Israel After 7 October and the War on Gaza

On Tuesday, March 11, 2025, the Fares Center hosted Professor Shai Feldman, Raymond Frankel Chair in Israeli Politics and Society at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies (Brandeis University) and co-author of Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East (2nd ed., 2022) as well as Arabs and Israelis: From October 7th to Peacemaking (2025).

Preliminary Observations: A Framework of Four Levels

Professor Feldman began by outlining four categories for interpreting the lead-up to the 7 October attacks and subsequent war:

1. International Diplomatic Failures: Professor Feldman asserted that every attempt to resolve Israeli–Palestinian tensions since the 1993 Oslo Accords has failed—particularly United States initiatives under Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump. He saw this diplomatic vacuum as having allowed simmering grievances to explode into violence. A critical perspective might question whether the focus on American-led negotiations neglects alternative frameworks—for instance, European or multilateral proposals—that could have helped avert the crisis.
2. Regional Developments: Feldman then discussed the “axis of resistance,” highlighting deepening ties between Hamas and other pro-Iranian groups, co-ordinated by Iran’s Qassem Soleimani. While he stressed that Hamas relied on this network for potential support, critics might point out that his depiction of a monolithic “axis” underestimates each actor’s independent objectives and the ways in which regional alliances can be fluid and transactional. In terms of economic normalisation elsewhere, Feldman contrasted the “axis of resistance” with Arab states seeking improved ties with Israel for geoeconomic reasons. He cited both the Abraham Accords and Israel’s maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon. Yet he glossed over the possibility that such treaties, when ignoring Palestinian interests, may exacerbate underlying grievances and thus be inherently unsustainable.
3. Domestic Israeli Politics: Feldmen described political instability and a rightward shift saying that Israel’s repeated elections yielded fragile coalitions, culminating in the inclusion of ultranationalist parties traditionally deemed beyond the pale. Feldman presented the resulting “judicial overhaul” crisis as a domestic conflict that left Israel’s deterrence posture exposed. Critics might note, however, that Feldman downplayed the extent to which such hard-line elements also shape strategic and security policies—factors that arguably contributed to intelligence and operational failures on 7 October.
4. In discussing Palestinian internal dynamics Feldman noted the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA), describing declining legitimacy for President Mahmoud Abbas and a parallel ascendancy of Hamas. Although he recounted Hamas’s negotiations with Israel over a long-term truce, it remains unclear whether he fully weighed the humanitarian context in Gaza and the West Bank—namely ongoing settlement expansion or blockade constraints—when depicting Hamas’s motivations.
   

The 7 October Attacks: Monumental Surprise or Predictable Failure?

Professor Feldman characterised 7 October as a major intelligence and operational failure for Israel. However, one might question his emphasis on “surprise,” since various analysts, including Israeli commentators, had long warned of potential upheaval in Gaza.

• Strategic vs. Basic Surprise: Feldman drew a distinction between situational surprise (failing to anticipate an event) and basic surprise (pursuing a belief system that “precludes” that event). He alleged that Israeli leadership misread Hamas as a rational actor primarily interested in short-term truces. Critics of this view might argue that Hamas’s willingness to escalate conflict is rooted in a deeper historical context of dispossession, thus more foreseeable than Feldman acknowledges.
• Operational Mishaps: Feldman attributed the extreme casualty toll to a slow Israeli military response. While he was forthright about “monumental” Israeli failures, he was less direct about any broader ramifications—such as whether domestic polarisation and settler violence played a role in provoking or anticipating Hamas’s decision-making.
  

Aftermath and Long-Term Implications

Although Feldman framed his remarks as though 17 months had elapsed since the war began, he devoted much of his analysis to hypothetical outcomes rather than confirmed developments:

• Impact on Hamas: He suggested that Hamas retains a semblance of organisation despite heavy losses, but has crucially lost autonomy. Yet he did not thoroughly assess Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe or how continuous sieges could reshape civilian support for Hamas or rival Palestinian factions.
• Arab State Involvement: Feldman observed that regional powers—especially Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—have assumed an outsized role, sidelining Palestinian leaders. Critics might contend that this external diplomatic dominance further deprives Palestinians of self-determination; the lecture did not fully consider how Palestinian voices and civil society might react to such external “solutions.”
  

Competing Currents: Resistance vs. Geoeconomics

Feldman juxtaposed two overarching trends in the Middle East:

• Conflict Track: Led by Iran and bolstered by groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. While he emphasised co-ordination, critics could argue he did not adequately explore each faction’s potential divergences, or the limited political capital Hamas truly holds post-war.
• Economic Normalisation Track: Pioneered by states that view open markets and bilateral agreements with Israel as beneficial. Feldman noted this approach bypassed the Palestinian question to a dangerous extent, but did not explore whether normalisation deals might be renegotiated or unravel entirely under new post-war realities.
  

Future of Peacemaking and the Two-State Paradigm

In audience discussions, Feldman reaffirmed his stance that a two-state solution remains the sole sustainable endpoint. Yet he did not fully address the persistent critique that entrenched settlement activity, demographic shifts, and the collapse of Palestinian governance structures in Gaza and the West Bank complicate this paradigm.

• Regional Arab Mediation: Feldman speculated that a more active role for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan need not exclude Palestinians from genuine state-building. However, he lacked clarity on how precisely those Arab governments—some of whom normalised ties with Israel sans meaningful Palestinian input—might serve as impartial guarantors of any future deal.
• Necessity of External Leverage: Feldman referenced U.S. pressure as a decisive factor compelling Hamas and Israel to negotiate sporadic ceasefires, yet critics might question whether external leverage has historically skewed negotiations in Israel’s favour. He did not sufficiently explain how such leverage could be rebalanced to accommodate the concerns of all parties, including ordinary Palestinians.
  

Conclusion

Professor Feldman’s analysis offered a structured breakdown of the multiple failures leading to and arising from the 7 October attacks. While he acknowledged Israel’s intelligence and military shortcomings, he was less explicit about the humanitarian cost to Palestinians and the ways in which Israeli domestic politics might have provoked radicalisation in Gaza. Moreover, his optimism regarding “two competing Middle Eastern trajectories” risks overlooking the stark inequality between a heavily militarised Israeli state and a fragmented Palestinian national movement.

Ultimately, Feldman underscored that no durable resolution—whether two-state or otherwise—can emerge without broad international engagement, particularly from Arab powers. Yet a critical reading of his talk suggests that any path to peace must move beyond diplomatic boilerplate and squarely address entrenched power imbalances, the ongoing siege conditions in Gaza, and the historical roots of Palestinian dispossession. While his concluding remark was that “we cannot set the conflict aside,” a fuller critique would highlight how prior attempts to do precisely that—notably in the Abraham Accords—contributed to a sense of fatal inevitability about the 7 October tragedy.