The Dumbest Analogy in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Take a bow, J.D. Vance!

By Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is going better than its critics contend but worse than its proponents present. The prospect of the Russo-Ukrainian war stretching into 2024 now seems highly likely. 

This has prompted ongoing debate within the United States about what the next steps should be. Debate is good! This is a knotty international relations problem without an obvious solution — exactly the kind of issue where outside debate might lead to new ideas, or at least productive disagreements. 

Take, for example, the push by some, like RAND’s Samuel Charap, to nudge Ukraine towards the negotiating table. As The Nation’s Jeet Heer argues, “Both Russia and Ukraine have been thwarted on the battlefield, and the Ukrainians are becoming, for the best of reasons, wary of high casualties. The time is surely ripe for a diplomatic push.”

The hard-working staff here at Drezner’s World does not find this “push for negotiations now” argument terribly persuasive, for a number of reasons. The simplest one is that Russia has already precluded any meaningful negotiations when it formally annexed the four Ukrainian regions where fighting is currently taking place. This might seem like meaningless to Americans but that is not how the Russians view it. Climbing down from their legal high horse would require some serious cognitive adjustments on their part. And so far Russian diplomats have, if anything, become more obstinate and obstreperous as the war has proceeded. This is as true for Track II as Track I negotiations: as I noted this past summer: “there is simply no constructive negotiating flexibility when talking to the Russians.” 

The deeper reason I don’t think a push for negotiations is ripe right now is that both sides still possess a plausible theory of victory. Unless and until Russia and Ukraine’s assessments of the war converge towards the same set of odds, there is little that can be gained from negotiation. For more on this point, see Hein Goemans and Branislav Stantchev’s recent essay in the Economist:

War is learning, and learning is about information. The war in Ukraine, like any other, cannot end while the two sides have wildly different expectations about the likely outcome if both stay in the fight…

Given the Russian strategy, the Ukrainians must press to take territory in order to demonstrate that the Kremlin’s forces will not be able to hold out in Ukraine, despite massive prepared defences and a heavy influx of new troops. The Russians must try to demonstrate the opposite: that even with all the Western help, the Ukrainians will not be able to dislodge them by force from the occupied territories. Either of these outcomes would cause beliefs about the trajectory of the war to begin to converge—a necessary but not sufficient condition for negotiations to end the war.

Since so much rides on expectations, each side must be careful about the signals it sends….

It can be tricky to signal commitment and, at the same time, tamp down expectations. Yet that is what Western leaders should be doing. Instead of fairy tales about Ukraine winning in mere months, they should explain to their people why aid should be sustained, or increased, even though the war will not end soon. The best tactic for that is explaining why Ukraine must win—not only to preserve Ukrainians’ lives and liberty, but also to prevent an emboldened Russia plunging the world back into a chaotic order of might making right.

Still, asking when there should be a push towards negotiations is a debate worth having. On the other hand, attempts to analogize U.S. support for Ukraine with the 2003 invasion of Iraq seem like they subtract more than add to the foreign policy debate. 

Of course, this is where J.D. Vance, the junior senator from Ohio, has decided to make his mark. In an interview, Vance said, “in a lot of ways… this reminds me of 2003-2004 with Iraq where everybody seemed to want to go and rush towards a military conflict. I think twenty years now we recognize what a terrible mistake that was. I don’t want us to get twenty years down the road before we realize what a catastrophic mistake we’re making.”

The National Review’s Noah Rothman found this analogy specious, noting on Twitter, “I cannot for the life of me see how Russia’s war in Ukraine bears even a passing resemblance to Iraq save for the subtextual argument Ukraine’s critics seem to have internalized that America is the bad guy.” 

Vance did not take this rejoinder well, responding with a tweet of his own1 listing ten suggested parallels between 2003 and 2023. Vance is worth quoting in its entirety to reveal the hollowness of his argument: 

1) The same idiots who push the most aggressive posture in Ukraine (you) did the same in Iraq (also you). 

2) The bizarre and reflexive WW2 analogies. “If we don’t stop him here….” “Neville Chamberlain also said….” 

3) The defense of the policy in terms of generic institutional deference and international norms rather than concrete American interest. 

4) The belief that tough talk and suicidal depletion of resources is an effective deterrent rather than, say, not wasting thousands of lives, billions of dollars, and much of our modern weapons of war. 

5) The mission creep. From eliminating weapons of mass destruction to building a liberal democracy in Iraq. From stopping the Russian advance to reclaiming every inch of territory to toppling Putin in Eastern Europe. 

6) The moralistic defense of our policies (freedom! democracy!) despite the fact that our client states are neither free nor democratic. 

7) The failure of our elites to acknowledge that our policies are enabling the persecution of historic Christian communities.

8) The fact that our policies unite our adversaries together—Iraq and Iran then, Russia and China now. 

9) Both led (or will lead) to massive refugee crises that destabilize European allies and threaten our security. (I’m sure you and others will try to distance yourselves from the consequences of driving up food prices and migration pressures for the entire continent of Africa.) 

10) Both empower China. 

Other than that, yeah, totally different.

It’s a bad sign for someone’s argument when it takes me less than ten seconds to think of the easy rebuttal to every single point being made. For kicks, though, let’s just go through Vance’s list: 

1. (“The same idiots who push the most aggressive posture in Ukraine (you) did the same in Iraq.“) This is the “subtextual argument” Rothman referenced, and Vance just makes it the text. At least he’s conceding Rothman’s initial argument with his first point! It’s also worth encouraging readers to check out Rothman’s lengthier response to Vance in NRO about the stupidity of this analogy: “This isn’t an apples and oranges comparison. It’s a comparison between apples and typewriters. They’re both carbon-based objects, I suppose, in the same way that all wars are, in fact, wars. But their similarities end there…. As a talking point, equating Russia’s war with the Iraq War pings painful emotional centers in the American mind. That’s probably the entirety of the analogy’s value proposition because the parallels don’t hold up amid anything resembling logical scrutiny.” 
2. (“The bizarre and reflexive WW2 analogies…“) Are Munich analogies bandied about way too much? Absolutely. With Putin, however, the fact pattern is clear: he invaded Georgia in 2008, annexed Crimea in early 2014, moved on the Donbas later on in 2014, and then invaded all of Ukraine in 2022. Putin has given every indication that he will use military force for revanchist aims unless he’s deterred.
3. (“The defense of the policy in terms of generic institutional deference and international norms rather than concrete American interest“) Pop quiz, Senator Vance: which great power established almost all of the “generic institutional deference and international norms” that you say run counter to “concrete American interest”?! That’s right, it’s the United States!!! So stop using this false dichotomy. The institutions and norms the U.S. is upholding also advance concrete American interests.
4. (“The belief that tough talk and suicidal depletion of resources is an effective deterrent rather than, say, not wasting thousands of lives, billions of dollars…“) If you think that spending less than five percent of the DOD budget on military aid to Ukraine equals “a suicidal depletion of resources” then I’m not sure you know what any of those words mean. Especially since the result has been to tie down the most aggressive military threat in Europe. If the United States were to follow Senator Vance’s advice, then that would be a great way for NATO allies to doubt U.S. credible commitments. 
5. (“The mission creep…“) This argument makes little sense. There has been no mission creep — the goal has been for Ukraine to defend its territory against Russia’s incursion. Unless and until Russia were to signal a willingness to stop fighting — and, as noted above, they have done the opposite of that — arming Ukraine to expel Russia remains the primary goal. Also, WTF does “toppling Putin in Eastern Europe” mean?!
6. (“The moralistic defense of our policies (freedom! democracy!) despite the fact that our client states are neither free nor democratic…“) For the love of God, Senator, please read Serhii Plokhy’s The Russo-Ukrainian War before pontificating about Russia and Ukraine having basically the same regime type. The tl;dr version: Ukraine is not a perfect democracy but it’s definitely mostly free and mostly democratic, and anyone who tells you differently is selling you something.
7. (“The failure of our elites to acknowledge that our policies are enabling the persecution of historic Christian communities“) I see, so moralistic defenses are okay for thee but not for me?! Make up your damn mind, Senator! Also, please provide a few more specifics on this point. Surely you’re not talking about the Russian atrocities in Bucha, or the Russian abduction of Ukrainian children, or overall Russian war crimes in Ukraine, are you? 
8. (“The fact that our policies unite our adversaries together…“) Congratulations, Senator Vance, it only took you eight tries to raise a semi-legitimate question! A closer Sino-Russian axis is concerning. On the other hand, your fantasy of weaning Russia away from China’s orbit sees about as plausible as any of Vivek Ramaswamy’s inane foreign policy musings.2 It’s far better to reach a working entente with China — the country currently not invading its neighbors — than try to reset relations with Russia. What Senator Vance suggests is a foreign policy endeavor that Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump all tried when taking office. Each of these gambits failed.
9. (“Both led (or will lead) to massive refugee crises that destabilize European allies and threaten our security…“) Please name a European country, any European country, that has been destabilized from an influx of Ukrainian refugees? Furthermore, this is actually an argument in favor of arming Ukraine further. Once it became apparent that Ukraine was going to survive, there was a significant reverse migration back into Ukraine. The more it seems as though Ukraine is winning the war, the greater the likelihood of reverse migration. That’s what you want, isn’t it Senator?3
10. (“Both empower China“) Nope. Based on everything China has said and done in the 19 months since the war began, it seems clear that they feel the loss of a Europe and Pacific Rim newly aware of China as a threat far more than any gain they reap from a more dependent Russia. Also, as it turns out, a lot of what the United States did during the Global War on Terror wound up laying the groundwork for the current statecraft toolbox being deployed against Russia, China et al. So no, this analogy falls flat as well. 

Of Vance’s ten points, maybe one has any plausibility. Other than that, Iraq and Ukraine are pretty different cases! 

This is, sadly, further evidence of the enshittification of the GOP’s foreign policy machine. I am happy to see and participate in ongoing debates about what the United States should do in Ukraine. It sure would be nice, however, if the J.D. Vance’s of the world started putting their fancy Ivy League educations to work instead of trying desperately to act like a faux populist. Because based on what I just read and heard, Vance’s arguments against supporting Ukraine are all hat and no cattle. 

1 It’s always gonna be a tweet, don’t try telling me it’s called something else now. 

2 Don’t take my word on this, take Jacob Heilbrunn or Jack Shafer’s word for it. These are two writers who would be extremely sympathetic to a cogent presentation of realism. What you and Ramaswamy are offering is… not that. 

3 As for the food issue, I’d like Senator Vance to guess which country withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. It takes most people only one guess, but given the senator’s ideological predilections I suspect he’ll need two.

(This post is republished from Drezner’s World.)