The Policy of the U.S. in the Middle East After the War on Gaza

On Wednesday, April 3, 2025, the Fares Center hosted Professor Vali Nasr, Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins–SAIS, former Dean of SAIS (2012–2019) and Senior Advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke (2009–2011).

Reassessing the Post-Gaza U.S. Strategy and India’s Emerging Role

Professor Nasr began by reiterating how Washington had, until 7 October, largely downplayed the Palestinian question and focused on containing Iran through sanctions or limited negotiations. He noted that the Abraham Accords aimed to streamline Israel’s ties with the Arab world, enabling the United States to shift resources away from the region. Yet he also underscored the growing presence of India in Middle Eastern economic and infrastructural projects—such as mooted trade corridors linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean—driven by both American and regional interests in diversifying alliances and countering China.

Nasr pointed out that these evolving India–Middle East connections form part of a broader geoeconomic vision that had initially bypassed the Palestinian situation. According to him, the Gaza war challenged the premise that stability could be secured by mere external investments, underscoring the continued potency of unresolved political grievances.

Axis of Resistance, From Central to Circumscribed

Nasr discussed the Axis of Resistance, emphasising its former centrality in regional geopolitics. Consisting primarily of Iran, Hezbollah, and allied groups—commonly legitimised under Iran’s concept of wilāyat al-faqīh (Guardianship of the Jurist)—the axis previously posed a direct deterrent to Israel’s military dominance. Hamas was sometimes seen as secondary within this structure, but still symbolically tied to it.

Impact of 7 October and Gaza War

Initially, Israel’s intelligence failure seemed to reinvigorate the axis, with Hamas seizing a fleeting advantage. However, Israel’s counter-offensive weakened Hamas considerably, and subsequent Israeli operations in Lebanon decimated Hezbollah’s leadership. Nasr observed that this collapse drastically curtailed Iran’s capacity to project influence near Israel’s borders, in part reversing the lessons Tehran had gleaned from its earlier focus on proxies in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Shifting Iranian Calculations

With wilāyat al-faqīh as its ideological bedrock, Iran had long relied on proxy movements to maintain what Professor Nasr labelled “forward defence.” Now, faced with an enfeebled Hezbollah and a diminished Hamas, Tehran may shift its resources to missile and drone programmes, marking a departure from its strategy of the late 1990s–2000s.

The Syrian Factor and Allegations of Switching Sides

Turning to the Syrian dimension, Professor Nasr cited growing tensions between Damascus and Tehran prior to the war. He noted that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime had been drifting from Iranian influence, refusing to open a ‘third front’ against Israel after 7 October. More significantly, Nasr highlighted claims—often heard in regional discourse—that Damascus had not only broken with Iran but also engaged with external intelligence interests, even prompting whispers of Assad serving as a quasi-“Mossad operative.” Such claims, he cautioned, signal the extent to which Syria’s realignment took shape, culminating in Assad’s ousting with support from Turkey.

According to Nasr, this upheaval has further undermined Iran’s strategic corridor into the Levant, exposing the Axis of Resistance to new vulnerabilities it did not face in previous decades.

Arab States, Turkey, and the U.S. Outlook

Beyond Iran and Syria, Professor Nasr discussed how key Arab powers—especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are recalibrating policy. He contended that after the Gaza conflict revealed Israel’s robust operational reach, and with Syria effectively switching sides, many Gulf states are inclined to balance amongst Israel, Turkey, and a weakened Iran, rather than simply supporting any single party. The return of President Trump, Nasr added, could see renewed emphasis on radical plans for the Palestinian territories (such as relocating Gaza’s population), which Arab governments find deeply destabilising. Nasr further underscored that these states remain wary of relying on Washington for security, given prior episodes where U.S. forces did not retaliate forcefully when Iran targeted Gulf assets.

Conclusion

Professor Nasr’s remarks suggested that the Middle East has entered a phase of unprecedented realignment, with the Axis of Resistance receding faster than many had predicted. However, the notion of addressing long-standing conflicts—such as the Palestinian issue—through mass displacement appears even more fraught in light of both historical lessons (notably Iran’s 1990s–2000s approach to proxy-building) and contemporary upheavals (Syria’s “side-switch,” the potential for a robust India–Middle East corridor, and ongoing Arab hedging).

Talk of forcibly displacing Gazans to solve the Palestinian question, or of simply bypassing the Axis of Resistance, risks inflaming underlying resentments. The war has exposed deep-rooted tensions that cannot be resolved by unilateral measures, nor can they be dismissed by external geoeconomic projects. Indeed, the region’s experience with wilāyat al-faqīh and Iranian proxy warfare reveals how neglected grievances readily spawn new alliances and rivalries. Similarly, Syria’s shifting allegiances underscore how volatile local regimes may be—whether or not they remain under the banner of Iranian influence.

Overall, Professor Nasr concluded that American policymakers appear determined to leave Middle East entanglements behind but have yet to adapt to post-war realities in Gaza, the Levant, or the Gulf. Whether such ambitions can withstand the undercurrents of communal discontent and strategic mistrust remains, as he put it, the central question in this unfolding era.