The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process in 2014: A Stakeholder-Mapping Analysis

The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process in 2014: A Stakeholder-Mapping Analysis

By Kate Hibbert

Background 

After the 2011 leak of a recording revealing secret talks between the Türkiye government and the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, the Turkish-Kurdish peace process became public. The Kurds, an ethnic minority, inhabit the region where the borders of Syria, Türkiye, Iraq, and Iran converge. For decades, the Türkiye government battled the PKK and other ethnonationalist militias seeking Kurdish independence. After Öcalan’s arrest and unsuccessful attempts to secure international support, the PKK relinquished its pursuit of independence and instead began to seek constitutional rights in Türkiye. Exemplifying the concept of ripeness, the ruling Turkish party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), simultaneously undertook reforms to enhance democratic rights after the European Union (EU) finally granted Türkiye candidacy status in December 1999. This created space for what is now called the “Kurdish Opening,” leading to the secret “Oslo Talks” of 2009-2011 and the “Solution Process” talks of 2013-2015. 

The Kurdish issue concerns all four states mentioned, as well as numerous international organizations and the fractured Kurdish population. This paper focuses on the Kurdish and Turkish parties involved in the border area between Syria and Türkiye during the mid-2014 talks. Utilizing a modified version of the stakeholder theory developed by Mitchell et al., the article aims to identify the salience and influence of the selected stakeholders for a policymaker audience.

Selection & Rationale

The stakeholders analyzed in this piece are as follows:

1. The Türkiye Government: the government was led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the socially conservative AKP in 2014, but in an effort to achieve greater inclusion with Europe, Erdoğan moved policies in the direction of openness and inclusion. Though the presence of women in politics increased during this period, the AKP did not cede real authority or power to women in their positions.
2. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): The PKK’s attacks on civilians and infrastructure earned it a terrorist organization designation by both Türkiye and the United States. PKK founder and leader Abdullah Öcalan was imprisoned in 1999. Beginning in the early to mid-2000s, the PKK sharply contrasted with regional traditional norms by empowering women, including in leadership ranks.
3. The Kurdish citizens of Türkiye: Kurdish citizens represented a minority at 15-20 percent of Türkiye’s population. Decades-long oppression generated both assimilation and distrust of the government, and some Kurds joined the PKK and similar militias. However, the PKK and the Kurdish rights movement in Türkiye did not wholly overlap. 
4. The United States Government (USG), as led by the Democratic Party and President Barack Obama: The U.S. interest in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict rested in counterterrorism and regional security, leading to support of Kurdish groups against ISIS and encouragement of Türkiye to make peace with the Kurds in order to focus all parties on defeating ISIS.

Rationale & Positionality

These stakeholders were selected for this analysis because of their roles in the 2014 peace processes and their relationships with the United States. The Türkiye Government and the PKK were the primary negotiating parties. Kurdish citizens of Türkiye, while a less clearly defined group, represent a group both directly influential and dependent on the Türkiye government, adding a level of analysis to the citizen population. Analysis of the U.S. government elucidates assumptions about U.S. interests and positions.

Stakeholder Typology & Descriptions

To aid in the description of the stakeholders, I utilize a typology that evaluates power, legitimacy, and urgency to identify a party’s salience and influence within a policy issue (Figure 1). 

Figure 1

Türkiye Government: Definitive Stakeholder.

• Power: possesses a monopoly on the use of force and legislative and judicial powers. 
• Legitimacy: benefits from international recognition of state sovereignty.
• Urgency: claimed that the PKK was infringing on its sovereignty and monopoly on the use of force. 

Erdoğan’s acknowledgement of the “Kurdish” problem qualified him as the first Turkish leader to utter the word, as predecessors and peers avoided mention of the topic, preferring instead to operate as though there were no issue at all. In pursuit of his underlying interest – greater inclusion with democratic and European states – Erdoğan outlined a new, more democratic position for the Türkiye government, opening the country to substantive legislative changes. For the first time, the Kurdish language could be used in public and official fora, and in 2014, a pro-Kurdish party, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), won seats in parliament. However, Erdoğan and the AKP-led Türkiye government feared loss of power and asserted that the 2013-14 negotiations resolved their dispute(s) with the entirety of the Kurdish movement.

PKK: Dangerous Stakeholder. 

• Power: coercive through terrorist tactics. 
• Legitimacy: lacking – being a designated terrorist organization.
• Urgency: based on aims to defend long-denied Kurdish rights. 

Since Öcalan’s imprisonment, the PKK shifted from Kurdish independence at all costs to “full political, linguistic, and sociocultural rights and some form of minor autonomy.” The PKK claimed that the Kurdish movement in Türkiye only sought stronger democratic rights. Their demands included, inter alia, removal of restrictions on Kurdish language and culture, decentralized political governance, increased political access, release of political prisoners, including Ocalan, amnesty for guerrillas, a truth and reconciliation commission, and a democratic constitution recognizing the Kurds. 

Kurdish Citizens of Türkiye: Dependent Stakeholder, bordering Definitive.  

• Urgency: based on conditions of oppression.
• Legitimacy: based on their existence as a general population living there.
• Power: lacking – not much influence on high-level negotiations. 

As of 2013, experts estimated that most Kurds in Turkey supported the PKK, despite its designation as a terrorist organization. As a people with Urgency and Legitimacy, Kurds in Türkiye could have obtained Power while maintaining Legitimacy by organizing into a nonviolent movement or political party, but were limited to organizations such as the HDP and the PKK. 

USG: Definitive Stakeholder. 

• Legitimacy: acted in line with international norms. 
• Power: possessed financial and coercive power to intervene in the conflict.
• Urgency: linked the issue to the fight against ISIS. 

The United States supported the Kurdish militias due to their effectiveness against IS-affiliated groups. The United States also encouraged Türkiye to make peace with the Kurds in order to focus on defeating ISIS. The U.S. government wielded significant influence through its ability to offer defense partnerships and military aid or to withhold this support.

Reflections & Conclusions

In 2014, the Kurdish-Turkish peace process reached a historic moment with an unprecedented opening between the Turkish government and Kurdish parties, especially the PKK. These primary parties dominated the talks due to the absence of a third-party mediator: the United States had only a negative relationship with the PKK at this time through its designation, disqualifying it as an impartial mediator and limiting its influence over the Kurds. Conversely, the Kurdish citizens of Türkiye had unique relationships that offered some prospect of transformative potential; having the PKK’s interests but having reasons for allegiance to the Türkiye government as well, the Kurdish population in Türkiye could have presented a convincing case for bridging the gap through mass organization. However, the Türkiye government’s focus on the PKK peace process, with the aim of delegitimizing all Kurdish parties, failed to lead to lasting peace.

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