Peace Missions in Africa: Constraints, Challenges, and Opportunities

Preliminary Report to the African Union

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Executive Summary

1. This is a preliminary report of a process of consultation and research to inform the AU Commission concerning the current standing of peace missions and strategic priorities for reform. The report deals with political missions (mediation and high-level panels) and peace support operations, in the context of an analysis of the nature of contemporary conflict in Africa. The report raises questions that the AUC may seek to raise in its engagement with stakeholders, including the United Nations High-Level Panel reviewing peace operations.

2. More than a decade after the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the rationale and coherence of Africa’s own vision for peace and security requires re-stating for the coming decade. The political and military components of the APSA require review, both with regard to vision and their implementation. The AU should boldly articulate its own doctrine and strategy and should not succumb to external pressures to meet others’ priorities.

3. Based on a fundamental commitment to multilateralism—a principle shared with the UN—Africa and the AU possess a number of comparative advantages in the field of peace missions. ‘African solutions’ are contextual and holistic; African leaders apply judgement to circumstances and interpret universal prescriptions in a manner relevant to the realities of specific situations.

4. The AU PSC is the pivot of APSA. The UN-AU relationship is the foremost example of the implementation of the Chapter VIII provisions of the UN Charter. In pursuing the reform of the UN including the UNSC, the AU should shape its own institutions and processes to suit its circumstances and press for UN reform aligned with these realities.

5. Africa is developing its peace doctrines in response to events. Important elements of emergent peace practices include: (a) the principle of non-indifference and the readiness of AU member states to deploy troops in peace support operations, in situations in which there is no peace to keep; (b) the development of the ASF including its mission scenarios and requirements for deployment; and (c) the comparative advantage of using front-line states as troop contributing countries under the guidance of the AU. Additionally, the AU has established high-level panels and peace missions in
response to political crises. These practices warrant further formulation as elements of an African peace doctrine.

6. Central to the emergent African peace doctrine is maintaining the primacy of political guidance and oversight over peace missions. Several key principles are enshrined in African best practices, notably ensuring that peace forums are inclusive and that peace efforts are guided by fundamental provisions for democratic constitutionalism contained in the AU Constitutive Act. It is also essential that peace efforts are designed to reflect the changing nature of political power and armed conflict. The report makes recommendations for how peace initiatives should be reformulated as ongoing mechanisms for political guidance of conflict-affected countries.

7. A stronger coordination mechanism between the AU and RECs is required, with respect to establishing peace missions and mandating PSOs. Notably, a mechanism is required for how to determine a mandating authority for political missions to ensure those initiatives obtain the maximum political support from their sponsors.

8. The AU should not seek to emulate the structure of its counterpart institutions at the UN. The political oversight provided by the AU PSD over PSOD is essential. At the UN, the respective roles of the DPA and DPKO should be reconsidered or recombined, in such a way that the necessary political guidance and oversight on matters of international peace and security are provided for UN peacekeeping missions.

9. The AU should review ASF/APSA with the objective of building on its strengths and filling gaps rather than jettisoning hard earned investment to embrace instead the new models offered by the U.S. and France.

10. The AU PSD analytical capacity needs to be enhanced and fed more directly into the PSC decision-making processes. Coordination with the UN should be enhanced with a focus on proactive measures to anticipate crises.

11. AU PSOD and ASF need to develop full-fledged planning capacity at headquarters level. Capacity to source and manage logistics should also be built upon. Effective deployment of ASF is not possible without such a capacity. The system of logistics should be built and owned by the AU/ASF outlining which capacities to be owned directly by the ASF and which capacities to be mobilized from other partners including the UN and or any outside Africa partners such as NATO.

12. The UN should move away from an implicit model in which the AU serves as a first responder, with its forces and civilian personnel ‘re-hatted’ at such a time when stabilization has been achieved. Options such as hybrid missions or blue-green ‘re-hatting’ (transitioning from UN to AU) should be considered along with other options.
13. Africa needs to be financially independent of external sponsors for its peace missions. A continent-wide review of African defence and peace support capabilities would enable African countries to orient their procurement to items that are appropriate for PSOs, decreasing the continent's reliance on external powers, and also orient their training accordingly. AU Member States should provide predictable funding mechanisms for AU PSOs.

I. Background and Context

14. This review poses the question, how to situate peace initiatives—the attempt to end armed conflict through mediation, preventative political missions, and robust armed peace missions—within a wider political agenda. The common agenda of the United Nations and the African Union is shaped by multilateralism and the emerging norms of international law. The overall situation of peace and security in Africa has improved since the 1990s, though there are some serious setbacks and problems remaining. More significant than the level of threats is their changing nature: today's conflicts are trans-national and yet connected to centres of power outside the African continent. In the current global order, multilateral principles are in retreat, as world powers increasingly pursue their global security interests through unilateral means. This is to the detriment of Africa: the securitization and militarization of global policy poses a paradigmatic challenge to peace missions.

15. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was designed in the early 2000s, against the backdrop of the wars and atrocities of the 1990s and based on the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2002. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Africa was marginalized and neglected by the international community. It was treated mostly as a humanitarian case. This situation both allowed and required African nations to take primary responsibility for peace-related activities in Africa. The AU sought to reintroduce political principles into African multilateral governance. Subsequently, the global powers have treated Africa primarily through a security lens (the war on terror and international policing) or a commercial lens (natural resources and investment opportunities). The responsibility for keeping political principles alive remains with the AU and African governments.

16. In response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and related events including the war in the DRC from late 1990s, the OAU established the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP). The IPEP and its report, ‘Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide,’ were instrumental in the African Union adopting its norm of non-indifference and its right to intervene in the affairs of a Member State, enshrined in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. This norm has to be interpreted in the light of other AU commitments to democracy, rule of law, good governance, and the continuing importance of respect for national sovereignty. The foundational concern of the OAU to protect the African
continent from the interference of former colonial powers and neo-imperialists was supplemented and not supplanted by the norm of non-indifference. It represented a collective African determination to resolve African conflicts and halt atrocities, not an open invitation to others to intervene. Article 4(h) has garnered a high level of scholarly and legal attention but has never yet been openly invoked, though it has remained as a guiding concern, as the ‘principle of non-indifference.’

17. The doctrine of ‘sovereignty as responsibility,’ as developed by the eminent jurist Francis Deng, also implies that state sovereignty should not be utilized as a screen behind which a national government can commit atrocities against its own people. The right to intervene in grave circumstances is linked to the principle of collective responsibility. However, Africa’s collective responsibility is not confined to preventing and stopping mass atrocities, but also extends to peace, security, and other principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act such as democracy.

18. The AU’s principled commitment to democratic constitutionalism is found in two articles of its Constitutive Act. Article 4(m) specifies ‘respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.’ Article 4(p) specifies ‘condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments. Read together, these principles shape the AU’s response to the takeover of government by the armed forces, popular uprisings against dictators, and incumbents’ measures to amend constitutions for political expediency. In all cases, the norm of rejecting unconstitutional changes in government has to be understood alongside the other norms identified (democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance) and in the specific national context. Article 4(p) has regularly been invoked to suspend member states, small and large, from participation in the affairs of the AU, for a period of time until constitutional order is restored (normally through elections).

19. The AU was established in parallel with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which contained important principles and practices concerning economic and political integration, common development, good governance and international partnership. While most of the principles enunciated in the Constitutive Act and many of the peace and security mechanisms may make the AU appear somewhat like a continental version of the United Nations, another complementary set of tasks make the AU appear more akin to the European Union. One of the most influential of NEPAD’s initiatives has been the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), whereby African states invite their peers to examine and assess their economic and political governance. The wider principle of peer responsibility is also reflected in the roles played by a plethora of ad hoc and informal mechanisms set up at inter-governmental level, whereby African leaders collectively encourage one another to adopt better practices, and assist one another in problem solving.
20. The norm of protection of civilians (PoC) emerged during the parallel debate at the UN, and was articulated in the Brahimi Report of 2000. This concept centered upon the operational imperative of peacekeeping missions to be able and willing to protect civilians at immediate risk. The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), with its concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) introduced a distinct, if overlapping, concept: the right to military intervention to use all necessary means to protect civilians, including ‘humanitarian intervention.’ Although the fully-articulated concept of R2P involves preventative diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction and a range of other political and diplomatic measures, its proponents have been happy for the concept to be identified in public discourse with its most controversial component, use of an armed force. In political reality, this amounts to the privilege of the most powerful nations to authorize military action, or to intervene themselves, in circumstances in which they deem civilians to be under immediate threat.

21. These norms are all subject to political agendas. The ostensibly humanitarian rationale for NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (without UN Security Council authorization) and for its intervention in Libya in 2011 (with a UN Security Council resolution that was at best ambiguous and at worst an act of deception) invites other powers to invoke similar justifications for interventions. The AU and UN share a common strategic interest in upholding the fundamental principles of international law and the norms of multilateralism in such circumstances.

22. An abiding practice of African conflict resolution is a contextual and holistic approach. African solutions are typically tailored for specific circumstances, seeking to reconcile disparate principles with national realities. Africa is averse to the attempt to apply purportedly universal principles or ‘one size fits all’ policies, regardless of local realities.

II. The APSA and the Future Role of the AU

23. More than a decade after the establishment of the APSA, the rationale and coherence of Africa's own vision for peace and security requires re-stating for the coming decade. The political and military components of that vision require review, both with regard to their vision and their implementation.

24. The rationale, vision and coherence of the APSA. The APSA consists of the following five pillars: (a) the Peace and Security Council (PSC); (b) the Panel of the Wise which includes political missions and mediation exercises; (c) the Continental Early Warning System which includes conflict analysis at the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU Commission; (d) the African Standby Force (ASF) and its regional
brigades; and (e) the African Peace Facility (APF). This report is structured around each of these five pillars.

25. The APSA does not formally incorporate the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs), although they play an important role in peace and security activities. Relations between the AU and RECs/RMs are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding for Conflict Resolution and Management, signed by all the eight recognized RECs/RMs. This MoU needs to be strengthened to take account of the challenges outlined in this report.

26. Informally, the APSA also includes the Pan African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and its associated Court. The twice-yearly Assembly of the AU is also a central pillar of APSA, both for its formal deliberations and also because it is the opportunity for a host of side events (such as REC summit meetings, AU PSC meetings at the level of heads of state and government) and informal interaction among Africa’s leaders.

27. The APSA has crafted a vision for peace and security as well as mechanisms for coordinating the different organs/initiatives. This vision is one that seeks to achieve collective solutions to peace and security threats. In other words, the underlying objective of these mechanisms is to achieve collective reliance. This is distinct from self-reliance in that it is founded on a thick set of interconnecting institutions and mechanisms in the political, economic and security fields. The principal challenge facing APSA is that its vision is not supported with the required African capacities to implement. The amount of genuine African ownership is related to the level of financial, institutional and political responsibility that is shouldered. African states therefore should come forward and take more responsibilities in terms of providing required financial resources for the implementation of APSA.

28. APSA is not an answer to every African problem related to peace and security; it rather is a platform that allows African states and stakeholders to deliberate the challenges of African peace and security.

29. The AU and multilateralism. Africa has the most to gain from a strong multilateral order including respect for international law, and the most to lose from any erosion or abuse of multilateralism. It follows that the AU has a partnership with the UN that is more than strategic: it is paradigmatic. A stronger UN should be a stronger Africa. Should the UN become weaker, Africa including the AU would also be weakened.

30. The UN also has a strategic and systemic affinity with Africa and the AU. The UN system as a whole is more relevant in Africa than anywhere else in the world. Africa is the location of the great majority of UN peacekeepers. It is where the UN specialized agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNEP, UN Habitat etc.) are able to pursue their complex
mandates in full. Africa is where the UN’s development agenda, for example the Millennium Development Goals, are most relevant. Africa has benefited greatly from the UN’s attention. The African Union is the UN’s strategic partner. Developing this partnership requires a careful evaluation of the relative strengths of each organization and an allocation of specific responsibilities according to capacity and political leadership priorities.

31. The UN-AU partnership has been challenged at several levels over recent years. There has been a regrettable tendency for a spirit of sibling rivalry at the middle levels of the two institutions. The foundational spirit of cooperation was challenged by the international intervention in Libya in 2011, in which senior figures in the AU felt they had been deliberately sidelined their wisdom and efforts spurned (although the AU also appeared to be less cohesive in its approach). This has generated a crisis of confidence that still requires attention if it is to be repaired.

32. The following sections include many specific areas in which the alignment and complementarity between the UN and AU can be enhanced. Underpinning this, however, is the need for the leaders of the two organizations continually to re-emphasize their fundamental common commitment to multilateralism.

III. The Peace and Security Council

33. The UN Security Council remains the ultimate authority under international law. The Security Council is concerned to preserve its standing. While it recognizes the importance of regional organizations it is unwilling to dilute its legal authority. The AU has pressed for reform of the UN and for greater recognition of its own authority. The 2005 ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ recognizes that the AU PSC and RECs/RMs should be able to authorize intervention with approval of UNSC but occasionally even more rapidly anticipating ‘after the fact’ approval.

34. Although designed differently in terms of structure and functional responsibilities (A notable difference is the lack of veto powers by members of the PSC, although some lead nations have some degree of leverage in its deliberations and decisions), the AU PSC resembles the UN Security Council in its membership, proceedings and the substantive issues it discusses. Its legal status is based upon Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and it often serves as a counterpart to the UNSC, forwarding its communiqueés to the UNSC, which may then be endorsed in the form of UNSC resolutions. Some observers have posited the notion of the PSC as a junior UNSC or an agent of the UNSC. It is more correctly seen as a Chapter VIII partner with complementary capabilities, with its own sources of legitimacy. The UN-AU relationship is indeed the most comprehensive and significant Chapter VIII relationship globally, which is giving new meaning to Chapter VIII itself. Therefore, after more than a decade
of functioning on this basis, the PSC should take the opportunity to reflect candidly on its own rationale, on particular on its mission statement and political performance.

35. The AU PSC has the capability to convene and respond to African conflicts in a timely manner. It is typically the first responder, and insofar as it provides the first official multilateral response to a crisis, it possesses an extremely important soft power, namely the power to set an agenda and determine a narrative. For this reason, the analytical capacities of the AU PSC, including the Member States represented and the AU PSD that serves as its secretariat, are extremely important. Intellectual leadership, based on rigorous and prompt analysis of conflicts, plays a critical role.

36. Africa has long considered that the UNSC is in need of reform, both in terms of its composition and its procedures. Indeed, UNSC reform remains a priority. This is one reason why the PSC should not seek to replicate the UNSC at a continental level or serve as an agent of the UNSC. The best advertisement for UNSC reform would be for the AU PSC to act in a manner that demonstrates how Africa would like the UNSC to perform. If the PSC is to enhance its performance, the capacity of the members of the PSC must be assured, and coordination between the AU Commission, the PSC and the ‘A3’ African members of the UNSC must be improved. The PSC members should not only ensure that they support good decisions, but should monitor the implementation of those decisions.

37. The principal reason why the AU and its Member States turn to the UNSC is financial. One illustration of this tendency was the African consultation that led to the establishment of regional force for combating Boko Haram. There was no need to go to the UNSC except for the establishment of Trust Fund, but in doing so, the African nations involved invited the UNSC to take major oversight responsibilities for the mission and the affected area.

38. The principle of non-indifference developed and endorsed by the AU at the Durban summit in 2002, has tremendous implications for the doctrinal difference between the AU and the UN in its peace and security architecture and practices. As observed above, this principle is not an open door for others to intervene in African affairs, or for unilateral action by African governments, but rather a responsibility for collective African action. The PSC should therefore seek to be bold enough to ensure that the principle of non-indifference is not abused by unilateral action, whether by African or non-African forces. It needs to reflect on the circumstances in which the UN, other multilateral institutions and bilaterals are entitled to intervene in African affairs, and how the AU should be engaged when such a situation occurs.

39. The relationship between the PSC and the African members of the UN Security Council (the ‘A3’) requires strengthening and clarification. The Government of Algeria has recently initiated an annual consultation to enable better information sharing.
consultation and coordination in this regard. This is a step in the right direction that requires further strengthening.

40. **The RECs/RMs** are an integral part of the de facto APSA. The synergistic relationship between the AU PSC and the RECs/RMs is work in progress. One of the most important policy challenges for the AU is to establish the correct consultative, operational and legal relationship with the RECs/RMs. This is essential for the PSC to be taken sufficiently seriously by RECs that possess their own operational capacities and political will.

41. **The AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) and Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)** are instruments of the APSA. Should the PSD and PSOD become a mirror image or copy of their counterparts at the UN? This review reveals that the PSD's functions were designed differently and remain fundamentally different from those of the UN's DPA and DPKO.

42. The PSD is the pen-holder for the PSC. Unlike in the UNSC, where member states draft the resolutions, in the AU it is the PSD that drafts the communiqués as well as preparing the briefs for the Chairperson of the Commission and the Commissioner for Peace and Security. In the UN, the DPKO is senior to the Department of Political Affairs, but in the AU, the Peace Support Operations Department is a component part of the PSD. The PSD therefore has responsibilities for drafting policy at the PSC, for special political missions and mediation activities, and for PSOs.

43. The elevation of the UN DPKO to be senior to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in January 2007 has not gone without question. The DPKO emerged from the Department of Special Political Affairs which was an operational hand of the DPA. The DPKO is now much larger, but remains a policy implementation arm while the DPA, with its privileged relationship to the Secretary General and the UNSC, should serve as the UN’s principal policymaking arm. From the vantage point of Addis Ababa, the hierarchy of UN departments is not necessarily the most appropriate. Given that the African analysis is that all crises are political first and security-related second, the AU may want to consider pushing for this to be reflected within the UN system itself. By the same token, the AU may want to resist any pressures for the PSOD to become an equal and separate department to the PSD, and instead insist that it retains its correct position as a strictly subordinate implementing arm.

44. **Doctrinal issues.** The AU PSC’s decision-making takes place in the absence of a well-developed doctrine for peace and security, including conflict prevention and resolution and PSOs. The dominant scenarios of the 1990s have changed and new circumstances have arisen. There are new and better capabilities for analyzing conflicts and responding in complex and appropriate ways. Several de facto guiding principles for AU peace measures have in the meantime emerged. These include: (a) the policy of
non-indifference; (b) the development of ASF and agreed mechanisms for its deployment; (c) the articulation of scenarios for the deployment of ASF and broad requirements; and (d) the recognition for the specific role ‘frontline states’ play in peace enforcements under the guidance and leadership of the AU. These instruments are unique to the African continent. Informed by these emergent practices, the AU PSC makes decisions on a case-by-case basis. The PSC’s ability to make informed decisions, and to justify those decisions and thereby sustain its initiatives, would be greatly enhanced by a more carefully worked out doctrine for peace missions.

45. Among the instruments of the APSA are the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Non-Aggression Pact, and a number of initiatives to enhance the professionalism and best practices of troops engaged in PSOs, for example the African Peace Support Trainers Association. These instruments can all contribute to the development of the operational elements of an African PSO doctrine. Additional analytical, political and policy perspectives are required for the development of the strategic elements of such a doctrine.

IV. The Panel of the Wise

46. The Panel of the Wise is the head of the second pillar of the APSA. That pillar consists of a host of peacemaking and political activities, including special political missions and high-level panels and representatives.

47. The comparative advantage of African peacemakers lies in preventative measures and political solutions. The priority for any peace agenda must begin here. This section begins with the principles of conflict prevention that have emerged in Africa over the last fifteen years. The discussion is concerned less with a priori or theoretical principles and more with the actual practices that have been developed by African leaders including at the AU. The discussion then moves to responses to unconstitutional changes in government, to negotiated transitions (with a particular focus on Libya) and on negotiated secession (focusing on South Sudan’s separation from Sudan).

48. Just as armed conflicts have changed, so have peace talks. This section then discusses the practices of conflict resolution through negotiation, both informal and formal. It argues that formal peace processes are poorly connected with the real practices of political bargaining.

49. African principles for conflict prevention and resolution can be found in key foundational documents, such as the Constitutive Act of the AU, and also in the prevailing practices adopted by African peacemakers. Prominent among these
principles are democratic constitutionalism and collective responsibility and non-indifference.

50. **Democratic Constitutionalism.** The AU’s principles of democratic constitutionalism have been applied in numerous different circumstances, including in some of the continent’s largest and most powerful countries. The emergent African practice that the determining principle is democratic legitimacy rather than adherence to the existing constitution per se. The main elaboration of the doctrine occurred in response to the popular uprising in Tunisia, which amounted to a new principle of recognizing the legitimacy of non-violent popular protest as a means of challenging governments with a deficit of democratic legitimacy. However, as the case of Egypt in 2013 made clear, this did not amount to a carte blanche for the overthrow of an elected government simply on the basis of mass demonstrations.

51. The AU’s principles were tested and further elaborated in two cases of contested electoral results (Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire) and the uprising and civil war in Libya.

52. **General principles of peace negotiations.** Peace is a complicated business, and peacemaking has been compelled to adapt. There are some enduring principles of mediation that have stood the test of time. In an influential paper based on wide experience,¹ Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed identified the ‘seven deadly sins’ of mediation—the faults that mediators too often make, which mean they are destined to fail. The seven are: ignorance; arrogance; partiality; impotence; haste; inflexibility; and false promises. They demanded a deeper contextual knowledge and skill on the part of mediators, which can be described as a greater awareness of the political context and dynamics of the conflict.

53. Current realities of conflict suggest that we should add an eighth sin, ‘formalism.’ This is adhering to inflexible models of mediation as a process, which are no longer applicable to the kind of conflict underway. The sin of ‘formalism’ is partly an outcome of a combination of ignorance, arrogance, haste and inflexibility. But it is distinct: it consists of arriving with a mental map of a mediation process that has the wrong boundaries and assumptions. Often, the formal procedures of peace negotiation remain an anachronism, designed for an earlier era of conflicts and their means of resolution.

54. **Changing contexts.** Conflicts are more complicated. They rarely if ever involve two parties who can become fictive ‘equals’ at a negotiating table. The parties are themselves constituted by multiple actors, who have complex relations among themselves, and prior and ongoing political relationships. The actors involved in conflict are more numerous and diverse, and include external actors with stakes on the

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mediation process. The objectives of peace negotiations are more ambitious. It is no longer sufficient for belligerents simply to agree to end the shooting; any agreement that is blessed by the AU needs to reflect other principles including human rights, civilian protection, democracy, accountability for war crimes, and the legitimate interests of neighbouring countries.

55. The dominant model for negotiating the resolution of an internal conflict is based upon the model for inter-state conflict. The parties are given equal standing in the room. The leaders of the belligerent parties sit across a table in the presence of a third party mediator, plus observers. This is a ‘square table’ format. At the table, they work out an agreement that consists of a document that resolves their political differences and addresses the power-sharing, resource allocation and security arrangements that arise. Those present have the authority to make whatever agreement is required, and in an idealized situation, the room is sealed. The resulting agreement is akin to a proto-constitution. It may require third party monitoring or assistance in implementation.

56. This model tends towards a zero-sum game, in which one party’s gain is the other’s loss. The focus is on achieving a compromise through bargaining. Insofar as there is added value—a positive sum game—it arises either through the public good of peace itself, or an external ‘peace dividend’ in the form of external assistance. If there is already an expanding resource base—for example an economy growing rapidly because of oil extraction—then the negotiation automatically becomes a ‘win-win’ without the need for the parties to change their zero sum mindset.

57. The Algiers talks and agreement that ended active hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000 is a rare example of a traditional ‘square table’ agreement. It is exceptional also in that it is an inter-state agreement that brought to an end a conventional war over disputed territorial claims.

58. With only a few exceptions, the ‘square table’ model has limited applicability to the realities of conflicts today and their associated political processes. Conflicts are usually multi-sided. Each party consists less in a single cohesive unit and is more akin to a coalition of groups and individuals, among whom authority must be negotiated and renegotiated. Each party has links to external actors, including financiers and patrons. The communications revolution means that the negotiations process is open and open-ended.

59. The result is that most peace agreements are no longer solemn documents that resemble constitutions, but are more akin to marketplace bargains that are only as good as the market conditions that prevailed at the time when the deal was made. Peace agreements are therefore much more complicated and are supplemented by implementation annexes and subordinate agreements to patch up problems that later arise. Those who disagree with the content of the agreement or its implementation will
dispute it by force of arms, or by threats thereof. If the agreement calls for disarming a certain group, most likely that disarmament will need to be achieved by force. Discontented elements will arise and mount new challenges. A peace agreement therefore does not end violence but instead reconfigures patterns of violence.

60. The context in which mediation currently takes place resembles a ‘political marketplace’ in which continuous bargaining takes place between the conflict parties, between the mediator and the conflict parties, and between the different groups within the primary conflict parties. The mediation channel is only one of the mechanisms of communication. It is not in fact the main channel for deal making. In the conference chamber, the conflicting parties are not usually represented by their leaders and members with decision making capacity. The mediation forum tends to be a place for ‘options development’ and testing each other’s interests and capabilities while actual deal is reached outside such a formal arrangement. Delegates can make a phone call, come back to the mediation effort after a couple of minutes and change their position.

61. A major consequence of mediation in this type of context is that trust between parties is not the critical factor, although confidence in the peace-making operation as whole is significant. Outcomes of mediation processes could change from time to time once the real or perceived benefits of the conflicting parties change. The central issue is therefore not building ‘trust’ but rather finding the right deal that reflects the actual interest and capacity of the conflicting parties and creating an objective understanding of each other’s interests and capabilities. The major tool of mediators is therefore their access to incentives and sanctions and their capability to wisely use the incentives and sanctions according to the flow of the political process.

62. Consequently, formal peace talks are only one part of a wider process of political negotiation over the ending of armed conflict. African peace processes reflect this more complicated reality: they have become multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-actor political processes. Indeed peace processes have become folded into Africa’s regional governance mechanisms.

63. **Talking to terrorists.** The changed political landscape has blurred the distinction between terrorists and forces with legitimate political grievances. The label ‘terrorist’ is increasingly being used as a normative term to political entities states decide not to talk to. The term is arbitrarily used by states to name dissenting armed or unarmed opposition forces. Many of today’s African leaders have been labeled as ‘terrorists’ by their predecessors. For example, almost all former liberation movements were called as ‘terrorists’ by the governments they were fighting against, including Nelson Mandela and his party the ANC. Without denying that there appears to be unified position of states on identifying some forces (for example, Al Shabab and Boko Haram) as terrorists; states sometimes use to name all sorts of political opposition as ‘terrorism’ and all forms of expression of political dissent as ‘terrorist act’.
64. Internationally, there is a wider agreement on rejecting ‘terrorist acts’ but there is no established and internationally recognized legal framework, procedure, or mechanism for labeling a certain political entity as a ‘terrorist’. Someone’s terrorist therefore could be taken as a ‘liberation’ fighter by another person. Despite such vagueness however, a fight against ‘terrorism’, called as a ‘global war on terror’, has dominated the politics of interventions globally. This ‘global war’ has come up with its influence on African mediations and political processes by tacitly putting ‘restrictions’ with which political force to talk. Such a ‘restriction’ probably has contributed in the radicalization of some dissenting voices and associating themselves to some ‘internationally’ operating organizations with more radical agendas.

65. Governments invariably end up negotiating with political entities they named ‘terrorists’ at one time. Moreover, current African realities indicate a difficulty in identifying ‘terrorists’ from ‘poorly organized violent resistance forces’. It may be necessary to fight, or to fight and talk, but ultimately there should be no prohibitions on who should be recognized as a party to a peace process. The only criterion should be whether engagement with the entity can have a positive outcome. It is therefore important that mediators are open to talk to anyone that matters in a certain conflict and push governments to make ‘talking’ as the first point of entry in addressing grievances and managing conflicts.

66. The case of the 2006 peace talks with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), conducted in southern Sudan under the facilitation of the Government of Southern Sudan, strongly supported by Special Envoy of the UNSC, former president Chissano, as well as regional and international stakeholders, is an example of how a ‘terrorist’ designation was overridden in the interest of seeking peace. Although the talks ultimately failed (in part due to military action initiated by the U.S.), the peace process resulted in a major success, which was the evacuation of the LRA from Uganda and the establishment of peace in Uganda.

67. **Choosing and mandating mediators.** Most international mediators are chosen, not for their professional skills in conflict resolution, but rather because they are prestigious senior diplomats and politicians. They may have been excellent negotiators themselves. These are useful, often indispensible qualities to bring to a mediation process. However they are not always the skills required for mediator. Several issues arise: (a) the importance of specific knowledge. It is tempting for a newly-appointed mediator to think that the situation is so urgent that learning the details is a luxury that cannot be afforded. This is almost never the case: time spent consulting stakeholders and experts, and analyzing conflict data, is invariably well spent. (b) The more senior the mediator, the less time he or she is likely to be able to devote to the issue. Time is needed to develop the required expertise, generate a strong understanding and rapport with the parties, and to persist long enough for a resolution to be achieved. Few senior
figures are ready to devote this level of time and effort. The AU's preference for
deploying its most senior statespersons as envoys and members of high-level panels,
runs into the challenge of the scarcity of these individuals and the pressures on their
time. (c) The dominance of the formal mediation process means that other approaches
to conflict resolution are often overlooked. This is not just a more inclusive approach in
which unarmed stakeholders (such as civilian political parties, civil society
organizations, women’s representatives, and traditional leaders) are represented. Other approaches to conflict resolution based on producing added value through agreement,
through joint problem solving, are rarely applied in these situations.

68. This review finds that mediation has become much more common in the last 25
years. In any given year, almost half of all conflicts in Africa are subject to a mediation
process. In order to address the question of which kinds of mediation lead to best
outcomes, Allard Duursma undertook an analysis of mediation of African conflicts
between 1960 and 2012. He found that African-led mediation was more likely to reach
positive outcomes than non-African-led efforts. The best formula was mixed mediation
with African mediators in the lead. This finding is robust when all the usual confounding
factors are controlled for. Regarding the durability (successful implementation) of
peace agreements, Duursma found that unmediated agreements—those reached
directly by the parties without a third party—were by far the most likely to endure.
African and mixed mediation generally lead to longer peace spells than non-African
mediation. (See Appendix B)

69. These conclusions are encouraging for the model of African-led international
partnerships for peace. This suggests especially that African-led political initiatives,
backed by international resources and leverage, are the most effective kind of peace
intervention.

70. An African doctrine and practice of conflict resolution and peacemaking: insofar
as such a doctrine and practice exist, they emphasize situational factors, and downplay
general models and universal prescription. The African focus is on the particular and
the political, and to integrate all situational factors into analysis and action in an holistic
manner. Across Africa, single-issue templates and prescriptions, whether they be the
’square table’ of negotiations, a doctrinaire insistence on criminal accountability, or a
refusal to talk to terrorists, have been impediments to finding workable solutions to
African conflicts.

71. Effective conflict resolution requires political analysis and skill. It requires the
political masters of the peace process to define mediation objectives in such a way that
they are achievable. This may mean downplaying universal prescriptions. It demands
astute and rigorous political analysis of the conflict in question, setting aside received
templates. It requires identifying mediators and determining mediation structures that
can deliver.
72. The existing blueprints for conflict resolution processes have reached their limit and are currently in need of transformation. The current civil war in South Sudan showcases the limitations of existing approaches based on conventional diplomacy. As the conflict has progressed, it has created new leaders who are not accessible to the mediators and the AU, thereby making the existing forum less effective.

73. **Mandating political missions:** The political support for mediation and special political missions comes mainly from the sponsoring body of the mission. When and if there is a congruence of interests of the political sponsors of that body, the mediation tends to get an undivided and unified political support that provides a better menu of incentives and sanctioning capabilities. There should therefore, exist, a mechanism that allows vetting the right sponsoring organization with the proper tools of incentives and sanctioning capabilities for certain mediation. Capacity of a mandating agency should be measured in terms of impartiality in relationship to the conflicting parties’, proximity to the conflict, and capacity to mobilize economic, political and military power.

74. Political missions must have robust but realistic mandates. The mandate of political missions should be sufficiently wide enough to address problems related with the conflict at hand. There are significant dilemmas over whether the mandate should be a return to the status quo, or transforming the conflict to a comprehensive and sustainable peace.

75. Despite the fact that the AU and RECs are increasingly mandating political missions, the UN still continues to be an important originator and mandating authority for political missions. The UNSC has a particularly vital role in establishing sanctions committees. UN political missions are sometimes deployed in advance of a peacekeeping operation, and hand over to that PSO on its arrival. However, the operational priorities of a PSO may lead to a neglect of the political focus. A means must be found to ensure the continued primacy of the political throughout.

76. There is need for a continued consultation to the AUC and African RECs in the process of mandate authorization, review and close scrutiny. This is essential because it is only through such close consultation that the mandate and deployment will reflect the expectations of the African countries and REC involved. The input of RECs and the AUC can also extend beyond strategic planning and impact operational planning as well helping the UN pick the right operational tools for a particular mission.

77. The African Union requires an investment in mediation support, including material and logistical capacity and expertise. But it is vitally important that such capability and expertise should not be developed at the expense of political analysis and political discretion. Applying a standard technocratic template to conflict resolution in Africa is sure to end in failure.
78. In pursuit of these goals, Africa should invest in its universities and think tanks, to enable African scholars and analysts to develop their capabilities. The continent's dependency on foreign expertise and foreign funds for African expertise should be ended. Another important element of this is maintaining institutional memory, including establishing archives of African peace efforts and insisting that all personnel involved prepare documentation including handover or end-of-mission reports.

79. One of the AU's strategic goals should be, own the narrative. Whoever masters the narrative cannot be manipulated by the protagonists or by outside powers. It is necessary for the mediator to know the conflict as well as the leaders of the belligerent parties themselves to preclude the possibility of any form of manipulation by the protagonists and to ensure that other outside actors would not infringe on defining the nature and modes of intervention to be taken by relevant parties such as the UN.

80. **Issues of justice and criminal accountability.** Africa has developed a singular approach to the challenges of seeking peace and justice. African states were among the earliest and most enthusiastic proponents of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, a decade after the Rome Statute came into effect, the AU was disillusioned with the ICC and suspended cooperation with the Court. The AU's decision to turn its back on the ICC reflected the African principle that peacemaking is contextual, and that no one norm or principle should override all others. In particular, the African approach reflects the reality that there can be no justice without peace. African practice incorporates concerns of justice and criminal accountability into peace processes in a manner that balances them with other priorities.

81. **Revising the format for peace talks.** The current standard model of peace conferences in luxury hotels in capital cities is increasingly under question. The task of constructing an alternative model has yet to be undertaken. There is a pressing need for an elaboration of diverse forms of conflict resolution, to expand the toolbox at the disposal of the AU.

**V. The Continental Early Warning System**

82. The African Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is the head of the third pillar of APSA. The bulk of this pillar consists of conflict analysis, conducted within the AU PSD and within the RECs.

83. The PSD has conflict analysts on staff who routinely produce analysis of impending and actual conflicts. They have a good record of strong analysis. The challenge is translating their analysis into action. For example, excellent early analysis of the deepening crisis in the Central African Republic in 2012-13 did not inform PSC
decisions and AU policy. A closer organic link between analysis and policy action is required: there is a need for conflict analysis and early warning to be channeled directly to the PSC.

84. The deployment of particular international missions is rarely informed by close analysis of the actual dynamics of the conflict. International policy appears often to be driven more by the press coverage than expert analysis and available information. Data available from the field could provide important insights to the specific models of peace missions in the future.

85. An example of this is provided by the case of Darfur, and the deployments of AMIS and UNAMID. Appendix D (figure 9) shows how the international attention to the Darfur crisis did not correspond to the objective severity of that crisis, measured in terms of numbers of people killed. A key database for allowing more rigorous and nuanced analysis of conflicts is the information collected by the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) of a PSO. These data should be made available to analysts so as to inform mission conception, planning and implementation.

86. Globally, the development of the norms and practices of political and military peace missions has not necessarily reflected rigorous conflict analyses. The debates around R2P were driven in part by a public perception that armed conflict and mass atrocity were increasing, at a time when the data show that they were in fact decreasing. One of the challenges for developing a continent-wide conflict analysis capability is obtaining better data and analyzing them.

VI. The African Stand-by Force (ASF)

87. The multidimensional, multidisciplinary, African Stand-by Force was designed as a central pillar of the APSA. Despite major efforts and a deadline of 2015, the ASF is not effectively operational. It lacks an approved vision and mission statement. To the extent that there is an AU PSO doctrine, it is to be found scattered through multiple documents and decisions. An attempt to synthesize these documents and decisions was undertaken in 2013 but the resulting synthesis document has yet to be approved by the AU Executive Council.

88. The concept of operations of the ASF was developed in 2003. It entailed five regional brigades and a rapid deployment capability (the rapidly deployable brigade under the AUC’s command, control and authority was not endorsed), with six potential scenarios:

- Scenario 1: AU/Regional military advice to a political mission;
- Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission;
• Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission;
• Scenario 4: AU/Regional Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building);
• Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers;
• Scenario 6: AU intervention in grave circumstances (genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes).

89. The six scenarios as originally envisaged have been overtaken by events. None of the six matches the situations in which African regional forces are deployed. The scenarios do not, for example, include responding to terrorist attacks, to piracy and transnational organized crime, or to insurgencies that affect multiple countries. The emerging threats could have been categorized under scenario 5 had it not been limited to a peace keeping environment and had it articulated specific doctrine that fits the situation. The AU needs to review the ASF in order better to respond to new circumstances.

90. The AU has made tremendous progress in terms of setting up its political institutions and mechanisms. It has not demonstrated comparable commitment to realize the ASF. It has been particularly challenging to achieve the goals of a consensus-driven force, that can be deployed rapidly, based upon each of the AU’s five regions which do not correspond precisely with the more active and vigorous RECs.

91. The regional brigades of the ASF have been developed and in many cases are potentially deployable, in time for the deadline of 2015. However, these brigades have not been called upon in situations of crisis. One reason for this is that the circumstances of conflicts have not corresponded with those envisaged in the original concept of operations. More significantly, individual states, both African and non-African, have preferred to initiate coalitions of the willing, often at the level of RECS, in an ad hoc and situation-specific manner.

92. The different mandating structures at the AU and RECs levels have not been harmonized. The AU PSC is often considered as the principal mandating authority, but in practice the RECs point out that the APSA allows for the RECs to deploy ASF components as PSOs. It is therefore necessary to clarify this relationship of subsidiarity and/or complementarity in order to build a coherent mechanism.

93. In 2013, under pressure to develop a military response mechanism better-suited to the exigencies for intervention preferred by external powers and Africa’s largest states, the AU set up the Africa Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC). The AICRC consists of tactical battle groups to be deployed by one or more African lead nations, to conduct stabilization and enforcement missions, combat terrorist groups and provide emergency assistance to AU member states. The aim is ‘to establish an efficient, robust
and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations. While heralded as a strictly transitional solution reflecting the difficulties of establishing the ASF and its Rapid Deployment Capability, it is probable that the AICRC will become the mechanism preferred by certain individual UN and AU Member States, thereby weakening the prospects of the ASF.

94. Meanwhile, in response to the security priorities of western nations (specifically the U.S. and France), and new threats such as terrorism and piracy, a different ad hoc operational modality has been developed. The P3 do not themselves contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. They may deploy their forces for parallel or complementary purposes, but do not place them under UN command. Well aware of the limitations of UN deployments, they are also attracted to using African troop contributors directly, or through the AU or RECs, as a way of circumventing the constraints on the UN. In Libya, the P3 drew upon NATO countries and members of the League of Arab States for an agenda that appeared to be regime change.

95. In parallel to the ASF, the U.S. and France have each established their own military response mechanisms. In the late 1990s, the U.S. set up, without prior consultation, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). At the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa in December 2013, the French government endorsed both the ASF and the AICRC but its actual actions have utilized the AICRC and ‘coalitions of the willing’, circumventing the ASF. In 2014, at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC, President Barack Obama announced a new African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP, ‘A-Prep’).

96. While the basic principle of the ASF is consensus, the forces deployed by the RECs or led by the U.S. and France, are ‘coalitions of the willing’ based on voluntary participation. This has been called ‘multilateralism à la carte’ but it resembles security pacts rather than principled multilateralism. The AU will need to review these instruments to determine whether they should be seen as complementary or competing models for mobilizing PSOs. The current trajectory is for ACRIC and U.S. initiatives to displace the ASF. The AU needs to review this situation.

97. The Evolution of Peacekeeping Doctrine. The strategic environment in which peacekeeping has taken place has evolved. As early as the 1960s, African leaders have taken great care to promote unity and minimize the risk of external powers’ intervention. For instance, the failure of the ONUC mission in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) triggered some African leaders to call for an African High Command. The

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subsequent group of 33, which was formed in 1965, looked at the authorization, financing, and management of peacekeeping operations.

98. UN peacekeeping was designed in an era of inter-state conflict and civil wars between well-matched belligerents. It was augmented in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the UN was the only multilateral institution capable of mounting a complex peacekeeping operation, and when none of the P5 at the UN Security Council objected to robust action to halt mass atrocities in small countries. In the last decade that has changed to a variable geometry of mandating authorities, each with different political interests. This has led to diverse forms of military peace mission, ranging from traditional military observer missions to enforcement operations, with various intermediate and hybrid forms.

99. **The need to develop African models for PSOs.** The circumstances and constraints of AU peace operations determine that the organization needs to create new forms of PSO. These could follow diverse models appropriate to diverse circumstances. It is not necessary to seek to replicate DPKO model of operations without having the resources DPKO commands.

100. **Capacity related issues:** The most common gap related to PSOs is the mismatch between the mandate provided by the organs of the AUC and the failure to obtain the required resources to effectively run their missions. African PSOs are mostly funded by donor and UN financial resources and supported by external logistics. The political will to intervene combined with the dependence of resources on others is what many refer as the ‘African Security Dilemma’—the gap between political ownership and responsibility to implement decisions. Having the political will to make ambitious political decisions without providing the resources to implement it is being a common failure of Africa in many instances. Several examples could be cited in this regard.

101. For example the AU’s decision to deploy a mission in Libya was not implemented as the required resources were not in place. NATO’s intervention came while the AUC was caught in this dilemma, and that intervention changed the situation in Libya. The AU’s perspective was that the problem was political and it required a political intervention. NATO intervened militarily but could not resolve the political situation in Libya through military means. The wisdom of the African position has been demonstrated over time and now all international actors are looking for a political intervention to address the situation.

102. Another example is the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia. AMISOM is mandated by the AU and reports to the same body but its finance comes from a donor trust fund managed by the UN. AMISOM does not have predictable funding and therefore makes it difficult to draw and implement an exit strategy where the Somalis take charge of their affairs. Every now and then the UNSC extends the mandate of the mission and therefore
planning is limited to those short terms despite AMISOM being expected to stay there for a reasonably long period before it is transferred to the UN and/or the Somali security forces take over. The fact AMISOM is mandated to make peace in collaboration with the National Security Forces of Somalia while its logistics is managed by UNSOA using UN peacekeeping standard operating procedures is an impediment to the operation. Somali security forces are deployed along the side of AMISOM but do not access logistics AMISOM gets because UNSOA’s regulations limit it to provide support to AMISOM forces. These are the kind of issues resource limitations impact AUC mandated operations.

103. **AU-UN-RECs relationship issues:** The AU and UN both have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. African missions have a higher-level degree of legitimacy compared to missions mandated by and composed of non-African forces. For example, it deploying non-African forces in Somalia will likely invoke a narrative of ‘infidels’ coming to Somalia. Other advantages are that the AU is closer to hotspots than the UN, allowing the AU to deploy a PSO more rapidly. African countries are also more willing to face the risks and challenges associated with peacekeeping in Africa. African countries have lost more troops in Somalia than the losses for all UN missions combined over the same period. Few non-African countries will take such risks.

104. A framework needs to be developed that can guide the desired level of coordination between African and non-African actors. UNAMID was intended to combine the leverages of both the UN and the AUC in one mission. This is an asymmetric partnership, and insufficient attention was given to what was needed to make it work properly. There can be no ‘contracting and sub-contracting’ relationship between these political bodies. Both are political entities with particular areas of competencies and leveraging capabilities. It is the subsidiarity relationship that has to be worked out.

105. Similar considerations apply to the relationship between the AU and African RECs. The relationships in terms of African PSOs should also be defined and elaborated sufficiently. So far, the only formal reference to such a relationship is the MoU between the AUC and African RECs and Regional Mechanisms. An MoU is insufficient for the requirement: a stronger agreement is needed.

106. **Issues related to mission transitions.** African Union soldiers are typically first responders and AU missions serve as rapid stabilization missions. The AU’s resource constraints then creates a situation in which the UN takes over.

107. The UN is committed to not deploy a peacekeeping force when there is no peace to keep. The AUC is committed to deploy rapid stabilization force and launch political processes that create peace agreements between the conflicting parties that may eventually call for the deployment of a peace support operation. However, the reality calls for continued engagement and negotiation for peace agreements to work even
after they are signed. Experience has shown that signing a peace agreement does not guarantee the existence of peace to keep. While the preconditions for the mission to be ‘re-hatted’ into a UN operation may exist on paper, it does not exist in practice. A PSO deployed following an agreement that failed to bring peace can only try to make peace using peace-keeping tools, and is unlikely to succeed.

108. To avert such a situation, ways of allowing AU stabilization forces to access predictable funding from the UN's assessed contributions should be sought or alternative mechanisms of funding should be set in place. The AU and UN also should work together from the beginning of the deployment of a stabilization force so that mission transition becomes smoother when the condition for such is fulfilled.

109. One option for the UN consider is a hybrid mission that combines components of both DPA and DPKO. This could help with ensuring the primacy of the political and continuity of political strategy within the UN, and would thereby enhance partnership with the AU.

VII. The African Peace Facility

110. The African Peace Facility is the fifth pillar of APSA. Currently, over 90% of APF resources come from donors outside Africa. While African PSOs remain dependent on external funds, the AU will be significantly constrained in its ability to develop its own doctrines and policies. The emerging division of labour between Africa and its external partners is that African countries have the political will to undertake painful military actions that involve loss of lives, while the partners have the funds. The AU needs to question the politics and ethics of such a formulation. African governments have discussed extensively how to finance the APF though assessed contributions, donations from African private sector and/or communities’ levies through different forms of taxation. None has yet become effective.

111. African defence budgets have expanded fast over recent years. During 2013 the average increase was 8.3%. Some African militaries have utilized PSOs as budgetary opportunities. Others have sought strategic alliances with external partners based on their specialized skills in PSOs or enforcement operations.

112. Despite the overall increase in African military finance, AU PSOs still lack the kinds of equipment required, such as heavy lift aircraft and transport helicopters. African military procurement remains skewed towards traditional territorial defence items and prestige equipment, to the detriment of the kinds of equipment useful for PSOs.
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations

113. The following major conclusions and recommendations arise from this preliminary review.

114. **Strategic Recommendations:**

- A doctrine for PSOs is needed, specific to the African context.
- As much as PSOs with robust mandates are required to impact a crisis situation, the danger of missions being open-ended with no exit should not be overlooked. The primary objective of a PSO should be limited to the creation of some sort of stability and peace that allows the key stakeholders to address the root causes of violence. Defining mission objectives related to the institutionalization of democracy is far from reality that only contributes to the open-endedness of missions. Such tasks should be left to the development agencies to deal with.
- The AU should review the last decade of experience of the Chapter VIII relationship between the UN and AU (and especially UNSC and AU PSC) with a view to enhancing this relationship in future.
- Develop stronger UN/AU consultations in determining the mandating authorities for political missions. Determination of mandating authority should base the leveraging capacity of each of the players in any given conflict without disregarding that primacy should be given to African institutions in African conflicts.
- The AU should review ASF/APSA with the objective of building on its strengths and filling gaps rather than jettisoning hard earned investment to embrace instead the new models offered by the U.S. and France.
- A stronger coordination mechanism between the AU and RECs is required, with respect to mandating PSOs.
- A continent-wide review of African defence capabilities would enable African countries to orient their procurement to items that are appropriate for PSOs, decreasing the continent’s reliance on external powers.

**The Peace and Security Council**

115. **Recommendations to the African Union:**

- A number of concrete actions would enhance the coordination between the AU PSC and the UNSC (especially the ‘A3’). These include formal consultation mechanisms: the Permanent Representatives to the AU of the ‘A3’ states should meet regularly with the Chair of the PSC and the Commissioner for Peace and Security; the ‘A3’ representatives in New York should convene regular meetings with the African group, especially when it is the turn of one of them to chair the UNSC.
• A formal consultative mechanism between the AU PSC and PSD and their counterparts in the RECs should be instituted, and the basis for the cooperation between them should be upgraded.
• The PSD should retain its status as providing political guidance to the PSOD.
• PSD's analytical capability and the uptake of early warning signals calling for early response should be improved.
• A doctrine for PSOs is needed, and their political oversight and relationship to mediation activities, specific to the African context.

116. **Recommendations to the United Nations:**

• The agenda of the consultative mechanism between the UNSC and AU PSC should include a special focus on common analysis of emerging issues and preparing coordinated responses to eventualities.
• In addition to the existing dialogue and coordination mechanisms (the Joint Task Force), and the UN Office for the AU, the tradition of periodic principal level consultations between the AU and the UN should be re-invigorated.

**The Panel of the Wise**

117. **Recommendations to the African Union:**

• The holistic and contextual character of ‘African solutions’ should be articulated more clearly, and developed into a doctrine. This could be accomplished through a comprehensive review of peace initiatives and a subsequent high-level political review.
• Develop a mechanism in consultation with the RECs on how to determine a mandating authority for special political missions and high-level panels that enables those initiatives to obtain the maximum political support from their sponsors.
• There is a need for deeper analysis of conflicts and more creative approaches to conflict resolution processes and mechanisms.
• Mediations and special political missions should be managed as projects with limited lifetime and their objectives should be clearly articulated in a way they are robust but realistic.
• The existing norm of a regionally inclusive forum in which all neighbouring states are involved should be upheld.
• The designation ‘terrorist’ has not proven helpful and its use in African political discourse should be discouraged.
• Strengthen the support provisions for AU mediators, special envoys, high representatives and others, in terms of experts and administrative and logistical assistance.
• Develop institutional capacity at the AU HQ for archiving and researching of the peacemaking activities in Africa, including in a lessons learned format.
Also introduce end of mission report for AU special envoys and chief mediators so that lessons learned could be accounted properly

- Ensure that there is continuity in political guidance and oversight through all stages of conflict resolution and post-conflict engagement.

118. **Recommendations to the United Nations:**

- Work together with the AU a mechanism for determining a mandating authority for a specific political mission and mediation that enables all the parties use their leverages in resolving a specific conflict
- Recognize that, generally speaking, the principal mediation role should be provided by the AU or other African institutions, with the UN in support.
- The UN’s Special Political Missions play an important role in Africa. Mechanisms for coordinating UN SPMs and African initiatives should be enhanced.
- Continue strengthening the political partnership with the AU by opening sufficient political space and encouraging the AU participation in all matters of decision making starting from discussions on the concept of operation through to exit strategies and policies. If warranted by the context and significance of the challenges to international peace and security, formalize such relationship in a mutually agreeable arrangement.
- Further promote the deployment and functioning of the peace missions which, as result of cooperation between the UN and the AU are fully contextualized within the regional and sub-regional security, humanitarian, environmental, and political realities and based on regional legal frameworks and political institutions.
- As expeditiously as possible provide them with requisite legislative authority and resources.

**The Continental Early Warning System**

119. **Recommendations to the African Union:**

- The analytical capacity of the AU PSD should be enhanced, with additional staff and resources, and a more direct link between the political and conflict analyses of the conflict analysts and the PSC should be established.
- Mechanisms should be established to enable analysts in PSOs to draw on expertise for analysis of JMAC data.

120. **Recommendations to the United Nations:**

- The respective roles of the DPA and DPKO should be reconsidered or recombined, in such a way that the necessary political guidance and oversight on matters of international peace and security are provided for UN peacekeeping missions.
• Analysts in UN missions should be networked with the AU PSD and should provide JMAC and other data for analysis.
• Where appropriate and in close consultation with the AU, second qualified UN staff, including consultants, to enhance the AU analytical capacity, during start-up arrangements and early deployment as well as in crisis situations.

The African Standby Force

121. **Recommendations to the African Union:**
  • The AU should review ASF/APSA with the objective of building on its strengths and filling gaps rather than jettisoning hard earned investment to embrace instead the new models offered by the U.S. and France.
  • AU PSOD and ASF need to develop full-fledged planning capacity at headquarters level. Capacity to source and manage logistics should also be built upon. Effective deployment of ASF is not possible without such a capacity. The system of logistics should be built and owned by the AU/ASF outlining which capacities to be owned directly by the ASF and which capacities to be mobilized from other partners including the UN and or any outside Africa partners such as NATO.
  • A stronger coordination mechanism between the AU and RECs is required, with respect to mandating PSOs.
  • Strong and continuous political oversight and guidance of PSOs is required, throughout the stages of mission planning and deployment, including mission transition and exit strategy and post-conflict phases.

122. **Recommendations to the United Nations:**
  • The UN should move away from an implicit model in which the AU serves as a first responder, with its forces and civilian personnel ‘re-hatted’ at such a time when stabilization has been achieved. Options such as hybrid missions or blue-green ‘re-hatting’ (transitioning from UN to AU) should be considered along with other options.
  • The UN should take the lead in developing predictable funding mechanisms for AU PSOs.
  • While engaging the AU in strategic planning on the mandate, format, size of a PSO in Africa, the UN should also actively engage the AU, RECs, and other regional arrangements on the financial, human resources requirements.
  • Staffing and recruitment policies and practices should be treated as political in the context of peacemaking in Africa.
  • Recruitment and deployment of senior mission staff in particular at the level of SRSGs and DSRSGs, should be given political attention and significance it deserves and invariably effected in close coordination with the AU and other regional stakeholders.
• Closer incorporation of DPA into peacekeeping missions throughout their lifetime.

The African Peace Facility

123. **Recommendations to the African Union:**
- A continent-wide review of African defence capabilities would enable African countries to orient their procurement to items that are appropriate for PSOs, decreasing the continent’s reliance on external powers.
- AU Member States should provide predictable funding mechanisms for AU PSOs.
Appendices

Appendix A. Conflict Trends in Africa

Figure 1: Trends in Conflict in Africa

![Graph showing trends in conflict in Africa](image)

*Source: Uppsala Conflict Database (derived by Allard Duursma)*

Figure 2: Regional Trends in Battle Deaths in State-Based Conflicts

![Graph showing regional trends in battle deaths](image)

*Source: Human Security Report 2013*
Figure 3: Regional Trends in Battle Deaths in Non-State Conflicts

Appendix B. Mediation Trends in Africa

Figure 4: Trends in Conflict Mediation

![Trends in Conflict Mediation Graph]

Source: Allard Duursma


1. Duursma finds that mediation has become much more common in the last 25 years. In any given year, almost half of all conflicts in Africa are subject to a mediation process. In order to address the question of which kinds of mediation lead to best outcomes, Allard Duursma compiled the ‘International Mediation in Civil Wars in Africa Dataset.’ The dataset is based on the Uppsala Conflict Database and is supplemented with unique data on all mediation efforts in civil wars in Africa between 1960 and 2012. In order to study the durability of peace agreements, Duursma used the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, Version 2.0. This dataset includes peace agreements concluded in armed conflicts between 1975 and 2011. Mediation success is thus assessed in terms of two outcome variables: the conclusion of peace agreements and the durability of the concluded peace agreements. In other words, success is understood both as the achievement and sustainability of a particular solution.
2. Duursma found that Africa has experienced 938 conflict dyad-years between 1960 and 2012. Of this total, 334 have experienced mediation (36%). African third parties have been involved in mediation in 241 conflict dyad-years over this period, just over half the time simultaneously or jointly with non-African third-parties. Non-African third-parties have mediated in 222 conflict dyad-years, 42% of the time in coordination with African third parties. Mixed mediation is thus the most common type of mediation in civil wars in Africa, followed by African mediation, and non-African mediation respectively. The UN and OAU/AU have been the commonest mediators.

3. Duursma found that African-led mediation was more likely to reach positive outcomes than non-African-led efforts. The best formula was mixed mediation with African mediators in the lead. This finding is robust when all the usual confounding factors are controlled for.

4. Regarding the durability (successful implementation) of peace agreements, Duursma found that unmediated agreements—those reached directly by the parties without a third party—were by far the most likely to endure. African and mixed mediation generally lead to longer peace spells than non-African mediation. The greatest risk of failure for a peace agreement is its first year. Duursma found that only around 43% of the non-African mediated peace agreements are still intact after one year, compared to 56% for African mediation and 66% for mixed mediation. Most peace agreements are robust if they survive longer than five years. Duursma’s data indicate that only 14% of all non-African mediated peace agreements persist beyond five years, compared to 53% for mixed mediated agreements and 52% for African mediated agreements.
(b) Overview of United Nations Special Political Missions

Prepared by Vladimir Zhagora

*Increase in the number of missions:*

The number of field-based special political missions has grown steadily over the past 20 years (see figure below). In 1993, there were only three political missions in the field. This number increased to 12 in 2000 and reached 15 in 2013. **This growth occurred notwithstanding the fact that over half of the country-specific special political missions deployed since 1993 have already been liquidated.**

*Increase in the size and costs of missions:*

Special political missions have also increased significantly in size, and therefore in their overall costs. In the 2000-1 biennium, the SPM “envelope” amounted to roughly US$110 million. By the 2012-13 biennium, the SPM budget had increased more than ten-fold, to US$1.18 billion.

*Increase in mandate complexity and thrust:*

The increase in the number of special political missions is only part of the story. Individually, the mandates of these missions have become significantly more complex than they were at the outset, when they had primarily reporting and monitoring tasks. Especially over the last decade, **field-based special political missions have become manifestly multidimensional operations**, in line with an expanding normative agenda, combining political tasks with a broader set of mandates in areas such as human rights, the rule of law, and combating sexual violence in conflict.

**Whereas a field-based mission in 1995 had an average of less than two mandate areas, this number had increased to 3.5 by 2000 and to roughly six by 2013.** Different thematic mandates became more prevalent over time. **For example, the percentage of field-based missions with security sector reform and rule of law mandates increased from none in 1995 to 30 per cent in 2000 to 60 per cent at present.** Human rights mandates followed a similar trend: 28 per cent of field-based special political missions had human rights-related mandates in 1995, 38 per cent in 2000, and 60 per cent at present.
Appendix C: Peacekeeping trends in Africa

Figure 5: UN Uniformed Peacekeeping Personnel, Worldwide 1991-2013

[Graph showing UN uniformed peacekeeping personnel worldwide from 1991 to 2013.

Source: UN, http://ourworldindata.org/data/war-peace/peacekeeping/]

Figure 6: Total numbers of uniformed personnel deployed in PSOs in Africa

[Graph showing total numbers of uniformed personnel deployed in PSOs in Africa from 2000 to 2014.

Source: UN and AU data, graph produced by Allard Duursma]
Figure 7: Total numbers of uniformed personnel deployed in African-led and hybrid PSOs

Source: UN and AU data, graph produced by Allard Duursma

Figure 8: UN Peacekeeping budgets

Source: UN data, [http://vitalsigns.worldwatch.org/vs-trend/peacekeeping-budgets-equal-less-two-days-military-spending](http://vitalsigns.worldwatch.org/vs-trend/peacekeeping-budgets-equal-less-two-days-military-spending)
Figure 9: African countries’ troop contributions to UN Peacekeeping

Source: Institute of Security Studies, based on data from International Peace Institute.

Figure 10: Selected African countries’ troop contributions to UN Peacekeeping
Figure 11: Contributions of ‘Established’ and ‘New’ African troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations

‘Established’ troop contributors are defined as those who contributed 500 or more uniformed personnel during 2000-02 and ‘new’ troop contributors as those who deployed more than 750 in 2012-14 but fewer than 500 in 2000-02.
Appendix D: Darfur Case Study

Figure 12: Darfur: Violent Fatalities and International Media Attention


Figure 13: Conflict in Darfur 2003-2014 and PSO deployment

Source: ACLED with dates of AMIS and UNAMID added.
Appendix E: Workshop Programme and Participants

Peace Missions in Africa:
Constraints, Challenges, and Opportunities

Workshop Programme

Addis Ababa, 16-17 February 2015

Day One: 16 February

9.00-9.30 Opening Session: Welcome and introductions

9.30-11.00 Session One: Emergent forms of peace support operation

Presenters:
- Wafula Okumu
- Gen. Louis Fisher
- Nurudin Azeez

11.30-13.00 Session One (continued)

14.30-16.00 Session Two: The APSA, ASF and future role of the AU

Presenters:
- Festus Aboagye
- Sarjoh Bah
- Solomon Dersso

16.30-17.30 Session Two (continued)

19.00 Workshop dinner (location to be confirmed)

Day Two: 17 February

9.00-11.00: Session Three: Mediation and political missions

Presenters
- Abdul Mohammed
- Vladimir Zhagora
- Alex de Waal

11.30-13.00 Session Three (continued)

14.30-16.00 Concluding Session: Next steps
Participants

Festus B. Aboagye
Nureldin Azeem
Al Haji Sarjoh Bah
Mulugeta Gebrehiwat Berhe
Kahssay Gebreyesus
Alex de Waal
Gen. Louis Fisher
Mor Mbow (written contribution)
Abdel Mohammed
Abdel Fatau Musah
Michelle Ndiaye-Ntab
Wafula Okumu
Aichatou Thamba
Charles Ukeje
Gen. Tadesse Werede
Dawit Yohannes
Vladimir Zhagora

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