On deterring Russia
By Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University
It’s Wednesday, which means it’s time to provide my answer. It’s pretty simple and combines some very hawkish and very dovish options.
First, Russia needs to believe that any incursion into Ukraine will trigger trends that it has no wish to see. Beyond punishing economic sanctions, these include the sustained repositioning of U.S. and NATO ally forces closer to the Russian border on the soil of other NATO members. Not at the 5,000-troop level that Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt of the New York Times reported two days ago, not at the 8,500-troop level that CNN and others have reported, but levels 10 times those proposals, which Cooper and Schmitt report could happen “if things deteriorate.”
Other NATO allies would also need to send a similar amount of forces. All these troops should be mobilized sooner rather than later. Plan a whole series of military exercises as well to increase combat readiness. Deploy them in precisely the countries where Russia does not want to see more NATO troops.
The previous few paragraphs might please the hawks. My second suggestion, however, would be that the United States and NATO should continue to negotiate with Russia as well. Thomas Graham and Rajan Menon’s proposals for bilateral talks, articulated in Politico this month, look like a solid framework. Some of their proposals — such as “a declared moratorium on the accession of Ukraine, or any other former Soviet state, for a defined period of, say, 20 or 25 years” — would entice Russia and represent a partial concession to Moscow’s stated demands.
In other words, I would prefer to see relatively hawkish steps taken to produce a relatively dovish agreement. Why?
U.S. policy needs to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin of three things. First, continued military brinkmanship and intervention in Eastern Europe will not pay off. One can understand why Putin thinks this gambit will work — it has in the past. NATO’s responses since 2014 have failed to persuade him to deviate from this course of action. Escalation is necessary as a signal.
Second, Putin needs to be dissuaded from his belief that the Biden administration wants to disengage from Europe. As Adam Tooze noted this month, “The Biden administration has clearly signaled that its priority is China and that it is willing to pay a political price for retrenching its strategic position (Afghanistan), perhaps that opens the door in Ukraine [for Russia].” Putin needs to be convinced that this door was never open and that the United States will not ignore Russia or its interests in Europe.
Third, Russia needs to believe in a tolerable status quo in the future, one that does not require constant brandishing of military threats. Is that possible with NATO continuing as it is and Ukraine continuing to be independent? This is a hard sell. Putin has already mobilized a lot of forces. Despite this attempt at military coercion, Putin has succeeded in creating his worst strategic outcome: unifying NATO.
To make a reduction of tensions possible, Russia must be offered a reformed European security architecture that includes a Russian seat at the table in multiple venues, as Graham and Menon outline in their story. None of these reforms would infringe on current NATO members, though it would de facto halt further expansion eastward. It might also help ease transatlantic tensions over how to confront Russia.
That is what I would do if I were Biden. It would not necessarily be popular, but I believe it is a strategy that would lead to a workable bargain. Which is certainly more appealing than the alternative.
This piece was re-published from The Washington Post.