Implications of the Putin-Kim Summit on European and Asian Security

By Nayan Seth, MGA 2024 Candidate at The Fletcher School

On the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C. in July 2024, heads of state of the four countries from the Indo-Pacific, called the IP4–Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea–discussed the recent strengthening of ties between Russia and North Korea. After the meeting, they issued a joint statement condemning the “illicit military cooperation” between Russia and North Korea and expressed concern over the violation of UN sanctions by the two sides. The NATO joint statement also noted with “great concern the deepening ties between Moscow and Pyongyang.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to North Korea, his first in 24 years, has complicated the United States-led security architecture both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The realignment has grave implications for the United States, Europe, and Washington’s regional allies–South Korea and Japan. Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine, with the assistance of China and North Korea, coupled with political uncertainty over the upcoming U.S. presidential election and the likelihood of Donald Trump’s return to power, have forced the United States and its friends to strengthen their alliances and make them irreversible. The intertwining of European and Asian crises has made the situation dangerous and would require an effective deterrence mechanism to avoid a wider conflict.

A Marriage of Convenience in the East

In June 2024, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un rolled out the red carpet for Putin and hosted a carefully choreographed pageantry in Pyongyang. They upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and signed a new defense pact that promised mutual military assistance if either was attacked–the strongest agreement between the two countries since the Cold War. 

Relations between the two autocracies have warmed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. North Korea is accused of sustaining Putin’s aggression by supplying around 10,000 containers of weapons that include artillery shells, anti-tank missiles, and portable surface-to-air missiles. In return, Russia has provided revenue from arms transfer and food staples that have stabilized the prices and played a crucial role in the economy’s rebounding in 2023.

Beyond economic gains, the military pact has revived fears of a possible transfer of nuclear technology from Russia to North Korea and revival of a Cold War-era rivalry with far-reaching implications.

Sung-Yoon Lee, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a former professor and alumnus of The Fletcher School, argued that the latest agreement is part of a new “psychological manipulation.”

“This is an attempt on the part of both Putin and Kim to try to sow the seeds of growing anxiety in Washington and other capitals around the world,” Lee said.  

Unlike the now defunct 1961 military agreement between the two sides, Lee highlighted that the new pact is “very long,” but that feature does not ensure durability. 

“Even during the Cold War, there were some questions as to whether Russia would really support North Korea again if North Korea started a war. So, in the end, all these agreements, especially in autocracies, are mere paper agreements. You can violate them without repercussions in a dictatorship. So, a strong man does as he pleases,” Lee added.

Aram Hur, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Fletcher School, agreed with that assessment. “I’m a little bit skeptical of the durability of this pact being anything deeper than a mutually, currently beneficial strategic alliance. This is not based on mutual interest but on a mutual enemy.”

While the long-term prospects could be uncertain, military assistance could still play a major role in either prolonging Putin’s war of attrition in Ukraine or tilting the balance in favor of Russia.

China, which itself has been accused by the West of being a “decisive enabler” in the conflict, is also in a bind over the revival of ties between Moscow and Pyongyang. According to Lee, while Beijing is not pleased with the growing closeness, it may conclude that “it is not detrimental to China’s interest and that China can win Kim Jong Un back.”

“If Kim Jong Un shows up in Beijing next week, no one should be surprised because China has an incentive. They might not relish doing that, but it’s in their national interest, from a ruthlessly pragmatic point of view,” Lee added.

With China’s alleged aid to Russia to continue its war in Ukraine and Putin’s visit to North Korea and Vietnam that aimed to complicate U.S. efforts in the Indo-Pacific, the European and Asian theaters have now been tied up. 

The outgoing NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly highlighted the intertwining of crises, saying that “in today’s world, security is not a regional matter but a global one.”

Lee asserted that the war in Ukraine “changed the world in fundamental ways” and “what happens in Europe has security implications in other regions of the world.” He feared that multiple crises like the ongoing war in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait could embolden the North Korean regime to take advantage and “start a limited but lethal attack on South Korea.”

To deter such an outcome, the United States has attempted to strengthen its alliance network in the region, with the recent warming of ties between Japan and South Korea and creating a trilateral framework among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. 

On the United States’ long-term goal of seeking complete denuclearization of North Korea, the needle has not moved much. Lee believed that “opportunity has passed already” and that the focus should remain on deterring the aggression. The one variable in all of that is the domestic political situation in South Korea. 

While the current South Korean administration under President Yoon Suk Yeol has taken a hardline approach toward North Korea and revived ties with Japan, a change of guard with a possible return of a left-leaning opposition leader could alter the inter-Korean relations and regional balance of power.

“If the parliamentary elections and Yoon’s plummeting approval rate is any indication, in 2025, in the next South Korean presidential election, it is highly likely that we will have a swing back to the left, that in and of itself, will change so much of the dynamic bit of inter-Korea relations,” Hur said.

Given the complex political environment in East Asia and the ongoing war in Europe, Russia seems to be exploiting the vulnerabilities well at the moment, both with its adversaries and partners.

“I think one of the strengths of democracy is the allowance of diversity. But that, inevitably, and Putin knows this well, comes at the cost of differences. So, Putin’s strategy is to really lean into that difference and amplify that, as long as it sows discord and confusion amongst the key players,” Hur added.