A New Threat: Russian Nuclear Weapons in Space

By Ariel Fanger, alumna of The Fletcher School

On February 14, 2024, Representative Mike Turner, Chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee, issued a vague statement on the social media platform X revealing that the Committee had shared information about a “serious national security threat” with all members of Congress. Soon after that, a series of news sources disclosed more specific details about Turner’s statement and the security concerns he was referring to: U.S. intelligence findings about Russia’s pursuit of space-based nuclear weapons to target U.S. satellite constellations. 

Satellite-targeted nuclear weapons could produce incredibly detrimental effects on both civilian and military communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, and imagery capabilities in low-earth orbit (LEO). From the military perspective, “Obliterating these kinds of space systems could degrade the effectiveness of Ukrainian defense forces that heavily rely on commercial satellite communications and imagery. It would also reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. military and that of its allies, which are similarly dependent on these systems,” said Aaron Bateman of Foreign Affairs. Tara Copp of the Associated Press added, “Your home’s electrical and water systems could fail. Aviation, rail, and car traffic could come to a halt. Your cellphone could stop working.” 

However, after the initial flurry of reporting and a series of briefings to NATO and Asian allies, the Biden administration assured that “the weapon is not yet operational and does not pose an imminent danger” and conceded that while the matter is serious, there are effective ways to contain the threat. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence agencies remain divided about the extent and nature of these threats.

As we consider these potential developments, it is imperative to address several key questions to comprehend and mitigate associated risks for international security: What drives Russia’s pursuit of such technology? What are the implications for international law? And how might the United States and its allies navigate and counter this emerging threat?

It is essential to underscore the fact that the detonation of nuclear warheads in space is not a recent development. In the 1960s, both Russia and the United States experimented using the capability in space. While the Soviet Union’s Project K produced detrimental effects on the ground including radioactive debris over Canada, the U.S. Starfish Prime test disabled several satellites and electrical grids. The United States and the Soviet Union signed a nuclear test ban treaty a year later, in 1963, which prohibited further testing of nuclear weapons in space.

When asked why Russia might develop nuclear weapons for use in space now, Peter Hays, a Fletcher alumnus who supports the Space Staff at the Pentagon noted, “Space and nuclear weapons are the glory days for the Russians; this pursuit combines the two.” This capability also helps the Kremlin augment its deterrence as it struggles to achieve a decisive victory nearly two years after its invasion of Ukraine.

Pavel Luzin, a visiting scholar at the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia program, suggested that Russia could use these weapons for blackmail and negotiation purposes. Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly discussed this issue over the past few months, reinforcing its strategic significance. Notably, he believes if the United States wants to engage in negotiations with Russia on strategic stability, they should incorporate these discussions with dialogue on the Ukraine conflict. That intertwines rather than decouples these two issues, potentially forcing the United States and its allies into a tough negotiating position.

Luzin provided further context for Russia’s development of space-based nuclear weapons, noting that the Russian military has openly considered developing this capability for many years given their perception that the United States simultaneously employs commercial satellites for military purposes. Luzin said that the U.S. Department of Defense has publicly stated that dual-use commercial technologies, particularly satellites, play a prominent role in the national security realm, proving this point. Indeed, Russia’s potential launch of a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) would be an efficient and effective way to eliminate these large, dual-use satellite constellations.

Luzin also suggested that Russia could use nuclear reactors to power electronic warfare capabilities on space vehicles to destroy satellites. In fact, in 2010, Russia created a research and development program to develop nuclear-powered systems for interplanetary missions and orbital satellites, which would also likely possess electronic warfare capabilities. While the initiative is set to conclude in July 2024, Putin has committed to retaining program personnel and increasing financial backing. While Putin denies that Russia would use nuclear weapons in space, he does not rule out that Russia would orbit a nuclear-powered satellite, making that a real possibility.

Senjuti Mallick, a Fletcher alumna and an expert in space law and policy currently working at COMSPOC, emphasized that any country introducing nuclear weapons into space would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST). Article IV of the OST explicitly forbids placing nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass destruction in Earth’s orbit, on celestial bodies, or in outer space in general. Such actions would not only breach the treaty’s core principle of peaceful space use but also risk sparking a space arms race with grave repercussions for humanity. Apart from the legal ramifications of Russia’s actions, Mallick underscored their wider impact on peace and security, noting that “Space has always been perceived as a realm for peaceful exploration and shared scientific advancement, not conflict and weaponry; we must preserve that.”

Regarding a potential U.S. or multilateral response, Hays said that the U.S. Department of State views the Outer Space Treaty as sufficient but recognizes that a different mechanism could be more effective. However, the U.S. government and the international community have little appetite to engage in these efforts. Realistically, the State Department is concerned that if negotiations produce a new treaty, the U.S. Senate might not ratify it. There’s also a widespread international concern that re-opening this matter might create an accord that’s less robust than the Outer Space Treaty. Hays floated the possibility of commercially led enhanced norms of space behavior and best practices and noted that states might subsequently adopt more formal mechanisms as a result.

Relatedly, Mallick noted, “This development underscores the critical importance of space diplomacy, international cooperation, and collaboration in ensuring space sustainability. As we confront emerging challenges, enhancing space domain awareness is crucial to monitor activities and identify potential threats effectively. Promoting transparency and engaging in confidence-building measures are key to proactively addressing and averting conflicts in outer space.”