Decoding China’s Digital Offensive: An Analysis of Information Warfare Tactics in Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election

By Lilly Min-Chen Lee, Doctoral Fellow in International Security Studies at The Fletcher School

1.     Introduction

1.1  Background of the Research

The Chinese government perceives the proliferation of internet technology as a strategic threat to its authority, potentially undermining its control over information flows and public discourse.[1] In response, Beijing has implemented a strategy aimed at controlling China’s digital landscape,[2] encompassing rigorous censorship and extensive propaganda that impacts both the domestic and international spheres.[3] This concerted effort by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to shape the online environment is critical to understanding its approach to information warfare.

Taiwan, at the forefront of China’s international influence operations, offers a critical case study of information warfare tactics deployed against a vibrant democracy. The specific tactics employed in Taiwan may provide insights into the CCP’s larger strategic patterns and methodologies. As Taiwanese voters prepared for the 2024 presidential election, they encountered a flood of posts questioning candidate competence and democratic integrity.[4] Many of these posts, while appearing to come from concerned citizens, were part of a coordinated information warfare campaign orchestrated by state actors across the Taiwan Strait.[5] This deliberate manipulation of human decision-makers, primarily through online social media platforms, aimed to distort the epistemic and emotional perspectives of voters, thereby influencing political outcomes and public opinion.

This research investigates whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in information warfare in the 2024 Taiwan presidential election —and if so, how it is conducting this campaign.  To provide clear boundaries and structure, we formulate the following sub-questions:

How has the Chinese government conducted information warfare related to the 2024 Taiwan presidential election?  What specific tactics and methods has China employed in this information warfare campaign? And, which key demographic groups, political factions, or influential individuals in Taiwan have been the primary targets of these operations?

To answer these questions, this research develops the Information Warfare Toolbox framework and applies it to two case studies of Chinese information warfare in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The first examines China’s manipulation of Taiwan’s domestic egg shortage crisis, demonstrating how external actors can amplify internal political tensions through coordinated social media campaigns and state-controlled media narratives. The second analyzes the disinformation campaign surrounding Vice President Lai Ching-te’s diplomatic visit to Paraguay, revealing how Chinese state actors construct and disseminate false narratives about Taiwan’s foreign relations. We systematically apply our framework’s dimensions—including objectives, tactics, stakeholders, platforms, amplifiers, and target audiences—to each case study and analyze patterns in China’s information warfare strategies. This comparative analysis will help policymakers and researchers better understand and counter such information warfare campaigns.

1.2  Analytic Framework

Under the Information Warfare Toolbox framework —developed through a combination of research, analysis, and open-source intelligence— we studied the various ways in which the Chinese government manipulates information to achieve specific objectives. From January to December 2023, we systematically analyzed content across multiple platforms including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), WeChat, Weibo, PTT, and Mobile01. We focused particularly on posts and articles related to Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, examining over 1,000 social media posts, news articles, and official statements from Chinese state media outlets such as Huaxia Jingwei Network and Shenzhen Media Group, as well as the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

The analysis involved examining examples of censorship (such as content removals on WeChat), propaganda (through state media narratives), narrative framing (via coordinated messaging across platforms), and disinformation (through forged documents and false claims) to identify common tactics and strategies. We traced how information flowed from Chinese state media to social media platforms, documenting the timing, messaging patterns, and amplification networks. The content was collected in both Chinese and English to capture the full scope of information operations targeting Taiwanese and international audiences. The gathered information was then cataloged into different dimensions based on their relevance and importance in understanding the Chinese government’s information manipulation techniques. 

Read the full article here.

(This post is republished from Yale Journal of International Affairs.)