BRICS in Transition: From the Kazan Summit to Brazil’s 2025 Presidency
By Mihaela Papa, Senior Fellow at The Fletcher School
This year’s BRICS summit brought world leaders to the city of Kazan in Russia. It was the bloc’s first main gathering since new countries joined the club earlier this year. What were the main outcomes? And how do you expect the group’s agenda to evolve under Brazil’s leadership in 2025?
In my view, four key outcomes from this year’s summit will be important as Brazil takes on the BRICS presidency in 2025. First, the group managed to effectively collaborate in an expanded format. Together, member states strengthened policy coordination in areas like trade by establishing the BRICS Informal Consultative Framework on WTO issues. The bloc also launched many new initiatives, including the BRICS Grain Exchange and the forum for cooperation on Special Economic Zones, and committed to bolstering its own institutions.
Second, BRICS enhanced its financial coordination and identified key projects aimed at reducing member states’ reliance on the US dollar and Western infrastructure. However, building consensus on these projects and their implementation will take time. The Kazan Declaration (paras. 65-67) encourages strengthening banking networks within BRICS and “enabling settlements in local currencies in line with BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative.” The leaders agreed “to discuss and study the feasibility of establishment of an independent cross-border settlement and depository infrastructure, BRICS Clear, (…) as well as BRICS independent reinsurance capacity.” BRICS’ finance officials are not only tasked with continuing work on local currencies, payment instruments, and platforms, but they also need to report on their progress by the next presidency.
Third, the group officially introduced the BRICS Partner Country category at the summit but has not formally announced any new members under this designation. Instead, BRICS agreed to invite thirteen countries – Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam – and the Russian presidency will hold consultations with these states to formalize their membership. Looking ahead, Brazil’s presidency will oversee the management of the enlargement process, including new applicants, waitlisted applicants, and those not accepted – such as Venezuela.
“In 2025, Brazil’s BRICS presidency is likely to deepen BRICS’ ties with the Global South and test the group’s capacity for entrepreneurship and solidarity.”
Finally, the group sought to de-escalate global tensions and address conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East – but there were no breakthrough actions. While BRICS leaders reaffirmed their support for the State of Palestine’s full UN membership – based on its internationally-recognized 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital – they did not extend an invitation for it to join the group. Brazil’s President Lula has regularly prioritised discussing the Gaza situation in his main speeches, though the group as a whole has maintained a cautious approach.
In 2025, Brazil’s BRICS presidency is likely to build on these four themes – new initiatives, finance-related ambitions, expansion, and conflict de-escalation – deepening BRICS’ ties with the Global South and testing the group’s capacity for entrepreneurship and solidarity. Its motto “Strengthening Cooperation in the Global South for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance” further reinforces BRICS’ role as a representative of the Global South. In his Kazan speech, President Lula already highlighted the importance of sustaining this momentum: creating alternative payment methods for intra-group transactions, tackling climate change, addressing hunger and poverty, ensuring equitable access to vaccines and medicines, and fostering fair development of AI. Plus, Brazil – which will also host COP 30 – can leverage BRICS’ recent adoption of the Framework on Climate Change and Sustainable Development and the Memorandum of Understanding on the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership to position itself as a climate leader.
Russia is under international sanctions over its war against Ukraine. Yet more than three dozen countries followed Vladimir Putin’s invitation and sent representatives to the BRICS meeting. UN Secretary-General António Guterres also travelled to Russia to attend the summit. What does this mean for EU efforts to defend and revitalise multilateralism?
It is important to realise that BRICS countries see the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the sole authority for imposing sanctions, and often criticise the use of other coercive measures as incompatible with the UN Charter. Further, prospective BRICS members understand that the group’s criteria forbid them from imposing such sanctions on existing members. Thus, Russia’s sanction status does not really deter current or aspiring members from engaging with Moscow. More generally, BRICS’ efforts to build non-Western financial infrastructure, increase intra-BRICS trade, and realign supply chains raise serious questions about the long-term effectiveness of sanctions. On this front, it is essential for the EU and like-minded actors to develop a broader set of multilateral strategies and form more diverse coalitions for conflict resolution. Collaborating with the UN Secretary General as he deploys and further develops his “good offices” – diplomatic efforts to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating, or spreading – is an integral part of this portfolio.
Going forward, the EU needs to recognize that perspectives on multilateralism vary widely and that the solution may not involve defending an old multilateralism, but envisioning a new one. In a non-Western context, BRICS countries are revitalising multilateralism by developing new forms of international cooperation and strengthening political, economic, and cultural ties. Prospective BRICS members often cite a commitment to bolstering multilateral action and South-South cooperation as a key reason for joining the group.
BRICS intends to establish itself as an alternative to what it regards as Western-dominated forms of global governance. Where do you see the group headed in the future?
The BRICS group is a strategic partnership pursuing a wide range of agendas and discussing issues across various working groups and events. Some agendas, such as moving away from the US dollar and Western financial infrastructure, challenge Western dominance in parts of the international system. However, the Kazan Declaration continues to emphasize the group’s commitment to reforming the UN system and international financial institutions. While BRICS seeks to alter the normative and operational features of the current order, it also has agency beyond its relationship with the West – with much of its focus on strengthening intra-BRICS, development-centred cooperation.
“The solution may not involve defending an old multilateralism, but envisioning a new one.”
Two key summit-related developments stand out for their impact on BRICS’ institutional growth. First, the China-India breakthrough agreement on border tensions is significant both for building internal trust and for positioning BRICS as a platform for peacebuilding. Second, while BRICS traditionally relies on consensus to advance initiatives, the Kazan Declaration introduces the language of “participation on a voluntary basis” for major financial initiatives. This allows the most ambitious members to push forward their projects, bypassing potential deadlock in the expanding group and paving the way for a multi-speed BRICS, akin to the EU’s approach. Together, these developments may further integration and enhance BRICS’ influence as a global governance actor.
(This post is republished from Ensured Europe.)