Final blow to Chinese ‘neutrality’ on Ukraine war

With the dismissal of the Swiss peace conference, Beijing’s commitment to Russia has reached new heights.

By Viking Bohman, Patrik Andersson, and Hugo von Essen (Bohman is a PhD Candidate at The Fletcher School)

Viking Bohman is an analyst at the Swedish National China Centre currently pursuing a PhD at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. Patrik Andersson is an analyst at the Swedish National China Centre, and his research has featured in publications such as the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and the Extractive Industries and Society. Hugo von Essen is an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), where he leads the SCEEUS Eastern Europe Policy Project.

China’s sympathy for Russia was already clear to most observers at the outset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Less discussed, however, is the extent to which Beijing’s support for Moscow has grown since.

This was made painfully clear in the lead-up to the Swiss peace summit on Ukraine last weekend.

While some European leaders are eager to involve China in efforts to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, much to their disappointment, Beijing declined to participate in the peace conference, citing its lack of participation and “recognition from both Russia and Ukraine.”

Following this announcement, in the run-up to the gathering, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed dismay about China’s absence, as well as Beijing actively pressuring other countries to not participate. Russia was “using Chinese diplomats” to “disrupt the peace summit,” Zelenskyy said. And though he didn’t specify which countries were targeted, in early May, China’s designated envoy for the conflict had visited nations like Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Kazakhstan.

It would, of course, be an exaggeration to say China and Russia are in complete agreement on the war. A review of recent statements and analyses from Beijing and Moscow makes clear that China recognizes Ukraine as a sovereign state, and doesn’t subscribe to Russian narratives about the country being a Nazified Western puppet. It also maintains direct contact with Kyiv, has spoken out against Russian nuclear threats, and hasn’t publicly supported the invasion either. Instead, it has vaguely stated that “the sovereignty of all countries” must be respected, subtly suggesting the invasion might not be justifiable.

But this is about as far as the divergences go, as the two countries tend to agree on key issues.

For example, China has repeatedly expressed support for the “legitimate security concerns” Russia has about NATO’s eastward expansion. In Beijing’s view, the culprit of the conflict is the U.S., which it says has sought to provoke a confrontation in the region.

Over the years, China’s historical skepticism of NATO, which dates back to at least the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, has developed into outright aversion. And Chinese officials view NATO’s June 2022 strategic concept — the first to list China as a security challenge — as confirmation of their suspicions that the organization is set to expand its geographical scope to try and contain the country.

Meanwhile, Beijing has also gravitated toward the notion of “indivisible security,” which posits that nations shouldn’t enhance their security at the expense of others — a doctrine promoted by Moscow for decades, and a criticism aimed at NATO’s activities. Prior to the invasion, China had endorsed the concept in joint statements with Russia. But since then, it’s been included in the Global Security Initiative — a cornerstone of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for international relations — which suggests it will enjoy a more prominent role in Chinese foreign policy.

The pair also share a disdain for Western sanctions — including those imposed on Russia. Chinese officials vehemently oppose American “illegal unilateral sanctions” and say they won’t comply with them. And Xi hasn’t just passively resisted efforts to isolate Russia, providing the country with an economic lifeline, he’s also shown he’s willing to bear both reputational and economic costs to support his neighbor.

Since 2022, China’s leaders have dealt with a serious economic downturn, the sudden and unexplained ousting of two cabinet ministers and growing Western resistance to its global ambitions. The war has only amplified these challenges, with China’s relations with Europe tarnished by Beijing’s support for Moscow. And while China’s been wary of openly violating Western sanctions, multiple Chinese companies have recently been subject to restrictions for trading with Russian counterparts.

But this seems to be a sacrifice Xi is willing to make. In fact, as the West has increased its demands on China, it’s bond with Russia appears to have only strengthened. Trade and defense exchanges have grown significantly, while the Russian people seem to have become more positively disposed toward China too.

The longer China maintains its pro-Russian stance, the harder all this will be to reverse. Chinese firms have already adapted their operations to cater to expanding trade relations with Russia. Over time, this structural change will become harder and more expensive to undo. Moreover, Xi’s support of Putin has been personal and highly publicized. And as China’s pro-Russian policies don’t enjoy universal support among Chinese intellectuals, a policy reversal could be seen as a concession to his critics.

After his meeting with Xi in April, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the two leaders had agreed to “coordinate intensively” on holding peace conferences regarding Ukraine. And he made it clear he thinks “China’s word carries weight in Russia.”

It’s true a mediator doesn’t have to be perfectly impartial to be successful. With decisive leverage over one or both conflicting parties, it can cajole them into making compromises that might otherwise be impossible. For such efforts to be successful, however, said mediator must be willing to lean on the dependent parties in a way that can significantly strain its relations with them. So far, Xi has shown no signs of willingness to do so — and the chances of that seem to be decreasing.

European leaders are right to maintain a dialogue with China and to continue demanding Xi uses his leverage. But until China does so, letting Beijing take on a major role in the peace process risks legitimizing the invasion.

(This post is republished from Politico.)