden Hashi Ayro. Some of this group did try to fight Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu, but most were killed in the effort – many by a U.S. Special Forces taskforce[xxxi]. Other fighters, however, gradually resumed an insurgency against the TFG and Ethiopian forces. By late 2007, they re-emerged as the *Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen* ("movement of youth for *jihad*"), which positioned itself as a movement of reformist and patriotic youth fighting the power-hungry and traitorous leaders of the TFG and ARS.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): 2007 - 2016?

The AU created AMISOM in January 2007[xxxii], and the UNSC endorsed its deployment[xxxiii] in February 2007. Its mandate was to support the Somali TFG, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, assist with the return of displaced populations, create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development in Somalia, and support the reestablishment and training of Somali national forces.

AMISOM was only authorized to use force in self-protection; partly because Al Shabaab had not yet emerged as a major threat to Somali civilians, but also because the AU considered AMISOM only a temporary measure to prevent a security vacuum while Ethiopian forces withdrew. The initial mandate of AMISOM was valid for only 6 months, and the AU expected to hand over to a UN peace operation after fulfilling its interim role.

AMISOM's initial mandated strength was 9 infantry battalions of 850 personnel each, supported by suitable maritime, coastal, air, and civilian components. At least 3 battalions were to deploy initially, to be rapidly followed by the other 6; logistics for these deployments were to be self-sustaining (i.e. provided by the troop contributing country itself), with the AU Commission to mobilise further logistical support as well as reimbursement for the troop contributing countries – an approach known as the "Burundi model"[xxxiv].

In fact, this model had already been unsuccessful in Somalia: the AU had authorized[xxxv] a peace operation by IGAD states in Somalia in 2005[xxxvi], but the mission entirely failed to deploy: the UNSC would not grant frontline states (i.e. those neighbouring Somalia) an exemption from arms embargo, and other potential troop contributing countries lacked funds to mobilize. In the event, Uganda and Burundi pledged 1600 troops each to AMISOM; Nigeria pledged 850, and Ghana, 350. Two Ugandan battalions deployed in March 2007; Burundi deployed battalions in January and October 2008. As of 2008, AMISOM

had thus deployed less than half of its mandated capacity, and raised only US$32 million of its US$622 million budget [xxxvii].

From March 2007 itself, AMISOM Ugandan battalions came under attack from the Somali resistance, which also continued to strike at TFG and Ethiopian forces, and to launch mortar attacks into Mogadishu.[xxxviii] (By September 2007, Al Shabaab emerged as the dominant group responsible for these attacks.) Meanwhile, the ARS split into "moderate" and "hardline" factions[xxxix] in March 2008; the moderate faction under Sharif Shaikh Ahmed reopened negotiations with the TFG, facilitated by SRSG Ahmadou Ould Abdallah, leading to the Djibouti Agreement in June 2008[xl].

This agreement put in place a 90-day ceasefire, which would begin on July 9, 2008. The ceasefire was to be followed by the deployment of a UN-authorized "*international stabilization force from countries that are friends of Somalia excluding neighbouring states*". Based on that provision, the AU suggested it was time for a UN mission to take over from AMISOM. The UNSC "express[ed] its intent" to establish a UN peace operation as a follow-up to AMISOM[xli], but no such mission has been created to date.

In 2009, as Ethiopian forces withdrew, the UN instead set up a "field support mission" – the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) – to provide logistics support to AMISOM.[xlii] UNSOA was to oversee the rollout of a UN "support package" to AMISOM, mostly consisting of non-lethal equipment and provisions. In 2010, the mandate of AMISOM (now equipped with the UN-provided supplies) was extended by another year[xliii]; however, the World Food Programme suspended its operations in Al Shabaab areas of Somalia.

In August 2010, AMISOM and the new Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), trained by AMISOM and the European Union, succeeded in securing most of Mogadishu, and violence fell to its lowest levels in years. This was made possible in large part by a shift in Al Shabaab strategy. In early 2007, Al Shabaab had been militarily defeated, and the relocation of the UIC political wing to Asmara simultaneously deprived it of much of its Hawiye support base. When Aden Hashi Ayro was killed in a drone strike, his successor Ahmed Abdi Godane swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2008[xliv], and simultaneously looked to the regions – as well as the large Somali refugee populations in Ethiopia and Kenya – as sources of recruitment and support.

Having switched focus to the interior, Al Shabaab then recaptured Baidoa in June 2008, Kismayo in August 2008, and Beledweyne in September 2008[xlv]. Instead of simply pressing on to Mogadishu, Al Shabaab instead aimed to govern these regions in place of the TFG, sometimes in coalition with local strongmen. Kismayo was recaptured with the support of Ahmed Madobe, an early member of Al Shabaab, who then set up his own militia – the Ras Kamboni Brigade[xlvi].

End of Transition, and Kenyan Invasion: 2011 - 2013

Together with its move to the interior, Al Shabaab also began to display a growing presence in the border regions and among the diaspora. Responding to the concerns of Somalia's neighbors, the AU authorized AMISOM to expand operations to parts of Somalia held by Al Shabaab, though still with a mandate only to support and protect the TFG, rather than to fight Al Shabaab.

In 2010, the UN approved expenditure of US $175 million on AMISOM[xlvii], and the UNSC endorsed the expansion of AMISOM[xlviii] to over 12,000 troops[xlix]. Troop deployment was again delayed by a lack of adequate logistical capacity, and AMISOM remained below its mandated strength through 2011. In July 2011, Al Shabaab re-allowed relief workers into territory under its control. (At this time, the UN was estimating that most of Somalia's regions were affected by famine, and projecting up to 260,000 famine deaths between 2010 and 2012.)

In August 2011, upcoming elections to renew the Federal Government's mandate (i.e. the end of the transitional period) prompted a power struggle between Speaker of the Parliament Sharif Hassan Aden and President Sheikh Ahmed. Ugandan President Museveni offered to mediate, and hosted the two politicians in Kampala in June 2011. With Museveni and UN Special Envoy to Somalia Augustine Mahiga facilitating, they agreed[l] to conduct the elections in August 2012 in exchange for the immediate resignation of Prime Minister Abdallahi Mohamad. Mohamad was a popular technocrat, and this "Kampala Accord" sparked protests against Ugandan interference in Somali affairs. Nonetheless, Mohamad resigned on June 19; the UN facilitated talks on election modalities in Mogadishu[li], and the adoption of the provisional Constitution in Garowe[lii].

In September 2011, Al Shabaab attacked Kenyan military forces, and abducted two foreign tourists from resorts in Kenya. In response, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) launched Operation Linda Nchi[liii] in October 2011, attacking Al Shabaab positions in Somalia, which Kenya justified as pre-emptive self-defense against cross-border terrorist attacks. This campaign evolved into a joint KDF-SNSF operation against Al Shabaab in southern Somalia, but Al Shabaab fighters rallied around Kismayo and fought the Kenyan forces to a stalemate.[liv]

In January 2012, while renewing the mandate of AMISOM, the AU increased the mission's mandated strength to over 17,000, and called for rapid deployment of AMISOM forces to areas recovered from Al Shabaab[lv]. In February 2012, the UNSC authorized the "re-hatting" of KDF forces into AMISOM. For the first time since its creation, AMISOM received Chapter VII authorization to use force against Al Shabaab and armed opposition groups[lvi]. The mission thus formally shifted to counter-insurgency; in practice, however, AMISOM strategy is yet to be adjusted to secure this objective, and cohesion between units remains limited.

AMISOM forces, spearheaded by KDF and acting in coordination with the SNSF, retook Baidoa by May 2012, and renewed the assault on Kismayo. Ahmed Madobe, the leader of the *Ras Kamboni* militia, had been appointed Governor of Jubbaland (the region in which Kismayo is located) in 2011. Madobe had also long been a client of the Kenyan government, and had no desire to lose his new post and old allies. He switched sides to fight against Al Shabaab, and the combined AMISOM/SNSF/*Ras Kamboni* forces took Kismayo in October 2012.

On August 20, 2012, the TFG mandate (as extended by the Kampala Accord) elapsed. On September 10, 2012, after two rounds of voting, the Transitional Federal Parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The UN, AU, IGAD, and the European Union sent observers to the election.

Al Shabaab escalation and AMISOM today: 2013 - present

In February 2013, the AU Commission released a Strategic Review of AMISOM[lvii], which called for the FGS and AMISOM to recover territory under Al Shabaab control, and consolidate government authority and service delivery in FGS territory. The review proposed a phased approach to securing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, enhancing the capacity of Somali defense and public safety institutions, and supporting the establishment of effective governance in Somalia, leading up to elections in 2016. The review called for giving AMISOM a robust peace enforcement capacity to fulfill this mandate, either by enhancing AMISOM capacity, or by establishing an AU-UN joint mission in Somalia.

The UNSC did not adopt either of these models; however, in May 2013, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) was created. UNSOM replaced UNPOS, and was mandated to support the FGS with "good offices" and strategic political advice[lviii]. UNSOM provides the FGS and AMISOM with expertise on governance, security sector reform, rule of law, disengagement of combatants, development

of a federal system, and electoral administration; it also coordinates international donor support to the FGS and AMISOM[lix].

In mid-2013, Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane[lx] led a purge of Al Shabaab senior leadership; veteran UIC leader Hassan Dahir Aweys was ousted as the head of Al Shabaab, and surrendered to the FGS in June 2013. Godane has led Al Shabaab in carrying out a series of violent attacks, including on the Presidential Palace and UN compound in Mogadishu in July 2013, the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013, and on a restaurant in Djibouti in May 2014. Godane was killed in a U.S. drone strike in September 2014, but his successor Ahmad Omar has continued the pattern of escalation, including the attack on Garissa College in northern Kenya in April 2015 that killed 148 civilians (mostly students). Al Shabaab also continues to carry out raids and attacks in Mogadishu.

Currently, AMISOM and FGS forces hold the major urban centres in southern Somalia; Al Shabaab is headquartered in the town of Jilib in Middle Jubba, and controls large swathes of rural territory. AMISOM is focused on defeating Al Shabaab, including recovering more areas from Al Shabaab control; AMISOM exit strategy, as outlined in its latest mandate, provides for a surge in troop capacity to over 22,000 personnel[lxi]. Building from the experience of the 2012 election, as well as a tense regional Presidential election in Puntland in 2014[lxii], AMISOM and UNSOM are working to establish suitable conditions for the conduct of national elections in 2016; UNSOM also supports the development and implementation of the FGS "Guulwade Plan" for long-term development of the national army[lxiii]. Transition to UN peacekeeping is not expected before 2016[lxiv].

AMISOM also supports the training of the Somali Police Forces (SPF). Based on a training needs assessment, AMISOM Police provide trainings to SPF officers and recruits on routine police functions, as well as on gender-based violence, child protection, and community policing. AMISOM Police officers co-locate at a number of SPF police stations, and the FPU and the maritime Vessel Protection Detachment conducts joint patrols with Somali forces in the Mogadishu area.

AMISOM political affairs section supports FGS capacity-building, including by providing training for civil servants, and facilitating on-job mentoring in AU member states. AMISOM civil affairs section has focused on the reinvigoration of local governance institutions, especially in Mogadishu. AMISOM Humanitarian Affairs section coordinates the delivery of humanitarian relief, and serves as a provider of last resort, providing access to free medical care, potable water and basic food items to civilians.

To finance these activities, the UN has budgeted US$ 497 million in support for AMISOM for the period July 2014 – June 2015, which includes US$ 113 million towards salaries of the military and police components, US$ 54 million towards salaries of the civilian component, and US$ 329 million towards operational costs. This allotment represents an increase of 14% over the 2013-14 budget of US$ 435 million, and a more than 20% increase over the 2012-13 budget of US$ 412 million[lxv]. Most recently, the UNSC further revamped UNSOA as the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)[lxvi].

The challenge for AMISOM is now to transition from a territory-based strategy to effective counter-insurgency in the context of Somalia's kinship-based society, wherein isolating Al Shabaab from its support base is more effective than denying them of specific bases of operation. This is particularly urgent because Al Shabaab appears to be switching its focus from Somalia proper to the large Somali diaspora, including in neighbouring countries such as Kenya. A security-first response in Kenya is likely to play into this recruitment strategy. These efforts are complicated by the extent to which contingents within AMISOM are reported to be pursuing criminal activities, potentially even in collusion with Al Shabaab or other militant groups in some regions.

The challenge for the FGS and the SNSF is to create an effective and cohesive federal security and governance strategy. Currently, specific units of the SNSF are trained by various bilateral actors – the

Somali National Intelligence, for instance, is trained by the U.S.; it has coordinated poorly with AMISOM to date. More importantly, the financial capacity to sustain a centralised security force is simply not available to the FGS, so effective cooperation with regional authorities is the only available path to security.

II. Key Issues, Dilemmas, and Lessons from Somalia

1.   Need for better management capacity: Force Generation, Logistics, Finances

AU peace operations consistently face the challenge of insufficient logistical and financial capacity to deploy troops to desired locations. Further, while countries may be willing to offer troops, the level of training of these forces is inconsistent, which creates difficulties with inter-operability, and with conduct and discipline.

The logistical challenges are most clearly demonstrated by the abortive effort to deploy an IGAD force, and the long delay in deploying AMISOM forces at even half its mandated strength. These challenges suggest strengthening the capacity of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission's Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) to identify suitable forces, provide logistics for deployment, and mobilize financial resources to sustain deployed contingents.

The "Burundi model", wherein troop contributing countries are assumed to be of logistically self-sustaining, seldom corresponds with on-ground realities; it cannot be considered the default approach. Even where the requisite capacities exist, this model gradually compounds the challenges of inter-operability, as more and more contingents deploy with their own supply chains and logistics. Ideally, the AU PSC and AU Commission must support deployments by securing voluntary funding and logistical support from international partners, particularly in terms of key force multipliers: vehicles, helicopters, airlift capacity, maritime support / patrolling, and intelligence / surveillance data.

Even with improvements in AU management capacity, however, peace operations are likely to always face resource constraints. The complement to resource mobilization is realistic tasking. The AU PSC must be careful to match its mandates to the capacities of actual forces available for deployment at a given point in time. Otherwise, as with the protection force under UNOSOM I[lxvii], troops will prioritize self-protection over trying to fulfill an impossible mandate – irrespective of the conditions under which the mandate authorizes use of force.

2.   Frontline countries: balancing logistical benefits and political costs

The presence in a peace operation of forces from neighbouring ("frontline") countries, particularly countries that whose interests are known to conflict with the interests of the countries to which they deploy, involves a high political cost. A peace operation involving such countries is seen, at best, as lacking neutrality or impartiality; at worst, it will be seen as an invasion of sovereignty, and local authorities who work with such forces will be vilified as traitors.

In Somalia, there was never any doubt that Ethiopians were the targets of long-standing suspicion, hostility, and xenophobia. Ethiopia was understood to have sent its forces into Somalia in pursuit of its own agenda to secure power in the region. The invitation from Abdellahi Yusuf did not legitimize their presence; in fact, Yusuf's association with the Ethiopian troops delegitimized his government. Sheikh Ahmed faced backlash (including from within the ARS itself) for signing the 2008 Djibouti Agreement with Yusuf. In 2011, the Kampala Accord probably cost him the Presidential election – Somalis were already suspicious of Uganda's agenda for AMISOM (every AMISOM Force Commander had been Ugandan), and deeply resented Ugandan interference in internal and clan politics.

Troops from neighbouring countries are also likely to share ethnicities with some persons in the country where they deploy. If such affiliations lead to the peace operation being viewed through the lens of clan politics, then clan leaders trying to maintain a balance of power will support those who fight the peace operation. For instance, given their close relationship with Ahmed Madobe and the Ras Kamboni militia, Kenyan forces were seen as affiliates of Madobe's Ogaden clan.

Nonetheless, it remains true that Uganda provided the only AMISOM forces that deployed in 2007. AMISOM was unable to reach its mandated strength until Kenyan troops re-hatted, and Djibouti sent forces as well. Ethiopian forces also continue to be part of AMISOM. The participation of frontline states can be the key to meeting urgent force deployment targets, and – precisely because their national interests are implicated – these countries may be willing to sustain far higher troop losses in the course of the mission[lxviii].

3.   Structuring reliable UN support to African peace missions

AMISOM illustrates the divergence in attitudes regarding the relative roles of the UN and the AU in maintaining peace operations. Key members of the UN SC have argued that the UN should focus its limited resources on its own peace operations, and that the AU should make its deployments self-sustaining. The AU, conversely, anticipates deploying as "first responders", before handing over to UN-mandated, organized, and financed operations.

In Somalia, neither expectation has materialized. Instead, a complicated triple structure has been created, with AMISOM providing primary military, police, and enforcement capacity, UNSOA providing logistics support to AMISOM, and UNSOM providing expertise in governance, security sector reform, election support, and political management of conflict. While it does correspond to the strengths of each organisation, this division of labour remains an incremental approach to coordination, resulting in inefficiency and redundancies. Funding mechanisms, in particular, could be better integrated: AMISOM relies on voluntary contributions, but UNSOA cannot raise, manage, or disburse these funds, while bilateral support to the FGS is coordinated through UNSOM.

To bridge these differences in expectation, the relative merits of various models (hybrid peace operations, voluntary contributions to regional organisations, or some other approach) must be further explored. The focus must be on building consensus regarding the AU/UN division of labour, and then ensuring timely follow-through on commitments to support and/or transition. Only a measure of certainty will encourage states to contributing troops to peacekeeping missions.

4.   Regional peacekeeping in countries under UN arms embargoes

UN sanctions, particularly arms embargoes, can be an additional complicating factor in the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and in the provision of bilateral support to build the capacity of national security forces. The UNSC can always provide exemptions from such sanctions for these purposes, but requires that countries seeking exemptions provide detailed proposals that include adequate safeguards against diversion of arms they bring into the country.

At the same time, a well-implemented arms embargo improves the likelihood of successfully disarming armed groups, and more generally of reducing levels of violence in a country. Ideally, the UNSC and troop contributing countries will be able to design sanctions and peace operations to be mutually reinforcing. While potential contributors to the IGAD mission were unable to satisfy the UNSC that their operations would be sanctions-compliant, the AU learnt from the experience and developed detailed frameworks for both their own operational capacity and their support to national forces; the UNSC could thus endorse their mandate and provide the required exemptions.

Subsequently, UN sanctions have been updated in response to AMISOM and Somali needs on multiple occasions. Targeted sanctions were passed against individuals who threatened or attacked AMISOM, or impeded its disarmament mandate. In 2010, when the World Food Programme projected a famine, funds supporting the humanitarian effort in Somalia were exempted from sanctions for one year.

The sanctions monitoring committee was also reconfigured – in response to AMISOM concerns that regional arms flows were preventing disarmament – into the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG). The SEMG was mandated to investigate individuals, entities, facilities, and routes involved in violations of arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea, and to recommend areas where state capacity to enforce these embargoes was in need of enhancement[lxix]. AMISOM and Somali authorities have benefited from SEMG intelligence, both in the conduct of specific operations, and in developing national security strategy.

5.   Disarmament is essential, but will require inclusive security institutions

The disarmament of clan-affiliated militia, although required by multiple peace agreements, has never been achieved. The reluctance to disarm stems largely from the inextricable linkage between clan affiliation and official authorities. Regional and national security institutions continue to be dominated by one or the other clan; the Somali National Army, for instance, is dominated by the Hawiye clan (particularly after the re-integration of ARS fighters). Factions from other clans thus see their weapons as essential for protection – not only against threats to their physical safety, but also from being politically marginalized.

Until the FGS can make the composition of its security forces more inclusive, the success of any proposed disarmament plan remains doubtful. Barre tried for years to bring stability to Somalia by suppressing clan identity, yet his policies only made clan rivalries all the more virulent. Stability in Somalia is more likely to result from balancing the power of the clans. In this context, successful disarmament – unless carried out by every clan, and backed up by alternative guarantees of security and political participation – may lead one or the other clan to feel more threatened, and to lash out against their rivals.

Along with greater inclusiveness, the security institutions will also need greater capacity and professionalism. Currently, despite the embargoes and monitoring, small arms and light weapons remain easy to acquire in Somalia. This is a result of multiple factors: incomplete seizure of the large stock of older weapons, low capacity of the FGS and regional authorities to manage their stockpiles, enabling even seized weapons to re-enter circulation, inadequate maritime and border security in Somalia and neighbouring states (especially where Al Shabaab controls border regions), and broader patterns of arms flows as a result of multiple conflicts in the region. (Based on data from the SEMG, the Small Arms Survey estimated some 50,000 weapons were in use in Somalia between 2004 & 2011; the complex nature of the arms trade in Somalia is indicated by the fact that most of these weapons date back to the Barre regime, but the ammunition for these weapons is of more modern manufacture[lxx].)

6.   Terrain-centric vs. Governance-centric military operations

Building inclusive national institutions is also the key to counter-insurgency; without such active attention to state-building, local populations will continue to see the government as simply another faction in a fractious polity. Pragmatic local leaders will align themselves with whoever exercises influence over their areas, especially if clan affiliations suggest such alliances.

The current approach to defeating Al Shabaab has focused on territorial control; with AMISOM forces fighting to clear out Al Shabaab, and the FGS responsible for stabilization and reconstruction. The AMISOM mandate does include support to the FGS in ensuring governance, rule of law, and delivery of basic services, but these efforts have remained modest, while the military aspect of the mission has taken primacy. This approach will not lead to sustainable stability in Somalia.

Many so-called Al Shabaab supporters' loyalties lie with their clans, rather than the broader movement; this means that Al Shabaab often commands fewer forces than it claims, but is extraordinarily resilient. The clans may abandon Al Shabaab when AMISOM / FGS forces arrive, but they will as easily abandon the FGS when Al Shabaab reasserts control. In this scenario, a sustainable victory will require the creation of vertically integrated (federal and regional) institutions of governance, which are perceived locally as having the sole claim to legitimate use of force.

7.   Militarisation of law and order

Local perceptions of legitimacy correspond to the extent to which federal or regional institutions are able to deliver security, law and order, and basic services. Military / paramilitary forces, trained in warfare and counterterrorism, are not ideally suited to most of these tasks. The FGS appears to be adopting a militarized approach to law and order; this is a worrying development, because the security and governance needs of ordinary Somali citizens are much broader than a focus on counterterrorism will address.

Despite this mismatch, international support to security institutions in Somalia has focused on expanding the size and capacity of the military[lxxi], and particularly on developing Somali National Army (SNA) capacity to fight Al Shabaab. This project to bolster the military aligns well with the interests of major clan leaders, particularly when it involves absorbing fighters from clan-based militias into the SNA. With international partners more worried about terrorism and piracy than human security, other Somali institutions are following the SNA's lead; for instance, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) has focused since its re-establishment in 2013 on raising its own paramilitary commando units.

The presence of Al Shabaab and various tribal militias is undeniably a factor in Somali insecurity. Al Shabaab's defeat, however, is not a sufficient condition for resolving insecurity: historically, good governance and disarmament have also been required to bring societies out of conflict[lxxii]. The prevailing discourse of the "War on Terror" may drive international (particularly U.S.) focus on destroying Al Shabaab, but AMISOM exit strategy will depend on developing the capacity of Somali authorities to deliver on promise of governance and political inclusion.

In this, Somalia may benefit from studying Somaliland, where clan leaders, traders and businessmen, and supporters in the Somali diaspora have identified a shared interest in ensuring stability and political inclusion. After recovering from civil war in 1996, Somaliland has seen multiple peaceful transitions of power, arguably because it has not tried to suppress clan interests, but rather to ensure they can be pursued through non-violent political avenues. The capacity of Somaliland's institutions is not necessarily greater than those of Somalia, but the foregrounding of politics has at least reduced the extent to which fears of clan dominance undermine their efforts to deliver governance.

III. Somalia Literature Review

Reports/Scholarly Works:

Hope Restored in Somalia? – Jonathan Stevenson, Foreign Policy, No. 91, 138-154 (1993)

A journalist's account of the early years of UN intervention in Somalia, with a detailed description of the political steps leading up to the deployment of UNOSOM and UNITAF, the effect of U.S. forces' presence, the difficulties faced by the UN in Somalia, and the political milieu prevailing in Mogadishu at the time of UNOSOM II deployment. The piece is particularly useful for understanding the skilled political negotiation of SRSG Sahnoun of Algeria, and the reversal of progress after his resignation in October 1992.

The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts – Cedric Barnes & Harun Hassan, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 1:2, 151-160 (2007)

This piece describes the role and influence of the Union of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu. It traces their development, from providing a measure of law and order for Hawiye Sheikhs and business communities, to a politicized force fighting with major warlords in the city. It provides important insight into the durable nature of support for the Islamic Courts project, despite their growing radicalization, given the lack of viable alternative institutions.

African Union Mission in Somalia: Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges – Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, *FOI Defence Analysis* (2008)

Assessment (by the Swedish Defence Research Agency) of the deployment of AMISOM, including the previous decision to send an IGAD peacekeeping mission (which failed to materialize), and the failure of AMISOM to reach mandated strength in its first two years either. Critiques the "Burundi model" of deployment logistics, and suggests measures the AU can take to enhance the effectiveness of peace operations on the ground.

A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab – Roland Marchal, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3(3), 381-404 (2009)

The first major historical assessment of Al Shabaab, pointing to the growing role of political Islam in the recentralization of Somali politics, and suggesting that Al Shabaab is primarily a pragmatic and political organisation. Even the theology and neo-Salafist ideology professed by the group is a function of its position in Somali society, and the need to maintain a space apart from customs that would undermine its influence.

Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al Shabaab, and East Africa's Refugee Crisis – Avery Burns, Refuge Vol. 27 No. 1, 5-15 (2010)

This piece analyzes the role of the large Somali refugee community in the threat perception and counterterrorism strategy of Kenya. Kenyan responses to refugees, border security, and military action in Somali territory are shaped by the extent to which Kenya believes it can address its national security crisis and its humanitarian crisis at the same time.

Lessons from AMISOM for Peace Operations in Mali – Matt Freear & Cedric de Coning, *International Journal of Security & Development*, 2(2): 23, 1-11 (2013)

This piece compares AMISOM and AFISMA, identifying factors that identify why Mali saw a transition to a UN operation, while Somalia will not see such a transition till 2017 at the earliest. Identifies lessons from the first five years of AMISOM operation that enabled AMISOM to be effective on the ground, particularly in terms of countering Al Shabaab propaganda or local support.

AMISOM in Transition: The Future of the African Union Mission in Somalia – Paul Williams, Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper (2013)

Assesses the force posture of AMISOM in 2013, following the election of the FGS and President Hassan Sheikh Mahmood, and considers the effect of the focus in the first six years on enhancing the capacities of AMISOM rather than the SNA. Recommends, as has since been done, that AMISOM mandate be adjusted to support the FGS in building capacity and institutions to provide security across the country.

Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) – Country Report: Somalia (2013)

The most recent country report on Somalia based on ACLED data, this report documents patterns in violence and casualties between the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2009, until the recapture of Kismayo by AMISOM and FGS forces in late 2013. Discusses the changes in Al Shabaab tactics as the group's territorial and organizational resources have been reduced, as well as the re-emergence of other local groups that had been suppressed by its rise.

Somalia / Al-Shabaab: It Will Be a Long War – International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing 99 (2014)

Assesses the relative capacities of Al Shabaab, the FGS, AMISOM and other international support. Examines the territory held, military and financial resources available, and the extent of underlying ideological support. Explains the durability of Al Shabaab in terms of its inherently Somali origin (as opposed to being a global Islamist movement), and its growing experience with the requirements of daily governance in the regions it controls.

How Many Fatalities has AMISOM Suffered? – Paul Williams, IPI Global Observatory Special Report (2015)

Explains the challenges and controversies surrounding the estimation of fatalities suffered by AMISOM over its deployment, as well as the policy implications of the secrecy that AMISOM TCCs have maintained over the numbers of their dead and injured.

Official Documents, Agreements

AU

Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia ("Addis Ababa Agreement"), 27 March 1993.

Declaration on National Reconciliation in Somalia ("Nairobi Declaration"), 24 March 1994.

Agreement on National Reconciliation and Peaceful Settlement ("SNA/SSA Agreement"), 21 February 1995.

Agreement of the Somali National Peace Conference ("Arta Agreement"), August 2000.

Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings ("Nairobi Agreement"), 29 January 2004. (*Adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter.*)

AU PSC Communique, 24th Meeting, 7 February 2005. (*Approving IGASOM.*)

Communiqué of the 24th ordinary session of the IGAD council of ministers on Somalia, 18th March 2005. (*Altering IGAD Charter to deploy IGASOM.*)

AU PSC Communique, 69th Meeting, 19 January 2007. (*AMISOM Mandate.*)

Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) ("Djibouti Agreement"), 9 June 2008.

AU PSC Communique, 245th Meeting, 15 October 2010. (*AMISOM expansion to 12,000 troops, and mandated to operate in the regions.*)

Agreement between the President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia ("Kampala Accord"), 9 June 2011.

Somalia End of Transition "Roadmap", 7 September 2011.

AU PSC Communique, 302nd Meeting, 2 December 2011. (*Endorsing Kampala Accord and End of Transition Roadmap.)*

Communique of the Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference ("Garowe Principles"), 23 December 2011.

AU PSC Communique, 306th Meeting, 5 January 2012. (*AMISOM expansion to 17,000 troops, and to deploy rapidly to areas recovered from Al Shabaab.)*

AU PSC, 356th Meeting, Report of the AU Commission on the Strategic Review of AMISOM, 27 February 2013.

UN

UNSC Resolution 733 (1992), 23 January 1992. *(First UN reaction to conflict in Somalia; imposition of arms embargo.)*

UNSC, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia (S/23693), 11 March 1992. *(Update on negotiations; the "Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire" signed between Mahdi and Aidid on 3 March 1992 is Annex III.)*

UNSC Resolution 751 (1992), 24 April 1992. *(UNOSOM mandate.)*

UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia (S/24343), 22 July 1992. (*Update on UNOSOM deployment, includes Letters of Agreement which substituted for a Status of Mission Agreement for UNOSOM.)*

UNSC Resolution 775 (1992), 28 August 1992. (*Expands UNOSOM to 3500 troops, sets up "zone headquarters" system.)*

UNSC Resolution 794 (1992), 3 December 1992. (*Authorizes UNITAF.)*

UNSC Resolution 814 (1993), 26 March 1993. (*UNOSOM II Mandate.)*

UNSC Resolution 837 (1993), 6 June 1993. (*Attack on Pakistani peacekeepers.)*

UNSC Resolution 897 (1994), 4 February 1994. (*Revised UNOSOM II mandate to implement disarmament as per Addis Ababa agreement.*)

UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007), 21 February 2007. (*Endorsing AMISOM mandate.)*

UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia (S/2008/709), 17 November 2008. (*Attacks on AMISOM.)*

UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008), 15 May 2008. (*Reiterating the intent to establish a UN mission to take over from AMISOM.)*

UNSC Resolution 1863 (2009), 16 January 2009. (*UNSOA Mandate.*)

UN General Assembly Resolution 64/287, 31 August 2010. *(AMISOM support budget - US$175 million allotted.)*

UNSC Resolution 1964 (2010), 22 December 2010. (*Approving expansion of AMISOM troop strength to 12,000.*)

UNSC, Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S-2012-74), 31 January 2012. (*Review of AMISOM operations under new strategic concept.*)

UNSC Resolution 2036 (2012), 22 February 2012. (*Approving expansion of AMISOM troop strength to 17000+ and granting Ch. VII authorization for AMISOM to use force against Al Shabaab and other armed groups.*)

UNSC Resolution 2102 (2013), 2 May 2013. (*UNSOM Mandate.*)

UN General Assembly Resolution 68/745, 11 February 2014. (*AMISOM budget for 2014-15.*)

UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2015/331), 12 May 2015. (*Update on UNSOM operations and "Guulwade Plan".*)

UNSC Resolution 2232 (2015), July 28 2015. (*Latest renewal of UNSOM mandate; notes no transition from AMISOM to UN expected before late 2016.*)

[i] Part of Somalia was colonized by the United Kingdom, and part by Italy; both parts merged in 1960.

[ii] Matt Bryden, "Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity", *African Security Review 13(2),* 2004.

[iii] Michael Walls, "The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland", *African Affairs*, 2009.

[iv] Sally Healy, and Mark Bradbury, "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict", *Accord* 21 (2010).

[v] UN Security Council resolution 733, 23 January 1992. This was the first UNSC resolution on Somalia since the outbreak of the civil war.

[vi] Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire, 3 March 1992.

[vii] Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 (Summer 1993). This practice was not linked to any particular armed group, but rather to the ease of access to small arms. Young men "…*roamed the streets in gun-mounted jeeps dubbed 'technicals', named for the drivers' practice of extorting money, sometimes at gunpoint, from relief agencies for 'technical assistance'."*

[viii] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia (S/24343), 22 July 1992. With no recognized government, these letters served as a Status of Mission Agreement.

[ix] UN Security Council resolution 751, 24 April 1992.

[x] UN Security Council resolution 775, 28 August 1992.

[xi] UN Security Council resolution 794, 3 December 1992.

[xii] UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe.

[xiii] Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?"

[xiv] UN Security Council resolution 814, 26 March 1993.

[xv] Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993. (Leaders of 15 armed factions agreed to hand over their weapons to UNITAF/UNOSOM.)

[xvi] United Somali Congress – Somali National Alliance.

[xvii] The bodies of the murdered troops were also mutilated and dragged through Mogadishu.

[xviii] UN Security Council resolution 837, 6 June 1993.

[xix] This incident was depicted in the book and film "Black Hawk Down".

[xx] UN Security Council resolution 897, 4 February 1994.

[xxi] Declaration on National Reconciliation in Somalia ("Nairobi Declaration"), 24 March 1994.

[xxii] Agreement on National Reconciliation and Peaceful Settlement ("SNA/SSA Agreement"), 21 February 1995.

[xxiii] *Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya* ("Islamic Unity"), whose camps along the Somalia-Ethiopia border were destroyed by Ethiopian forces. The Ethiopian government's unease stems from the presence of a large Somali refugee population in Ethiopia. Historical attempts, by Barre among others, to forcibly unite the contiguous regions inhabited by a majority of Somali-speaking peoples likely also play a role.

[xxiv] Radical Islamist movements in Somalia were most closely associated with Mogadishu-based members of the Hawiye clan; regional leaders – while also Muslim – were typically anti-Hawiye.

[xxv] Under the 4.5 Formula, seats in the national government were split evenly between the 4 major clans (excluding the Isaaq, who form the majority in Somaliland), with a half-share reserved for women leaders, who had played an unprecedented role in creating a national consensus. Women were excluded from negotiations or government; at Arta, a cross-clan coalition of women – led by Asha Hagi Elmi, the founder of Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) – successfully demanded representation as a "sixth clan".

[xxvi] Agreement of the Somali National Peace Conference ("Arta Agreement"), August 2000.

[xxvii] IGAD member-states recognized that the damaged relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea – both IGAD members – were contributing to political stalemate in Somalia. Since neither seemed likely to give up on supporting its proxies, the more powerful IGAD member – Kenya – took over the mediation instead.

[xxviii] Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings ("Nairobi Agreement"), 29 January 2004.

[xxix] These airstrikes marked the first U.S. military action in Somalia since the withdrawal in March 1994.

[xxx] Roland Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab", Journal *of Eastern African Studies* 3(3), 2009.

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] AU PSC Communique, 69th Meeting, 19 January 2007.

[xxxiii] UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007), 21 February 2007.

[xxxiv] As used in the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the first AU-mandated peace operation, in 2003.

[xxxv] AU PSC Communique, 24th Meeting, 7 February 2005.

[xxxvi] Communiqué of the 24th ordinary session of the IGAD council of ministers on Somalia, 18th March 2005. IGAD had to amend its own Charter, which was based on non-interference, to authorise this mission.

[xxxvii] *Figures in this paragraph are as per:* Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, "African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges", FOI Defence Analysis (2008).

[xxxviii] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, 17 November 2008.

[xxxix] The terms were used by Western leaders, and ostensibly referenced moderate and hardline Islamists. Marchal (2009) describes the two ARS groups as not greatly distinguished by degree of radicalization; rather, the difference was primarily in terms of willingness to reconcile with the TFG.

[xl] Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) ("Djibouti Agreement"), 9 June 2008.

[xli] UN Security Council resolution 1814 (2008), 15 May 2008.

[xlii] UN Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), 16 January 2009.

[xliii] UN Security Council resolution 1964 (2010), 22 December 2010.

[xliv] Some analysts suggested this move indicated a growing radicalization of Somali youth. In all likelihood, though, this was an alliance of convenience rather than conviction. Al Shabaab was a fundamentally Somali nationalist movement; it may well have regional interests, but has shown little inclination for global *jihad*.

[xlv] Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED), Report for Somalia (2009).

[xlvi] Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED), Report for Somalia (2013).

[xlvii] UN General Assembly resolution 64/287, 31 August 2010.

[xlviii] AU PSC Communique, 245th Meeting, 15 October 2010.

[xlix] UN Security Council resolution 1964 (2010), 22 December 2010.

[l] Agreement between the President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia, made in Kampala on 9 June 2011. ("Kampala Accord")

[li] The modalities were listed in a detailed "Somalia End of Transition Roadmap".

[lii] Under the "Garowe Principles", a new 275-member bicameral parliament, appointed using the 4.5 formula, would indirectly elect the President.

[liii] Avery Burns, "Feeling the Pinch: Kenya, Al Shabaab, and East Africa's Refugee Crisis", *Refuge Vol. 27 No. 1*, pp. 5-15 (2010). ("*Linda Nchi*" is Swahili for "protect (the) country".)

[liv] UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S-2012-74), 31 January 2012.

[lv] AU PSC, Communique (306th Meeting), 5 January 2012.

[lvi] UN Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), 22 February 2012.

[lvii] AU PSC (356th Meeting), Report of the AU Commission on the Strategic Review of AMISOM, 27 February 2013.

[lviii] UN Security Council resolution 2102 (2013), 2 May 2013.

[lix] All of which were noted in the Strategic Review as areas where AMISOM needed greater capacity.

[lx] An *Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya* veteran in Al Shabaab. Godane went by the *nom de guerre* Abu Zubayr.

[lxi] AMISOM currently has 22,126 uniformed personnel, with troops from Uganda (6,223), Burundi (5,432), Ethiopia (4,395), Kenya (3,664), Djibouti (1000), and Sierra Leone (850). AMISOM Police includes two Formed Police Units (Nigeria and Uganda, 140 officers each) and 230 individual police officers.

[lxii] "Puntland's Punted Polls", *International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 97*, 19 December 2013.

[lxiii] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2015/331), 12 May 2015.

[lxiv] UN Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), July 28 2015.

[lxv] UN General Assembly resolution 68/745, 11 February 2014.

[lxvi] UN Security Council resolution 2245 (2015), 9 November 2015.

[lxvii] The 500-strong Pakistani police contingent remained bivouacked at the airport for months, as they were visibly outgunned by the various militia in Mogadishu, and General Aidid had explicitly threatened that his forces would attack whoever attempted to interfere with their activities.

[lxviii] UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson estimated as many as 3000 AMISOM casualties (2007-2013). See also Paul D Williams, "How many Fatalities has AMISOM Suffered?" *IPI Global Observatory Special Report,* 10 September 2015. Williams explains that the number of deaths and injuries suffered by AMISOM are not released by the countries involved, making this a matter of estimation and controversy.

[lxix] UN Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), 19 March 2010.

[lxx] Small Arms Survey, "Surveying the Battlefield: Illicit Arms in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia", *Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2012*.

[lxxi]" EUTM Somalia: EU military mission to contribute to the building up and strengthening of the Somali National Armed Forces", *European External Action Service Factsheet*, October 2014.

[lxxii] Laurie Nathan, "'The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse': Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa",*Peace and Change, Vol. 25, No. 2*, April 2000. Nathan describes how South Africa had to deploy the army to maintain law and order, because of "*the practical problem of an inefficient, corrupt, and poorly trained police service, unable to cope with the high incidence of violent crime*". Somalia faces the further problem of the army itself being seen as the instrument of one or the other clan or political faction, such that a military presence is inherently a source of insecurity for members of other clans.