Regional Implications of Israel’s Ongoing War on Gaza

Hosted by The Fares Center, this lecture featured Mouin Rabbani, a leading expert on Middle Eastern affairs, discussing the regional implications of Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza.

Mouin Rabbani began his talk exploring the endurance of Arab-Israeli normalization, emphasizing that despite the ongoing conflict in Gaza, Arab-Israeli normalization agreements have remained largely unaffected. He contrasted the present situation with historical precedents, such as in 1967, when several Arab states severed diplomatic ties with the United States in response to the Six-Day War. And again in 1973, when Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, imposed an oil embargo on the United States following the Yom Kippur War. He identified several factors accounting for this lack of a robust Arab state response: The weakened state of the Arab political system, which no longer exerts the collective influence it once did; The absence of a competing superpower (such as the former Soviet Union), which in previous decades counterbalanced US and Israeli dominance in the region; The deepening of security cooperation between certain Arab states and Israel, particularly in the case of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia; and An aversion to legitimizing popular sentiment amongst Arab citizens, given the memory of mass protests and political instability in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of the past decade. However, Rabbani noted a recent shift in the perceptions of Gulf states. First, that Israel’s military campaign has begun to unsettle Gulf governments, which increasingly view Israel as a source of regional instability rather than a reliable security partner. He also pointed out that at the recent Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members signed a firm condemnation of Israeli military actions, an unprecedented move in recent years. This diplomatic shift, he argued, suggests an evolving assessment of regional security threats among Arab states.

Drawing parallels with previous geopolitical crises, Rabbani underscored that the present conflict could trigger long-term political instability across the Arab world. He said that following the 1948 Palestine War (the Nakba), Arab states endured a decade of internal upheaval, marked by coups, mass protests, and regime changes, culminating in the 1958 overthrow of Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. Today, he said, the key distinction today is that Arab states are not militarily involved in Gaza, raising the question of whether this inaction will shield them from domestic repercussions or, conversely, render them more vulnerable to internal dissent. He posited that Arab publics may, in the long term, hold their governments accountable not for losing a war, but for failing to intervene altogether.

Considering Israel’s strategic objectives in Gaza, Rabbani argued that Israel’s long-term approach in Gaza bears strong resemblance to its 2002 military strategy in the West Bank during the Second Intifada. He described Operation Defensive Shield (2002) which saw Israeli forces dismantle Palestinian militant structures in the West Bank and weaken the Palestinian Authority’s political and security grip. Following this operation, Israel withdrew without a formal ceasefire, instead implementing a strategy of sustained incursions and targeted military actions at will. He suggested that Israel seeks to replicate this model in Gaza, whereby Hamas’s governance and military capacity would be systematically dismantled; No formal ceasefire would be pursued, granting Israel the flexibility to intervene at any time; and a prolonged political vacuum would be left unfilled, ensuring Palestinian fragmentation. He argued that this strategic framework explains Israel’s apparent disinterest in genuine ceasefire negotiations over the past year.

Turning to Lebanon, to explore Hezbollah and U.S. policy considerations Rabbani noted that the U.S.-brokered ceasefire proposal for Lebanon would effectively grant Israel unilateral authority to conduct military operations as it deems necessary. He dismissed the likelihood that either Hezbollah or the Lebanese government would accept such an arrangement, as it would violate Lebanese sovereignty and legitimize Israeli military intervention. Regarding the role of the United States Rabbani speculated that Washington initially discouraged Israeli escalation against Hezbollah, but later approved the assassination of key Hezbollah and Hamas figures, such as Fouad Shoukour and Ismail Haniyeh. By mid-2024, he said the Biden administration appeared to have shifted its stance, becoming more receptive to Israeli efforts to alter the regional balance of power, but with the administration change on the horizon, this offers little insight into future U.S. policy.

Addressing the potential fate of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the possible annexation of the West Bank, Rabbani argued that Israel no longer perceives the PA as a useful entity and may seek to further marginalize or dismantle it, rather than selecting a successor to Mahmoud Abbas. He said that while the PA has long served as a security subcontractor for Israel in the West Bank, its continued existence is increasingly seen as an impediment to Israel’s unilateral annexation plans. Should formal annexation proceed, he predicted strong rhetorical condemnation from the Arab League but little substantive action. Calling into consideration the Arab League’s position on West Bank annexation, he noted that while the West Bank remains internationally recognized as Palestinian territory, there is no indication that Arab states would take significant action to prevent Israeli annexation. Given the muted Arab response to Israel’s actions in Gaza, he said a similar pattern could be expected in the event of formal West Bank annexation.

Rabbani concluded by emphasizing that Israel sees the present conflict as an opportunity to reshape the regional balance of power, akin to its 1967 military victory. However, Hezbollah’s resilience and regional uncertainty may prevent Israel from achieving its objectives. He said that the Palestinian Authority is increasingly irrelevant, and Israeli annexation of the West Bank remains a serious possibility. And that U.S. policy has evolved towards tacit support for Israel’s strategic realignment, though long-term American interests in regional stability may ultimately constrain this support.