A Human-Centered Approach to Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict
A Human-Centered Approach to Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict
By Annalena Bacher
Introduction: Environmental Protection Mechanisms Under IHL
While the international community has reached consensus regarding the high importance of environmental protections during armed conflict, the reality is that the environment continues to suffer daily from the impacts of warfare. Destruction is inherent in conflict, and environmental harm resulting from combat and the general conduct of military operations is frequently regarded as collateral damage that is simply part of warfare. Environmental degradation resulting from armed conflict affects human beings in a variety of ways, particularly those living in vulnerable contexts with a lack of adaptive or protective measures, ultimately leading to immeasurable suffering and death.
While International Humanitarian Law (IHL) provides guidelines regarding environmental protections during armed conflict, these protections are often vague or overly permissive, which obstructs their effective implementation. A prime example of such a norm is the prohibition of widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment under Art. 35 (3) and Art. 55 (1) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977. This prohibition is codified as ‘Rule 2’ by the ICRC in the 2020 Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict. In principle, Rule 2 sets a powerful limit on environmental damage carried out by conflict parties. Yet, many see it as ineffective and weak, and it has not been cited in any relevant case discussions.
The Controversial Dichotomy of Ecocentric & Anthropocentric Protection
Rule 2’s ineffectiveness originates not only from its impossibly high legal threshold, the lack of clarity surrounding the three key terms “widespread”, “long-term” and “severe,” but also from the ambiguity behind its rationale: Currently, the two IHL rules underlying Rule 2 are framed through two different value-based approaches, thereby complicating its interpretation and implementation.
On one hand, Art. 35(3) was the first IHL rule to protect the natural environment per se from not just intentional, but also expected collateral damage. It therefore takes a nature-focused, meaning ecocentric approach to environmental protection, recognizing the environment’s inherent worth and the dependence of all human and non-human beings on it. On the other hand, Art. 55(1) takes an anthropocentric approach, putting humankind at the center by protecting the natural environment in relation to the health and survival of its population. Moreover, as stated in the 2020 ICRC Guidelines, it is generally acknowledged that the natural environment is, by default, protected as civilian and shall not be directly targeted. However, if parts of the environment become military objectives by their nature, location, purpose, or use, they lose this civilian status.
This dichotomy fuels the ongoing debate on whether Rule 2 should be understood as taking an eco- or anthropocentric approach. The ICRC is of the opinion that the ecocentric approach should be used for IHL assessments, as long as there is “still relatively limited knowledge of the effect of armed conflict on the environment and the implications of this for civilians.” I, however, disagree with this approach and argue for an anthropocentric interpretation; while it makes sense to value and protect the environment based on its intrinsic value, labeling all environmental protection measures as ecocentric makes them seem far-reaching, blurring the line between environmental harm and human suffering.
The Argument for a More Human-Centered Approach & Its ‘Grey Zones’
Some might point out that the ecocentric approach does include human beings as part of a larger ecosystem. While this is true and makes sense for other areas of international law, I argue it distracts from IHL’s purpose, thereby limiting its credibility. In my opinion other legislation, for example, the human right to a healthy environment, is able to protect the integrity of nature in a much more pointed and effective way than Rule 2 ever could. This view is supported by the United States, which argues more generally that applying IHL to environmental issues undermines the protection afforded to civilians. Rule 2 should thus be interpreted with an anthropocentric rationale, strengthening the security of directly involved human beings.
At first glance, this pro-anthropocentric argument seems to be supported by the classification of the environment as either a by-default protected civilian object or, if it fulfills the necessary criteria, as a military objective constituting a lawful target. However, the ICRC does not recognize ‘grey zones’ in-between, meaning objects which are neither relevant to the civilian population nor of any military value. For example, a bush in an inhabited area would constitute a civilian object, provided it does not constitute a direct military objective. Therefore, on closer inspection, this lack of recognition seems to undermine an anthropocentric reading of the rule, as it protects elements of the environment that humans neither directly nor indirectly rely on. Additionally, institutionalizing such ‘grey zones’ through direct legislation, such as Rule 2, fails to account for conflict realities and devalues parts of the environment relevant to human use by generalizing them all under the same level of protection. Israel, for example, argues that considering pits of sand or rock to be civilian objects would “simply be untenable from an operational perspective.”
Thus, the creation of a rule so broad that it can barely be complied with, like Rule 2, neglects the purpose of IHL and renders the obligation effectively meaningless. In my view, environmental protection is weakened when parties to the conflict are required to protect all parts of the environment equally from widespread, long-term, and severe damage. To balance the exclusion of these ‘grey zones’ from an anthropocentric perspective, I argue that parts of the environment with direct or indirect impact on human life or high intrinsic value should benefit from heightened protection. The Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict (2020) suggest that such “areas of particular environmental importance or fragility” should be designated as demilitarized zones. While I agree with this recommendation, there is a need for further definition on key terms from these guidelines such as ‘grey zones’, ‘areas with a high intrinsic or anthropocentric value,’ and ‘adaptive capacity.’ Even if more comprehensive environmental protection is always desirable from an ecological standpoint and the elements of nature designated as grey areas are essentially no less worthy of protection than others, their protection might be better governed under a more general and non-absolute rule, such as the Principle of Proportionality under IHL. The exclusion of such grey areas could then signify the lower limit of the scope of environmental protection under Rule 2. In other words, for IHL to remain relevant, its interpretation must focus on reducing the ‘horrors of war’ for the affected human beings. Attempting to fill gaps left by other legal frameworks on environmental protection risks leaving IHL without any clear purpose or power.
Conclusion
Overall, adjusting and redefining rules relating to environmental protections is only one part of reducing human suffering in armed conflict. Conflict parties must also improve compliance with existing IHL, and promote environmental awareness throughout the command chain. A healthy environment is essential not only for civilian protection but for society as a whole, including combatants. I argue that this rule should be interpreted more pragmatically to strengthen the increasingly urgent humanitarian protection of the environment. In my view, reinforcing the anthropocentric rationale behind environmental protection is one concrete way to achieve this.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Annalena Bacher holds a dual-degree Master’s from The Fletcher School (USA) and the University of St. Gallen (Switzerland). Having grown up in Switzerland’s beautiful natural environment, she developed a strong appreciation for environmental integrity at an early age. Her academic work has centered on the nexus between climate change, environmental sustainability, humanitarian affairs, and human security. She has gained professional experience through internships in both national and international settings, including with the Swiss government and an international organization specializing in the attribution of extreme weather events to climate change.