What does Ukraine’s incursion into Russia say about a so-called ‘red line’?

NPR’s Steve Inskeep talks to former Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Evelyn Farkas, now at the McCain Institute, about Ukraine’s incursion into Russia, and implications for U.S. and allied policy

(Farkas is a Fletcher alumna and Executive Director of the McCain Institute)

Transcript:

STEVE INSKEEP, HOST: 

Ukrainian troops did something exceedingly rare when they advanced into Russia this month. They invaded the territory of a country that has nuclear weapons – thousands of them. This just doesn’t happen often, for obvious reasons. It’s seen as insanely risky to provoke a nuclear power, which is one reason the United States has been so careful in just how it arms and supports Ukraine. Then Ukrainian troops swept across the Russian border, and this week, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the old idea of a red line that nobody should cross is obsolete. Evelyn Farkas is watching all this. She was a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Obama administration and now leads a nonpartisan think tank called the McCain Institute. Good morning.

EVELYN FARKAS: Good morning, Steve.

INSKEEP: I talk with Ukrainians. I think they felt for a long time that the U.S. was way too worried about Russian nuclear retaliation. Have the Ukrainians now proven themselves right?

FARKAS: I think so. Time and time again, Vladimir Putin has blustered about red lines. He’s threatened to use nuclear weapons, and frankly, I think the Ukrainians understand how Vladimir Putin thinks, how the Russians think, and they always thought that these threats were hollow. They attacked Crimea when Putin used the same threats. And so you see, they are not afraid to cross right into Russia.

INSKEEP: OK. With that said, though, is there a little chance of a nuclear catastrophe? Because you probably don’t want any chance, if you can avoid it.

FARKAS: Well, I think the greatest chance is the one that Russia has caused, frankly – the greatest risk – by, you know, conducting a military occupation…

INSKEEP: Sure.

FARKAS: …Of Zaporizhzhia, the nuclear facility in Ukraine. That’s the risk, that you would have an accident or something of that nature. So I don’t think there’s a risk of Russia, you know, attacking Ukraine using nuclear weapons, because frankly, the fallout – pun intended – will also include Russian territory, Russian forces. I think most people understood all along that this was kind of extreme bluster.

INSKEEP: Oh, good point, because the Russian troops themselves are right there. So let’s think this through a little bit more. Does the logic of war make it necessary for Ukraine to strike into Russia in the way that it’s now doing because, you know, they can’t allow the enemy to have a safe zone?

FARKAS: I think so, Steve, although the logic wasn’t clear, I think, to everyone all along. That’s why this was such a surprise, I think, to the international community. You know, the reality is that you need to keep your enemy off balance, and Putin has been feeling pretty smug, you know, in the sense that this war of attrition is one that Russia can weather. They can sit it out. They have men. They have materiel. Even though their economy is under stress, they can hang in there, at least until the U.S. elections and, perhaps, beyond. Now the Ukrainians are telling them, you can’t hang on, you know, indefinitely. We’re going to change the rules of the game.

INSKEEP: Now, have they, in fact, changed the rules of the game? I mean, this seemed like a minor incursion, but has it really changed the war?

FARKAS: Well, I think it’s caused the Russians to think about what else the Ukrainians might have up their sleeve, and certainly, they’re in a bind now. Ukrainians are controlling Russian territory. Russian civilians have been forced to flee. This government of Vladimir Putin’s is not a very strong government. We know from Russian history that it just takes a few, you know, incidents – one incident or more in a few days, the Russian government can be brought down. I’m not saying that’s going to happen right now, necessarily.

But Putin – you can see he doesn’t quite know what to do, and part of it has to do with the internal problems that he’s been facing, clamping down on his military and his internal security, his intelligence services. Neither one of these two groups are trusted 100% by him. They don’t trust one another, so they haven’t been able to, frankly, respond. So the Ukrainians are still sitting in Russian territory, and now that they’ve blown up the three key bridges that would have allowed the Russian forces to cross back and take the territory, it’s becoming increasingly harder, and now you can see a scenario where the Ukrainians might actually hold on to this territory.

INSKEEP: Now, do you think that this example is going to prompt, or should prompt, the United States to change the way that it thinks about supporting Ukraine? The U.S, as you know very well, has been very cautious, very slow to send new weapon systems, especially ones that can be used to strike into Russia.

FARKAS: Yes, Steve, because I think the U.S. government wants Ukraine to win. That is to say, the United States government wants Ukraine to reestablish its sovereignty, and in order to do this, they should take advantage of the momentum right now that Ukraine has by providing longer-range weapons to take out Russian military facilities on Russian territory.

INSKEEP: Evelyn Farkas, thanks for the insights. I really appreciate it.

FARKAS: Thank you, Steve.

INSKEEP: She was a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Obama administration and now leads the McCain Institute.

(This post is republished from NPR.)