Exchanging Égalité for Exclusion: What factors have impeded the integration of immigrants of Maghrebi descent?

Exchanging Égalité for Exclusion: What factors have impeded the integration of immigrants of Maghrebi descent?

by Emma Blake

As immigration crises run rampant across the globe, dissecting these phenomena more critically is increasingly necessary for proposing more creative and transformative solutions. This paper explores North African immigrant exclusion in France: it investigates and combines existing academic research to examine the unique historical context, social and economic policy, and xenophobic attitudes that have systematically propelled and exacerbated the problems that these immigrants face. It pays particular attention to the French Republican Model, which seeks to unite French citizens but overlooks ethnic diversity, and also to discrimination in the housing and labor markets, which trap immigrants in an inescapable and socially entrenched cycle. Upon careful consideration of the factors driving immigrant exclusion, this paper suggests the application of solutions based in the concept of intersectionality, or the interconnectedness of different forms of discrimination based on identity, in order to more effectively guide policy targeting this marginalized community.

Immigration policy has long been a source of controversy in nation-states across the globe.[1][2] Questions of economic integration and social cohesion tend to dominate policy-making circles, and often highlight socio-political cleavages, ideological differences, and xenophobic attitudes. All of these issues are especially prevalent in France, a country that has historically accepted massive waves of immigrants and yet failed to effectively integrate them. Though France is home to generations of immigrants from several countries, North African immigrants, or immigrants of Maghrebi descent from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, are disproportionately segregated and victimized.[3] Furthermore, they are often subject to racism that manifests itself in social, political, and economic contexts, and discrimination that is especially pronounced in the labor and housing markets. Above all, the failures of integrative frameworks in France can be attributed to their lack of an intersectional approach. The ways in which these frameworks overlook the interrelatedness of racial, social, and economic discrimination render them ineffective in comprehensively addressing the plight of North African immigrants and their descendants.

However, understanding the origins of the discrimination that this population faces is important for analyzing more contemporary issues that hinder integration. Within the past two centuries, France has experienced three main waves of immigration.[4] The first took place during the 1920s and 1930s and was mostly comprised of Europeans who worked the same jobs and lived in the same areas; this wave set a precedent for a system that segregates immigrants according to occupation and neighborhoods according to ethnicity.[5] A second influx of immigrants arrived in the 1950s, as “labor shortages created by the reconstruction and modernization of France provoked the arrival of the first immigrant generations to come from the former colonies, in particular from North Africa.”[6] Unfortunately, urban structures were insufficient in housing this influx. As a result, these immigrants were forced to either settle in abandoned housing or build shantytowns in the outskirts of major cities.[7] The government responded with a program to rapidly construct cheap public housing, but this soon turned into a social disaster. In fact, “the bleak, unglamorous concrete-slab neighborhoods were gradually abandoned” by populations who could afford to exit.[8] The reaction to this program left immigrants, who already lacked political capital and voice, in substandard housing with little hope of exit.

The 1970s, however, saw the implementation of programs to eliminate slums and move immigrant families to transitional housing projects. This shift sparked the beginning of some integration for North African immigrants. As citizens of Maghrebi origins played increasingly significant roles in different sectors of the labor market and consequently moved into wealthier neighborhoods, the native French population began to voice dissatisfaction.[9] Specifically, the fact that immigrants became more noticeable strained neighborhood relations and intensified competition between the immigrant population and the local population as they sought increasingly scarce jobs.[10] At the same time, another massive influx of North African immigrants arrived in France only to be victimized by intense social stigma and institutionalized segregation. This social stigma became especially pronounced in the housing market. In fact, the presence of a large immigrant population in a particular area often led to the loss of prestige of that area, and in turn, the increased tendency of urban renewal projects to stop investing in these areas.[11] It was during the same time that French immigration policy took a xenophobic turn: in fact, the country implemented a national racial quota-based policy that defined the “assimilability” of immigrants based on their origins and indicated immigrants of North African descent to be the least desirable.[12]

In 1981, immigrant dissatisfaction with the conditions that arose from this policy manifested in public riots.[13] The government responded by implementing a policy targeting urban minorities known as politique de la ville.[14] An urban regeneration program that focused on “sensitive urban zones”, politique de la ville was somewhat effective in improving housing, but “never emphasized the ethnic composition” of those living in districts addressed by the policy.[15] Though some additional attempts at reform have taken place since 1981, “no policy [has] ever addressed the specific problems of immigrants.”[16] Rather, policies have simply addressed areas of lower socioeconomic status without considering the fact that populations of Maghrebi origin tend to disproportionately populate these areas. Altogether, France’s history of immigration policy and integrative frameworks, coupled with its failure to recognize the specific challenges faced by ethnic North Africans, has set precedent for policies that not only fail to effectively integrate this population, but also that discriminate against and victimize them.

Aside from historical policies, systems, and patterns, France’s Republican Model has severely impeded the integration of North African immigrants and their descendants in their communities. “Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic proclaims the French State as a nation-state ‘one and indivisible,’”[17] which, in principle, implies equal treatment for all.[18] In practice, however, this model fosters perceptions of immigration that consider it a threat to order, unity, and French national identity. Similarly, this model “exiles cultural difference to a private sphere” and forces “assimilation to dominant French values that pretend to be universal.”[19] Moreover, it prohibits the recognition of specific ethnic and religious identities, and by extension, the implementation of programs that target discrimination based on these identities out of fear that doing so would threaten French Republican principles.[20] Issues of poverty, then, are “traditionally addressed through color-blind, state-run programs aimed at reducing inequalities, without consideration for the role race plays in inequality.”[21] Fundamentally, these programs fail to recognize the concept of intersectionality, or the interconnectedness of different forms of marginalization. They disregard the ways in which the interactions of categories like ethnicity and class often compound social problems for certain groups of people. In particular, they overlook the ways in which Arab populations are disproportionately subject to discrimination, unemployment, worse housing, and lower levels of education.

Even worse, French census data only takes into account nationality and not ethnicity.[22] This practice only exacerbates the aforementioned issues, as the descendants of North African immigrants who were born in France are recognized to be nationally French but not ethnically Arab. As such, the French government ignores the distinctiveness of this population, the existence of ethnic-based discrimination, and the ways in ethnic differences intensify victimization.

Beyond the French Republican Model and its associated principles, xenophobic attitudes held by the French severely impede the integration of Arab populations. This discrimination is largely rooted in previously discussed historical phenomena, policies, and mindsets. French populations continue to hold the Republican Model in high regard, and consequently “perceive Arabs as symbolic threats to French culture.”[23] Many also automatically associate populations of Maghrebi descent with Islamist extremism: in fact, a 2015 study by the Institut Montaigne found that in 2012, 43 percent of French citizens saw the presence of Muslims as “a threat to the identity of [their] country.”[24] Some express their dissatisfaction by voting for extreme right-wing and populist political parties, like the National Front or Front National.[25] This only deepens cleavages between those who are of Maghrebi descent and those who are not.

These attitudes manifest in different contexts. For example, xenophobia is the root cause of a number of issues in the labor market. The Institut Montaigne drew attention to this issue through its dissection of a 2008 resume-based trial that discovered that “French citizens with origins outside Europe do suffer systematic discrimination” in the labor market and that citizens with North African origins suffer the most discrimination.[26] In fact, a 2011 report from the High Council for Integration found that French citizens of non-European descent are twice as likely to be unemployed in comparison to citizens of French or European origin; these statistics are even more severe for younger populations.[27] Obtaining a job becomes significantly more difficult without a high school diploma for these immigrants, but even when citizens of Maghrebi origins are more qualified, they are disproportionately unemployed in comparison to their European counterparts.[28] Similarly, even when descendants of North African immigrants are employed, their chances of reaching higher wage levels are between 15 and 25 percent lower than those of French origins working the same jobs.[29] Altogether, these studies and statistics are indicative of systematic labour-market discrimination. There are multiple and powerful consequences of this discrimination. North African immigrants tend to be disproportionately subject to poverty and forced to live in poorer, under-resourced, and overlooked communities.

This disproportionate concentration of people of Maghrebi origins in impoverished neighborhoods has a number of ramifications. As per Burgess’ Human Ecology model, location is often tied to concentrations of certain demographics and the problems they face.[30] In France, people of Maghrebi descent are often confined to these poorer areas due to discrimination in the housing market. Neighborhood segregation in French society is indicative of “discriminatory practices in the private housing market by real estate agents and landlords,” as well as phenomenon like “white flight” and “white avoidance,” where white populations flee or avoid neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrants.[31] The fact that these privileged populations of French descent tend to live in homogeneous and wealthier neighborhoods enables “the reproduction of their institutional and cultural capital.”[32] Similarly, it reflects their enhanced capacity to exit and exercise voice. The tendency of wealthy populations to leave consequently removes political capital and voice from poor and marginalized immigrant communities.

The tendency of these immigrant communities to be less wealthy means that they are also overrepresented in the public housing sector, which are generally located in the suburbs or the banlieues.[33] As such, they are victimized by ghettoization: Ethnic enclaves “are increasingly tied to the presence of large housing projects”, as are they to poverty, unemployment, lower levels of education, and delinquency.[34] Although these neighborhoods suffered from these problems due to economic crisis prior to the arrival of immigrant families, these families are often regarded as the cause of these problems, however, when immigrant families are actually the victims. The tendency of wealthier and advantaged populations to flee these areas, coupled with housing market discrimination that disadvantages populations of North African origin, has left Arabs with diminished voices and little hope of exit.

Lack of integration has a number of other detrimental implications. Perhaps most significantly, “the gap between what the French [Republican] model implies–meritocracy, rights, and citizenship–and the actual situation is one of the major causes of frustration and resentment” for North African immigrants and their descendants.[35] Politically, this resentment sometimes encourages populations of Maghrebi origin to exercise their voice in radical ways or turn to Islamic extremism.[36] Socially, the lack of integration further hinders social cohesion between the French and populations of North African descent. This contributes to the phenomenon of “othering”, whereby local and native populations consider Arabs to be outsiders and threats. Challenges of social integration are especially difficult for this group “because they are the last to have arrived…and because the conditions in which they find themselves in France are difficult.”[37] The segregation and exclusion of immigrants in the housing and labor markets is interrelated with this lack of social integration, and often means that populations of North African descent are less well-off than their French counterparts.

Though the multiple forms of discrimination that this marginalized population endures limits their ability exercise voice, one implication of segregation has been a notable instance of collective action. This instance occurred in the form of riots in 2005 in the banlieues.[38] These riots represented a manifestation of the resentment of predominantly young, unemployed men of Maghrebi origin, and were indicative of the ways in which the ethnicity of these men contributed to their political, social, and economic marginalization. In other words, the riots demonstrated the ways in which the intersectional identities of these young men compounded the problems they faced. In this case, this particular marginalized community engaged in collective action in part due to self-interest, but also in part due to the bonds of solidarity they held with those who were enduring similar problems. This group likely united on the basis of shared experiences and common interests, which, as Fireman and Gamson suggest, are important in sparking and facilitating collective action.[39] Though violent, these riots highlighted the problems that populations of Maghrebi origins often endure and brought into the public sphere issues that the government refused to recognize. At the same time, they also “othered” marginalized communities, depicting them as excessively extreme and savage in their actions. As such, effective forms of collective action have yet to take place.

Segregation and exclusion of this community persists. Perhaps one of the most significant reasons for this relates to perception: North African immigrants and their descendants are consistently depicted “as the causes of social and economic ills, rather than as the bearers of the brunt of those ills.”[40] The fact that France doesn’t gather data based on ethnicity intensifies these issues, as it prevents the government from identifying the existence and concentration of racism and discrimination. The Republican Model also plays into this, as it theoretically assimilates populations of Maghrebi origin into French culture while socially excluding them.[41] As such, government intransigence has played a significant role in hindering integration. [42]

Beyond the government’s reluctance to recognize ethnic distinctiveness and promote social cohesion, however, issues in the labor market and housing market are two of the most significant factors that continue to perpetuate segregation. For example, immigrants have consistently been “overrepresented in low-skilled jobs”, and their descendants tend to occupy the same positions in the labor market.[43] This is largely due to the previously discussed xenophobic attitudes of many employers, as well as lower levels of social integration of immigrants and their descendants. Altogether, these factors often trap populations of Maghrebi origin in socioeconomic standings similar to their ancestors.

Beyond the labour market, however, housing market discrimination against Arabs also perpetuates persistent segregation and exclusion. The fact that North African immigrant populations and their descendants are disproportionately concentrated in poor, under-resourced communities and lack possibilities for exit means that children are consistently educated in schools that are characterized by low rates of success and high rates of dropouts.[44] In this sense, Burgess’ Human Ecology Model is relevant: The neighborhoods in which these children live tend to dictate lower levels of educational attainment and success and, ultimately, reduced possibility of social mobility.[45] Once again, the disproportionate concentration of ethnic North Africans in these neighborhoods, coupled with their lack of political capital, prevents them from exercising the voice and collective action necessary to improve their situations. The lack of representation of their interests in prominent nationalist political parties only exacerbates these aforementioned problems. Similarly, nationalist rhetoric in France is normalized: It dominates French politics and does not prioritize the recognition of ethnic minorities. The fact that the French often fear that acknowledging difference will tear apart the French national fabric intensifies this phenomenon. Altogether, the combination of these processes and practices overlooks the needs and voices of vulnerable people.

The previously discussed forms of economic and geographic segregation are clearly interrelated and inextricably linked to ethnicity and background. At the same time, programs to address these problems have yet to take an intersectional approach. In other words, they have failed to address the relationships between race, class, and levels of education, and the ways in which populations of Maghrebi descent are disproportionately subject to discrimination in each of these areas. As such, a number of structural changes are necessary in order to effectively integrate these populations.

Arguably the most significant of these transformations requires a shift in France’s fundamental approach to the existence of ethnic diversity. In order to effectively combat the plight of populations of Maghrebi origins, France must recognize the fact that it is ethnically diverse. A 2015 Report on the Prevention of Racism by the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) recommended the introduction of “a new article into the Charter of Secularism that highlights the sense of openness that secularism promotes” in order to foster tolerance and understanding of cultural and ethnic difference.[46] Furthermore, France must begin collecting census data on ethnicity in order to identify the tendencies of discriminatory practices. Though these reforms certainly have powerful potential, there are several obstacles preventing them from becoming a reality. The most notable is the fact that the French Republican Model is enshrined in the Constitution and consequently a foundational aspect of France’s statehood. However, moving towards the acknowledgement of ethnicity in nationally-collected data would allow for recognition of ethnic distinctiveness and the ways in which this distinctiveness dictates discrimination. Furthermore, it would make possible the development of programs that would more thoroughly address intersectionality, and more specifically, the ways in which ethnicity plays into the political, social, and economic segregation that past reforms have failed to adequately tackle.

The implementation of programs that seek to fight stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes directed towards populations of Maghrebi descent must accompany these approach-based changes. The government has indeed taken steps towards addressing racism on a more broad scale through the implementation of structures like an anti-racism hotline and the increased funding of programs to fight discriminatory attitudes.[47] However, the fact that intolerant attitudes towards the recognition of ethnic diversity are so entrenched in the French Republican Model and French society on the whole means that racism and xenophobia continue to persist. Altogether, intolerance poses a significant obstacle to the adoption and implementation of effective integrative frameworks.

Aside from attitude-based transformations, programs must be implemented in the labor market in order to curb socioeconomic-based discrimination and encourage integration, specifically for newer immigrants. A study by Sotomayor-Morales, Grande-Gascón, and Ajaaouani found that incoming North African immigrants disproportionately suffer in the labor market because no system exists to account for the skills developed prior to their arrival.[48] The establishment of such a system is therefore a necessary component of effective programs to combat labor market discrimination. Additionally, employers and training programs should focus on the development of language, legal, labor, and social skills.[49] The existing disconnect between the realities of immigrants and their descendants, and the social programs that seek to address their problems, has rendered the implementation of comprehensive labor market integration strategies ineffective. Lack of funding for these programs has only exacerbated job-based segregation and discrimination. Current French President Macron sought to change this late last year by promising $17 billion to be directed towards job training specifically for members of impoverished immigrant communities.[50] Though the success of this program is unknown due to its novelty, it indeed provides hope for increased integration in the French labor market, and possibly, increased social mobility as a result.

In addition to job training, curbing discrimination in the labor market against populations of Maghrebi descent must include direct attacks on discriminatory hiring practices. The previously discussed Institut Montaigne has suggested that employers implement resume-based trials in order to assess the presence of discrimination. Once the existence of discrimination has been established, they suggest that employers train and sensitize employers, adopt more inclusive recruitment policies, and implement a hiring subsidy to promote the hiring of immigrants and their descendants.[51] Above all, these programs must be founded on the recognition that populations of Maghrebi descent experience multiple forms of oppression, and that their ethnicity often compounds the problems they face in the labor market.

Measures that focus on combating discrimination in the housing market must also complement solutions that target the labor market in order to address the multiple forms of marginalization that populations of Maghrebi descent experience. One possible reform includes increasing “the number of immigrants in small and dispersed housing projects” as it “would lend possibility to diminished geographic segregation.”[52] At the same time, it would allow marginalized populations access to better educational institutions and more developed community infrastructure. Similarly, it would likely give these groups of people, who tend to lack political capital, a greater degree of voice: Majority populations would be more inclined to listen to and cater to their needs if they were more closely integrated in neighborhoods. A notable obstacle to this solution involves the possibility of the exit of wealthier populations in areas with increased Arab presence. However, if implemented strategically in ways that created incentives for all populations to comply, this step would undoubtedly pave the path for decreased levels of neighborhood segregation in France.

One of the most significant obstacles to the aforementioned proposed solutions relates to the ways in which populations of French and European descent gain from the segregation of Arab populations. For example, the fact that North African immigrants and their descendants disproportionately suffer from discrimination in the labor market means that others benefit from relatively higher job opportunities and wages. Similarly, the fact that immigrant descendants tend to be concentrated in poorer neighborhoods means that the French are able to isolate themselves from the problems this disadvantaged population faces, effectively turning a blind eye from their plight. This complacency allows them to maintain intolerant and neglectful attitudes towards ethnic diversity.[53] It also discourages them from challenging the negative implications of the policies and principles that guide France’s development. Above all, the fact that citizens of French descent tend to benefit from the marginalization of their Maghrebi counterparts has largely perpetuated the structural inequalities of which immigrants and their descendants are disproportionately victim.

Recently, however, changes in France’s political climate have supposedly lent possibility to the implementation of programs that encourage increased integration. In particular, the election of President Emmanuel Macron in 2017 was largely seen as a victory for leftists, who envisioned the creation of a much more tolerant and progressive political climate under his leadership. It supposedly symbolized the French population’s rejection of the far right, populist, and xenophobic attitudes that have become increasingly prevalent throughout Europe. However, although Macron has implemented some reforms to increase integration, including programs to fight labor market discrimination, his immigration policies have made asylum rules stricter, intensified penalties for illegal immigrants, and overall hindered progress in other areas related to the integration of North African immigrants.[54] Similarly, though he enlisted a commission to reform the banlieues and thus target housing market discrimination and its associated issues, he decided not to implement most of its recommendations.[55] Instead, he established a program that involved education reforms specifically for schools in areas with high concentrations of Arab populations. Though it did enact certain tangible changes, including a requirement that cut class sizes in half, this program was largely buried in “lofty rhetoric” that lacked specifics.[56]

Despite the aforementioned critique, it does seem as though Macron has largely encouraged amplified discussion on the segregation of immigrants and their descendants. However, should he continue to seek to guide change through general programs that do not actually target the structural root of the problem and the marginalization that the French Republic Model allows for, the likelihood that French society will experience increased integration significantly decreases. Nevertheless, should Macron maintain his campaign promises to represent all members of French society, including those who are most marginalized, he may indeed bring a greater degree of voice to marginalized populations of Maghrebi descent. If this political capital becomes sufficient to actually implement effective integration policies, these populations may become more socially, politically, and economically prominent in French society.

Clearly, France’s current political climate lends some possibility to reforms that effectively encourage and established the increased integration of Arab populations in the country. At this point, it seems as though possibilities of some reform are likely. If they prioritize and address the intersectional nature of the marginalization that North African immigrants and their descendants face, increased integration may indeed be a possibility.


Emma Blake is a sophomore at Brown University. She is studying International Relations, and is particularly interested in Security Studies, International Law, and European politics.


Footnotes:

[1] Thompson, Derek. “How Immigration Became So Controversial.” The Atlantic. March 2, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/why-immigration-divides/552125/.

[2] Hovden, Jan Fredrik and Hilmar Mjelde. “Increasingly Controversial, Cultural, and Political: The Immigration Debate in Scandinavian Newspapers 1970–2016”, Javnost – The Public, 26:2, 2019. p. 138-157, doi: 10.1080/13183222.2019.1589285.

[3] Algan, Yann, Camila, Landias, and Claudia Senik. “Cultural Integration in France.” Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, p. 2. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[4] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma.” Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, vol. 13, no. 1, 1998, pp. 44, doi:10.1007/bf02496933.

[5] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 44.

[6] Oberti, Marco. “The French Republican Model of Integration: The Theory of Cohesion and the Practice of Exclusion.” New Directions for Youth Development, 2008, pp. 2., doi:10.1002/yd.273.

[7] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 45.

[8] Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. “Understanding Urban Riots in France.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 1 Dec. 2005, www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-urban-riots-in-france/.

[9] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 51.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 48.

[12] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective.” Identities, vol. 21, no. 6, 2014, pp. 8.

[13] Duprez, Dominique. “Urban Rioting as an Indicator of Crisis in the Integration Model for Ethnic Minority Youth in France.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 35, no. 5, 2009, pp. 760., doi:10.1080/13691830902826160.

[14] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 10.

[15] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 11.

[16] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 55.

[17] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 4.

[18] Oberti, Marco. “The French Republican Model of Integration: The Theory of Cohesion and the Practice of Exclusion,” 1.

[19] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 3.

[20] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 4.

[21] Tissot, Sylvie. “‘French Suburbs’: A New Problem or a New Approach to Social Exclusion?” HAL Archives-Ouvertes, 4 June 2008, pp. 3.

[22] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 43.

[23] Porter, Carissa. “Unveiling French Xenophobia: A Study of Prejudice Against Arabs in France.” Inquiry: The University of Arkansas Undergraduate Research Journal, vol. 13, 2012, pp. 83–99.

[24] Valfort, Marie-Anne. Religious Discrimination in Access to Employment: A Reality. Institut Montaigne, 2015, 47.

[25] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 12.

[26] Valfort, Marie-Anne. Religious Discrimination in Access to Employment: A Reality, 47.

[27] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 3.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Boutchenik, Béatrice, and Jérôme Lê. “Wage Inequalities Due to National Origin: Which Explanations along the Wage Distribution?” National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, 1 Feb. 2016, pp. 5., doi:10.1787/9789264244825-graph19-en.

[30] “The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project.” The City, by Robert Ezra. Park et al., 50.

[31] Verdugo, Gregory, and Sorana Toma. “Can Public Housing Decrease Segregation? Lessons and Challenges from Non-European Immigration in France.” Demography, vol. 55, no. 5, 2018, pp. 1806., doi:10.1007/s13524-018-0705-4.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Verdugo and Toma, “Can Public Housing Decrease Segregation?”, 18011; Tissot, Sylvie. “‘French Suburbs’: A New Problem or a New Approach to Social Exclusion?” 3.

[34] Verdugo and Toma, “Can Public Housing Decrease Segregation?”, 1816.

[35] Oberti, Marco. “The French Republican Model of Integration: The Theory of Cohesion and the Practice of Exclusion,” 3.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Duprez, Dominique. “Urban Rioting as an Indicator of Crisis in the Integration Model for Ethnic Minority Youth in France,” 765.

[38] Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. “Understanding Urban Riots in France.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 1 Dec. 2005, www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-urban-riots-in-france/.

[39] Fireman, Bruce, and William A. Gamson. “Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective.” CRSO Working Paper #153, 1977, pp. 22.

[40] Tissot, Sylvie. “‘French Suburbs’: A New Problem or a New Approach to Social Exclusion?” 8.

[41] Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” 10.

[42] Duprez, Dominique. “Urban Rioting as an Indicator of Crisis in the Integration Model for Ethnic Minority Youth in France,” 768.

[43] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 48.

[44] Oberti, Marco. “The French Republican Model of Integration: The Theory of Cohesion and the Practice of Exclusion,” 10.

[45] “The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project.” The City, by Robert Ezra. Park et al., University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 50; Oberti, Marco. “The French Republican Model of Integration: The Theory of Cohesion and the Practice of Exclusion,” 10.

[46] Report on the Prevention of Racism, Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia. National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, 2015, pp. 17.

[47] Bleich, Erik. “Race Policy in France.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 1 May 2001, www.brookings.edu/articles/race-policy-in-france/.

[48] Sotomayor-Morales, Eva, et al. “The Social Inclusion of the Immigrant Population in Europe through the Development of New Teaching and Learning Methods in Vocational Training.” Procedia–Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 237, 2017, pp. 539. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2017.02.103.

[49] Sotomayor-Morales, et al, “The Social Inclusion of the Immigrant Population in Europe”, 538.

[50] Nossiter, Adam. “Macron Visits ‘Left-Behind France’ to Show He’s President for Everyone.” The New York Times, 14 Nov. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-france-labor-suburbs.html.

[51] Valfort, Marie-Anne. Religious Discrimination in Access to Employment: a Reality. Institut Montaigne, 2015, 78.

[52] Verdugo, Gregory, and Sorana Toma. “Can Public Housing Decrease Segregation? Lessons and Challenges from Non-European Immigration in France,” 1804.

[53] Simon, Patrick. “Ghettos, Immigrants, and Integration the French Dilemma,” 43.

[54] Blinken, Antony J. “Can Macron Do for the Banlieues What the Banlieues Have Done for Soccer?” The New York Times, 16 July 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/france-world-cup-immigrants-macron-mbappe-banlieues.html.

[55] Blinken, Antony J. “Can Macron Do for the Banlieues What the Banlieues Have Done for Soccer?”

[56] Ibid.


Works Cited

Algan, Yann, Camila, Landias, and Claudia Senik. “Cultural Integration in France.” Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Barou, Jacques. “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective.” Identities, vol. 21, no. 6, 2014, pp. 1–20.

Bleich, Erik. “Race Policy in France.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 1 May 2001, www.brookings.edu/articles/race-policy-in-france/.

Blinken, Antony J. “Can Macron Do for the Banlieues What the Banlieues Have Done for Soccer?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 16 July 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/france-world-cup-immigrants-macron-mbappe-banlieues.html.

Boutchenik, Béatrice, and Jérôme Lê. “Wage Inequalities Due to National Origin: Which Explanations along the Wage Distribution?” National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, 1 Feb. 2016, pp. 1–27., doi:10.1787/9789264244825-graph19-en.

Duprez, Dominique. “Urban Rioting as an Indicator of Crisis in the Integration Model for Ethnic Minority Youth in France.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 35, no. 5, 2009, pp. 753–770., doi:10.1080/13691830902826160.

Fireman, Bruce, and William A. Gamson. “Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective.” CRSO Working Paper #153, 1977, pp. 1–60.

“The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project.” The City, by Robert Ezra. Park et al., University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 47–61.

Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. “Understanding Urban Riots in France.” Brookings.edu, The Brookings Institution, 1 Dec. 2005, www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-urban-riots-in-france/.

Nossiter, Adam. “Macron Visits ‘Left-Behind France’ to Show He’s President for Everyone.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 14 Nov. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-france-labor-suburbs.html.

Oberti, Marco. “The French Republican Model of Integration: The Theory of Cohesion and the Practice of Exclusion.” New Directions for Youth Development, 2008, doi:10.1002/yd.273.

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One thought on “Exchanging Égalité for Exclusion: What factors have impeded the integration of immigrants of Maghrebi descent?

  • January 29, 2020 at 10:21 pm
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    An intriguing discussion is worth comment. I think that you need
    to write more on this topic, it may not be a taboo matter but generally people do not discuss such
    subjects. To the next! Best wishes!!

    Reply

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